Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 4 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Communitarianism Barber Brocker I 690
Communitarianism/Barber: Barber is not considered communitarian by all authors, but he does represent the typical topoi of communitarian politics: - rejection of a political philosophy based on abstract principles ((s)
CommunitarianismVsKant),
- the accusation of the separation of the individual from social ties ("atomism") and
- dissatisfaction with a purely instrumental view of political institutions.
BarberVsCommunitarianism: in contrast to the chief theorists of communitarianism, Barber participated in the communitarian reform movement around Amitai Etzioni.
Variants of communitarianism: a) substantialistic: here the community is seen as a given, against it:
b) procedural: this is about the common practice of counselling and decision-making. Barber is to be attributed to the latter variant. (1)(2)
BarberVsMacIntyre, BarberVsWalzer, BarberVsTaylor: Considering theorists like Michael Walzer, Alasdair MacIntyre and Charles Taylor as sceptics of a national policy of democratic society and as supporters of a civil society perspective (3), Barber's programme of a strong democracy had to appear as a quite radical and reasonable position because it ultimately gave a high rank to the national political community and participation in political decisions. (BarberVsTaylor, BarberVsWalzer, BarberVsMacIntyre).


1. Hartmut Rosa, „Fremde zu Nachbarn: die Vision einer demokratischen Bürgerschaft. Rezension zu Benjamin Barber, „Starke Demokratie“, in: Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 43/6, 1995 S. 1066-169.
2. W. Jay Reedy, „The relevance of Rousseau to Contemporary Communitarism. The Example of Benjamin Barber”, in: Philosophy and Social Criticism 21/2, 1995
3. Michael Haus, Kommunitarismus. Einführung und Analyse, Wiesbaden 2003

Michael Haus, „Benjamin Barber, Starke Demokratie“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018

PolBarb I
Benjamin Barber
The Truth of Power. Intellectual Affairs in the Clinton White House New York 2001


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Inflation Targeting Economic Theories Mause I 233
Inflation Targeting/Monetary Policy/Economic Theories: in many countries there is a shift away from monetary policy strategies taking explicit interim targets into account. (VsTaylor, John Brian, VsMcCallum, Bennett). Solution: in inflation targeting, central banks orientate their monetary policy directly towards inflation trends instead.
VsInflation Targeting: the central banks run the risk that their monetary policy measures may take effect too late and have a procyclical effect due to time lags. Against this background, central banks must gear their monetary policy interventions to the expected inflation potential, i.e. their strategy is based on a control of the forecast inflation rate.
As soon as the assumed inflation potential deviates from the formulated inflation target, monetary policy measures are required.
Problem: the credibility of monetary policy depends (...) crucially on the determination of the forecast inflation rate.
Solution: a combination with a Taylor-type monetary policy rule is proposed. See Taylor Rule/Taylor.


Mause I
Karsten Mause
Christian Müller
Klaus Schubert,
Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018
McCallum Rule McCallum Mause I 232f
McCallum Rule/McCallum: McCallum proposes (1) to facilitate monetarist monetary policy by investing money supply control more indirectly than in the case of the Taylor Rule (see Taylor Rule/Taylor). The central bank is to align the monetary base with the longer-term development path of the nominal domestic product.
McCallumVsTaylor: the direct control of money supply by the Taylor rule means that monetary policy makers must make explicit statements about the price and volume components.
Solution/McCallum: The very long-term orientation (more than 20 years) also ensures that the development path is independent of monetary development. (2)
The averages are calculated over a rolling period of 4 years to prevent the monetary base from reacting to cyclical fluctuations in circulation speed. In contrast to the original Taylor Rule, the McCallum Rule is based exclusively on data from the previous period or on long-term average values. The problem of real-time data in identifying the need for adaptation therefore does not occur.
VsMcCallum: this volume-oriented concept consciously accepts greater interest rate fluctuations.


1. McCallum, Bennett T., The case for rules in the conduct of monetary policy: A concrete example. Review of World Economics 123, (3), 1987, S. 415– 429.
2. Ibid.

EconMcCall I
Bennett McCallum
The case for rules in the conduct of monetary policy: A concrete example 1987


Mause I
Karsten Mause
Christian Müller
Klaus Schubert,
Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018
Taylor Rule Taylor Mause I 231
Taylor Rule/State intervention/Monetary policy/Taylor: The Taylor rule for state intervention is based on money market rates. Taylor tried to identify the relationship between interest rate developments and the potential final target variables in the US using a policy response function. (1),(2) As a rule, the Federal Reserve System's Open Market Committee (FOMC) has changed the Federal Funds Rate whenever there have been deviations between the current (average) and desired rate of inflation (inflation gap) and differences between the real domestic product and a long-term equilibrium level (output gap).
The central bank increases the money market rate with rising inflation and higher economic growth and vice versa (feedback rule). If the Taylor rule is to be operationalised, statements on the long-term (equilibrium) real interest rate level, the inflation rate and domestic product targets and information on the reaction parameters are required.
Problem: the required data is only available with a time delay and will also be readjusted frequently and to a not inconsiderable extent in the following period.
VsTaylor: Monetary policy should not react to historical values of the inflation or output gap, but anticipate the gaps expected in the future and initiate appropriate countermeasures. See also Edge Width Problem.


1. John B. Taylor,“Discretion Versus Policy Rules in Practice”, Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy 39, 1993 p. 195– 214.
2. John B. Taylor, “A Historical Analysis of Monetary Policy Rules,” In Monetary Policy Rules, J.B. Taylor, ed. Chicago 1999.

