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The author or concept searched is found in the following 1 entries.

Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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Vagueness | Williamson | Field II 283
Vagueness/Williamson Puzzles/WilliamsonVsNonfactualism/Field: (Williamson 1994): thesis: for any question there is a simple argument for the conclusion that it has a specific, objective, factual answer. - E.g. Joe is rich or Joe is not rich. - Then there is in each case a fact if he is rich or if he is not rich. Then E.g. Verdi/Bizet is pointless for Williamson. FieldVsWilliamson: E.g. then there must be an inaccessible fact which decides whether the pre-Newtonians mean mass or weight: implausible.
---II 284
Quantum mechanics: here the Nonfactualism is different. |
EconWillO Oliver E. Williamson Peak-load pricing and optimal capacity under indivisibility constraints 1966 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 InTheories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |

Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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Jackson, F. | Williamson Vs Jackson, F. | Stalnaker I 106
Global Supervenience/WilliamsonVsJackson/Stalnaker: as Jackson defines global supervenience, it is not sufficient for strong supervenience.
Def Global Supervenience/Ethics/Jackson:(s) for all possible worlds (poss.w.) w and w' if w and w' are descriptively exactly the same, then they are also exactly the same from an ethical point of view. I.e. the ethical supervenes on the descriptive. I 107
WilliamsonVsJackson: shows that global supervenience in this sense can also apply if the strong supervenience does not apply:
Def uniform property/Williamson/Stalnaker: be a property that is either true of all or nothing. ((s) then possible worlds may differ in that in one all things are u, in the other possible worlds is no thing u). ((s) uniform property(s): e.g. self-identity e.g. difference from other individuals). U: be the set of uniform properties N.B.: then U = U' (the closure on the set of U, properties that are definable in terms of uniform properties are themselves uniform). For example, suppose w and w' are equal in terms of all uniform properties, then w = w'. ((s) I.e. they are equal at all). So that all possible words which are the same in terms of uniform properties are also the same in terms of all properties! ((s) Because F properties are not yet introduced, see below). Then the set of all properties supervenes globally on the uniform properties. But this is not true for strong or even weak superveniences! Because two individuals existing in the same possible world will have the same uniform properties, but may differ in terms of non-uniform properties. StalnakerVsWilliamson: that is true, but it exploits the gap we have closed in the text. Therefore, it does not affect our outcome. Gap: Q: be a trait that applies to some but not all things in world w. ((s) I.e. F is not a uniform property, i.e. there are other properties besides u properties). f: be some picture of world w on itself that maps everything what is in w F, on something that is not F in w. w. will be U-indistinguishable from itself relative to figure f, but not {F}- indistinguishable from itself. ((s) Simple, because not all things are F, although all are u.) Therefore, any set of properties containing F will supervene globally on U. |
EconWillO Oliver E. Williamson Peak-load pricing and optimal capacity under indivisibility constraints 1966 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |

Stalnaker, R. | Williamson Vs Stalnaker, R. | I 159
Identity/Indistinguishability/Timothy WilliamsonVsStalnaker: (1996):
Actuality Operator/@/Williamson: if we add it to K, we can prove the necessity of diversity from the necessary identity. I.e. actual different things are then necessarily different: Logical form: I- @ (∀x)(∀y)(x ≠ y > Nx ≠ y). I 160
Stalnaker: my independence argument above for necessary diversity was based on two assumptions
1. the extensional logic of identity is the same as the logic of indistinguishability, but2. in a modal semantics without symmetry condition for the accessibility relation, individuals can be distinguishable in a possible world while they are not in another possible world. If one cannot "look back", the information about the distinction may be lost. Actuality Operator/Williamson: preserves the information because you can always look back to the actual world. General: the information about every possible world accessible from the actual world is reflected in the actual world and thus also in every other possible world in the model. Williamson: general thesis: I- Ni (x ≠ y > Nj x ≠ y) In our classical system, the universal generalization is invalid and unprovable with this (∀x)(∀y)(Ni (x ≠ y > Nj x ≠ y) because the predication implies existence and thus the negation of an identity statement can be true, not because the expressions refer to different things, but because these do not exist at all. But: the version with the quantifiers within the necessity operator Ni (∀x)(∀y) (x ≠ y > Nj x ≠ y) Will be valid even if the equal sign is defined as indistinguishable. But it will not be provable. Reason: K + @ is an incomplete quantified modal logic. Actuality Operator/Stalnaker: Problem: the semantic limitations for its interpretation have consequences that are not reflected in the propositional logic for this operator, consequences that occur when the range may change from possible worlds to possible worlds. There are propositions without identity which are valid but not provable, e.g. I- @ N (∀x)(Fx > @MFx) Counterpart Semantics/counterpart theory/necessity diversity/Stalnaker: the absence of the need of diversity in the counterpart theory. I 161
Is not connected with the limits of the expressiveness of modal logic (it is even missing in S5). The necessary identity is valid and provable here.
Rather, the necessary difference cannot be proven with or without the actuality operator. StalnakerVsWilliamson: therefore I think that his argument does not threaten the thesis, Thesis: the necessity (or essentiality) of identity is more central in identity logic than the necessity of diversity. |
EconWillO Oliver E. Williamson Peak-load pricing and optimal capacity under indivisibility constraints 1966 |

The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.

Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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Actual-Operator | Williamson, T. | Stalnaker I 160
Actual-Operator/Williamson: preserves the information because you can always look back to the real world.
General: the information about any possible world accessible from the real world is reflected in the real world and thus also in any other world in the model. Williamson: general thesis: I- Ni (x ≠ y > Nj x ≠ y) In our classical system the universal generalization of it is: (∀x)(∀y)(Ni (x ≠ y > Nj x ≠ y) Stalnaker I 161
StalnakerVsWilliamson: so I think his argument does not threaten the thesis,
Thesis: The necessity (or materiality) of identity is more central in identity logic than the necessity of diversity. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |