Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Designation Quine II 61
Naming: is a name or singular term. Designate: a predicate designates. Naming and designating are referring. They do not express meaning.
VIII 27
Syncategorematic expressions such as "on" do not designate anything. Likewise, we can assume that words such as "unicorn" do not designate anything; neither something abstract nor something concrete. The same applies to "-ness" or punctuation marks. The mere ability to appear in a sentence does not make a string a name.
Nominalism: interprets all words as syncategorematic!
Ad XI 173 Note 18:
Sentences/QuineVsFrege/Lauener: sentences do not designate! Therefore no names can be formed by them (by quotation marks).
XI 173
Substitutional Quantification/Ontology/Quine/Lauener: Substitutional Quantification does not enter into an ontological obligation in so far as the names used do not have to name anything. That is, we are not forced to accept values of the variables. >Substitutional Quantification/Quine.
XI 49
QuineVsSubstitutional Quantification: this is precisely what we use to disguise ontology by not getting out of the language.
XI 132
Sense/designate/singular term/Quine/Lauener: it does not need a name to make sense. Example: unicorn. There is a difference between sense,meaning and reference.
XII 73
Distinguishability/real numbers/Quine: N.B.: any two real numbers are always distinguishable, even if not every real number can be named! ((s) Not enough names). Because it is always x < y or y < x but never x < x.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Domains Logic Texts Read III 57
Substitution criterion / Vssubstitution criterion / VsBolzano: leads to absurd results: because it declares certain invalid inferences for valid - e.g. "there are at least two things." It is not a matter of logic, that there are at least two things - one can just as well say "there are two things, so there are 76 things" - solution / Tarski: establish a domain - then "there are at least 2 things" might be falsified and is not a logical truth any more.
Logic Texts
Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988
HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998
Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997
Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983
Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001

