Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 1 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Validity Claims | Habermas | III 65 Definition validity claim/Habermas: a validity claim is equivalent to the assertion that the conditions for the validity of a statement are fulfilled. While yes/no opinions on claims to power are arbitrary, statements on claims of validity are characterised by the fact that the listener agrees or disagrees with a criticisable statement for reasons. They are an expression of insight. HabermasVsTugendhat: this neglects this distinction in E. Tugendhat 1976(1). III 66 Examples of claims of validity are those of truth, correctness, appropriateness or comprehensibility (or well-formedness). These claims of validity are usually implicitly raised. >Truth, >Correctness, >Appropriateness, >Understandability, >Well-formedness. IV 107 Validity Claim/Speech Act/Habermas: a speaker can motivate a listener to accept his/her offer independently of the normative context. >Motivation. This is not the achievement of an effect with the listener, but a rationally motivated communication with the listener, which comes about on the basis of a criticisable validity claim. This is about a speaker's demand that the listener should accept a sentence as true or as truthful. >Agreement. IV 111 Norm validity/truth/Durkheim/Habermas: the idea of truth can only borrow from the concept of norm validity the determination of the impersonality deprived of time (2) of an idealized agreement, an inter-subjectivity related to an ideal communication community. >Norms, >Ideal speech community. The authority behind knowledge does not (...) coincide with the moral authority behind norms. Rather, the concept of truth combines the objectivity of experience with the claim to intersubjective validity of a corresponding descriptive statement, the idea of correspondence of sentences and facts with the concept of an idealized consensus. >Consensus, >Intersubjectivity, >Correspondence, >Facts, >Reality, >Objectivity, >Experience. Validity Claim/Habermas: only from this connection does the term of a criticizable validity claim emerge. 1. E. Tugendhat, Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die sprachanalytische Philosophie, Frankfurt 1976, p. 76f, 219ff 2. Vgl. 1.E. Durkheim, Les formes élementaires de la vie religieuse, Paris, 1968, German: Frankfurt 1981, S. 584. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Dummett, M. | Tugendhat Vs Dummett, M. | I 253 Meaning/assertion/Dummett/Tugendhat: Example Game: assertion action, assertion and counter assertion, "yes"/"no" corresponds to "true"/"false" one wins, one loses. This schema should be the basis of every utterance of every assertoric sentence! I 254 The speaker gives a guarantee, which is doubted by the listener. (Searle quite similar, see above). I 255 New: it is said vice versa: if the expression is used, which then are the conditions under which it is correct. This presupposes: 1. That the conditions in which the expression is used are indifferent to the correctness of the use. 2. That the conditions on which the correctness depends are those the fulfilment of which is guaranteed by the use of the expression itself. What the expression guarantees is that the conditions of its correctness (truth) are fulfilled! The equivalence "p equi that p is true" is based on the fact that the person who claims something has always asserted its correctness. I 256 Speaker: Conditions and presence together guaranteed. Listener: separates both and questions it separately. (Asymmetry). I 256/257 TugendhatVsDummett/TugendhatVsSearle: unsatisfactory: 1. Nothing has yet been said about what the truth conditions of an assertion or proposition are. One possibility would be to say that the truth conditions of a proposition are indicated by a proposition. Of course, this presupposes that for the explanation of a proposition there is always already another proposition available. Meta Language. (TugendhatVs). The explanation must lie in a usage rule. It is not enough to show that the first sentence is used as the second, it is necessary to show under which conditions the one sentence is used. 2. Every assumption of a guarantee presupposes the use of an assertoric proposition, which is a pseudo explanation. II 231 TugendhatVsDummett: "Meaning" in Frege should not be translated with "Reference"! II 232 Justified only where Frege considers sentences as proper names! II 247 Reference/Tugendhat: through my criticism of translation, meaning = reference, I have not questioned the primacy of truth over objects. DummettVsTugendhat: it is not enough to explain the meaning of names merely as truth-value potential: 1. The meaning could then be understood as a mere equivalence set of expressions. TugendhatVsDummett: correct with sentences and predicates, with names one does not have to be content with it. DummettVsTugendhat: 2. That two names "a" and "b" have the same meaning, if they have the same truth-value potential, applies only to extensional predicates. But with which criterion can extensional ones be distinguished from intensional predicates? It presupposed that we had a criterion for the equality of meanings of names, which is not first determined by Leibniz's law. II 248 Leibniz's Law/Dummett: cannot be understood as a definition of "=", but is based on the fact that when we predetermine something from an object, the truth value of the assertion must be independent of the way it is given! TugendhatVsDummett: not so with Frege: Dummett himself points out that he understood Leibniz's law as definition of "=". Tugendhat: we cannot explain what we mean by identity with the law. Tugendhat pro Dummett. TugendhatVsDummett: with sentences as equivalence classes one has not lost touch with the world: it is only about very specific equivalence sets, which of course are determined by the nature of the world. Dummett: sentences do not equal names! (VsFrege). II 249 Reference/Dummett: semantic role. Tugendhat: this is exactly the same as my "truth-value potential". ((s) Cf. > semantic value, >semantic role). II 250 Reference/Frege: he never spoke of reference Predicate/Frege: he never said that the meanings of predicates must be understood as "quasi-objects". Dummett/Tugendhat: the justified core of Dummett's criticism: it does not yet follow from the truth-value potential that the meaning of a name is an object. