Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
[german]

Screenshot Tabelle Begriffes

 

Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.

Enhanced Search:
Search term 1: Author or Term Search term 2: Author or Term


together with


The author or concept searched is found in the following 16 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Absoluteness Hegel Bubner I 182
Absolute Mind/Hegel: the eternal and self-contained idea operates as an absolute mind, creates and enjoys. (According to Aristotle, who distinguishes the self-thought as the highest activity of reason.)
I 183
Absolute/HegelVsAristoteles: for him, the Absolute fits in with the categories of a self-uniting unity that seamlessly fits into systematic philosophies. He goes beyond this, in that he does not reserve the theory of goodness to a sub-domain of metaphysics. Thus, the doctrine of God means philosophizing in an encyclopaedically comprehensive dimension. There is no longer a supreme object.
HegelVsAristoteles: Furthermore: parting with the teleology of nature. Instead: subjectivity principle. Heartbeat of the whole. The energeia, which permeates all things, is attributed to thought activities.
I 184
Absoluteness/Hegel/Bubner: Absoluteness of the idea presents itself as the method of logic, and fulfills the condition of self-reference with this typically modern trick.
Adorno XII 115
Absoluteness/Consciousness/Hegel/Adorno: by adopting an absolute identity of being and mind, Hegel tried to save the ontological proof of God. This assumption is actually the content of his philosophy. (>Absolute Mind). KantVsHegel: denies such an identity between what is and our consciousness.


Bu I
R. Bubner
Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992

A I
Th. W. Adorno
Max Horkheimer
Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978

A II
Theodor W. Adorno
Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000

A III
Theodor W. Adorno
Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973

A IV
Theodor W. Adorno
Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003

A V
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995

A VI
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071

A VII
Theodor W. Adorno
Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002

A VIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003

A IX
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003

A XI
Theodor W. Adorno
Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990

A XII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973

A XIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974
Designation Geach I 52
Naming/Denotation/Two-Names Theory/GeachVsAristoteles: Incorrect approximation of predication and naming: as if predicates were (complex) names : "on the mat" - E.g. ((s) "The man stabbing Caesar to death stabbed the one stabbed by Brutus.") Additionally, Geach would use a link - Two-names theory: "Socrates is a philosopher" should be true because the thing is named - Vs: "Philosopher" (general term) is not a name for "all (or every) philosopher". ---
I 153f
Intentionality/naming/Parmenides/Geach: one cannot name anything that does not exist. (Geach pro) - ((s) Existence introduction is not arbitrary, not without premise). - E.g. Geach dreamed of a girl and wants to call it "Pauline" - on the other hand, acquaintance is sufficient - present is not necessary. - Problem: is the girl even more imaginary, if he has not dreamed of her? - Geach: that is a sure sign that this is all nonsense. - Geach with Parmenides: "There is only that what exists." - GeachVsParmenides: However, one can talk about non-existent objects. - E.g. talking about absent friends without knowing that he is dead, changes the truth value, but not the fact that these are sentences. - Imaginary girls are not competing for identification in the dream. - If it is true of no identifiable girl that I dreamed of her, then I have not dreamed of any girl. - Solution: "I dreamed of a girl, but it is not true of a certain girl that I dreamed of her" - Similar to: it is not true of a certain stamp that I want it. ---
I 252
Predication/Geach: can be done without naming: in an if-that-sentence or in an or-sentence, a term P can be predicated of a thing without naming the thing "P". - E.g.: "If that what the policeman said is true, then he drove faster than 60". This does not call the policeman's sentence true. - (> Conditional). - Predication/naming: centuries-old error: that the predicate is uttered by the thing. - Frege: Difference >naming / >predication, >designation: to name a thing "P", a sentence must be asserted! But a property is also predicted in a non-assertive sub-clause (subset). - Therefore, naming must be explained by predication, not vice versa.

Gea I
P.T. Geach
Logic Matters Oxford 1972

Existence Jonas Brocker I 612
Existence/Jonas: Jonas' Ecological Imperative (see Ecological Imperative/Jonas) states that we "do not have the right to choose or even dare the non-existence of future generations because of the existence of the present. Why we do not have this right, why on the contrary we have an obligation towards what is not yet and 'in itself' and does not have to be, at least what is non-existent has no claim to existence, is theoretically not easy at all and" - he typically adds - "perhaps not at all to justify without religion" (1). Philosophy/Jonas/Brocker: Thus Jonas clearly expresses that he does not consider a philosophical argument in the present question
Brocker I 613
sufficient or compelling enough to change beliefs and behaviour in the long term. BrockerVsJonas: this is a performative contradiction to Jonas' own actions. Furthermore, it is questionable how religious foundations, which Jonas assumes have largely disappeared (2), can achieve this. (3)
Existence/Jonas: simply because humanity exists, it is worth preserving. (4) The existence of humanity should not be regarded as a contingent biological fact, as an accidental result of evolutionary development processes, but as a setting of value from nature. See also Intergenerational Justice/Jonas.
Problem/JonasVsKant, one must, despite Kant, allow for the possibility of rational metaphysics.
Solution/Jonas: the question, why something is at all and not nothing, must be reformulated to what it is worth to exist.
Brocker I 614
Teleology/Solution/JonasVsAristoteles: we must accept purposes in nature instead of locating them in the subject's actions. (5) This can be explained by the instinct of self-preservation found in nature in all life. (6)

