Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 7 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Causality | Lewis | IV 77 Causality/State/Lewis: A possible world that consisted only of a distribution of states ((s) without the assumed objects) would be causally just like ours. - There are no properties of the actual world except those that supervene on the distribution of local qualities - causality: is determined by nothing except by the distribution of local qualities. --- V 201 Backward/Backwardness/Lewis: only allowed with counterfactual conditionals outside causal contexts - false reverse causality: E.g. to say: if D had not fired, it would have meant that it was not stimulated. V 286 Causality/Avoidance: E.g. circuit with exclusive-OR gate: each output signal is partly caused by the absence of a second input signal - then the match is a fluke. >Coincidence/Lewis. --- Schwarz I 131ff Causality/Lewis/Schwarz: counterfactual conditionals without causality: E.g. Had I not turned the handle, the window would not have opened - e.g. Had Socrates not died, Xanthippe would not have become a widow - e.g. Had I not written to X, I would not have written to Larry. - Events must not overlap, otherwise, for example, a football match would be caused by its first half ((s) because of counterfactual conditionals). >Counterfactual conditional/Lewis, >Event/Lewis. Schwarz I 135 Reverse causality/Time/Hausmann/Lewis: E.g. Fred jumps off the bridge - counterfactual: what is the next possible worlds in which he does not end up in the water? - Pre-history is the same up to the last moment, then great miracle needed - small wonder: if he does not even jump - important argument: then the landing caused the jump! - ((s) Because absence of landing can only be explained by absence of jump?). >Miracles/Lewis. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Causation | Armstrong | III 155 Causation/necessity/Armstrong: 1) irreflexive: Nothing causes itself, relative to itself no relation. 2) nontransitive: cause is not transmitted, but a new universal, even probability = 1, requires new law. 3) allows no contra-position (reversal), the effect cannot be the cause of the cause 4) not symmetric, special case: causes in chain, but not reverse causality, merely necessary "precondition". A chain of causes isnot reverse causality, only: each state has a necessary conditio.n - Conditions do not cause! - Analogy: Laws of nature do not evoke anything. - Therefore causal laws are only a subclass of laws of nature. Martin III 168 Constitution is not causation. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 Martin I C. B. Martin Properties and Dispositions In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin II C. B. Martin Replies to Armstrong and Place In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin III C. B. Martin Final Replies to Place and Armstrong In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin IV C. B. Martin The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010 |
| Causation | Martin | Armstrong III 155 Causation/necessity/Armstrong: 1) irreflexive: Nothing causes itself, relative to itself no relation. 2) nontransitive: cause is not transmitted, but a new universal, even probability = 1, requires new law. 3) allows no contra-position (reversal), the effect cannot be the cause of the cause 4) not symmetric, special case: causes in chain, but not reverse causality, merely necessary "precondition". A chain of causes isnot reverse causality, only: each state has a necessary conditio.n - Conditions do not cause! - Analogy: Laws of nature do not evoke anything. - Therefore causal laws are only a subclass of laws of nature. Martin III 168 Constitution is not causation. |
Martin I C. B. Martin Properties and Dispositions In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin II C. B. Martin Replies to Armstrong and Place In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin III C. B. Martin Final Replies to Place and Armstrong In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin IV C. B. Martin The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010 Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
| Description-Dependence | Lewis | V 252 Event/artificial description: e.g. "the event which consists in the Big Bang, when Essendon wins the final" - ((s) linguistically related, no real reverse causality). >Description dependent. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Economic Models | Gelbach | Parisi I 33 Economic models/Gelbach/Klick: Econometric studies come in two basic flavors: structural and reduced form. Structural modeling involves writing down an explicit mathematical and statistical representation of the determinants of individual, firm, or organizational behavior, such that these relationships can be captured with a finite collection of parameter estimates Reduced form: Reduced form work instead involves attempting to estimate more generally defined contextual objects such as the average treatment effect of past implementations of policy changes. (...) it is possible that one doesn’t learn as much from reduced form estimation as from valid structural estimation. Thus, the choice between structural and reduced form approaches can involve trading off the need to make stronger assumptions (structural work) against the prospect of learning less information (reduced form work) that could prove to be valuable. Parisi I 34 Omitted variables: The fundamental challenge in this context is omitted variable bias. >Empirism/Economic theories. That is, when attempting to isolate the causal effect of policy P on outcome Y through, say, the use of multiple regression analysis, it is necessary to rule out the possibility that any estimated effect is driven by unobserved (or at least uncontrolled for) variables that happen to be correlated with P. Terminology: This general omitted variable bias problem goes by many names (e.g., endogeneity, selection effects, reverse causality, simultaneity, etc.),(...). Suppose we are interested in how changes in a policy P affect some continuous outcome variable Y. Traditional solution: A traditional way to model the relationship between these variables was to assume that there is a parametric function F that relates them structurally, through a combination of assumptions on individual behavior, organizations’ cost functions, and market forces (or other aggregating forces) relating them to each other, such that Y = F(P;τ,ε), where τ is a parameter and ε is an unobserved term. The causal effect of a policy change from P1 to P2 is thus to shift Y from F(P1;τ,ε) to F(P2;τ,ε). If we assume that F is linear in P and ε, then the structural relationship between Y and P is captured by the equation Y = Pτ+ε together with the claim that when ε is held fixed, a change in P’s value from P1 to P2 will induce a change of τ units in Y’s value. On this account, the parameter τ measures the causal effect on Y of a one-unit change in P. If P and ε are uncorrelated, then the OLS estimator is consistent for this causal effect. On the other hand, if P and ε are correlated, then the OLS estimator will differ from τ even in large samples. (...) Parisi I 37 Policies: The key to policy-relevant empirical work, then, involves two questions. First, is it reasonable to assume that ε and P are mean-independent, or that there is a linear structural relationship between Y and P, with P and ε uncorrelated? The second key question is how to estimate causal effects when it is not reasonable to assume that either situation (A) or (B) holds. An enormous amount of modern empirical work is focused on answering this question. Random assignment: One approach to solving the problem of dependence between ε and P is to assign policy levels to units randomly. This approach, common in studies involving the effects of medical and psychological interventions, is frequently used in empirical economics (...).The advantage of random assignment is that it directly imposes the mean independence of ε and P, so that τ may be regarded as the causal effect of the policy, at least within the particular population studied experimentally. For this reason, it is common in the empirical economics literature to consider randomized controlled trials (RCTs) the conceptual benchmark against which other study types are measured. Parisi I 38 Randomized controlled trials/problems: This is surely too strong a claim, as Heckman and Smith (1995)(1) and Deaton (2010)(2) have ably discussed, because RCTs do have potentially important drawbacks. One drawback is that not all questions are susceptible to study using RCTs. RCTs cannot measure what are sometimes called “general equilibrium effects,” that is, effects that a policy change has to behavior outside the study’s domain of impact. >Randomized assignment/Economic theories. 1. Heckman, James J. and Jeffrey A. Smith (1995). “Assessing the Case for Social Experiments.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 9(2): 85–110. 2. Deaton, Angus (2010). “Instruments, Randomization, and Learning about Development.” Journal of Economic Literature 48(2): 424–455. Gelbach, Jonah B. and Jonathan Klick „Empirical Law and Economics“. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press. |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Quantum Mechanics | Wheeler | Genz II 291 Quantum Mechanics/Interference/Mirror/Wheeler/Genz: it is not about interference at all. N.B.: it is about the presence or absence of the second semipermeable mirror which does not allow the assumption or allow the photon to take any particular path. If the mirror is in its place, both paths must have contributed. N.B.: the experimenter can make the decision in the course of the experiment! ((s) That is, after the photon has already passed the position. >reverse causality. II 292 Gravitational lens effect/Genz: here the same principle plays a role, the photons have perhaps been traveling for millenniums, after they have passed the galaxy. Later, it