Re III
St. Read
Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997
Number Theory Quine IX 81
Elementary Number Theory/Quine: this is the theory that can only be expressed with the terms "zero, successor, sum, power, product, identity" and with the help of connections from propositional logic and quantification using natural numbers. One can omit the first four of these points or the first two and the fifth.
But the more detailed list is convenient, because the classical axiom system fits directly to it.
Quine: our quantifiable variables allow other objects than numbers.
However, we will now tacitly introduce a limitation to "x ε N".
Elementary Number Theory/Quine: less than/equal to: superfluous here. "Ez(x + z = y)" - x ε N > Λ + x = x. - x,y ε N >{x} + y = {x+y}.
IX 239
Relative Strength/Proof Theory/Theory/Provability/Quine: Goedel, incompleteness theorem (1931). Since number theory can be developed in set theory, this means that the class of all theorems IX 239
(in reality, all the Goedel numbers of theorems) of an existing set theory can be defined in that same set theory, and different things can be proved about it in it.
>Set Theory/Quine.
Incompleteness Theorem: as a consequence, however, Goedel showed that set theory (if it is free of contradiction) cannot prove one thing through the class of its own theorems, namely that it is consistent, i.e., for example, that "0 = 1" does not lie within it.
If the consistency of one set theory can be proved in another, then the latter is the stronger (unless both are contradictory). Zermelo's system is stronger than type theory.
II 178
Elementary number theory is the modest part of mathematics that deals with the addition and multiplication of integers. It does not matter if some true statements will remain unprovable. This is the core of Goedel's theorem. He has shown how one can form a sentence with any given proof procedure purely in the poor notation of elementary number theory, which can be proved then and only then if it is wrong. But wait! The sentence cannot be proved and still be wrong. So it is true, but not provable.
Quine: we used to believe that mathematical truth consists in provability. Now we see that this view is untenable to mathematics as a whole.
II 179
Goedel's incompleteness theorem (the techniques applied there) has proved useful in other fields: Recursive number theory, or recursion theory for short. Or hierarchy theory. >Goedel/Quine.
III 311
Elementary Number Theory/Quine: does not even have a complete proof procedure. Proof: reductio ad absurdum: suppose we had it with which to prove every true sentence in the spelling of the elementary number theory,
III 312
then there would also be a complete refutation procedure: to refute a sentence one would prove its negation. But then we could combine the proof and refutation procedure of page III 247 to a decision procedure.
V 165
Substitutional Quantification/Referential Quantification/Numbers/Quine: Dilemma: the substitutional quantification does not help elementary number theory to any ontological thrift, for either the numbers run out or there are infinitely many number signs. If the explanatory speech of an infinite number sign itself is to be understood again in the sense of insertion, we face a problem at least as serious as that of numbers - if it is to be understood in the sense of referential quantification, then one could also be satisfied from the outset uncritically with object quantification via numbers. >Quantification/Quine.
V 166
Truth conditions: if one now assumes substitutional quantification, one can actually explain the truth conditions for them by numbers by speaking only of number signs and their insertion. Problem: if numerals are to serve their purpose, they must be as abstract as numbers.
Expressions, of which there should be an infinite number, could be identified by their Goedel numbers. No other approach leads to a noticeable reduction in abstraction.
Substitutional quantification: forces to renounce the law that every number has a successor. A number would be the last, but the substitutional quantification theorist would not know which one. It would depend on actual inscriptions in the present and future. (Quine/Goodman 1947).
This would be similar to Esenin Volpin's theory of producible numbers: one would have an unknown finite bound.
V 191
QuineVsSubstitutional Quantification: the expressions to be used are abstract entities as are the numbers themselves.
V 192
NominalismVsVs: one could reduce the ontology of real numbers or set theory to that of elementary number theory by establishing truth conditions for substitutional quantification on the basis of Goedel numbers. >Goedel Numbers/Quine.
QuineVs: this is not nominalistic, but Pythagorean. It is not about the high estimation of the concrete and disgust for the abstract, but about the acceptance of natural numbers and the rejection of most transcendent numbers. As Kronecker says: "The natural numbers were created by God, the others are human work".
QuineVs: but even that is not possible, we saw above that the subsitutional quantification over classes is basically not compatible with the object quantification over objects.
V 193
VsVs: one could also understand the quantification of objects in this way. QuineVs: that wasn't possible because there aren't enough names. You could teach space-time coordination, but that doesn't explain language learning.
X 79
Validity/Sentence/Quantity/Schema/Quine: if quantities and sentences fall apart in this way, there should be a difference between these two definitions of validity about schema (with sentences) and models (with sentences). But it follows from the Löwenheim theorem that the two definitions of validity (using sentences or sets) do not fall apart as long as the object language is not too weak in expression. Condition: the object language must be able to express (contain) the elementary number theory.
Object Language: In such a language, a scheme that remains true in all insertions of propositions is also fulfilled by all models and vice versa.
>Object Language/Quine
The requirement of elementary number theory is rather weak.
Def Elementary Number Theory/Quine: speaks about positive integers by means of addition, multiplication, identity, truth functions and quantification.
Standard Grammar/Quine: the standard grammar would express the functors of addition, multiplication, like identity, by suitable predicates.
X 83
Elementary Number Theory/Quine: is similar to the theory of finite n-tuples and effectively equivalent to a certain part of set theory, but only to the theory of finite sets.
XI 94
Translation Indeterminacy/Quine/Harman/Lauener: ("Words and Objections"): e.g. translation of number theory into the language of set theory by Zermelo or von Neumann: both versions translate true or false sentences of number theory into true or false sentences of set theory. Only the truth values of sentences like e.g. "The number two has exactly one element",
which had no sense before translation, differ from each other in both systems. (XI 179: it is true in von Neumann's and false in Zermelo's system, in number theory it is meaningless).
XI 94
Since they both serve all purposes of number theory in the same way, it is not possible to mark one of them as a correct translation.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Ontological Commitment Quine Lauener XI 130
Ontological Commitment/Quine/Lauener: only exists when an object is common to all differently re-interpreted domains - (while retaining the interpretation of the predicates) - the theory only presupposes objects if it would be wrong if the objects did not exist - E.g. "objects of any kind whatsoever": here one is commited to dogs if each of the domains contains one or the other dog.
XI 48
Substitutional Quantification/sQ/Ontology/Quine/Lauener: substitutional quantification does not enter into an ontological obligation in so far as the names used do not have to name anything. That is, we are not forced to accept values of the variables.
XI 49
QuineVsSubstitutional Quantification: precisely with this we disguise ontology by not getting out of the language. >Substitutional Quantification/Quine.
XI 133
Ontology/Modality/LauenerVsQuine: it is noticeable that in its formulations occur intensional expressions such as "must occur among the values of the variables", "must be true of" etc. Or psychological connotations such as "we look at". ChurchVsQuine: the expression "ontological commitment" is intentional. (>Intensions).
XI 158
Ontology/ontological obligation/Quine/Lauener: Lauener: unsolved problem: the relationship between ontological obligation and ontology. For example, two modern chemical theories, one implies the existence of molecules with a certain structure, the other denies them. Question: do they have the same ontology despite different commitments?
Quine/Lauener: would probably say yes and say that one of the two theories must be wrong.
((s) Then they have rather the same obligation than the same ontology).
LauenerVsQuine: my attempts to solve these problems make me believe that not only the quantified variables (with the objects) but also the predicates play a role.
Quine VII (a) 12
Ontology: the bound variable is the only way to impose ontological obligations on us. Example: we can already say that it is something (namely the value of the bound variables) that red houses and sunsets have in common.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987


