Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Pragmatism Rorty VI 105
Pragmatism/Reality/Rorty: pragmatism thinks it is pointless to ask whether neutrinos really are entities or are merely useful heuristic fictions. >Fiction.
VI 111
Difference/Pragmatism: every difference must make a difference in terms of practice.
VI 112
G.K. ChestertonVsPragmatism: "Pragmatism is about human needs, and one of the most important human needs is to be more than a pragmatist."
Vi 186
Language/Sellars: cannot be verified at all on the base of non-linguistic things! Rorty: Therefore, only utility is interesting for pragmatism. There is nothing non-human, to which we are committed!
VI 286f
Preference for small compromises rather than large theoretical syntheses. VI 290
VI 425
Truth/pragmatism/benefits/James/Rorty: contrary to some problematic formulations by James the truth is timeless, so it cannot be mixed up with benefits - (RortyVsJames, W.).

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Social World McGarty Haslam I 239
Social World/stereotypes/McGarty: Our approach (McGarty et al (1993) (1) was informed by an alternative social cognitive approach to stereotyping that was inspired by the social identity approach, and in particular self-categorization theory (Turner et al., 1994)(2). (see also >Social World/James, >Social World/Bruner). McGartyVsBruner, McGartyVsJames. Thesis: social perceivers are not confronted with a too complex world which they must oversimplify but instead seek to add to their stock of knowledge; they seek out subtleties and concealed insights.
Stereotypes/McGartyVsTradition/McGarty: Thesis: stereotypes are not rigid, simplifying, and negative distortions of reality but in fact are impressions of groups that would tend to be as flexible, complex, positive, and accurate as they needed to be, in order to reflect the requirement of the perceivers who formed them to adapt to and interact with the environment they confront.



1. McGarty, C., Haslam, S.A., Turner, J.C. and Oakes, P.J. (1993) ‘Illusory correlation as accentuation of actual intercategory difference: Evidence for the effect with minimal stimulus information’, European Journal of Social Psychology, 23: 391–410.
2. Turner, J.C., Oakes, P.J., Haslam, S.A. and McGarty, C. (1994) ‘Self and collective: Cognition and social context’, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 20: 454–63.



Craig McGarty, „Stereotype Formation. Revisiting Hamilton and Gifford’s illusory correlation studies“, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic studies. London: Sage Publications


Haslam I
S. Alexander Haslam
Joanne R. Smith
Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017

The author or concept searched is found in the following 8 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Donagan, A. Rorty Vs Donagan, A. Horwich I 452
Explanation/Truth/Causality/Donagan/Rorty: Although it could be said that the fact that most of the beliefs of the natives and field linguists are true is an explanation for the fact that they can communicate. RortyVsDonagan: but that is not an explanation that requires a causally effective property.
Explanation/Rorty: this is like an explanation of communication by the fact that, e.g., people populate the same spacetime region.
Problem: we do not know what it would be like for these people if it were not like this, just as we do not know, e.g., what it would be like if most beliefs were wrong.
Causal Explanation/Rorty: the only candidates for causally effective properties are such properties that we can think away! ((s) >it must be possible to abstract from properties). >Causal explanation.
Important argument: therefore "truth" ("true") has no explanatory use.
Truth/DavidsonVsPragmatism/VsJames: but besides the normative use it also has disquotational use.
Truth/RortyVsTradition: it mixes disquotational and normative use and tries to explain both through the use of "true" to designate a non-causal relation of "correspondence". This is a false attempt to have "inside" and "outside" of the language game at the same time.

Rorty I 120
Sensation/Wittgenstein/Donagan/Rorty: Wittgenstein clarified the situation by conceding "that sensations are private, non-dispositional concomitants of the behavior, which is their natural expression", but refusing "to subsume processes under these concomitants, which can be explored regardless of the circumstances that produced them."
I 121
RortyVsDonagan: that is correct, but you have to go one step further: a "private, non-material medium" is obscure.

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
James, W. Peirce Vs James, W. Hacking I 104
PeirceVsJames: Vs popularization of pragmatism. "real" / Peirce: we use this concept only for the delineation of the non-real. The concept of reality includes the concept of community.

Peir I
Ch. S. Peirce
Philosophical Writings 2011

Hacking I
I. Hacking
Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983
German Edition:
Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996
James, W. Rorty Vs James, W. Horwich I 443
Truth/James/Rorty: Thesis: no truth theory (TT) can explain a correspondence relation.
I 444
Correspondence/James: does not exist as as something neutral between perceptual, theoretical, moral or mathematical truths. Correspondence cannot take on an explanatory role. Truth/VsJames: theories are not true, because they work, but vice versa. They work, because they are true.
JamesVsVs: these critics miss the point: Thesis: "true" is a term of respect.
Truth/Justification/RortyVsJames: Unfortunately, James did not confine himself to this negative point, but he concluded from a false premise:
If we have a concept of "justified", we do not need the concept of truth".
"True" needs to mean something like "justifiable".
This is a form of the idealistic error of inferring.
We cannot get any sense out of the concept of truth as correspondence.
Truth must exist in an ideal consistency. >Coherence.
RortyVsJames: the mistake is to assume that "true" requires a definition, and then the fact that they cannot be defined as a relation of beliefs to non-beliefs on the view that it would have to be defined as a relation between beliefs.
Naturalistic Fallacy/PutnamVsJames:
E.g. "it could be true, but not X" is always useful, no matter what is inserted for X. (Moore asserted the same in connection with "good".)
Truth/RortyVsPeirce: it was a mistake to identify it with the "end point of our examination".

