Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 32 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Abortion | Thomson | Singer I 132 Abortion/J. J. Thomson/P. Singer: Thought experiment: Imagine that you should be connected to the blood circulation of a seriously ill, famous violinist for 9 months in order to save his life. After that, your help is no longer needed. All the music lovers of the whole world are watching. Thomson: When you wake up in the hospital (kidnapped by music lovers to help the violinist) and find yourself in this situation, you are not morally obliged to let the violinist use your body. It may be a generosity on your part - but it is not morally wrong to reject it.(1) Singer: Thomson's conclusion does not depend on the fact that the violinist came into his circumstances involuntarily. Thomson also expressly states that the violinist has a right to life, but this right does not include the right to use another body, even if one dies without this help. Singer: the parallel to rape is obvious. Singer I 133 For the sake of the argument, we assume that the embryo is considered a fully developed human being. Question: can Thomson's argument be extended to cases of pregnancy that are not based on rape? This depends on whether the theory behind it is well-founded. For example, could I force my favorite movie star to save my life? Thomson/Singer: it does not say that although I have a right to life, I would always be forced to take the best path or to do what would have the most pleasant consequences. Solution/Thomson: instead, it accepts a system of rules and obligations that allows us to justify our actions regardless of their consequences. Cf. >Consequentialism, >Deontology. P. SingerVsThomson/UtilitarianismVsThomson, J. J./Singer, P: in the case of the violinist, the utilitarianism would reject Thomson's theory. Singer I 308 In this way, utilitarianism would also reject Thomson's position on abortion. >Utilitarianism, >Preference utilitarianism. 1. Judith J. Thomson, "A Defense of Abortion" in: Philosophy and Public Affairs 1 (1971. |
ThomsonJF I James F. Thomson "A Note on Truth", Analysis 9, (1949), pp. 67-72 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 ThomsonJJ I Judith J. Thomson Goodness and Advice Princeton 2003 SingerP I Peter Singer Practical Ethics (Third Edition) Cambridge 2011 SingerP II P. Singer The Most Good You Can Do: How Effective Altruism is Changing Ideas About Living Ethically. New Haven 2015 |
| Actions | Austin | II 36f Action/Ryle/Austin: actions are very different - szneezing, to win wars: life is not simply a sequence of actions. - Excuse does not match every verb - a way to characterize actions - e.g. "voluntarily". AustinVsRyle: this is not a characteristic of actions such as "truth," not of assertions - rather a name of a dimension. >Voluntarily/Ryle. |
Austin I John L. Austin "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 24 (1950): 111 - 128 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Austin II John L. Austin "A Plea for Excuses: The Presidential Address" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 57, Issue 1, 1 June 1957, Pages 1 - 3 German Edition: Ein Plädoyer für Entschuldigungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, Grewendorf/Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Acts of Will | Geach | I 251f Vs"Acts of Will"/Geach: attribution of responsibility instead of causality (GeachVs)-Vs: "ascription theory" ("ascriptivism", Oxford). Ascriptivism/Oxford: Thesis: saying that an action is voluntary is not a description of the action, but an attribution. "All he said"/Oxford: Thesis: this would not be about description but about "confirmation". >Everything he said is true. GeachVs: such theories can be invented by the dozen. - The actual distinction to be observed is the one between naming and predication. >Naming, >Predication. VsAscription Theory: condemning a thing by calling it "bad" must be explained by the more general concept of predication, and such predication can also be done without condemnation. Neither can "done deliberately" be characterized by attribution of responsibility or "being imposed" without describing the act as such first. Cf. >Prescriptivism, cf. >"voluntarily"/Austin. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Assertibility Conditions | Searle | VII 101 Searle: assertibility conditions are not the same as truth conditions: e.g. the use of "voluntarily" (> Ryle-Austin-Searle-Hare-Cavell-Fodor; see SearleVsAustin). VsUse Theory: use is too vague. The circumstances are beyond the language. >Truth condition. VII 96 Intention/Searle: thesis: the strangeness or deviation that is a condition for the utterance: "X was done intentionally", provides at the same time a reason for the truth of the utterance of: "X wasn't done on purpose." Condition of assertiveness: it is the condition of utterance for one assertion precisely because it is a reason for the truth of the others. >Assertibility condition. >Truth conditions/Searle, >Conditions of satisfaction/Searle, >Assertibility. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Carbon Price Strategies | Stavins | Stavins I 153 Carbon Pricing Policy Instruments/Carbon price strategies/Aldy/Stavins: We consider five generic policy instruments that could conceivably be employed by regional, national, or even subnational governments for carbon pricing, including carbon taxes, cap-and-trade, emission reduction credits, clean energy standards, and fossil fuel subsidy reduction. (…) however [there are also] Stavins I 154 conventional environmental policy approaches, namely, command-and-control instruments, which have dominated environmental policy in virtually all countries over the past four decades. Command-and-Control Regulations: command-and-control regulatory standards are either technology based or performance based. Technology-based standards typically require the use of specified equipment, processes, or procedures. In the climate policy context, these could require firms to use particular types of energy-efficient motors, combustion processes, or landfill-gas collection technologies. Performance-based standards are more flexible than technology-based standards, specifying allowable levels of pollutant emissions or allowable emission rates, but leaving the specific methods of achieving those levels up to regulated entities. >Command-and-Control-Regulations/Stavins. Stavins I 155 Carbon Taxes: In principle, the simplest approach to carbon pricing would be through government imposition of a carbon tax (Metcalf, 2007)(1). The government could set a tax in terms of dollars per ton of CO2 emissions (or CO2-equivalent on greenhouse gas emissions) by sources covered by the tax, or—more likely—a tax on the carbon content of the three fossil fuels (coal, petroleum, and natural gas) as they enter the economy. The government could apply the carbon tax at a variety of points in the product cycle of fossil fuels, from fossil fuel suppliers based on the carbon content of fuel sales (“upstream” taxation/regulation) to final emitters at the point of energy generation (“downstream” taxation/regulation). >Carbon Taxation/Government policies, >Carbon Taxation/Fankhauser, >Carbon Taxation/Stavins. Stavins I 157 Cap-and-Trade Systems: A cap-and-trade system constrains the aggregate emissions of regulated sources by creating a limited number of tradable emission allowances—in sum equal to the overall cap—and requiring those sources to surrender allowances to cover their emissions (Stavins, 2007)(2). Cap-and-trade sets an aggregate quantity, and through trading, yields a price on emissions, and is effectively the dual of a carbon tax that prices emissions and yields a quantity of emissions as firms respond to the tax’s mitigation incentives. >Cap-and-Trade Systems/Stavins. Stavins I 159 Emission-Reduction-Credit Systems: An emission-reduction-credit (ERC) system delivers emission mitigation by awarding tradable credits for “certified” reductions. Generally, firms that are not covered by some set of regulations—be they command-and-control or market-based — may voluntarily participate in such systems, which serve as a source of credits that entities facing compliance obligations under the regulations may use. Individual countries can implement an ERC system without having a corresponding cap-and-trade program. While ERC systems can be self-standing, as in the case of the CDM [Clean Development Mechanism], governments can also establish them as elements of domestic cap-and-trade or other regulatory systems. These ERC systems—often referred to as offset programs—serve as a source of credits that can be used by regulated entities to meet compliance obligations under the primary system. >Emssion-Reduction-Credit System/Stavins Clean Energy Standards: The purpose of a clean energy standard is to establish a technology-oriented goal for the electricity sector that can be implemented cost-effectively (Aldy, 2011)(3). Under such standards, power plants generating electricity with technologies that satisfy the standard create tradable credits that they can sell to power plants that fail to meet the standard, thereby minimizing the costs of meeting the standard’s goal in a manner analogous to cap-and-trade. Stavins I 161 A clean energy standard represents a de facto free allocation of the right to emit greenhouse gases to the power sector. >Clean Energy Standards/Stavins. Eliminating Fossil Fuel Subsidies: Phasing out fossil fuel subsidies can represent significant progress toward “getting prices right” for fossil fuel consumption, especially in some developing countries, where subsidies are particularly large. Imposing a carbon price on top of a fuel subsidy will not lead to the socially optimal price for the fuel, but removing such subsidies can deliver incentives for efficiency and fuel switching comparable to implementing an explicit carbon price. >Eliminating Fossil Fuel Subsidies/Stavins. 1. Metcalf, G. E. (2007). A proposal for a U.S. carbon tax swap (The Hamilton Project Discussion Paper 2007-12). Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. 2. Stavins, R. N. (2007). A U.S. cap-and-trade system to address global climate change (The Hamilton Project Discussion Paper 2007-13). Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution. 3. Aldy, J. E. (2011). Promoting clean energy in the American power sector (The Hamilton Project Discussion Paper 2011-04). Washington, DC: The Hamilton Project. Robert N. Stavins & Joseph E. Aldy, 2012: “The Promise and Problems of Pricing Carbon: Theory and Experience”. In: Journal of Environment & Development, Vol. 21/2, pp. 152–180. |
Stavins I Robert N. Stavins Joseph E. Aldy The Promise and Problems of Pricing Carbon: Theory and Experience 2012 |
| Categorization | Gadamer | I 433 Categorization/Gadamer: the logical scheme of induction and abstraction [is] very misleading in that there is no explicit reflection in the linguistic consciousness on what is common between different things, and the use of words in their general meaning does not understand what is named and designated by them as a case subsumed under the general. The generality of the genre and the classificatory formation of concepts are quite far removed from the linguistic consciousness. When someone transfers an expression from one to the other, he or she is looking at something in common, but it does not necessarily have to be a generic commonality. Rather, he or she is following his or her expanding experience, which preserves similarities, be they of factual appearance or of significance to us. This is the genius of the linguistic consciousness that it knows how to express such similarities. We call this its basic metaphor, and it is important to recognize that it is the prejudice of a non-linguistic logical theory when the figurative use of a word is reduced to an improper use.(1) Generalization: (...) thinking [can turn to] a reserve that language has made for it for its own instruction.(2) Plato expressly did this with his "flight into the Logoi"(3). Gadamer: But also the classificatory logic ties in with the logical advance that language has accomplished for them. >Categories/Aristotle. 1. That's what L. Klages saw in particular. Cf. K. Löwith, Das Individuum in der Rolle des Mitmenschen, 1928, pp. 33ff (and my review in Logos 18 (1929), pp. 436-440; Vol. 4 of the Ges. Werke). 2. This image appears involuntarily and thus confirms Heidegger's statement of the proximity of meaning between legein = to say and legein = to read together (first in "Heraklits Lehre vom Logos" commemorative publication for H. Jantzen). 3rd Plato, Phaid. 99 e. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Contracts | Durkheim | Habermas IV 122 Contracts/Law/Durkheim/Habermas: for the transfer of property, inheritance is historically the norm. The competing form of acquisition or divestiture is the contract that is considered a status change. The contract adds new relationships to existing relationships. The contract is therefore a source of variations, which presupposes an earlier legal basis with a different origin. The contract is preferably the instrument with which the changes are implemented. He himself cannot form the original and fundamental foundations on which the law is based. (1) Problem: how can a contract bind the parties when the sacred basis of law has been removed? Solution/Hobbes/Weber/Habermas: the standard answer since Hobbes and up to Max Weber is that modern law is compulsory law. Habermas IV 123 DurkheimVsHobbes/DurkheimVsWeber/Habermas: Durkheim is not satisfied with that. Obedience must also have a moral core. The legal system is in fact a part of a political order with which it would fall if it could not claim legitimacy. (See Legitimacy/Durkheim). Legitimacy/Civil Law/Durkheim/Habermas: Problem: a contract cannot contain its own bases of validity. The fact that the parties voluntarily enter into an agreement does not imply the binding nature of this agreement. The contract itself is only possible thanks to a regulation of social origin. (2) 1. E. Durkheim, Lecons de sociologie, Physique des moeurs et du droit. Paris 1969, S. 203f ; (engl. London 1957). 2. E. Durkheim, De la division du travail social, German: Über die Teilung der sozialen Arbeit, Frankfurt, 1977, S. 255. |
Durkheim I E. Durkheim The Rules of Sociological Method - French: Les Règles de la Méthode Sociologique, Paris 1895 German Edition: Die Regeln der soziologischen Methode Frankfurt/M. 1984 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Definiteness | Searle | V 226 Determinable/Searle: something that can be determined, corresponds to "classified", "estimates", "evaluate" or "consider". Determined: that something is determined, corresponds to "recommend", "praise", "boast" or "recognize". Searle: we assume relations between words instead of meaning (e.g."voluntary"). Cf. >determinates/determinables, >"voluntarily", >Identification, >Individuation. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Descriptions | Cavell | II 212 Description/Action/Language/Cavell: Actions that are normal do not allow any special descriptions. >"Voluntarily", >Voluntarily/Ryle, >Voluntarily/Austin, >Actions, >Intention, >Description levels. |
