Lexicon of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
[german]


 

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The author or concept searched is found in the following 34 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Anti-Realism Field
 
Books on Amazon
I 229
Anti-Realism/Field: many forms (which have nothing to do with our purpose) are reductionist: (E.g. reduction of the external world to human experience) or quasi-reductionist (e.g. theories that match in statements about human experiences must be cognitively equivalent. ) - (I.e. have the same understanding of "true").
I 249
Truth Definition/Anti-RealismVsTarski/Anti-RealismVsKripke - Anti-RealismVsModel Theory: VsOntology of sets (Anti-Platonism dito). - ((s) Because model-theoretic statements for the A-R are trivially true, because they have no references.)

Fie I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Fie II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Fie III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Clauses Searle
 
Books on Amazon:
John R. Searle
V 120
Clause/subordinate sentence/SearleVsFrege/SearleVsTarski/Tarski: subordinate clauses are not names of sentences - Words in quotation marks are not names of words - otherwise »» »regress« ««.

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Convention T Putnam
 
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I 66
Truth/PutnamVsTarski: his convention theory does not clarify the concepts of truth and reference, because it uses the concepts of the "designation" of a sentence and of "following from something" - these are (too?) closely related to truth and reference. - PutnamVsSellars: his analysis of the designation is not helpful: "wheel" plays the role of "Rad" in English. - This is not a description of the role, but the name of the role! - ((s) Those who know neither of both know nothing.) ---
II 89f
Definition Convention Theory/Tarski/Putnam: the requirement that all sentences from the language S are equivalent with the corresponding sentence of the metalanguage MS. - Putnam: this only determines the extension of "true" only when the connectives are interpreted classically and not intuitionistically. - Intuitionistically it would be about "provable". - Tarski: "electron refers" is equivalent to "There are electrons". - Intuitionistically: there is a description D, so that "D is an electron" is provable in B1 - That could be true with the appropriate theory, even if there are no electrons. - Intuitionism: here, existence is intra-theoretical.

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu II
H. Putnam
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Pu III
H. Putnam
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Pu IV
H. Putnam
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Deflationism Rorty
 
Books on Amazon:
Richard Rorty
VI 32
Def Deflationism: the view, Tarski’s work encompasses all the essential features of the truth.
VI 39
WrightVsDeflationism / Rorty: (like Davidson, but for different reasons) Wright not even mentioned the duty to achieve the truth - that leads to renewed inflation - because one standard need not be met with the other - VI 40 WrightVsTarski: he has not succeeded to specify a standard.

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Denotation Field
 
Books on Amazon
II 6
Primitive denotation/Field: a theory T1, based on primitive denotation, has compositionality - i.e. that the truth values (tr.v.) of the sentences depend on the truth values of the non-logical parts. - Primitive Denotation: Problem: E.g. - "He takes drugs": here only one token has a meaning, but not the type. - ((s) primitive denotation/(s): without markings). ---
II 6f
T1/Field: with primitive denotation; each name denotes what it denotes, a predicate denotes what it applies to, etc. - No composite expression has a primitive denotation. - Definition truth/primitive denotation: when a speaker says something true - hence tokens! - Not types of expressions - expressions like "John", "I", "You" are always only tokens. - Advantage: diachronic theory of language. ---
II 8
T1 uses semantic terms: "satisfy", "denote", "apply" (unlike Tarski) - VsT1: "John", "I" or "You" - problems with expressions like T2 (see below): without semantic expressions (E.g. satisfy, denotate, apply). ---
II, 18f
Denotation/T-Theory/Language/Field: for different languages at the same time: one could define "denote": E.g. DE (English) to say the name N denotes an object a is the same as to demand that either a is France and N is "France" or "a" is Germany and "N" is "Germany" ... then for another language, e.g. German: corresponding "... a is France and N is "France"...". ---
II 21
Problem: So one could define magic physically acceptable by simply setting up a list of magician -object pairs. ---
II 21
Names/Denotation/FieldVsTarski: Tarski's definition boils down to mere lists - and also lists for applying predicates and for fulfillment. - (> Possible world semantics/Properties:> II 41).