EconTayl I
John Brian Taylor
Discretion Versus Policy Rules in Practice 1993

TaylorB II
Barry Taylor
"States of Affairs"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

TaylorCh I
Charles Taylor
The Language Animal: The Full Shape of the Human Linguistic Capacity Cambridge 2016


Mause I
Karsten Mause
Christian Müller
Klaus Schubert,
Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018

The author or concept searched is found in the following controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Taylor, Ch. Rorty Vs Taylor, Ch. VI 126
World/Knowledge/Reality/Existence/Taylor/Rorty: Taylor: Thesis: nobody is seriously prepared to deny that there are no chairs in this room, and that this is true or false because of the nature of reality. RortyVsTaylor: I do deny this, however! There are two ways to interpret the phrase "due to the sochness of things":
1) as an abbreviation: "due to the uses of our current descriptions and causal interactions.
2) "Because of the suchness of things, regardless of how we describe these things." (Rorty: this is simply pointless).
VI 127
Correspondence/Rorty: with the absence of the thing in itself, the notion of correspondence has also disappeared from the scene. RortyVsTaylor: tries to retain one concept while he renounces the other. That's doomed.
VI130
Truth/Taylor: Thesis: "Internal frame": a concept of truth, which is given by our non-representational handling of what is at hand. ((s) >practice, practical use). Rorty/RortyVsTaylor: (with Sellars): according to psychological nominalism (everything is linguistic) "non-representational handling" of anything is suspicious.
RortyVsSellars: also, language represents nothing! (Sellars per representation (!)).
RortyVsTaylor: our handling of things at most gives us a sense of the causal independence of things, but not a concept of truth of conformity.
VI 131
Taylor: distinguishes "internal frame" truth (correspondence) and "understanding yourself". Because we ourselves are to a great extent constituted by our acts of self-understanding, we can interpret them as if they were in the same manner as our object descriptions about an independent object.
VI 133
Reality/Knowledge/World/RortyVsTaylor: it is not good to say. "The solar system was there, waiting for Kepler". Re-Description/Rorty: difference between a new description of the solar system and of myself: the solar system is not changed by that, and I can make true statements about it at the time before that. For myself, in some cases, I even do not use them to make true statements about my past self.
But there are no scientific re-descriptions the solar system à la Sartre!
(Sartre/Rorty: e.g. "He recognized himself as a coward and thereby lost his cowardice").
TaylorVsRorty/TaylorVsPutnam/TaylorVsGoodman: those authors who say there is no description independent suchness of the world are still tempted to use form/material metaphors. They are tempted to say there were no objects before language had formed the raw material.
Wrong causal relationship: as if the word "dinosaur" caused their emergence.
Taylor: We should stop saying something general about the relationship between language and reality or the "essence of reference" at all. (Only statements about the specific linguistic behavior of certain persons are permitted, which also allows for predictions).
World/Language/Davidson/Rorty: there is certainly a very specific relationship between the word "Kilimanjaro" and a particular speaker, but we are unable to say even the slightest about it if we are not very well informed on the role of this word in sentences!
Referencing/Reference/Davidson/Rorty: no hope of explaingin the reference directly in non-language-related terminology (regardless of sentence)!
Language/Davidson/Rorty: "something like a language does not exist." (Nice Derangement of Epitaphs): there is no set of conventions that you would have to learn when you learn to speak. No abstract entity that would have to be internalized.
VI 134
Taylor/Rorty: distinguishes between things "that can be decided by means of reason" and things where that is not possible. RortyVsTaylor: at most pragmatic distinction between useful for us and not useful for us.
VI 137
Taylor: once you escaped epistemology, you come to an "uncompromising realism". RortyVsTaylor: only at a trivial and uninteresting realism.
VI 139
Representation/Knowledge/Taylor Rorty: the epistemological interpretation of knowledge as mental images is inappropriate. We can draw a line between my image and the object, but not between my handling of the object and the object itself. The notion that our understanding is based in our handling of the world rejects representations in general.
VI 140
Taylor: Heidegger ( "handiness") and Merleau-Ponty (thesis: action and corporeality) show a way out. RortyVsTaylor: precisely these two authors are holding on to images and representations, and no matter how mediated.
Representation/Taylor/Rorty: Thesis: handling the world more original than representation.
VI 141
Rorty: no break between the non-verbal and the verbal interactions between organisms (and machines) and the world. Object/Representation:/RortyVsTaylor: we cannot - in contrast to Taylor - draw any line between the object and our image of the object, because the "image" is also merely a form of handling.

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 theses of the more related field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Reality Taylor, Ch. Rorty VI 126
World/knowledge/reality/existence/Taylor/Rorty: Taylor: Thesis: No one is seriously willing to deny that there are no chairs in this room, and that this is true or false because of the nature of reality. RortyVsTaylor: I deny that! There are two ways of interpreting the phrase "on the basis of the so-being of things:
1. As an abbreviation: "on the basis of the uses of our current descriptions and causal interactions.
2. "Because of the so-being of things, no matter how we describe them." (Rorty: this is just pointless).
Truth Taylor, Ch. Rorty VI ~126
Truth/Taylor: Thesis: "internal framework": a concept of truth that is given by our non-representational approach to the available. Rorty/RortyVsTaylor: (with Sellars): according to psychological nominalism (everything is linguistic) "non-representational dealing" with something suspect.
RortyVsSellars: besides, language represents nothing at all! (Sellars pro representation (!!)).
VI 140
Taylor: Heidegger ("Zuhanden") and Merleau-Ponty (thesis action and corporeality) show a way out. RortyVsTaylor: these two authors hold on to images and representations, no matter how they are conveyed.