Dictionary of Arguments

Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute

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The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Feedback Wright I 28
Feedback/Teleology/Wright, G. H.: a key concept in the "causalist" theory of purposefulness is the concept of negative feedback. (Compare R. Taylor: "Comments on a Mechanistic Conception of Purpusefoulness", 1950a - R. Taylor, Purposeful and Non-Purposeful Behavior: A Rejoinder, 1950b, - A. Rosenblueth and N. Wiener, Purposeful and Non-Purposeful Behavior - A. Rosenblueth, N. Wiener and J. Bigelow "Behavior, Purpose and Teleology“; 1968) ---
I 156
TaylorVsRosenblueth/TaylorVsWiener/TaylorVsBigelow/Wright: Taylor calls the views of Rosenblueth, Wiener and Bigelow a "mechanistic" conception of purposefulness. Wright: However, the term "mechanistic" must be used in a broader sense, that is I think, better understood by the expression "causal". The authors themselves do not call their view causal. They are on the contrary cautious...
I 157
...to differentiate between causality and their concept of teleology. WrightVsBigelow/WrightVsWiener: this seems to be a too strong limitation of the expression "causal".
Teleology/Wiener/Bigelow/Wright, G. H.: Bigelow and Wiener want to restrict "teleological behaviour" to "targeted reactions controlled by trial and error". This means it becomes equal in meaning with
behaviour controlled by negative feedback. (A. Rosenblueth, N. Wiener and J. Bigelow "Behavior, Purpose and Teleology", 1943, S. 23-24.).

WrightCr I
Crispin Wright
Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001

WrightCr II
Crispin Wright
"Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox"
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

WrightGH I
Georg Henrik von Wright
Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971
German Edition:
Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008

Information Wiener II 83
Information/Language/Wiener: it is theoretically possible to develop the statistics of semantic and behavioural language in such a way that we obtain a good measure of the amount of information in each system. In any case, we can generally show that phonetic language contains less overall information in relation to the input of data...
II 84
or in any case it does not contain more than the transmission system leading to the ear and that semantic and behavioural language contains even less information. This fact is a form of the second principle of thermodynamics and is only valid if we consider the transferred information at each stage as maximum information that could be transmitted with an appropriately encrypted receiving system.
II 121
The right of ownership of information suffers from the necessary disadvantage that information intended to contribute to the general state of the Community's information must say something substantially different from the community's previous general possession of information.
II 122
The idea that information can be stacked in a changing world without noticeably reducing its value is wrong.
II 123
Information is more of a dynamic matter than a stacking affair.
II 124
The time factor is essential in all assessments of the information value.

Brockman I 155
Information/Wiener/Kaiser: [Wiener borrowed Shannon’s insight]: if information was like entropy, then it could not be conserved – or contained. (>Information/Shannon). Conclusion/Wiener: it was folly for military leaders to try to stockpile the “Scientific know-how of the nation in static libraries and laboratories.”(1)
Brockman I 156
Since “information and entropy are not conserved,” they are “equally unsuited to being commodities.”(2)
Brockman I 157
KaiserVsWiener: what Wiener had in mind, was not what Shannon meant with “information”. Wiener’s treatment of “information” sounded more like Matthew Arnold in 1869(3) than Claude Shannon in 1948—more “body and spirit” than “bit.”
Brockman I 158
[Today] [i]n many ways, Wiener has been proved right. His vision of networked feedback loops driven by machine-to-machine communication has become a mundane feature of everyday life.

1. Wiener, N. (1950) The Human Use of Human Beings. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
2. ibid.
3. Matthew Arnold, Culture and Anarchy, ed. Jane Garnett (Oxford, UK: Oxford University
Press, 2006).

Kaiser, David “”information” for Wiener, for Shannon, and for Us” in: Brockman, John (ed.) 2019. Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI. New York: Penguin Press.

Brockman I 179
Information/Wiener/Hillis: “Information is a name for the content of what is exchanged with the outer world as we adjust to it, and make our
Brockman I 179
adjustment felt upon it.” In his words, information is what we use to “live effectively within that environment.”(1) For Wiener, information is a way for the weak to effectively cope with the strong.
1. Wiener, N. (1950) The Human Use of Human Beings. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 17-18.

Hillis, D. W. “The First Machine Intelligences” in: Brockman, John (ed.) 2019. Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI. New York: Penguin Press.