Cavell I St. Cavell Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen Frankfurt 2002 Cavell I (a) Stanley Cavell "Knowing and Acknowledging" in: St. Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say?, Cambridge 1976, pp. 238-266 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (b) Stanley Cavell "Excursus on Wittgenstein’s Vision of Language", in: St. Cavell, The Claim of Reason, Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy, New York 1979, pp. 168-190 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (c) Stanley Cavell "The Argument of the Ordinary, Scenes of Instruction in Wittgenstein and in Kripke", in: St. Cavell, Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome: The Constitution of Emersonian Perfectionism, Chicago 1990, pp. 64-100 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Davide Sparti/Espen Hammer (eds.) Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell II Stanley Cavell "Must we mean what we say?" in: Inquiry 1 (1958) In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Desert Theories | Lamont | Gaus I 227 Desert Theories/Lamont: Desert theories differ about what should be the basis for desert claims. The three main categories are: Gaus I 228 1) Productivity: people should be rewarded for their work activity with the product of their labour or value thereof (Gaus, 1990(1): 410—16, 485-9; Miller(2), 1976; 1989(3); 1999(4); Riley, 1989(5)). 2) Effort: people should be rewarded according to the effort they expend in contributing to the social product (Sadurski, 1985)(6). 3) Compensation: People should be rewarded according to the costs they voluntarily incur in contributing to the social product (Carens, 1981(7); Dick, 1975(8); Feinberg, 1970(9); Lamont, 1997(10)). Desert theorists in each category also differ about the relationship between luck and desert. All desert theorists hold that there are reasons to design institutions so that many of the gross vagaries of luck are reduced, but theorists diverge with respect to luck in the genetic lottery. >Desert/Political philosophy, cf. >Inequlities/Resource-based view (RBV), >Distributive Justice/Resource-based view (RBV). Desert theorists, because of their emphasis on outcomes being tied to people's responsibility rather than their luck, view with concern how much people's level of economic benefits still depends significantly on factors beyond their control. UtilitarianismVsDesert theories: By contrast, utilitarians consider this of no moral consequence since, for them, the only morally relevant characteristic of any distribution is the utility resulting from it. This gap between the desert and utilitarian theorists, and hence between the general public and utilitarian theorists, is partly attributable to differences in empirical views. Desert theoriesVsUtilitarianism:. Desert theorists are much more likely to view people as signifi- cantly responsible for their actions and want to give effect to that responsibility by reducing the degree to which people's life prospects are influenced by factors beyond their control. Utilitarianism: Utilitarians are more likely to see people as largely the products of their natural and social environment, and so not responsible for many of their actions in the first place. On the latter view, the point of reducing the effect of luck is less attractive. Scheffler: But, as Scheffler (1992)(11) points out, the general population has a noticeably more robust view of the responsibility of people than many academic theorists. >Distributive Justice/Libertarianism. 1. Gaus, Gerald F. (1990) Value and Identification. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2. Miller, David (1976) Social Justice. Oxford: Clarendon. 3. Miller, David (1989) Market, State, and Community. Oxford: Clarendon. 4. Miller, David (1999) Principles of Social Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 5. Riley, Jonathan (1989) 'Justice under capitalism'. In John H. Chapman, ed., NOMOS xrxl: Markets and Justice. New York: New York University Press, 122—62. 6. Sadurski, Wojciech (1985) Giving Desert Its Due. Dordrecht: Reidel. 7. Carens, Joseph (1981) Equality, Moral Incentives and the Market. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 8. Dick, James C. (1975) 'How to justify a distribution of earnings'. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 4: 248—72. 9. Feinberg, Joel (1970) Doing and Deserving. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 10. Lamont, Julian (1997) 'Incentive income, deserved income, and economic rents'. Journal of Political Philosophy, 5 (1): 26-46. 11. Schemer, Samuel (1992) 'Responsibility, reactive attitudes, and liberalism in philosophy and politics'. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 21 (4): 299-323. Lamont, Julian, „Distributive Justice“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Emission Reduction Credits | Stavins | Stavins I 159 Emission-Reduction-Credit Systems/ERC/Aldy/Stavins: An emission-reduction-credit (ERC) system delivers emission mitigation by awarding tradable credits for “certified” reductions. Generally, firms that are not covered by some set of regulations—be they command-and-control or market-based — may voluntarily participate in such systems, which serve as a source of credits that entities facing compliance obligations under the regulations may use. Individual countries can implement an ERC system without having a corresponding cap-and-trade program. A firm earns credits for projects that reduce emissions relative to a hypothetical “no project” baseline. In determining the number of credits to grant a firm for a project, calculation of the appropriate baseline is therefore as important as measuring emissions. VsEmission-Reduction-Credit: Dealing with this unobserved and fundamentally unobservable hypothetical baseline is at the heart of the so-called “additionality” problem. While ERC systems can be self-standing, as in the case of the CDM [Clean Development Mechanism], governments can also establish them as elements of domestic cap-and-trade or other regulatory systems. These ERC systems—often referred to as offset programs—serve as a source of credits that can be used by regulated entities to meet compliance obligations under the primary system. >Carbon Pricing/Stavins. Robert N. Stavins & Joseph E. Aldy, 2012: “The Promise and Problems of Pricing Carbon: Theory and Experience”. In: Journal of Environment & Development, Vol. 21/2, pp. 152–180. |
Stavins I Robert N. Stavins Joseph E. Aldy The Promise and Problems of Pricing Carbon: Theory and Experience 2012 |
| Everyday Language | Cavell | I (a) 39 Skepticism/everyday language/Cavell: one usually assumes that the reference to the everyday language refutes skepticism. Vs: this can be refuted itself. We have to deal with the everyday language, when it is interpreted as the source of independent data, independently of certain philosophical positions or theories. I (a) 40 Otherwise the skeptic would be accused, in a biased way, that the obvious conflict between words and the world would be unclear to him or that he would not be able to address this conflict. Skepticism/Cavell: a serious refutation must show that the person who is as capable of understanding English as we are and knows everything we know has no real use for the words of the everyday language. >Skepticism. How can you show that? A decisive step would be to be able to show the skeptic (also the one who one has inside oneself) that you know what his words say in his opinion. (Not necessarily what they mean according to his opinion, as if they had a special or technical meaning). So we need to understand his position from within. I (a) 41 Skepticism/everyday language/Cavell: the reference to the ordinary language does not refute the skeptic: 1. will not surprise him; 2. one is obviously misunderstanding him. Regarding the use of the language, we agree anyway. >Language use, >Meaning, >Reference. --- II 170 Everyday language/Cavell: here there are three possible types to make statements about them: Type I statement: "We say ...... but we do not say ...." Type II statement: The addition of type I statement by explanations. Type III statement: Generalizations. Ryle: Thesis: when we use the word "voluntarily", it is with an action that we would not normally do. >"voluntarily"/Ryle. II 172 Cavell thesis: Native speakers generally do not need to know what they can say in their language. They, themselves, are the source of such statements. MatesVs intuition and memory in terms of correct speech. CavellVsMates: Intuition is also not necessary at all. I do not need to remember the hour I learned something and not a perfect memory for my speaking. One does not remember the language; it is spoken. >Memory. II 173 CavellVsRyle: requires an explicit explanation (type II statement): for this he is generally also authorized, but precisely in relation to his example "voluntarily", the generalization fails: II 174 E.g. Austin: a voluntary gift. >"voluntarily"/Austin. |
Cavell I St. Cavell Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen Frankfurt 2002 Cavell I (a) Stanley Cavell "Knowing and Acknowledging" in: St. Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say?, Cambridge 1976, pp. 238-266 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (b) Stanley Cavell "Excursus on Wittgenstein’s Vision of Language", in: St. Cavell, The Claim of Reason, Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy, New York 1979, pp. 168-190 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (c) Stanley Cavell "The Argument of the Ordinary, Scenes of Instruction in Wittgenstein and in Kripke", in: St. Cavell, Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome: The Constitution of Emersonian Perfectionism, Chicago 1990, pp. 64-100 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Davide Sparti/Espen Hammer (eds.) Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell II Stanley Cavell "Must we mean what we say?" in: Inquiry 1 (1958) In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Fairness | Rawls | I 108 Fairness/Principles/Rawls: our principles of justice concerned institutions and the basic structure of a society. When it comes to individuals, the principle of fairness is relevant. --- I 110 Individuals/Principles: this is, among other things, about what obligations we have. However, a certain basic structure of a company to be established is assumed from the outset. Rawls: here it can be interpreted without major distortions in such a way that the duties and tasks presuppose a moral conception of institutions, and that the content of equitable institutions must therefore be determined before demands can be made on individuals. --- I 111 Right/legality/conformity/Rawls: intuitively, we can say that the notion of being right is synonymous with one's being consistent with those principles which, in a society's initial state, would be recognised as being applied to the relevant problems. If we accept that, we can equate fairness with rightness. Individuals/fairness: first of all, we must distinguish between obligations and natural duties. Principle of fairness: requires a person to fulfil his obligations as established by an institution, under two conditions. 1) The institution is fair, i. e. the institution fulfils the two principles of justice (see Principles/Rawls). --- I 112 2) The arrangement has been voluntarily approved. This means that those who have agreed have a right to expect this from others who benefit from this arrangement(1). It is wrong to assume that justice as fairness or contract theories would generally follow that people have an obligation to unjust regimes. VsLocke/Rawls: Locke in particular was wrongly criticized for this: the necessity of further background assumptions was overlooked(2). (1) See H.L.A. Hart „Are There Any Natural Rights?“, Philosophical Review, Vol. 64, (1955) p. 185f. (2) See Locke's thesis that conquest does not create justice: Locke, Second treatise of Government, pars. 176, 20.) |
Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 |
| Golden Rule | Hobbes | Höffe I 220 Golden Rule/Hobbes/Höffe: Hobbes' second "Law of Nature", a variant of the Golden Rule, explains: "Everyone should voluntarily renounce his right to everything [in the natural state], if he deems it necessary for the sake of peace and self-defence" (Leviathan, chap. 14). By continuing this law, Hobbes anticipates Kant's principle of mutual restriction of freedom: "and he should be satisfied with as much freedom towards others as he would grant others against himself" (ibid.). >Peace/Hobbes, >Reason/Hobbes, see >Categorical Imperative. |
Hobbes I Thomas Hobbes Leviathan: With selected variants from the Latin edition of 1668 Cambridge 1994 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Justice | Thomas Aquinas | Höffe I 149 Justice/Thomas/Höffe: Thomas Aquinas places [the concept of] justice (iustitia) (...) between prudence (prudentia) and courage (fortitudo). Thomas Aquinas per Aristotle: In terms of content, he follows Aristotle's differentiations made in the book of justice of Nicomachian ethics. >Ethics/Aristotle. In doing so, he introduces two distinctions that have since been canonical and effective far beyond Thomism(), the linguistic origin by Thomas Aquinas is unknown to many: A. General justice: (iustitia generalis, not: universalis) means a comprehensive righteousness which voluntarily fulfills all that is required by law and custom. >Customs/Morality. Iustitia particularis: [here we are concerned] with questions where insatiability threatens, namely questions of honour, money or self-preservation. Distributive justice: Within special justice, the allocation of honor and money, which allows for certain inequalities, distributive justice (iustitia distributiva), is set off against regulatory justice (iustitia commutativa). Iustitia commutativa: (...) is responsible for two areas, voluntary exchange, business transactions and civil law, and can be called "distributive justice" here, but only here. >Inequalities. B. Secondly, there is the criminal law with its restorative or corrective justice (iustitia correctiva). >Laws. 1.Summa IIa Ilae qu. 58 und 61 |
Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Language | Cavell | I 185 Language/Universals/Wittgenstein/Cavell: we project words from one context to the next, but without relying on any definitions or rules. For the most part (not always) we do not need universals as a fundamentalist premise. >Meaning, >Word meaning, >Reference, >Sentence meaning, >Speaking, >Communication, >Universals. Skepticism here would only look for new universals here. >Skepticism. I 186 Language learning/language acquisition: the entry into our culture is not guaranteed by something essential. >Language acquisition. I 187 The projection is instead guaranteed by our agreement in the judgment. >Judgments. Our words occur in an unlimited number of cases and projections, and their variance is not arbitrary. --- II 189 Language Philosophy/Cavell: this is not so much about revengeing sensational offenses against the intellect, as to remedy its civilian misconduct. We must return tyrannizing ideas (such as existence, certainty, identity, reality, truth ...) to their specific contexts in which they function normally, so that they can function normally without corrupting our thinking. >World/thinking, >Language behavior. Language/World/Cavell: the transition from language to the world occurs imperceptibly when Austin says "We can voluntarily make a gift" (general statement) is a "material mode" (Mates) for "The gift was made voluntary" (special case). |
Cavell I St. Cavell Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen Frankfurt 2002 Cavell I (a) Stanley Cavell "Knowing and Acknowledging" in: St. Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say?, Cambridge 1976, pp. 238-266 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (b) Stanley Cavell "Excursus on Wittgenstein’s Vision of Language", in: St. Cavell, The Claim of Reason, Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy, New York 1979, pp. 168-190 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (c) Stanley Cavell "The Argument of the Ordinary, Scenes of Instruction in Wittgenstein and in Kripke", in: St. Cavell, Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome: The Constitution of Emersonian Perfectionism, Chicago 1990, pp. 64-100 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Davide Sparti/Espen Hammer (eds.) Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell II Stanley Cavell "Must we mean what we say?" in: Inquiry 1 (1958) In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Legitimacy | Durkheim | Habermas IV 123 Legitimacy/Civil Law/Durkheim/Habermas: Problem: a contract cannot contain its own bases of validity. The fact that the parties voluntarily enter into an agreement does not imply the binding nature of this agreement. The contract itself is only possible thanks to a regulation of social origin. (1) This regulation, for its part, cannot be an expression of mere arbitrariness, not based on the factuality of state authority. Solution/Durkheim: the rights that have their origin in things were dependent on the religious nature of these things. Thus, all moral and legal relations (...) owe their existence to a sui generis force that is inherent in either the subjects or the objects and that forces respect. Question: how can two decisions originating from two different subjects have a greater binding force, simply because they are identical? (2) Solution/Durkheim: contracts have the binding character due to the legitimacy of the legal regulations on which they are based. And these only apply Habermas IV 124 as legitimate because they express a general interest. Criterion/Durkheim: that the contract is moral is only guaranteed due to the fact that no side is favoured. (3) DurkheimVsWeber/Habermas: Durkheim is not - like Max Weber - concerned here with material justice, but with the fact that the obligatory character of contracts cannot be derived from the arbitrariness of the interest-led agreement of individuals. 1. E. Durkheim, De la division du travail social, German: Über die Teilung der sozialen Arbeit, Frankfurt, 1977, p. 255. 2. E. Durkheim, Lecons de sociologie, Physique des moeurs et du droit. Paris 1969, p. 205. (engl. London 1957). 3. Durkheim (1969) p. 231. |
Durkheim I E. Durkheim The Rules of Sociological Method - French: Les Règles de la Méthode Sociologique, Paris 1895 German Edition: Die Regeln der soziologischen Methode Frankfurt/M. 1984 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Meaning (Intending) | Cavell | I 14 To mean/meaning/Cavell: There is a difference between the meaning of the words we use and what we mean when we give them a voice. >Speaking, >Implicature. Thesis: Our ability to mean what we say is dependent on two characteristics of our situation: 1. from the everydayness, the ordinariness of the resources at our disposal. 2. from the fact that we are the ones that access these resources. >Convention, >Community, >Understanding. We sometimes achieve or sometimes we do not achieve to mean what we say with our words! --- II 168 Cavell thesis: what we usually say and mean can have a direct and profound control over what we can say and mean in the philosophical sense. II 205 To mean/must/Cavell: this is not about reproducing the meaning as what you "must mean". Intension is not a substitute for intention. >Intension, >Intention. Cavell Thesis: Still, if we say "we must something", we imply that we are convinced of it, although it is not analytically, it is necessarily true! >Analytical, >a priori, >necessarily. Truth/Necessity/Cavell: if truth (with Aristotle) means: From what it is to say that it is, Then necessary truth is From what is, to say what it is. ((s) How it is done). But it is a profound prejudice to mean that it was a matter of content. It does not apply to all statements, but to those who are concerned with actions, and therefore have a rule description complementarity. >Truth. II 207 Necessity/Language/Cavell: 1. it is perfectly correct that the German language could have developed differently. 2. There is no way out when you say "I can say what I want, I do not always have to use the normal forms". You do not want to argue that you can talk without the language providing the possibility for this? II 208 E.g. A baker could use "voluntarily" and "automatically" synonymously. If it then follows that the professor does not understand the baker, then the professor would not understand another professor any more! >Language use, >Speaking. II 208 Method/Mates: Grewendorf/Meggle S 160): two methods: 1. Extensional: one brings out the meaning of a word by finding out what it has in common with other cases of its use. >Extension. 2. Intensive method: one asks the person concerned what he means. >Intension. II 209 Language/Cavell: it is not the case that we always know only by empirical investigations what words mean. We could not then come to generalizations. For example, half of the population could use "voluntarily" and "automatically" without any difference, but it does not show that the two are synonymous, but that both apply to the action of the person in question! II 210 It may be that the baker even insists that the two words mean the same. One could then argue: "You can say it, but you cannot mean it!" "You cannot mean what you would mean if you had chosen the other wording." Why is the baker not entitled to his argument then? >Assertibility. II 211 To a philosopher we would say in this situation (> Humpty Dumpty): 1. That he limits his expressive possibilities. 2. That he has a shortened theory of what it means to do something. Likewise, the philosopher who asks in everything: "analytical or synthetic?" has a shortened concept of communication. >Communication. II 213 Language/Cavell: The error is based on the assumption that the normal use of a word represents a function of the internal state of the speaker. To mean/Cavell: the false assumption that a statement about what we mean is synthetic comes from the fact that we believe that it describes the mental processes of a speaker. In reality, it is about the use of language. >Mental states, >Mind. For example, to a child, we might say, "You do not know, you believe it". The child learns the word usage. II 215 To mean/Cavell: there is no such activity as finding out what I mean with a word. But there is a finding out what a word means. >Language acquisition. |
Cavell I St. Cavell Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen Frankfurt 2002 Cavell I (a) Stanley Cavell "Knowing and Acknowledging" in: St. Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say?, Cambridge 1976, pp. 238-266 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (b) Stanley Cavell "Excursus on Wittgenstein’s Vision of Language", in: St. Cavell, The Claim of Reason, Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy, New York 1979, pp. 168-190 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (c) Stanley Cavell "The Argument of the Ordinary, Scenes of Instruction in Wittgenstein and in Kripke", in: St. Cavell, Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome: The Constitution of Emersonian Perfectionism, Chicago 1990, pp. 64-100 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Davide Sparti/Espen Hammer (eds.) Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell II Stanley Cavell "Must we mean what we say?" in: Inquiry 1 (1958) In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Necessity | Cavell | II 177 Language/Necessity/Cavell: Question: are there logical requirements or only empirical findings? (Cavell thesis: (according to Fodor): logical necessities do consist in language philosophy). Cavell: logical necessities do not exist between language and world but only between sentences. The opportunity in which we express a sentence (circumstances) cannot be regarded as part of meaning or logic. >Cicrumstances, >Language use, >Meaning, >Sentence meaning. II 178 To mean/Must/Necessity/Language/Cavell: e.g. "He would not say that unless he meant ..." >Meaning/Intending/Cavell, >Convention, >Implicature. If we assume that the speaker and we already understand the meaning and use of an expression, one could conclude: II 170 1. the pragmatic implications are unrestricted and therefore any deviation is possible. 2. there are restrictions of use, then a) since all necessity is logical, the "pragmatic implications" are "quasi-logical implications", b) then there must be a "third kind of logic", since the pragmatic implications cannot be deductively constructed. c) there is also a non-logical necessity. II 180 Necessity/Language/Cavell: it must now be argued that from the fact that an expression is used in its usual way, something follows: it entitles one to draw certain conclusions. Learning what these implications are is a part of learning the language itself. Full understanding is implicit understanding. >Learning, >Language acquisition. II 200 Must/Cavell: when I say "You must ..." and if that is correct and appropriate, then nothing you can do proves that I am wrong. >Imperative/Cavell. II 201 Should/Cavell: when I say that you should return the borrowed money, it only makes sense if there could be a reason to suppose that the money was perhaps a present. >Sense. This is an analogy to the distinction between a mere execution of an action and a good execution. cf. >"voluntarily"/Austin. |
Cavell I St. Cavell Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen Frankfurt 2002 Cavell I (a) Stanley Cavell "Knowing and Acknowledging" in: St. Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say?, Cambridge 1976, pp. 238-266 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (b) Stanley Cavell "Excursus on Wittgenstein’s Vision of Language", in: St. Cavell, The Claim of Reason, Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy, New York 1979, pp. 168-190 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (c) Stanley Cavell "The Argument of the Ordinary, Scenes of Instruction in Wittgenstein and in Kripke", in: St. Cavell, Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome: The Constitution of Emersonian Perfectionism, Chicago 1990, pp. 64-100 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Davide Sparti/Espen Hammer (eds.) Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell II Stanley Cavell "Must we mean what we say?" in: Inquiry 1 (1958) In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Negation | Searle | V 171 Negation/Searle: the philosophers have long abandoned the idea that there are irreducible negative sentences >Existence statement. V 219 Negation/Searle: the negation of certain sentences such as "He doesn't know if he is in pain" are simply wrong, not as is sometimes assumed, neither true nor false. >Truth value gap. But if they are wrong, does their negation not have to be true? --- IV 113 Negation/metaphor/Searle: the negation is just as metaphorical! >Metaphor/Searle. --- VII 91 Negation/Searle: the negation of an A-word (for an activity that one can sensibly call "voluntary") is not again an A-word! For example: I did not buy my car voluntarily, I was forced to do so. I did not come voluntarily, I was dragged here. He doesn't know if the object in front of him is a tree. There is considerable asymmetry between A words and their opposite or negation. >"Voluntarily". VII 95 SearleVsAustin: Austin's thesis ("No modification without aberration”) does not even go over sentences: making an assertion means committing oneself to something that is the case. If the possibility that the facts do not exist is excluded, it is pointless. Austin's slogan should be reformulated too: "No remark that is not remarkable," or "Not an assertion that's not worth asserting." Negation/Searle: the opposite of a standard condition is not itself a standard condition. Therefore, no A condition is required for the utterance of a negation of an A proposition. A-phrases mark standard situations, but their negations do not. A-condition: an A-condition is normally a reason to assume that the negation of the A proposition is true. Generally, only where there is a reason to assume that a standard situation could have been a non-standard situation, the remark that it is a standard situation makes sense. >Sensible/senseless, >truth value gaps. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Peace | Nietzsche | Höffe I 375 Peace/Nietzsche/Höffe: Even if wars between peoples will continue to exist, peacetime, according to Nietzsche, allows the genius to blossom(1). Later, however, in the volume II of "Human, All Too Human" (No. 284)(2), he mocks the so-called peace that prevailed at that time, imputing to the neighbors an aggressiveness that one denies for oneself. A true peace rests on a "peace of mind," in which a victorious people voluntarily proclaims: "We break the sword". >Politics/Nietzsche. 1. F. Nietzsche, Fünf Vorreden zu fünf ungeschriebenen Büchern. 1872. III. „Der griechische Staat“. 2. F. Nietzsche, Menschliches, Allzumenschliches – Ein Buch für freie Geister. 1878-1880 |