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Frank, M. | Pauen Vs Frank, M. | Pauen I 249 I/Heidelberg School/Pauen: Dieter Henrich and Manfred Frank. It's not about the evidence that the "objects" cited by the traditional notion of I do not exist, but the fact that the traditional model itself is inadequate. We are not entitled to a "fiction of the I"! However, it has proven indispensable in psychology. I 250 Subjet/Object/Henrich/Frank/Pauen: both Vs this conception. And regardless of a determination with respect to dualism/monism. The assumption that self-awareness arises from the recognition of the identity of subject and object causes an insoluble problem: This realization presupposes that the subject is already aware of the fact that it is the object of its own reflection. The act of reflection presupposes the existence of that self-awareness which, according to the model, is supposed to be the result. Henrich: it is indeed not necessary that it has in any way conceptual knowledge of itself or is able to give of a description of itself, but it must be able in any case to testify with certainty that it is familiar with itself in the sense of self-awareness. To arrive at an identification with itself the subject already needs to know under which conditions it can attribute something which it encounters to itself. It can never gain this knowledge through self-relation before everything else (1970). I 251 Subject/Object/Manfred Frank/Heidelberg School/Pauen: the arguments against the S/O model also speak against the attempt to justify self-awareness as a self-ascription of properties. But if I want to realize that it is me for whom these properties are true, I already need to have self-awareness myself. Self-Awareness/Frank: can therefore not be explicated as relation of something to something else in general. I 252 I.e. self-awareness cannot be explained as the knowledge of a state of affairs. Of course, the subject can acquire knowledge, and self-awareness can thus turn into self-knowledge. Frank Thesis: there must be an upstream pre-reflexive awareness of the self. 1) This is not a form of knowledge. 2) No application of criteria. 3) "Immediate": it is not based on the relation of the subject to anything else. I 253 VsFrank: 1) Question whether the model does not remain biased in the subject/object thinking. 2) Question whether the concept of "pre-reflexive" can ever be explained coherently. 3) Question to what extent the relation of the subject to itself should be distinguished from other common forms of knowledge. Pre-Reflexive/Frank/Pauen: this relation of the subject with itself should exist solely in the intimacy with itself. Not content-wise. No knowledge. Thus it can be maintained even during change. VsFrank: then we cannot speak of an "I" in the interesting sense at all. TugenhatVsHenrich/Pauen: he recurs as explicitly as one could wish on the subject/object model. The subject is itself the object. I 258 PauenVsTugendhat/PauenVsHenrich/PauenVsFrank/Pauen: The problem with all approaches is that a state of affairs is only a determined state of affairs when it is different from other states of affairs. The mere absence of doubt whether an object is ugly does not justify the reverse that the person simply considered it to be beautiful. If the doubt never occurs and the person falls otherwise does not make any judgments of taste, this rather suggests that they lack appropriate judgment! A person can only attribute a state as their own if they are able to recognize foreign states. I 262 PauenVsHeidelberger School: the "pre-reflexive self" is not a necessary condition: the necessary distinction between self and external perspective can be made without it. On the other hand there is no objection to attributing a pre-reflexive self to subjects that have the ability to self-ascription. |
Pauen I M. Pauen Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001 |
| Tugendhat, E. | Davidson Vs Tugendhat, E. | Frank I 668 Twin Earth/Davidson: does not depend on the idea that social language use dictates what speakers mean and of course not, what their narrow psychological states are. Meaning/DavidsonVsTugendhat: is partially determined by the circumstances. TugendhatVsDavidson. Twin Earth/Stereotype: "Water" is not only applied to substances with the same molecular structure, but also to substances that are sufficiently similar. (Stereotype), E.g. odorless, colorless, etc. Rigid Designator/Davidson: this remark shows that it is possible that I do not recognize a rigid designator when I see one!. Facts/Twin Earth/Davidson: the special fact does not depend on such cases, and also not on how we analyze or should analyze them. It depends instead simply on how the basic connection between words and things is made. Frank I 669 Otherwise we would have no way of knowing what others mean. Meaning/Davidson: we can easily learn the meaning of "Moon" without ever having seen the moon! Davidson thesis: all thinking and every language has a foundation in such direct historical connections (> Putnam, Kripke, baptism/not only for the name, but for all the words). Donald Davidson (1987): Knowing One's Own Mind, in: Proceedings and Adresses of the American Philosophical Association LX (1987),441-4 58 |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
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