Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 21 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Absoluteness Hegel Bubner I 182
Absolute Mind/Hegel: the eternal and self-contained idea operates as an absolute mind, creates and enjoys. (According to Aristotle, who distinguishes the self-thought as the highest activity of reason.)
I 183
Absolute/HegelVsAristoteles: for him, the Absolute fits in with the categories of a self-uniting unity that seamlessly fits into systematic philosophies. He goes beyond this, in that he does not reserve the theory of goodness to a sub-domain of metaphysics. Thus, the doctrine of God means philosophizing in an encyclopaedically comprehensive dimension. There is no longer a supreme object.
HegelVsAristoteles: Furthermore: parting with the teleology of nature. Instead: subjectivity principle. Heartbeat of the whole. The energeia, which permeates all things, is attributed to thought activities.
I 184
Absoluteness/Hegel/Bubner: Absoluteness of the idea presents itself as the method of logic, and fulfills the condition of self-reference with this typically modern trick.
Adorno XII 115
Absoluteness/Consciousness/Hegel/Adorno: by adopting an absolute identity of being and mind, Hegel tried to save the ontological proof of God. This assumption is actually the content of his philosophy. (>Absolute Mind). KantVsHegel: denies such an identity between what is and our consciousness.


Bu I
R. Bubner
Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992

A I
Th. W. Adorno
Max Horkheimer
Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978

A II
Theodor W. Adorno
Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000

A III
Theodor W. Adorno
Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973

A IV
Theodor W. Adorno
Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003

A V
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995

A VI
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071

A VII
Theodor W. Adorno
Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002

A VIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003

A IX
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003

A XI
Theodor W. Adorno
Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990

A XII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973

A XIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974
Community Aristotle Höffe I 64
Community/Aristoteles/Höffe: Aristotle, for example, rejects session fees, although they allow all citizens to participate in the People's Assembly. Aristotle's basic thesis of a political anthropology is that man is by nature a political being (physei politikon zôon). Towards the beginning of politics it appears in connection with three other assertions: The polis is the perfect community, it is natural, furthermore by nature earlier than the house and the individuals.
HobbesVsAristoteles: Hobbes argues that communities are not only gatherings but also alliances, so they are not created by nature but by art (Leviathan, introduction).
Other authors VsAristotle: According to another, legitimatory objection Aristotle commits the naturalistic fallacy, because from statements about man as he is, he derives how he should live.
Historical objection VsAristoteles: After the historical objection finally man could not be a political living being already because the corresponding communities had arisen late in the history of mankind.
AristotleVsVs/Höffe: The historical objection assumes a static concept of nature.
Höffe I 65
According to his pattern for Physis, the biological processes, Aristotle understands nature dynamically as a development in which three aspects are important: the beginning and motor, the goal already latently present in the beginning and motor, and the sequence, the development process. "Biological fallacy" VsAristotle/Höffe: Aristotle does not succumb to a further, "biological fallacy", according to which political communities develop "by themselves", without a conscious own contribution of man. For he speaks of someone who brought the polis into being and, like Hobbes later, qualifies him as the "author of greatest goods".




Höffe I
Otfried Höffe
Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016
Conjunction Aristotle Geach I 16/17
Konjunktion/Aristoteles/Geach: Im Frühwerk betrachtet Aristoteles Konjunktionen als wahr oder falsch, später änderte er seine Meinung. Er betrachtet das, was wir eine "Verschmelzung von Prädikaten" nennen könnten:
Bsp "ist weiß" und "ist ein Mann" zu "ist ein weißer Mann". Das funktioniert. Aber:
Bsp "ist gut" und "ist ein Schuster" lässt sich so nicht zu "ist ein guter Schuster" verbinden.
Bsp Ein zusammengesetztes Substantiv wie "morse" (man and horse): kann nicht als Subjekt einer Prädikation auftreten.
Denn es wird nichts damit bezeichnet, auch bzw. gerade, weil gefordert wird, daß "Mann Pferd" alle entsprechenden Prädikate vereinigen soll.
I 18
Geach: 1. das ist eigentlich fraglich, aber jedenfalls ist es keine Konjunktion, wenn man einem solchen Subjekt Prädikate zuschreibt: Bsp "S" sei "Rechtsanwalt Politiker". Dann kann weder:
"Jeder S ist ein Halunke" noch
"Einige S sind ehrlich"
als Konjunktion von Prädikationen betrachtet werden, die daraus gewonnen würde, daß man zuerst "Rechtsanwalt" und dann "Politiker" für "S" einsetzt.
GeachVsAristoteles: So ist sein Argument gegen das zusammengesetzte Subjekt irrelevant. 2. wenn das zusammengesetzte Subjekt "morse" als beabsichtigtes Äquivalent einer Kombination zweier Prädikationen angesehen wird, dann erhalten wir als Resultat der Gegenüberstellung (antiphasis?) nicht notwendigerweise wahr und falsch.
Das zeigt, daß "morse" nicht als Prädikation verstanden werden kann.
Bsp "Irgendein morse ist weiß" wird wahr sein, wenn irgendein Mann und irgendein Pferd weiß ist.
"Kein morse ist weiß" ist wahr, wenn kein Mann und kein Pferd weiß ist.
Problem: wenn kein Mann weiß aber irgendein Pferd weiß ist, dann erhalten wir nicht wahr für die eine Seite und falsch für die andere Seite:
"Irgendein morse ist weiß" "kein morse ist weiß". DF Einsetzen, Einheit.
Also ist ""Irgendein morse ist weiß" kein wohlgeformter Satz.
(s) Eindeutigkeit ließe sich erzielen, wenn jeweils gleichzeitig kein Mann und kein Pferd, oder alle Männer und alle Pferde das fragliche Prädikat teilen. Bsp Bei Vierfüßigkeit ließe sich wiederum kein Satz bilden.
Konjunktion/GeachVsAristoteles: damit ist aber nicht gezeigt, daß die Konjunktion
Bsp Einige Männer sind weiß und einige Pferde sind weiß" kein Satz wäre!