Nie I Friedrich Nietzsche Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009 Nie V F. Nietzsche Beyond Good and Evil 2014 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Planning | Rawls | I 408 Plan/life plan/planning/Rawls: A person's life plan is rational, if and only if 1. it is one of the plans that is consistent with the principles of rational decision when applied to all relevant characteristics of the person's situation. 2. if this plan is one of those that could be chosen by the person voluntarily in the consciousness of all relevant facts, taking into account the consequences. --- I 409 A person's interests and goals are rational if and only if they are communicated to the person through a plan that is rational to the person. It is important that the principles do not always allow for a single plan. The class of approved plans is maximum in the sense that each plan in the quantity is superior to a plan outside the quantity. Good/The good/Rawls: the definition of a rational plan is crucial to defining what can be considered good, because a rational life plan marks the fundamental point of view from which all a person's value judgments arise and must ultimately be consistent. Definition Happiness/happiness/Rawls: someone is happy when their plans are fulfilled or are going to be fullfilled. --- I 410 Planning/Rawls: the structure of plans is characterized by a lack of information and by the mirroring of a hierarchy of needs. In planning we organize our activities in a temporal sequence(1). --- I 411 We must weigh up different needs in terms of their importance and possible incompatibilities. There will then be a hierarchy of subordinate plans. (See Rational Choice/Rawls). --- I 413 It looks as if extreme long-term decisions, such as career choice, are culture-dependent. However, the fact that we all have to make such decisions is culturally independent. The borderline case that we have no plan at all and let things come to us does not have to be irrational. Principle of inclusion/inclusiveness: always choose the plan that covers most objectives. Combined with the principle of efficient resources (see Rational Decision/Rawls), this principle chooses the most comprehensive plan and the most far-reaching resources. Together with the principle of greater probability, the plan chosen is the one that covers most objectives and has a chance of success. --- I 414 Principle of inclusiveness/Aristoteles/Rawls: We can use the Aristotelian principle to argue for inclusiveness: that it corresponds to a higher-order human interest to train and take advantage of the most complex combinations of abilities. --- I 417 Rationality/Sidgwick/Rawls: I take an approach from Sidgwick(2): if we could foresee all the relevant information about our future situation, we would choose what we can then consider as an individual asset. --- I 426 Definition Aristotelian Principle/Terminology/Rawls: that is what I call the following principle: ceteris paribus means that people enjoy the exercise of their abilities, and all the more so the more they realize these abilities and the more challenging (complex) they are(3)(4)(5)(6). --- I 429 Rawls: The principle formulates a tendency and shows no pattern of how to make a choice. --- I 430 Skills/Rawls: if we assume that people gain skills while pursuing their plans, we can adopt a chain by using n-1 skills in the nth activity. According to the Aristotelian principle, people then prefer to use as many skills as possible and tend to ascend in the chain. (1) See J. D. Mabbott,"Reason and Desire", Philosophy, vol. 28 (1953). (2) See H. Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 7th. ed., London, 1907, pp. 111f. (3) Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, bk. VIII, chs. 11-14, bk X. chs 1-5; (4) See W. F. R. Hardie, Aristote's Ethical Theory, (Oxford, 1968), ch. XIV; (5) G. C. Field, Moral Theory (London, 1932), pp. 76-78; (6) R. W. White, "Ego and Reality in Psychoanalytic Theory", Psychological Issues, vol. III (1963), ch. III and pp. 173-175,180f. |
Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 |
| Police Interrogations | Social Psychology | Parisi I 133 Police interrogations/Social Psychology/Nadler/Mueller: In the United States, physical force is no longer permitted in interrogations - the law requires confessions to be given voluntarily. Today, about half of all interrogations produce incriminating statements (Kassin et al., 2007(1); Schulhofer, 1987(2); Thomas, 1996(3)). Given that confessing to a crime is "an exceedingly self-defeating proposition, regardless of one's actual guilt" (D. Simon, 2012)(4), social psychologists have been interested in investigating why so many suspects choose to confess. More importantly, why do suspects confess to crimes they did not commit? False confessions: In most cases, the answer lies in the psychological pressures brought to bear in modern interrogation procedures. In one experiment, 36% of guilty suspects and 81 % of innocent suspects agreed to waive their right to remain Parisi I 134 silent and talk to police (Kassin and Norwick, 2004)(5). Of those who agreed to waive their right to remain silent, most guilty suspects did so to avoid looking suspicious. Most innocent suspects did so because they felt they had nothing to hide. Deception: A large body of literature reporting tests of people's ability to detect deception has demonstrated that people on average perform no better than chance, and with few exceptions trained offcers perform at the same level as laypersons, albeit with high levels of confidence (Bond and DePaulo, 2006(6); Kassin, 2008(7); Kassin Meissner and Norwick 2005(8). Meissner and Kassin 2002(9). D. Simon 2012(4). Vrij, Edward, and Bull, 2001)(10). Because police investigators have trouble distinguishing between true and false confessions, they have little reason to stop an interrogation until the confession is obtained. Bias: Generally, once people form an impression, they are motivated to verify it rather than disconfirm it (Rosenthal and Jacobson, 1968(11); Snyder and Swann, 1978(12)), and the tendency to try to confirm guilt holds true in the interrogation room - when interrogators already believe that a suspect is guilty, they are more likely to use aggressive tactics like the presentation of false evidence and promises of leniency (Kassin, Goldstein, and Savitsky, 2003)(13). >False confessions/Social psychology. 1. Kassin, S. M., R. A. Leo, C. A. Meissner, K. D. Richman, L. H. Colwell, A.-M. Leach, and D. L. Fon (2007). "Police Interviewing and Interrogation: A Self-Report Survey of Police Practices and Beliefs." Law and Human Behavior 31 381-400. doi:10.1007/s10979-006-9073-5. 2. Schulhofer, S. J. (1987). "Reconsidering Miranda." University of Chicago Law Review 54: 435. 3. Thomas, G. C. I. (1996). "Plain Talk about the Miranda Empirical Debate: A Steady-State Theory of Confessions." UCLA Law Review 43:933. 4. Simon, D. (2012). In Doubt: The Psychology of the Criminal Justice Process. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 5. Kassin, S. M. and R. J. Norwick (2004). "Why People Waive Their 'Miranda' Rights: The Power of Innocence." Law and Human Behavior 28(2): 211—221. 6. Bond, C. F. and B. M. DePaulo (2006). "Accuracy of Deception Judgments." Personality and Socia Psychology Review doi:10.1207/s15327957pspr1003 2. 7. Kassin, S. M. (2008). " The Psychology of Confessions." Annual Review of Law and social science 4(1): 193-217. doi:10.1146/annurev.1awsocsci.4.110707.172410. 8. Kassin, S. M., C. A. Meissner, and R. J. Norwick (2005). "'I'd Know a False Confession if I Saw One': A Comparative Study of College Students and Police Investigators." Law and Human Behavior 29(2): 211-227. doi:10.1007/s10979-005-2416-9. 9. Meissner, C. A. and S. M. Kassin (2002). "'He's Guilty!': Investigator Bias in Judgments of Truth and Deception." Law and Human Behavior 26(5):469-480. doi:10.1023/ A:1020278620751. 10. Vrij, A., K. Edward, and R. Bull (2001). "Police Offcers' Ability to Detect Deceit: The Benefit of Indirect Deception Detection Measures." Legal and Criminological Psychology 6(2): 185-196. doi:10.1348/135532501168271. 11. Rosenthal, R. and L. Jacobson (1968). "Pygmalion in the Classroom." The Urban Review 3(1): 16-20. doi:10.1007/BF02322211. 12. Snyder, M. and W. B. Swann (1978). "Hypothesis-Testing Processes in Social Interaction." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 36: 1202-1212. 13. Kassin, S. M., C. C. Goldstein, and K. Savitsky (2003). "Behavioral Confirmation in the Interrogation Room: On the Dangers of Presuming Guilt." Law and Human Behavior 27(2): 187-203. Nadler, Janice and Pam A. Mueller. „Social Psychology and the Law“. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Political Institutions | Acemoglu | Acemoglu I 79 Political institutions/Acemoglu/Robinson: The political institutions of a society are (...) the rules that govern incentives in politics. They determine how the government is chosen and which part of the government has the right to do what. Political institutions determine who has power in society and to what ends that power can be used. Absolutist institutions: If the distribution of power is narrow and unconstrained, then the political institutions are absolutist, as exemplified by the absolutist monarchies reigning throughout the world during much of history. Pluralistic institutions: political institutions that distribute power broadly in society and subject it to constraints are pluralistic. Instead of being vested in a single individual or a narrow group, political power rests with a broad coalition or a plurality of groups. Acemoglu I 86 Absolutism: In an absolutist regime, some elites can wield power to set up economic institutions they prefer. Would they be interested in changing political institutions to make them more pluralistic? In general not, since this would only dilute their political power, making it more difficult, maybe impossible, for them to structure economic institutions to further their own interests. Pluralism: The people who suffer from the extractive economic institutions cannot hope for absolutist rulers to voluntarily change political institutions and redistribute power in society. The only way to change these political institutions is to force the elite to create more pluralistic institutions. ((s) But: for problems in relation to pluralism see >Pluralism/Acemoglu.) |
Acemoglu II James A. Acemoglu James A. Robinson Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy Cambridge 2006 Acemoglu I James A. Acemoglu James A. Robinson Why nations fail. The origins of power, prosperity, and poverty New York 2012 |
| Practise | Socrates | Bubner I 25 Ethics/Practise/Socrates/Bubner: no one acts voluntarily badly! Therefore, to act well, means simply: to act with consideration. >The Good/Socrates. Whoever acts badly is subject to deception. Talking about each other is not meant to increase knowledge, but to affect the living people, so that they are strengthened in their original action intentions. Bubner: This argument is not intellectualistic, how many critics of Socrates have objected. |
Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 |
| Rules | Cavell | II 184 Rules/Cavell: contrary to a widespread idea rules do not always have something to do with commands. Thesis: there is a complementarity of rules and determinations. II 185 You can describe an actual action, or perform it according to rules. II 186 Now one can say according to binding rules that it is wrong (an abuse) to say "I know it" if one is not sure. The only relevant condition is that one speaks grammatically correct. It follows, however, that our statements S, T, and T' are not only non-analytic, but also not synthetic! (not like, for example, the synthetic statement that someone who dresses himself voluntarily dresses himself). For example, the determination in question are similar to "The future will be the past" but: If the future is not "like" the past, no one will be surprised by that. II 196 Rule/determination/Cavell: there is a complementarity between the two. How could we overlook it? Because of the false assumption that a rule must be in imperative ("You should") instead of simply describing how something is done. II 197 Rule/Cavell: I do not deny that they can never be associated with imperatives, but only that this is always possible. E.g. Chess: I probably forget to say "J'adoube", so I have to be brought to do it... II 198 ...but I do not forget how the trains are made. I do not have to be brought to do this. Cf. >Chess. II 201 Rule/Principle/Cavell: Difference: Rules say how to do a thing, Principles tell you how to make a thing good! >Principles, cf. >Laws. |
Cavell I St. Cavell Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen Frankfurt 2002 Cavell I (a) Stanley Cavell "Knowing and Acknowledging" in: St. Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say?, Cambridge 1976, pp. 238-266 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (b) Stanley Cavell "Excursus on Wittgenstein’s Vision of Language", in: St. Cavell, The Claim of Reason, Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy, New York 1979, pp. 168-190 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (c) Stanley Cavell "The Argument of the Ordinary, Scenes of Instruction in Wittgenstein and in Kripke", in: St. Cavell, Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome: The Constitution of Emersonian Perfectionism, Chicago 1990, pp. 64-100 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Davide Sparti/Espen Hammer (eds.) Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell II Stanley Cavell "Must we mean what we say?" in: Inquiry 1 (1958) In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Social Contract | Locke | Höffe I 251 Social Contract/Locke/Höffe: Among the obligations that prevail in Locke's pre-contractual natural state is the right, in the absence of public authority, to punish the violation of the relevant divine and natural commandments itself. Locke sees the only way out of leaving the natural state in the establishment of a political or civil society(1). Cf. >State/Locke. Religious Reasons/Höffe: (...) Locke's legitimation [still contains] pre-modern elements, with which the philosopher, despite his appreciation of reason and experience, methodically never sufficiently emancipated himself from his puritanical origin. State: (...), for the establishment of a state, the concept of contract (...) takes on its most important role. 1) It explains the origin of state power, 2) determines its function and 3) defines its limits. All three tasks are combined in the raison d'être of the state, in the defence against all external and internal Höffe I 252 dangers that threaten the basic goods of citizens, life, freedom and property. >Property/Locke. Liberalism: With its typically liberal purpose of averting danger and the associated protection of property, Locke answers the question he poses himself: What motive induces purpose-rational persons who seek to maximize the benefits defined in terms of freedom to voluntarily renounce their natural freedom and power and submit to the fetters of a legal and state order that henceforth regulates what they do and do not do by force? Locke's answer: To overcome the dangers of partiality and powerlessness, private justice is abolished in favour of a common impartial arbitrator who decides according to fixed rules. Problem: (...) a twofold legal uncertainty (...): people do not always have enough power to enforce their rights and if they do have the power, they run the risk of taking too much. 1. Locke, Second treatise of Government, 1689/90, Chap. VII. |
