Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 15 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Assertibility Conditions | Searle | VII 101 Searle: assertibility conditions are not the same as truth conditions: e.g. the use of "voluntarily" (> Ryle-Austin-Searle-Hare-Cavell-Fodor; see SearleVsAustin). VsUse Theory: use is too vague. The circumstances are beyond the language. >Truth condition. VII 96 Intention/Searle: thesis: the strangeness or deviation that is a condition for the utterance: "X was done intentionally", provides at the same time a reason for the truth of the utterance of: "X wasn't done on purpose." Condition of assertiveness: it is the condition of utterance for one assertion precisely because it is a reason for the truth of the others. >Assertibility condition. >Truth conditions/Searle, >Conditions of satisfaction/Searle, >Assertibility. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Concepts | Nagel | I 50ff Conceptual scheme/NagelVs alternative conceptual schemes: There are such schemes, from which we could not even then get out when we look at ourselves from the outside as thinking beings. Therefore, the idea of a different kind of consciousness or conceptual scheme contributes nothing to distance ourselves from such thoughts. >Conceptual scheme, >Scheme/content, >Language community. I 61 ff The type of match does not make the whole concept. Just as sensory perception, through which one detects a physical object, does not make the whole concept of this detected object. (Vsuse theory of meaning). >Use theory, >Correspondence. Meaning is not simply the same as use, unless one understands "use" in a normative sense, which already implies meaning. >Language use. |
NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 Nagel I Th. Nagel The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997 German Edition: Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999 Nagel II Thomas Nagel What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987 German Edition: Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990 Nagel III Thomas Nagel The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980 German Edition: Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 |
| Deflationism | Horwich | I XVI Deflationism/Horwich: deflationism implies bivalence and even vagueness, e.g. unicorn (DeflationismVsPragmatism, DeflationismVsUsefulness of truth, etc. >Disquotationalism, >Minimalism, >Quote/Disquotation, >Bivalence. |
Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Everyday Language | Fodor | II 126 Anomalies/deviation/irregularities/intuition/everyday language/Fodor/FodorVsCavell: it is not about explaining anomalies by intuitions. Instead: specifying the relevant similarity means exactly determining the rules of creation (>Rules). --- III 234 Everyday language/distinction/perception/use/FodorVsCavell: it is not true that we have different words for each perceived difference, e.g. for shapes, colors, sizes, sounds, etc. Then, from the absence of certain words does not follow that we do not perceive the corresponding difference ((s)> Whorf) Fodor: then, when requesting a distinction, you cannot fall back on the actual use of language. > FodorVsUse Theory: here, you need philosophy, not empiricism. >Empiricism, >Use theory, >Meaning, >Language Behavior, >Colour, >Form. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Meaning | Nagel | I 60 Meaning/content/validity/valid/use/use theory/Nagel: the validity of thought does not depend on how they are used. >Validity, >Thoughts. I 61 However, the practice of the community cannot be defeated by the objectivity of the field: the language changes. In contrast to the meaning of words that does not apply for the content of thought, however. >Content, >Word meaning, >Practise, >Community. Meaning: is contingent. - E.g. that "and" is the word for conjunction. Thinking content: is the conjunction. (The content of thought itself is not contingent). >Propositional content. I 63 NagelVsUse Theory: meaning is not simply the same as use, unless one understands "use" in a normative sense, that already implies meaning. >Use theory. --- II 34 Meaning/Definition/Nagel: definitions cannot be the foundation of the meaning of each word, otherwise we would move in circles - somewhere we need to get to words that have their meaning in a direct manner. >Foundation. |
NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 Nagel I Th. Nagel The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997 German Edition: Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999 Nagel II Thomas Nagel What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987 German Edition: Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990 Nagel III Thomas Nagel The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980 German Edition: Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 |
