Lexicon of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 21 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Competence Chomsky
 
Books on Amazon:
Noam Chomsky
I 307
Competence/ChomskyVsHarman: I do not claim that they consist in "knowing-that", that language is described by the rules of grammar - Competence/ChomskyVsHarman: not a number of habits, no reference to the ability of the cyclist - instead the mastery of generative grammar - (non-formulated knowledge) - less than the ability to speak a language. ---
Searle VIII 404
Competence/performance/Chomsky: Thesis: performance is just the peak of the iceberg of competence. ---
VIII 437
SearleVsChomsky: the distinction is wrong: he assumes that a theory of speech acts must be more like a theory of performance than one of competence - he does not see that ultimately competence is a performance competence - ChomskyVsSpeech act theory: suspects behaviorism behind it. SearleVs: not true, because speech act theory involves intention. ---
Searle VIII 409
Chomsky: new: object of study is the language skills - old: random number of sentences, classifications. ChomskyVsStructuralism: a theory must be able to explain which chains represent sentences and which do not. ---
VIII 414
SearleVsChomsky: not clear how the grammatical theory provides the knowledge of the speaker.

Cho I
N. Chomsky
Aspekte der Syntaxtheorie Frankfurt 1978

Cho II
N. Chomsky
Language and Mind Cambridge 2006


S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983
Competence Searle
 
Books on Amazon:
John R. Searle
VIII 404
Competence/Performance/Chomsky: Thesis: Performance is just the tip of the iceberg of competence. ---
VIII 437
SearleVsChomsky: the distinction is misled: he assumes that a theory of speech acts must be rather a theory of performance than one of competence - r does not see that competence is ultimately performance competence - ChomskyVsSpeech Act Theory: suspects behaviorism behind it. SearleVs: this is not true, because Speech Act Theory involves intention. ---
VIII 409/10
Chomsky: new: object of study is language skills - old: indiscriminate sets of sentences, classifications. ChomskyVsStructuralism: a theory must be able to explain which chains represent sentences and which do not. ---
VIII 414
SearleVsChomsky: not clear how the grammatical theory provides the knowledge of the speaker.

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Criteria Chomsky
 
Books on Amazon:
Noam Chomsky
I 345
Criteria/mental states/Wittgenstein: mental states or the "inner workings of the mind" do not provide a criterion for the proper use of an expression. ---
I 346
ChomskyVsWittgenstein: here it is not about a "real statement" e.g. if someone reads something, but about a legitimate claim - e.g. mirage: can provoke a legitimate (incorrect) assertion.

Cho I
N. Chomsky
Aspekte der Syntaxtheorie Frankfurt 1978

Cho II
N. Chomsky
Language and Mind Cambridge 2006

Deep Structure Chomsky
 
Books on Amazon:
Noam Chomsky
I 269F
Surface Structure/Chomsky: Determination of a hierarchy of parts of sentences that belong to specific categories: noun phrase, verb phrase, adjective phrase, etc. E.g. John is certain that Bill will leave. John is certain to leave: - similar surface structure, different deep structure. ---
I 273
Surface Structure/Chomsky: Assumption: it contributes nothing to the meaning. The contribution an expression makes to the sentence is defined by the deep structure (> compositionality) ChomskyVsAnalytic Philosophy: if different intensions were to change their meaning after substitution, there would have to be a corresponding difference in the deep structure, which is unlikely. ---
I 276f
Deep Structure/Chomsky: plays a role in the mental representation of sentences.

Cho I
N. Chomsky
Aspekte der Syntaxtheorie Frankfurt 1978

Cho II
N. Chomsky
Language and Mind Cambridge 2006

Epistemology Putnam
 
Books on Amazon
III 87
Interest/knowledge/epistemology/recognition/Putnam: recognition is driven by interests (ChomskyVs) - but VsChomsky: that does not mean that we are free to choose our interests - or that interests were not open to criticism - also reasonableness depends on the circumstances - the claim that a term is relative to interests does not mean that all interests were equally reasonable. ---
I 200
Kripke/Putnam: assumes that we have something like "intellectual intuition" - PutnamVsKripke - that should correspond to a "transcendental correspondence"?

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu II
H. Putnam
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Pu III
H. Putnam
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Pu IV
H. Putnam
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Grammar Chomsky
 
Books on Amazon:
Noam Chomsky
Searle VIII 414
ChomskyVsStructuralism: phrase structure rules alone cannot resolve ambiguities - e.g. Active/Passive - Solution/Chomsky: transformation rules, transformation phrase markers by permutation, insertion, eradication of elements in other phrase markers - then the syntax consists of two components: base and transformation. ---
VIII 418
Deep structure/Chomsky: determines the meaning - Surface structure: determines the phonetic form (late works: sometimes the meaning) - Syntax/Chomsky: is to be separated from semantics - (according to Searle): man is a syntactic creature, the brain is syntactic. ---
VIII 421
SearleVsChomsky: from this it would follow that if one day we had syntactically modified forms, we would have no language anymore, but something else. ---
VIII 421
Generative grammar/NeogrammariansVsChomsky: semantics crucial for the formation of syntactic structures.

Cho I
N. Chomsky
Aspekte der Syntaxtheorie Frankfurt 1978

Cho II
N. Chomsky
Language and Mind Cambridge 2006


S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983
Grue Chomsky
 
Books on Amazon:
Noam Chomsky
I 290
Grue/ChomskyVsGoodman: marginal problem - the initial question is much too vague - you can easily find a property of language "grue bleen" which is not a property of a "languange like German" - e.g. the predicate "being similar", only applied to objects rather than to qualia - Chomsky: there is no point in time t such that we can predict of objects that they will not be similar - they could be the similar if both were green - it is a property of natural languages ​​that they behave more like German than like "grue bleen" - but language concepts such as "German" are too vague to satisfy Goodman’s criterion - we cannot explain why the learner does not acquire grue as basis for generalisation - that certainly follows from the sensory system.

Cho I
N. Chomsky
Aspekte der Syntaxtheorie Frankfurt 1978

Cho II
N. Chomsky
Language and Mind Cambridge 2006

Indeterminacy Chomsky
 
Books on Amazon:
Noam Chomsky
I 325
Indeterminacy of translation/Quine/Chomsky: According to this theory all the suggestions for the translation should be able to be "compatible with the totality of speech disposition, but incompatible with each other." (Q + O, 27) - Chomsky: that is not possible because of the problems associated with the probability. The thesis when all probabilities are indistinguishable, both inside and outside of a language - Quine: circumvents the problem by starting not from the "totality of dispositions" but from the "stimulus meaning". ---
I 325
Translation ambiguity, vagueness: ChomskyVsQuine: Disposition either in terms of stimulus, or in relation to the total corpus of the language: then all sentences are equally likely - (reference classes).

Cho I
N. Chomsky
Aspekte der Syntaxtheorie Frankfurt 1978

Cho II
N. Chomsky
Language and Mind Cambridge 2006

Indeterminacy Quine
 
Books on Amazon:
Willard V. O. Quine
Rorty I 227
McDowellVsQuine: If truth is underdetermined by the entirety of the observable, then it must be independent of it. This is absurd for verificationists, therefore one must not understand it realistically. This strategy would imply, however, that one includes biology, but excludes translation.
ChomskyVsQuine: there is only one indeterminacy: the familiar underdeterminacy of each theory through all observations.
((s) You never know whether all the observations are taken into account, or are already done.
---
Quine I 257
Indeterminate singular terms do not designate objects. - An indefinite singular term must therefore stand in purely significant position: E.g. "The tax inspector is looking for someone" (position significant - "someone" is not significant). ---
I 283
Indefinite singular term: disappears in quantification "something is an x such that", "everything is an x .." ---
I 285
Beliefs and quotes can be understood as infinite different things (Indeterminacy). ---
II 33
Inscrutability of reference: no difference: "x is a dog" or "x is the spatiotemporal strand, which is filled by a dog" - only one statement about the used terminology and its translation, not about physical objects (representative function). - Inscrutability: occurs in translation or permutation. ---
VI 69
Indeterminacy of translation/syntax/Quine: the ambiguity does not extend to the syntax - but on the referential apparatus: plural endings, equal signs, quantifiers - but these are not part of syntax. ---
XII 60
Indeterminacy of translation/Quine: E.g. numbers of Neumann, Frege, Zermelo: each definition is correct, but they are all incompatible with one another. - Solution: we invent set-theoretic models which must comply with the laws that fulfill the numbers in non-explicit meaning - Problem: you do not know if you talk about the terms or about the Goedel numbers - (> shifted ostension). ---
XII 62
Indeterminacy of translation/Native language/Quine: the indeterminacy of translation is also valid in a language: E.g. we may translate the "hopefully" of a particular speaker better differently - principle of indulgence: justifies deviations from the homophonic translation, reproduction by the same phoneme order - compensation: can be made by corrections to the predicates - problem: we cannot ask: "are you really referring to Goedel numbers?" - Because the answer: "to numbers" lost its right to homophonic translation - ((s) because of the principle of indulgence). ---
XII 97
Indeterminacy/translation/Gavagai/linguistics/Quine: the linguist always comes to an accurate translation, but only because he unconsciously makes arbitrary decisions - decisive: the holism: statements cannot be isolated. - ((S) any differences can be compensated in other partial-translations.)