Loc III J. Locke An Essay Concerning Human Understanding Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Social Goods | Hardin | Shirky I 51 Social goods/Commons/Garrett Hardin/Shirky: Hardin used the term "The Tragedy of the Commons" (1) (The Tragedy of the Commons) for the problem that when it comes to the use of common goods such as fish stocks or pastureland, those who miss out and wait until it is their turn and therefore try to get a bigger share for themselves. This leads to overfishing of fish stocks, for example. One reason for antisocial behaviour is that sheep "do not drive themselves to the market". ((s) An added value must therefore be generated). Shirky I 53 In connection with the tragedy of the common land, there is the fact that no one pays taxes voluntarily. 1. Garrett Hardin, “The Tragedy of the Commons,” Science 162 (3859), December 13, 1968, pp. 682-83. - www.garretthardinsociety.org/articles/art_tragedy_of_the_commons.html). |
EconHardin I Garrett Hardin Living within Limits: Ecology, Economics, and Population Taboos Oxford 1995 Shirky I Clay Shirky Here Comes Everybody: The Power of Organizing Without Organizations New York 2009 |
| Social Goods | Minimal State | Gaus I 121 Social goods/public goods/Minimal state/Gaus/Mack: the market anarchist and the minimal statist share a crucial premise, namely, that the value to individuals of their receipt of protective services will motivate almost everyone to pay for those services. >Minimal state/Gaus, >Society/Minimal state. Protection/individual liberty: the shared premise is that the protection of rightful claims is a standard economic good which people will voluntarily pay for to the extent that they value it. Unfortunately, however, important parts or aspects of the protection of rightful claims are not like standard economic goods; important parts or aspects of the protection of rightful claims are public goods. Gaus: The crucial feature of a public good is that, if the good is produced, it will not be feasible to exclude individuals who have not paid for that good from benefiting from it. >Social goods. The nonexcludability of these goods provides people with an incentive not to purchase them. Rational individuals confront a multi-person case of the well-known >prisoner’s dilemma (...).The parties thus end up at a Pareto-inferior result (...) .>Pareto-Optimum. Mack, Eric and Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. „Classical Liberalism and Libertarianism: The Liberty Tradition.“ In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications. |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Socialization | Developmental Psychology | Corr I 182 Socialization/Developmental psychology/Rothbart: conscience altered depending on the fearfulness of the child. Beyond the inhibitory control provided by fear, later developing Effortful Control makes a crucial contribution to socialization. Effortful Control is defined as the ability to inhibit a prepotent response and to activate a non-prepotent response, to detect errors and to engage in planning. As executive attention skills develop in the second or third years of life and beyond, individuals can voluntarily deploy their attention, allowing them to regulate their more reactive tendencies (Posner and Rothbart 2007(1); Ruff and Rothbart 1996(2)). In situations where immediate approach is not allowed, for example, children can inhibit their actions directly and also limit their attention to the rewarding properties of a stimulus, resisting temptation and delaying gratification. Research indicates some stability of individual differences in effortful control during childhood. For example, the number of seconds delayed by pre-school children while waiting for rewards that are physically present predicts parents’ reports of children’s attentiveness and ability to concentrate as adolescents (Mischel, Shoda and Peake 1988(3)). A lack of control in pre-school has also been identified as a potential marker for lifecourse persistent antisocial behaviour (Moffitt et al. 1996(4)) and the inattentive-disorganized symptoms of ADHD (Nigg 2006)(5). 1. Posner, M. I. and Rothbart, M. K. 2007. Educating the human brain. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association 2. Ruff, H. A. and Rothbart, M. K. 1996. Attention in early development: themes and variations. New York: Oxford University Press 3. Mischel, W., Shoda, Y. and Peake, P. K. 1988. The nature of adolescent competencies predicted by preschool delay of gratification, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 54: 6687–96 4. Moffitt, T. E., Caspi, A., Dickson, N., Silva, P. and Stanton, W. 1996. Childhood-onset versus adolescent-onset antisocial conduct problems in males: natural history from ages 3 to 18 years, Development and Psychopathology 8: 399–424 5. Nigg, J. T. 2006. Temperament and developmental psychopathology, Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry 47: 395–422 Mary K. Rothbart, Brad E. Sheese and Elisabeth D. Conradt, “Childhood temperament” in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Terminology | Baudrillard | Blask I 11 Seduction/Baudrillard: the term seduction later becomes meaningful to Baudrillard. Contrary to simulation, seduction is pure pretense and not a world of signs. Blask I 11 Fatality/Baudrillard: the fatal strategies include seduction, restoration and ecstasy. Everything is happening anyway. Blask I 26 Simulacra = are artificial worlds of signs. Blask I 34 Implosion/Baudrillard: the disappearance of the poles of cause and effect, of subject and object. Individual and class have no meaning anymore. Masses are only a statistical phenomenon. Implosion of the sense. Start of simulation. Blask I 46 The symbolic exchange resolves the contrast between real and imaginary. Arbitrary interchangeability of the characters. Blask I 47 Crisis: crisis is not a threat, but an attempt to renew confidence. Generated itself by the system. Blask I 47 Symbolic exchange: (following Marcel Mauss): symbolic exchange is a gift without return and beyond the Equivalence Principle. No value law. One inevitably gets something back, but no value system dictates the appropriateness. Baudrillard: the system is to be challenged by a gift to which it cannot answer except through its own death and collapse. Blask I 55 Alfred Jarry: "Pataphysics". In accordance with this, characterized and really his own work. Blask I 57 Seduction: seduction is the bearer of reversibility. "Seduction is a pure pretense and not a sign world." It renounces the principle of representation and already establishes "the other" as opposed to the identical. Against any kind of causality and determination. The law gives way to the rule of the game, the simulation of the illusion, the communication of irony. Seduction is more false than the false, for it uses signs that are already pseudo-forms to remove the meaning of the sign. Blask I 58 Seduction: the starting point is the opposite: truth, results from a convulsive urge for revelation. Pornography, an example of the escalation of truth: more true than the truth. No secret. Even love stands after confession-like truth and ultimately obscenity. Blask I 59 Seduction: seduction has no truth, no place, no sense. The seducer himself does not know the enigma of seduction. Woman: just pretense, she has a strategy of pretense. Seduction: the strength of the seducer is not to desire. Reversibility as a counterforce to the causality principle. Blask I 60 Seduction: seduction does not produce a law, but is based on rules of the game to which one can voluntarily engage. Love: love is individual, one-sided and selfish. Seduction: seduction is two-sided and antagonistic, according to rules which have no claim to truth. Sexuality and love are rather resolutions of seduction. Seduction appreciates distance and is an infinite rescue of an exchange. The female is not the opposite of the male but his seducer. Seduction Blask I 62 The Evil: the evil is not the opposite, but the deceiver of the good. Blask I 67 Fatality/Baudrillard: Ecstasy - irony (overcomes morality and aesthetics) - superiority of the object Principle of evil - at the same time subversion. Blask I 68 Ecstasy/Baudrillard: ecstasy lives in all things of the present. Passion for doubling and increasing. Adopts the dialectic, resolves its opposites. "Either or" no longer exists. E.g. Cancer Cells: growth acceleration, disorder and aimlessness. Blask I 69/70 Ecstasy: ecstasy is simultaneously slowdown, laziness. End before the end and surviving at a standstill. What, dissolution and disaster. The return point has long since been crossed, the catastrophe is without consequences and thus inevitable as the purest form of the event. Small breaks replace the downfall. Blask I 70 Indifference/Baudrillard: according to Baudrillard dreams, utopias and ideas have been played out, they have already been redeemed in reality. Everything has already taken place. The avant-garde has become as meaningless as the revolution. This is the transpolitical. Blask I 78 The Other: is the last way out of the "Hell of the Same." (VsSartre). Blask I 93 Asceticism/Baudrillard: The abundant society tends rather to asceticism because it wants to save what it has achieved. Blask I 95/96 Mythic poles: myth of banality and myth of the desert. "Anything you cross with insane speed is a desert." Blask I 102 Principle of the evil: the whole universe contradicts the principles of dialectics. In their stead, the principle of evil rules: "the malice of the object." Evil: Good and evil are not to be separated, nor distinguished as effects or intentions. Mental subversion by confusion, perversion of things, fundamental inclination to heresy. The principle of evil is the finished counterforce to logic, causality, and signification. "Say," God is evil, "is a tender truth, friendship for death, glide into space, into absence." Blask I 104 Scene: the basis of every illusion, challenge of the real, the opponents of the obscene. Blask I 105 Obscene: "The total obscenity of the money game." Blask I 108 Ceremony of the world: everything is always predetermined. Need for a return. Blask I 110 Virtual catastrophes: Schadenfreude of the machines. Delusion of prophylaxis. The last virus: the virus of sadness. |
Baud I J. Baudrillard Simulacra and Simulation (Body, in Theory: Histories) Ann Arbor 1994 Baud II Jean Baudrillard Symbolic Exchange and Death, London 1993 German Edition: Der symbolische Tausch und der Tod Berlin 2009 Blask I Falko Blask Jean Baudrillard zur Einführung Hamburg 2013 |
| Use Theory | Cavell | II 215 Meaning/Uses/Cavell's Use Theory: what the technical terms of mathematics and sciences mean, cannot be deduced by us from the way we use e.g. "mass" commonly. II 216 To mean/Meaning/Use theory/Cavell: one could still say: "Some actions are voluntary, others are involuntary, so I can call them as I want!" >"voluntarily"/Ryle. CavellVs: what we have to ask ourselves here is: in what kind of situation does it make no difference how I call a thing? It is a difference whether we ask: "What does x mean?" qnd "What does x really mean?". The second is not a profound version of the first, but is expressed in another situation. II 217 The most normal and the most profound utterances can only be understood when expressed in their natural contexts. >Context dependence, >Speaker meaning, >Speaker intention. |
Cavell I St. Cavell Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen Frankfurt 2002 Cavell I (a) Stanley Cavell "Knowing and Acknowledging" in: St. Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say?, Cambridge 1976, pp. 238-266 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (b) Stanley Cavell "Excursus on Wittgenstein’s Vision of Language", in: St. Cavell, The Claim of Reason, Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy, New York 1979, pp. 168-190 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (c) Stanley Cavell "The Argument of the Ordinary, Scenes of Instruction in Wittgenstein and in Kripke", in: St. Cavell, Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome: The Constitution of Emersonian Perfectionism, Chicago 1990, pp. 64-100 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Davide Sparti/Espen Hammer (eds.) Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell II Stanley Cavell "Must we mean what we say?" in: Inquiry 1 (1958) In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Austin, John L. | Searle Vs Austin, John L. | SearleVs Traditional Speech act analysis. (SearleVsAustin,SearleVsHare) Thesis: "Good", "true" mean the same in different acts. Ignored by the traditional speech act theory) good/true/speech act theory/tradition: Hare: E.g. "Good" is used to recommend something. Strawson: "True" is used to confirm or acknowledge statements. Austin: "Knowledge" is used to provide guarantees. (SearleVs). In principle: "the word W is used to perform the speech act A". >Speech act theory. IV 17 illocutionary act/Austin: five categories: verdictive, expositive, exercitive, conductive, commissive) speech acts/SearleVsAustin: Distinction between illocutionary role and expression with propositional content: R(p). The various acts performed in different continua! There are at least 12 important dimensions. IV 18 1. Differences in joke (purpose) of the act. (However, not to every act a purpose has to belong). IV 19 The illocutionary joke is part of the role, but both are not the same. E.g. a request may have the same joke as a command. 2. Differences in orientation (word to the world or vice versa). Either, the world needs to match the words, or vice versa. IV 20 Example by Elizabeth Anscombe: Shopping list with goods, the same list is created by the store detective. IV 21 3. Differences in the expressed psychological states E.g. to hint, to regret, to swear, to threaten. (Even if the acts are insincere). Def sincerity condition/Searle: You cannot say, "I realize that p but I do not believe that p." "I promise that p but I do not intend that p" The mental state is the sincerity condition of the act. IV 22 These three dimensions: joke, orientation, sincerity condition are the most important. 4. Differences in the strength with which the illocutionary joke is raised. E.g. "I suggest", "I swear" 5. Differences in the position of speaker and listener E.g. the soldier will make not aware the general of the messy room. IV 23 6. Differences of in which the utterance relates to what is in the interest of speaker and listener. E.g. whining, congratulating 7. Difference in relation to the rest of the discourse E.g. to contradict, to reply, to conclude. 8. Differences in propositional content, resulting from the indicators of the illocutionary role E.g. report or forecasts IV 24 9. Differences between those acts that must always be speech acts, and those that can be carried out differently. E.g. you need not to say anything to classify something, or to diagnose 10. Differences between those acts, for which the extra-linguistic institutions are needed, and those for which they are not necessary E.g. wedding, blessing, excommunication IV 25 11. Differences between acts where the illocutionary verb has a performative use and those where this is not the case E.g. performative use: to state, to promise, to command no performative: "I hereby boast", "hereby I threaten". 