| Use Theory | Brandom | I ~ 169 Rule/Sellars/Brandom: Sellars: I'll interpret our judgments that A causes B as an expression of a rule for the use of "A" and "B". >Causation, >Use. I 490 DummettVsUse Theory: if there is no key idea regarding the meaning, then it is unclear what the meaning of a word is in contrast to that of a sentence. Dummett: Key idea: understanding a word needs to consist only in understanding its contribution to the sentence. Force: pragmatic significance, sentantial content - meaning: semantic content, sub-sentential (!) content. >Content, >Subsententials. Brandom: according to this analogy, the sentences are divided in equivalence classes by performative significance in a way that the force is maintained in case of substitution. >Equivalence class, >Substitution. --- II 43f Use theory/realism/Brandom: our use of concepts such as "electron" depends not only on our dispositions to inferential approvals, but also on "what is going on with the world" - use is not limited to approval of inferences - whether inferences are correct depends on what "really follows" - contents are what they are because we use concepts as we do, not because we believe that they are. - This does not argue that concepts have a representational dimension. >Concepts, >Representation. II 246 Accounting/Brandom: completes use theory - does not imply that all players have the disposition that they should have. >Attribution, >Dispositions. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Use Theory | Dummett | I 31 DummettVsuse theory: The disadvantage is that this is substantially non-systematic. According to Wittgenstein, however, it is an advantage, because he emphasizes the variety of speech acts. Dummett: orderliness but is not everything. The use theory is likely to assume that a significant part of the language is already understood. I 31 Use gives meaning - sence gives reference (Frege). - Meaning is not the same as reference: E.g. Unicorn. Use theory of meaning >speech act theory. I 29 Use/Truth/Wittgenstein/Dummett: use theory makes the concept of truth superfluous. >meaning before truth. III (a) 10 Use theory/Dummett: Circumstances not sufficient - we need the purpose of why we use a word - even with classification valid/invalid always of interest (purpose). III (e) 196 Use theory/Dummett: sentences, not words have use. III (e) 200 E.g. use of money: here one must understand the whole institution. I Schiffer 223f Use theory/Understanding/Meaning/Manifestation/Dummett/SchifferVsDummett: behavioristically - (also othersVsDummett) - from it does not follow anti-realism - Dummett himself uses psychological vocabulary - why should one have to be able to show understanding? - Own use should be sufficient. I 225 McDowellVsDummett: Martians still cannot understand us, because the intentional (content-determining) cannot be reduced to the non-intentional. I 227 Knowing whether something counts as verification, could depend on extra-linguistic knowledge and not on the understanding of the sentence - QuineVsDummett: direct Verific. cond. cannot exist for every sentence - ((s)> Quine: ~ theories are not verifiable sentence by sentence). - Sure there are meaningful sentences that have no discernible conditions which would prove the sentence to be true or false. I 228 Pain/Verification/Wittgenstein/Dummett/Schiffer: Dummett cites Wittgenstein with consent: that pain behavior can be refuted - SchifferVsDummett: then the meaning theory needs both contestable criteria and contestable conditions - problem: this is true for most empirical judgments. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Use Theory | Fodor | III 4 FodorVsUseTheory/Austin: use theory it does not provide a complete grammar. It also does not show the semantic influence of the grammatical forms. There is no decision procedure as to which dictionary entry applies in a given sentence: then it is not possible to decide: when two words have the same use, when there is abuse. >Grammar, >Meaning. --- II 118 Use Theory/Ryle: sentences have no manners of use! Therefore sentences are a priori excluded from the study of philosophical language analysis. In addition: sentences do not belong at all to language, but only to speaking. II 121 Use Theory/FodorVsUse Theory: use theory cannot answer: 1. Under what conditions do two words or expressions have the same use? 2. How do we distinguish use from abuse? 3. What does it depend on whether a word has more than one usage? VsVs: the use theory could answer with language rules: two expressions have the same use if they follow the same rules. But that is not possible: >Language rules. II 122 Use Theory/FodorVsUse Theory: variant: use theory considers the circumstances because the semantic and syntactic properties are not sufficient. But the circumstances cannot be systematized! II 123 Use Theory/FodorVsUse Theory: use theory does not provide a theory of meaning, but only a characterization of the data that would be relevant for such a theory. Behavior provides only empirical material for semantic research. >Language behavior, >Semantics. --- III 223 Use Theory/Fodor: use theory must distinguish between object language ((s) as data material) and statements of the native speaker about his/her use (metalanguage). Problem: if the linguist wants to distinguish between true and false statements, he/she has to know a lot about the language beforehand >Radical Interpretation. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Use Theory | Goodman | I 90 GoodmanVsUse theory of meaning: e.g. a chair is a chair, even if it is never sat on. And a packing list is a packing list, even if it is never found and is only used to sit on (To say what art does, does not mean to say what art is. Perhaps the former is even more interesting.) >Meaning. |
