Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 1 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Causation Bigelow I 276
Causation/Bigelow/Pargetter: we should understand it as a relation between events (in a broad sense). Speech of causation/causality/Davidson/Bigelow/Pargetter. We take over from Davidson (1980):
Problem: singular causal statements. E.g.
"The short circuit caused the fire."
Truth conditions: the statements can be true because the relation exists, even if it is clear that short circuits are neither sufficient nor necessary conditions for fire.
Generalization: can be true, but only if we reword the sentence.
Causal Relation/Davidson/Bigelow/Pargetter: exists, if and only iff there is a way of describing the events so that they can be brought under a general causal law.
BigelowVsDavidson: (see above) the causal relation is rather local than global.
BigelowVsDavidson: the nature of the causal relation is not derived from the existence of an underlying law.
---
I 277
Bigelow/Pargetter pro Davidson: however, the truth conditions of a singular causal statement require the existence of a relation (but not under a description). Causal statements/Bigelow/Pargetter: some must be rewritten: E.g.
"The stone caused the window pane to break."
Must be rewritten to:
"That the stone touched the window pane caused the window pane to break."
E.g.
"Becker's easy victory over Lendl surprised the commentators."
Must be changed:
"Becker's victory surprised ... and if it had not been easy, it would not have been surprising."
Bigelow pro Davidson: So far his theory is convincing.
Causality/causal statements/Bigelow/Pargetter: sometimes we must also make general causal statements:
For this, we need types of events or properties of events.
Causal statements: must then be counterfactual conditionals: E.g.
"If Lendl's defeat had not been so clear, it would not have been surprising."
E.g.
"The antidote slowed the death of Protheros."
This seems to require causal relations between characteristics of events (e.g. lightness, slowing).
---
I 278
Universals: are sometimes used here. Sometimes it is about unique events, sometimes about characteristics of events. Problem: why should the relations between such different entities be summarized? Why should they all be causal?
Solution/Bigelow/Pargetter: we must assume that they all supervene on a basic causal relation. This can not be specified in modal terms.
Causal Relation/Bigelow/Pargetter: is largely unknown to us. It is best to recognize it when it is encountered.
---
I 279
Our task is now to figure out what it is. This is a metaphysical, not a semantic task. ---
I 288
Causation/Explanation/Bigelow/Pargetter: Let's assume that we can close the gap between everyday forces and the fundamental forces. ---
I 289
Forces/Bigelow/Pargetter: how do we justify that we have chosen forces for the explanation? Explanation/David Fair/FairVsBigelow/Bigelow/Pargetter: (Fair 1979): he selects instead of forces energy flow ((s) energy transfer > Gerhard Vollmer).
Forces/Bigelow/Pargetter: we take them because they occur in Newton's 3rd law. For us, there are two instances of causation then, because there are two forces.
Fair: for him it is an instance of energy flow and thus a causation.
BigelowVsFair: his theory does not provide the right relations of higher levels between universals that we need.
Energy flow/energy transfer/Fair/Bigelow/Pargetter: this term requires the identification of packages of energy in time.
Energy/Cause/Effect/Fair/Bigelow/Pargetter: The energy present in the effect is numerically identical to the energy lost in the cause.
Problem/BigelowVsFair: but there is also cause, where no energy is transmitted, but only impulse. Therefore, it needs a shared access. Then the causation is hardly a unifying element in any explanation.
Problem: besides, there are cases where both energy and impulse are transmitted, and how should one choose then? The causation cannot be identified with both. ((s) also BigelowVsVollmer).
---
I 290
BigelowVsFair: besides, energy transmission and pulse transmission supervene on properties and relations. Therefore, according to Fair, there can be no Humean world, which coincides with a causal possible world in all properties of the 1st level. This should, however, be possible (see Chapter 5): a theory that allows this must also recognize causation as a relation of a higher level. Fair cannot do this.

