Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 1 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Dualism Pauen Pauen I 35
Dualism/Pauen: two types of states that can also occur independently - interactionist dualism: mutual influence: Descartes (>Dualism/Descartes), >Eccles/Popper. - >Property dualism: certain neural processes have not only their physical characteristics but additionally also mental characteristics that are theoretically independent of the neural - Typical theory: computer analogy (>Computation), >Martians, etc.
I 60
Consciousness as an autonomous property.
I 38
Dualism/Pauen: 1. explanation for the uniformity of our experiences in light of the diversity of physical realizations (> Multiple realization). Integration performance of the free mind - 2. Explanation of >free will.
I 39
3. Pro dualism: VsMonism: Problem of qualitative varied experience by uniform activity of nerve cells
I 56
VsDualismus: has no concrete research subject.
I 44
Descartes/Pauen: the distinction of substances can be justified by the imaginability of such a distinction. The argument still plays an important role today: - Kripke uses it as the basis for its objection VsIdentifikation of mental and neural processes. (>Identity Theory).

Pauen I
M. Pauen
Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001


The author or concept searched is found in the following 6 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Dualism Deutsch Vs Dualism I 165
Leben: Lebende Moleküle (Gene) sind lediglich Moleküle und gehorchen denselben Naturgesetzen wie unbelebte! Sie enthalten keine besondere Substanz und haben auch keine besonderen physikalischen Eigenschaften!(VsDualismus: Leben keine Substanz).

Deutsch I
D. Deutsch
Fabric of Reality, Harmondsworth 1997
German Edition:
Die Physik der Welterkenntnis München 2000
Dualism Esfeld Vs Dualism I 201
Regelfolgen/Esfeld: 1. VsReduktion der Beschreibung von intentionalen Zuständen auf die Beschreibung von physikalischen Zuständen. 2. VsDualismus in der Ontologie: denn intentionalen Vokabular ist genau deshalb nicht auf physikalisches reduzierbar, weil intentionale Zustände nur relativ zu sozialer Praxis determiniert sind.
Dies Praktiken haben allerdings eine physikalische Realisierung.

Es I
M. Esfeld
Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002
Dualism Ryle Vs Dualism Pauen I 82
Ryle/Pauen: it seems as if Ryle wanted to deny the existence of mental states, but this is a misunderstanding. He simply denies an autonomous mental substance.
I 84
RyleVsDualism: Category Error: falsely assumes that we can speak of mental processes in the same context as of physical processes. As if mind and brain differed like Library and Lecture Hall. Therefore, it is pointless to speak of "concurrent" mental and physical events.

Ryle I 226 ff
Dualism/RyleVsDualism/Ryle: life is not a double series of events that take place in two different kinds of matters. It's only a chain of events of various genres whose differences are mainly in that logically different types of statements of law and law-like statements are applicable to them.
I 228
We are not looking into a secret chamber. In reality, the problem is not of that kind. It is is rather about the methodological question of how we prove law-like statements about the silent demeanor of people and apply them. E.g. I find out that someone is a true master of chess by watching him. That a student is lazy by watching him for a longer while.
The question is not the frame question: "How do I discover that we have a soul?", but: a whole series of special questions of the form: how do I discover that I am more selfless than you, that I do poorly in dividing, but better at solving differential equations? That you are suffering from anxiety or easily overlook certain kinds of facts?
Apart from such purely dispositional questions, there is the whole range of execution and event questions of the form: how do I find out that I got the joke, but you did not? That your deed required more courage than mine?
I 229
Questions of this kind are not a mystery!
I 230
In short, it is part of the meaning of "he understands" that he could have done this and that and that he would have done it... and the test is a set of tasks. With a single success we would not entirely have been satisfied, but we were with twenty. (Whether a boy can divide).
Wittgenstein VII 147
Philosophy/Nonsense/Logical Grammar/Tetens: the thesis that philosophy is based on a misunderstanding of the "logical grammar" of language, can neither be found in Carnap nor in the Tractatus, but in Ryle in his criticism RyleVsDualismus, VsDescartes (Ryle 1969).