is decided which way they have "taken". Wave function/quantum mechanics/Genz: the wave function states that the photon cannot be assigned a single way around the galaxy. >Wave function. Delayed choice/quantum mechanics/Genz: the delayed choice amplifies the oddities of quantum mechanics. II 293 Copenhagen interpretation/Genz: Genz does not admit any reality to the quantum world. Therefore, Wheeler's "smoky dragon" (which makes the intermediate steps unrecognizable) is not needed. Therefore, it does not allow the "ghostly remote effects" (Einstein, Podolsky, Rosen EPRVsCopenhagen interpretation) as an argument. >Copenhagen interpretation. Delayed choice/semipermeable mirrors/Wheeler/Genz: his experiment can clarify what the principle of free will forbids (see above): For example, it could be that with the decision whether the photon chooses one or the other way, also the other decision is made,... II 294 ...whether the experimenter will install one or the other device. Genz II 295 Wheeler/Natural laws/Genz: Thesis: God must roll dice, otherwise we could not understand "his" laws. >Understanding. Law/Wheeler: thesis: every law will ultimately prove to be statistical. |
Wheeler I J. A. Wheeler Quantum Theory and Measurement Princeton 2014 Gz I H. Genz Gedankenexperimente Weinheim 1999 Gz II Henning Genz Wie die Naturgesetze Wirklichkeit schaffen. Über Physik und Realität München 2002 |
| Time Travel | Lewis | V 67 Time Travel/Lewis: thesis: it is possible. - The paradoxes are merely curiosities. - They involve a discrepancy between time and time. Problem: how can the same event (departure and arrival) be separated by two time distances with different length. Wrong: to postulate several time dimensions. For the time traveler would not be able to find his comrades on a surface. V 69 Solution: separation of external time and personal time of the traveler, as measured by his clock. - No matter what happens to the clock - we do not want to define time operationally, but functionally. - I.e. the clock is infallible by definition. V 70 Functional role in the event pattern of time traveler. - E.g. his hair is growing, but that is not time, but only the same role as in normal life. - It is the personal time of the traveler - this is sufficient to transfer the temporal vocabulary. >Functional role/Lewis. V 71 Time travel: the life of the traveler is like a railway track: e.g. a place 2 miles east might as well be a place 9 miles west. E.g. loop: the track crosses an earlier section of itself once - external time: unique encounter - personal time: repeated - Event: separated in the personal time, united in the external time. Time Traveler: is not there twice in full person, but in two full states. - (> Person state). Problem: What unites these states? Different problem: if the time travel is instantaneous, there is a break in the time line. - Then there are two people and none of them is the time traveler. V 73 Time travel/Causality: 1) the time travel requires personal identity and thus causal continuity. - Thus reverse direction. >Personal identity. The direction of counterfactual dependence and causation is controlled by the direction of other asymmetries of time, so reverse causality and thus causal loops cannot be excluded. That does not mean that the loop as a whole is the cause or can be explained. >Counterfactual dependence. Problem: information transfer. - E.g. if the information must be transmitted first to build the time machine, there is no solution. The person and person-states of the time travel have to be defined simultaneously. - Otherwise, they will be assumed to be mutually circular. V 74f For the journey we only need three-dimensional space without time as a fourth dimension. V 75f Time travel/Grandfather paradox: the past cannot be changed, because moments cannot be split into temporal parts which could be reversed. Murdering of the grandfather is either contained timelessly in the past or it is timelessly not contained. Wrong: Original and new past: instead: one and the same thing is localized twice (like railroad crossing in eight-shaped railway track). So a killing during time travel is a contradiction: both killing and not killing. But past is no particular character. - Also present and future are unchangeable, because their moments have no temporal parts. "Can"/capability: is ambiguous: a monkey cannot speak Finnish, because of its anatomy, I can’t speak it, but I have not learned it. Narrower and broader set of facts. Murdering of the grandfather is possible because of narrow set: everything you need for murder. - But no more set: father-son relation, the end of life of the grandfather, etc. Branched time: (branching after the murder of the grandfather) no solution, because the past is not changed. It is consistent that the grandfather is alive and dead, but in different branches, but there are not two events. >Event/Lewis. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
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