Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 9 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Brain/Brain State | Frith | I 12 Brain/brain research/Frith: brain research is the examination of the structure by measuring the energy that the brain consumes. I 59 Brain/consciousness/Frith: brain scanners showed that an object can cause a change in brain activity without the person being aware of it (in the Amygdala). I 61 Thesis: "Our brain does not tell us everything it knows." >Unconscious. I 88 Brain/Frith: thesis: "My brain can get along easily without me". I 89 It can initiate actions that are not the ones that you consider appropriate. I 90/91 Brain/Frith: our brain does not tell us when our body moves differently than we have intended (for normal people). I 131 Brain/world/Frith: thesis: the brain embeds us into the world and conceals the world from us at the same time. I 149 Building Block/basic building block/brain/neuron/Cajal/Frith: the basic building block of the brain is the neuron, the nerve cell with all its extensions. Reason: the extensions grow out of the cells and approach the extensions of other cells, but never unite with them. I 242 Brain/Frith: the brain works like science: it designs ever better models that are tested and improved. I 246 I/self/Frith: thesis: the "I" is created by my brain. >I, >Self, >Subject. I 249 Isolation/Frith: isolation is bad for people and for brains. I 250 Communication/Frith: in communication you should always examine two brains at the same time. >Communication. I 251 Homunculus/Frith: it is a common mistake to assume a smaller brain inside the brain. >Homunculus. Part/parts/brain/Frith: nevertheless the brain consists of parts, because there are actions that we can regret. >Emotion, >Actions. |
Frith I Chris Frith Making up the Mind: How the Brain Creates Our Mental World, Hoboken/NJ 2007 German Edition: Wie unser Gehirn die Welt erschafft Heidelberg 2013 |
| Connectionism | Pinker | I 128 ff - 145 Neural Networks/Pinker: Learning/Problem: there are incorrect reinforcements with "XOR" (exclusive or; Sheffer stroke). Solution: we have to interpose internal >representation. I 142 Neural nets/Rumelhart: neural nets return all errors. "Hidden levels": several statements that can be true or wrong can be assembled into a complex logical function, the values then vary continuously. The system can place the correct emphasis itself if input and output are given - as long as similar inputs lead to similar outputs, no additional training is required. >Homunculi. I 144f Connectionism/Rumelhart: the mind is a large neural network. - Rats have only fewer nets. PinkerVsConnectionism: networks alone are not sufficient for handling symbols - the networks have to be structured in programs. - Even past tense overstretches a network. Precursors: "association of ideas": Locke/Hume/Berkeley/Hartley/Mill >Association/Hume. 1) contiguity (context): frequently experienced ideas are associated in the mind 2) Similarity: similar ideas activate each other. >Similarity/Locke. I 146 Computer variant: is a statistical calculation with multiple levels. I 147 VsConnectionism: units with the same representations are indistinguishable. - The individual should not be construed as the smallest subclass. I 151 Connectionism cannot explain compositionality of representation. >Compositionality. I 158ff Recursion/Recursive/Neural Networks/Memory/Pinker: recursion solution for the problem of an infinite number of possible thoughts: Separation of short/long-term memory. The whole sentence is not comprehended at once, but words are processed individually in loops. >Recursion/Pinker. I 159 Networks themselves have to been as recursive processor: for thoughts to be well-formed. I 166 Neural Networks/Pinker: the networks do not reach down to the rules - they only interpolate between examples that have been put in. >VsConnectionism. |
Pi I St. Pinker How the Mind Works, New York 1997 German Edition: Wie das Denken im Kopf entsteht München 1998 |
| Cybernetics | Ashby | Brockman I 179 Cybernetics/Ashby/Hillis: a control system needed to be as complex as the system it controlled. Cyberneticist W. Ross Ashby proved that this was true in a precise mathematical sense, in what is now called Ashby’s Law of Requisite Variety, or sometimes the First Law of Cybernetics. The law tells us that to control a system completely, the controller must be as complex as the controlled. Thus cyberneticists tended to see control systems as a kind of analog of the systems they governed, like the homunculus - the hypothetical little person inside the brain who controls the actual person. This notion of analogous structure is sometimes confused with the notion of analog encoding of messages, but the two are logically distinct. >Cybernetics/Hillis. Hillis, D. W. “The First Machine Intelligences” in: Brockman, John (ed.) 2019. Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI. New York: Penguin Press. |