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q II
W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Q III
W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Q IX
W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Q V
W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Q VI
W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Q VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Q VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Q X
W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003


Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Innateness Locke
 
Books on Amazon
Danto I 113
Imagination/innate/Locke: Thesis imagination is innate - (ChomskyVs). - Simple ideas cannot be imagined. ---
Euchner I 17
Ideas/LockeVs innate ideas: would they exist, cultures could not diverge this way. ---
I 19
Spirit: blank blackboard. ---
Arndt II 191
innate ideas/tradition/Arndt: certain independence of ideas and language, recognition without language, representation.

Loc III
J. Locke
An Essay Concerning Human Understanding


Dt I
A. C. Danto
Wege zur Welt München 1999

Dt III
Arthur C. Danto
Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998

Dt VII
A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005

Loc I
W. Euchner
Locke zur Einführung Hamburg 1996

Loc II
H.W. Arndt
Locke
In
Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen - Neuzeit I, J. Speck (Hg), Göttingen 1997
Inscrutability of reference Newen, A./Schrenk, M.
 
Books on Amazon
NS I 76
Inscrutability/Gavagai/Quine/Newen/Schrenk: 1. inscrutability of reference: E.g. non-severed rabbit parts fulfil the same observation situations. - 2. inscrutability of translation: E.g. non-severed rabbit parts: can a) "be the same" b) "be part of the same thing". In each case in the foreign language. That is proceeding the inscrutability of reference - 3. underdetermination (if a theory) by the data: (corresponds to the translation inscrutability): there may be rival theories that fit to the same set of observations - VsQuine:. it never comes to radical translations because many aspects of the language are evolutionarily formalized in the brain and cannot vary greatly -. (ChomskyVsQuine) - Then there is only the 3. inscrutability.

Language Chomsky
 
Books on Amazon:
Noam Chomsky
I 279 (where?)
Language/Chomsky: apart from its mental representation, it has no objective existence. Therefore, we do not need to distinguish here between "systems of beliefs" and "knowledge". ---
I 319
Language/ChomskyVsQuine: must separate language and theory - otherwise, two speakers of the same language could have no disagreement. ---
I 330
Language/Chomsky/Quine: no frame of a tentative theory as in physics - several analytical hypotheses not only possible but necessary - ChomskyVsQuine: Vs "property space": not sure whether the concepts of the language can be explained with physical dimensions - Aristotle: rather associated with actions - VsQuine: not evident that similarities can be localized in a room - principles, not "learned sentences". ---
I 333
VsQuine: cannot be dependent on "disposition for reaction", otherwise moods, eye injuries, nutritional status, etc. would be essential. ---
I 343
Perhaps language does not have to be taught. ---
Graeser I 121f
Language/ChomskyVsGrice: Question: should the main aspect really be communication? - Searle: rather representation, but not as opposite - Meaning/VsGrice: most of the sentences of a language have never been uttered, so anyone can hardly ever have meant something by them - Meaning/VsGrice: We can only ever find out speaker meanings, because we know what the sentence means. - Students of Grice: Strawson and Searle. ---
Münch III 320
Language/Chomsky/Holenstein: no natural kind.

Cho I
N. Chomsky
Aspekte der Syntaxtheorie Frankfurt 1978

Cho II
N. Chomsky
Language and Mind Cambridge 2006


Grae I
A. Graeser
Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002

Mü I
D. Münch (Hrsg.)
Kognitionswissenschaft Frankfurt 1992
Language Harman
 
Books on Amazon
Chomsky I 306
Language / Harman: because it is obviously not a knowledge-that, it must be a knowledge-how
I 308
HarmanVsChomsky: the internal system for the selection of a grammar should be presented in a more fundamental language that would already have to be understood by the child - ChomskyVsVs: there is perhaps a more fundamental language, but the child does not have to speak it - the child has to learn the native language, but maybe it already actually masters a grammar.

Harm I
G. Harman
Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity 1995


Cho I
N. Chomsky
Aspekte der Syntaxtheorie Frankfurt 1978

Cho II
N. Chomsky
Language and Mind Cambridge 2006
Language Acquisition Chomsky
 
Books on Amazon:
Noam Chomsky
I 281
Learning/Chomsky: a child learns as well Japanese as English - pointless to ask "which hypotheses it reduces" - there must be more than the ability to associate - structural grammar does not yield the structures that we have to postulate as generative grammar. ---
I 283
Internal organization plays an important role for the perception, it determines an extremely restrictive initial scheme. ---
I VsGoodman 285
Learning a second language is not that different. ---
I 299
Learning/Chomsky: whether the evaluation function is learned or it is the basis for learning, is an empirical question. ---
I 324
Language learning: behaviorist/Quine: Conditioning, association - ChomskyVsQuine: additionally principles , only by them infinitely many sentenes are explainable.

Cho I
N. Chomsky
Aspekte der Syntaxtheorie Frankfurt 1978

Cho II
N. Chomsky
Language and Mind Cambridge 2006

Language Evolution Gärdenfors
 
Books on Amazon:
Peter Gärdenfors
I 71
Language Evolution/Evolution/Language/Gärdenfors: Thesis: in early forms of communication the communicative act itself was more important than its expressive form. (See H. Clark, 1992, Winter, 1998, Gärdenfors, 2010). Therefore, the pragmatics of natural language is evolutionary seen the fundamental. Later, when the communication acts become more diverse and independent of the immediate context, the semantics is brought to the fore. Syntax is needed when the communication becomes even more conventional later: markers are used to establish uniqueness. Then syntax is used only for the most subtle aspects of communication. VsGärdenfors: this is in contrast to most contemporary authors in linguistics.
ChomskyVsGärdenfors: for Chomsky's school syntax is at the beginning of the investigation, semantic features are added only when grammar is not enough.
GärdenforsVsChomsky.
---
I 72
Pragmatics/GärdenforsVsChomsky/Gärdenfors: For Chomsky, the pragmatics is only the waste basket for the remains: context, deixis, etc.). Gärdenfors: for a theory of the evolution of language, we must proceed differently: pragmatics before semantics before syntax. ---
I 73
Language formation/Gärdenfors: just as the money was later added to the exchange economy and made it more efficient, the language was added to the existing communication among humans. Analogy/linguistic communication/monetary economy/Gärdenfors: one can extend the analogy: just as the money allows a stable price system, a relatively stable system of meanings is formed by language.
Game theoretical explanation/analogy: just as prices, linguistic meanings are also equilibrium points in a system. (> Meeting of minds).
---
I 78
Langauge Formation/Communication/Gärdenfors: Thesis: growing semantic complexity is achieved by extending the domains in the shared conceptual space. One can understand the linking of different domains as the creation of product spaces. ((s) Product space: Cartesian coordinate system, where one axis corresponds to a conceptual dimension.) This is how domains are combined.