Fie I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Fie II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Fie III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Idiolect Davidson
 
Books on Amazon
K. Glüer, Davidson zur Einführung, 1993
Glüer II 51
DavidsonVsTarski: the actually spoken language is ultimately irrelevant.
Glüer II 53
DavidsonVs social character of meaning: even idiolect is principally interpretable (via causal hypotheses)
Frank 626
Truth / language / Davidson: because of the sincerity condition truth is relativized on language of the speaker, otherwise the behavior provides no evidence.

D I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D III
D. Davidson
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

D IV
D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990


D II
K. Glüer
D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993
Indexicality Logic Texts
 
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Sai V 189
Indexicality/BurgeVsTarski: (1979) he uses the term in a narrower sense: in a way that it only relates to circumstances - there are then different levels of truth and which is the relevant level, is not determined by the meaning of the sentence, but by the statement which is made during an opportunity. - Sainsbury: this avoids many difficulties associated with Tarski's hierarchy - Vs: it is hard to justify that "true" would be indexical.
Logic Texts
Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988
HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998
Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997
Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logik Stuttgart 1983
Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001
Individual Constants Bigelow
 
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I 101
Names/Individual Constants/BigelowVsTarski: Tarski allowed only things as referents that can occupy a place at a time. We, on the other hand, will also allow Possibilia.

Big I
J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter
Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990

Interpretation Davidson
 
Books on Amazon
K. Glüer, Davidson zur Einführung, 1993
Glüer II 28
Interpretation theory/Glüer: must not assume that their theorems were derived with the help of a translation (circle) - therefore DavidsonVsTarski: presupposing truth to explain meaning. ---
Glüer II 29/30
Definition interpretative/Glüer: is a theory if all T-equivalences to be obtained from the schema T are true. Because truth conditions are given in the recursion to the structure of the sentences -> Meaning holism: a sentence only has meaning in the context of the language - Thus the problem is "Snow is white iff grass is green excluded, because such a theory could not imply at the same time a true T-equivalence for the sentences "This is white" or "That is snow". ---
Glüer II 117/8
Interpretation/action/explanation/Davidson/Glüer: an action is only interpretable if it can be described as part of a rational structure - this also applies to speech action - therefore, actions are linked to propositional attitudes - each action is an interpreted action - N.B.: therefore it is no empirical question whether an acting person is rational - ((s) because it is presupposed) - An event that cannot be described in the language of the propositional attitudes is not an action - (because it is not interpretable). ---
Frank I 645
Mental states/proposition/self-attribution/external-ascription/Davidson: we have to start from sentences or utterances instead of propositions or meanings - otherwise, different types of sources are suggested - instead: relationships between actors and utterances - no different knowledge and no different criteria - solution : If someone knows that I think of a sentence as correct, he knows what I believe - it would be circular to explain the basic asymmetry by an asymmetry of certainty -> interpretation. ---
I 648
Interpretation/mental states/external-ascription/Davidson: also the speaker can problematize his sentences - he can also be wrong about the meaning of his words - he also needs the Tarski-theory - asymmetry: N.B.: the listener/interpreter cannot be sure that the Tarski-theory is the best method for external attribution. - The best thing the speaker can do is to be interpretable. ---
Graeser I 167
Interpretation/Davidson: utterances are verifiable, without the individual propositional attitudes of the speakers being known. - Radical interpretation: equality of meaning cannot be assumed, otherwise circle > truth conditions. ---
Perler/Wild. 139
Truth/Interpretation/Davidson: the contrast between truth and falsity can only occur in the context of interpretation.

D I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D III
D. Davidson
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

D IV
D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990


D II
K. Glüer
D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994

Grae I
A. Graeser
Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002
Intersubjectivity Davidson
 
Books on Amazon
K. Glüer, Davidson zur Einführung, 1993
Glüer II 122/123
Truth / intersubjectivity / Davidson / Glüer: inter-subjective understanding of truth: Third Way between correspondence-theory and coherence theory - "divided world" - Communication - DavidsonVsTarski: it is only by understanding the truth that can we give the objects a place in the public world.