Brockman I John Brockman Possible Minds: Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI New York 2019 |
| Imagination | Holenstein | Münch III 324 Denken/Holenstein: es ist keineswegs so, wie man im Anschluss an Aristoteles jahrhundertelang geglaubt hat, dass Denken ohne bildliche Vorstellung als Fundament nicht möglich sei. Sie sind nicht nur epistemologisch entbehrlich, sondern auch beim psychologischen Entstehen von Denkleistungen. Münch III 331 Bild/Holenstein: bei einer bildlichen Repräsentation (Vorstellung) brauchen die räumlichen Verhältnisse nicht material, sondern nur funktional realisiert zu sein. Münch III 332 Homunculi/bildliche Vorstellung/HolensteinVsSearle: es ist ein beliebtes Argument gegen bildliche Repräsentation von mentalen Bildern, dass sie von Homunculi betrachtet werden müssten, die das Problem der Kodierung bloß verschieben. Holenstein: das ist eine ontologische Voraussetzung, die nicht den wissenschaftlichen Standards entspricht! Die Annahme von Homunculi bedarf einer besonderen Begründung! Statt Regress ist außerdem einfach ein geregelter Gebrauch einer physikalischen Struktur des Gehirns möglich. Münch III 336 Vorstellung/Holenstein: was wie Vorstellungen kausal auf Physikalisches einwirkt, ist per definitionem ebenfalls als "physikalisch" anzunehmen. Von mentalen Strukturen ist so anzunehmen, dass sie als funktionale Strukturen in physikalischen Strukturen verwirklicht sind. Münch III 338 Vorstellung/Holenstein: der Prozess findet "im Geist" statt, das Resultat wird in eine Welt hineinprojiziert, die sich entweder mit der Wahrnehmungswelt deckt, oder eine Alternative bildet. Elmar Holenstein, Mentale Gebilde, in: Dieter Münch (Hg) Kognitionswissenschaft, Frankfurt 1992 |
Mü III D. Münch (Hrsg.) Kognitionswissenschaft Frankfurt 1992 |
| Individuals | Mayr | I 205 Formation of Individuals/Biology/Mayr: Def Parthenogenesis: Asexuality: in some organisms, individuals develop themselves from the eggs, fertilization is not necessary. E.g. Aphids, plankton crustaceans: here sexual and asexual generations alternate. I 206 Sexuality: increases diversity and thus defense against diseases. I 207 Pangenesis theory: (old) theory, according to which each body cell contributes hereditary material. From Aristotle to the 19th century. PreformationVsEpigenesis (already in Aristotle, then to the nineteenth century). I 208 VsAristotle: Aristotle believed falsely, only female organisms could possess eggs. >Aristotle. I 209 Egg: the actual mammal was discovered only by Karl Ernst von Baer in 1828(1). It was recognized that the ovary is the counterpart to the testis. DNA: discovered by Johann Friedrich Miescher (19th century). I 211 Definition Preformation: Eggs produce individuals of the same species. Therefore it was concluded that egg or sperm is already a miniature of the future organism. Logical consequence: in this organism all future offspring must again be contained in a miniature edition (nesting). Numerous contemporary pictures did show such small miniature humans (homunculi) in the spermatozoon. I 212 Epigenesis: thought that the development came from an entirely unformed mass. "Vis essentialis." Each species has its own peculiar "essential force". This was completely opposed to the uniform forces described by the physicists, e.g. gravitation. Definition Epigenesis: Development during the life history of the individual, in contrast to ontogeny and phylogeny. Nevertheless, the epigenesis prevails in the controversy. Solution only in the 20th century: difference between Definition genotype (genetic constitution of the individual) and Definition phenotype (totality of perceptible characteristics). Cell: how does it come that the nerve cell develops so completely differently as a cell of the digestive tract? I 214 Cell division: Wilhelm Roux (1883)(2) concludes the complex internal differentiation of the cell: Solution: particles must be placed on a thread, and this is divided! Confirmed later. Cell: passes through a differentiation process, only a small part of the genes in the nucleus is active. Cell development: in taxa with regulatory development (e.g. vertebrate animals) there are no fixed early cell lines, but extensive cell migration. Induction (influence of already existing tissues on the development of other tissues) largely determines the specification of the cells. Cell migration: pigment and nerve cells make extensive migrations through the organism. Often they follow clear chemical stimuli. 1. E. v. Baer (1828). Entwickelungsgeschichte der Thiere: Beobachtung und Reflexion. Königsberg: Bornträger. 2. W. Roux (1883). Über die Bedeutung der Kerntheilungsfiguren. Leipzig: Engelmann. |