Big I
J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter
Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990


The author or concept searched is found in the following 6 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Fair, D Bigelow Vs Fair, D I 289
Forces/Bigelow/Pargetter: how can we justify that we have chosen forces as an explanation?. Explanation/David Fair/FairVsBigelow/Bigelow/Pargetter: (Fair 1979): He choses energy flow instead forces ((s) energy transmission> Gerhard Vollmer).
Forces/Bigelow/Pargetter: we use them, because they appear in Newton’s 3rd law. So there are two instances of causation for us, because there are two forces.
Fair: for him it is one instance of energy flow and thus a causation.
BigelowVsFair: his theory does not provide the proper relations between universals of a higher level that we need.
Energy flow/energy transmission/Fair/Bigelow/Pargetter: this concept requires the identification of units (packages) of energy in time.
Energy/Cause/Effect/Fair/Bigelow/Pargetter: the energy that is present in the effect is numerically identical with the energy that is lost in the cause. (Strand).
Problem/BigelowVsFair: there are also causations, where no energy is transmitted, but only momentum! Therefore, he needs a divided approach. Then the causation is hardly a unifying element in an explanation.
Problem: furthermore: there are cases where both energy and momentum are transferred, and how should one decide then? Causation cannot be identified with both. ((s) also BigelowVsVollmer).
I 290
BigelowVsFair: furthermore, energy transmission and momentum transmission supervene over properties and relations. Therefore, there can be no Humean world according to fair, which coincides with a causal possible world in all 1st stage properties. However, this should be possible (see above Chapter 5): A theory which allows that must recognize causation as a relation of a higher level. Fair cannot do that.

Big I
J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter
Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990
Mackie, J. L. Putnam Vs Mackie, J. L. V 276
Ethics/Mackie thesis: the good is ontologically "strange": one cannot know that something is good, without having a "Pro" attitude with regard to this something. This boils down to that one presupposes the emotivism to prove it. It also presupposes that there is ONE TRUE THEORY. PutnamVsMackie: but that does not mean that the linguistic use is not correct, there are also cases of conscious infringement.
Philippa Foot: you may even intend to be a bad person.
V 277
The difference between prescriptive and descriptive use is not a bad feature of the vocabulary. From the fact that "good" is used for recommendations, it does not follow that it is not a property.
V 278
Properties/Mackie: thesis: there is no property like "to be justified", but only "justification settings". PutnamVsMackie: thus we fall into total relativism. For the "dedicated physicalists" there is even the problem that the reference (reference) is "ontologically strange". There are simply too many "candidates" (relations) for this post. Namely endlessly many.
Nature/Putnam: a priority would really be strange because we have built a certain neutrality, a certain blankness into our concept of nature. Nature should neither have interests nor intentions, nor a position.
Would a physicalist property be identical with moral correctness, that would be really weird. As if nature itself had intentions of reference.
V 279
Insofar, Moore was right. But that does not schow that the good, the right, etc. do not exist. It only shows that the monistic naturalism (or "physicalism") represents an inadequate theory. ---
I (g) 201
Causality/Mackie: is something epistemic and nothing at all in the world. However, there can be "mechanical causality" next to it in the world. (> G. Vollmer: nowadays causality is traced back to energy transfer,).
I (g) 202
PutnamVsMackie: but this is difficult to see without counterfactual sentences. E.g. Putnam: then my practical frictionless operation of a switch does not represent a "mechanical cause".
PutnamVsMackie/PutnamVsVollmer: such a narrow term may be physically useful, but it is not useful for explaining reference.
On the other hand, when the circuit is mechanical causality, how do we characterizes it then without the counterfactual sentence: "The current would not have flown through the wire if the switch had not been moved"?

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

Putnam I (a)
Hilary Putnam
Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (b)
Hilary Putnam
Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (c)
Hilary Putnam
What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (d)
Hilary Putnam
Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (e)
Hilary Putnam
Reference and Truth
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (f)
Hilary Putnam
How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (g)
Hilary Putnam
Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (h)
Hilary Putnam
Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (i)
Hilary Putnam
Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (k)
Hilary Putnam
"Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam II
Hilary Putnam
Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988
German Edition:
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Putnam III
Hilary Putnam
Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Putnam IV
Hilary Putnam
"Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164
In
Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994