D I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D III
D. Davidson
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

D IV
D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990


D II
K. Glüer
D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993
Meaning Putnam
 
Books on Amazon
I 16
Meaning/Putnam: not in the head: Proof: linguistic division of labor shows that I am not the only one who has the criteria - ((s) at least I am willing to learn from others) - PutnamVsTarski : understanding of the reference must be added - this must be independent of recognition - (realistic position). ---
I 49
Meaning/theory/PutnamVsCarnap/VsPositivismus: the theory does not determine the meaning - otherwise the term gravity would change if a 10th Planet was discovered - positivists also require, that the theory is dependent of all additional assumptions, otherwise the schema theory and prediction would collapse. ---
141 ~ I
Meaning/Putnam: results from the deletion of quotes. ---
I 258
Term transformation/change of meaning/significance/Putnam: e.g. if aliens had replaced all the stars of the Big Dipper through giant light bulbs, we would say : "that is not really a star" but not "this is not really the Big Dipper".

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu II
H. Putnam
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Pu III
H. Putnam
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Pu IV
H. Putnam
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Modalities Bigelow
 
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I 101
Modality/Necessity/Possibility/Modal/Montague/Bigelow/Pargetter: Montague is extreme by - Thesis: attributing modal operators (MO) to referents. Bigelow/Pargetter: instead, we can assume functions.
Modality/Bigelow/Pargetter: our strategy will be an intermediate position: we only assign referents to names and open sentences. (Not to the modal operators "possible" and "necessary").
Name/individual constants/BigelowVsTarski: Tarski allowed only things as referents that can occupy a place at a time.
We, on the other hand, will also allow Possibilia.
Group: Possibilia: Bigelow pro Possibilia - - against: QuineVsPossibilia/TarskiVsPossibilia.
Possibilia/Bigelow/Pargetter: Things that are not located anywhere but could have been. They are not universals at first! In the end, however, we will argue that they are universals after all.
Definition predicate/Bigelow/Pargetter: at the end we will say that predicates refer to sets constructed from universals and possibilia.
Modality/Modal Operator/Bigelow/Pargetter: for "possible", "necessary", "likely" we do not introduce referents, but rules.
---
I 290
Necessity/Modality/Causality/Bigelow/Pargetter: although we do not define causes with necessary and sufficient conditions, there are connections between causes and necessity. In one sense, the effect is more than just a coincidental consequence. There are two ways that leads causation to modalities.
1.
This comes from two terms of "cause", we call them "fat" and "thin" in analogy to Armstrong's "thick" and "thin" single particulars. (Armstrong 1978) a) Definition thin cause/terminology/Bigelow/Pargetter: is simply the complex of particulars, properties and relations that are causally related to the effect.
b) Definition thick cause/terminology/Bigelow/Pargetter: additionally the external properties, including all force relations.
Modality/Necessity/Bigelow/Pargetter: comes into play, because there is certainly a necessary connection between thick causes and their effects. This is because a relation cannot exist if its Relata does not exist.
Forces/necessity/Bigelow/Pargetter: this means that forces must be active.
---
I 291
Cause/effect/necessity/Bigelow/Pargetter: this trivial statement explains why causes are necessary for their effects. Cause/Bigelow/Pargetter: we can also consider it the rest of all causal interaction when everything else is eliminated. Conversely, if we are the only ones to remove the effect from the interaction, the effect must follow.
2.
Necessity/Modality/Causation/Explanation/Bigelow/Pargetter: the second way in which causation leads to modality has more to do with thin causes:
We have seen that thin causes are not always sufficient and necessary conditions for an effect.
Sometimes, however, thin causes are quite sufficient and necessary for the effect.
Modality: comes into play when we modify Lewis' analysis to say that the next possible worlds are where the cause has this or that effect. This is true for most of the causes, and so we also have counterfactual conditionals again.
Similarity metrics/similarity/next possible world/most similar/Bigelow/Pargetter: the proximity of possible worlds is determined by the individuals, properties and relations (1st and higher level) they have in common.
Similarity metrics/similarity/next possible world/most similar/Bigelow/Pargetter: the greater weight should have properties and relations of a higher level. That is, the next world will generally be the one that has most relations in common. If we then have the thick cause, the effect must also set in (necessity).
---
I 292
Effect/Cause/Bigelow/Pargetter: the effect will occur in the majority of the next possible worlds. ---
I 383
Modality/Mathematics/Bigelow/Pargetter: the hardness of the mathematical "must" is something that has to be foreseen. Science: reveals necessities in nature. But these are only relative, conditional necessities.
Natural necessity/natN/Bigelow/Pargetter: is always only relative, a conditional necessity.
Absolute necessity/Bigelow/Pargetter: only arises from mathematics.
---
I 384
Necessity/Bigelow/Pargetter: imposes restrictions. Science/Bigelow/Pargetter: Science also shows us possibilities that we would never have seen without it. Mathematics again plays a key role here.
Modality/Bigelow/Pargetter: derives from mathematics, which cannot be separated from science.
Realism/Bigelow/Pargetter. Problem: must also be realism in relation to mathematical objects, and thus it becomes platonism.
Nominalism/Bigelow/Pargetter: as a scientific realist, you can also be a nominalist. However, he must then either reject parts of the mathematics or take a strongly instrumentalistic view.
---
I 385
Quine/Bigelow/Pargetter: was driven away from nominalism by his scientific realism. Lewis/Bigelow/Pargetter: much of his modal realism was formulated within a nominalist framework. His later preference for universals does not alter the fact that his central theories are based on individuals and sets.
Nominalism/Bigelow/Pargetter: is only committed to antirealist consequences if he nourishes "worldly" presuppositions.
Scientific Realism/Bigelow/Pargetter: should be a scientific Platonist at the same time. That means he needs mathematical entities and universals Bigelow/Pargetter pro.
Combinatorial theory/Bigelow/Pargetter: pro: the world contains a collection of particulars and universals. This also gives us modalities.
In this way, we obtain a world book that corresponds to a complex property that either instantiates the world or not.
---
I 386
We call these possible worlds.