Q XI
H. Lauener
Willard Van Orman Quine München 1982
Referential Quantification Kripke III 378
Referential quantification: if sentences are substitutes, it is again about referential quantification: are (s) sentences treated as objects? Kripke: in any case there is a dispute: are the variables going over sentences, propositions or truth values?
III 377
Referential quantification/interpretation/KripkeVsSubstitutionalism: the point is that an uninterpreted formal system is exactly what it is: uninterpreted! Then it is simply impossible to ask for the "right interpretation"!
III 378
1. Kripke: surely there are certain formal systems that allow referential interpretation but not substitutional interpretation. Example Quine: If (Ex)φ(x) is provable but ~φ(t) (negation!) is provable for any expression t that can be used for x, resulting in a meaningful sentence φ(t), it is obviously impossible to give the system a substitutional interpretation, but if the formation rules are standard, and it is formally consistent, a referential interpretation is possible.
((s) Although the referential interpretation makes "ontologically stronger assumptions"!).
If ~φ(t) is provable for each expression in a class C, while ((s) simultaneously) (Ex)φ(x) is provable, it is impossible to let all theorems be true and interpret the quantifier as replaceable with the substitution class C.
These conditions are sufficient, but demonstrably not necessary, so that a first-stage theory does not receive a substitutional interpretation that makes all theorems true.
2. What about the common problem? (Referential interpretation excluded but substitutional interpretation allowed):
The autonymous interpretation (see section 3 above, where each term denotes itself) could suggest a negative answer. And this will be one reason why many mathematical logicians did not want to treat substitutional quantification as an independent model-theoretical topic.
KripkeVs: however, there may be cases where substitutional quantification is more appropriate than referential quantification.
For example, if the substitution class insists on sentences of L0, a referential interpretation with sentences as substitutes leads to a philosophical dispute: do the variables go over propositions, over sentences or over truth values? Are the entities in the area denoted by the sentences?
Connectives/Kripke: connectives do not play a threefold role now: as
a) sentence connectives, b) function symbols and c) predicates. However, in Frege's system they play such a threefold role!

Kripke I
S.A. Kripke
Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972
German Edition:
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981

Kripke II
Saul A. Kripke
"Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

Kripke III
Saul A. Kripke
Is there a problem with substitutional quantification?
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976

Kripke IV
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
In
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984