12. differences in style E.g. announcing, entrustment. IV 27 SearleVsAustin: the list does not refer to acts but to verbs. One must distinguish between verb and act! E.g. one can proclaim commands, promises, reports but that is something else, as to command, to announce or to report. A proclamation is never merely a proclamation, it also needs to be a determination, a command or the like. IV 30 Searle: E.g.iIf I make you chairman, I do not advocate that you chairman IV 36 Def Declaration/Searle: the successful performance guarantees that the propositional content of the world corresponds. (Later terminology: "institutional facts) Orientation: by the success of the declaration word and world match to each other () No sincerity. Overlapping with assertive:... The referee's decisions. SearleVsAustin: Vs Distinction constative/performative. VII 86 Cavell: "Must we mean what we say?" defends Austin and adds: The deviation can be "really or allegedly" present. Austin: it is neither true nor false that I write this article voluntarily, because if there is no deviation, the concept of free will is not applicable. SearleVsAustin: that's amazing. VII 88 SearleVsAustin: Five theses to see Austin in a different light: 1. Austin exemplifies an analysis pattern that is common today as it is also used at Ryles' analysis of "voluntarily". Ryle thesis of "voluntary" and "involuntary" can be applied only to acts, "you should not have done." Again, it is absurd to use it in an ordinary use. VII 89 Neither true nor false: Wittgenstein: e.g. that I "know that I am in pain" E.g. that Moore knows he has two hands. etc. (> certainty). Austin: E.g. it is neither true nor false, that I went out of free will to the session. VII 90 The use of "voluntary" required certain conditions are not met here. Words in which they are not met, we can call "A-words", the conditions "A-Conditions". We can create a list. 2. the conditions that are exemplified by the slogan "No modification without deviation", penetrate the whole language and are not limited to certain words. E.g. The President is sober today. Hans breathes. etc. VII 91 3. Negation/Searle: the negation of an A-word is not in turn an A-word! E.g. I bought my car not voluntarily, I was forced to. I did not volunteer, I was dragged here. He does not know whether the object in front of him is a tree. Considerable asymmetry between A-words and their opposite or negation. VII 92 SearleVsAustin: according to him, in both cases a deviation is required. 4. A deviation is generally a reason to believe that the claim that is made by the statement to the contrary is true, or could have been, or at least could have been held by someone as true. An A-condition is simply a reason to believe that the remark could have been false. SearleVsAustin: his presentation is misleading because it suggests that any deviation justifies a modification. E.g. if I buy a car while strumming with bare toes on a guitar, which is indeed a different way to buy a car, but it does not justify the remark "He bought his car voluntarily." VII 93 SearleVsAustin: we can come to any list of A-words, because if word requires a deviation, will depend on the rest of the sentence and on the context. Then Austin's thesis is not about words but about propositions. VII 94 Standard situation/circumstances/SearleVsAustin: notice that there is a standard situation, is to suggest that this fact is remarkable and that there is reason to believe that it could also be a non-standard situation. VII 95 SearleVsAustin: his thesis even is not on propositions: to make an assertion means to specify that something is the case. If the possibility that the situation does not exist, is excluded, it is meaningless. Austin's slogan should be formulated to: "No comment, which is not remarkable" or "No assertion that is not worth to be claimed". VII 96 SearleVsAustin: this one has seen it wrong. This is connected with the concept of intention: Intention/Searle: Thesis: the oddity or deviation which is a condition for the utterance "X was deliberately done" represents, at the same time provides a reason for the truth of the statement by "X was not done intentionally". assertion condition/utterance condition: it is the utterance condition of an assertion precisely because it is one reason for the truth of the other. SearleVsAustin: the data must be explained in terms of the applicability of certain terms. So my view is simple and plausible. (VII 98): In Austin's slogan "No modification without deviation" it is not about the applicability of these terms, but rather about conditions for putting up claims generally. Negation/SearleVsAustin: then the negations of the above, are not neither true nor false, but simply false! E.g. I did not go voluntarily to the meeting (I was dragged). etc. VII 98 Example The ability to remember ones name is one of the basic conditions ... |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Derrida, J. | Habermas Vs Derrida, J. | Derrida I 95 Derrida: no distinction between everyday language and specialist languages. (DerridaVsSearle). I 196 HabermasVsDerrida: there are differences. Derrida over-generalizes poetic language. There has to be a language in which research results can be discussed and progress registered. HabermasVsDerrida: he does not wriggle out of the restrictions of the subject-philosophical paradigm. His attempt to outbid Heidegger does not escape the aporetic structure of the truth events stripped of truth validity. I 211 Subject-Philosophy/Derrida: Habermas: he does not break with her at all. He falls back on it easily in the style of the original philosophy: it would require other names than those of the sign and the re-presentation to be able think about this age: the infinite derivation of the signs who wander about and change scenes. HabermasVsDerrida: not the history of being the first and last, but an optical illusion: the labyrinthine mirror effects of ancient texts without any hope of deciphering the original script. I 213 HabermasVsDerrida: his deconstructions faithfully follow Heidegger. Involuntarily, he exposes the reverse fundamentalism of this way of thinking: the ontological difference and the being are once again outdone by the difference and put down one floor below. I 214 Derrida inherits the weaknesses of the criticism of metaphysics. Extremely general summonings of an indefinite authority. I 233 DerridaVsSearle: no distinction between ordinary and parasitic use - Searle, HabermasVsDerrida: there is a distinction: communication requires common understanding I 240 Derrida’s thesis: in everyday language there are also poetic functions and structures, therefore no difference from literary texts, therefore equal analysability. HabermasVsDerrida: he is insensitive to the tension-filled polarity between the poetic-world-opening and the prosaic-innerworldly language function. I 241 HabermasVsDerrida: for him, the language-mediated processes in the world are embedded in an all prejudicing, world-forming context. Derrida is blind to the fact that everyday communicative practice enables learning processes in the world thanks to the idealizations built into communicative action, against which the world-disclosing power of interpretive language has to prove itself. Experience and judgment are formed only in the light of criticizable validity claims! Derrida neglects the negation potential of communication-oriented action. He lets the problem-solving capacity disappear behind the world-generating capacity of language. (Similarly Rorty) I 243 HabermasVsDerrida: through the over-generalization of the poetic language function he has no view of the complex relationships of a normal linguistic everyday practice anymore. Rorty II 27 HabermasVsDerrida, HabermasVsHeidegger/Rorty: "subject philosophy": misguided metaphysical attempt to combine the public and the private. Error: thinking that reflection and introspection could achieve what can be actually only be effected by expanding the discussion frame and the participants. II 30 Speaking/Writing/RortyVsDerrida: his complex argument ultimately amounts to a strengthening of the written word at the expense of the spoken. II 32 Language/Communication/HabermasVsDerrida: Derrida denies both the existence of a "peculiarly structured domain of everyday communicative practice" and an "autonomous domain of fiction". Since he denies both, he can analyze any discourse on the model of poetic language. Thus, he does not need to determine language. II 33 RortyVsHabermas: Derrida is neither obliged nor willing to let "language in general" be "determined" by anything. Derrida could agree fully with Habermas in that "the world-disclosing power of interpretive language must prove itself" before metaphors are literarily absorbed and become socially useful tools. RortyVsHabermas: he seems to presuppose that X must be demonstrated as a special case of Y first in order to treat X as Y. As if you could not simply treat X as Y, to see what happens! Deconstruction/Rorty: language is something that can be effective, out of control or stab itself in the back, etc., under its own power. II 35 RortyVsDeconstruktion: nothing suggests that language can do all of this other than an attempt to make Derrida a huge man with a huge topic. The result of such reading is not the grasping of contents, but the placement of texts in contexts, the interweaving of parts of various books. The result is a blurring of genre boundaries. That does not mean that genera "are not real". The interweaving of threads is something else than the assumption that philosophy has "proven" that colors really "are indeterminate and ambiguous." Habermas/Rorty: asks why Heidegger and Derrida still nor advocate those "strong" concepts of theory, truth and system, which have been a thing of the past for more than 150 years. II 36 Justice/Rawls Thesis: the "just thing" has priority over the "good thing". Rawls/Rorty: democratic societies do not have to deal with the question of "human nature" or "subject". Such issues are privatized here. Foundation/Rorty Thesis: there is no Archimedean point from which you can criticize everything else. No resting point outside. RortyVsHabermas: needs an Archimedean point to criticize Foucault for his "relativism". Habermas: "the validity of transcendental spaces and times claimed for propositions and norms "erases space and time"." HabermasVsDerrida: excludes interaction. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 Derrida I J. Derrida De la grammatologie, Paris 1967 German Edition: Grammatologie Frankfurt 1993 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Frankl. V. | Nozick Vs Frankl. V. | II 579 Death/Nozick: it is often assumed that our mortality is a particular problem for the meaning of life. Why? Would this problem not exist if life were infinite? Life/Infinite/Victor Frankl: Thesis: it is death himself who gives meaning to life. Suppose we had an infinite life: then we could legitimately postpone all our actions forever. It would be of no consequence whether we do something now or later. It might then happen that someone voluntarily ends their life to give it meaning. Scientists who discovered a remedy for immortality would probably keep it secret. ((s) Vs: (similar to above): this possible world is so far away from us, and the description is so general and vague that it is hard to say anything about it and hardly any conclusions can be drawn from it: would we not need anything to eat then, would we not need to work for it? Would we not need breathe regularly and would we not stumble into certain conflict situations? Would immortality make our bodies so different that the physiology became incomparable and thus our way of life then would not be comparable to our life now? Would there be no competition for finite resources therefore?) Nozick: perhaps other things would be won that would outweigh the loss of meaning? Frankl/Nozick: our only desire is to get certain things done. II 580 Nozick: also: if we had an infinite life, we could look at it as a whole, as something we could shape ((s) Does infinity not prevent that?. NozickVsFrankl: does not seem to be in question whether infinity did not eliminate the meaning of God's existence! Frankl: just general assumption that restrictions and pre-existing structures are necessary to operate a meaningful organization or store things (in vessels). NozickVsFrankl: even if that were true, death is only one way of limitation, sonatas and sonnets have different restrictions. Death: why should we think that the bad thing about death is the good which it ends, and not the good that it prevents from happening? E.g. a child dies three minutes after birth. II 581 Why does it bother us that after death an infinite amount of time will pass in which we do not exist? Death/Epicurus: is not bad for someone who lives, because this is not dead, and not bad for someone who is dead, because the dead no longer exist. Nozick: is death bad because it makes our life finite? E.g. Suppose our past is infinite, but we have forgotten most of it. If death still bothers you, it is not because it makes life finite! E.g. Inverse situation: infinite future. That does not explain why there is an asymmetry between past and future. II 582 E.g. why do we not mourn our late birth as much as we mourn our early death? Is it because we already accept the past as fixed and the future as malleable? Perhaps a fulfilled past in which we have experienced, seen, and lived through everything would let death appear less serious than an endless monotonous past. |
No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 |