G IV N. Goodman Catherine Z. Elgin Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988 German Edition: Revisionen Frankfurt 1989 Goodman I N. Goodman Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1978 German Edition: Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984 Goodman II N. Goodman Fact, Fiction and Forecast, New York 1982 German Edition: Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988 Goodman III N. Goodman Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976 German Edition: Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997 |
| Use Theory | Grice | Welker I 137 ff WelkerVsUse Theory of meaning: since sentences hardly come up twice in our lives in the same form, we should question why the use determines the meaning (VsWittgenstein). >Sentences, >Language behavior. If we give the mastering of a language as an answer, we need to refer back to time-independent meaning. >Competence, >Timelessness. Languages exist, genetically speaking, before all users of language. >Language. To explain words using other words leads to similar indefinite infinities, as the explanation of numbers in their relation to other numbers. >Words. |
Grice I H. Paul Grice "Meaning", in: The Philosophical Review 66, 1957, pp. 377-388 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Megle Frankfurt/M. 1993 Grice II H. Paul Grice "Utterer’s Meaning and Intentions", in: The Philosophical Review, 78, 1969 pp. 147-177 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Grice III H. Paul Grice "Utterer’s Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning", in: Foundations of Language, 4, 1968, pp. 1-18 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Grice IV H. Paul Grice "Logic and Conversation", in: P. Cple/J. Morgan (eds) Syntax and Semantics, Vol 3, New York/San Francisco/London 1975 pp.41-58 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Welker I David D. Welker Linguistic Nominalism, Mind, 1970, pp. 569-580 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 |
| Use Theory | McGinn | I 120 f Intention/Use Theory/McGinn: how problematic the first position (1. Position: Are the intended meaning and its correct theory things of the same ontological type?) for the intention is, explains Kripke. McGinn: there has to be, for example, a constitutive connection between intentioned meaning and use, but a simple equation leads to fundamental problems. (> Use Theory/Kripke) - ((s) E.g. you could have meant all the time with addition something else than I have, and have yet been found out the same numbers as I did.) "result ratio": correspond two living beings in all not semantic descriptions (behavior, inner, relation to other things), they must think and intend the same. Nevertheless, the basis of this result ratio contains nothing what could be handled of the FIN-features (FIN - fruitfulness, invulnerability, normativity) captured essence nature of semantic features. Use theory/McGinn: Meaning is no such thing as the link between use situations. ---- I 124/25 Because of this it is so difficult to articulate the relationships, because the FIN-features (fruitfulness, invulnerability, normativity) are not CAlM products. (CAlM: combinatorial atomism with lawlike mappings, See Terminology/McGinn). VsUse Theory/McGinn: problematic in the context of >compositionality. |
McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Use Theory | Nagel | I 57 Nagel: the validity of thoughts does not depend on how they are used! >Use theory. Meaning/validity: Meaning as such is not validity. >Validity, >Thoughts, >Meaning. However, the practice of the community cannot be beaten by the objectivity: the language changes. >Language use, >Practise, >Community, >Language community, >Meaning change. This does not apply for the content of thoughts. - In contrast to the meaning of words! >Content, >Word meaning. I 61 The type of match characterizes the whole concept no more than the sensory perception through which one recognizes a physical object captures the whole concept of this detected object. (Versus use theory of meaning). Meaning is not simply the same as use, unless one understands "use" in a normative sense that already implies meaning. I 63 NagelVsUse theory: meaning is not simply the same as use, unless one understands "use" in a normative sense that already implies meaning |
NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 Nagel I Th. Nagel The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997 German Edition: Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999 Nagel II Thomas Nagel What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987 German Edition: Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990 Nagel III Thomas Nagel The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980 German Edition: Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 |