Substitutional Quantification Quine V 140
Substitutional quantification/Quine: is open for other grammatical categories than just singular term but has other truth function. - Referential quantification/Referential Quantification: here, the objects do not even need to be specifiable by name. ---
V 141
Language learning: first substitution quantification: from relative pronouns. - Later: referential quantification: because of categorical sentences. - Substitution quantification: would be absurd: that every inserted name that verifies Fx also verifies Gx - absurd: that each apple or rabbit would have to have a name or a singular description. - Most objects do not have names. ---
V 140
Substitutional Quantification/Referential Quantification/Truth Function/Quine: referential universal quantification: can be falsified by one single object, even though this is not specifiable by a name. - The same substitutional universal quantification: in contrast, remains true. - Existential quantification: referential: may be true due to a non-assignable value. - The same in substitutional sense: does not apply for lack of an assignable example. ---
V 146f
Substitutional Quantification/Quine: Problem: Blind spot: substitutional universal quantification: E.g. none of the substitution cases should be rejected, but some require abstention. - Existential quantification: E.g. none of the cases is to be approved, but some abstention is in order.- then neither agree nor abstain. (Equivalent to the alternation). ---
Ad V 170
Substitutional Quantification/(s): related to the quantification over apparent classes in Quine’s meta language? ---
V 175
Numbers/Classes/Quantification/Ontology/Substitutional quantification/Quine: first substitutional quantification through numbers and classes. - Problem: Numbers and classes can then not be eliminated. - Can also be used as an object quantification (referential quantification) if one allows every number to have a successor. - ((s) with substitution quantification each would have to have a name. Class quantifier becomes object quantifier if one allows the exchange of the quantifiers (AQU/AQU/ - EQu/EQu) - so the law of the partial classes of one was introduced.
---
X 124
Substitutional quantification/Quine: requires name for the values ​​of the variables. Referential quantification/(s) speaks of objects at most. - Definition truth/Substitutional Quantification/Barcan/Quine: applying-Quantification - is true iff at least one of its cases, which is obtained by omitting the quantifier and inserting a name for the variable, is true. - Problem: almost never enough names for the objects in a not overly limited world. - E.g. No Goedel numbers for irrational numbers. - Then substitutional quantification can be wrong, because there is no name for the object, but the referential quantification can be true at the same time - i.e. both are not extensionally equal.
---
X 124
Names/logic/substitutional quantification/Quine: Problem: never enough names for all objects in the world: e.g. if a set is not determined by an open sentence, it also has no name. - Otherwise E.g. Name a, Determination: x ε a - E.g. irrational numbers cannot be attributed to integers. - (s) > substitution class. ---
XII 79f
Substitutional Quantification/Quine: Here the variables are placeholders for words of any syntactic category (except names) - Important argument: then there is no way to distinguish names from the rest of the vocabulary and real referential variables. ((s) Does that mean that one cannot distinguish fragments like object and greater than, and that structures like "there is a greater than" would be possible?). ---
XII 80
Substitutional Quantification/Quine: Problem: Assuming an infinite range of named objects. - Then it is possible to show for each substitution result of a name the truth of a formula and simultaneously to refute the universal quantification of the formula. - (everyone/all). - Then we have shown that the range has at least one unnamed object. - ((s) (> not enough names). - Therefore QuineVsSubstitutional Quantification. E.g. assuming the range contained the real name - Then not all could be named, but the unnamed cannot be separated. - The theory can always be strengthened to name a certain number, but not all - referential quantification: attributes nameless objects to itself. - Trick: (see above) every substitution result with a name is true, but makes universal quantification false. ((s) Thus an infinite number of objects secured). - A theory of real names must be based on referential quantification.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Substitutional Quantification Hintikka II 171
Substitutional Quantification/sQ/HintikkaVsSQ/HintikkaVsSubstitutional Quantification/Hintikka: substitutional quantification is a pseudo-paradise, at most of formal interest, there has never been a satisfactory explanation for it. Description/knowledge/Russell: knowledge by description: e.g. we do not know Bismarck. We wish that the object itself is a constituent of our proposition, but this does not work here. We know, however, that there is an object called Bismarck (existence).
Russell: we also know about this Bismarck that he is a clever diplomat.
Solution/Russell: then we can describe the proposition we want to claim, namely, "B was a clever diplomat", where B is the object that is Bismarck (> logical form).
Logical Form/Hintikka:
(15) (Eb) (b = Bismarck; we judge that b was a clever diplomat)
"B": this variable has then actual objects (objects from the actual world) as values.
Russell/Hintikka: that shows that he has not chosen the solution (i).
II 172
Description/knowledge/Russell/Hintikka: knowledge by description: here we know propositions about the "so-and-so" without knowing who or what so-and-so is.

Hintikka I
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
Investigating Wittgenstein
German Edition:
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Hintikka II
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989