Konjunktion /Aristoteles: (spät, Sophistici elenchi): leugnet, dass Konjunktionen w/f sein können. Es sei der "Ruin des Diskurses,
Bsp Auf "Ist es der Fall daß p und q und r...?" mit "ja" oder "nein" zu antworten. Sogar wenn es harmlos aussieht weil alle Glieder vielleicht wahr oder falsch wären.
GeachVsAristoteles: Die moderne Logik hat damit überhaupt kein Problem: die Konjunktion ist wahr, wenn alle Glieder wahr sind, sonst falsch. Aus "Nein" würde nur ein Verwirrter folgern, daß alle Glieder falsch sein müssen.
Bsp Aristoteles: "Sind Koriscus und Kallias zu hause?" als ob es dasselbe wäre wie
"Ist es der Fall daß p und q?"
I 19
GeachVsAristoteles: aber das ist nicht genau derselbe Satz wie "Koriskus ist zu hause und Kallias ist zu hause". (Jeder bei sich zu hause?).
((s) Sind die Subjekte "zusammengefasst" oder die Prädikate? Das kann man hier gar nicht aufteilen!)
Geach: "d und b sind P's" oder
"d ist (ein) P und b ist (ein) P" (so dachte Aristoteles).
Aber es gibt Fälle wo die Zuschreibung im Plural illegitim wird, obwohl sie im Singular statthaft ist. Bsp (s.o.)
Parmenides/Der Dritte Mann" Argument: Lösung: wenn wir zugestehen, daß das
Prädikat "groß" von sich selbst ausgesagt werden kann und gleichzeitig auch von vielen großen Dingen.
Das setzt aber voraus, daß wir nicht zulassen, daß man von dieser Form von "großen" im Plural (ta polla megala/tanta megala) gleichzeitig annimmt, daß sie auf sich selbst zutrifft.
"Analogie"/Mittelalter/GeachVs: von
Bsp "Gott it weise und Platon ist weise" sollte man nicht schließen können:
"Gott und Platon sind zwei Weise". (sapiens/sapientes, Plural, Substantivierung des Prädikats).
Struktur: wenn d P ist und b P ist und a eine Klasse von Ps, dann können wir nicht schließen, daß "P" im Plural von einer Klasse ausgesagt (prädiziert) werden kann, die gerade a und b oder nur d als Element hat. (Prädikation/Singular/Plural).
Ob eine solche Menge überhaupt statthaft ist, hängt von der zugelassenen Mengenlehre ab.
Aristoteles: zeigt an einem teuflischen Beispiel, daß die Pluralform des Prädikats nicht zuschreibbar ist, wenn es die Singularform ist.
Bsp Aristoteles: Zwei Tiere "d" und "b" sind blind. Ist das äquivalent damit:
"d ist blid und b ist blind"?
Aristoteles: (Sophistici elenchi): Sogar das ist nicht statthaft! (GeachVsAristoteles).
1. "Blind" heißt: seiner Natur nach sehend, aber ohne Fähigkeit zu sehen.
2. Wenn d und b der Natur nach sehend sind, so haben sie entweder die Fähigkeit dazu oder nicht.
I 20
3. wenn d und b der Natur nach sehend sind, aber die Fähigkeit nicht haben, sind sie blind. 4. Daher , wenn d und b der Natur nach sehend sind, haben sie entweder beide die Fähgigkeit oder beide nicht.
5. Wenn d die Fähigkeit hat und b blind ist, dann sind d und b der Natur nach sehend
6. Daher, wenn d die Fähigkeit hat und b blind ist, haben entweder beide die Fähigkeit oder sind beide blind. Was absurd ist. (Aristoteles).
Lösung/Aristoteles: solche Plural Fragen wie: "Sind sie der Natur nach sehend?" oder "Sind sie blind?" sollten verbannt werden.
GeachVsAristoteles: das ist drastisch und unnötig. "Die Fähigkeit haben, zu sehen" kann grammatisch auf zwei verschiedene Arten konstruiert werden:
a) dasss keiner aus einer Klasse die Fähigkeit hat
b) dass nicht jeder aus einer Klasse die Fähigkeit hat.
Geach: Um Schritt 3. korrekt zu machen, muss es heißen: jedes Element der Klasse hat die Fähigkeit nicht.
I 25
Konjunktion/Aristoteles/Geach: A. eigener Beweis seines Metatheorems: Prämissen: sollen "A ist weiß" (eines gültigen Syllogismus) sein
Konklusion: "B ist groß".
Dann können die Prämissen eines vermuteten Syllogismus nicht wahr sein:
(14) Wenn A nicht weiß ist, dann ist B groß
Der Syllogismus selbst soll repräsentiert sein von:
(15) Wenn A weiß ist, dann ist B groß
(15) führt zur Kontraposition
(16) Wenn B nicht groß ist, dann ist A nicht weiß
dann führen (1) und (14) in dem, was Aristoteles den "hypothetischen Syllogismus" nennt, zu der Konklusion:
(17) Wenn B nicht groß ist, dann ist B groß.
Dann nennt Aristoteles "absurd".
VsAristoteles: manche Autoren: die Form "Wenn nicht p dann p" muß nicht absurd sein! (Geach pro). Bsp Man kann es benutzen, um "p" selbst zu erreichen (?). in der Geometrie:
"Wenn AB und CD nicht parallel sind, dann sind sie Parallelen, also sind sie Parallelen."(?).
VsVs: das übersieht aber in diesem Fall daß "B ist groß" gar keine Proposition (Aussage, Satz) im Sinne eines traditionellen Syllogismus ist: wie z.B. "Jedes X ist Y".
GeachVsAristoteles. er beansprucht hier gezeigt zu haben, daß wenn wir zwei gültige Schemata von Syllogismen haben mit einer Konjunktion der Prämissen "p und q" und "nicht p und nicht q", , dann wenn beide die Konklusion "Jedes X ist Y" liefern, dann sollten wir verpflichtet sein zur Anerkennung der allgemeinen Gültigkeit der Formel:
"Wenn nicht jedes X Y ist, dann ist jedes X Y" und das ist in der Tat absurd.
((s) Unterschied zu oben: Wenn B nicht groß ist, dann ist B groß. enthält nicht "jedes" bzw. "nicht jedes": Unterschied konträr/kontradiktorisch).
GeachVsAristoteles: der Fehler liegt in seiner falschen Auffassung von Kontradiktion.
Er hat schon recht damit, daß eine Konjunktion eine Proposition ist.
Pointe: wenn "A ist weiß" eine Prämissen Konjunktion "p und q" darstellen soll, dann kann seine Negation: "A ist nicht weiß" nicht "nicht p und nicht q" repräsentieren.
Richtig ist die Negation vielmehr: "nicht beide p und q"

Negation: Einer Konjunktion: ~(p u q) = (plq) nicht (~p u ~q). Nicht beide, nicht "keins".
Bsp (s) A ist wei": Negation: A ist nicht weiß" nicht "A ist nicht weiß und auch kein Gegenstand".

I 26
GeachVsAristoteles: weil er nur implizit annahm, daß Konjunktionen Sätze sind (Geach pro), erwog er nicht richtig die Frage, was die Kontradiktion einer Konjunktion eigentlich sei. (s.u.) Im Spätwerk erkannte Aristoteles Konjunktionen explizit als Propositionen an mit der genialen Erfindung von "A" und "B" usw. als Satzbuchstaben. (Satzvariablen). >Modallogik/Geach, >Tatsachen/Geach.


Gea I
P.T. Geach
Logic Matters Oxford 1972
Designation Geach I 52
Naming/Denotation/Two-Names Theory/GeachVsAristoteles: Incorrect approximation of predication and naming: as if predicates were (complex) names : "on the mat" - E.g. ((s) "The man stabbing Caesar to death stabbed the one stabbed by Brutus.") Additionally, Geach would use a link - Two-names theory: "Socrates is a philosopher" should be true because the thing is named - Vs: "Philosopher" (general term) is not a name for "all (or every) philosopher". ---
I 153f
Intentionality/naming/Parmenides/Geach: one cannot name anything that does not exist. (Geach pro) - ((s) Existence introduction is not arbitrary, not without premise). - E.g. Geach dreamed of a girl and wants to call it "Pauline" - on the other hand, acquaintance is sufficient - present is not necessary. - Problem: is the girl even more imaginary, if he has not dreamed of her? - Geach: that is a sure sign that this is all nonsense. - Geach with Parmenides: "There is only that what exists." - GeachVsParmenides: However, one can talk about non-existent objects. - E.g. talking about absent friends without knowing that he is dead, changes the truth value, but not the fact that these are sentences. - Imaginary girls are not competing for identification in the dream. - If it is true of no identifiable girl that I dreamed of her, then I have not dreamed of any girl. - Solution: "I dreamed of a girl, but it is not true of a certain girl that I dreamed of her" - Similar to: it is not true of a certain stamp that I want it. ---
I 252
Predication/Geach: can be done without naming: in an if-that-sentence or in an or-sentence, a term P can be predicated of a thing without naming the thing "P". - E.g.: "If that what the policeman said is true, then he drove faster than 60". This does not call the policeman's sentence true. - (> Conditional). - Predication/naming: centuries-old error: that the predicate is uttered by the thing. - Frege: Difference >naming / >predication, >designation: to name a thing "P", a sentence must be asserted! But a property is also predicted in a non-assertive sub-clause (subset). - Therefore, naming must be explained by predication, not vice versa.