Mayr I Ernst Mayr This is Biology, Cambridge/MA 1997 German Edition: Das ist Biologie Heidelberg 1998 |
| Mental States | Dennett | Rorty VI 144 Rorty: (According to Wittgenstein: what would it look like when the sun revolved around the earth (i.e. just like it?) Qualia/Dennett: (like Smart and Place): "How would it look if there really were nothing more than a compound of electrochemical processes in your brain?" Cf. >Brains in a vat. Dennett I 274 Mind/Dennett: "PDP": Model of parallel distributed processing. Davidson, like Dennett: therefore the mind is not its own residence. VsDescartes. >Mind/Davidson. Mind/Meaning/Dennett: there once was a time when neither existed, nor error or function and no reasons. They were created along the way of the tiny improvements that evolution brought with it. (Finite regress). I 274ff Finite sequence of steps, without ever having to draw a line. Mind/Dennett: that's what mind is: no wonder apparatus, but a huge, semi-designed and self-transformaing compound of small appliances, each of which has its own designhistory and plays its own role. >Homunculi. I 283 Robot/Dennett: from the fact that we are descended from robots (e.g. hemoglobin, etc.) does not follow that we are robots! We are descended from bacteria, but we are not bacteria. Neither are we monkeys. But we are composed of robots! I 525 Mind/Evolution/Dennett: today, each and everyone of us is able to understand ideas that would have been unthinkable for geniuses from the generation of our grandparents. II 183 Mind/Dennett: a human mind without paper and pencil, without language to compare notes and making sketches is something we’ve never met. |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Mentalese | Mentalese: Mentalese is a language of which is assumed that it is used for information processing in the brain. It is supposed to differ from the everyday language, which would require a twofold translation. Critics argue that this makes the explanations simply complicated, or the brain requires a higher work performance than necessary. The homunculus argument has become known against the language of thought. J. Fodor: Signal language of the brain: for internal processing - H. PutnamVs: Mentalese explains nothing, shifts the problem. R. SearleVs: Regress of homunculi. - Rorty's solution is a hierarchy of dumber homunculi. |
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| Nature | Maupertuis | Gould IV 114 Nature/Maupertuis: thesis: Nature has an equal interest in the survival of all species.(1) >Evolution, >Species. IV 117 Embryology: in the 18th century: Thesis: There is a small homunculus in the egg. It didn't have to be a perfect miniature, but all structures had not only to be existent from the beginning, but also connected from the very beginning! Epigeneticians/MaupertuisVsEmbryology: Maupertuis's thesis: the visible signs of development must also be literally respected as truth. Gould: the embryo seemed to differentiate more complex parts from originally simpler ones. So it had to behave like that in reality. PreformismusVsEpigenese/VsMaupertuis: the argument: the microscopes of that time were not sufficient to recognize this. >Method, >Theory. MaupertuisVsPreformism: the oocytes of the homunculus had to contain other, much smaller homunculi, and this back over countless generations. Up to unimaginable tiny details. All the people of world history must already have been preformed in Eva's ovaries. IV 122 Maupertuis: Thesis: A kind of gravity would have to bring together the right parts to form a fetus. For example, an additional finger never springs from the belly or back of the head, but connects to the other five. IV 123 Gould: from today's point of view, this basic assumption was justified. Complexity cannot arise from transformed potential. There must be something in the egg and sperm. But today we have a completely different idea of this "something". >Forces, >Complexity. 1. P. L. M. de Maupertuis, Venus physique, Paris, (1745) |
Mauper I P. L. M. de Maupertuis The Earthly Venus 1966 Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989 |