Gä I
P. Gärdenfors
The Geometry of Meaning Cambridge 2014

Method Chomsky
 
Books on Amazon:
Noam Chomsky
I 278
Method/theory/Chomsky: requirement; we must be able to describe what the person receives - the percept itself is a construction of the first order - its properties are determined experiment. Grammar: construction of the second-order - for this one must abstract from the other factors involved in the use and understanding of language and refer to internalized knowledge of the speaker - VsBehaviorismus: excludes the concept of "what is perceived" and "what is learned" from the outset. ---
I ~ 297ff
Method/theory: PutnamVsChomsky: certain ambiguities can only be discovered through routine, therefore their postulated explanation by Chomsky's grammar is not that impressive - ChomskyVsPutnam: he misunderstands it, in fact this refers to competence and not to performance - routine does not matter here, but the inherent correlation between sound and meaning. ---
I 303
Chomsky: my universal grammar is not a "theory of language acquisition", but one element of it - my thesis is an "all-at-once" proposal and does not try to capture the interplay between the tentative hypotheses constructed by the child and new data interpreted with them. ---
I 316
Method/theory/Chomsky: "association", "reinforcement", "random mutation ": hide our ignorance - (s) something dissimilar may also be associated. ---
I 321
Method/theory/ChomskyVsQuine: his concept of "reinforcement" is almost empty - if reinforcement is needed for learning, it means that learning cannot happen without data. ---
I 323
Language Learning/ChomskyVsQuine: he does not explain it: if only association and conditioning, then the result is merely a finite language. ---
I 324
VsQuine: concept of probability of a sentence is empty: the fact that I utter a particular German sentence is as unlikely as a particular Japanese sentence from me.

Cho I
N. Chomsky
Aspekte der Syntaxtheorie Frankfurt 1978

Cho II
N. Chomsky
Language and Mind Cambridge 2006

Omniscience Hintikka
 
Books on Amazon
I XV
Logical omniscience/Hintikka: Thesis: is only a supposed problem. ChomskyVsHintikka: he has given the alleged paradox as the reason for his rejection of any model-theoretical semantics for propositional attitudes.
HintikkaVsChomsky: his problem has been solved long ago.
---
I 21
Omniscience/Solution/Hintikka: we must allow individuals to not exist in every possible world. Otherwise, all world lines would have to be ad libitum extendable, then everyone would have to know what an individual would be in any world (in whatever disguise), namely on the basis of the form of knowledge + indirect W-question. ---
I 23
Logical omniscience/epistemic logic/model theory/Hintikka: Problem: Suppose (S1> S2). That is, all S1 models are S2 models. Then all the epistemic alternatives in which S1 is true are those in which S2 is true.
Problem: it follows that for each knowing person b and every scenario applies:
(3.1) {b} KS1> {b} K S2.
That is, one must also know all the logical consequences of one's knowledge.
This has led some to reject model theory.
Model theory/HintikkaVsVs: this follows only if one cannot avoid omniscience, and one can avoid it.
Solution: one can find a subset of logical consequences (S1 > S2) for which (3.1) applies.
(i) This subset can be restricted syntactically. The number of free individual symbols together with the number of layers of quantifiers limit the number of individuals that can be considered in a set S (or in an argument).
Solution: this number (parameter) should not be greater than the one in S1 or S2 at any point in the argument.
Problem: there is no simple axiomatic-deductive system for this.

Hin I
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

W I
J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Surface Structure Chomsky
 
Books on Amazon:
Noam Chomsky
I 269F
Surface Structure/Chomsky: finding a hierarchy of phrases that belong to certain categories: noun phrase, verb phrase, adjective phrase, etc. E.g. John is certain Bill wants to leave - John is certain to leave: similar surface structure, different deep structure. ---
I 273
Surface Structure/Chomsky: Assumption: it contributes nothing to the meaning - what contribution a term makes to the sentence, is adjusted by the deep structure (> compositionality) - ChomskyVsAnalytic Philosophy: if different intensions after substitution should change the meaning, there would have to be a corresponding difference in the deep structure, which is unlikely.

Cho I
N. Chomsky
Aspekte der Syntaxtheorie Frankfurt 1978

Cho II
N. Chomsky
Language and Mind Cambridge 2006

Synonymy Chomsky
 
Books on Amazon:
Noam Chomsky
I 335
Synonymy/ChomskyVsQuine: false idealization: not "equality in the terms" causes synonymous expressions - not assertibility conditions (circumstances) but it is about distinguishing between langue and parole, between competence and performance.

Cho I
N. Chomsky
Aspekte der Syntaxtheorie Frankfurt 1978

Cho II
N. Chomsky
Language and Mind Cambridge 2006

Transformational Grammar Chomsky
 
Books on Amazon:
Noam Chomsky
I 271
Chomsky: thesis: in any language, surface structures are produced by "grammatical transformation" from "deep structures" - Definition transformation: Representation of an indexed bracket on an indexed bracket, e.g. [S[NPJohn][VP is [AP Certain] [VP ...] - deep structure: even an indexed bracket - the large class of deep structure is specified by basic rules - deep structure: subject and predicate may be exchanged - deep structures are limited in their variance. ---
I 296
Transformation/Grammar/ChomskyVsPutnam: Transformations are not rules but operations - (for creating surface structures from deep structures). ---
Strawson VI 395
Transformational grammar Vs traditional grammar: it is supposed to be too unsystematic, no explanation with the traditional concepts "verb" , "noun", "object" is possible - transformational grammer Vs formal logic. ---
397 VI
Grammar/Strawson: must distinguish between essential and non-essential connections.

Cho I
N. Chomsky
Aspekte der Syntaxtheorie Frankfurt 1978

Cho II
N. Chomsky
Language and Mind Cambridge 2006


Str I
P.F. Strawson
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Str IV
P.F. Strawson
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Str V
P.F. Strawson
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981
Underdetermination Chomsky
 
Books on Amazon:
Noam Chomsky
I 337
Underdetermination/Indeterminacy/Theory/ChomskyVsQuine: each hypothesis goes beyond the data, otherwise it would be uninteresting.

Cho I
N. Chomsky
Aspekte der Syntaxtheorie Frankfurt 1978

Cho II
N. Chomsky
Language and Mind Cambridge 2006


The author or concept searched is found in the following 19 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Artificial Intelligence Chomsky Vs Artificial Intelligence
 
Books on Amazon:
Noam Chomsky
Dennett I 540
Language / ChomskyVsArtificial Intelligence: the child shall later only switch whether it is learning Chinese or English, but it is not a "general problem solver". Even "slow" children "learn" jspeak well! They do not "learn" it, just as birds do not learn their feathers.
I 541
Dennett per Chomsky. But if he s right, the phenomena of language are much more difficult to explore.

Cho I
N. Chomsky
Aspekte der Syntaxtheorie Frankfurt 1978

Cho II
N. Chomsky
Language and Mind Cambridge 2006

Den I
D. Dennett
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Den II
D. Dennett
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999
Behaviorism Chomsky Vs Behaviorism
 
Books on Amazon:
Noam Chomsky
Dantos2 I 268
Rotating figuresVsBehaviorism > Mental representation (inner r.)Vsintrospection (ChomskyVsBehaviorism) - FodorVsBehaviorism
Chomsky I 278
ChomskyVsBehaviorism: has proven to be quite unfruitful. It excludes the concept of "what is perceived" and of "what is learnt" from the start. I 351 ChomskyVsBehaviorism: is just as if you were to call physics the "science of reading scales".

Searle VIII 404
ChomskyVsBehaviorism: fundamental confusion between data and object of investigation.