Big I
J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter
Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990

Paradoxes Prior
 
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CresswellII 110
Paradox/liar/Cretans/Prior/Cresswell: thesis: the Cretan must, so that he can have said anything (expressed), have said more than one sentence-. ((s) Otherwise the sentence refutes itself and thus logically expresses nothing). ---
Cresswell II 180ff
Paradox/Cohen/Prior/Cresswell: (Cohen 1957, 225), (Prior 1961). Cohen E.g. When the policeman testifies that everything that the prisoner says is wrong, and the prisoner explains that something that the policeman testified is true, then something that the police officer testified is wrong and something that the prisoner explains, true. - Spelling: d1: -"the policeman testified that: - - d2: the prisoner explains" - logical form: (d1 p(d2p> ~ p) u d2Ep(d1 p up))> (Ep (d1P u ~ p) u Ep (d2p up)) - liar/Prior: d: "was told by a Cretan": dp (dp> ~ p)> (Ep (dp up) and Ep (dp u ~ p)) - (ii) dp (dp> ~ p)> Ep Eq(p unequal q) u dp u dq) - (ii) states that the Cretans must have said at least two things. ---
Prior I 81
Prior/(s): tautology p > pq Prior reads it like this: p E.g. Say, q: adverb. - E.g. CpAKpqKpNq: if it is the case that p, then either it is the case that p-and-q or it is the case that p-but-not-q - Moore's paradox: the same device can be used for it, I believe that it is raining, but of course it does not rain - philosophers have found it remarkably difficult to explain what is wrong with it - but that happens all the time. ---
Prior I2
Moore's Paradox/Prior: we only need normal truth and error (error or dishonesty as the only options). ---
Prior I 85
Preface paradox/Prior: thesis that something is in the book, is not the case, can only be claimed outside of the book - Variant: book with only one sentence: something in this book is wrong: sequence of theorems:. 1. then something is wrong - 2. the say that something is wrong in the book is true - 3. which in turn is true - 4. then something is wrong in the book and something is true ((s) but only a statement) - but then at least two different things are said in the book - by contraposition: if nothing is wrong in the book, except that it is said that something is wrong in the book, then this is not said in the book. ---
Prior I 88
Preface paradox/Prior: in the book there is something wrong just cannot be the only assertion - but self-reference is not the problem. ---
Prior I 96f
Preface Paradox/Prior: Parallel/Cohen E.g. if John has a brown cow which is then and only then pregnant if any animal of John is not pregnant, then any animal of John is not pregnant - Proof: e.g. hypothesi : when an animal of John is not pregnant, the cow is pregnant so if the cow is not pregnant, the other animal is pregnant - and therefore (because the cow is only pregnant, when another animal is not, then an animal of John is not pregnant - he must have at least two animals - Prior:. oddly enough, not essential that the pregnant animal must be a brown cow, just so: for x, x means that the sky is blue and x is true, iff grass is green - both elements are quite irrelevant for each other - even for the preface paradox. ---
Prior I 98
Preface paradox/PriorVsTarski: my concept of truth here non-Tarski: truth is not property of sentences, but of propositions - that means, Quasi properties of quasi-objects - rather adverbs than adjectives. - E.g. truthfully and incorrectly.

