Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 1 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Democracy Fishkin Surowiecki I 330
Democracy/Politics/Deliberation/Communication/Fishkin/Surowiecki: In 2003, Fishkin organized a meeting of 343 people in Philadelphia who had been carefully selected to represent a cross-section of the American population. (1) Fishkin invented the deliberative opinion poll based on the idea that political discussion should not be confined to specialists or members of the political class and that there is no need to do so. Since then, such initiatives have been carried out in hundreds of major cities around the world.
Surowiecki I 331
Given sufficient information and the opportunity to discuss matters with their peers, ordinary citizens are perfectly capable of understanding complicated situations and choosing between different points of view in a meaningful way. Richard PosnerVsFishkin/PosnerVsAckerman: it is a false expectation that such discussion events could turn Americans into role models of reason and civic virtue.
The people of the United States form a "deeply philistine society". "Citizens have little taste in abstraction, little time and even less inclination to spend a considerable part of their free time educating themselves to be informed and responsible voters". And further: "It is much more difficult to get a solid idea of what is necessary for the whole society than to be aware of one's own interests". (2)
Democracy/Surowiecki: the dispute between Posner and Fishkin is about the question of what we mean by democracy at all: do we have a democracy, because it...
a) gives people a feeling of being involved in everything and being able to determine their own lives,...
Surowiecki I 332
...and that is why it contributes to political stability? Or b) because citizens have the right to govern themselves, even if they use this right in a ridiculous way? Or
c) because democracy is an excellent instrument for making intelligent decisions and discovering the truth?

1. A similar idea is presented in: James Fishkin, Democracy and Deliberation (Yale University Press, New Haven 1952), as well as in: Fishkin, The Voice of the People – Public Opinion and Democracy (Yale University Press, New Haven 1996). The "National Issues Convention" attracted considerable national attention and a five-hour segment was broadcast live on PBS and C-SPAN. Bruce Ackerman and James Fishkin outlined their idea of a day of political opinion-forming in "Deliberation Day", a treatise they presented at the conference "Deliberating About Deliberative Democracy" at the University of Texas (February 2000). See also Ackerman and Fishkin, Deliberation Day (Yale University Press, New Haven 2004).
2. Richard Posner, Law, Pragmatism, and Democracy (Harvard University Press, Cambridge 2003), S. 131 f., 164.

PolFishk I
James S. Fishkin
Democracy and Deliberation: New Directions for Democratic Reform New Haven 1993


Surowi I
James Surowiecki
Die Weisheit der Vielen: Warum Gruppen klüger sind als Einzelne und wie wir das kollektive Wissen für unser wirtschaftliches, soziales und politisches Handeln nutzen können München 2005

The author or concept searched is found in the following controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Various Authors Quine Vs Various Authors II 111ff
QuineVsSemantic Theory: there is a lack of a general definition of meaning QuineVsUse Theory of Meaning: definition of meaning through use too vague! (Demarcation of what is detectable under the "circumstances") (QuineVsWittgenstein).

III 272
Singular Term/QuineVsSingular Terms: the whole category of singular terms is logically superfluous and should be abolished! ((s) Instead: variable).
V 58
Language Learning/Language Acquisition/Quine: E.g. the child learns that "red" is applied to blood, tomatoes, ripe apples, etc. The idea associated with that may be whatever it likes! Language bypasses the idea and focuses on the object.
((s) reference/(s): goes to the object, not an idea, which is in this case unnecessary.)
Stimulus/Quine: has nothing mysterious in language learning.
V 60
Problem: in progressive learning sentences are formed which have less to do with stimuli. E.g. about past and future. Quine: philosophers have great difficulty to specify accurately and in detail which connections it is about.
QuineVsSupranaturalism.
V 61
We only need orientation by external circumstances. Internal mechanisms are only insofar positive as we can hope that they will be clarified by neurophysiology.
IX 199
Individuals/QuineVsFraenkel: we cannot follow him to simply waive individuals, because under TT this would exclude infinite classes and also the classical number theory. (Chapter 39). Solution: (from Chapter 4): the identification of individuals with their One classes.
IX 199/200
But then we would have to make an exception in the interpretation: if x is an individual, then "x ε x" should count as true. (Above, "x ε y" became false if neither were objects of sequential type). Now (1) and (2) reduce to:
(4) Ey∀x(x ε y (Tnx u Fx)),
(5) (∀w(w ε x w ε y) u x ε z) > y ε z.
Moreover, the definition of "Tnx" needs to be revised to make it match the new idea of ​​the individual: " x VT y" by way of merging we can define
(6) "T0x" stands for "∀y (y ε x y = x)"
((S) "all parts of individuals are identical with this one".)
"T n + 1 x" stands for "∀y(y ε x > Tny)"
((s) "The set x is always one type higher than its elements y".)

IX 237
Set Theory/QuineVsAckermann: (like ML and NB) but unlike ZF: does not fully guarantee the existence of finite classes. Additional concept "M".
II 129
QuineVsZettsky: Zettsky: properties are identical if the classes to which they belong are the identical... but when are such classes identical?
II 130
We cannot rely on the identity of the elements here (as with physical objects), as we simply have no antecedent principle of individuation for the properties (as elements of classes) here.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987