The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
substit. Quantific. Hintikka Vs substit. Quantific. II 171
Substitutional Quantification/SQ/HintikkaVsSQ/HintikkaVsSubstitutional Quantification/Hintikka: is a mock paradise, at maximum of formal interest, there has never been a satisfactory explanation for them. Ad (i)/Russell/Hintikka: implied the equivalence of (120) and (11) in the period 1905-14). Description/Knowledge/Russell. Knowledge by description: E.g. we do not know Bismarck. We do wish that the object itself were a constituent of our proposition, but that is not possible. But we know that there is an object called Bismarck (existence). Russell: We also know about this Bismarck that he is a skillful diplomat. ((s) attribution of properties, predication, to individuation, property that goes beyond the mere naming). Solution/Russell: then we can describe the proposition that we want to assert, namely: "B was a skillful diplomat" with B being the object that Bismarck is. (logical form). Logical Form/Hintikka:
(15) (Eb)(b = Bismarck & we judge that b was a skillful diplomat) "b": this variable then has current objects (objects from the real world) as values. Russell/Hintikka: this shows that he has not chosen the solution (i). However, Russell says on another occasion, admittedly:
II 172
Description/Knowledge/Russell/Hintikka: knowledge by description: Here we know propositions about the "so-and-so" without knowing who or what the so-and-so is. Ad (ii): E.g. description: instead of Bismarck: "the first chancellor of the German Reich". HintikkaVs (ii) that sweeps the problem under the carpet. Problem: The use of descriptions must ultimately lead to the descriptions being re-translated into names, and that is not possible here! Furthermore: Reduction/Description/Name/Hintikka: not all individuals of which we speak with descriptions have identities that are known to everyone. The interpretation of Russell does precisely not exclude that many different entities act as legitimate values ​​of the variables that can, in principle, also be denoted with names.
Ad (iii) Russell/Hintikka: that was Russell’s implicit solution: he redefined the domain of the individual variables so that they are limited to individuals who we know by acquaintance. Existential Generalization/EG/Russell/Hintikka: applies only to names of individuals with whom we are familiar. Hidden Description/Russell/Hintikka: existential generalization fails for individuals whose names must be regarded as hidden descriptions ((s) because we only know them by description).

Hintikka I
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
Investigating Wittgenstein
German Edition:
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Hintikka II
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989
substit. Quantific. Quine Vs substit. Quantific. V 158
VsSubstitutional Quantification/SQ/Quine: the SQ has been deemed unusable for the classic ML for a false reason: because of uncountability. The SQ does not accept nameless classes as values ​​of variables. ((s) E.g. irrational numbers, real numbers, etc. do not have names, i.e. they cannot be Gödel numbered). I.e. SQ allows only a countable number of classes.
Problem: Even the class of natural numbers has uncountably many sub-classes.
And at some point we need numbers!
KripkeVs: in reality there is no clear contradiction between SQ and hyper-countability! No function f lists all classes of natural numbers. Cantor shows this based on the class {n:~ (n e f(n))} which is not covered by the enumeration f.
refQ: demands it in contrast to a function f enumerating all classes of natural numbers? It seems so at first glance: it seems you could indicate f by numbering all abstract terms for classes lexicographically.
Vs: but the function that numbers the expressions is not quite the desired f. It is another function g. Its values ​​are abstract terms, while the f, which would contradict the Cantor theorem, would have classes as values...
V 159
Insertion character: does ultimately not mean that the classes are abstract terms! ((s) I.e. does not make the assumption of classes necessary). The cases of insertion are not names of abstract terms, but the abstract terms themselves! I.e. the alleged or simulated class names.
Function f: that would contradict Cantor's theorem is rather the function with the property that f(n) is the class which is denoted by the n-th abstract term g(n).
Problem: we cannot specify this function in the notation of the system. Otherwise we end up with Grelling's antinomy or that of Richard.
That's just the feared conflict with Cantor's theorem.
This can be refute more easily: by the finding that there is a class that is not denoted by any abstract term: namely the class
(1) {x.x is an abstract term and is not a member of the class it denotes}.
That leaves numbers and uncountability aside and relates directly to expressions and classes of expressions. (1) is obviously an abstract expression itself. The antinomy is trivial, because it clearly relies on the name relation. ((s) x is "a member of the class of abstract expressions and not a member of this class").