1. Hans Jonas, Das Prinzip Verantwortung. Versuch einer Ethik für die technologische Zivilisation, Frankfurt/M. 1979, p. 36.
2. Hans Jonas, »Warum wir heute eine Ethik der Selbstbeschränkung brauchen«, in: Elisabeth Ströker (Hg.), Ethik der Wissenschaften? Philosophische Fragen, München/Paderborn u. a. 1984, S. 76, 80.
3. Vgl. Oelmüller, Willi, »Hans Jonas. Mythos – Gnosis – Prinzip Verantwortung«, in: Stimmen der Zeit 206, 1988, p. 349-350.
4. Jonas 1979, p. 92-100.
5. Ibid. p. 138
6. Ibid. p. 142f.

Manfred Brocker, „Hans Jonas, Das Prinzip Verantwortung“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018

Jonas I
Hans Jonas
Das Prinzip Verantwortung. Versuch einer Ethik für die technologische Zivilisation Frankfurt 1979


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Flux Bigelow I 71
Flux/Bigelow/Pargetter: cooperates very well with the Cartesian law of inertia. Thereafter, the same speed is not a change. Defintion law of inertia/Descartes/Bigelow/Pargetter: an object moves at a constant velocity when no forces act on it.
Change/Bigelow/Pargetter: if we assume that any change needs a cause, the Flux doctrine revises the Aristotelian view of the movement. (FluxVsAristoteles).
Change/Flux/Bigelow/Pargetter: the Flux-Doctrine states that a change of location is an extrinsic change for a body, because the intrinsic property of speed does not have to change for this.
Flux/explanation: for most changes flux is the better explanation.
---
I 72
Change/Bigelow/Pargetter: for a few changes, Ockham's explanation ((s) is not a vector for instantaneous velocity) better: for example twilight, for example, cooling, for example, moral improvement, simply much that people contemplated about in the Middle Ages. Impulse/Ockham/Bigelow/Pargetter: has a body according to the Ockhamists because it had that and that position at the time.
Problem: this requires that, e.g. a meteor has a "memory".
Acceleration/Ockham/Bigelow/Pargetter: the problem becomes more difficult when e.g. the meteor has still an acceleration, because this still needs additional assumptions. Then the movement of the meteor depends on the distances of points in space.
Ockham/Bigelow/Pargetter: that the movement depends on the prehistory, cannot simply be lead ad absurdum. Only the flux doctrine is more elegant.
Impulse/Shock/Flux/Bigelow/Pargetter: The meteor has the impulse according to the flux doctrine due to its instantaneous properties.
Prehistory/Bigelow/Pargetter: can play an epistemic role to explain why the body has its instantaneous speed.
Cause/Bigelow/Pargetter: the causal cause, however, is the instantaneous velocity and not the prehistory.
VsOckhamism/VsOckham/Bigelow/Pargetter: Problem: For example, the perfectly homogeneous, rotating disk.
---
I 73
Motion/Bigelow/Pargetter: the movement of this disk does not lead to any change in the distribution of qualities. Nevertheless, it differs from an inactive disk. The two are distinguished by their causal forces. Explanation: change the material parts. Time sections of the rotating disk provide circles, the ones of the stationary disk do not.
Identity/Bigelow/Pargetter: the concept of identity that is used here is controversial. It does not rely on the possibility of qualitative distinction or tracking back in time cannot rely on tracking an identifiable piece of matter. This leads to haecceitas
Haecceitism/Bigelow/Pargetter: is based on the assumption that identity cannot always be based on the same qualities. For example a perfectly rotating homogeneous disk.
Haecceitas: This-ness.
Identity/Bigelow/Pargetter: we do not resist against non-qualitative identity. We accept that the rotating disk has a pattern of changing identities.
Solution/Bigelow/Pargetter: this is not the whole story:
Causal forces: e.g. the rotating disk: are not provided by the non-qualitative identities.
Solution/flux/Bigelow/Pargetter: the individual parts of the homogeneous disk have an instantaneous speed.
---
I 74
These lead to the fact that the time sections describe circles. Universals/Physics/Bigelow/Pargetter: this is the reason why we say that instantaneous speed - a vector with magnitude and direction - is a universal that body at a time can possess. It is an intrinsic property.
Property/Problem/Bigelow/Pargetter: but we have to explain what kind of property this is that has a size and direction.
Size/Direction/flux/Bigelow/Pargetter: according to the flux doctrine, the size and direction of a vector are more difficult to explain. We cannot explain the necessary instantaneous velocity by the pattern of the earlier positions.
Solution/flux/Bigelow/Pargetter: we need a theory of relations between properties.
Size/direction/vector/Ockham/Bigelow/Pargetter: can simply say that both are given by the previous history of the earlier positions.

