Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
[german]

Screenshot Tabelle Begriffes

 

Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.

Enhanced Search:
Search term 1: Author or Term Search term 2: Author or Term


together with


The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Absoluteness Unger Stroud I 75
Absolute Terms/Skepticism/Peter Unger/Stroud: Def absolute terms/Unger: Example "flat", "empty": these are used legitimately (assertibility) in many situations even if they are not literally true. - This shows that there is no obstacle for our use and understanding of these terms. - Also "safe", for example. - StroudVsUnger: pro: this relation between meaning and use can defend skepticism, but weaker than Descartes' dream argument. - StroudVsUnger: superfluous.

Unger I
P. Unger
Empty Ideas: A Critique of Analytic Philosophy


Stroud I
B. Stroud
The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984
Forms of Thinking Dennett I 275
Limits/Unger: There must always be a pair of x on both sides of the border; this is required by our conventions. InwagenVsUnger: so much the worse for the conventions!
Jackendoff: Candidates on the border are forced into one or the other category.
Dennett: a good trick, but not a forced move! Darwin shows us that nature does not need what we say we need to think; nature copes well with gradual variations.
I 277
((s) Limits are necessary for thinking, but not for nature.) General/Particular/Artificial Intelligence/Dennett: Donald Symons(1): there is no "general problem solver", because there are no general problems, only particular problems. >General Problem Solver.
I 691
DennettVsSymons: There is also no general wound, but only particular wounds. Nevertheless, there is a general wound healing process.

1. Symons, D. 1992. "On the Use and Misuse od Darwinism in the Study of Human Behavior." In: Barkow, Cosmides, and Tooby, 1992, pp. 137-62.

Dennett I
D. Dennett
Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995
German Edition:
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Dennett II
D. Dennett
Kinds of Minds, New York 1996
German Edition:
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999

Dennett III
Daniel Dennett
"COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots"
In
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996

Dennett IV
Daniel Dennett
"Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Limits Unger Dennett I, 276
Limits/Unger: there must always be a pair of x on either side of the limit; this is required by our conventions. InwagenVsUnger: all the worse for the conventions!

Unger I
P. Unger
Empty Ideas: A Critique of Analytic Philosophy


The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Unger, P. Lewis Vs Unger, P. IV 244
Sorites/Truth Value/Vagueness/Lewis: For example Fred is a borderline case of baldness, then the sentence "Fred is bald" is perhaps without truth values. Nothing in our language makes such descriptions (delineations) right and others wrong. We can't find a limit once and for all. If a sentence is true over the entire range, it is simply true.
But we treat a sentence as more or less "simply true" even if it goes beyond an area of its vagueness that is large enough. So if it is "true enough".
We can usually cope with this, but not always, as the paradoxes testify:
Problem: truth-preserving arguments do not always have the quality of being "true enough"!
"true enough": when is one sentence true enough? It's a matter of vagueness in itself.
IV 245
More importantly, it depends on the context. In other circumstances, something may not be true enough. Austin: "France is hexagonal". Standards can be loosened or tightened. Interestingly, tightening is easier than loosening:
For example, if the standards were high and something is said that is true enough only under relaxed standards, and nobody contradicts, then the standards are lowered.
But what is said under lowered standards may still seem imperfectly acceptable.
For example, tightening standards: always manages to appear recommendable, even if it disturbs the purposes of conversation.
Absolute/relative: e.g. (Peter Unger): one could say that there is actually nothing that is really level! The sidewalk is level, but the desk is more level! And so there is surely also something that is more level than the desk. One can always think of something that is even more level, etc.
Problem: "level" should actually be taken as an absolute term. Then how could one deny that the table is level
VsUnger: one could deny that "level" is absolute. But Unger is right about that. What he calls inconsistent really sounds that way. So I assume that in no description of the relative vagueness of "level" and "more level" it is true that something is more level than something that is level.
LewisVsUnger: the correct answer is that he is changing her account. (He is changing the score on you). He's transferring the account to you.
What he says is only acceptable under tightened standards of precision.
IV 246
Because what he says is only acceptable under tighter standards, it is no longer true that the sidewalk is level. But that does not change the fact that it was true in the original context. Unger has not shown that the new context is somehow more legitimate than the old one.
"Safe"/Unger: in an analogous way, Unger (correctly) observed that "safe" is an absolute term. Therefore, nobody is actually safe in any matter!
In fact, the approximation rule allows Unger to create a context in which everything he says is true, but that doesn't show that anything we do in more everyday contexts is wrong.

Lewis I
David K. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

Lewis I (a)
David K. Lewis
An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (b)
David K. Lewis
Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (c)
David K. Lewis
Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis II
David K. Lewis
"Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Lewis IV
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

Lewis V
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

Lewis VI
David K. Lewis
Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LewisCl
Clarence Irving Lewis
Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970

LewisCl I
Clarence Irving Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991
Unger, P. Stroud Vs Unger, P. Stroud I 75
Absolute Expressions/Scepticism/Peter Unger/Stroud: (Unger, (Oxford 1975, Journ. of Phil., 1977). Def Absolute Terms/Unger: e.g. "flat", "empty": these are used justifiably (assertiveness) in many situations, even if they are not literally true. This shows that there is no obstacle to our use and understanding of these expressions.
N.B./Unger: this also applies to the absolute expression "certain". Because knowledge implies certainty. Thus our use of "certain" etc. would be compatible with the literal truth of skepticism.
StroudVsUnger: pro: its relation between meaning and use can be used to defend skepticism. But Unger cannot support skepticism on the basis of "absolute expressions" alone.
Descartes/Stroud: but this shows that what this is about is as strong as the dream argument in Descartes.
But without the requirement that we do not dream, the absolute expressions "certain" and "I know" would not yield the sceptical conclusion.
StroudVsUnger: we do not need his doctrine of "absolute expressions".

Stroud I
B. Stroud
The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984