Pri I
A. Prior
Objects of thought Oxford 1971

Pri II
Arthur N. Prior
Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003


Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984
Paradoxes Putnam
 
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I 232f
Paradoxes/truth/PutnamVsTarski: the paradox of his theory is that you have to stand outside the whole hierarchy to say that the hierarchy exists - Charles Parsons: thesis: statements about truth values are made in a higher language - a speech act 'sui generis'. ---
I 234
PutnamVsParsons, Charles: not more 'sui generis' than a sentence in red ink - merely formalistic trick to say, they could then not contain paradoxes - the problem is only shifted: the language in which we express that sentences in red ink ... - solution/Putnam: some forms of discourse can be understood without a prerequisite concept of truth - Rorty: proposes this for all discourses - some: these things could not be "said, but shown" - PutnamVs: the notion that there was a discursive thought that could not be said is incomprehensible - Gödel: takes set-theoretic paradoxes to be solved; semantic paradoxes for not solved.

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu II
H. Putnam
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Pu III
H. Putnam
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Pu IV
H. Putnam
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Picture Theory Wittgenstein
 
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Danto I 70/71
Image Theory/Picture Theory/Wittgenstein/Danto: thesis: the world has the same shape as the language. - Without that the world itself would be somehow linguistically in its structure i.e. more of a reflection. ---
Hintikka I 67
Picture theory/Image theory/Facts/Object/Early Wittgenstein/Hintikka : - when the sentence is a linguistic counterpart of the matter. ---
I 68
Then that connection is no relation, but the existence of a relation - ((s) the relation of the state of affairs is the existence of the subject matter - this is Wittgenstein's position before the Tractatus - WittgensteinVs: Vs later - Russell: pro. ---
I 127
Image/Image Theory/Theory of Reflection/Bild/Abbild/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: comes from Frege - is also found in Tarski again. ---
I 131
Hintikka: thesis: the - image - theory? is in reality an anticipation of the first condition Tarski truth theory. ---
I 132
WittgensteinVsTarski : a truth theory is inexpressible. ---
I 132f
ARb/Expressions/Representation/Image Theory/Image theory/Complex/Wittgenstein/Hintikka : not a character (E.g. - R) represents something - but the linguistic relationship attached to it - the linguistic relation is not a class of pairs of individuals (Frege value pattern) - but a real relationship - WittgensteinVsFrege - TarskiVsWittgenstein/CarnapVsWittgenstein/(s): extensional semantics - Item/WittgensteinVsFrege: Elements of possible facts - then the relation that the - - R always corresponds to a special relation. ---
I 134/35
Image theory/Theory of reflection/(Abbild, Widerspiegelung)/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: no image relation, but isomorphism - (truth conditions) no theory of language, but the truth. ---
I 135
Can be described as theory but not expressed (structural equivalence, isomorphism). ---
I 141
Image theory/Theory of reflection/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: only simple sentences are images - not complex sentences - these would only be recipes for the construction of images - if you would permit this, you would have no argument for the special status of some sentences: - namely to be true. ---
I 161
Image theory/Theory of reflection/Reflection/Tractatus/Hintikka: Image unequal reflection - illustration: require that some of the connections allowed to play some of the possible configurations of objects - but it does not follow that the reflection must be complete - i.e. not each link must speak of a possible issue - Name: no image of the object - but it can reflect it - Sentence: Image - logic: reflection of reality (Widerspiegelung, Abbild). ---
I 183
Wittgenstein/Early/Middle/late/Plant/Hintikka: Image Theory: was abandoned 1929 - Hintikka: he has never represented a perfect picture theory - later than 1929: Vs the thesis that language functions according to strict rules - Hintikka: that he might never have represented - 1934/35: new: language games. WittgensteinVsTractatus: VsReflection. ---
I 184
Language/Medium Wittgenstein 1929: physical language instead of phenomenological language - ((s) b > Quine) - but it is always the ordinary language. ---
III 144
Language/Thought/World/Reality/Image Theory/Theory of Reflection/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: the actual relationship between language (thinking) and reality cannot be a part of reality itself - because the image B, which should reflect the ratio between A and S, would then be identical with A - hence the sentence can only schow its sense, it cannot express it.