| Qualia | Chalmers | I 251 Qualia/Missing Qualia/ChalmersVsBlock: (Block 1978)(1) Thought experiments, in which system properties that reflect a human consciousness system in an economy or in the Chinese population are realized as a whole, have at most intuitive power. They are intended to show that such a system, in which an individual e.g. should stand for a neuron, as a whole system cannot develop a consciousness. ChalmersVsBlock: just as intuitively, we argue, when we say that it is hardly credible that a piece of gray mass produces consciousness and yet it does! We would not see any experiences in an economy as a whole, but we do not do that in the brain either! >Analogies, >Thought experiments, >Levels/order, >Levels of description, >Comparisons, >Comparability. I 252 Likewise, we can explain the functioning of the whole system in the case of the population as well as the brain, even without conscious experiences. >Functions, >Experience. On the other hand, it would not in principle be ruled out that a corresponding organizational structure in a population as a whole would bring about conscious experience, but one would have to considerably increase the speed of the signal lines. BlockVsVs: we know about neurons that can do the job, we do not know this of homunculi (that would be individuals in the population in the example). I 253 Fading Qualia/VsChalmers: For example, suppose parts of the brain would be replaced by silicon chips (Pylyshyn 1980)(2), Savitt (1982)(3), Cuda (1985)(4), then it could be that Qualia faded or disappeared bit by bit. I 254 ChalmersVsVs: If the individual chips get enough input information (and if they check somewhere) then it makes no difference and the qualia remain. Bit by bit, all neurons could be replaced by chips. I 256 A being with weaker Qualia is systematically mistaken about everything it experiences. Things I perceive as different will be homogeneous for it. The being will nevertheless believe,... I 257 ...that it has these complex experiences that are actually missing him. It has lost contact with its experiences. This seems implausible. Fading Qualia: are nevertheless logically possible. >Logical possibility, cf. >Metaphysical possibility, >Physical possibility, >Possibility. I 261 ChalmersVsVs: it is reasonable to assume that no system can be misunderstood as to its experiences. I 262 Invariance of the behavior/VsChalmers: could there be a system that is completely differently structured than me, but behaves the same as I do? Such a system would have to be conscious in the same way! >Invariance, >Behavior. VsVs: On the other hand, Block's example of a huge display with all inputs and outputs is not surely conscious. (Block 1981)(5). So something must be wrong with the argument. ChalmersVsVs: 1. My argument does not apply to behaviourally equivalent systems. A perfect actor does not have to be of the same opinion as the person represented. 2. A thought experiment with equivalent behavior cannot be introduced bit by bit as with replacing neurons with electronic chips. I 263 A system like this would be rational in any case. I 266f Def Dancing Qualia/Chalmers: Assuming that 10%, 20%, 30% ... of the brain are replaced by silicon chips, and the resulting Qualia may change rapidly between systematically weak or unsystematic, we do not care. There must only be two points A and B so that... I 267 1. no more than 10% of the brain has been exchanged between A and B, and 2. A and B have significantly different experiences. Problem: There may be some unnoticed differences between different experiences. (> Sorites/Chalmers). Switch: we assume that I have a backup system of my brain and can switch back and forth from time to time. I 268 After switching, I'll be like the new system - we call it Bill. He may have a blue instead of my red experience. I could even go back and forth, that would be the dancing qualia. N.B.: when switching back and forth, I will not notice any difference! I 269 A change or altered behavior would require a functional difference between the two systems, contrary to the stipulated (functional) isomorphism. Since this is not the case, I cannot acquire any new beliefs, such as, for example, "My qualia just jumped." If it were otherwise, we would have to accept a completely new, changed psychology and phenomenology. N.B.: it could even be that our Qualia are actually constantly dancing in front of our eyes! I 270 The only place where you could draw a principal line would be the functional level! Solution/Chalmers: the only thing that prevents us from accepting the possibility of the dancing qualia in our own case is the following principle: Principle: If someone's conscious experiences change significantly, one notices the change. ((s) Circular between "significant" and "noticeable"). If we neglect the principle, we have no longer any defense against skepticism. >Skepticism. I 271 VsChalmers: Objections refer to gaps in the argument about the perception history, speed, weak inversions,... I 272 ...unnoticed qualia, which for their part are interchanged, e.g. at the edge of the facial field,... I 273 ...multiple changes. ChalmersVsVs: none of these arguments is critical for my argument. Absent Qualia/Chalmers: absent qualia are extremely implausible, dancing and interchanged Qualia are even extremely implausible. Functionalism: But this does not confirm functionalism in its strongest form (the thesis according to which the functional organization is constitutive for consciousness), since such qualia are not logically excluded. >Functionalism, >Functionalism/Chalmers. 