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The author or concept searched is found in the following 7 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Community | Marsilius of Padua | Höffe I 178 Community/Marsilius/Höffe: Marsilius [practised] complete renunciation of revelation and theology [with regard to] the foundation of the community. Like Thomas and Dante, Marsilius also refers significantly to Aristotle's politics, which became known in the West in the 13th century. MarsiliusVsThomas Aquinas/MarsiliusVsDante: Unlike Thomas Aquinas and Dante, however, he accepts [Aristotles] explosive power of church theory and church politics at the same time. The intellectual background is the sharp distinction between the spiritual and the secular sphere, which is represented by the no less sharp difference between "human law" (lex humana) and the "law of the gospel". MarisiliusVsDoctrine of the two kingdoms see >Governance/Marsilius. |
Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Constitution | Spinoza | Höffe I 235 Constitution/Spinoza/Höffe: Spinoza(1) starts with the foundations of law and state, shows that it is neither possible nor necessary to transfer everything to the highest authorities, and draws some political doctrines from the state constitution and history of the Hebrews. He declares that the law in spiritual matters, including the decision on external religious worship, is the exclusive prerogative of the highest authorities, and ends with the argumentation goal of the entire treatise: that in a free state not everyone is allowed to act as one wants, but that one is allowed to think what one wants and say what one thinks. >Natural Justice/Spinoza, >State/Spinoza, >Freedom/Spinoza. Chapter 16(1), which is fundamental for the philosophy of law and state, breaks with the traditional Aristotelian Stoic-Thomist theory of natural law, which extends into the Spanish late scholasticism. >Natural justice, >Aristotle, >Stoa, >Thomas Aquinas. Natural Law/SpinozaVsThomas Aquinas/SpinozaVsAristotle: Spinoza retains the traditional expression of natural law, but gives it a fundamentally new, exclusively naturalistic meaning. According to its principle of self-preservation, natural law does not contain any moral or otherwise normative claim. >Validity claims. SpinozaVsMachiavelli: On the contrary, every human being, not just the prince as in Machiavelli's case, may do what morality tends to forbid, he may act with force or cunning. >N. Machiavelli. Defined without any sense of duty, pre-state law consists in nothing other than its own natural power (potentia). With this, a subjective right - the legitimate claim of a person - coincides with one’s ability to enforce one’s right. >Law, >Rights, >Freedom, >Society. SpinozaVsRationalism: Spinoza, a rationalist who is methodologically uncompromising in ethics, surprisingly rejects any recourse to ratio here. Thus, Höffe I 236 within his metaphysics he gives priority to content-related naturalism over methodical rationalism. >Rationalism. The state treaty necessary for overcoming the state of nature is only valid under considerations of usefulness. >Contract Theory/Spinoza. 1. B. Spinoza, Tractatus theologico-politicus 2. Ibid., Chap. 16 |
Spinoza I B. Spinoza Spinoza: Complete Works Indianapolis 2002 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Natural Justice | Spinoza | Höffe I 235 Natural Law/SpinozaVsThomas Aquinas/SpinozaVsAristotle: Spinoza retains the traditional expression of natural law, but gives it a fundamentally new, exclusively naturalistic meaning. According to its principle of self-preservation, natural law does not contain any moral or otherwise normative claim. >Natural justice/Aristotle. SpinozaVsMachiavelli: On the contrary, every human being, not just the prince as in Machiavelli's case, may do what morality tends to forbid, he may act with force or cunning. >N.Machiavelli. Defined without any sense of duty, pre-state law consists in nothing other than its own natural power (potentia). With this a subjective right - the legitimate claim of a person - coincides with his ability to enforce his right.(1) >Freedom, >State, >Society, >Individuals, >Community, >Law, >Rights. 1. B. Spinoza, Tractatus theologico-politicus. |