Big I
J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter
Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990

Ideas Locke Euchner I 19
Ideas/Locke: The sensations and their processing cause in our mind "simple ideas" (simple ideas), for example: from heat, light, hard, soft, certain colors and flavors (these are unmistakable) - the "first objects of our understanding" - things/objects/Locke: are not captured by a single, but only with a bundle of many "simple ideas": "complex ideas"- they correspond with objects. ---
I 27
Idea/Locke: each object of the mind (understanding) - concept, idea, may also be an illusion-, any content of consciousness. ---
I 33
Ideas/Locke: Modes: Ideas that represent the states or properties of other ideas or constructs of ideas - simple ideas: caused by a sense: E.g. colors, light, sounds. ---
I 38
itself neither true nor false, but instruments. ---
I 42
LockeVsAristoteles: Reason can trace without clattering syllogisms the "natural order of connecting ideas". ---
I 35
complex ideas/Locke: here the spirit is active (in the simple passive).
I 36
E.g. lie - E.g. substance (!). ---
I 35
simple idea/Locke. E.g. room - modes: distance, infinity, figure - simple idea: E.g. pain, joy - modes: hope, love, fear, envy.
Holz I 45/46
Ideen/Wahrnehmung/Locke: es gibt "Ideen", die durch mehr als einen Sinn vermittelt werden: z.B. die Ideen Ausdehnung, Gestalt, Bewegung usw. Ideen/Wahrnehmung/LeibnizVsLocke: diese "Ideen" (Ausdehnung, Dauer, Gestalt usw.) stammen aus dem Geist, nicht aus der Wahrnehmung.
Sie sind die "Ideen des reinen Verstandes". Sie haben aber einen Bezug zur Außenwelt und sind so der Definition und des Beweises fähig.

Loc III
J. Locke
An Essay Concerning Human Understanding


Loc I
W. Euchner
Locke zur Einführung Hamburg 1996

Holz II
Hans Heinz Holz
Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994

Lei I
H. H. Holz
Leibniz Frankfurt 1992
Indistinguishability Wittgenstein Rorty VI 414
WittgensteinVsAristoteles/Rorty: wrong question: "Which of my distinctions are real distinctions".

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958
German Edition:
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921.
German Edition:
Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960


Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Individuals Mayr I 205
Formation of Individuals/Biology/Mayr: Definition Parthenogenesis: Asexuality: in some organisms, individuals develop themselves from the eggs, fertilization is not necessary. E.g. Aphids, plankton crustaceans: here sexual and asexual generations alternate.
I 206
Sexuality: increases diversity and thus defense against diseases.
I 207
Pangenesis theory: (old) Theory, according to which each body cell contributes hereditary material. From Aristotle to the 19th century. PreformationVsEpigenesis (already in Aristotle, then to the nineteenth century).
I 208
VsAristoteles: he believed falsely, only female organisms could possess eggs.
I 209
Egg: the actual mammal was discovered only by Karl Ernst von Baer in 1827. It was recognized that the ovary is the counterpart to the testis. DNA: discovered by Johann Friedrich Miescher (19th century).
I 211
Definition Preformation: Eggs produce individuals of the same species. Therefore it was concluded that egg or sperm is already a miniature of the future organism. Logical consequence: in this organism all future offspring must again be contained in a miniature edition (nesting). Numerous contemporary pictures did show such small miniature humans (homunculi) in the spermatozoon.
I 212
Epigenesis: thought that the development came from an entirely unformed mass. "Vis essentialis." Each species has its own peculiar "essential force". This was completely opposed to the uniform forces described by the physicists, e.g. gravitation.
Definition Epigenesis: Development during the life history of the individual, in contrast to ontogeny and phylogeny.
Nevertheless, the epigenesis prevails in the controversy. Solution only in the 20th century: difference between Definition genotype (genetic constitution of the individual) and Definition phenotype (totality of perceptible characteristics).
Cell: how does it come that the nerve cell develops so completely differently as a cell of the digestive tract?
I 214
Cell division: Wilhelm Roux (1883) concludes the complex internal differentiation of the cell: Solution: particles must be placed on a thread, and this is divided! Confirmed later. Cell: passes through a differentiation process, only a small part of the genes in the nucleus is active.
Cell development: in taxa with regulatory development (e.g. vertebrate animals) there are no fixed early cell lines, but extensive cell migration. Induction (influence of already existing tissues on the development of other tissues) largely determines the specification of the cells.
Cell migration: pigment and nerve cells make extensive migrations through the organism. Often they follow clear chemical stimuli.

