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The author or concept searched is found in the following 8 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Assertibility | Nagel | I 63ff Mean: According to Kripke, Wittgenstein is not only convinced that by no fact that affects me will it be made true that I mean something, but he also believed that this concept should not be explained with reference to truth conditions, but with respect to assertibility conditions. > Assertibility/Nagel, >Assertibility conditions, >Kripke's Wittgenstein, >Rule following, >Meaning(Intending), >Meaning, >Nonfactualism, >Facts. I 72ff Def assertibility conditions: naturalistic: with reference to the sequels that are natural according to a joint human view and that do not require any further justification. cf. >Projectability, >Induction. |
NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 Nagel I Th. Nagel The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997 German Edition: Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999 Nagel II Thomas Nagel What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987 German Edition: Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990 Nagel III Thomas Nagel The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980 German Edition: Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 |
| Concepts | Poundstone | I 95 Projectability/Poundstone: three types of situations in which positive examples of something are not transferable: 1. Grue/bleen Paradox > >Additional hypotheses, >Hypotheses, >Predication, >Knowledge, >Certainty. 3. "All emeralds are been observed": there are no unknown emeralds. - This is well rooted in the language, but not expandable (not projectible). >Induction. |
Poundstone I William Poundstone Labyrinths of Reason, NY, 1988 German Edition: Im Labyrinth des Denkens Hamburg 1995 |
| Grue | Grue, philosophy: Artificial predicate in a thought experiment by Nelson Goodman (N. Goodman, Fact, Fiction and Forecast, Indianapolis, 1965) to illustrate his "New riddle of induction". An object x is grue iff x has been observed before time t and is green or has been observed after t and is blue, the time t being in the future. The problem of uncertainty as to whether something is green or grue arises because the set of green objects is a subset of the set of grue objects. See also induction, projectability, predicates. |
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| Grue | Putnam | V 256 Grue/Goodman: pathological predicates cannot be excluded on purely formal grounds. >Projectability. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Predicates | Goodman | I 127 Predicate/denotation/Goodman: names and certain images denote singular. Predicates and certain other images denote in general (for example, images in a bird book.) >Denotation, >Singular terms, >General terms. --- II I (preface Putnam) Goodman/Putnam: not all predicates are equally projectable. >Grueness, >Induction. II IV Preface No predicate is disjunctive by itself or non-disjunctive (VsCarnap). >Disjunctive predicates. II IV Nevertheless, according to Carnap both "length" and "length squared" are qualitative. This selection of predicates that should be fundamental or not fundamental is too arbitrary. II V More radical solution: proposed by Wesley Salmon: to allow for inductive logic only ostensively defined basic predicates. To distinguish normal from pathological predicates. PutnamVs: unmotivated and too strict: E.g. we call a bacillus S-shaped when it looks like that under a microscope. Then the concept is not based on observation, but it is totally projectable II IV Grue/Goodman: if we take the familiar color predicates, "grue" is a disjunctive predicate. If we take, however, the unusual predicates grue and bleen as basic expressions then grue can be defined as green and observed before the point of time t or as bleen and not observed before t. >Grueness. II 61 Misleading is, to regard the issue of disposition as the one of explanation of hidden properties. I do not want to say that there is some object like the property combustible or the property "burning". It is, after all, predicates that produce relations. >Properties, >Dispositions. II 64 A predicate such as "flexible" can be regarded as an extension or continuation of a predicate like "biggt". The problem is to define these continuations only with manifest predicates. When are two objects much of the same kind? The fact that they both belong to any class, is not enough. Because: any pair of objects belongs to any class. And that both should belong exactly to the same class would be a demand too great, because two objects never belong to exactly the same class. II 74 Continuation/predicates: statement: "time-space is red": two continuations: it continues the two predicates "red" and "time-space" on p + t. Variant: real time-space p1 + t1, head rotation, other color: the predicate "U-blue possible" only continues the predicate "blue" on a wider range of real objects. II 77 One can move fictitious mountains to London in true statements, simply by applying on London a certain continuation of the predicate "mountainous". II 78 Statements about what is possible do not need to exceed the boundaries of the real world. We often confuse a description of the real world with the real world itself. II 79 The possible objects and predicates disappear. Predicates refer to reality, but have extensions that are related in a very specific way with the extensions of certain manifest predicates and usually go further. The problem of the continuation of "burning" to "combustible" is akin to the problem of induction. II 121 "Green" and "grue" seem to be completely symmetrical to each other (in terms of continuation), but "green" is much better anchored. >Grueness, >Projectability. |
G IV N. Goodman Catherine Z. Elgin Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988 German Edition: Revisionen Frankfurt 1989 Goodman I N. Goodman Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1978 German Edition: Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984 Goodman II N. Goodman Fact, Fiction and Forecast, New York 1982 German Edition: Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988 Goodman III N. Goodman Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976 German Edition: Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997 |