Spinoza I B. Spinoza Spinoza: Complete Works Indianapolis 2002 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Proof of God’s Existence | Hume | Fraassen I 212 Proof of God/HumeVsThomas Aquinas: the universe instead of God. If God's will would be crucial how should we understand this will? ((s) God's will would always be identical with the factual and therefore not to distinguish from anything else.) --- II 253 Cosmological proof of God: there must be a cause for every thing and thus an explanation of its existence. This is something necessary existent. >Cause, >Condition, >Dependence, >Causal dependence, >Ontological dependence. HumeVs: the existence of God would be a fact. Facts are never necessary. >Facts, >Necessity, >Contingency. Hume: the necessary existing could be the universe instead of God. >Totality, >Whole, >Universe. II 256 Teleological proof of God/Hume: the teological proof of god is the only one he takes seriously, because it does not require a priori assumptions. >Teleology. Here: variant: the amazing reconciliation cannot be a coincidence. An intelligent creator is necessary. >"Clockmaker". HumeVs: 1. It lacks the repetition which is necessary for connection. 2. The analogy to humans is questionable. >Absoluteness, >Connection, >Distribution. II 257 3. If yes, then they would make a) the unity of God and b) the immateriality and endlessness questionable. >Unity, >Infinity. II 259 4. Order is not evidence of conscious planning, e.g. animals have no less order than a clock, but are not begotten by a watchmaker, but by parents. >Order, >Planning, >Evolution. II 260 Principle: the production of plants and animals is always herbal or animal. In human inventions, there is an understanding of the causes but not in divine inventions. >Knowledge, >Causality. 5. (Anticipating the theory of evolution): matter is in constant motion and eventually reaches a certain stability. >Entropy, >Second law of thermodynamics. |
D. Hume I Gilles Delueze David Hume, Frankfurt 1997 (Frankreich 1953,1988) II Norbert Hoerster Hume: Existenz und Eigenschaften Gottes aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen der Neuzeit I Göttingen, 1997 Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 |
| Slavery | Thomas Aquinas | Höffe I 148 Slavery/Thomas Aquinas/Höffe: In the course of the lex (law) tract(2) Thomas Aquinas justifies the servitudo, Höffe 149 the slavery or servitude. Thomas Aquinas pro Aristotle: Again he refers back to Aristotle, here the concept of "slaves by nature"(1), whose intellectual deficit, making a master necessary, is due to original sin(2). HöffeVsAristotle/HöffeVsThomas Aquinas: But this reasoning is not convincing. For all human beings are subject to original sin, which is why they all have to be regarded as servants/slaves, whereby the difference decisive for slavery, masters there, slaves here, becomes invalid. The fact that such an outstanding thinker as Thomas overlooks this consequence shows how much he remains attached to a view prevailing at that time. In the decisive respect for the Christian theologian, however, the slaves or servants are not disadvantaged; they too are called to eternal salvation. >Christianity, >Theology, >Ethics, >Justification. 1. Aristoteles, Politika 15. 2. Thomas Summa lIa Ilae, qu. 105 |
Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Thomas | Höffe | Höffe I 158 Thomas Aquinas/Höffe: (...) Thomas Aquinas' teaching is not undisputed (...): On March 7th, 1277, already three years after his death, Bishop Tempier of Paris condemns 219 theses, which also include Thomas Aquinas' teachings. Eleven days later, a similar condemnation is made in Oxford. OckhamVsThomas Aquinas/DunsScotusVsThomas Aquinas/Meister EckartVsThomas Aquinas/Höffe: Later on there is a strong intellectual criticism, made by such astute theologians and philosophers as Johannes Duns Scotus (about 1266-1308), William of Ockham (about 1285-1349) and Meister Eckhart (about 1260-1328), who were admittedly condemned as heretical in some views by the church. >William of Ockham. Canonization: Two generations after his death, on July 18, 1323, Thomas Aquinas is canonized by Pope John XXII. During the Counter-Reformation, in 1567, Pope Pius V raised him to the rank of Doctor of the Church (doctor ecclesiae and doctor communis). In 1879, Pope Leo XIII proclaimed him the First Doctor of the Catholic Church and the following year he became the patron of all Catholic schools. |
Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Tyranny | Thomas Aquinas | Höffe I 154 Tyranny/Thomas Aquinas/Höffe: Although Thomas Aquinas considers the rule of a single person, the monarchy, to be the best, he knows thanks to his openness to experience that the sole ruler is only able to pursue its own advantage, whereby the monarchy turns into the worst of all constitutions: a tyranny(1). To avoid the danger of tyranny (...) Thomas Aquinas (...) suggests precautions: One should raise a "man of such dispositions to the rank of king of whom it is hardly likely that he will turn to tyranny" (I, 6). HöffeVsThomas Aquinas: But Thomas Aquinas doesn't think about how to test the character before the royal election and how to make sure that the character is the deciding factor. Resistance: In the case that tyranny still occurs, Thomas does envisage resistance, but not tyrannicide. In his detailed discussion, however, he grants the people the right to depose the tyrant, or at least to limit his powers, because the people have the right "to appoint a king for themselves". Höffe I 155 (...) the people