Gea I
P.T. Geach
Logic Matters Oxford 1972

Existence Jonas Brocker I 612
Existence/Jonas: Jonas' Ecological Imperative (see Ecological Imperative/Jonas) states that we "do not have the right to choose or even dare the non-existence of future generations because of the existence of the present. Why we do not have this right, why on the contrary we have an obligation towards what is not yet and 'in itself' and does not have to be, at least what is non-existent has no claim to existence, is theoretically not easy at all and" - he typically adds - "perhaps not at all to justify without religion" (1). Philosophy/Jonas/Brocker: Thus Jonas clearly expresses that he does not consider a philosophical argument in the present question
Brocker I 613
sufficient or compelling enough to change beliefs and behaviour in the long term. BrockerVsJonas: this is a performative contradiction to Jonas' own actions. Furthermore, it is questionable how religious foundations, which Jonas assumes have largely disappeared (2), can achieve this. (3)
Existence/Jonas: simply because humanity exists, it is worth preserving. (4) The existence of humanity should not be regarded as a contingent biological fact, as an accidental result of evolutionary development processes, but as a setting of value from nature. See also Intergenerational Justice/Jonas.
Problem/JonasVsKant, one must, despite Kant, allow for the possibility of rational metaphysics.
Solution/Jonas: the question, why something is at all and not nothing, must be reformulated to what it is worth to exist.
Brocker I 614
Teleology/Solution/JonasVsAristoteles: we must accept purposes in nature instead of locating them in the subject's actions. (5) This can be explained by the instinct of self-preservation found in nature in all life. (6)

1. Hans Jonas, Das Prinzip Verantwortung. Versuch einer Ethik für die technologische Zivilisation, Frankfurt/M. 1979, p. 36.
2. Hans Jonas, »Warum wir heute eine Ethik der Selbstbeschränkung brauchen«, in: Elisabeth Ströker (Hg.), Ethik der Wissenschaften? Philosophische Fragen, München/Paderborn u. a. 1984, S. 76, 80.
3. Vgl. Oelmüller, Willi, »Hans Jonas. Mythos – Gnosis – Prinzip Verantwortung«, in: Stimmen der Zeit 206, 1988, p. 349-350.
4. Jonas 1979, p. 92-100.
5. Ibid. p. 138
6. Ibid. p. 142f.

Manfred Brocker, „Hans Jonas, Das Prinzip Verantwortung“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018

Jonas I
Hans Jonas
Das Prinzip Verantwortung. Versuch einer Ethik für die technologische Zivilisation Frankfurt 1979


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Experience Aristotle Gadamer I 356
Experience/Aristotle/Gadamer: Aristotle describes (...) in the appendix of his second analytics(1) (and quite similarly in the first chapter of metaphysics) how many individual perceptions, by keeping the manifoldness of the individuals, finally result in experience, the one unity of experience. What is this unity? >Induction/Aristotle, >Unity/Aristotle. GadamerVsAristoteles: The relationship between experiencing, keeping and the resulting
unity of experience remains conspicuously unclear. Obviously Aristotle builts here upon a train of thought that in his time already
Gadamer I 357
had a certain classical imprint. We can prove it in its oldest testimony for Anaxagoras, of whom Plutarch has handed down to us that the distinction of the human over animals was determined by Empeiria, Mneme, Sophia and Techne.(2) We find a similar connection with the emphasis on "mnemes" in the Prometheus of Aeschylus(3) and although we miss the corresponding emphasis on "mnemes" in the Platonic Protagoras myth, Plato(4) as well as Aristotle show that this is already a firm theory. The remaining of important perceptions (moné) is apparently the connecting motive through which the knowledge of the general is able to rise from the experience of the individual.
Science/Method: Aristotle has a very nice picture for the logic of [the] process [of induction]. He compares the many observations one makes with a fleeing army. (...) if, in this general flight, an observation is confirmed throug re-
Gadamer I 358
peated experience, then it stops. Thus at this point, as it were, a first standstill in the general flight sets in. If others now join it, the whole army of the fugitives comes to a halt at the end and again obeys the unit of the command. GadamerVsAristotle: If one now, like Aristotle, thinks the essence of experience only in terms of "science" (which is not science, but "knowledge"), then one simplifies the process in which it comes into being. The picture describes just this process, but it describes it under simplifying conditions that do not apply in this way.
As if the typical of experience were self-evident without contradiction! Aristotle here always already presupposes the common, which in the flight of observations comes to a halt and develops as a general; the generality of the concept is for him an ontological prius.
What Aristotle is interested in experience is merely its contribution to the formation of concepts. If experience is thus considered in terms of its result, then the
Gadamer I 359
actual process of experience is skipped. >Experience/Gadamer.

1. An. Post. B 19 (99ff.)
2. Plut. de fort. 3 p. 98 F = Diels, Vors. Anaxag. B 21 b.
3. Aisch. Prom. 461.
4. Phaid. 96.


Gadamer I
Hans-Georg Gadamer
Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010