Putnam V
Hilary Putnam
Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981
German Edition:
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Putnam VI
Hilary Putnam
"Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Putnam VII
Hilary Putnam
"A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000
Putnam, H. Vollmer Vs Putnam, H. I 285
Causality/Putnam: can be characterised 1. Regular sequences (purely physical, unsatisfactory) or 2. via the concept of explanation (not purely physical), or
3. via counterfactual conditions (this requires "normal conditions" or "worlds as similar as possible").
I 285
Def Reference/Lewis/Vollmer: functional property (not simply of a living being, but) of a living being with its environment. Causality/VollmerVsPutnam: overlooks the fourth possibility of characterizing causality: energy transfer.
PutnamVsVollmer: if energy transfer is to play such a large role, then activating a light switch cannot be a cause!
VollmerVsPutnam: this overlooks the fact that not all the energy has to be transferred, but only a minimum of any size.
I 286
PutnamVsVollmer: if you admit this, the question is still how to characterize it without counterfactual formulation. VollmerVsPutnam: this is not necessary at all, because there is a physical characterization.
Reference/VsEvolution Theory: (e.g. Putnam): it is not clear which reference physical terms have at all!
VollmerVsVs: once you have a physical characterization of causal relationships (energy transfer), you can also physically explicate "reference".

Vollmer I
G. Vollmer
Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988

Vollmer II
G. Vollmer
Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988
Vollmer, G. Wittgenstein Vs Vollmer, G. Evolutionary Epistemology/WittgensteinVsVollmer: we cannot say, our knowledge of the evolution is a result of evolution.
---
II 103
(DennettVsWittgenstein: knowledge has grown gradually.)