Mayr I
Ernst Mayr
This is Biology, Cambridge/MA 1997
German Edition:
Das ist Biologie Heidelberg 1998

Is Ryle Grasses I 30
"Is"/RyleVsAristoteles: "systematically misleading locutions", "is" should suggest the appearance of a thing/property relationship. ---
I 31
Error: the universal "human" is itself not a thing that breathes. Rather, it is to be interpreted as a class subordination - "if existence is a term of 2nd order, God cannot be a subject term" - rather predicate term like 'infinite beings' - RyleVsRussell: E.g. Pegasus: Problem not in the subject term, but in the predicate term.

Ryle I
G. Ryle
The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949
German Edition:
Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969

Kripke’s Wittgenstein Esfeld I 99ff
Kripke's Wittgenstein: each finite row of examples satisfies an infinite number of possible logical rules - Kripke does not proceed from behavior, but from intention: how do you know yourself that one should say 125, if one intends to act in accordance with one's previous answers? - There's nothing mental, which determines the content - with infinite possibilities there is no conceptual content - but term independent of certain application ---
I 102
Kripke's Wittgenstein: dispositions/Kripke: do not help because they are also limited - why would the act that you are dispositional for be the one that should be done? - Form/KripkeVsAristoteles: same problem: how can one recognize the right "natural characteristics" (normativity problem)? ---
I 105f
Kripke's Wittgenstein/skeptical solution: results only in assertibility conditions, no truth conditions: thus no facts which make statements about meaning come true - Esfeld: solution: social practice, middle way between skeptical solution (nonfactualism) and direct solution: which tries to find the facts of meaning in the equipment of the world - KripkeVs: one could have addition today and yesterday quaddition:. whatever appears correctly in the moment, is correct - current dispositions have always privileged position - change not independet from conceptual content: to determine change, this must be established first. See also >Private Language, >Rule Following.

Es I
M. Esfeld
Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002

Paradoxes Logic Texts Re III 187f
Paradoxes: Hierarchy (Tarski)-problem: Kreter does not know which level his own statement assumes - it is only meaningful if truth attribution takes place at a lower level - it requires knowledge! (> knowledge / >understanding). Self-reference: is not always bad or faulty.
---
Re III 192f
Curry paradox: If A and if A. then B, then B - If this conditional sentence is true, then snow is black - ponendo ponens - solution: contraction: two applications are replaced by one - change of logic. Example: If this (conditional) theorem is true, then snow is black.
Consequentia mirabilis: If A, then ~ A, thus ~ A - contraction: If A, then if A, then 0 = 1; So if A, then 0 = 1 - contraction leads to triviality: it makes every statement from the curry paradox true.
---
Re III 196
Semantically completed: language contains its own truth predicates - avoidance of paradox: is done by separation of the truth conditions from fallacy conditions. ---
Sai V 17
Zenon/Sainsbury: Zenon's thesis: no area of space is infinitely divisible, so that it has an infinite number of parts, if each part has a certain extent, for then the sum is infinitly large - Zenon tried to show with this, that not really many things exist - overall, no object can have parts, for then it must be infinitely large. ---
V 19
Sainsbury: infinite division goes only mentally. - Problem: then no composition to space - in the composition, however, the space does not have to grow indefinitely. - e.g. sequences with limit. ---
Sai V 38f
Arrow/Paradox/Zenon: at any time, the flying arrow takes a space that is identical to it. The arrow cannot move in a moment because movement requires a period of time and a moment is seen as a point - this also applies to everything else: nothing moves. Time/AristotelesVsZenon: Time does not consist of points - SainsburyVsAristoteles: today: we are constantly trying to allow points of time: E.g. acceleration at a point, etc. ---
V 39
The question of whether the arrow is moving or resting in a moment is also related to other moments - Defininition rest/Sainsbury: an object rests under the condition that it is also at the same point in all nearby moments - no information about the individual moment can determine whether the arrow is moving - the premise is acceptable: no movement at the moment - but the conclusion is unacceptable. ---
Sai V 184
Sentence/Statement: is only circular at a certain occasion - paradox is therefore not in the meaning, but in the occasion.
Logic Texts
Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988
HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998
Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997
Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logik Stuttgart 1983
Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001
Politics Hobbes Adorno XIII 239
Politics/Hobbes/Adorno: The power struggles within which Hobbes' materialism is to be understood were, in essence, the power struggles between the state as an organization that affects the real coexistence of people, against the power of the churches. The inner pathos of the whole Hobbes' thinking goes - this is wholly Renaissance-like - into the direction of strengthening the power of the state against the interference of the Church. Therein he is quite similar to Macchiavelli. How does Hobbes' extremely authoritarian state philosophy combine with a certain materialistic basic conception in metaphysics or natural philosophy?
---
Adorno XIII 249
Politics/Power/Hobbes/Adorno: The idea of ruling nature is extended by Hobbes also to the inner-human nature. He equates human nature with the animal world, as it becomes clear in his famous parable, that a human is to another human like a wolf, homo homini lupus. ---
XIII 250
HobbesVsAristoteles: The Aristotelian concept of zoon politikon, the human as a political animal, is denied by Hobbes. For the nominalistic Hobbes, there are only the pure, natural, self-sustaining individual beings. Certain moments of this view are not so different from the ethics of Spinoza - e.g. the principle that every being is first determined by the need to preserve itself. ---
XIII 251
State contract/Hobbes/Adorno: according to Hobbes freedom is not good for anything. The evil animals, the human beings, transfer them to the sovereign, who keeps them as far as he still guarantees to them the possibility of self-preservation. It is materialistic in the fact that humans as natural beings are constituted only by the bare need and the only chance to get beyond the possibility of the conflict is that the fulfillment of the needs is made dependent on the renunciation of the original war of all individuals against all individuals - the original bellum omnium contra omnes.

