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The author or concept searched is found in the following 6 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Democracy | Protagoras | Gaus I 307 Democracy/Protagoras/Keyt/Miller: [a] hotly debated issue concerning the Great Speech is whether it is a defence of democracy. ((s) For the Great Speech see >Protagoras/Plato). The Great Speech does contain a defence of the democratic practice of the Athenian assembly of allowing every citizen a voice about issues of justice and temperance (Prot. 322d—323a). This has led one scholar to claim that Protagoras 'has produced for the first time in human history a theoretical basis for participatory democracy' (Kerferd, 1981(1): 144) and another to say that Protagoras is 'the first democratic political theorist in the history of the world' (Farrar, 1988(2): 77). Relativism: furthermore, there does seem to be a natural alliance between Protagorean relativism and democracy if the locus of relativism is the individual (Taylor, 1976(3): 83—4). By such relativism whatever seems good to citizen A is good for A, and whatever seems good to citizen B is good for B (Tht. 166c—d). But A and B cannot be friends if they thwart each other's good. Thus, if there are to be the bonds of friendship, without which a polis cannot exist, A must take account of what seems good to B, and B of what seems good to A, and in general each citizen must take account of what seems good to every other citizen. Otherwise stasis results. But this 'live and let live' philosophy is one of the defining features of democracy. Vs: On the other hand, when the locus of relativity is shifted from the Gaus I 308 individual to the polis, Protagorean relativism does not seem to favour democracy over any other form of government: if oligarchy or monarchy seems just to the citizens of a polis, oligarchy or monarchy is just for them. (Rosen, 1994(4), is a useful survey of the extensive literature on both sides of this issue.) >Relativism/Protagoras. 1. Kerferd, G. B. (1981) The Sophistic Movement. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2. Farrar, Cynthia (1988) The Origins of Democratic Thinking: The Invention of Politics in Classical Athens. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 3. Taylor, C. C. W. (1976) Plato Protagoras. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 4. Rosen, F. (1994) 'Did Protagoras justify democracy?' Polis, 13: 12-30. Keyt, David and Miller, Fred D. jr. 2004. „Ancient Greek Political Thought“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Nature | Aristotle | Gaus I 312 Nature/Aristotle/Keyt/Miller: Plato had already attempted to combat Protagorean relativism and conventionalism by an appeal to nature, but the nature to which he appealed was either divine reason (in the Laws) or a realm of incorporeal and changeless Forms existing beyond time and space (in the Republic). (PlatoVsRelativism, PlatoVsProtagoras: >Protagoras/Plato, >Relativism/Protagoras). AristotleVsPlato: though Aristotle too wishes to combat relativism by an appeal to nature, he wishes to do so without invoking a suprasensible standard or a supernatural being: his aim is to avoid Platonism as well as relativism. (...) Aristotle, by identifying nature with the realm of sensible objects and of change (Metaph. XII.l.1069a30-b2), brings it down to earth. Nature/Aristotle: Aristotle's concept of nature, unlike Plato's, would be recognizable to a modern physicist or biologist. Gaus I 313 Nature makes its first appearance in three basic theorems that stand as the portal to the Politics: (1) the polis exists by nature, (2) man is by nature a political animal, and (3) the polis is prior by nature to the individual (Pol. 1.2). These statements are referred to as theorems because they are not simply asserted but argued for. Problems: nothing concerning them or the arguments supporting them is uncontroversial. The very content of the theorems is contested, for it is unclear what 'nature' means in each of them. Aristotle distinguishes several senses of 'nature' (Phys. II.1; Metaph. V .4), the most important of which correspond to his four causes (final, formal, efficient, and material); but he usually relies on the context to indicate the intended sense of a particular occurrence of the term. It has even been suggested that 'nature' has an entirely different sense in the Politics than it has in the physical and metaphysical treatises. Questions: what is Aristotle tacitly assuming? Are the arguments valid or invalid? How plausible are his premises? The tenability of Aristotle's naturalism depends upon the answer to these questions. (For the controversy see Ambler, 1985(1); Keyt, 1991b(2); Depew, 1995(3); Miller, 1995(4): 27-66; and Saunders, 1995(5): 59-71.) Aristotle's analysis of nature leads to a complex treatment of the antithesis between physis and nomos. >Nomos/Aristotle. Phys.: Aristotle Physics Pol: Aristotle Politics Metaph.: Aristotle Metaphysics 1. Ambler, Wayne (1985) 'Aristotle's understanding of the naturalness of the city'. Review of Politics, 47: 163—85. 