| Use Theory | Quine | II 61 ff Use theory:> circumstances of use> stimulus situation. QuineVs: circumstances are vague and disorganized. Solution: identification with a known expression (Quine: use theory is legitimate). Use theory: synonymy: Equality of use. QuineVs: explains only small minority of the lexicon - important instead: Equivalence: by the same stimulus situations - but circularly. Solution: cognitive (without circumstances), is free of inscrutable motivations - but this is too strong. Solution: "Common variation". >Covariance. --- II 111 Lexicon VsUse Theory - Lexicography VsUse Theory. > Lexicon. XII 89 Sentence meaning/clause/subordinate clause/term/word/meaning/use theory/Quine: Whole sentences are undeniably meaningful, and so is the use they make of their partial expressions. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Use Theory | Rorty | I 139 Language/Use theory/Rorty: no one would say that there is e.g. a "nature of crime" which could be found out by a study of our language - solution: it is about social practices, not just about language use. >Language use, >Community, >Convention. II (c) 70 Rorty: Analytical philosophy VsUse theory (VsMeaning change). >Meaning change. III 36 RortyVsWittgenstein: the analogy between vocabularies and tools has one drawback: craftsmen usually know what kind of work they need to do before they look for or invent the tools. This cannot be expected of poets. >Use, >Vocabulary. III 101 Use theory of meaning/Rorty: problem: that you know in advance for which purpose a tool is designed. This is not the case with language! As long as we are still trying to figure out how they can be used, we cannot consider Christianity, Newtonian physics, the romantic movement or political liberalism as tools!. III 102 Use theory/Rorty: Problem: the purposes of language are not yet established - unlike tools. III 194 SellarsVsHeidegger/SellarsVsUse theory: Physics prevail - HeideggerVsSellars - HeideggerVsWittgenstein: not physics but the poetry shows that the language game is inappropriate. >Language game, >Heidegger, >Wittgenstein, >Sellars. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Use Theory | Searle | V 221 SearleVsUse theory of meaning: there is no distinction between word and sentence (SearleVsWittgenstein). >Sentence meaning, >Word meaning. V 231f SearleVsUse theory: "use" is too vague to distinguish between the truth conditions for proposition and those of the illocutionary force. >Truth condition, >Illocutionary act. E.g. Obscenities: the use of obscenities differs substantially from that of the corresponding polite synonyms. E.g. "He is not a nigger" is as derogatory as "He is a nigger." >SearleVsUse theory. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Use Theory | Goodman Vs Use Theory | I 90 GoodmanVsuse theory of meaning Example A chair remains a chair even if nobody ever sat on it. And a packing list remains a packing list, even if it is never found and is only used to sit on. (To say what art does, does not mean to say what art is.). ((s) The use theory is about words, not about art). |
G IV N. Goodman Catherine Z. Elgin Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988 German Edition: Revisionen Frankfurt 1989 Goodman I N. Goodman Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1978 German Edition: Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984 Goodman II N. Goodman Fact, Fiction and Forecast, New York 1982 German Edition: Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988 Goodman III N. Goodman Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976 German Edition: Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997 |
| Use Theory | Rorty Vs Use Theory | III 36 Use Theory/RortyVsUse Theory/RortyVsWittgenstein: the analogy between vocabularies and tools has one drawback: craftsmen usually know what work they need to do before they look for or invent the tools. This cannot be expected of poets. >Use, >Vocabulary. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Use Theory | Searle Vs Use Theory | III 64 Use theory of meaning/SearleVsSearleVsUse theory: E.g. it is said that in Muslim countries a man can divorce his wife by simply saying three times "I divorce myself from you," while throwing three white pebbles. This is obviously a deviating use of the word compared to the use of the word in our societies. Anyone who thinks that meaning is use, would have to conclude that the word "divorce" has a different meaning for Muslims than for others. But that is not the case! III 64/65 Solution/Searle: an existing proposition form has been assigned a new status function. The proposition form "I divorce myself from you," does not change its meaning when a new status function is added. Rather, it is now simply used to create a new institutional fact. (Declaration). E.g. that does not apply to every institutional fact: you cannot make a touchdown (baseball), by simply saying that you make it. III 79 Causality/Status Function/Searle: Status functions differ from causal use functions in terms of their language dependency: E.g. one can think without all the words that this is a screwdriver because you can easily think that this thing is used to screw in these other things, because you may have seen it many times. To treat an object as a screwdriver and to use it, no words are logically necessary! (> Use) There are structural properties available that may be perceived without using words. Status: here no physical features are available. V 221 Searle: the concept of use is too vague. SearleVsUse theory: 1. no indication of the distinction between the use of a word and the use of a proposition! 