Hobbes I
Thomas Hobbes
Leviathan: With selected variants from the Latin edition of 1668 Cambridge 1994


A I
Th. W. Adorno
Max Horkheimer
Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978

A II
Theodor W. Adorno
Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000

A III
Theodor W. Adorno
Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973

A IV
Theodor W. Adorno
Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003

A V
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995

A VI
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071

A VII
Theodor W. Adorno
Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002

A VIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003

A IX
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003

A XI
Theodor W. Adorno
Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990

A XII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973

A XIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974
Predication Geach I 52
Two Names Theory/TNT/GeachVsAristoteles: false alignment of predication and denotation (naming): as if predicates were (complex) names: "on the mat". - E.g. (s) "the person-who-stabbed-Caesar stabbed the one stabbed by Brutus" - Geach: in addition, a binding member would be needed - Two-name-theory: "Socrates is a philosopher" shall be true because this thing is named. - Vs: "philosopher" (general term) is not a name for "all (or any) philosopher". ---
I 70
Contradictory predications like "Fa" and "~Fa" refer to a common subject - there are no "contradictory subjects". ---
I 252
Predication/Geach: can be done without naming: in an if-clause or in an or-clause, a term P can be predicated from a thing without naming the thing with "P" - E.g. "If that what the police officer has said, is true, then he was driving faster than 60". This does not name the police officer's sentence as true. - (> Conditional). - Predication/naming: century-old error: the predicate is predicated from the thing - Frege: Difference >designation, >denotation, >predication: to name a thing "P", a sentence must be asserted! But a property is also predicated in a non-asserting sub-clause (subset) - therefore, naming must be explained by predication, not vice versa. ---
I 290
Predication/Geach: wrong: to read "SiP" as "a thing is a predicate" - (origin: "Two-Names-Theory, Aristotle) a subject cannot be negated - sentence negation: negation of the predicate. ---
I 291
GeachVsAristoteles: Vs "Two-Names-Theory"/TNT: confuses the relation of names to the named with relation of the predicate to what it is stated from -> false doctrine of the Trinity. ---
I 295
Prediction/Theology/Thomas Aquinas: the expression after "as" is predicative: e.g., "Christ inasmuch as he is human" - distinction between subject and predicate, VsTwo-Name-Theory - false: Two-Name-Theory: E.g.: "His godly nature is immortal, his human nature is mortal" Aquinas: can distinguish "Christ as human is God": false - Two-name-theory: cannot do this because "human" and "God" are merely two names. - VsOckham: E.g. for him, "humanitas" is not more than "majesty": a disguised name for a concrete thing. - Problem: for Ockham, humanity is no longer human when viewed as the Son of God. - VsOckham: because it is not genuinely abstract, e.g. the mayor's office becomes the mayor. ---
I 300
Predication/Thomas Aquinas/Geach: Subject: refers to a suppositum (an "accepted") predicate: refers to a form or nature. - Predication: unequal naming: E.g. "The Prime Minister became Prime Minister" - Nonsense: "which Prime Minister?".