WienerN I
Norbert Wiener
Cybernetics, Second Edition: or the Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine Cambridge, MA 1965

WienerN II
N. Wiener
The Human Use of Human Beings (Cybernetics and Society), Boston 1952
German Edition:
Mensch und Menschmaschine Frankfurt/M. 1952

Brockman I
John Brockman
Possible Minds: Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI New York 2019
Wiener Lloyd Brockman I 3
Wiener, Norbert/Lloyd: Because he was immersed in problems of control, Wiener saw the world as a set of complex, interlocking feedback loops, in which sensors, signals, and actuators such as engines interact via an intricate exchange of signals and information.
Brockman I 4
In The Human Use of Human Beings(1) has more to teach us humans than it did the first time around. Perhaps the most remarkable feature of the book is that it introduces a large number of topics concerning human/machine interactions that are still of considerable relevance. (…) Wiener foresaw a moment in the near future of 1950 in which humans would cede control of society to a cybernetic artificial intelligence, which would then proceed to wreak havoc on humankind. The automation of manufacturing, Wiener predicted, would both create large advances in productivity and displace many workers from their jobs (…).
LloydVsWiener: (…) Wiener failed to foresee crucial technological developments. Like pretty much all technologists of the 1950s, he failed to predict the computer revolution. Computers, he thought, would eventually fall in price from hundreds of thousands of (1950s) dollars to tens of thousands; neither he nor his compeers anticipated the tremendous explosion of computer power that would follow the development of the transistor and the integrated circuit.
Brockman I 5
(…) Wiener was fascinated by the notion of capturing human behavior by mathematical description. In the 1940s, he applied his knowledge of control and feedback loops to neuromuscular feedback in living systems (…). (…) Wiener’s central insight was that the world should be understood in terms of information. Complex systems, such as organisms, brains, and human societies, consist of interlocking feedback loops in which signals exchanged between subsystems result in complex but stable behavior. When feedback loops break down, the system goes unstable. He constructed a compelling picture of how complex biological systems function, a picture that is by and large universally accepted today.
Brockman I 6
1. LloydVsWiener: It is exactly in the extension of the cybernetic idea to human beings that Wiener’s conceptions missed their target. Wiener notes that prosthetic limbs would be much more effective if their wearers could communicate directly with their prosthetics by their own neural signals, receiving information about pressure and position from the limb and directing its subsequent motion. This turned out to be a much harder problem than Wiener envisaged: Seventy years down the road, prosthetic limbs that incorporate neural feedback are still in the very early stages.
Brockman I 7
2. LloydVsWiener: Wiener (…) greatly underappreciated the potential of digital computation.

1. Wiener, N. (1950) The Human Use of Human Beings. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

Lloyd, Seth. “Wrong, but More Relevant Than Ever” in: Brockman, John (ed.) 2019. Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI. New York: Penguin Press.

Brockman I
John Brockman
Possible Minds: Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI New York 2019

The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Carnap, R. Brendel Vs Carnap, R. I 275
logischer EmpirismusVsSkeptizismus/Empirismus/Skeptizismus/Schlick/Carnap/Brendel: VerifikationismusVsSkeptizismus: (Wiener Kreis): verifikationistische BT: nicht verifizierbare Aussagen sind sinnlos.
Skeptizismus: die Frage nach seiner Wahrheit oder Falschheit zählt auch zu den sinnlosen fragen bzw. „Scheinproblemen“.
I 276
Verifizierbarkeit/BrendelVsWiener Kreis/BrendelVsSchlick/BrendelVsCarnap/Brendel: dieser Begriff war damals schon ständig schwankend.
I 277
Problem: welches sollte die empiristische Basis für Aussagen der verschiedenen Gebiete bilden? VsEmpirismus: Problem: Theoretische Termini.
BrendelVsEmpirismus: dennoch ist die therapeutische Diagnose richtig, weil nicht alles sinnlos ist, das dem empiristischen Sinnkriterium nicht genügt.

Bre I
E. Brendel
Wahrheit und Wissen Paderborn 1999
Wittgenstein Tarski Vs Wittgenstein Berka I 410
Analytical/Tarski: the division of terms into logical and extra-logical ones also plays an important role in the specification of this term.
I 411
Tautology/Tarski: however, some authors see analytical statements as an exact formal correlate of the concept of tautology (i.e. a statement that says nothing about reality). TarskiVsWittgenstein/VsWiener Schule: that seems vague to me.
I 412 Foot note
Tautology/Wittgenstein/Berka: that T says nothing about reality, stems from Wittgenstein's conception of formal truth: according to this, the expression
(p > q) > ((q > r) > p > r))

true by its form alone. (1)
Tautology/material/formal/G. Klaus: the difference between formal and material truths does not lie in the fact that one of the two (the material one) requires a reference to reality, and the other does not, but only in the way in which the truth is founded. What representatives of the theory of formal truth call material W is what can be confirmed by practice and experiment. The formal, on the other hand, are merely derived from arithmetic operations.
G. KlausVs: but this does not prove the truth, but only leads it back to the truth of other statements, which in turn still require justification.
(G. Klaus, (1966), S 117).(2)

1. A.Tarski, „Über den Begriff der logischen Folgerung“, in: Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique, Paris 1935, Bd. VII, ASI 394, Paris 1936, pp 1-11
2. G. Klaus, Moderne Logik, Berlin 1966

Tarski I
A. Tarski
Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923-38 Indianapolis 1983

Berka I
Karel Berka
Lothar Kreiser
Logik Texte Berlin 1983