2. Keyt, David (1991b) 'Three basic theorems in Aristotle's Politics'. In David Keyt and Fred D. Miller, eds, A Companion to Aristotle's Politics. Oxford: Blackwell. 3. Depew, David J. (1995) 'Humans and other political animals in Aristotle's History of Animals'. Phronesis, 40: 159-81. 4. Miller, Fred D. (1995) Nature, Justice, and Rights in Aristotle's Politics. Oxford: Claredon. 5. Saunders, Trevor J. (1995) Aristotle Politics Books I and 11. Oxford: Clarendon. Keyt, David and Miller, Fred D. jr. 2004. „Ancient Greek Political Thought“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Nature | Plato | Gaus I 312 Nature/Plato/Keyt/Miller: Plato had already attempted to combat Protagorean relativism and conventionalism by an appeal to nature, but the nature to which he appealed was either divine reason (in the Laws) or a realm of incorporeal and changeless Forms existing beyond time and space (in the Republic). (For PlatoVsRelativism, PlatoVsProtagoras see >Protagoras/Plato, >Relativism/Protagoras). AristotleVsPlato: though Aristotle too wishes to combat relativism by an appeal to nature, he wishes to do so without invoking a suprasensible standard or a supernatural being: his aim is to avoid Platonism as well as relativism. (...) Aristotle, by identifying nature with the realm of sensible objects and of change (Metaph. XII.l.1069a30-b2), brings it down to earth. Nature/Aristotle: Aristotle's concept of nature, unlike Plato's, would be recognizable to a modern physicist or biologist. >Nature/Aristotle. Metaph.: Aristotle Metaphysics Keyt, David and Miller, Fred D. jr. 2004. „Ancient Greek Political Thought“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Protagoras | Taureck | I 13 Protagoras/Sophist/Taureck: (~ 485-415) Protagoras is one of the first and most important representatives of the sophists. Forty years profession of the paid thinker. I 14 He was commissioned in 444 by the democratic Athens to formulate a constitution for the stand of Thuroi in southern Italy. In the end, like Socrates, but also Phidias and Anaxagoras, he was supposed to have been a victim of the Athenian democracy. The reason is probably his remark that he does not know anything about the existence and nature of the gods. Supposedly he was expelled from Athens and burned his books on the market. He supposedly drowned on departure in the sea storm. Banishment is now being doubted. Protagoras wrote books on science, gods, ambition and truth. None of these was preserved. Quote: "The human is the measure of all things". I 15 Our main source: Plato: "Protagoras", "Theaitetos". I 111 Protagoras/Taureck: there is no proof that Protagoras regarded humans as equal. Already in antiquity, he was interpreted differently, either phenomenally or realistically. >Democracy/Protagoras, >Ethics/Protagoras, >Logos/Protagoras, >Myth/Protagoras, >Recognition/Protagoras, >Relativism/Protagoras, >Social Contract/Protagoras, >Sophists. Additional literature on the sophists: W. K C. Guthrie, The Sophists, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1971. A. Laks and G. W. Most, Early Greek Philosophy 2016. Richard Winton. "Herodotus, Thucydides, and the sophists" in: C.Rowe & M.Schofield, The Cambridge Companion to Greek and Roman Political Thought, Cambridge 2005. Hermann Diels & Rosamond Kent Sprague (eds.) The Older Sophists a Complete Translation by Several Hands of the Fragments in Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker. With a New Ed. Of Antiphon and of Euthydemus. University of South Carolina Press 1972. John Dillon and Tania Gergel. The Greek Sophists. UK: Penguin Group 2003. |
Taureck I B. H.F. Taureck Die Sophisten Hamburg 1995 |