Gea I
P.T. Geach
Logic Matters Oxford 1972

Presuppositions Stechow 80
Presupposition/Strawson: also for the falsity of "all my children are sleeping" the existence is a prerequisite. Syllogisms/StrawsonVsAristoteles: the presupposition does not apply to the predicate term. - Sentence meaning/Strawson: then no longer set of possible worlds but partial function of possible world in truth values - because it should be possible that there si no truth value at all.
---
113
Presupposition/Stechow: a sentence presupposes all its logical consequences - sentence meaning: partial function - presupposition: set of situations - therefore propositions. ---
121
(Existence-) presupposition: = limiting the scope - dom(p) = = pre-area presupposition of p. ---
123
Presupposition/Stechow: states that the evaluation situation must be in the field of argument proposition (i.e. meaning) a presupposition must be a meaning, not a truth value. Original place/Frege: Kepler died in misery: assumes that the name means something. - But the prerequisite is not part of the thought (proposition), which is expressed by the sentence.
A. von Stechow
I Arnim von Stechow Schritte zur Satzsemantik
www.sfs.uniï·"tuebingen.de/~astechow/Aufsaetze/Schritte.pdf (26.06.2006)
Sentences Geach I 204
Sentence/Name/Abbreviation/Substitute/Proxy/Geach: e.g. if "P" and "Q" are abbreviations of sentences and "A" and "B", the respective names of these sentences, then we could have a convention, by which "A > B" is the name (abbreviation) of the sentence "P > Q". Autonymous/Carnap: the symbol ">" in "A > B", is used as a sign of itself, autonymous - (Geach per)
I 258
Conjunction/Sentence/Frege: "P u Q" is a phrase that is different from "p" and "q" individually - Mill: ditto: otherwise "a group of horses" would be the same as "a kind of horse" - but not: E.g. "Jim is convinced and his wife is unfaithful"- solution: "the fact that ..." is always to be split into a pair of statements.
I 291
Sentence / GeachVsAristoteles: it is a mistake to analyze complex sentences as a combination of atomic sentences.

Gea I
P.T. Geach
Logic Matters Oxford 1972

Teleology Jonas Brocker I 614
Teleology/Purposes/Nature/Existence/Ultimate Justification/JonasVsAristoteles/Jonas: Jonas Thesis: We must accept purposes in nature instead of locating them in the subject's actions. (1) This can be explained by the instinct of self-preservation found in nature in all life. (2) Context: the question is how to justify that we should limit our lives today for the sake of future generations. See Intergenerational Justice/Jonas, Existence/Jonas, Responsibility/Jonas, Humanity/Jonas.
Jonas speaks of the "superiority of purpose per se over futility" and adds: "In purposefulness as such, whose reality and effectiveness in the world according to the previous [...] is to be considered established, we can see a fundamental self-affirmation of being, which sets it absolutely as the better against non-being. In every purpose being explains itself and against nothingness" (3).


1. Hans Jonas, Das Prinzip Verantwortung. Versuch einer Ethik für die technologische Zivilisation, Frankfurt/M. 1979, p. 138.
2. Ibid. p. 142f.
3. Ibid. p. 155.
Manfred Brocker, „Hans Jonas, Das Prinzip Verantwortung“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018

Jonas I
Hans Jonas
Das Prinzip Verantwortung. Versuch einer Ethik für die technologische Zivilisation Frankfurt 1979


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Terminology Geach I 52
Two-Names-Theory/TNT/GeachVsAristoteles: false approximation of predication and naming: as if predicates were (complex) names: "on the mat") - ((s) E.g. "The person who stabbed Ceasar stabbed the one stabbed by Brutus"). - Geach: besides, a binding member would be needed. - Two-name-theory: "Socrates is a philosopher" is supposed to be true, because the same thing is named - Vs: "philosopher" (general term) is not a name for "all (or any) philosopher". ---
I 54
Two-Classes-Theory/TCT/GeachVs: even worse than Two-Name-Theory: the general term "philosopher" means "class of philosophers" - Socrates is then only a part of the class. Vs: The element-relation is quite different from the subclass-relation: E.g. a parliamentary committee is not a member of Parliament. - But: "is a philosopher" means exactly the same in both applications. - copula: fallacy of division: as if there were two varieties of "is": one for "is a philosopher," and one for "is an element of the class of philosophers" - Geach: equivalent sentences need not be able to be divided into equivalent sub-sets - "every logician" is not equivalent to "class of logicians". ---
I 122
Latin prose theory/Geach: the relative pronoun is treated as a connection of a binding word with a bound pronoun: "the" is translated as "so that": E.g. the king sent emissaries to make them ask for peace - e.g.(Bach-Peters phrases) solution : A boy kissed a girl, and she really loved him, but he was only pretending (this is still ambiguous) - but solution: e.g. Every true Englishman reveres __ above all ... and __ is his queen. ---
I 239
Predicate/Terminology/Geach: I only name predicates like this if they are used as the principal functor in a proposition, otherwise "predicables" - I-predicables/I-predicate/Geach: (s): those predicates which are indistinguishable with respect to the two objects in a given theory - If distinctions can be made in an extended theory, the I-predicate does not change its meaning, it is no longer an I-predicate. - e.g. "uniform" for (different, but not yet differentiated) tokens of words, later tokens are distinguished, but still "uniform". ---
I 245
"Surman"/Geach: (should be identical, if they have the same family name) are not counted twice - because in different theories differently provided with predicates - and thus counted differently. - ((s) identified as different by the theory.) - e.g. applicable in the universe with the same right: "is the same token as ..", "is the same type as ... "- "is the same lexicon entry as...". ---
I 250
Ascription theory/Geach: Vs "acts of will": attribution of responsibility instead of causality (GeachVs) - Oxford: Thesis: to say that an action is willful is not a description of the action but an attribution. ---
I 291
GeachVsAristoteles: Vs "Two-Name-Theory"/TNT: confuses the relation of names to named with the relation of the predicate to from what it is said. -> false doctrine of the Trinity.