1. N. Block, Troubles with functionalism. In: C. W. Savage (Ed) Perception and Cognition: Issues in the Foundatzion of Psychology. Minneapolis 1978. Reprinted in N. Block (Ed) Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology, Vol 1, Cambridge 1980. 2. Z. Pylyshyn, The "causal power" of machines. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3, 1980: pp. 442-44 3. S. Savitt, Searle's demon and the brain simulator reply. Behavioral and Brain Sciences5, 1982: pp. 342-43 4. T. Cuda, Against neural chauvinism. Philosophical Studies 48, 1985: pp. 111-27. 5. N. Block Psychologism and behaviorism Philosophical Review 90 (1):5-43 (1981). |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
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| Block, Ned | Shoemaker Vs Block, Ned | Block I 188 Block: And if there are no homunculi, they cannot be identical with a qualitative structure. ShoemakerVsBlock: asserts that the Def "argument of the missing qualia" is logically impossible. That means it is logically impossible that two systems are in the same functional state but one has a qualitative state, the other, however, does not! (I 218) (BlockVs). ShoemakerVsBlock: the problems with brains in the tank can be avoided if we introduce the concept of a "paradigm embodied person". Thus, a functioning sensory apparatus and a will control over movement is assumed. Then you can extend it to the functional character of non-paradigmatic: a physical structure that is not part of a paradigm embodied person, then passes as a realization of mental states, if it can be included without changing its internal structure and the types of relations between their states into a larger physical system, namely the body of the embodied paradigmatic person. Frank I 61 FodorVsFunctionalism/BlockVsFunctionalis/Frank: the so combined F. does not capture the Qualia, that is the actual mental states. E.g. inverted spectra: functionalism then no longer explains this consciousness experiences. ((s) For him, the inverted spectrum would be identical to the non-exchange?). Fodor/Block: nothing would be a token of the general type of state of pain, even if it was linked to all other mental states at all typical ways for pain. Fra I 62 "absent qualia argument"/argument of the missing qualia/Block/Fodor: even more fatal: the organism could behave exactly like that without qualia. ShoemakerVsBlock: defends the compatibility of the concession of qualia with functionalism. Qualia are intuitive for the consciousness, given without a transmission of a perception and their becoming a feeling is a completely adequate identification of their existence. |
Shoemaker I S. Shoemaker Identity, Cause, and Mind: Philosophical Essays Expanded Edition 2003 Block I N. Block Consciousness, Function, and Representation: Collected Papers, Volume 1 (Bradford Books) Cambridge 2007 Block II Ned Block "On a confusion about a function of consciousness" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Dodwell, P.C. | Rorty Vs Dodwell, P.C. | I 258 Dodwell/Rorty: what would someone like Dodwell answer to this argument? Dodwell pro analogy brain/computer. >Computation, >Computer Model. I 259 VsAnalogy Brain/Computer/Computation/RortyVsDodwell/VsAnalogies/Rorty: this analogy is trivial, because a program only codifies a set of operations and explains thinking as little as a set of logical formulas explain the laws of inference. F.o.th. a code adds nothing! (No additional insight). Dodwell: the analogy only becomes mandatory when different levels are distinguished. Hardware/Software. Conceptual level: "control process" - physiological level: hardware. The principle of operation of the subprograms cannot in turn be made understood by studying the hardware. Accordingly, the understanding how the subprograms themselves work does not help us to explain the principle of problem solving in the terminology of a sequence of steps. This requires consideration of the control process that embodies the overall organization of the machine. I 259 Analogy Brain/Computer/Computation/RortyVsDodwell/Rorty: trivial: a program may also be assumed for thinking - Dodwell: you have to assume different levels - (hardware/software) - the principle of subprograms cannot be understood by studying the hardware - solution: control process which embodies the overall