| Relativism | Plato | Gaus I 306 Relativism/Plato/Keyt/Miller: Socrates' account of Protagoras is combined with spirited criticism. >Relativism/Protagoras. 1) One question that arises about Protagoras' universal relativism is whether it is self-refuting (Tht. 170a—171c). Applied to itself the Protagorean formula asserts that 'man is the measure' is frue for those for whom it seems true. But to most men the Protagorean formula seems false. Thus, the formula is more false than true. (For more on self-refutation see Burnyeat, 1976(1).) Cf. >Circular reasoning. 2) A second problem, a problem in the political realm, relates to Protagoras' claim to be wiser than others and on that basis to deserve his high fees (Tht. 167c—d). What role can there be for a wise man, a sophist, one might Gaus I 307 wonder, if truth is relative? >Truth/Plato. Protagoras: Speaking through Socrates, Protagoras has an interesting answer to this question. He claims not access to truth that is denied to lesser mortals but rather an ability to change the way things appear to poleis: when harmful things seem just to a given polis the wise man can make beneficial things seem and be just to that polis. 3) This response leads directly to a third problem over which Protagorean relativism seems to break down (Tht. 177c—179b). The laws of a polis, Socrates claims, aim at what is advantageous for the polis in the future. According to the man-measure formula, what seems to a lawmaker to be to the future advantage of his polis is to the future advantage of his polis; but when the future arrives, it may seem to be (and hence actually be) to his polis's disadvantage. What seemed true may not be true. >Polis/Plato, >Governance/Plato, >Relativism/Protagoras. 1. Burnyeat, Myles (1976) 'Protagoras and self-refutation in Plato's Theaetetus'. Philosophical Review, 85: 172—85. Keyt, David and Miller, Fred D. jr. 2004. „Ancient Greek Political Thought“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Social Contract | Protagoras | Gaus I 308 Social contract/Protagoras/Keyt/Miller: [an] issue of debate is whether a theory of the social contract can be found in the Great Speech. ((s) For the Great Speech see >Protagoras/Plato). There are scholars on both sides of this issue. Although political relativism is consistent with a social contract, the elimination argument usually used to attribute a social contract theory to Protagoras - not by nature or by the gods, therefore by a social contract (see, for example, Guthrie, 1969(1): 137) - tacitly assumes a false disjunction. Another possibility, noted in passing by Plato, is that laws are due to chance in the guise of war, poverty, and disease (Laws IV.709a—b). Schiappa (1991)(2) is a recent book-length study of Protagoras. >Relativism/Protagoras, >Democracy/Protagoras. 1. Guthrie, W. K. C. (1969) A History of Greek Philosophy. Vol. 3, The Fifth-Century Enlightenment. Cambridge: Cambridge Umversity Press. 2. Schiappa, Edward (1991) Protagoras and Logos: A Study in Greek Philosophy and Rhetoric. Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press. Keyt, David and Miller, Fred D. jr. 2004. „Ancient Greek Political Thought“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Garfinkel, H. | Putnam Vs Garfinkel, H. | Field IV 415 Relativism/Field pro: the relativism to which we are led here is coherent and manageable. Because it only refers to values, not to facts. >Relativism. Relativism/Garfinkel: (p. 119f): relativism about values is itself no evaluation, therefore there is no reason to believe that it itself is only relatively true. (Garfinkel "one liner"). PutnamVsGarfinkel: his argument is not applicable here. Relativism/Protagoras/Plato/Field: this relativism is different: this claims that it is pointless to say that there is objectively Fs, but only Fs relative to us. PutnamVsProtagoras: this relativism is incoherent. (Field ditto). Internal realism/iR/Putnam: its own internal realism is immune to the objection VsProtagoras because Putnam says that our standards of rationality are objectively correct. So it is not a true relativism. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Spinoza, B. | Rorty Vs Spinoza, B. | II (e) 104 World/Mind/Matter/Spinoza/Rorty: two equally valid ways of describing the world: one in terms of matter, then in terms of the mind. The order based on the connection of the corpuscles is the same as the order and connection of our ideas. The mind only knows as long as the body is well and vice versa. "We know God all the more, the more we understand individual things." SpinozaVsSocrates: we should not, like Socrates, be discouraged by the fact that there are no teleological explanations for natural events. II (e) 105 The Spirit of God is no more and no less than the comprehension of all relations between individual things. RortyVsSpinoza: as soon as the ways of description are recognized as equivalent, the idea of the natural order is in danger. Also both ways of description can be illusory. >Description Levels. Thus entering the slippery slope down to Kant's unrecognizable thing in itself. Ultimately, the relativism of Protagoras. >Relativism/Protagoras. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
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