Cho II
N. Chomsky
Language and Mind Cambridge 2006

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983
Behaviorism Fodor Vs Behaviorism
 
Books on Amazon
Danto I 268
Rotary FiguresVsBehaviorism > Mental Representation (inner r) VsIntrospection (ChomskyVsBehaviorism) - FodorVsBehaviorism
Fodor/Lepore IV 56
VsBehaviorism/Fodor/Lepore: E.g. Assuming "dog" and "shmog" are two words with which speakers react to exactly the same stimuli, namely dogs. Then would follow for e.g. Skinner that "dog" and "shmog" are synonymous. Then, the following sentence would be analytical in the language of the speaker: "Whatever is a dog, is a shmog." QuineVs: there are neither synonyms nor analytic sentences! IV 57 So Skinner’s semantics must be wrong. VsVs: namely a priori! Even worse: all the semantics must be wrong, a priori, because these nihilistic theory will say that there are no semantic properties at all. Fodor/Lepore: what went wrong this time? We have taken literally, that Quine has not shown in Two Dogmas (TD) (and also has not argued) that there are no semantic facts and no analytic truths. Meaning/Fodor/Lepore: what we rather concede is that if meaning is to have any sense at all, then it cannot be reconstructed by reference to the sentences to which the speaker agrees. Meaning/TD/Quine: cannot be reduced to the inferences to which one is willing to agree. Reason: what inferences you agree to only depends on how you see the world, i.e. what you intend your words to mean. ((s)> interest, intention, meaning). Important argument: In that, it is impossible to detect which of his views the speaker accepts a priori! So there are no analytic sentences.
IV 195
Qualia/Quality/Sensation/Exchanged Spectra/Fodor/Lepore: it is conceptually possible that while you see something red, I see something green. If the exchange is systematic, there is nothing in the behavior that could uncover it. VsBehaviorism/VsFunctionalism: the reversed spectra thus seem to indicate that behaviorism is wrong. And also functionalism! (Block/Fodor, Shoemaker). You might think that a theory of qualitative content could solve the problem. But it is precisely the qualitative content that has been exchanged. And it is precisely the concept of the perceptual identity that becomes ambiguous because of that. VsChurchland: his approach does not help at all. The labels of the dots on the dice could be exactly reversed. ((s) You could always describe them without knowing what feelings are present in the other.).

F/L
J. Fodor/E. Lepore
Holism Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992

Dt I
A. C. Danto
Wege zur Welt München 1999

Dt III
Arthur C. Danto
Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998

Dt VII
A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005
Bloomfield, L. Chomsky Vs Bloomfield, L.
 
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Noam Chomsky
Lyons I 237
ChomskyVsBloomfield: speaks of creation. Generative method > generative grammar. BloomfieldVsChomsky: speaks of analysis (classification).
generative grammar/Chomsky/Lyons: sets limits to the classification. E.g. longlegs/Bloomfield: are exocentric so that they can occur both as singular as well as plural. However, this shows that these forms are no constructions. They must rather be registered in the lexicon as not further analyzable entities. Distribution: of E.g. longlegs is different from that of long legs. BloomfieldVsChomsky: this cannot be accounted for with a productive formation rule.

Cho II
N. Chomsky
Language and Mind Cambridge 2006

Ly I
J. Lyons
Einführung in die moderne Linguistik München 1995

Ly II
John Lyons
Semantics Cambridge, MA 1977
Chomsky, N. Harman Vs Chomsky, N.
 
Books on Amazon
I 306
Competence/Performance/ChomskyVsHarman: competence as "knowledge that language is described by the rules of grammar". And that "grammar specifies this competence". ChomskyVsHarman: I have not only never asserted this, but also repeatedly rejected it publicly. It would be absurd if the speaker had to know the rules explicitly.
Knowledge/Language/Harman: a) knowing that b) knowing how. Since language is obviously not "knowing that", it must be "knowing how". The speaker knows "how he has to understand other speakers." Analogous to the ability of the cyclist.
I 307
ChomskyVsHarman: he uses "competence" very different than me. I see no relation to the "ability of the cyclist", not a "set of habits," or something like that.
I 308
HarmanVsChomsky: the internalized system (that limits the choice of grammars) must be represented in a more fundamental language, and the child must have understood the latter already, before it can apply this schematism a) this leads to a circle: If you said that the child mastered the "more fundamental language" "directly", without having learned it, then why do you not also say that it mastered the actual language "directly" without learning it. Or: b) Regress: If, however, you said that it has to learn the more fundamental language first, then the question is how this fundamental language is learned itself. ChomskyVsHarman: even if you assume that the schematism must be represented at an "innate language", it does not follow what Harman sees: the child may need to master the "more fundamental language", but it does not have to "speak and understand" it. We just have to assume that it can make use of it. ad a): the assumption that the child masters its native language without learning it is wrong. It is not born with perfect knowledge of German. On the other hand, nothing speaks against the assumption that it is born with perfect knowledge of a universal grammar.
HarmanVsChomsky: in a model, conclusions from the given data on a grammar can only be made, if detailed information on a theory of performance is included in the model. Chomsky: interesting, but not necessary.
I 310
Empiricism/Theory/HarmanVsChomsky: calls Chomsky’s strategy "inventive empiricism", a doctrine that uses "induction principles". Such "inventive empiricism" is certainly not to be refuted, "no matter how the linguistic data look". ChomskyVsHarman: empiricism is not so important. I’m interested in the question of whether there are "ideas and principles of various kinds" which "determine the form of the knowledge acquired in a largely defined and highly organized manner" (rationalist variant) or whether on the other hand "the structure of the appropriation mechanism is limited to simple and peripheral processing mechanisms..." (empiricist variant). It is historically justified and makes heuristic sense to distinguish that.

Harm I
G. Harman
Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity 1995
Chomsky, N. Putnam Vs Chomsky, N.
 
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I 293
PutnamVsChomsky: Putnam assumes for phonetics in the universal grammar, that it only has a single list of sounds. This did not require a sophisticated explanatory hypothesis. Only "memory span and powers of recollection". "No upright behaviorist would deny that these are innate properties." ChomskyVsPutnam: but there have been set up very strong empirical hypotheses about the selection of the universal distinctive features, none of which seems to be explained on the basis of restrictions of memory.
I 298
PutnamVsChomsky: Thesis: instead of an innate schematism, "general multipurpose strategies" could be assumed. This innate base would have to be the same for the acquisition of any knowledge, so that there is nothing special about language acquisition.
I 299
ChomskyVsPutnam: with that he is no longer entitled to assume something is innate. Furthermore, it only shifts the problem. PutnamVsChomsky: the evaluation functions proposed in the universal grammar "the kind of facts is constituted which tries to explain the theory of learning, but not the required explanation itself".
ChomskyVsPutnam: E.g. no one would say that the genetic basis for the development of arms instead of wings was "the kind of fact that attempts to explain the theory of learning". Rather, they are the basis for an explanation of other facts of human behavior.
Whether the evaluation function is learned or is the basis of learning, is an empirical question.
PutnamVsChomsky: certain ambiguities can only be discovered by routine, therefore their postulated explanation by Chomsky's grammar is not very impressive.
ChomskyVsPutnam: he misunderstands it, in fact that refers to competence and not to performance (actual practice).
What the grammar explains is why e.g. in "criticism of students" "student" can be understood as subject or object, whereas e.g. "grain" in "the growing of the grain" can only be subject.
The question of routine does not matter here.
I 300
Innate Ideas/ChomskyVsPutnam: the innate representation of universal grammar indeed solves the problem of learning (at least partly) if it is really true that this is the basis for language acquisition, which may very well be the case!
III 87
Putnam/Chomsky: Putnam proposes: correctness in linguistics is what the currently available data best explain about the behavior of the speaker under a current interest. What is true today, will be false tomorrow. PutnamVsChomsky: I never said that what is right today, will be wrong tomorrow.
Putnam: Chomsky's hidden main theses:
1) the we are free to choose our interests at will,
2) that interests themselves are not subject to normative criticism.
E.g. Hans' heart attack lies in the defiance of medical recommendations. Other explanation: high blood pressure. It may be, in fact, that on one day one fact is more in the interests of the speaker, and the next day another one.
III 88
PutnamVsChomsky: 1) we cannot just pick and choose our interests. (>Schopenhauer). 2) It sometimes happens that the relevance of a particular interest is disputed. How can it be, however, that some interests are more reasonable than others? Reasonableness is supposed to depend on different conditions in different contexts. There is no general answer.
III 88/89
The assertion that a concept is interest relative does not come out at the same as the thesis, all interests are equally reasonable.

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu II
H. Putnam
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Pu III
H. Putnam
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Pu IV
H. Putnam
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990
Chomsky, N. Searle Vs Chomsky, N.
 
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John R. Searle
SearleVsChomsky: he went a step too far: he should deny that the speech organ has any structure that can be described as an automaton. So he became a victim of the analytical technique.
Dennett I 555
Language/SearleVsChomsky: One can explain language acquisition this way: there is actually an innate language acquisition device. Bat that will ad nothing to the hardware explanation assuming deep unconscious universal grammatical rules. This does not increase the predictive value.   There are naked, blind neurophysiological processes and there is consciousness. There is nothing else. ((s) otherwise regress through intermediaries).