Ryle I
G. Ryle
The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949
German Edition:
Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969

Pauen I
M. Pauen
Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958
German Edition:
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921.
German Edition:
Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960
Dualism Pauen Vs Dualism Pauen I 56
VsDualismus: it appears to explain the consistency of experiences and the free will better indeed, but it still remains absolutely unclear how consciousness was able accomplish this integration feat. What non-physical regularities govern it? The dualist does not have any concrete research subject! If this integration takes place completely unconsciously, it is not an activity of the consciousness!
MonismVsDualism: has a research object in contrast whose mode of operation is known in principle and which can be checked for evidence of integration feats.
I 57
VsDualism: merely shifts the problem of free will by autonomous mind. The autonomous mind can hardly have created itself. Therefore, it is also dependent on the properties and characteristics that go back to the act of creation, or were acquired after this act.
I 58
VsDualism: is it not at least superior in the question of the origin of consciousness? Again, only shift of the problem: the dualist cannot rely on theories of neuronal processes here, but has to rely on something beyond that. However, it is absolutely unclear where it should start here.
The assumption that immaterial substance possessed the ability to produce consciousness is as mysterious as the assumption that material processes possessed it.
Nor can you define the mind as a "capacity to create consciousness". That would be as circular as reducing playing chess to the "ability to play chess".
MonismVsDualism: has a concrete object of study here, even though it is pondering the same question.
I 59
VsInteractionalistic Dualism: if it assumes an interaction, it violates the principle of the causal closure and the principle of physical determination. E.g. brick: the flight cannot rely on consistently physically described events, after all, the reaction would depend on an act of will.
The principle of physical determination is also violated: the act of will had no equivalent in physically describable events, after all, it is supposed to be independent of neuronal activity.
I 60
Property Dualism: ignores these problems and represents consciousness as an autonomous property that is simultaneously a new kind of physical properties. For this, one would have to encounter events that cannot be explained by neural processes. This would force us to enhance the natural sciences methodically.
MonismVsDualism: contrary to the principle of ontological austerity.

Pauen I
M. Pauen
Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001
Reductionism Esfeld Vs Reductionism I 201
Regelfolgen/Esfeld: 1. VsReduktion der Beschreibung von intentionalen Zuständen auf die Beschreibung von physikalischen Zuständen. 2. VsDualismus in der Ontologie: denn intentionalen Vokabular ist genau deshalb nicht auf physikalisches reduzierbar, weil intentionale Zustände nur relativ zu sozialer Praxis determiniert sind.
Dies Praktiken haben allerdings eine physikalische Realisierung.
I 202
VsReduktionismus/Esfeld: eine Beschreibung , die einem außenstehenden Beobachter zugänglich ist, verfehlt notwendigerweise den begrifflichen Inhalt.

Es I
M. Esfeld
Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002
Various Authors Dewey Vs Various Authors Suhr I 57
DeweyVsAbility: there is no "ability in itself", but only in connection with a task! Thinking is trial treatment.
I 95
DeweyVsDualismus: experience does not come from nature but is in nature.
Hacking I 109
Dewey/Hacking: it has the (false) appearance that for Dewey everything is a social construct. DeweyVsDualism, all dualisms. Theory/Practice, Mind/Matter, Thinking/Action, Fact/Value. Vs "Spectator Theory of Knowledge".
Putnam III 237
Durkheim: had come to the conclusion that political opinions should be based on the "opinion of experts".
III 238
DeweyVsDurkheim: perhaps did not even know this treatise, yet Vs: "It cannot fail to happen that an expert class moves so far away from the interests of the community that it becomes a class with private interests and private knowledge. And private knowledge is not knowledge at all in relation to social affairs."
Rorty VI 88
Truth/Goal/DeweyVsSpencer: there is no goal of a truth to be achieved (this goal is also represented today by Peirce and by Bernard Williams).

Dew II
J. Dewey
Essays in Experimental Logic Minneola 2004

Suhr I
Martin Suhr
John Dewey zur Einführung Hamburg 1994

Hacking I
I. Hacking
Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983
German Edition:
Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

Putnam I (a)
Hilary Putnam
Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (b)
Hilary Putnam
Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (c)
Hilary Putnam
What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (d)
Hilary Putnam
Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (e)
Hilary Putnam
Reference and Truth
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (f)
Hilary Putnam
How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (g)
Hilary Putnam
Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (h)
Hilary Putnam
Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (i)
Hilary Putnam
Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (k)
Hilary Putnam
"Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam II
Hilary Putnam
Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988
German Edition:
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Putnam III
Hilary Putnam
Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Putnam IV
Hilary Putnam
"Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164
In
Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994

Putnam V
Hilary Putnam
Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981
German Edition:
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Putnam VI
Hilary Putnam
"Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Putnam VII
Hilary Putnam
"A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000