Gadamer II
H. G. Gadamer
The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986
German Edition:
Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977
Experience Gadamer I 66
Experience/"Erlebnis"Gadamer: The investigation of the appearance of the word in German literature leads to the surprising result that it has first become commonplace in the 1970s of the 19th century. In the 18th century it is still completely missing, but even Schiller and Goethe do not know it. The earliest proof(1) seems to be a letter by Hegel(2). The word appears just as seldom in the fifties and sixties and only in the seventies [of the 19th century] it suddenly appears frequently(3). Its general introduction into common usage seems to be related to its use in biographical literature.
Gadamer: to experience means first of all to be "still alive when something happens". From there, the word carries the tone of immediacy with which something real is grasped - in contrast to that of which one also beliefs to know, but for which the authentication by one's own
experience is missing, whether it is taken over from others or comes from hearsay (...) Experience is always self-experience.
Content: but at the same time the form "the experienced" is used in the sense that
I 67
the lasting content of what is experienced is designated by it. Biography/Gadamer: It corresponds to this double direction of the meaning of "experience" that
it is the biographical literature through which the word "experience" first becomes naturalized. The essence of biography, especially the biography of artists and poets in the 19th century, is to understand the work from life. Its achievement consists precisely in conveying the two directions of meaning that we differentiate, or in recognizing them as a productive connection. Something becomes an experience, provided that it has not only been experienced, but that its being experienced has had a special emphasis that gives it lasting meaning.
I 69
Historical development of the terms "life"/"experience"/Gadamer: Schleiermacher's appeal to the living feeling against the cold rationalism of the Enlightenment, Schiller's call for aesthetic freedom against the mechanism of society, Hegel's opposition of life (later: of the spirit) - against these things stands the prelude to a protest against modern industrial society, which at the beginning of our century made the words experience and experiencing rise to watchwords of an almost religious sound. The revolt of the youth movement against civic education and its way of life was under this sign. The influence of Friedrich Nietzsche and Henri Bergson also worked in this direction. In addition an "intellectual movement" such as that around Stefan George and last but not least the seismographic fineness with which Georg Simmel's philosophising reacted to these processes testify the same. Thus the philosophy of life of our days ties in with its romantic predecessors.
I 75
Art Experience/Gadamer: The aesthetic experience is not just one kind of experience among others, but represents the very essence of experience. Just as the work of art as such is a world of its own, so the aesthetic experience as an experience is removed from all contexts of reality. It seems to be the very purpose of the work of art to become an aesthetic experience (...).
I 76
In the experience of art, a wealth of meaning is present that does not belong to this particular content or object alone, but rather represents the meaning of life as a whole.
I 352
Experience/Gadamer: All experience is (...)
I 353
only valid as long as it is confirmed. In this respect, its dignity is based on its fundamental repeatability. This means, however, that experience, by its very nature, cancels out its history and thus erases it. This already applies to the experience of everyday life, and even more so to every scientific event of it. In this respect, it is not a coincidental one-sidedness of modern philosophy of science, but rather factually justified that the theory of experience is completely teleologically related to the acquisition of truth that is achieved in it. >Experience/Husserl.
I 356
That experience is valid as long as it is not disproved by new experience (ubi non reperitur instantia contradictoria) seems to characterize the general nature of experience, whether it is its scientific event in the modern sense or the experience of daily life as it has always been. Thus this characterization corresponds entirely to the analysis of the concept of induction given by Aristotle in the appendix to his second analytics.(4) >Induction/Aristotle.
I 358
GadamerVsAristoteles: What Aristotle is interested in experience is merely its contribution to the formation of concepts. (>Experience/Aristotle). If experience is thus considered in terms of its result, then the
Gadamer I 359
the actual process of experience is skipped. Gadamer: Because this process is a much more negative one.
It cannot be described simply as the seamless formation of typical generalities. Rather, this formation happens by constantly refuting false generalizations through experience, by de-typing what is seen as typically.(5)
Negative experience/Gadamer: (...) the actual experience is always a negative one.
If we have an experience with an object, it means that we have not seen things properly up to now and now we know better how things are. The negativity of experience therefore has a peculiarly productive meaning. It is not simply a deception that is seen through and thus a correction, but a far-reaching knowledge that is acquired.
Dialectical Experience/Gadamer: So it cannot be an arbitrarily picked up object on which one makes an experience, but it must be such that one gains a better knowledge not only about it, but about what one thought to know before, i.e. about something general. The negation by which it achieves this is a certain negation. We call this kind of negation dialectical. >Experience/Hegel.
I 361
(...) the application that Hegel makes to history by seeing it conceived in the absolute self-consciousness of philosophy (>Experience/Hegel), [does not do justice to the hermeneutic consciousness (...)]. Hermeneutics/Gadamer: The essence of experience is thought here from the outset from that in which experience is transcended. Experience itself can never be science. It stands in an irrevocable contrast to knowledge and to that instruction that flows from theoretical or technical general knowledge.
Openness: The truth of experience always contains the reference to new experience. Therefore, the one who is called experienced has not only become one through experience, but is also open to experience. But in this way the concept of experience, which is now at issue, contains a qualitatively new moment. It does not only mean experience in the sense of the instruction it gives about this or that. It means experience as a whole.
I 363
The actual experience is the one in which the human becomes aware of his or her finiteness. This is where the ability to do and the self-confidence of his or her planning reason finds its limits. It turns out to be mere appearance that everything can be reversed, that always for everything is time and everything somehow returns. Rather, the person standing and acting in history constantly experiences that nothing returns. Recognition of what is does not mean here: recognition of what is once there, but insight into the limits within which the future is still open to expectation and planning - or, more fundamentally, that all expecting and planning finite beings is a finite and limited one. Actual experience is thus experience of one's own historicity. >Text/Gadamer, >I-You-Relation/Gadamer.
I 372
(...) the negativity of experience [implies] logically the question. In fact, it is the impulse that is represented by the one who does not fit into the pre-opinion through which we experience. Questioning is therefore also more a suffering than an action. The question suggests itself. It can no longer be evaded and we can no longer remain with the usual opinion. >Question/Gadamer.
I 421
Experience/Gadamer: Experience is not at first wordless and is then made an object of reflection by naming it, for instance in the way of subsumption under the generality of the word. Rather, it belongs to experience itself that it seeks and finds the words that express it. >Language and Thought/Gadamer.
I 454
Experience/Discovery/Gadamer: The linguistic nature of our experience of the world is prior to anything that is recognized and addressed as being. The basic reference of language and world therefore does not mean that the world becomes the object of language. Rather, what is the object of cognition and statement is always already enclosed by the world horizon of language. The linguistic nature of human experience of the world as such does not mean the objectification of the world.

1. Cf. Konrad Cramer in J. Ritter's „Historischem Wörterbuch der Philosophie“ (Vol. 2, p. 702-711)
2. In the report of a journey Hegel writes "my whole experience" (Letters, ed. Hoffmeister, III 179). One has to keep in mind that this is a letter...
3. In Dilthey's Schleiermacher-Biography (1870), in Justi in the Winckelmann-Biography (1872), in Hermann Grimm's „Goethe“ (1877) and probably more often.
4. An. Post. B 19 (99ff.).
5. This is similarly described by Karl Popper's pair of concepts of trial and error - with the restriction that these concepts start all too much from the voluntary, all too little from the passionate side of human experiential life. GadamerVsPopper: That is justified as far as one has the "logic of research" in mind alone, but certainly not if one means the logic that is effective in the experiential life of humans.

Gadamer I
Hans-Georg Gadamer
Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010

Gadamer II
H. G. Gadamer
The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986
German Edition:
Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977

Flux Bigelow I 71
Flux/Bigelow/Pargetter: cooperates very well with the Cartesian law of inertia. Thereafter, the same speed is not a change. Defintion law of inertia/Descartes/Bigelow/Pargetter: an object moves at a constant velocity when no forces act on it.
Change/Bigelow/Pargetter: if we assume that any change needs a cause, the Flux doctrine revises the Aristotelian view of the movement. (FluxVsAristoteles).
Change/Flux/Bigelow/Pargetter: the Flux-Doctrine states that a change of location is an extrinsic change for a body, because the intrinsic property of speed does not have to change for this.
Flux/explanation: for most changes flux is the better explanation.
---
I 72
Change/Bigelow/Pargetter: for a few changes, Ockham's explanation ((s) is not a vector for instantaneous velocity) better: for example twilight, for example, cooling, for example, moral improvement, simply much that people contemplated about in the Middle Ages. Impulse/Ockham/Bigelow/Pargetter: has a body according to the Ockhamists because it had that and that position at the time.
Problem: this requires that, e.g. a meteor has a "memory".
Acceleration/Ockham/Bigelow/Pargetter: the problem becomes more difficult when e.g. the meteor has still an acceleration, because this still needs additional assumptions. Then the movement of the meteor depends on the distances of points in space.
Ockham/Bigelow/Pargetter: that the movement depends on the prehistory, cannot simply be lead ad absurdum. Only the flux doctrine is more elegant.
Impulse/Shock/Flux/Bigelow/Pargetter: The meteor has the impulse according to the flux doctrine due to its instantaneous properties.
Prehistory/Bigelow/Pargetter: can play an epistemic role to explain why the body has its instantaneous speed.
Cause/Bigelow/Pargetter: the causal cause, however, is the instantaneous velocity and not the prehistory.
VsOckhamism/VsOckham/Bigelow/Pargetter: Problem: For example, the perfectly homogeneous, rotating disk.
---
I 73
Motion/Bigelow/Pargetter: the movement of this disk does not lead to any change in the distribution of qualities. Nevertheless, it differs from an inactive disk. The two are distinguished by their causal forces. Explanation: change the material parts. Time sections of the rotating disk provide circles, the ones of the stationary disk do not.
Identity/Bigelow/Pargetter: the concept of identity that is used here is controversial. It does not rely on the possibility of qualitative distinction or tracking back in time cannot rely on tracking an identifiable piece of matter. This leads to haecceitas
Haecceitism/Bigelow/Pargetter: is based on the assumption that identity cannot always be based on the same qualities. For example a perfectly rotating homogeneous disk.
Haecceitas: This-ness.
Identity/Bigelow/Pargetter: we do not resist against non-qualitative identity. We accept that the rotating disk has a pattern of changing identities.
Solution/Bigelow/Pargetter: this is not the whole story:
Causal forces: e.g. the rotating disk: are not provided by the non-qualitative identities.
Solution/flux/Bigelow/Pargetter: the individual parts of the homogeneous disk have an instantaneous speed.
---
I 74
These lead to the fact that the time sections describe circles. Universals/Physics/Bigelow/Pargetter: this is the reason why we say that instantaneous speed - a vector with magnitude and direction - is a universal that body at a time can possess. It is an intrinsic property.
Property/Problem/Bigelow/Pargetter: but we have to explain what kind of property this is that has a size and direction.
Size/Direction/flux/Bigelow/Pargetter: according to the flux doctrine, the size and direction of a vector are more difficult to explain. We cannot explain the necessary instantaneous velocity by the pattern of the earlier positions.
Solution/flux/Bigelow/Pargetter: we need a theory of relations between properties.
Size/direction/vector/Ockham/Bigelow/Pargetter: can simply say that both are given by the previous history of the earlier positions.