Searle I 273
SearleVsChomsky: for universal grammar there is a much simpler hypothesis: there is indeed a language acquisition device. Brings limitations, what types of languages can be learned by human being. And there is a functional level of explanation which language types a toddler can learn when applying this mechanism.
By unconscious rules the explanatory value is not increased.

IV 9
SearleVsChomsky/SearleVsRyle: there are neither alternative deep structures nor does is require specific conversations potulate.
IV 204
Speech act theory/SearleVsChomsky: it is often said folllowing Chomsky, the language must finally obey many rules (for an infinite number of forms).
VI 205
This is misleading, and was detrimental to the research. Better is this: the purpose of language is communication. Their unit is the illocutionary speech. It's about how we go from sounds to files.

VIII 411
Grammar/language/Chomsky/Searle: Chomsky's students (by Searle called "Young Turks") pursue Chomsky's approach more radically than Chomsky. (see below). Aspects of syntactic theory/Chomsky: (mature work, 1965) more ambitious targets than previously: Statement of all linguistic relations between the sound system and the system of meaning.
VIII 412
For this, the grammar must consist of three parts: 1. syntactic component that describes the internal structure of the infinite number of propositions (the heart of the grammar)
2. phonological component: sound structure. (Purely interpretative)
3. semantic component. (Purely interpretive),.
Also structuralism has phrase structure rules.
VIII 414
It is not suggested that a speaker actually passes consciously or unconsciously for such a process of application of rules (for example, "Replace x by y"). This would be assumed a mix of competence and performance. SearleVsChomsky: main problem: it is not yet clear how the theory of construction of propositions supplied by grammarians accurately represents the ability of the speaker and in exactly what sense of "know" the speaker should know the rules.
VIII 420
Language/Chomsky/Searle: Chomsky's conception of language is eccentric! Contrary to common sense believes it will not serve to communicate! Instead, only a general function to express the thoughts of man.
VIII 421
If language does have a function, there is still no significant correlation with its structure! Thesis: the syntactic structures are innate and have no significant relationship with communication, even though they are of course used for communication.
The essence of language is its structure.
E.g. the "language of the bees" is no language, because it does not have the correct structure.
Point: if one day man would result in a communication with all other syntactic forms, he possessed no language but anything else!
Generative semantics/Young TurksVsChomsky: one of the decisive factors in the formation of syntactic structures is the semantics. Even terms such as "grammatically correct" or "well-formed sentence" require the introduction of semantic terms! E.g. "He called him a Republican and insulted him".
ChomskyVsYoung Turks: Mock dispute, the critics have theorized only reformulated in a new terminology.
VIII 422
Young Turks: Ross, Postal, Lakoff, McCawley, Fillmore. Thesis: grammar begins with a description of the meaning of a proposition.
Searle: when the generative semantics is right and there is no syntactic deep structures, linguistics becomes all the more interesting, we then can systematically investigate how form and function are connected. (Chomsky: there is no connection!).
VIII 426
Innate ideas/Descartes/SearleVsChomsky: Descartes has indeed considered the idea of a triangle or of perfection as innate, but of syntax of natural language he claimed nothing. He seems to have taken quite the contrary, that language is arbitrary: he assumed that we arbitrarily ascribe our ideas words!
Concepts are innate for Descartes, language is not.
Unconscious: is not allowed with Descartes!
VIII 429
Meaning theory/m.th./SearleVsChomsky/SearleVsQuine: most meaning theories make the same fallacy: Dilemma:
a) either the analysis of the meaning itself contains some key elements of the analyzed term, circular. ((s) > McDowell/PeacockeVs: Confusion mention/use).
b) the analysis leads the subject back to smaller items, that do not have key features, then it is useless because it is inadequate!
SearleVsChomsky: Chomsky's generative grammar commits the same fallacy: as one would expect from the syntactic component of the grammar that describes the syntactic competence of the speaker.
The semantic component consists of a set of rules that determine the meanings of propositions, and certainly assumes that the meaning of a propositions depends on the meaning of its elements as well as on their syntactic combination.
VIII 432
The same dilemma: a) In the various interpretations of ambiguous sentences it is merely paraphrases, then the analysis is circular.
E.g. A theory that seeks to explain the competence, must not mention two paraphrases of "I went to the bank" because the ability to understand the paraphrases, just requires the expertise that will explain it! I cannot explain the general competence to speak German by translating a German proposition into another German proposition!
b) The readings consist only of lists of items, then the analysis is inadequate: they cannot declare that the proposition expresses an assertion.
VIII 433
ad a) VsVs: It is alleged that the paraphrases only have an illustrative purpose and are not really readings. SearleVs: but what may be the real readings?
Example Suppose we could interpret the readings as heap of stones: none for a nonsense phrase, for an analytic proposition the arrangement of the predicate heap will be included in the subject heap, etc.
Nothing in the formal properties of the semantic component could stop us, but rather a statement of the relationship between sound and meaning theory delivered an unexplained relationship between sounds and stones.
VsVs: we could find the real readings expressed in a future universal semantic alphabet. The elements then stand for units of meaning in all languages.
SearleVs: the same dilemma:
a) Either the alphabet is a new kind of artificial language and the readings in turn paraphrases, only this time in Esperanto or
b) The readings in the semantic alphabet are merely a list of characteristics of the language. The analysis is inadequate, because it replaces a speech through a list of elements.
VIII 434
SearleVsChomsky: the semantic part of its grammar cannot explain, what the speaker actually recognizes when it detects one of the semantic properties. Dilemma: either sterile formalism or uninterpreted list.
Speech act theory/SearleVsChomsky: Solution: Speech acts have two properties whose combination we dismiss out of the dilemma: they are regularly fed and intentional.
Anyone who means a proposition literally, expresses it in accordance with certain semantic rules and with the intention of utterance are just to make it through the appeal to these rules for the execution of a particular speech act.
VIII 436
Meaning/language/SearleVsChomsky: there is no way to explain the meaning of a proposition without considering its communicative role.
VIII 437
Competence/performance/SearleVsChomsky: his distinction is missed: he apparently assumes that a theory of speech acts must be more a theory of performance than one of competence. He does not see that competence is ultimately performance skills. ChomskyVsSpeech act theory: Chomsky seems to suspect behaviorism behind the speech act.

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Den I
D. Dennett
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Den II
D. Dennett
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999
Chomsky, N. Hintikka Vs Chomsky, N.
 
Books on Amazon
I XV
Logical Omniscience/Hintikka: Thesis: is only an alleged problem. ChomskyVsHintikka: he has quoted the alleged paradox as a reason for his rejection of any model-theoretical semantics for propositional attitudes.
HintikkaVsChomsky: his problem has already been solved long ago. (Essay 5)

Hin I
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

W I
J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996
Descartes, R. Locke Vs Descartes, R.
 