organization of the machine - Analogy: in reality we do not recognize visual patterns not through selection of critical features, but by finding and comparing matching templates. This is neither a "conceptual" statement (about the "control process") nor a "physiological" statement (about the "hardware"), but nevertheless has a genuine explanatory value. I 260 The idea of a "subprogram" seems to give us precisely what psychology needs, an explanation that might be good for this tertium quid between common sense and physiology. Rorty: how does this help us against the regress arguments, though? Malcolm and Ryle would probably insist that the "templates" in turn bring up the same issues as the "consistency" which is to be explained by them. DodwellVsRyle: but that would only be the case if they were to serve to answer such general questions like "how is abstraction (recognition, constancy) possible?". But there are no answers to such questions apart from the pointless remark that nature had produced the appropriate material to such achievements! Wittgenstein similar: the fact that rules are implicit, and in any case not all the rules can be explicit, prevents recourse. (See Rules/Brandom). Recourse/Homunculus/Rorty: I think it is misleading to say the little man (homunculus) leads to regress, because I do not see how little machines are less "conscious" than small men. We cannot explore which of these bundles are "tinted with consciousness", in Quine's words, nor whether this tint is lacking. Familiarity with computers does not lead to such a discovery, but merely turns the intentional position into something common and casual. Inferring/Subconsciously/Helmholtz/Rorty: concept of "subconsciously inferring"! Perceptions as subconscious inferences. (RyleVs). I 261 Doubling/Rorty: the complaint that the templates like Lockean ideas led to a doubling of the explanandum is like the complaint that the particles of the Bohr atom doubled the billiard balls whose behavior they help to explain. ((s) 1) inversion, 2) analogies are not doubling anyway) Rorty: It turns out, however, that it is fruitful to postulate small billiard balls inside the big billiard balls. Model/Sellars: every model has its comment aside. Psychology/Rorty: we can assume the following comment for all anthropomorphic models of psychology: As long as we are at the level of subprograms, we are not set to attribute reason and character. I 262 No more than the talk of 'red sensations' determines the assumption of internal red-colored entities. However, if we ascend to the hardware level, then anthropomorphism is no longer appropriate. If we limited ourselves to the hardware level, sensations would play no role anymore. Then the computer analogy is no longer relevant, as little as with unicellular organisms. Complicated physiology arouses the need for psychology! Dodwell: subprograms cannot in turn be made understandable by studying the hardware, just as the purpose of multiplication tables cannot be seen by examining the brain. (Also Fodor: distinction between functions (program) and mechanics (hardware) in psychology is irreducible and not merely pragmatic.) RortyVsDodwell: that is seriously misleading: it contains a confusion of the evident idea: I 263 if we did not know what multiplication is, we could not even find it out by examination of the brain With the dubious statement: Even if we knew what multiplication is, we could not find out if someone has just multiplied by examining his brain. The latter is doubtful. RortyVsDodwell: the question of what can best be explained by hardware, and what better through the programs, depends on how ad hoc or manageable the hardware in question is. Whether something is ad hoc or manageable, clearly depends on the choice of vocabulary and attraction level. And that's precisely why this is also true for the hardware/software distinction itself. Rorty: Yes, you can imagine machines whose structure can be found out easier by opening them than by looking at the programs. Rorty: the brain is almost certainly no such machine. But that it is possible with some machines is an important philosophical principle. I 263/264 It shows that the difference between psychology and physiology is no stronger difference between two subject areas than, for example, the difference between chemistry and physics. Regress/Rorty: the argument of duplication is simply due to a poorly asked question. (VsMalcolm and VsRyle "How is movement possible?" "Why does nature follow laws?"). I 265 Dodwell/Rorty: models such as that of Dodwell are not brought forward for solving Cartesian pseudo-problems, nor as discoveries about any non-physical entities. Then the argument of recourse is not valid. I 266 For the