should not "involve themselves in dangers far more serious than the tyrannies themselves by undertaking operations against the tyrant". Höffe: So Thomas Aquinas tacitly weighs up the goods and fears. - Is he rather a realist or a pessimist here? - That the successor is even worse or that a failed tyrant's downfall makes the tyrant even more cruel. Theological argument: even "if the excesses of tyranny reach an intolerable level", the Old Testament allows the murder of a tyrant, but the "teaching of the apostles" contradicts this, since according to the First Epistle of Peter(2) "one must be subject not only to good and moderate, but also to hard masters". Höffe: With this reference Thomas takes back a right of resistance. >Civil disobedience, >Obedience, >State (Polity), >Constitution, >Dictatorship. 1. Thomas De regno ad regem Cypri I,6 2. Petrusbrief 2, 19 |
Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Shoemaker, S. | Martin Vs Shoemaker, S. | Armstrong II 86 Properties/MartinVsShoemaker: the image of a property as a mere ability to produce other properties is absurd even in a realistic view of properties. Just as it is absurd to state something purely dispositional and not categorical as the perceiver of a counterfactual conditional, so it is absurd to state something purely categorical and not dispositional. Something that Thomas Aquinas calls a "pure act". MartinVsThomas Aquinas: this is a logical fiction. "Pure"/Martin: nothing is pure. |
Martin I C. B. Martin Properties and Dispositions In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin II C. B. Martin Replies to Armstrong and Place In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin III C. B. Martin Final Replies to Place and Armstrong In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin IV C. B. Martin The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010 Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
| Thomas Aquinas | Hume Vs Thomas Aquinas | Fraassen I 212 Proof of the Existence of God/HumeVsThomas Aquinas/Fraassen: our new view (modern analogy) is not exposed to criticism by Hume (HumeVsThomas Aquinas). Even though regress in causation or explanation must end. I 213 There is no reason to assume that this end (end point) should not be the universe (world) itself (instead of God). Problem: because if the world can only be understood by reference to the will of God, how are we to understand God's will? And if we cannot understand Him, why should we not halt at the universe? VsHume: all counterarguments seem to be based on the assumption that God is essentially different from the universe. God himself requires no explanation or justification. Fraassen: this may be true for God, yet there is a possible counterargument for our case: namely as follows: Explanation/Fraassen: in terms of explanation there is no difference between galvanometers and electrons. Instead: we assume a microstructure (MiSt). Microstructure/MiSt/VsFraassen: demanding a microstructure does not mean appealing to a cosmic coincidence, e.g. that cloud chambers and galvanometers behave like this, is even then surprising if there are theoretical entities such as electrons. Because it is surprising that there should be such a regularity in the behavior of the electrons. If we are not metaphysically minded, we should be glad that our relation to quantum mechanics has brought order in there. Because we do not understand the underlying (prior, not temporal) coincidence. If we then continue to ask what brings the micro-things of the same kind to behave in the same way in the past, present and future, we have a new exaggerated realism. FraassenVsVs: Explanation/regularity/Fraassen: thesis: there are regularities of observable phenomena that need to be explained! Theoretical Entities/Fraassen: the question of why they behave the way they do is a question on a different level than that of explanation. Because then there are two possibilities: a) there is another, still unexplained regularity or b) there is the presumption that our theory can still be improved by being simplified. In neither case the regularities behind the phenomena demand an explanation. |
D. Hume I Gilles Delueze David Hume, Frankfurt 1997 (Frankreich 1953,1988) II Norbert Hoerster Hume: Existenz und Eigenschaften Gottes aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen der Neuzeit I Göttingen, 1997 Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 |
| Thomas Aquinas | Wessel Vs Thomas Aquinas | I 221 Identity/Thomas Aquinas: "merely ideal relation, since there is only one thing, caused by our language. Wessel: pro: Identity is indeed a linguistic phenomenon, WesselVsThomas Aquinas: but it is not a "mere ideal relation" but an ontological assertion. The relation exists when there is the object and the two modes of designation. |
Wessel I H. Wessel Logik Berlin 1999 |
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