Big I
J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter
Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990

Ideas Locke Euchner I 19
Ideas/Locke: The sensations and their processing cause in our mind "simple ideas" (simple ideas), for example: from heat, light, hard, soft, certain colors and flavors (these are unmistakable) - the "first objects of our understanding" - things/objects/Locke: are not captured by a single, but only with a bundle of many "simple ideas": "complex ideas"- they correspond with objects. ---
I 27
Idea/Locke: each object of the mind (understanding) - concept, idea, may also be an illusion-, any content of consciousness. ---
I 33
Ideas/Locke: Modes: Ideas that represent the states or properties of other ideas or constructs of ideas - simple ideas: caused by a sense: E.g. colors, light, sounds. ---
I 38
itself neither true nor false, but instruments. ---
I 42
LockeVsAristoteles: Reason can trace without clattering syllogisms the "natural order of connecting ideas". ---
I 35
complex ideas/Locke: here the spirit is active (in the simple passive).
I 36
E.g. lie - E.g. substance (!). ---
I 35
simple idea/Locke. E.g. room - modes: distance, infinity, figure - simple idea: E.g. pain, joy - modes: hope, love, fear, envy.
Holz I 45/46
Ideen/Wahrnehmung/Locke: es gibt "Ideen", die durch mehr als einen Sinn vermittelt werden: z.B. die Ideen Ausdehnung, Gestalt, Bewegung usw. Ideen/Wahrnehmung/LeibnizVsLocke: diese "Ideen" (Ausdehnung, Dauer, Gestalt usw.) stammen aus dem Geist, nicht aus der Wahrnehmung.
Sie sind die "Ideen des reinen Verstandes". Sie haben aber einen Bezug zur Außenwelt und sind so der Definition und des Beweises fähig.

Loc III
J. Locke
An Essay Concerning Human Understanding


Loc I
W. Euchner
Locke zur Einführung Hamburg 1996

Holz I
Hans Heinz Holz
Leibniz Frankfurt 1992

Holz II
Hans Heinz Holz
Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994
Indistinguishability Wittgenstein Rorty VI 414
WittgensteinVsAristoteles/Rorty: wrong question: "Which of my distinctions are real distinctions".

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958
German Edition:
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921.
German Edition:
Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960


Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Individuals Mayr I 205
Formation of Individuals/Biology/Mayr: Definition Parthenogenesis: Asexuality: in some organisms, individuals develop themselves from the eggs, fertilization is not necessary. E.g. Aphids, plankton crustaceans: here sexual and asexual generations alternate.
I 206
Sexuality: increases diversity and thus defense against diseases.
I 207
Pangenesis theory: (old) Theory, according to which each body cell contributes hereditary material. From Aristotle to the 19th century. PreformationVsEpigenesis (already in Aristotle, then to the nineteenth century).
I 208
VsAristoteles: he believed falsely, only female organisms could possess eggs.
I 209
Egg: the actual mammal was discovered only by Karl Ernst von Baer in 1827. It was recognized that the ovary is the counterpart to the testis. DNA: discovered by Johann Friedrich Miescher (19th century).
I 211
Definition Preformation: Eggs produce individuals of the same species. Therefore it was concluded that egg or sperm is already a miniature of the future organism. Logical consequence: in this organism all future offspring must again be contained in a miniature edition (nesting). Numerous contemporary pictures did show such small miniature humans (homunculi) in the spermatozoon.
I 212
Epigenesis: thought that the development came from an entirely unformed mass. "Vis essentialis." Each species has its own peculiar "essential force". This was completely opposed to the uniform forces described by the physicists, e.g. gravitation.
Definition Epigenesis: Development during the life history of the individual, in contrast to ontogeny and phylogeny.
Nevertheless, the epigenesis prevails in the controversy. Solution only in the 20th century: difference between Definition genotype (genetic constitution of the individual) and Definition phenotype (totality of perceptible characteristics).
Cell: how does it come that the nerve cell develops so completely differently as a cell of the digestive tract?
I 214
Cell division: Wilhelm Roux (1883) concludes the complex internal differentiation of the cell: Solution: particles must be placed on a thread, and this is divided! Confirmed later. Cell: passes through a differentiation process, only a small part of the genes in the nucleus is active.
Cell development: in taxa with regulatory development (e.g. vertebrate animals) there are no fixed early cell lines, but extensive cell migration. Induction (influence of already existing tissues on the development of other tissues) largely determines the specification of the cells.
Cell migration: pigment and nerve cells make extensive migrations through the organism. Often they follow clear chemical stimuli.

Mayr I
Ernst Mayr
This is Biology, Cambridge/MA 1997
German Edition:
Das ist Biologie Heidelberg 1998

Is Ryle Grasses I 30
"Is"/RyleVsAristoteles: "systematically misleading locutions", "is" should suggest the appearance of a thing/property relationship.
I 31
Error: the universal "human" is itself not a thing that breathes. Rather, it is to be interpreted as a class subordination - "if existence is a term of 2nd order, God cannot be a subject term" - it would rather be predicate term like 'infinite beings'. RyleVsRussell: e.g. Pegasus: here the problem is not in the subject term, but in the predicate term.

Ryle I
G. Ryle
The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949
German Edition:
Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969

Kripke’s Wittgenstein Esfeld I 99ff
Kripke's Wittgenstein: each finite row of examples satisfies an infinite number of possible logical rules. Kripke does not proceed from behavior, but from intention: how do you know that you should say 125, if you intend to act in accordance with your previous answers? There is nothing mental, which determines the content - with infinite possibilities there is no conceptual content - the term is independent of certain applications.
I 102
Kripke's Wittgenstein: dispositions/Kripke: dispositions do not help because they are also limited. Why would the act that you are dispositional be the one that should be done? Form/KripkeVsAristoteles: same problem: how can one recognize the right "natural characteristics" (normativity problem)?
I 105f
Kripke's Wittgenstein/skeptical solution: results can only be obtained in assertibility conditions. No truth conditions: means there are no facts which make statements about meaning come true. Esfeld: solution: social practice is the middle way between skeptical solution (nonfactualism) and a direct solution which tries to find the facts of meaning in the equipment of the world. KripkeVs: one could have addition today and yesterday quaddition. Whatever appears correctly in the moment, is correct. Current dispositions have always a privileged position. Change is not independet from conceptual content: to determine change, this must be established first. See also >Private Language, >Rule Following.