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico Philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960


Dt I
A. C. Danto
Wege zur Welt München 1999

Dt III
Arthur C. Danto
Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998

Dt VII
A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005

Hin I
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

W I
J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996
Satisfaction Putnam
 
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I 91
Satisfaction/Tarski: is the terminus for reference. - Putnam: relation between words and things, more precisely, between formulas and finite sequences of things. - Tarski; "The sequence of length one only existing of x, satisfies the formula "electron (y)" iff x is an electron". - The sequence Abraham: Isaac meets the formula "x is the father of y". - If there are more binary relations one does not speak of Reference. -> Correspondence theory -> picture theory - Putnam: Tarski's theory is not suitable for the correspondence theory because satisfaction is explained by a list. - (Instead> meaning postulates: "electron" refers to electrons, etc.) - "true" is the zero digit case of fulfillment: a formula is true if it has no free variables and if it meets the zero sequence. ---
I 92
Zero digit relation: E.g. Tarski: "true" is the zero digit case of satisfaction: that means, a formula is true if it has no free variables and if the zero sequence is met. - Zero sequence: converges to 0. Example 1;, 1/4, 1/9, 1/16, ... ---
I 92
Satisfaction/Putnam: criterion T can be extended to the criterion E: (E) an adequate definition of fulfilled-in-S must generate all instances of the following scheme as theorems: "P(x1 ... xn) is only fulfilled by the sequence y1. ..yn when P (y1 .... yn) - reformulated: "electron (x)" is then and only then fulfilled by y1 when y1 is an electron - This is determined by truth and reference (not determined by provability) and is therefore even preserved in intuitionistic interpretation. PutnamVsField: his objection fails: for the realists the Tarski schema is correct - FieldVsTarski: similar to a "definition" of chemical valence by enumeration of all elements and their valence. The causal involvement in our explanations is lacking - PutnamVsField: truth and reference are not causally explanatory terms, we still need them for formal logic, even if scientific theories are wrong.

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu II
H. Putnam
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Pu III
H. Putnam
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Pu IV
H. Putnam
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Tarski Davidson
 
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Rorty VI 32
Davidson/Rorty: Tarskis "true in -L" specifies extension and thus no reference to future or general cases. ---
Rorty VI 123 ff
T-Theory/Davidson/Rorty: "Theory of truth for a Language: simple "a theory that makes it possible to predict with some success what noise a speaker will make in what situation. ---
Rorty VI 193
Rorty: Fact/Davidson/Rorty: Tarski's great merit is it, to have shown that we can do without the concept of fact. ---
K. Glüer, Davidson zur Einführung, 1993
Glüer II 50f
Meaning/Tarski/Davidson: Tarski-like theories do not refer to meaning as fixed entities. (Davidson pro: meaning ultimately not fixable) - Consequences: 1. DavidsonVsTarski: actually spoken language ultimately irrelevant - 2. The trivial thesis that meaning is conventional, must be abandoned.