Books on Amazon
I 27
angeborene Ideen/LockeVsScholastics/LockeVsDescartes: es gibt keine angeborenen Ideen! Weder im spekulativen noch im praktischen (moralischen, theologischen) Denken, auch nicht in Form von "Maximen", also unmittelbar einleuchtenden Prinzipien. 1. spekulative Prinzipien: wären sie angeboren, müssten sie bei noch nicht durch Vorurteile verbildeten Menschen nachweisbar sein, als z.B. bei Kindern oder Geistesschwachen, und das sind sie nicht!
2. wären Wahrheiten in Form von Sätzen angeboren , so müssten dies auch die dazugehörenden Begriffe sein, sogar die Folgerungen aus diesen Sätzen! Derartige Annahmen dehnten den Bereich angeborener Begriffe und Sätze aber ins Unübersehbare aus.
3. Maximen: die spontane Zustimmung zu ihnen bedeutet, dass sie zuvor nicht gewusst wurden! Angeborenes müsse aber immer präsent sein.
ChomskyVsLocke/(s): würde einwenden, dass Grammatikregeln auch erst ins Bewusstsein treten. Da geht es um die Leichtigkeit des Lernens).
angeborene Ideen/Locke: die Annahme, Denken beginne mit der Anwendung angeborener Denkgesetze oder erster Prinzipien, die mehr seien als bloß instrumentales Denkvermögen, ist eine Täuschung.
I 45
Körper/Ausdehnung/res extensa/LockeVsDescartes: Ausdehnung und Körper sind daher nicht identisch! Es ist auch gar nicht ausgemacht, dass sie der Geist vom Körper unterscheiden lassen muss. (Riskierte den gefährlichen Vorwurf des Materialismus). Die Idee der Ausdehnung und die Idee des Körpers sind verschieden.
Ausdehnung: schließt weder Festigkeit noch Widerstand gegen Bewegung (Trägheit) ein.
Raum: kann nicht geteilt werden, weil sonst Oberflächen entstünden!
VsCartesians: diese müssen zugeben, dass sie in Anbetracht der Unendlichkeit des Raums entweder Körper als unendlich denken, oder aber zugeben müssten, dass Raum nicht mit Körper identifiziert werden kann.
I 52
res cogitans/LockeVsDescartes: Descartes: Welt der Körper und des Denkens strikt zu trennen.
Locke: gibt zu bedenken, ob es nicht ausgedehnte Dinge, also Körper geben könnte, die denken, etwas fließende Materiepartikel. Jedenfalls ist nicht auszuschließen, dass Gott in seiner Allmacht "Materiesystemen" die
I 53
Kraft der Wahrnehmung und des Denkens gegeben oder "übergestülpt" habe. Dadurch fühlten sich zeitgenössische Theologien, besonders sein Kontrahend Stillingfleet provoziert.
LockeVsDescartes: führt auch zu Problemen mit der menschlichen Identität (s.u.).
I 54
Identität/LockeVsDescartes: Problem: das Verhältnis von Substanz und Person, wenn die Denkfähigkeit allein einer immateriellen Substanz zugeschrieben wird. Bsp so wäre es denkbar, dass jemand die Überzeugung vertreten könnte, er sei dieselbe Person wie Nestor. Wenn man nun die Richtigkeit der Cartesianischen These voraussetzt,
I 55
so sei es denkbar, dass ein zeitgenössischer Mensch tatsächlich die Person Nestor sei. So sei er deshalb aber doch nicht der Mensch Nestor, eben weil die Idee des Menschen nicht von seiner körperlichen Gestalt ablösbar sei.
Das ist für uns heute abstrus. (> Geach).
Locke relativiert die These damit, dass es für das Bewusstsein auf die Beschaffenheit der Substanz gar nicht ankomme, weshalb er diese Frage offen lassen wolle - er vermittelt dabei den Eindruck, dass er der materialistischen Sichtweise zugeneigt ist.

II 189
Klarheit/LockeVsDesacrtes: kein Wahrheitskriterium, sondern weiterer Sinn: auch im Bereich bloß wahrscheinlichen Wissens.
II 190
Deutlichkeit/LockeVsLeibniz/LockeVsDescartes: bei ihm an Benennbarkeit gebunden. Setzt die Möglichkeit eindeutiger Bezeichnung voraus. (>Sprache).
II 195
Erkenntnis/Locke: intuitive und demonstrative Erkenntnis bilden nach Locke eine vollständige Disjunktion der möglichen sicheren Erkenntnis. VsDescartes: diese besteht nicht in einem Erkennen vorgegebener begrifflicher Gehalte, das sich in deren Anschauung vollzieht, sondern konstituiert sich erst auf der empirischen Grundlage einfacher Ideen in der Verstandestätigkeit.

Loc III
J. Locke
An Essay Concerning Human Understanding
Goodman, N. Chomsky Vs Goodman, N.
 
Books on Amazon:
Noam Chomsky
I 287
Language learning/language acquisition/Goodman: Second language is not problematic because the acquisition of the first language is the acquisition of a "secondary symbolic system". ChomskyVsGoodman: that could have some weight if it could be shown. (For example, for the distinction of surface structure and depth structure).
But we have no empirical evidence.
---
I 288
ChomskyVsGoodman: Acquisition of first and second language: Fallacy: If we learn the second language easier by means of explanations from the first language, we would have had to acquire a language before the first language in order to acquire the first language (which is particularly easy). (Regress). Goodman: Acquisition of the first language is acquisition of a "secondary symbolic system" and therefore corresponds to the acquisition of the second language.
Chomsky's: the primary symbolic systems that he has in mind are rudimentary and cannot be used in the same way as a first language in acquiring the second language.
GoodmanVsChomsky: his theses cannot be checked because we do not have examples of "bad languages".
---
I 289
ChomskyVsGoodman: There are dozens of books in which features of a universal grammar are formulated and their empirical consequences are examined, whereby each such property specifies "bad" languages. ---
I 290
Grue/ChomskyVsGoodman: affects more of a border problem. The initial question is too vague. You can easily find a property, even a fairly general one, of the language "grue bleen", which is not the property of a "language like German".
E.g. Chomsky: the predicate "be equal" (Structure of Appearance) applies only to objects instead of to Qualia.
Now the language grue bleen has the peculiar property: "If an object A before t and an object B after t are examined, and if both are determined to be grue (or bleen), then we know that they are not like each other.
But there is no such t that we could predict of these objects that they will not be equal. They could just as well be equal if both are grue (or bleen).
Chomsky: it is undoubtedly a general property of natural languages that they behave more like German than "gruebleen".
Thus, there is no difficulty in establishing a distinction between such languages as grue bleen and such as German.
This would not suffice Goodman, of course, because one could still construct more refined examples.
As long as it is only about vague terms like "like German" or "like Gruebleen", Goodman's requirement is impossible to fulfill.
---
I 291
ChomskyVsGoodman: It may be relevant to induction, but not to linguistics, just as little as for any other science, such for the question of why embryos get arms and no wings within a given framework of conditions. ((s) is irrelevant because once conceptual, once empirical.)
Chomsky: with this we cannot explain at all why the learner does not acquire grue as a generalization basis. Undoubtedly this follows from certain properties of the sensory system.
Congenital ideas/ChomskyVsGoodman: it does not seem incomprehensible to me that any aspect of the "final state" of an organism or automaton is also an aspect of its "initial state". And this before any interaction with his environment!
---
I 292
Innate ideas/ChomskyVsGoodman: in his essay, Goodman at least once admits that the mind contains ideas in some sense. Then it is obviously not incomprehensible that some of these ideas are "implanted as an original equipment" to the mind.

Cho II
N. Chomsky
Language and Mind Cambridge 2006
Lewis, D. Chomsky Vs Lewis, D.
 
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Noam Chomsky
Black I 200
Language/Semantics/Convention/Psychology/Lewis/Schwarz: the psychology behind the intentions and expectations does not interest Lewis. ChomskyVsLewis: denies the mechanism
LewisVsVs: that is wrongly attributed to him. In the present state of neurophysiology, he considers it idle to speculate about it.
It would also be possible that beings without internal grammar use the German language, or that different speakers of the German have different internal grammars. Therefore, we should not focus on cognitive implementation.


Cho II
N. Chomsky
Language and Mind Cambridge 2006

Bla I
Max Black
Bedeutung und Intention
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg), Frankfurt/M 1979

Bla II
M. Black
Sprache München 1973

Bla III
M. Black
The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983
Locke, J. Chomsky Vs Locke, J.
 
Books on Amazon:
Noam Chomsky
Danto2 I 114
Locke: the imagination is innate. (ChomskyVs) we cannot imagine simple ideas. ---
Chomsky I 284
ChomskyVsLocke: his arguments cannot cooperate with the dispositional nature of the congenital structure. That is why they pass the point.

Cho II
N. Chomsky
Language and Mind Cambridge 2006
Quine, W.V.O. Chomsky Vs Quine, W.V.O.
 
