Dictionary of Arguments

Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute

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The author or concept searched is found in the following 5 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Frege, G. Verificationism Vs Frege, G. Field II 104
Verifikationstheorie/VsFrege/VsRussell/VsTractatus/VsRamsey/Bedeutung/Field: hier ist der Hauptbegriff nicht Wahrheitsbedingungen (WB) sondern Verifikations-Bedingungen (VB). (Vielleicht über Reize). Diese werden ohne daß-Sätze gegeben. WB/Rege/Russell/Field: einige Vertreter dieser Linie werden sagen, was beim Verifikationismus ausgelassen ist, sind nicht die WB, sondern propositionaler Inhalt.
Proposition/Verifikationismus/Field: kann der Verifikationist dann einfach als Klasse von VB bezeichnen. Für eine Äußerung drückt die entsprechende Proposition dann die Menge der VB aus, die sie hat. So mußten Propositionen im verifikationistischen Sinn nicht mit daß-Sätzen beschrieben werden.
Proposition/Inflationismus/Frege/Russell/Field: würde sagen, daß das keine richtigen Propositionen sind, weil diese WB einschließen müssen. InflationismusVsVerifikationismus.

Field I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Field II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Field III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Field IV
Hartry Field
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994
Leibniz, G.W. Millikan Vs Leibniz, G.W. I 261
VsLeibniz/VsLeibniz' law/principle/identity/indistinguishability/the indistinguishable/Millikan: the classic objection VsLeibniz is to point out the possibility that the universe might be perfectly symmetrical, in which case there would be a perfectly identical ((S) indistinguishable) individual at another place. ((S) That is, there would be something indistinguishable from x, which would still not be identical to x, against Leibniz principle). Variants: Ex a time-repetitive universe etc. Ex two identical drops of water, two identical billiard balls at various locations.
Property/Leibniz: thesis: a reference to space and time leads to a property that is not purely qualitative.
Millikan: if one disregards such "impure" properties ((S) does not make a reference to space and time), the two billiard balls have the same properties!
VsLeibniz' principle/law/R. M. Adams/Millikan: thesis: the principle that is used when constructing such symmetrical worlds, is the principle that an individual can not be distinguished (separated) from themselves, therefore, the two halves of the world can not be one and the same half.
Leibniz' law/VSVS/Hacking/Millikan: (recent defense of Hacking): The objections do not respond to the fact that there could be a curved space instead of a duplication.
Curved space/Hacking/Millikan: here emerges one and the same thing again, there is no duplication as in Euclidean geometry.
MillikanVsHacking: but that would not answer the question.
I 262
But there are still two interesting options: Leibniz' law/principle/identity/ indistinguishability/Millikan:
1. symmetrical world: it could be argued that there is simply no fact here, which determines whether space is curved or doubled. ((s)> Nonfactualism).
Pointe: this would imply that Leibniz's principle is neither metaphysical nor logically necessary, and that its validity is only a matter of convention.
2. Symmetrical world: one could say that the example does not offer a general solution, but rather the assumption of a certain given symmetrical world: here, there would very much be a fact, whether the space is curved or not. Because a certain given space can not be both!
Pointe: then the Leibniz principle is neither metaphysical nor logically necessary.
Pointe: but in this case this is then no matter of convention, but a real fact!
MillikanVsAdams/MillikanVsArmstrong/Millikan: neither Adams nor Armstrong consider that.
Curved space/Millikan: what is identical is then necessarily identical ((S) because it is only mirrored). Here the counterfactual conditional would apply: if one half would have been different, then the other one, too. Here space generally seems to be double.
Duplication/Millikan: when the space is mirrored (in Euclidean geometry) the identity is random, not necessary. Here one half could change without the other half changing. ((S) No counterfactual conditional).
Identity: is given when the objects are not indistinguishable because a law in situ applies, but a law of nature, a naturally necessary agreement.
I 263
Then identity of causality applies in the second option. (X) (y) {[NN (F) ⇔ Fx Fy] ⇔ x = y}
Natural necessity/notation: naturally necessary under naturally possible circumstances.
MillikanVsVerifikationismus: if my theory is correct, it must be wrong.
Truth/world/relationship/Millikan: thesis: ultimately, meaningfulness and truth lie in relations between thought and the world.
I 264
Therefore, they can not be in the head, we can not internalize them.
I 268
Properties/Millikan: thesis: Properties (of one or more parts) that fall into the same area, are properties that are opposites of each other. Certainly, an area can contain another area. Ex "red" includes "scarlet" instead of excluding it and Ex "being two centimeters plus minus 1 millimeter" includes "being 2.05 centimeters plus minus 1 millimeter" rather than excluding this property.
The assumption that two properties may be the same only if the complete opposite regions from which they come coincide, implies that the identity of a property or property area is linked to the identity of a wider range from which it comes, and therefore is bound to the identity of their opposites. Now we compare Leibniz' view with that of Aristotle:
Identity/Leibniz/Millikan: all single properties are intrinsically comparable. However, perhaps not comparable in nature, because God has just created the best of all possible worlds - but they would be metaphysically comparable.
complex properties/Leibniz/Millikan: that would be properties that are not comparable. They also include absences or negations of properties. They have the general form "A and not B".
((S) Comparison/comparability/comparable/Millikan/(S): composite properties are not comparable Ex "A and not B".)
Of course, it is incompatible with the property "A and B".
Pointe: thus the metaphysical incompatibility rests on the logical incompatibility. That is, on the contradiction.
I 269
Necessity/Leibniz/Millikan: then God has first created logical necessity and later natural necessity. ("In the beginning…"). opposite properties/opposite/property/Leibniz/Millikan: according to Leibniz opposite properties are of two kinds:
1. to attribute both contradictory properties to one thing then would be to contradict oneself ((S) logically) or
2. the contradiction between the properties would lie in their own nature. But that would not lie in their respective nature individually but would be established by God, which prevented the properties from ever coming together.
Identity/Properties/Aristotle/Millikan: opposite properties: for Aristotle, they serve to explain that nothing can be created from nothing. Def opposite property/Aristotle: are those which defy each others foundation, make each other impossible. The prevention of another property is this property!
Alteration/transformation/change/Aristotle/Millikan: when a change occurs, substances acquire new properties, which are the opposites of the previous properties.
Opposite/Aristotle is the potentiality (possibility) of the other property. Then, these opposites are bound at the most fundamental level (in nature) to each other.
Millikan pro Aristotle: he was right about the latter. In Aristotle there is no "beginning" as in Leibniz.
Properties/Opposite/Leibniz/Millikan pro Leibniz: was right about the assertion that two opposite properties that apply to the same substance is a contradiction. But this is about an indefinite negation, not the assertion of a specific absence. Or: the absence is the existence of an inconsistency.
Ex Zero/0/modern science/mathematics: is not the assertion of nothing: Ex zero acceleration, zero temperature, empty space, etc. Zero represents a quantity.
Non-contradiction/law of non-contradiction/Millikan: then, is a template of an abstract world structure or something that is sufficient for such a template.
Epistemology/epistemic/Leibniz/Aristotle/Millikan: the dispute between Leibniz and Aristotle appears again at the level of epistemology:
I 270
Ex the assertion "x is red" is equivalent to the statement "x looks red for a standard observer under standard conditions". Problem: from "x is red" follows that "x does not look red for ... under ...".
ontologically/ontology: equally: not-being-red would be an emptiness, an absence of red - rather than an opposite of red.
But it is about "x is non-red" being equivalent to "x does not look red under standard conditions" is either empty or incorrect.