| Habermas, J. | Tugendhat Vs Habermas, J. | II 16 TugendhatVsHabermas/Apel: "good" or the entire ethics cannot be justified linguistically. Only voluntarily. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Hume, D. | Verschiedene Vs Hume, D. | Hacking I 68 Causality/W.C.BroadVsHume: VsRegularity: For example we can see that the siren of Manchester howls every day at the same time, whereupon the workers of Leeds let the work rest for one hour. But no causation. Hacking I 70 CartwrightVsHume: the regularities are characteristics of the procedures with which we establish theories. (>Putnam). Hume I 131 Def Atomism/Hume/Deleuze: is the thesis that relations are external to conceptions. (KantVs). VsHume: Critics accuse him of having "atomized" the given. Theory/DeleuzeVsVs: with this one believes to have pilloried a whole system. As if it were a quirk of Hume. What a philosopher says is presented as if it were done or wanted by him. I 132 What do you think you can explain? A theory must be understood from its conceptual basis. A philosophical theory is an unfolded question. Question and critique of the question are one. I 133 It is not about knowing whether things are one way or the other, but whether the question is a good question or not. Apron I 238 Lawlikeness/lawlike/Schurz: b) in the narrower sense: = physical necessity (to escape the vagueness or graduality of the broad term). Problem: not all laws unlimited in space-time are legal in the narrower sense. Universal, but not physically necessary: Example: "No lump of gold has a diameter of more than one kilometre". Universality: is therefore not a sufficient, but a necessary condition for lawfulness. For example, the universal statement "All apples in this basket are red" is not universal, even if it is replaced by its contraposition: For example "All non-red objects are not apples in this basket". (Hempel 1965, 341). Strong Hume-Thesis/Hume/Schurz: Universality is a sufficient condition for lawlikeness. SchurzVs: that is wrong. Weak Hume-Thesis/Schurz: Universality is a necessary condition for lawfulness. ((s) stronger/weaker/(s): the claim that a condition is sufficient is stronger than the claim that it is necessary.) BhaskarVsWeak Hume-Thesis. BhaskarVsHume. Solution/Carnap/Hempel: Def Maxwell Condition/lawlikeness: Natural laws or nomological predicates must not contain an analytical reference to certain individuals or spacetime points. This is much stronger than the universality condition. (stronger/weaker). Example "All emeralds are grue": is universal in space-time, but does not meet the Maxwell condition. ((s) Because observed emeralds are concrete individuals?). I 239 Natural Law/Law of Nature/Armstrong: are relations of implication between universals. Hence no reference to individuals. (1983) Maxwell condition/Wilson/Schurz: (Wilson 1979): it represents a physical principle of symmetry: i.e. laws of nature must be invariant under translation of their time coordinates and translation or rotation of their space coordinates. From this, conservation laws can be obtained. Symmetry Principles/Principle/Principles/Schurz: physical symmetry principles are not a priori, but depend on experience! Maxwell Condition/Schurz: is too weak for lawlikeness: Example "No lump of gold..." also this universal statement fulfills them. Stegmüller IV 243 StegmüllerVsHume: usually proceeds unsystematically and mixes contingent properties of the world with random properties of humans. Ethics/Morality/Hume: 1. In view of scarce resources, people must cooperate in order to survive. 2. HumeVsHobbes: all people have sympathy. If, of course, everything were available in abundance, respect for the property of others would be superfluous: IV 244 People would voluntarily satisfy the needs in the mutual interest according to their urgency. Moral/Ethics/Shaftesbury/ShaftesburyVsHume: wants to build all morality on human sympathy, altruism and charity. (>Positions). HumeVsShaftesbury: illusionary ideal. Ethics/Moral/Hume: 3. Human insight and willpower are limited, therefore sanctions are necessary. 4. Advantageous move: intelligence enables people to calculate long-term interests. IV 245 The decisive driving force is self-interest. It is pointless to ask whether the human is "good by nature" or "bad by nature". It is about the distinction between wisdom and foolishness. 5. The human is vulnerable. 6. Humans are approximately the same. |
Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Kant | Verschiedene Vs Kant | Kanitscheider I 434 KantVsNewton: Infinite unimaginable! NewtonVsKant: unimaginable, but conceptually comprehensible! Kanitscheider I 441 EllisVsKant: (antinomies): the expressions "earlier" and "later" can be related to states before a fixed time t0, without assuming that all these states really existed. Just as one can speak of a temperature of 0 K, even if one knows that this temperature cannot be reached. Kant I 28 VsKant/Causality: Of course, he does not adhere to this himself! His critique of reason is about more than possible experience (namely about metaphysics through freedom and thus about the absolute value of our existence). Here Kant's concept of causality shows itself to be completely unaffected by Hume. - Intelligent Cause. I 47 Mind: has its own causality: "spontaneity of concepts". (VsKant: untouched by Hume). Antinomy of Freedom: VsKant: a bluff: we cannot do it with objects, "it will only be possible with concepts and principles that we accept a priori." I 49 Freedom Antinomy: solution: third cosmological antinomy: theme: the third constitution of the world as a whole: event context. - VsKant: Imposition: the "acting subject", i.e. I, should take myself as an "example" for things! It is not in itself subject to the condition of time. Spontaneous beginning of events. I 53 Freedom/Kant: The freedom of the other would be uncertain. VsKant: A freedom that could be both mine and that of the other cannot be thought of in this way. - VsKant: he misappropriates the problem of identification with the other. (> intersubjectivity, subject/object). I 52 For Kant this was not a problem: for him the rescue was not in the world of appearances. Concept: Predicates only have to be consistent. I 66 SchulteVsKant: this only applies to objects for which it can always be decided, not to chaotic diversity. I 67 Predicate/Kant: Kant simply omits the negative predicates. I 68 I 69 MarxVsKant: Dissertation from 1841: Kant's reference to the worthlessness of imaginary thalers: the value of money itself consists only of imagination! On the contrary, Kant's example could have confirmed the ontological proof! Real thalers have the same existence as imagined gods". I 104 Only through this idea does reason a priori agree with nature at all. This prerequisite is the "expediency of nature" for our cognitive faculty. > Merely logical connection. - VsKant: actually relapse into "thinking in agreement". Die ZEIT 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink: Rawls) RawlsVsKant: religiously influenced Manichaeism. Because the "good ego" that lives in the intelligent world of understanding is threatened by the "evil ego" of the natural world of the senses, moral action must be anchored in the belief that it is God's will to realize the "supreme good" of existence in accordance with the ideal realm of purposes. Moral/HegelVsKant: in a well-ordered state with a functioning legal system, the individual does not have to be committed to morality, but acts voluntarily in accordance with the moral constitution of bourgeois society. Menne I 28 Kant: transcendental reasoning of logic. It must apply a priori. Kant: analytical judgement: so narrowly defined that even the largest part of mathematics and logic falls within the realm of synthetic judgement. MenneVsKant: if he wanted to justify logic from the twelve categories, this would be a circular conclusion. Vaihinger I 333 Thing in itself/F.A. LangeVsKant/Vaihinger: If the thing itself is fictitious, then also its distinction from the apparitions. ((s)Vs: the distinction is only mental, not empirical). Vollmer I XIV World View/Konrad LorenzVsKant: in no organism do we encounter a world view that would contradict what we humans believe from the outside world. Limit/Lorence: The comparison of the world views of different species helps us to expect and recognize the limitations of our own world view apparatus. |
Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996 Me I A. Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1997 Vaihinger I H. Vaihinger Die Philosophie des Als Ob Leipzig 1924 |
| Nozick, R. | Verschiedene Vs Nozick, R. | I 378 Minimal State/Nozick: Rights/Nozick: the human has the right to self-destruction. Other people are untouchable. Taxes/Nozick: there is no abstract total social benefit. Therefore, millionaires should not be taxed. I 379 Utilitarianism/Nozick/Rawls: both reject all utilitarian considerations and calculations! Life: only a creature with the ability to plan its own life can have a meaningful life. Property: the individual is its own property and not that of another. Otherwise one could, for example, remove its kidneys on demand. Reason: the individual would not have worked them out itself. The free market with private property rights will ensure the effective use of scarce resources and encourage inventiveness and new thinking. This is the reason why those who have fewer resources available because they have already used others are not really worse off. I 381 For example, suppose one person's life could only be saved by violating another person's property right, for example over a certain medicine. Nozick: in certain extreme cases, his principle that the property of others is absolutely inviolable can be relaxed. VsNozick: unfortunately, deals nowhere with how the moral status of these rights is founded. Question: if the right to property has the same moral value as the right to self-determination, the plausibility of the starting position is endangered. If the second has priority over the first, the argumentation is inconclusive, because the inviolability of property is a necessary precondition for the rejection of any form of state. I 383 Distribution/Nozick: there is no allocation or distribution of goods just as there is no allocation of spouses in a society. The just distribution therefore depends on the way in which the property came into the hands of the owner, that is, on its prehistory. (Most other theories about distributive justice deal only with the result of distribution or the key: e.g. Rawls' principle of difference). Justice: a) original acquisition: appropriation of "masterless" goods. b) transfer of possessions. I 384 1. Anyone who acquires a property in accordance with the principle of just appropriation shall be entitled to that property. 2. Anyone who acquires a property in accordance with the principle of equitable transfer from someone who is entitled to the property shall be entitled to the property. 3. Claims to possessions arise only through (repeated) application of rules (1) and (2). c) Correction of injustices. Dealing with thieves, fraudsters and perpetrators of violence. Question: how can the sins of the past be corrected again? VsNozick: he deals with this complicated problem on less than one and a half pages. He only says that this is an important and complicated problem. Distributive justice/Nozick: Difference: structured (historical) principles/non-structured (non-historical) principles. I 384/385 "Natural Dimension": distribution according to performance (historical). Historical: according to intelligence or race. E.g. Basketball fans pay completely overpriced prices to see their star. Nozick: this must be seen as completely fair, since it happens voluntarily. The appearance of injustice arises only if, on the one hand, individuals are granted a free right of disposal over their goods and, on the other hand, it is demanded that the distribution resulting from the exercise of this right should have taken place in accordance with the original structured and result-oriented distribution principle. Nozick: there can be no enforcement of result-oriented principles or structural distribution without permanent interference in people's lives! In order to maintain a certain structure, the state would have to intervene again and again. I 386 VsNozick: Question: why does he assume that people in the state of the original distributive justice V1 have absolute freedom to deal with their possessions at their own discretion (to buy overpriced baseball tickets)? A right which, according to the structural theories, they supposedly have based on their assumptions V1, yes, a right they do not even possess! Contradiction. The question is more complicated than it seems: Goods/Nozick: are seen by Nozick as a kind of mass entry to the common catering of all. VsNozick: this systematically ignores the demands of the workers from their own production. Nozick unfortunately gives himself a systematic discussion of this problem of competing demands. |
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| Ordinary Language | Positivism Vs Ordinary Language | Fodor II 118 PositivismusVsOrdinary Language/PositivismVsOxford: the philosophy of ordinary language has no system. A representation of natural language, which does not specify its formal structure, cannot comprehend the production principles for the syntactic and semantic properties. II 123 FodorVsOrdinary Language: that forces the philosophers of ordinary language to seek refuge more and more with the intuitions. II 124 In particular, he will claim to detect anomalies intuitively and to say that a philosophical problem is solved if anomalies are detected. (Cavell asserts that!). FodorVsCavell: Contradiction: so he thinks that in philosophical practice it is important not to use words wrongly, and at the same time he thinks that he can decide with the help of intuition when a word is misused. Even though it may be clear intuitively when a word is abnormal, it is not enough for philosophical purposes to know that it is abnormal, it may be abnormal for many reasons, some of which are not faulty! E.g. If you accuse a metaphysicist that he uses language wrongly, he will answer rightly: "So what?" Moreover, we cannot demand of a theory of meaning that any expression which is called abnormal by a theoretically untrained speaker is also evaluated as such by the theory. II 125 The theory should rather only determine semantic violations. II 126 FodorVsIntuitions: decisions about unusualness (anomalies) cannot be extrapolated in any way if they are based only on intuitions. Then we have no theory, but only overstretched intuitions. OxfordVsFodor/Ordinary LanguageVsFodor: could counter that we have ignored the principle of treating similar cases with similar methods. FodorVsVs: that is beside the point: specifying relevant similarity means precisely to accurately determine the production rules. III 222 Ordinary Language/Cavell: here there are three possible types to make statements about them: Type I Statement: "We say..., but we do not say...." ((s) use statements) Type II Statement: The supplementation of type I statements with explanations. Type III Statement: Generalizations. Austin: E.g. we can make a voluntary gift. (Statement about the world). Cavell: conceives this as "substantive mode" for "We say: 'The gift was made voluntarily'". (Statement about the language). Voluntary/RyleVsAustin: expresses that there is something suspicious about the act. We should not have performed the act. Cavell Thesis: such contradictions are not empirical in any reasonable sense. III 223 Expressions of native speakers are no findings about what you can say in a language, they are the source of utterances. ((s) data). Also without empiricism we are entitled to any Type I statement that we need to support a Type II statement. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Ryle, G. | Austin Vs Ryle, G. | Vendler I 243 Voluntary/Ryle: this word is only used for acts that seem to be the result of a person's guilt. AustinVsRyle: you can also make a gift voluntarily. Voluntarily/Cavell: middle way between Austin and Ryle: the action must at least be suspect. |