2. false conviction: because we could not say this or that under certain conditions, it could under these conditions not be the case! V 221/222 E.g. "under what conditions would we say that he can remember this or that or the act was carried out voluntarily?" False: 1. What does W mean? 2. How is W used? 3. How is W used in simple present indicative propositions of the form "X is W"? (Way too specific!). 4. how are such propositions used? V 223 5. Which illocutionary act is performed? 6. When would we say such propositions? The assumption that the answers to the fifth question represent necessary answers to the first leads to speech fallacy. ((s) as Tugendhat: meaning not from circumstances.) Relation to the fallacy of criticism of the naturalistic fallacy: V 224 SearleVsUse theory: "Use" is too vague to distinguish between the truth-conditions of the proposition expressed and the truth conditions of the illocutionary strength of the expression. V 229 SearleVsUse theory: there is a difference between the question "What does it mean to call something good?" and "What is the meaning of" good "?" V 234 SearleVsUse theory: E.g. obscenities: the use of obscenities is substantially different from that of the corresponding courteous synonyms. E.g. "He is not a nigger" is just as derogatory as "He is a nigger". |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Use Theory | Verschiedene Vs Use Theory | Metz II 328 HolensteinVsuse theory: must be supplemented by world knowledge. Rules alone are not enough. Grice I 145 Use theory of meaning / WelkerVsWittgenstein: because the phrases uttered in our lives hardly appear twice in the same form, it is the question why the use determines the meaning. |
Grice I H. Paul Grice "Meaning", in: The Philosophical Review 66, 1957, pp. 377-388 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Megle Frankfurt/M. 1993 Grice II H. Paul Grice "Utterer’s Meaning and Intentions", in: The Philosophical Review, 78, 1969 pp. 147-177 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Grice III H. Paul Grice "Utterer’s Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning", in: Foundations of Language, 4, 1968, pp. 1-18 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Grice IV H. Paul Grice "Logic and Conversation", in: P. Cple/J. Morgan (eds) Syntax and Semantics, Vol 3, New York/San Francisco/London 1975 pp.41-58 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 |
| Use Theory | Chisholm Vs Use Theory | Frank I 262 Attribution theoryVsUse Theory/Chisholm: the concept-wise conceptual competence cannot be reduced to linguistic verrbal skills. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1989): Self-Consciousness, I-Structures and Physiology, in: Manfred Spitzer/Brendan A. Maher (eds.) (1989): Philosophy and Psychopathology, Berlin/Heidelberg/New York 1989, 118-145 |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Use Theory | Cavell Vs Use Theory | I (b) 215 Meaning/Use/CavellVsUse Theory: what the technical terms of mathematics and science mean, cannot be seen from how we usually use e.g. "mass". |
Cavell I St. Cavell Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen Frankfurt 2002 Cavell I (a) Stanley Cavell "Knowing and Acknowledging" in: St. Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say?, Cambridge 1976, pp. 238-266 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (b) Stanley Cavell "Excursus on Wittgenstein’s Vision of Language", in: St. Cavell, The Claim of Reason, Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy, New York 1979, pp. 168-190 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (c) Stanley Cavell "The Argument of the Ordinary, Scenes of Instruction in Wittgenstein and in Kripke", in: St. Cavell, Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome: The Constitution of Emersonian Perfectionism, Chicago 1990, pp. 64-100 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Davide Sparti/Espen Hammer (eds.) Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell II Stanley Cavell "Must we mean what we say?" in: Inquiry 1 (1958) In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Use Theory | Zink Vs Use Theory | Wolf II 163 Meaning/Naming/Name/Zink: but the meaning of the name is with what it names! It is not the named thing. It is also not "the naming". Naming/Zink: is a use of words and not a meaning. II 164 Use for localization. No showing/pointing. Showing/Pointing/Zink: one can point to something, but one hopes that the meaning communicates itself indirectly. Learning/Zink: you also do not show the meaning, but give a hint from which you can start to learn the words. Understanding/Zink: one does not understand in a context of things, but in a context of words! But one has not understood if one could not point to the thing. II 165 ZinkVsUse Theory: Meaning not use, but that whose understanding makes use possible. |
Zink I Sidney ZInk "The Meaning of Proper Names", in: Mind 72 (1963) S. 481-499 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 K II siehe Wol I U. Wolf (Hg) Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993 |