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958
German Edition:
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921.
German Edition:
Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960
Vollmer, G. Verschiedene Vs Vollmer, G. Putnam I 196
Causality/Charles FriedVsVollmer: can easily be considered a physical relationship! For example, "act, smash, move" are causal verbs. (impulse transmission). Fried: Once you have made this mistake, it is easy to believe that functional properties would simply be higher-level physical states. (Putnam self-criticism: I believed this myself earlier) And then to think, reference (and pretty much anything at all) could be a functional property and thus physical.
Vollmer I 275
VsEvolutionary Epistemology/EE: Adaptation is reciprocal. It is precisely the selection advantage of the human to be able to radically reshape his environment (in relation to his needs). Thus the constructive moment is excluded in the evolutionary epistemology. VollmerVsVs: the evolutionary epistemology has been developed by biologists who are well aware of the interaction of adaptation.
However, the dynamic of the process does not affect the applicability of the concept of adaptation at all. (DennettvsAdaption, GouldVsAdaption).
I 290
DretskeVsEvolutionary Epistemology: has very little to offer. (1971, 585) PutnamVsEvolutionary Epistemology: may not be scientifically wrong, but does not answer a single philosophical question! (1982a,6)
I 292
VsEvolutionary Epistemology: some of its representatives already see a "knowledge-gathering process" in the entire biological evolution. Or one speaks of a molecule "recognizing" another molecule.
I 293
VollmerVsVs: no critic defines "knowledge", only Löw: this includes subjectivity (which he does not define either). Information/Löw: Information always exists only for one subject. Vollmer pro, but perhaps too dogmatic.
I 298
Truth/Success/VsEvolutionary Epistemology: when the correctness of experience is inferred from evolutionary success: 1. facts are confused with norms (quid juris, quid facti)
2. the problem of knowledge is reduced to its genetic context and thus
3. the question of the validity of a statement ist trivialized.
This is a genetic fallacy.
VollmerVsVs: it is true that factual and normative questions are considered inseparable here, but it does not mean that they are confused!
The evolutionary epistemology does not conclude from survival the correctness of a world view!
Rather vice versa: in general, a better understanding of the external world structures points to a survival advantage.
Under competition then mostly the better world view prevails.
I 300
Validity/VsEvolutionary Epistemology: The evolutionary epistemology does not solve the validity problem. Validity is central to knowledge, but not possible without reflection. Validity/Vollmer: what validity is, is seen very differently.
Lotze: Validity
Puntel: Discursive redeemability Gethmann: Ability to consent
Generally necessary: a valid statement must be syntactically correct, logically consistent, semantically flawless, intersubjectively understandable, discursive, intersubjectively verifiable, compatible with accepted statements, etc.
Sufficient: here one must distinguish between conditional (hypothetical) and unconditional (categorical) validity.
Conditional validity: has a statement if another statement must be assumed as valid to prove its validity, otherwise unconditional validity.
Vollmer: the claim of unconditional validity has never been honoured. (> Final statement). We must content ourselves with conditions for relative validity.
I 309
VsEvolutionary Epistemology: if epistemology is empirical, it becomes circular.
I 310
Evolutionary Epistemology/EE/Vollmer: it is not the task of epistemology to provide absolute justifications for knowledge and truth claims. One can, however, ask under which conditions certain factual knowledge would be possible, and to these questions it can also give reasonable answers.
Epistemology/Vollmer: Tasks:
Explication of concepts and knowledge
Investigation of our cognitive abilities, comparison of different cognitive systems.
Differentiation of subjective and objective structures, descriptive and normative statements, factual and conventional elements.
Illumination of the conditions for cognition.
Demonstration of cognitive boundaries.
I 315
Causality/VsEvolutionary Epistemology: after the evolutionary epistemology, causality plays a threefold role: 1. order form of nature
2. thinking category
3. this category of thinking is the result of selection.
Therefore, causality generates causality via causality.
a) Through the multiple meaning of "causality" the principle of methodical order is violated. (Gerhardt, 1983,67 69,75).
b) If causality is a category of thought, it cannot at the same time be a product of experience. For this it would have to be inductive or abstract like any experience. Thus, such event sequences must first of all have been recognized as causal. (Lütterfelds, 1982, 113,6).
I 316
VollmerVsVs: the ambiguity is admissible, but easy to eliminate. Solution: instead, one can say that causality as a real category generates causality as a form of thinking via a causally effective selection. This is then not a life-worldly experience.
I 318
VsEvolutionary Epistemology: says nothing new at all! Already Spencer was refuted. Haeckel already uses the term "biological epistemology".
The thesis of the mind as an organ function is reminiscent of Kant's interpretation by Helmholtz and F.A. Lange: "The a priori as a physical psychic "organization".
Vollmer I 313
Reason/BaumgartnerVsVollmer: cannot come out of himself. It is absolute in this sense and cannot be deceived. Reason/ZimmerliVsVollmer: the eye can see itself through apparatuses. But seeing can never see it, because it always does seeing. "Mental uncertainty relation".
Explanation/HayekVsVollmer: no system can explain itself.
I 314
Back-Reference/Hövelmann: in principle the ability to speak cannot be cheated on. VollmerVsVs: these authors do not explain "reason" etc. at all. Exception:
I 323
Def Explanation/Hayek: requires classification. A system that is to classify objects according to n properties must be able to create and distinguish at least 2 exp n different classes. Therefore, the classifying system must be much more complex. However, no system can surpass itself in complexity and therefore cannot explain itself.
I 314
Back-Reference/Vollmer: of course self-knowledge and self-declaration cannot impart secure or complete knowledge. But many "good circles" are quite consistent and informative. Example: "Good circles":





Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000

Vollmer I
G. Vollmer
Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988

Vollmer II
G. Vollmer
Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988
Wittgenstein Dennett Vs Wittgenstein II 103
WittgensteinVsVollmer: you cannot say that my knowledge of the evolution is a result of evolution
II 30
(DennettVsWittgenstein: gradually emerged (> robots, molecules). DennettVsWittgenstein: if a lion could talk, we would understand it quite well - with the usual trouble that a decent translation between different languages requires. But in conversations with it we would learn virtually nothing about the mind of normal lions, because its mind equipped language would be completely different. Pro Wittgenstein: in any case, we should not assume that the mind of the speechless animals is like ours.

Dennett I
D. Dennett
Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995
German Edition:
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Dennett II
D. Dennett
Kinds of Minds, New York 1996
German Edition:
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999

Dennett III
Daniel Dennett
"COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots"
In
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996

Dennett IV
Daniel Dennett
"Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005