Gea I
P.T. Geach
Logic Matters Oxford 1972


The author or concept searched is found in the following 7 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Aristotle Russell Vs Aristotle EMD II 286
Nature/name/RussellVsEssentialism/RussellVsAristoteles: (History of Western Philosophy): E.g. Socrates is sometimes happy, sometimes sad. Because these things change, they are not part of his nature. But it is thought of Socrates, that he is a huamn. So the question of the nature is a question on how to use the words. We use the same name on several occasions for things or people that we see as the manifestations of the same.
The nature of Socrates is then in the properties, in whose absence we will not use the name of Socrates. So names might have nature, things cannot have nature.
---
EMD II 286/287
We find it convenient to summarize certain events in the life of "Socrates" and others in the life of "Smith". Then we believe that Socrates is somehow more stable than the things that happen to him. But he is not. "Mr. Smith" is a collective name for such occurrences, that is, it refers to something completely unknowable.
---
Prior Prior I 121
Unicorn/Mill: stays on more safer ground than Reid when it comes to centaurs, but he seems to have forgotten what he said before. Syllogism/MillVsAristoteles: E.g.
A dragon breathes fire
a dragon is a serpent
Ergo: some or all snakes breathe fire
This is valid, according to Aristotle.
RussellVsAristoteles: this is simply invalid because the premises are wrong: a dragon does not exist.
Russell: either the premises mean:
"Dragon is a word that means a thing that spits fire"
or
"The idea (idea) of a dragon is the idea of a thing that spits fire".
((s) Once a "word", twice an "idea".)
Question: if there is no dragon, then the idea is no wrong idea?
What would you say about that:
"I would be afraid if a dragon would came inside"? Would he call this an idea or a word?
VsReid: his own principles should have told him better.

Russell I
B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead
Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986

Russell II
B. Russell
The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969
German Edition:
Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989

Russell IV
B. Russell
The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912
German Edition:
Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967

Russell VI
B. Russell
"The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202
German Edition:
Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus
In
Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993

Russell VII
B. Russell
On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit"
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996

EMD II
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977

Evans I
Gareth Evans
"The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

Evans II
Gareth Evans
"Semantic Structure and Logical Form"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Evans III
G. Evans
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989

Pri I
A. Prior
Objects of thought Oxford 1971

Pri II
Arthur N. Prior
Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003
Aristotle Tarski Vs Aristotle Skirbekk I 142
Truth/Description/Tarski: If we would decide to extend the popular use of the term to "designate" and apply it not only to names but also to statements, then we could say:
"A statement is true if it designates an existing fact." (Like Aristotle).
Truth/Aristoteles: of something that is, to say that it is not, or of something that is not, to say that it is, is false, while of something that is, to say that it is, or of something that is not, to say that it is not, is true.
TarskiVsAristoteles: this is not a satisfactory definition. We need a more precise expression for our intuitions.(1)


1. A.Tarski, „Die semantische Konzeption der Wahrheit und die Grundlagen der Semantik“ (1944) in. G: Skirbekk (Hg.) Wahrheitstheorien, Frankfurt 1996

Tarski I
A. Tarski
Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923-38 Indianapolis 1983