prognostic success would make it sufficiently clear that these objects of psychological research really exist. Ryle: Dilemma between learned and innate skills: RortyVsRyle: Dodwell's models allow us to admit easily that nature must have installed some innate skills in us so that we can perform our higher mental operations. At least some of the homunculi must have existed there from birth. And why not? (SearleVs). Why should subprograms in the shape of chromosomes not be incorporated? The question as to which are added later is surely not important for understanding the human nature. Psychology/Rorty: postulates "intervening variables" as a mere placeholders for undiscovered neural processes. Psychology: if it was discovered that physiology will never explain everything, it would not make psychology something dubious. I 267 Abstract/Rorty: it will not surprise us that something "abstract" like the ability to detect similarities, was not obtained, nor was the so 'concrete' ability to respond to the note C sharp. Abstract/Concrete/RortyVsFodor: the entire distinction of abstract/concrete (also Kant) is questionable. No one can say where the line is to be drawn. (Similar to the idea of the "irreducibly psychical" in contrast to the "irreducibly physical".) |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Putnam, H. | Block Vs Putnam, H. | I 179 Pain/Functionalism/Putnam: Thesis: pain is a functional state. Thesis: no organism that can feel pain, allows a decomposition into parts that have separate descriptions. E.g. a swarm of bees as a whole cannot be a single pain feeler. BlockVsPutnam: 1) that could be modified in a way that the parts may not all have one organization that are characteristic of sentient beings. This would not exclude a system with homunculi!. E.g. sense organs have also insentient parts!. 2) Also vice versa it should not be said that no real part may feel: E.g. otherwise, pregnant women and organisms infested with parasites would not be considered as pain feeling beings. Block: what is important is that the sentient beings play a crucial role in giving the thing its functional organization. I 192 Best explanation/Abduction/Block: E.g. Psycho functionalism: you could say: "What else could mental states be, if not psycho-functional states?" (Putnam per psycho functionalism, 1967). "Better explanation than behaviorism or materialism. BlockVsPutnam: this is a dubious use of the inference to the best explanation. Because what guarantees us that an answer to the question "What are mental states?" exists at all?. In addition, the conclusion about the best explanation is not applicable if there are no acceptable explanations. ((s) If nothing is useful, what is available?) |
Block I N. Block Consciousness, Function, and Representation: Collected Papers, Volume 1 (Bradford Books) Cambridge 2007 Block II Ned Block "On a confusion about a function of consciousness" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 |
| Qualia | Block Vs Qualia | Block I 198 It could be said that some homunculi have saved sentences and "remember" them. However, that is no reason to suppose Qualia. To have qualia is not a matter of information processing. Theory/Block: The system that we are discussing here is something to which every true psychological theory applies according to the hypothesis. Any doubt that it has qualia would be a doubt that qualia belong in the field of psychology. Vs: That can only be cognitive psychology. No wonder that qualia do not belong to this area. BlockVsVs: I am not thinking of cognitive psychology: Instead, nothing that we know about the psychological processes underlying our conscious mental life has anything to do with Qualia! Only psychophysics could be designed in a way that it would be about Qualia on its own initiative. But it would only have to do with functional aspects, not with a qualitative character. So it would not enlighten the Qualia. Block I 200 Dennett: Thesis: contents of consciousness consist only of judgments. Qualia are probably not judgments (opinions). Then they are artificial theoretical entities that we postulate to explain the desire to predict everything about what is going on in our minds. BlockVsDennett: he has the same relation to qualia that the American Air Force has to Vietnamese villages: he destroys them, to save them. I 200 Argument of the lack of Qualia/Block: uses the possibility that the functional* and the psycho-functional state that are to be identified with pain, can occur without a Quale existing at the same time. It seems at least conceivable that a quale can occur without the functional state. E.g. split-brain patients report that they still feel pain, although the pain no longer torments them. They recognize pinpricks as sharp, but do not avoid them. |