V 191
Substitutional Quantification/SQ/Nominalism/Quine: the nominalist might reply: alright, let us admit that the SQ does not clean the air ontologically, but still we win something with it: E.g. SQ about numbers is explained based on expressions and their insertion instead of abstract objects and reference. QuineVsSubstitutional Quantification: the expressions to be inserted are just as abstract entities as the numbers themselves.
V 192
NominalismVsVs: the ontology of real numbers or set theory could be reduced to that of elementary number theory by establishing truth conditions for the sQ based on Gödel numbers. QuineVs: this is not nominalistic, but Pythagorean. This is not about the extrapolation of the concrete and abhorrence of the abstract, but about the acceptance of natural numbers and the refutal of the most transcendent nnumbers. As Kronecker says: "The natural numbers were created by God, the others are the work of man."
QuineVs: but even that does not work, we have seen above that the SQ about classes is, as a matter of principle, incompatible with the object quantification over objects.
V 193
VsVs: the quantification over objects could be seen like that as well. QuineVs: that was not possible because there are not enough names. Zar could be taught RZ coordination, but that does not explain language learning.
Ontology: but now that we are doing ontology, could the coordinates help us?
QuineVs: the motivation is, however, to re-interpret the SQ about objects to eliminate the obstacle of SQ about classes. And why do we want to have classes? The reason was quasi nominalistic, in the sense of relative empiricism.
Problem: if the relative empiricism SQ talks about classes, it also speaks for refQ about objects. This is because both views are closest to the genetic origins.
Coordinates: this trick will be a poor basis for SQ about objects, just like (see above) SQ about numbers.
Substitutional/Referential Quantification/Charles Parsons/Quine: Parsons has proposed a compromise between the two:
according to this, for the truth of an existential quantification it is no longer necessary to have a true insertion, there only needs to be an insertion that contains free object variables and is fulfilled by any values of the same. Universal quantification: Does accordingly no longer require only the truth of all insertions that do not contain free variables.
V 194
It further requires that all insertions that contain free object variables are fulfilled by all values. This restores the law of the single sub-classes and the interchangeability of quantifiers.
Problem: this still suffers from impredicative abstract terms.
Pro: But it has the nominalistic aura that the refQ completely lacks, and will satisfy the needs of set theory.

XI 48
SQ/Ontology/Quine/Lauener: the SQ does not make any ontological commitment in so far as the inserted names do not need to designate anything. I.e. we are not forced to assume values ​​of the variables.
XI 49
QuineVsSubstitutional Quantification: we precisely obscure the ontology by that fact that we cannot get out of the linguistic.
XI 51
SQ/Abstract Entities/Quine/Lauener: precisely because the exchange of quantifiers is prohibited if one of the quantifiers referential, but the other one is substitutional, we end up with refQ and just with that we have to admit the assumption of abstract entities.
XI 130
Existence/Ontology/Quine/Lauener: with the saying "to be means to be the value of a bound variable" no language dependency of existence is presumed. The criterion of canonical notation does not suppose an arbitrary restriction, because differing languages - e.g. Schönfinkel's combinator logic containing no variables - are translatable into them.
Ontological Relativity/Lauener: then has to do with the indeterminacy of translation.

VsSubstitutional Quantification/Quine/Lauener: with it we remain on a purely linguistic level, and thus repeal the ontological dimension.
But for the variables not singular terms are used, but the object designated by the singular term. ((s) referential quantification).
Singular Term/Quine/Lauener: even after eliminating the singular terms the objects remain as the values ​​of variables.

XI 140
QuineVsSubstitutional Quantification: is ontologically disingenuous.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987
substit. Quantific. Boer Vs substit. Quantific. I 11
VsSubstitutional Quantification/Vs sQ/Non-existence/Boer: Problem: Example "Homer worshipped something": here Could the truth inappropriately be dependent on contingent facts about the reference of our
singular term.
For example, German* is a fragment of German that contains "Homer" as the only singular term. Then
"(y)(Homer worshipped y)" is wrong unless he worshipped himself.
Problem: it is assumed that a translation without context-dependent expressions would preserve the truth value.
However, this is no longer the case here.
I 12
Problem: the two sentences in question contain exactly the same words ("...something") in the same grammatical position. I.e. we have to say that the two sentences in German and
German* are correct translations of each other.
VsSubstitutional Quantification/Non-existence/Vs sQ: Problem: it cannot express that although we consider Homer's gods to be non-existent, we still want to say that Homer worshipped something, and that this is a true relation.
VsSubstitutional Quantification/Vs sQ/Concept Dependency/Boer: similar: Example ...y = z and x believes
that y exists, but not that z exists.
This will be true in German but wrong again in German*. (If German* only contains one singular term.
Problem: why should the truth value be contingently dependent on whether we speak German or German*?

Boer I
Steven E. Boer
Thought-Contents: On the Ontology of Belief and the Semantics of Belief Attribution (Philosophical Studies Series) New York 2010

Boer II
Steven E. Boer
Knowing Who Cambridge 1986