Austin I John L. Austin "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 24 (1950): 111 - 128 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Austin II John L. Austin "A Plea for Excuses: The Presidential Address" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 57, Issue 1, 1 June 1957, Pages 1 - 3 German Edition: Ein Plädoyer für Entschuldigungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, Grewendorf/Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Vendler II Z. Vendler Linguistics in Philosophy Ithaca 1967 Vendler I Zeno Vendler "Linguistics and the a priori", in: Z. Vendler, Linguistics in Philosophy, Ithaca 1967 pp. 1-32 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Ryle, G. | Cavell Vs Ryle, G. | II 170 Everyday Language/Cavell: here there are three possible types to make statements about them: Type I statement: "We say ...... but we do not say..." Type II statement: the addition of explanations to Type I statements. Type III statements: generalizations. II 171 AustinVsRyle: for example a gift can be given voluntarily (without being guilty) but that is not something you should normally not do. II 173 CavellVsRyle: requires an explicit explanation (Type II statement): he is generally entitled to do so, but especially with regard to his example "voluntarily" the generalization goes wrong: II 174 (E.g. Austin: voluntary gift). Austin Thesis: we cannot always say of actions that they are voluntary, even if they were obviously not involuntary either. CavellVsRyle: he has not completely neglected it, his mistake is that he characterizes these actions incompletely and those where the question cannot arise wrongly. He does not see that the condition for the use of the term "voluntarily" applies in general. II 175 He falsely assumes that "not voluntary" means "involuntary". Cavell: this is also overlooked by utilitarianism. |
Cavell I St. Cavell Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen Frankfurt 2002 Cavell I (a) Stanley Cavell "Knowing and Acknowledging" in: St. Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say?, Cambridge 1976, pp. 238-266 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (b) Stanley Cavell "Excursus on Wittgenstein’s Vision of Language", in: St. Cavell, The Claim of Reason, Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy, New York 1979, pp. 168-190 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (c) Stanley Cavell "The Argument of the Ordinary, Scenes of Instruction in Wittgenstein and in Kripke", in: St. Cavell, Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome: The Constitution of Emersonian Perfectionism, Chicago 1990, pp. 64-100 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Davide Sparti/Espen Hammer (eds.) Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell II Stanley Cavell "Must we mean what we say?" in: Inquiry 1 (1958) In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Use Theory | Searle Vs Use Theory | III 64 Use theory of meaning/SearleVsSearleVsUse theory: E.g. it is said that in Muslim countries a man can divorce his wife by simply saying three times "I divorce myself from you," while throwing three white pebbles. This is obviously a deviating use of the word compared to the use of the word in our societies. Anyone who thinks that meaning is use, would have to conclude that the word "divorce" has a different meaning for Muslims than for others. But that is not the case! III 64/65 Solution/Searle: an existing proposition form has been assigned a new status function. The proposition form "I divorce myself from you," does not change its meaning when a new status function is added. Rather, it is now simply used to create a new institutional fact. (Declaration). E.g. that does not apply to every institutional fact: you cannot make a touchdown (baseball), by simply saying that you make it. III 79 Causality/Status Function/Searle: Status functions differ from causal use functions in terms of their language dependency: E.g. one can think without all the words that this is a screwdriver because you can easily think that this thing is used to screw in these other things, because you may have seen it many times. To treat an object as a screwdriver and to use it, no words are logically necessary! (> Use) There are structural properties available that may be perceived without using words. Status: here no physical features are available. V 221 Searle: the concept of use is too vague. SearleVsUse theory: 1. no indication of the distinction between the use of a word and the use of a proposition! 2. false conviction: because we could not say this or that under certain conditions, it could under these conditions not be the case! V 221/222 E.g. "under what conditions would we say that he can remember this or that or the act was carried out voluntarily?" False: 1. What does W mean? 2. How is W used? 3. How is W used in simple present indicative propositions of the form "X is W"? (Way too specific!). 4. how are such propositions used? V 223 5. Which illocutionary act is performed? 6. When would we say such propositions? The assumption that the answers to the fifth question represent necessary answers to the first leads to speech fallacy. ((s) as Tugendhat: meaning not from circumstances.) Relation to the fallacy of criticism of the naturalistic fallacy: V 224 SearleVsUse theory: "Use" is too vague to distinguish between the truth-conditions of the proposition expressed and the truth conditions of the illocutionary strength of the expression. V 229 SearleVsUse theory: there is a difference between the question "What does it mean to call something good?" and "What is the meaning of" good "?" V 234 SearleVsUse theory: E.g. obscenities: the use of obscenities is substantially different from that of the corresponding courteous synonyms. E.g. "He is not a nigger" is just as derogatory as "He is a nigger". |
Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Various Authors | Lewis Vs Various Authors | I (b) 21 Tradition had no problems or disputes in equating water with H2 0 or light with electromagnetic radiation. According to the conventional wisdom, such identifications are made voluntarily. Simply with the help of >bridge laws. Tradition: the equating is made, not found! (LewisVs, Putnam/KripkeVs). I (b) 22 LewisVsTradition (see above): theoretical identifications are not fixed, they follow rather from the theories that make them possible. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Volitions | Ryle Vs Volitions | 79 Volition/Act of will/Tradition/Ryle: long-term undisputed axiom: that the human mind is three-parted: thought, feeling, will. Tradition/Ryle: also modes: of knowing, of affection, of striving. We refute this, but do not deny that there are will-strong and weak people, voluntary and involuntary acts. Tradition/Ryle: only when my body movement arises from an act of will, I deserve praise or blame. --- I 80 RyleVsVolitions/Ryle: inevitable expansion of the myth of the ghost in the machine. He assumes that there are states of mind and processes, and there are different states of the body and processes for this. An event on the one stage is never identical to an event on the other stage. A causal proposition is necessary, which says that the physical action of pulling the trigger of the pistol is an effect of the mental act of will to pull the trigger. A mental impulse has caused the contraction of the muscles. This is the language of the paramechanic theory of mind. When a theorist believes in acts of will, he believes in the mind as a secondary field of special causes. He will then speak of physical actions as "utterances" of mental processes. RyleVsVolitions: 1 .: nobody ever says (even not the advocates of the theory) that he was busy at ten o'clock in the morning, to want this or that. Or he carried out five fast and light and two slow and heavy acts of will between the breakfast and lunch. If there were acts of will, with what predicates would they be described? Could they be sudden or gradual, strong or weak, pleasant or unpleasant? Can I do two or seven of them at the same time? Can I execute one in a dream, or while I think of something else? Can I mistakenly believe that I had executed one? At what moment did the jumper perform his act of will as he put his foot on the ladder when he took a deep breath when he counted one, two, three but did not jump? What would he answer to these questions himself? Acts of will/Tradition/Ryle: Advocates of the theory say, of course, that the execution of acts of will would be tacitly asserted whenever an action is described as voluntary, deliberate, etc. They also say that one cannot only, but one must know that one carries out an act of will. RyleVsVolitions: but you cannot ask an advocate when he has done his last act of will, or whether he performs one when he recites "Oh, you dear Augustin" backwards. He will admit that he had difficulties in answering these questions, although he should not have any according to his own theory. RyleVsVolitions: 2. It is admitted that one can never observe an act of will. One can only conclude from effects. It follows from this that no judge, father, or teacher ever knows whether the deeds which he judges deserve praise or rebuke. The making of confessions is also just another muscle movement. (The only thing you can observe according to this theory). Nor can it be maintained that the agent himself can know whether any action is the effect of an act of will. Suppose, for example, that he could localize his act of will shortly before pulling the trigger of the pistol due to introspection. Then it would still not prove that the pulling of the trigger was the effect of the act of will. It could still be caused by another event. (Regress) RyleVsVolitions: 3. The connection between the act of will and the movement is admittedly puzzling. It is not, however, an unsolved mystery of a solvable kind, as the problem of recognizing the causes of disease, but of a quite different kind. Tradition/Ryle: The episodes in the life of the mind have supposedly a completely different existence than the episodes in the career of a body. A middle position is not allowed. But interrelationships between the body and the mind need the middle members, where there can be no members. VsVolitions: 4. It is the main function of acts of will to induce body movements, but from the argument to the proof of their existence, as weak as it is, it follows that some mental events must also be caused by acts of will. (Regress). Acts of will/Tradition/Ryle: were postulated to make actions voluntarily, resolutely, laudably or wanton. But predicates of this kind are not only attributed to body movements, but also to those activities that are not physical, but mental, according to the theory. Acts of will/volitions: Ryle: what is the status of the will acts themselves? Are they voluntary or involuntary? ((s)> Schopenhauer: We are free to do what we want, but not free to want what we want). VsVolitions/Ryle: both voluntary and involuntary acts of will are absurd. If my act of will is voluntary in the sense of theory, another act of will must have preceded it, ad infinitum (regress). It has been proposed for avoidance that the acts of will can neither be described as voluntary nor involuntary. "Act of will" is a term that cannot accept predicates such as "virtuous," "vicious," "good," or "wicked," which may embarrass those moralists who use the acts of will as the emergency anchor of their systems. --- I 85 In short, the theory of acts of will is a causal hypothesis, and the question of voluntariness is a question of the cause. |
Ryle I G. Ryle The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949 German Edition: Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 4 theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Modification | Austin, J.L. | III 48 Austin/Thesis: "No modification without deviation": i.e. no modification of the language without deviation in behavior (to normality). One is of the opinion that there must always be at least one modifying expression. Austin: this is completely unjustified for most uses of most verbs! E.g. "eat", "push", "play football" here no modifying expression is necessary or even permissible. Probably also not with "murder". A modifying expression is only permissible in the case of a deviating design. Searle VII 86 Austin: Thesis: The terms used by us to modify descriptions of actions, such as "intentionally", "voluntarily", etc., are only used to modify an action if the action is somehow deviant or cross. "No modification without deviation". VII 93 .... Austin's thesis is not about words but about sentences. |
Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Ethics | Hume, D. | Stegmüller IV 243 Ethics/Moral/Hume: Thesis 1. In view of scarce resources, people must cooperate in order to survive. 2. HumeVsHobbes: all people have sympathy. If, of course, everything were available in abundance, respect for the property of others would be superfluous: IV 244 People would voluntarily satisfy the needs in the mutual interest according to their urgency. IV 244 Ethics/Morality/Hume: Thesis 3. human insight and willpower are limited, therefore sanctions are necessary. 4. Advantageous move: intelligence enables people to calculate long-term interests. IV 245 The decisive driving force is self-interest. It is pointless to ask whether the human is "good by nature" or "bad by nature". It is about the distinction between wisdom and foolishness. 5. Humans are vulnerable. 6. Humans are approximately the same. |
Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Determinism | Lewis, D. | V 291 Def soft Determinism/Lewis: the thesis that one sometimes voluntarily does what one is predestined to do and that in such cases one could also act differently, although prehistory and the laws of nature determine that one will not act differently. Def Compatibilism/Lewis: is the thesis that soft determinism could be true. But a compatibilist could still doubt soft determinism because he doubts that there is a physical basis, that we are predetermined to act as we act. Lewis: Thesis: I myself am a compatibilist, but not a determinist. For the sake of the argument, I will pretend to represent soft determinism. V 293 Weak Thesis/Lewis: I am able to do something so that if I did, a natural law would be broken. Strong Thesis: I am able to break natural laws. V 295 Lewis: Thesis: I was able to raise my hand (instead of actual lowering). I acknowledge that a natural law had to be broken for this, but I deny that I would be able to break natural laws because of it. Soft Determinism does not require supernatural forces. Compatibilism/Lewis: in order to maintain it one does not even have to assume that supernatural powers are possible at all! |
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| Voluntarily | Ryle, G. | Searle VII 88 Ryle s thesis: "voluntary" and "involuntary" can be applied only to acts "that you should not have done." Again, it is absurd to use it in ordinary use. |
Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
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