Block I N. Block Consciousness, Function, and Representation: Collected Papers, Volume 1 (Bradford Books) Cambridge 2007 |
| Qualia | Functionalism Vs Qualia | Lanz I 293 Functionalism - representation - homunculi - materialism - hierarchy (VsRegress) - Token-Token identity FunctionalismVsQualia problem: (Jaegwon Kim / Davidson): functionalists are materialists because they believe that the bearers of the functional roles are ultimately physical entities. "Token-token identity". VsType-type identity: does not allow for the possibility that one and the same type of mental state is realized in different physical states. (Turing machine). |
Lanz I Peter Lanz Vom Begriff des Geistes zur Neurophilosophie In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 |
| Representation | Pinker Vs Representation | I 353 Ideas/PinkerVsRepresentation/Pinker: we shape very detailed images in our mind, e.g. if we are to imagine how the ears of a dog are shaped. I 356 Pinker: I am skeptical when cancer patients are to imagine the destruction of their tumors. Mental Image/Pinker: is rejected by many philosophers because of problems with homunculi and recourse. (Also BehaviorismVsMental Images, VsRepresentation). In reality, the computer theory of the mind makes it quite easy: a mental image is simply a two-and-a-half dimensional sketch (curved surface, wherein depth is neglected). It is simply called up from the long-term memory. This is how many AI programs are constructed. I 357 E.g. "An equilateral triangle stands on a circle": these words do not represent any points in the visual field, they express relationships. |
Pi I St. Pinker How the Mind Works, New York 1997 German Edition: Wie das Denken im Kopf entsteht München 1998 |
| Searle, J.R. | Verschiedene Vs Searle, J.R. | Lanz I 296 VsSearle/VsChinese Room: (Lanz): the brain is also a purely syntactic machine. So in the end there is nothing left but the path taken by cognitive science: to look for subpersonal cognitive processes under as many realistic assumptions as possible! Münch III 332 Homunculi/pictorial representation/HolensteinVsSearle: it is a popular argument against pictorial representation of mental images that they must be viewed by homunculi who merely shift the problem of coding. Holenstein: this is an ontological prerequisite that does not meet scientific standards! The assumption of homunculi requires special justification! Instead of recourse, a regulated use of a physical structure of the brain is also possible. Elmar Holenstein, Mentale Gebilde, in: Dieter Münch (Hg) Kognitionswissenschaft, Frankfurt 1992 Tetens IV 115 Def Meaning/Searle/Tetens: an expression has meaning if the speaker expresses meaning with it! (Mental act of "giving meaning"). Artificial Intelligence/TetensVsSearle: the machine can also do the "giving" of meaning with the help of the programmer! So not only "pure syntax" in the machine, as Searle means, but also semantics. Tetens IV 117 Tetens: let us assume that we would come to the conclusion that a machine can only behave like a human being if it completely resembles the human organism. Then we would not learn anything about humans from it that we do not already know. In this respect the artificial intelligence is philosophically neutral. Searle I 26 VsSearle: I was accused of representing "property dualism" and "privileged access" and believed in "introspection". I 27 But I did not represent that explicitly anywhere. Searle I 126 Searle Thesis: my approach in the philosophy of mind: the biological naturalism. VsSearle: this is sometimes confronted with the following argument: if we can imagine that the same behavior can be produced by a zombie without consciousness, then why did evolution produce consciousness at all? I 127 But it is a false assumption that every biologically inherited trait must give the organism an advantage in selection. For example, the passion for alpine skiing certainly has a biological basis that is not the result of practice or training. It may be that we have more general biological needs that are satisfied by these activities. I 288 Foot Note: There is a distinction between what is selected and what is selected for. III 39 GiddensVsSearle: against the description of the distinction between regulative and constitutive rules. |
Lanz I Peter Lanz Vom Begriff des Geistes zur Neurophilosophie In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Mü III D. Münch (Hrsg.) Kognitionswissenschaft Frankfurt 1992 Tetens I H. Tetens Geist, Gehirn, Maschine Stuttgart 1994 W VII H. Tetens Tractatus - Ein Kommentar Stuttgart 2009 Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
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