Books on Amazon:
Noam Chomsky
I 319
Language/Quine: interweaving of sentences. Theory/Language/ChomskyVsQuine: Quine himself must even presuppose that both are separated here: he certainly does not believe that two monolingual speakers of the same language can have no differences of opinion.
((s) If language and theory were identical, one could not argue, since even according to Quine the theories must have a certain unity.
Chomsky: otherwise, according to Quine, every dispute would be completely irrational, as between two speakers of different languages.
---
I 320
Definition Language/Quine: "Complex of present dispositions to verbal behavior, in which speakers of the same language have necessarily corresponded to one another." (W + O, 27) Language/ChomskyVsQuine: then our disposition would have to be explained to a certain verbal behavior by a certain system. This is certainly not the case.
---
I 321
Reinforcement/ChomskyVsQuine: his concept of "reinforcement" is almost empty. If reinforcement is needed to learn, this means that learning cannot go without data. This is even more emptier than with Skinner, who, unlike Quine, does not even require that intensifying stimuli influence. It is sufficient here that the reinforcement is merely imagined.
---
I 324
Language learning: behavioristic/Quine: conditioning, association ChomskyVsQuine: additional principles, only so endlessly many sentences explainable. Probability/Language/ChomskyVsQuine: the concept of the "probability of a sentence" is completely useless and empty:
---
I 325
Translation indeterminacy, indeterminacy: ChomskyVsQuine: disposition either with regard to stimulus, or with regard to the total body of the language: then all sentences are equally probable (reference classes). ---
I 326
Logical truth/Quine: is derived by him by conditioning mechanisms that associate certain sentence pairs with each other, ---
I 327
so that our knowledge of the logical relations can be represented as a finite system of linked propositions. ChomskyVsQuine: it remains unclear how we distinguish logical from causal relations.
Truth functions/Quine: allow a radical translation without "non verifiable analytical hypotheses", so they can be directly learned from the empirical data material (W + O § 13)
ChomskyVsQuine: his readiness to settle these things within the framework of the radical translation may show that he is ready to regard logic as an innate experience-independent basis for learning.
Then it is, however, arbitrary to accept this framework as innate, and not much else that can be described or imagined.
---
I 328
ChomskyVsQuine: his narrowly conceived Humean frame (Chomsky pro) with the language as a finite (!?) interweaving of sentences is incompatible with various triusms, which Quine certainly would accept. ---
I 329
Analytical hypothesis/stimulus meaning/Quine: stimulus meaning invloves, in contrast to the analytical hypothesis only "normal inductive uncertainty". Since the corresponding sentences can contain truth functions, they lead to "normal induction". This is not yet a "theory construction" as in the case of analytical hypotheses.
ChomskyVsQuine: the distinction is not clear because the normal induction also occurs within the radical translation.
---
I 330
ChomskyVsQuine: Vs "property space": not sure whether the terms of the language can be explained with physical dimensions. Aristotle: more connected with actions. VsQuine: not evident that similarities are localizable in space. Principles, not "learned sentences". ---
I 333
VsQuine: cannot depend on "disposition to reaction", otherwise moods, eye injuries, nutritional status, etc. would be too authoritive. ---
I 343
Language may not be taught at all. ---
I 335
Synonymy/ChomskyVsQuine: (he had suggested that synonymy "roughly speaking" exists in approximate equality of situations, and approximately equal effect). Chomsky: there is not even an approximate equality in the conditions that are likely to produce synonymous utterances.
ChomskyVsQuine: Synonymy can thus not be characterized by means of conditions of use (conditions of assertion) or effects on the listener. It is essential to distinguish between langue and parole, between competence and performance.
It is about meaningful idealization, Quine's idealization is meaningless.
---
I 337
Translation indeterminacy/ChomskyVsQuine: the reason for the thesis is, in a psychological context, an implausible and rather contentless empirical assertion, namely, which innate qualities the mind contributes to language acquisition. In an epistemic-theoretical context, Quine's thesis is merely a version of the well-known skeptical arguments, which can equally well be applied to physics or others.
---
I 337
Inconsistency/indeterminacy/theory/ChomskyVsQuine: any hypothesis goes beyond the data, otherwise it would be uninteresting. ---
Quine V 32
Definition Language/Quine: "Complex of dispositions to linguistic behavior". ((s) that could be called circular, because "linguistic" occurs. Vs: then it should be expressed by the fact that there is not yet a language besides the behavior.)
Disposition/ChomskyVsQuine: such a complex can presumably be presented as a set of probabilities to make an utterance under certain circumstances.
Vs: the concept of probability fails here: the probability with which I utter a certain English sentence cannot be distinguished from the probability with which I express a particular Japanese sentence.
QuineVsChomsky: one should not forget that dispositions have their conditions.
---
V 33
We find this through the procedure of question and consent. ---
Quine XI 115
Language/Theory/ChomskyVsQuine/Lauener: the language of a person and their theory are in any case different systems, even if one would agree with Quine otherwise. ---
XI 116
Quine: (dito). Indeterminacy of the translation: because of it one cannot speak of an invariant theory opposite translations.
Nor can we say that an absolute theory can be formulated in different languages, or vice versa, that different theories (even contradictory ones) can be expressed in one language.
((s)> Because of the ontological conclusion that I cannot argue about ontology, by telling the other that the things that exist with him are not there, because I then make the self-contradiction that there are things that do not exist).
Lauener: that would correspond to the error that the language contributes the syntax, the theory but the empirical content.
Language/Theory/Quine/Lauener: that does not mean that there is no contradiction between the two: insofar as two different theories are laid down in the same language, it means then that the expressions are not interchangeable in all expressions.
But there are also contexts where the distinction language/theory has no meaning. Therefore, the difference is gradual. The contexts where language/theory are interchangeable are those where Quine speaks of a network.

Cho II
N. Chomsky
Language and Mind Cambridge 2006

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q II
W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Q III
W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Q IX
W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Q V
W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Q VI
W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Q VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Q VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Q X
W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003
Structuralism Chomsky Vs Structuralism
 
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Noam Chomsky
Searle VIII 409
ChomskyVsStructuralism: a theory must be able to explain which chains represent sentences and which do not. Old: object of investigation: an arbitrary set of sentences. Classifications, corresponding discovery procedures.
New: object of investigation: the basic language knowledge of the speaker.


Cho II
N. Chomsky
Language and Mind Cambridge 2006

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983
Tradition Chomsky Vs Tradition
 
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Noam Chomsky
Lyons I 136
Grammar/Modern/Lyons: is often referred to as "formal" today in contrast to the traditional "content-related" grammar. ((s) stock: Lyons pro formal grammar, partial VsChomsky).
---
I 137
Interposition: some grammarians assume that there are extralinguistic categories independent of the random facts of existing languages. Jespersen: Thesis: there are universal grammatical categories (tradition). For example, "parts of speech", "tense", "mode", etc.). (see below, the question is whether there is any at all).
Formal grammar/Lyons: does not exclude that there are no such universal grammatical categories. The structure of each language should be described individually.
---
Quine X 38
ChomskyVsTradition/Quine: Trees of educational rules are not enough, you also need grammatical transformation. Some compositions can best be understood by looking back and forth between different trees of the educational rules. Transformations allow this lateral movement. Quine: this is superfluous for the artificial expressions of logic.
---
Searle VIII 407
ChomskyVsTradition: most famous example "John is easy to leave" - "John is eager to leave". The (structuralist) tradition treats both sentences as grammatically equal. However, the VP(Verb Phrase) and NP(Noun Phrase) are grouped differently.

Cho II
N. Chomsky
Language and Mind Cambridge 2006

Ly I
J. Lyons
Einführung in die moderne Linguistik München 1995

Ly II
John Lyons
Semantics Cambridge, MA 1977

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983
Tradition Lyons, J. Vs Tradition
 