Es I
M. Esfeld
Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002

Natural State Hobbes Höffe I 216
Natural State/State of Nature/Hobbes/Höffe: In Chapter 13 of the Leviathan, which is central to the first anthropological part, Hobbes presents a consideration that has been famous ever since under the title of the state of nature. It has the methodological status of a thought experiment.
Höffe I 217
With the state of nature, Hobbes does not sketch a historical or prehistoric phase of humanity. Rather, he examines the potential for conflict inherent in the coexistence of rational sensory beings, provided there are no binding rules and no public powers among them. HobbesVsAristoteles: In radical contrast to Aristotle's definition of humans as a political being by nature, the state (...) is not created by nature, but by art.
"Homo homini lupus": Hobbes' answer to his novel question has become proverbial as a formula: "The human is the humans’ wolf" (homo homini lupus: from the citizen, dedication). The formula, of course, originates from pre-Christian antiquity and is already quoted by Bacon in the generation before Hobbes. (see below "The human is a god to humans").
Natural State: Because now, in the absence of state power, as the thought experiment presupposes, the comrades-in-arms act in complete freedom, they become opponents in the event that they fight over the same means: people are afraid of each other. There are three reasons for this. 1) competition, 2) distrust, 3) striving for glory.
Civil war: Surprisingly, the decisive cause of civil wars, the dispute over religious truth, is missing here. For this dispute does not fall under any of the three causes of conflict mentioned: Oriented towards the salvation of souls, it does not stem from the desire for profit, security or fame.
Höffe I 219
Positive Passions/Hobbes: Höffe: Fortunately, in the state of nature there are other passions besides the three causes of conflict. Those who, like many performers, suppress them not only make a considerable cut, since they only take into account the first half of Hobbes' natural state. Nor does he understand how the natural state can be overcome. Hobbes refers to three motivational forces that seek peace: the fear of death, the desire for things that are necessary for a pleasant life, and the hope of achieving them through one's own efforts (ibid.). >Peace/Hobbes. The right to everything in the state of nature proves on closer examination to be a right to nothing. Because this insight in itself lacks any driving force, it needs another factor, both energetic and purposeful, precisely the three passions that promote peace. >Hobbes.
Ruler: Because of [his] omnipotence, Hobbes calls him a god,
Höffe I 221
but only "mortal" God because of his transitoriness. He claims that the enlightened self-interest, the >reason in the sense of wisdom of life, requires to establish it. "The human is a god to humans": in this context, Hobbes - which many interpreters fail to mention - introduces the competition formula to the Wolf formula. It too comes from antiquity and is also already quoted by Bacon: "The human is a god to humans" (homo homini deus), so it says already in the dedication of the Scripture On the citizen.



Danto III 229
Natural State/Hobbes/Danto: According to Hobbes, there was no sign of civilization in the natural state and the story of bare life would have to be a monotonous repetition of beating and rape: If there has been a history in itself, then it is due to religion, and according to Nietzsche it is also due to the "spirit that came into them from the powerless (Danto: the priests). (F. Nietzsche: Jenseits von Gut und Böse, VI. 2, p. 281). Sense/Life/Nietzsche/Danto: from here, the meaning of religion can only be properly estimated: "The human being, the animal human being, has so far had no sense. His existence on earth had no purpose; he did not know how to justify, explain or affirm himself." (page 429.).

Hobbes I
Thomas Hobbes
Leviathan: With selected variants from the Latin edition of 1668 Cambridge 1994


Höffe I
Otfried Höffe
Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016

Danto I
A. C. Danto
Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989
German Edition:
Wege zur Welt München 1999

Danto III
Arthur C. Danto
Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965
German Edition:
Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998

Danto VII
A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005
Paradoxes Logic Texts Read III 187f
Paradoxes: Hierarchy (Tarski)-problem: Kreter does not know which level his own statement assumes - it is only meaningful if truth attribution takes place at a lower level - it requires knowledge! (> knowledge / >understanding). Self-reference: is not always bad or faulty.
III 192f
Curry paradox: If A and if A. then B, then B - If this conditional sentence is true, then snow is black - ponendo ponens - solution: contraction: two applications are replaced by one - change of logic. Example: If this (conditional) theorem is true, then snow is black.
Consequentia mirabilis: If A, then ~ A, thus ~ A - contraction: If A, then if A, then 0 = 1; So if A, then 0 = 1 - contraction leads to triviality: it makes every statement from the curry paradox true.
III 196
Semantically completed: language contains its own truth predicates - avoidance of paradox: is done by separation of the truth conditions from fallacy conditions. ---
Sainsbury V 17
Zenon/Sainsbury: Zenon's thesis: no area of space is infinitely divisible, so that it has an infinite number of parts, if each part has a certain extent, for then the sum is infinitly large - Zenon tried to show with this, that not really many things exist - overall, no object can have parts, for then it must be infinitely large.
V 19
Sainsbury: infinite division goes only mentally. - Problem: then no composition to space - in the composition, however, the space does not have to grow indefinitely. - e.g. sequences with limit.
V 38f
Arrow/Paradox/Zenon: at any time, the flying arrow takes a space that is identical to it. The arrow cannot move in a moment because movement requires a period of time and a moment is seen as a point - this also applies to everything else: nothing moves. Time/AristotelesVsZenon: Time does not consist of points - SainsburyVsAristoteles: today: we are constantly trying to allow points of time: E.g. acceleration at a point, etc.
V 39
The question of whether the arrow is moving or resting in a moment is also related to other moments - Defininition rest/Sainsbury: an object rests under the condition that it is also at the same point in all nearby moments - no information about the individual moment can determine whether the arrow is moving - the premise is acceptable: no movement at the moment - but the conclusion is unacceptable.
V 184
Sentence/Statement: is only circular at a certain occasion - paradox is therefore not in the meaning, but in the occasion.
Logic Texts
Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988
HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998
Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997
Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983
Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001

Re III
St. Read
Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997

Sai I
R.M. Sainsbury
Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995
German Edition:
Paradoxien Stuttgart 1993
Politics Hobbes Adorno XIII 239
Politics/Hobbes/Adorno: The power struggles within which Hobbes' materialism is to be understood were, in essence, the power struggles between the state as an organization that affects the real coexistence of people, against the power of the churches. The inner pathos of the whole Hobbes' thinking goes - this is wholly Renaissance-like - into the direction of strengthening the power of the state against the interference of the Church. Therein he is quite similar to Macchiavelli. How does Hobbes' extremely authoritarian state philosophy combine with a certain materialistic basic conception in metaphysics or natural philosophy?
---
Adorno XIII 249
Politics/Power/Hobbes/Adorno: The idea of ruling nature is extended by Hobbes also to the inner-human nature. He equates human nature with the animal world, as it becomes clear in his famous parable, that a human is to another human like a wolf, homo homini lupus. ---
XIII 250
HobbesVsAristoteles: The Aristotelian concept of zoon politikon, the human as a political animal, is denied by Hobbes. For the nominalistic Hobbes, there are only the pure, natural, self-sustaining individual beings. Certain moments of this view are not so different from the ethics of Spinoza - e.g. the principle that every being is first determined by the need to preserve itself. ---
XIII 251
State contract/Hobbes/Adorno: according to Hobbes freedom is not good for anything. The evil animals, the human beings, transfer them to the sovereign, who keeps them as far as he still guarantees to them the possibility of self-preservation. It is materialistic in the fact that humans as natural beings are constituted only by the bare need and the only chance to get beyond the possibility of the conflict is that the fulfillment of the needs is made dependent on the renunciation of the original war of all individuals against all individuals - the original bellum omnium contra omnes.

Hobbes I
Thomas Hobbes
Leviathan: With selected variants from the Latin edition of 1668 Cambridge 1994


A I
Th. W. Adorno
Max Horkheimer
Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978