Millikan I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Millikan II
Ruth Millikan
"Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005
Verificationism Danto Vs Verificationism DantoVsVerifikationismus: heute von sehr wenigen Philosophen vertreten. Man fand nie einen Weg, ihn so zu formulieren, dass er nicht zugleich mit der verhassten Metaphysik einen Großteil der Wissenschaft kippte.
Das lag an gewissen undichten Stellen der Logik, über die einiges an metaphysischer Terminologie einfließt. Sie können nicht gestopft werden, ohne wichtige Merkmale der Logik zu opfern. I 76

Danto I
A. C. Danto
Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989
German Edition:
Wege zur Welt München 1999

Danto III
Arthur C. Danto
Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965
German Edition:
Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998

Danto VII
A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005
Verificationism McDowell Vs Verificationism II 63
Def weak verificationism/McDowell: language proficiency can not be represented regardless of susceptibility to evidence. Def strong verificationism/McDowell: language proficiency can only be represented as consisting in susceptibility to evidence.
II 64
McDowell: perhaps we have seen how the approach of the conditions of truth for the explanation of meaning can fulfill the weak V., but certainly not the strong V. VsStrong V: a concept of truth, which is independent of evidence, can not even be learned.
Strong here: should only accept significance as stimulus (McDowellVsVerifikationismus).

McDowell I
John McDowell
Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996
German Edition:
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001

McDowell II
John McDowell
"Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism"
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell
Verificationism Verschiedene Vs Verificationism Kanitscheider II 85
Explanation / KanitscheiderVsVerficationism: often requires the introduction of empirically inaccessible entities or spacetime regions. (Eg inflation of the universe).
Danto I 81
Verifikationisnmus/C.I. LewisVsVerifikationismus: ein Satz, der nicht empirisch geprüft werden kann, ist sinnvoll, wenn er sich in einer Reihe überprüfbarer Sätze »übersetzen« läßt. Eine solche Übersetzung wäre allerdings niemals vollständig, da solche Sätze eine unbegrenzte Anzahl jener empirisch privaten Sätze nach sich ziehen würde.

Kanitsch I
B. Kanitscheider
Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991

Kanitsch II
B. Kanitscheider
Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996

Danto I
A. C. Danto
Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989
German Edition:
Wege zur Welt München 1999

Danto VII
A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005