| Use Theory | Wessel Vs Use Theory | I 27 Meaning/WesselVsUse Theory of Meaning: for logically simple terms, the meaning is indicated by the designated objects. I 28 This means that you must specify the assignment that exists between the term and the described (>Reference). For compound terms and statements, the meaning results from the parts occurring in them and the operators. |
Wessel I H. Wessel Logik Berlin 1999 |
| Various Authors | Quine Vs Various Authors | II 111ff QuineVsSemantic Theory: there is a lack of a general definition of meaning QuineVsUse Theory of Meaning: definition of meaning through use too vague! (Demarcation of what is detectable under the "circumstances") (QuineVsWittgenstein). III 272 Singular Term/QuineVsSingular Terms: the whole category of singular terms is logically superfluous and should be abolished! ((s) Instead: variable). V 58 Language Learning/Language Acquisition/Quine: E.g. the child learns that "red" is applied to blood, tomatoes, ripe apples, etc. The idea associated with that may be whatever it likes! Language bypasses the idea and focuses on the object. ((s) reference/(s): goes to the object, not an idea, which is in this case unnecessary.) Stimulus/Quine: has nothing mysterious in language learning. V 60 Problem: in progressive learning sentences are formed which have less to do with stimuli. E.g. about past and future. Quine: philosophers have great difficulty to specify accurately and in detail which connections it is about. QuineVsSupranaturalism. V 61 We only need orientation by external circumstances. Internal mechanisms are only insofar positive as we can hope that they will be clarified by neurophysiology. IX 199 Individuals/QuineVsFraenkel: we cannot follow him to simply waive individuals, because under TT this would exclude infinite classes and also the classical number theory. (Chapter 39). Solution: (from Chapter 4): the identification of individuals with their One classes. IX 199/200 But then we would have to make an exception in the interpretation: if x is an individual, then "x ε x" should count as true. (Above, "x ε y" became false if neither were objects of sequential type). Now (1) and (2) reduce to: (4) Ey∀x(x ε y (Tnx u Fx)), (5) (∀w(w ε x w ε y) u x ε z) > y ε z. Moreover, the definition of "Tnx" needs to be revised to make it match the new idea of the individual: " x VT y" by way of merging we can define (6) "T0x" stands for "∀y (y ε x y = x)" ((S) "all parts of individuals are identical with this one".) "T n + 1 x" stands for "∀y(y ε x > Tny)" ((s) "The set x is always one type higher than its elements y".) IX 237 Set Theory/QuineVsAckermann: (like ML and NB) but unlike ZF: does not fully guarantee the existence of finite classes. Additional concept "M". II 129 QuineVsZettsky: Zettsky: properties are identical if the classes to which they belong are the identical... but when are such classes identical? II 130 We cannot rely on the identity of the elements here (as with physical objects), as we simply have no antecedent principle of individuation for the properties (as elements of classes) here. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Wittgenstein | Dummett Vs Wittgenstein | Brandom I 490 Wittgenstein (according to Dummett): There is no single means of derivation of all other properties from one. (Use only) DummettVsWittgenstein: If there is no key concept anymore, then we do not know what the meaning of a word is as opposed to the meaning of a sentence. Dummett I 31 DummettVsUse Theory: The downside is that this is essentially unsystematic. According to Wittgenstein, however, this is an advantage, because he emphasizes the variety of speech acts. Dummett: orderliness is not everything, though, the use theory is likely to assume that a significant portion of language is already understood. Only a systematic theory might explain in how far linguistic meaning can be explained without a previously given stock of semantic concepts. Ideally, no semantic concepts are needed in advance. From the elusiveness of truth (Frege) does not follow the inexplicability. Dummett I 83 Understanding/Wittgenstein:> understanding is not a mental process, but an ability (dispositional).LL. FregeVs: the grasping of a thought is an act of consciousness. And one that is directed towards something outside of the consciousness: (episodic). DummettVsWittgenstein: hard to see why no episodic sense of understanding should be possible if E.g. you can be stunned at first hearing of a sentence!. I 145 Private Language: WittgensteinVs - Dummett artificial private language possible and learnable. I 156 DummettVsWittgenstein/DummettVsUse Theory: Failure to assume a complete representation of language understanding is given as soon as its statements that express themselves in the use are described. For this reduces command of a language to having a practical ability. I 161 Animal: question: whether we can attribute thoughts to animals. Wittgenstein: "The dog is afraid that the master will strike it, but it is not afraid that the master will strike it tomorrow". DummettVsWittgenstein: this depends to a much lower degree than Wittgenstein would like on memories, but rather on a theoretical apparatus. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
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