| Probability | Poundstone | I 68f Probability/confirmation/Poundstone: E.g. a circus man is 99 feet tall. - That makes us unsure if a man cannot be 100 feet tall. N.B.: if there is no way to detect irrelevant information the probability remains the same. >Relevance, >Knowledge, >Subjective probability, >Objective probability, >Certainty, >Projectability, >Information, >Verification, >Verificationism. |
Poundstone I William Poundstone Labyrinths of Reason, NY, 1988 German Edition: Im Labyrinth des Denkens Hamburg 1995 |
| Verification | Goodman | II 44 Verification/Goodman: e.g. 26 marbles are black, there is 1 unknown color and 25 verified colors: we could assume a "continuability" of predicates (>projectability). Problem: from the same data can follow both black, as well as a different color. >Induction. II 91 Although some statements that confirm a general hypothesis are conclusions from it, but not all conclusions of it verify it. II 92/3 "And"/conjunction: verification of an ingredient gives the whole statement no credibility which would pass onto other sub-statements. II 93 Confirmation/Hempel: a hypothesis is really only confirmed by such statements, that are application cases of it in the special sense that from them follows not the hypothesis itself, but its relativization or restriction on the class of objects that is mentioned in that statement. >Confirmation. --- IV 120 Verification/Goodman: even with the present, real objects only a fairly small part of our knowledge is often based on direct verification. >Knowledge. |
G IV N. Goodman Catherine Z. Elgin Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988 German Edition: Revisionen Frankfurt 1989 Goodman I N. Goodman Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1978 German Edition: Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984 Goodman II N. Goodman Fact, Fiction and Forecast, New York 1982 German Edition: Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988 Goodman III N. Goodman Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976 German Edition: Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997 |
| Verification (Confirmation) | Poundstone | I 68f Probability/confirmation/Poundstone: E.g. a circus man is 99 feet tall. - That makes us unsure if a man cannot be 100 feet tall. N.B.: if there is no way to detect irrelevant >Relevance, >Knowledge, >Probability, >Subjective probability, >Objective probability, >Certainty, >Projectability, >Information, >Verification, >Verificationism. |
Poundstone I William Poundstone Labyrinths of Reason, NY, 1988 German Edition: Im Labyrinth des Denkens Hamburg 1995 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Hempel, C. | Quine Vs Hempel, C. | XI 108 Projectability/Goodman/QuineVsHempel/Lauener: the complement of a projectable predicate need not be projectable. E.g. "Non-grazers" and e.g. "Non-cow" are not projectable. (>bleen-grue, authors on >Grueness). |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Popper, K. | Putnam Vs Popper, K. | V 146 Popper/Putnam: predictions are confronted with "basis sentences" that are publicly accepted. VsPopper: one has criticized, he used a "conventionalist" language, as if the acceptance of a basic sentence would be a convention. >Protocol sentence. Putnam: in reality it is simply recognizing the fact of institutionalization. V 257/258 Method/Popper has suggested that one should accept the most falsifiable hypotheses of the alternative ones. PutnamVsPopper: but it turns out that the falsification varies, depending on which undefined predicates the language choses as a basis. Method/Science: it follows that there is still a necessity, (or the acceptance of a Bayesian "prior"), for a non-formal element that equals a Goodman-decision on the projectability. Here one may ask, how should we explain the success of science, if there is no method? It cannot be denied that science has been remarkably successful. Answer: there is probably a scientific method, but it assumes that you already have a concept of rationality. --- V 258/259 Rationality/Science/Putnam: It cannot be that a newly created method serves only to define what rationality actually is. --- V 260 Popper/Putnam: Claims, that there are rationality terms that are broader than the scientific rationality, and also valid for ethical decisions. PutnamVsPopper: it is not possible to test all theories with high falsifiability. --- V 261 Even his method involves such a thing as a previous selection. Also his calculations of falsfiability levels is not independet from what predicates that are chosen as a basis. >Method/Putnam. Popper/Putnam: could it not be that the Popperian method (as vague and non-formal as it may be) covers not only the concept of scientific rationality exhaustively but the entire concept of knowledge-based rationality? PutnamVsPopper: such a rationality view is even too narrow for science. E.g. it would exclude a theory that belongs to the most successful: the evolution. (Popper would accept this). Evolution: is not high-falsifiable, and it does not imply any predictions. --- V 263 PutnamVsPopper: he even exaggerates the degree of falsifiability of theories of classical physics. >Falsification. Method/Science/Putnam: danger, to dilute the method more and more: if it says in the end: "perform experiments as carefully as possible, then conclude the best explanation, eliminate theories that can be falsified by experimenta crucis" then it can no longer be seen, what cannot be verified through such a vaguely described method. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Projectability | Stalnaker, R. | I 81 rooted / projectability / Stalnaker: it is this non-linguistic conceptual structure (conceptual) which is rooted and projected. But the semantic frame(semantics) does not tell us how to do this. It is at most the form of a philosophical theory, not the theory itself. |
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