Skirbekk I
G. Skirbekk (Hg)
Wahrheitstheorien
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt 1977
Aristotle Hegel Vs Aristotle Bubner I 39
HegelVsAristoteles: "speculative spirit of language": the insight into the linguistic and logical roots in speculation is intended to restore to it to the rank of strict method which Aristotle had just denied it because of its connection with the language.
Bubner I 183
Absolute/HegelVsAristoteles: for him, the Absolute fits in with the categories of a self-uniting unity that seamlessly fits into systematic philosophies. He goes beyond this, in that he does not reserve the theory of goodness to a sub-domain of metaphysics. Thus, the doctrine of God means philosophizing in an encyclopaedically comprehensive dimension. There is no longer a supreme object.
Furthermore: parting with the teleology of nature. Instead: subjectivity principle. Heartbeat of the whole. The energeia, which permeates all things, is attributed to thought activities.
I 190
Logos/Aristotle: through it the elementary natural conditionality is surpassed. In contrast to Hobbes and Rousseau, however, there is no contract, which leads away from nature (natural law). Logos: Aristotle understands it as language and not as reason, which becomes obvious from the comparison with the animals.
      Language reveals the good and the just in mutual exchange.
The good is quite a controversial concept of action, so that it is a matter of debate.
The logos is such a means for finding out, but not a set goal and no content in itself.
It is only thanks to the submission of joint interests that the dialogue is set in motion.
Without polis no function of the logos and without logos no politics.
The excessively growing complexity is self-sustaining without forming a political community of action. HegelVsAristoteles recognizes this.

Bu I
R. Bubner
Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992
Aristotle Bacon Vs Aristotle Bubner I 123
BaconVsAristotle: "Novum Organon" (!620): Weariness of scholastic formalism. Turning to empiricism and realism. "Once people have become dependent on the judgment of another, (senators without vote) they no longer enhance science, they confine themselves to praising certain writers ..." Bacon: per induction from concrete sensually given things, Vs futile dialectics of Aristotle consisting of syllogisms.
John D. Barrow Die Natur der Natur, Hamburg 1996
I 509
Francis BaconVsAristoteles: gave up on deductive logical reason.

Bu I
R. Bubner
Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992
Aristotle Hobbes Vs Aristotle Bubner I 193
Natural Law/Hobbes/Bubner: HobbesVsAristoteles: modern natural law. The "state of nature" is a fiction in which the legal foundations of the founding of a state are anchored, while the actual conclusion of a contract overcomes that state through an artificial legal institution.
The natural right of each individual to pursue his or her interests wisely is one of the characteristics of the state of nature, as is the fundamental impossibility of the collective assertion of individual interests, which has increased to the point of death threat.
Both characteristics together result in a dilemma which the collective only leaves behind by abandoning the rights of all individuals in the conclusion of the contract.
Here, nature acts as a prerequisite and stimulant for a step beyond nature with regard to securing permanent order.
Leviathan the contractually legitimized sovereign guarantees order. He deserves the title of the natural only because of his inevitability.
Actually, he is a machine that imitates the divine creation.

Hobbes I
Thomas Hobbes
Leviathan: With selected variants from the Latin edition of 1668 Cambridge 1994

Bu I
R. Bubner
Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992
Hempel, C. Goodman Vs Hempel, C. Bubner I 128
Deduction schema / Hempel:
  C1, C2, ... Ck
  L1, L2, .... Lr
  E (description of the phenomenon)   Thus, the laws fall under the premises. (The only major change VsAristoteles).
GoodmanVsHempel: law-like statements instead of laws!
       Induction: the "new riddle of induction" does not affect the confirmation but the original formation of hypotheses.

G IV
N. Goodman
Catherine Z. Elgin
Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988
German Edition:
Revisionen Frankfurt 1989

Goodman I
N. Goodman
Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1978
German Edition:
Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984

Goodman II
N. Goodman
Fact, Fiction and Forecast, New York 1982
German Edition:
Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988

Goodman III
N. Goodman
Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976
German Edition:
Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997

Bu I
R. Bubner
Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992
Quine, W.V.O. Wiggins Vs Quine, W.V.O. II 285
Necessity/QuineVsAristoteles: cannot be considered independently of the way objects are specified. Wiggins: Quine mocks essentialism.
WigginsVsQuine: is his critique on the level of an unreflected acceptance of Aristotle's three-dimensional fiction of our world? Or does he claim that, even if we remain in this provincial ontology, we have the choice to choose whether we want to discriminate or not to discriminate in favor of some of the concepts under which the things we perceive fall?
II 286
Concept/Language/WigginsVsQuine: Quine's attitude is not entirely clear here. Thesis: only a conscious system of distinctions in favor of concepts of substance and against chance formations could explain the certainty with which our culture deals with questions of identity in time or permanence.
II 303
WigginsVsKripke: even if names are rigid designators: there is the question if we can evaluate sentences with names for all possible worlds ("necessary existence") Problem: Cross-world identity

Wiggins I
D. Wiggins
Essays on Identity and Substance Oxford 2016

Wiggins II
David Wiggins
"The De Re ’Must’: A Note on the Logical Form of Essentialist Claims"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976