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
James, W. Russell Vs James, W. Brendel I 132
Pragmatism/RussellVsPragmatism/RussellVsJames/Brendel: with the usefulness-definition of truth, it may be that "Santa Claus exists" is true, although it does not exist, simply because it is useful. James/Brendel: but does not want to claim that refuted statements are true, but wants to show that there is inextricable interdependence between values and facts.
Truth/James/Brendel: also for James truth is influenced by our perceptions and causal relationships to the environment. >Pragmatism.
---
Rescher I 349
RussellVsJames: grotesquely unfair with respect to the pragmatism: accused him, his pragmatic formula does not comply with the colloquial meaning of "true". E.g. "it is true that other people exist", and "it is useful to think that other people exist" when the two sentences would have the same meaning, then that does not comply with the colloquial meaning of "true".
Russell himself pointed to a solution: better distinction between definition and criterion.

Russell I
B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead
Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986

Russell II
B. Russell
The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969
German Edition:
Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989

Russell IV
B. Russell
The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912
German Edition:
Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967

Russell VI
B. Russell
"The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202
German Edition:
Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus
In
Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993

Russell VII
B. Russell
On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit"
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996

Bre I
E. Brendel
Wahrheit und Wissen Paderborn 1999

Resch I
Nicholas Rescher
The Criteriology of Truth; Fundamental Aspects of the Coherence Theory of Truth, in: The Coherence Theory of Truth, Oxford 1973 - dt. Auszug: Die Kriterien der Wahrheit
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Resch II
N. Rescher
Kant and the Reach of Reason: Studies in Kant’ s Theory of Rational Systematization Cambridge 2010
James, W. Verschiedene Vs James, W. James I 102
VsFunctionalism, VsPragmatism: The concept of utility is circular and empty. "Anything that is useful for a system" can be interpreted arbitrarily. PragmatismVs: VsJames: confused truth with probation: it can never be determined whether an observation is translated correctly. (Basis sentence-problem - Quine ditto).




James, W. Mackie Vs James, W. Stegmüller IV 442
Religious Experience/MackieVsJames: he cannot explain why psychological explanations should not always be superior. In addition, the naturalistic hypothesis is much more economical.
IV 443
on the question of value: 1. What is their value as revelations for those who have them?
2. What is their value for us?
Mackie: there is no answer to 1 and 2.
3. Is it justified to esteeem religious experiences more than those experiences that lack religious claims of truth?
Mackie: religious tradition often times only generates the diseases it claims to cure.
4. Would these experiences still be valuable if those who made them would be more critical towards them?
Mackie: this is unlikely, since then they would presumably be replaced by their non-religious equivalents.
Religion/James: the root of all religion is the religious experience.

Macki I
J. L. Mackie
Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong 1977

Carnap V
W. Stegmüller
Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis
In
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987

St I
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989

St II
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987

St III
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987

St IV
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989
James, W. Ramsey Vs James, W. III 75
Truth/RamseyVsJames: it is a shame that you have to insist on these platitudes but some authors manage to deny them: according to James it is possible, for example, that the earth can be round without it being true that the earth is round.
III 76
According to James, it is possible that e.g. a pragmatist can think that Bacon wrote the works of Shakespeare and that the opinion of someone else that Shakespeare wrote them could be "perfectly true for him".
III 74
RamseyVsJames: the confusion is that the question "What is Truth" can be understood in at least three different ways. a) as a search for a criterion for distinguishing truth from falsehood.
III 77
Truth Criterion/Kant/Ramsey: the search for it is absurd, because: (KdrV, Transcendental Logic, Introduction III, (A57=B82)) the explanation that truth is the agreement of knowledge with its object is given and presupposed here. But one demands to know what is the general criterion of the truth of every knowledge.

Ramsey I
F. P. Ramsey
The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays 2013

Ramsey II
Frank P. Ramsey
A contribution to the theory of taxation 1927

Ramsey III
Frank P. Ramsey
"The Nature of Truth", Episteme 16 (1991) pp. 6-16
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994
James, W. Stegmüller Vs James, W. IV 4437444
Religion/StegmüllerVsJames: this is controversial today on the basis of historical research: traditions always seem to have been strongly influential. Explanation/Method/Stegmüller: For example, although individual religious experiences can be explained by traditions, these elements within the totality of religious experiences are only explained if one falls back on something other than these experiences themselves.

Carnap V
W. Stegmüller
Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis
In
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987

St IV
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989