A II
Theodor W. Adorno
Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000

A III
Theodor W. Adorno
Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973

A IV
Theodor W. Adorno
Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003

A V
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995

A VI
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071

A VII
Theodor W. Adorno
Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002

A VIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003

A IX
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003

A XI
Theodor W. Adorno
Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990

A XII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973

A XIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974
Predication Geach I 52
Two Names Theory/TNT/GeachVsAristoteles: false alignment of predication and denotation (naming): as if predicates were (complex) names: "on the mat". - E.g. (s) "the person-who-stabbed-Caesar stabbed the one stabbed by Brutus" - Geach: in addition, a binding member would be needed - Two-name-theory: "Socrates is a philosopher" shall be true because this thing is named. - Vs: "philosopher" (general term) is not a name for "all (or any) philosopher". ---
I 70
Contradictory predications like "Fa" and "~Fa" refer to a common subject - there are no "contradictory subjects". ---
I 252
Predication/Geach: can be done without naming: in an if-clause or in an or-clause, a term P can be predicated from a thing without naming the thing with "P" - E.g. "If that what the police officer has said, is true, then he was driving faster than 60". This does not name the police officer's sentence as true. - (> Conditional). - Predication/naming: century-old error: the predicate is predicated from the thing - Frege: Difference >designation, >denotation, >predication: to name a thing "P", a sentence must be asserted! But a property is also predicated in a non-asserting sub-clause (subset) - therefore, naming must be explained by predication, not vice versa. ---
I 290
Predication/Geach: wrong: to read "SiP" as "a thing is a predicate" - (origin: "Two-Names-Theory, Aristotle) a subject cannot be negated - sentence negation: negation of the predicate. ---
I 291
GeachVsAristoteles: Vs "Two-Names-Theory"/TNT: confuses the relation of names to the named with relation of the predicate to what it is stated from -> false doctrine of the Trinity. ---
I 295
Prediction/Theology/Thomas Aquinas: the expression after "as" is predicative: e.g., "Christ inasmuch as he is human" - distinction between subject and predicate, VsTwo-Name-Theory - false: Two-Name-Theory: E.g.: "His godly nature is immortal, his human nature is mortal" Aquinas: can distinguish "Christ as human is God": false - Two-name-theory: cannot do this because "human" and "God" are merely two names. - VsOckham: E.g. for him, "humanitas" is not more than "majesty": a disguised name for a concrete thing. - Problem: for Ockham, humanity is no longer human when viewed as the Son of God. - VsOckham: because it is not genuinely abstract, e.g. the mayor's office becomes the mayor. ---
I 300
Predication/Thomas Aquinas/Geach: Subject: refers to a suppositum (an "accepted") predicate: refers to a form or nature. - Predication: unequal naming: E.g. "The Prime Minister became Prime Minister" - Nonsense: "which Prime Minister?".

Gea I
P.T. Geach
Logic Matters Oxford 1972

Presuppositions Stechow 80
Presupposition/Strawson: also for the falsity of "all my children are sleeping" the existence is a prerequisite. Syllogisms/StrawsonVsAristoteles: the presupposition does not apply to the predicate term. - Sentence meaning/Strawson: then no longer set of possible worlds but partial function of possible world in truth values - because it should be possible that there si no truth value at all.
---
113
Presupposition/Stechow: a sentence presupposes all its logical consequences - sentence meaning: partial function - presupposition: set of situations - therefore propositions. ---
121
(Existence-) presupposition: = limiting the scope - dom(p) = = pre-area presupposition of p. ---
123
Presupposition/Stechow: states that the evaluation situation must be in the field of argument proposition (i.e. meaning) a presupposition must be a meaning, not a truth value. Original place/Frege: Kepler died in misery: assumes that the name means something. - But the prerequisite is not part of the thought (proposition), which is expressed by the sentence.
A. von Stechow
I Arnim von Stechow Schritte zur Satzsemantik
www.sfs.uniï·"tuebingen.de/~astechow/Aufsaetze/Schritte.pdf (26.06.2006)
Sentences Geach I 204
Sentence/Name/Abbreviation/Substitute/Proxy/Geach: e.g. if "P" and "Q" are abbreviations of sentences and "A" and "B", the respective names of these sentences, then we could have a convention, by which "A > B" is the name (abbreviation) of the sentence "P > Q". Autonymous/Carnap: the symbol ">" in "A > B", is used as a sign of itself, autonymous - (Geach per)
I 258
Conjunction/Sentence/Frege: "P u Q" is a phrase that is different from "p" and "q" individually - Mill: ditto: otherwise "a group of horses" would be the same as "a kind of horse" - but not: E.g. "Jim is convinced and his wife is unfaithful"- solution: "the fact that ..." is always to be split into a pair of statements.
I 291
Sentence / GeachVsAristoteles: it is a mistake to analyze complex sentences as a combination of atomic sentences.

Gea I
P.T. Geach
Logic Matters Oxford 1972

Teleology Jonas Brocker I 614
Teleology/Purposes/Nature/Existence/Ultimate Justification/JonasVsAristoteles/Jonas: Jonas Thesis: We must accept purposes in nature instead of locating them in the subject's actions. (1) This can be explained by the instinct of self-preservation found in nature in all life. (2) Context: the question is how to justify that we should limit our lives today for the sake of future generations. See Intergenerational Justice/Jonas, Existence/Jonas, Responsibility/Jonas, Humanity/Jonas.
Jonas speaks of the "superiority of purpose per se over futility" and adds: "In purposefulness as such, whose reality and effectiveness in the world according to the previous [...] is to be considered established, we can see a fundamental self-affirmation of being, which sets it absolutely as the better against non-being. In every purpose being explains itself and against nothingness" (3).


1. Hans Jonas, Das Prinzip Verantwortung. Versuch einer Ethik für die technologische Zivilisation, Frankfurt/M. 1979, p. 138.
2. Ibid. p. 142f.
3. Ibid. p. 155.
Manfred Brocker, „Hans Jonas, Das Prinzip Verantwortung“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018

Jonas I
Hans Jonas
Das Prinzip Verantwortung. Versuch einer Ethik für die technologische Zivilisation Frankfurt 1979


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Terminology Geach I 52
Two-Names-Theory/TNT/GeachVsAristoteles: false approximation of predication and naming: as if predicates were (complex) names: "on the mat") - ((s) E.g. "The person who stabbed Ceasar stabbed the one stabbed by Brutus"). - Geach: besides, a binding member would be needed. - Two-name-theory: "Socrates is a philosopher" is supposed to be true, because the same thing is named - Vs: "philosopher" (general term) is not a name for "all (or any) philosopher". ---
I 54
Two-Classes-Theory/TCT/GeachVs: even worse than Two-Name-Theory: the general term "philosopher" means "class of philosophers" - Socrates is then only a part of the class. Vs: The element-relation is quite different from the subclass-relation: E.g. a parliamentary committee is not a member of Parliament. - But: "is a philosopher" means exactly the same in both applications. - copula: fallacy of division: as if there were two varieties of "is": one for "is a philosopher," and one for "is an element of the class of philosophers" - Geach: equivalent sentences need not be able to be divided into equivalent sub-sets - "every logician" is not equivalent to "class of logicians". ---
I 122
Latin prose theory/Geach: the relative pronoun is treated as a connection of a binding word with a bound pronoun: "the" is translated as "so that": E.g. the king sent emissaries to make them ask for peace - e.g.(Bach-Peters phrases) solution : A boy kissed a girl, and she really loved him, but he was only pretending (this is still ambiguous) - but solution: e.g. Every true Englishman reveres __ above all ... and __ is his queen. ---
I 239
Predicate/Terminology/Geach: I only name predicates like this if they are used as the principal functor in a proposition, otherwise "predicables" - I-predicables/I-predicate/Geach: (s): those predicates which are indistinguishable with respect to the two objects in a given theory - If distinctions can be made in an extended theory, the I-predicate does not change its meaning, it is no longer an I-predicate. - e.g. "uniform" for (different, but not yet differentiated) tokens of words, later tokens are distinguished, but still "uniform". ---
I 245
"Surman"/Geach: (should be identical, if they have the same family name) are not counted twice - because in different theories differently provided with predicates - and thus counted differently. - ((s) identified as different by the theory.) - e.g. applicable in the universe with the same right: "is the same token as ..", "is the same type as ... "- "is the same lexicon entry as...". ---
I 250
Ascription theory/Geach: Vs "acts of will": attribution of responsibility instead of causality (GeachVs) - Oxford: Thesis: to say that an action is willful is not a description of the action but an attribution. ---
I 291
GeachVsAristoteles: Vs "Two-Name-Theory"/TNT: confuses the relation of names to named with the relation of the predicate to from what it is said. -> false doctrine of the Trinity.