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Lyons I 137
Grammatik/Jespersen/Tradition/Lyons: es gibt universelle grammatische Kategorien („Redeteile“), Tempus, Modus, usw.. formale GrammatikVsTradition: jede Sprache sollte individuell beschrieben werden –
I 150
Def grammatische Klassen: Bsp Verb, Nomen, usw. - Bsp Wortklassen: Mann, Hund, Banane, läuft, isst, sieht – Problem: Unterscheidung zu grob – Lösung/Tradition: Subklassen (Bsp a {Mann, Linguist, Wissenschaftler,…}, b {Affe, Pferd, Hund…}), um „Der Affe sieht die Bedeutung“ zu vermeiden.
I 167
VsTradition/ChomskyVsTradition: nicht die Grammatik, sondern das Lexikon schließt das aus! – Chomsky: dennoch Grammatik nicht unbestimmt.
I 140
Universalien/Chomsky: 1. substantive Universalien/Chomsky/Lyons: (nicht „substantiell“): wenn man eine Menge distinktiver Merkmale einführt, von denen jeweils eine Teilmenge verschiedenfach in den phonologischen Systemen der einzelnen Sprachen kombiniert wird, dann sind die distinktiven Merkmale die substantiven Universalien.
2. formale Universalien/Chomsky/Lyons: jede Bedingung für die Wirkungsweise der phonologischen Regeln oder die Kombinationen der phonologischen Einheiten gemäß den Regeln. Bsp das Postulat der Eindimensionalität.
VsTradition. die dortigen Universalkategorien können weder als formal noch als substantiv bezeichnet werden, da die regeln der traditionellen Grammatik nicht explizit formalisiert wurden.
I 140
Tradition/Chomsky: wurde in erste Linie vom „Substantiven“ her definiert.
I 150
Def Grammatische Klassen/Tradition/Lyons/VsTradition: Grammatische Klassen: Nomen, Verb, Adjektiv usw.
Problem: die Tradition vermischte zwischen Gesichtspunkte:
1. hier wird nach den Bedingungen gefragt, die für die Zuordnung eines Worts zu einer bestimmten grammatischen Klasse ausschlaggebend sein sollen. Bsp „Gehört das Wort „men“ zu X oder zu Y? Das ist praktisch immer schon durch die Distribution des Worts festgelegt. (Tradition dito).
2. hat mit der Benennung der Klassen zu tun (wenn ihr „Klasseninhalt“ auf formaler Grundlage bereits feststeht): Bsp „Wird X zu recht als Klasse der Nominal bezeichnet?“.
formale Grammatik: hier ist jede Beschreibung gleich gut, man muss etwas nicht „Adjektiv“ nennen!
„universal“: hier werden Wortklassen wie „Verb“, „Nomen“ usw. inhaltsbezogen aufgefasst. (Tradition).
formal: (moderne Grammatik): hier nehmen wir an, dass die Klassen aufgrund der Distribution erstellt wurden, und auch anders hätten heißen können.

Ly I
J. Lyons
Einführung in die moderne Linguistik München 1995

Ly II
John Lyons
Semantics Cambridge, MA 1977
Various Authors Chomsky Vs Various Authors
 
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Noam Chomsky
Lyons I 157
Rules/grammar/transformational grammar/Chomsky/Lyons: Chomsky seems to reject this. In his opinion, ChomskyVsGrammatical rules: Thesis: the grammatical structure of language is determined ((s) not according to the above rules) and is mastered by the speaker of the mother tongue "intuitively" (unconsciously). (ChomskyVsRules: because of the consistency of the "indeterminacy of grammar"/ChomskyVsIndeterminacy of grammar).
Lyons: the differences of opinion are exaggerated here. Not the whole grammar is indeterminate.

Cho II
N. Chomsky
Language and Mind Cambridge 2006

Ly I
J. Lyons
Einführung in die moderne Linguistik München 1995

Ly II
John Lyons
Semantics Cambridge, MA 1977
Whorf, B. Dennett Vs Whorf, B.
 
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NSI 147
World/Language/Reality/Structure/Newen/Schrenk: if we hold on to realism, we must say that some languages ​​represent reality better than others which have a completely different structure.
NS I 148
Sapir-Whorf Thesis/Newen/Schrenk: can already be found in Wilhelm von Humboldt. (Literature: 11-3a, Vol IV, p 27). Thesis: Speakers with different vocabulary and above all different grammar must think very differently about the world than others. E.g. Hopi language: only has words for "son" and "daughter". Problem: "uncle" and "grandfather" can only be characterized indirectly. It looks as if both are not distinguished with respect to their relationship.
NS I 149
DennettVsWhorf/Evolution TheoryVsWhorf/ChomskyVsWhorf/PinkerVsWhorf: the ability of language use is realized through specific areas of the brain that have been formed by evolution and are therefore genetically encoded and thus common to all humans. FodorVsWhorf: Language is already anchored in the brain. Newen/Schrenk: Problem: It may still be that we read structure into the world (idealism) instead of discovering it. But then it is unlikely that people of different cultures do it in very different ways, since the relevant biological equipment is common to all if them. Language/Reality/World/Newen/Schrenk: if the language capacity in the brain has evolved through adaptation to an environment, it is also possible that the structure of the world has left its footprints in the language.

Den I
D. Dennett
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Den II
D. Dennett
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999
Wittgenstein, L. Chomsky Vs Wittgenstein, L.
 
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Noam Chomsky
I 344
ChomskyVsWittgenstein: he speaks of "the different processes, to expect someone to tea". Chomsky: there is no point in talking about "processes of expectation".
---
I 345
Criteria/mental states/Wittgenstein: mental states or the "internal functions of the mind" do not provide a criterion for the correct use of an expression. ---
I 346
ChomskyVsWittgenstein: but this is not about a "correct claim". E.g. whether someone is reading, but about a legitimate claim. ---
I 349
ChomskyVsWittgenstein: this often leads to the brink of the deepest and most interesting problems, in order then to stand still and to assert that the philosopher cannot go further here. ---
I 350
We need more than mere description (descriptive linguistics or philosophy): otherwise the important question is forgotten, for which the data is actually data.

Cho II
N. Chomsky
Language and Mind Cambridge 2006

The author or concept searched is found in the following disputes of scientific camps.
Disputed term/author/ism Pro/Versus
Entry
Reference
Darwinism Versus Dennett I 543
ChomskyVsSkinner, ChomskyVsArtificial Intelligence, ChomskyVsDarwin

Den I
D. Dennett
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Den II
D. Dennett
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999

The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 theses of the more related field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Rules Chomsky, N.
 
Books on Amazon
I 272
Chomsky These dann könnte man vorschlagen, daß eine Sprache Regeln enthält, die Tiefenstrukturen zu Repräsentationen aus der universalen Semantik in Beziehung setzen. (Analog zur Phonologie).
Lyons I 157
Regeln/Grammatik/Transformationsgrammatik/Chomsky/Lyons: Chomsky scheint dies abzulehnen. Seiner Meinung nach ist: ChomskyVsgrammatische Regeln: These die grammatische Struktur der Sprache ist bestimmt ((s) nicht nach den obigen Regeln) und wird vom muttersprachlichen Sprecher -žintuitiv-œ (unbewußt) beherrscht. (ChomskyVsRegeln wegen der Konsequenz der -žUnbestimmtheit der Grammatik-œ /ChomskyVsUnbestimmtheit der Grammatik).
Lyons: die Meinungsverschiedenheiten sind hier übertrieben. Nicht die ganze Grammatik ist unbestimmt.

Ly I
J. Lyons
Einführung in die moderne Linguistik München 1995

Ly II
John Lyons
Semantics Cambridge, MA 1977
Indetermination Chomsky, N.
 
Books on Amazon
I 325
Unbestimmtheit der Übersetzung/Quine/Chomsky: nach dieser These sollen "alle Vorschläge für die Übersetzung mit der Totalität der Sprechdisposition verträglich, aber untereinander unverträglich" sein können. (Q+O, 27). Chomsky: das geht wegen der Probleme in Zusammenhang mit der Wahrscheinlichkeit nicht. Die These wenn alle Wahrscheinlichkeiten ununterscheidbar sind, sowohl innerhalb als auch außerhalb einer Sprache.
Quine: umgeht das Problem, indem er nicht von der "Totalität der Dispositionen" sondern von der "Reizbedeutung" ausgeht.
I 337
Übersetzungsunbestimmtheit/ChomskyVsQuine: die These läuft in einem psychologischen Kontext auf eine unplausible und ziemlich gehaltlose empirische Behauptung hinaus, nämlich darüber, welche angeborenen Eigenschaften der Geist zu Spracherwerb beisteuert. In einem erkenntnistheoretischen Kontext ist Quines These lediglich eine Version der bekannten skeptischen Argumente, die genauso gut auf die Physik oder anderes angewendet werden können.
Es ist ganz sicher, daß ernstzunehmende Hypothesen "über das Datenmaterial hinausgehen" .Wäre das nicht so, wären sie als Hypothesen uninteressant!
Innate Locke, J.
 
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Danto I 113
Imagination / congenital / Locke: the imagination is innate. (ChomskyVs). One can not imagine simple ideas.