Gea I
P.T. Geach
Logic Matters Oxford 1972


The author or concept searched is found in the following 7 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Aristotle Russell Vs Aristotle EMD II 286
Nature/name/RussellVsEssentialism/RussellVsAristoteles: (History of Western Philosophy): E.g. Socrates is sometimes happy, sometimes sad. Because these things change, they are not part of his nature. But it is thought of Socrates, that he is a huamn. So the question of the nature is a question on how to use the words. We use the same name on several occasions for things or people that we see as the manifestations of the same.
The nature of Socrates is then in the properties, in whose absence we will not use the name of Socrates. So names might have nature, things cannot have nature.
---
EMD II 286/287
We find it convenient to summarize certain events in the life of "Socrates" and others in the life of "Smith". Then we believe that Socrates is somehow more stable than the things that happen to him. But he is not. "Mr. Smith" is a collective name for such occurrences, that is, it refers to something completely unknowable.
---
Prior Prior I 121
Unicorn/Mill: stays on more safer ground than Reid when it comes to centaurs, but he seems to have forgotten what he said before. Syllogism/MillVsAristoteles: E.g.
A dragon breathes fire
a dragon is a serpent
Ergo: some or all snakes breathe fire
This is valid, according to Aristotle.
RussellVsAristoteles: this is simply invalid because the premises are wrong: a dragon does not exist.
Russell: either the premises mean:
"Dragon is a word that means a thing that spits fire"
or
"The idea (idea) of a dragon is the idea of a thing that spits fire".
((s) Once a "word", twice an "idea".)
Question: if there is no dragon, then the idea is no wrong idea?
What would you say about that:
"I would be afraid if a dragon would came inside"? Would he call this an idea or a word?
VsReid: his own principles should have told him better.

Russell I
B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead
Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986

Russell II
B. Russell
The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969
German Edition:
Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989

Russell IV
B. Russell
The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912
German Edition:
Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967

Russell VI
B. Russell
"The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202
German Edition:
Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus
In
Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993

Russell VII
B. Russell
On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit"
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996

EMD II
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977

Evans I
Gareth Evans
"The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

Evans II
Gareth Evans
"Semantic Structure and Logical Form"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Evans III
G. Evans
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989

Pri I
A. Prior
Objects of thought Oxford 1971

Pri II
Arthur N. Prior
Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003
Aristotle Tarski Vs Aristotle Skirbekk I 142
Truth/Description/Tarski: If we would decide to extend the popular use of the term to "designate" and apply it not only to names but also to statements, then we could say:
"A statement is true if it designates an existing fact." (Like Aristotle).
Truth/Aristoteles: of something that is, to say that it is not, or of something that is not, to say that it is, is false, while of something that is, to say that it is, or of something that is not, to say that it is not, is true.
TarskiVsAristoteles: this is not a satisfactory definition. We need a more precise expression for our intuitions.(1)


1. A.Tarski, „Die semantische Konzeption der Wahrheit und die Grundlagen der Semantik“ (1944) in. G: Skirbekk (Hg.) Wahrheitstheorien, Frankfurt 1996

Tarski I
A. Tarski
Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923-38 Indianapolis 1983

Skirbekk I
G. Skirbekk (Hg)
Wahrheitstheorien
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt 1977
Aristotle Hegel Vs Aristotle Bubner I 39
HegelVsAristoteles: "speculative spirit of language": the insight into the linguistic and logical roots in speculation is intended to restore to it to the rank of strict method which Aristotle had just denied it because of its connection with the language.
Bubner I 183
Absolute/HegelVsAristoteles: for him, the Absolute fits in with the categories of a self-uniting unity that seamlessly fits into systematic philosophies. He goes beyond this, in that he does not reserve the theory of goodness to a sub-domain of metaphysics. Thus, the doctrine of God means philosophizing in an encyclopaedically comprehensive dimension. There is no longer a supreme object.
Furthermore: parting with the teleology of nature. Instead: subjectivity principle. Heartbeat of the whole. The energeia, which permeates all things, is attributed to thought activities.
I 190
Logos/Aristotle: through it the elementary natural conditionality is surpassed. In contrast to Hobbes and Rousseau, however, there is no contract, which leads away from nature (natural law). Logos: Aristotle understands it as language and not as reason, which becomes obvious from the comparison with the animals.
      Language reveals the good and the just in mutual exchange.
The good is quite a controversial concept of action, so that it is a matter of debate.
The logos is such a means for finding out, but not a set goal and no content in itself.
It is only thanks to the submission of joint interests that the dialogue is set in motion.
Without polis no function of the logos and without logos no politics.
The excessively growing complexity is self-sustaining without forming a political community of action. HegelVsAristoteles recognizes this.

Bu I
R. Bubner
Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992
Aristotle Bacon Vs Aristotle Bubner I 123
BaconVsAristotle: "Novum Organon" (!620): Weariness of scholastic formalism. Turning to empiricism and realism. "Once people have become dependent on the judgment of another, (senators without vote) they no longer enhance science, they confine themselves to praising certain writers ..." Bacon: per induction from concrete sensually given things, Vs futile dialectics of Aristotle consisting of syllogisms.
John D. Barrow Die Natur der Natur, Hamburg 1996
I 509
Francis BaconVsAristoteles: gave up on deductive logical reason.

Bu I
R. Bubner
Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992
Aristotle Hobbes Vs Aristotle Bubner I 193
Natural Law/Hobbes/Bubner: HobbesVsAristoteles: modern natural law. The "state of nature" is a fiction in which the legal foundations of the founding of a state are anchored, while the actual conclusion of a contract overcomes that state through an artificial legal institution.
The natural right of each individual to pursue his or her interests wisely is one of the characteristics of the state of nature, as is the fundamental impossibility of the collective assertion of individual interests, which has increased to the point of death threat.
Both characteristics together result in a dilemma which the collective only leaves behind by abandoning the rights of all individuals in the conclusion of the contract.
Here, nature acts as a prerequisite and stimulant for a step beyond nature with regard to securing permanent order.
Leviathan the contractually legitimized sovereign guarantees order. He deserves the title of the natural only because of his inevitability.
Actually, he is a machine that imitates the divine creation.

Hobbes I
Thomas Hobbes
Leviathan: With selected variants from the Latin edition of 1668 Cambridge 1994

Bu I
R. Bubner
Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992
Hempel, C. Goodman Vs Hempel, C. Bubner I 128
Deduction schema / Hempel:
  C1, C2, ... Ck
  L1, L2, .... Lr
  E (description of the phenomenon)   Thus, the laws fall under the premises. (The only major change VsAristoteles).
GoodmanVsHempel: law-like statements instead of laws!
       Induction: the "new riddle of induction" does not affect the confirmation but the original formation of hypotheses.

G IV
N. Goodman
Catherine Z. Elgin
Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988
German Edition:
Revisionen Frankfurt 1989

Goodman I
N. Goodman
Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1978
German Edition:
Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984

Goodman II
N. Goodman
Fact, Fiction and Forecast, New York 1982
German Edition:
Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988

Goodman III
N. Goodman
Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976
German Edition:
Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997

Bu I
R. Bubner
Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992
Quine, W.V.O. Wiggins Vs Quine, W.V.O. II 285
Necessity/QuineVsAristoteles: cannot be considered independently of the way objects are specified. Wiggins: Quine mocks essentialism.
WigginsVsQuine: is his critique on the level of an unreflected acceptance of Aristotle's three-dimensional fiction of our world? Or does he claim that, even if we remain in this provincial ontology, we have the choice to choose whether we want to discriminate or not to discriminate in favor of some of the concepts under which the things we perceive fall?
II 286
Concept/Language/WigginsVsQuine: Quine's attitude is not entirely clear here. Thesis: only a conscious system of distinctions in favor of concepts of substance and against chance formations could explain the certainty with which our culture deals with questions of identity in time or permanence.
II 303
WigginsVsKripke: even if names are rigid designators: there is the question if we can evaluate sentences with names for all possible worlds ("necessary existence") Problem: Cross-world identity

Wiggins I
D. Wiggins
Essays on Identity and Substance Oxford 2016

Wiggins II
David Wiggins
"The De Re ’Must’: A Note on the Logical Form of Essentialist Claims"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976