D I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D III
D. Davidson
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

D IV
D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990


Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

D II
K. Glüer
D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993
Tarski Field
 
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I 33f
Tarski/Field: According to him the following two sentences are a contradiction because he needs quantities for his definition of implication: a) "snow is white" does not imply logically "grass is green". - b) There are no mathematical entities (m.e.) like quantities. - ((s) Therefore, Field must be independent of Tarski.) Solution Field: Implication as a basic concept. ---
II 124
Tarski/Truth: unlike disquotational truth: only for a fragment. - Unrestricted quantifiers and semantic concepts must be excluded. Problem: we cannot create infinite conjunctions and disjunctions with that. - (Tarski-Truth is not suitable for generalization). DeflationsimVsTarski/QuineVsTarski. - Otherwise, we must give up an explicit definition. - Deflationism: uses a generalized version of the truth-schema. - TarskiVsDeflationism: pro compositionality. (Also Davidson) - Tarski: needs recursion to characterize e.g."or".
---
II 125
Composition principle/Field: E.g. A sentence consisting of a one-digit predicate and a referencing name is true, iff the predicate is true of what the name denotes. - This goes beyond logical rules because it introduces reference and denotation. - Tarski: needs this for a satisfying Truth-concept. Deflationism: it is not important for it. - (> Compositionality). ---
II
Truth-Theory/Tarski: Thesis: we do not get an adequate Truth-theory if we take only all instances of the schema as axioms. - This does not give us the generalizations we need, e.g. that the modus ponens receives the truth. ---
II 142
Deflationism/Tarski/Field. Actually, Tarski's approach is also deflationistic. ---
Horwich I 477
FieldVsTarski/Soames: hides speech behavior. - Field: introduces primitive reference, and so on. -> language independence. - SoamesVsField: his physicalist must reduce every single one of the semantic concepts. - For example, he cannot characterize negation as a symbol by truth, because that would be circular. E.g. he cannot take negation as the basic concept, because then there would be no facts about speakers (no semantic facts about use) that explain the semantic properties. - FieldVsTarski: one would have to be able to replace the semantic terms by physical terms.

Fie I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Fie II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Fie III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980


Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Tarski Wright
 
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Rorty I 38ff
WrightVsTarski: he did not succeed to specify a standard. Wright: two standards: legitimate assertibility and truth. Difference: the pursuit of one is necessary also a striving for the other, but a success in one is not necessarily a success with the other. ---
Wright I 85
VsWright: Tarski requires bivalence, assertions can also be undecidable (Vs Platitude assertion = putting something forward as true) - WrightVsVs: the deflationismus precisely does not accept the (disquotation scheme) - there are no problems with indefinite truth values, but with additional ones or gaps.

Wri I
Cr. Wright
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001

WriGH I
G. H. von Wright
Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008


Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Truth Austin
 
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StrawsonVsTarski, AustinVsTarski: truth no property - Tarski: Truth is a property.
I 20
Def truth / Austin: statements are true, if they are connected to things, events, etc. of the type of a given situation by descriptive conventions concerning the words (sentences) - Austin: per correspondence theory, but with convention - I 230 so that a statement can be true , a state of affairs must be similar to certain other st.o.a. - I 237 "true" is not logically superfluous as well as "vague"
I 240
Truth / Austin: "true" is used when talking about statements, not sentences. (Strawson ditto).
John L. Austin
I Austin Wahrheit in: Wahrheitstheorien Hrsg. Skirbekk, Frankfurt/M 1996
II Jörgen Husted "Austin" aus :Hügli (Hrsg) Philosophie im 20. Jahrhhundert, Reinbek 1993
III Austin: "Ein Plädoyer für Entschuldigungen" aus: Linguistik und Philosophie (Grewendorf/Meggle(Hg)) Frankfurt (Athenäum) 1974/1995
Truth Ayer
 
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I 21
Truth/Circle/Ayer: true statements are determined by relation to facts - facts determined with true statements - Circle: broken by actions and observations - Ayer separates between T def and truth criterion.
I 297
VsCorrespondence Theory: confuses a method for interpreting the symbols with a truth criterion.
I 276
Truth/AyerVsTarski: should not be property of sentences but of propositions (statements expressed by sentences) - E.g. time ratio is relevant.
I 278
Truth/Tarski/Ayer: analysis of use (use, no criterion of truth)
Horwich I 101
Truth/Ayer: adds nothing - Truth/Falsehood: their function is to replace negation and assertion signs.
I 102
They themselves are not real concepts.
A.J.Ayer
I Ayer Wahrheit, aus "Wahrheitstheorien" Hrsg. Skirbekk Frankfurt/M 1996
II Hügli ()Hrsg.) Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, Reinbek 1993

Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Truth Davidson
 
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I 56
Immanence Theory of Truth/Davidson: The sentence of another could be true for him, even though, when I translate it correctly, it makes no sense for me. ---
The T-predicate defined in the meta-language can be translated back into the object language and the state before the elimination can be restored of the "true".
  Object and meta-language should contain the predicate "true".
Davidson, however, can avoid the dilemma by not defining a definition at all. He calls this a truth definition in the style of Tarski in the following called "T-theory".
DavidsonVsTarski: empirical instead of formal - Empiricism excludes false additions of law (Goodman) .- Convention T is not sufficiently empirical
The truth of an utterance depends only on two things: of what the words, as they were used, mean, and of the world.
---
K. Glüer, Davidson zur Einführung, 1993
Glüer II 131
VsTranscendentalism: one cannot separate language competence and influence on the world. "Negative Transcendentalism". ---
Rorty VI 51
Davidson/Truth: We collect information and patterns about whether actors agree to sentences or not. And this, without knowing the meaning of the sentences of actor. But after a while we do the step from the "nonpropositional to the propositional". A theory of truth is at the same time automatically a theory of meaning and rationality. Every intensional concept is intertwined with every other intensonal concept.
---
K. Glüer, Davidson zur Einführung, 1993
Glüer II 28
Interpretation theory/Glüer: must not assume that their theorems were derived with the help of a translation (circle) - therefore DavidsonVsTarski: presupposing truth to explain meaning. ---
Horwich I 443
Truth/Davidson/Rorty: should be identified with nothing. - There is no correspondence, no truth-making. DavidsonVsPragmatism: Truth is not equal to assertion. ---
Rorty VI 189
Truth/Norms/Davidson: (according to Brandom): the pursuit of truth cannot go beyond our own practices (also Sellars).

D I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D III
D. Davidson
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

D IV
D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990


D II
K. Glüer
D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Truth Goodman
 
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I 31
Truth/Goodman: Provided that a world consists of statements, truth may be relevant. But truth cannot be defined or be checked by compliance with "the world". Truth is a docile and obedient servant, no severe master. ---
I 34
The scientist who assumes he is especially looking for truth deceives himself. He does not care about trivial truths he could grind out. "The truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth": this would be a wrong and paralyzing policy for any world producer. The whole truth would be too much, it is too large, too variable and too burdened by trivial. Nothing but the truth would be too little, for some right versions are not true (they are either false or neither true nor false).
---
I 147
GoodmanVsTarski: Tarski must be revised: ""Snow is white" is true according to a version if and only if snow is in accordance with this version of white".
---
I 149
Truth/Goodman: is like intelligence exactly what the tests test. ---
I 146 ff
GoodmanVsPragmatism: then the pragmatist thesis loses at the moment of victory its force: because that truths best meet the purpose of acquiring truths is as empty as it is obvious. Accuracy/Goodman:
Goodman suggests high acceptability as accuracy scale.
---
III 242
The truth of a hypothesis is a matter of fitting. Of fitting to a theory building and the fitting of hypotheses and theory to the existing data and the facts one will encounter. Truth/Goodman: We should reserve truth for the symbols in sentence form.
---
IV 208
Accuracy/Goodman: does not seek a formal definition. Accuracy is a matter of fitting and activity. ---
IV 205
Accuracy and truth sometimes go apart even in statements. Although snow is white, the statement "snow is white" can sometimes be incorrect.

G I
N. Goodman
Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984

G II
N. Goodman
Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988

G III
N. Goodman
Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997

G IV
N. Goodman/K. Elgin
Revisionen Frankfurt 1989

Truth Prior
 
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I 21
Truth/belief/Prior: Truth cannot only be applied to propositions, but also to belief: logical form: "(X thinks that) p and p" (bracket) - but determination of truth does not ascribe a property to any proposition (always facts decisive) - fact possible without believed proposition - problem/Moore: if no one believes that the belief must be false, even if it would be correct if someone believes that! - ((S) due to non-existence) - PriorVs: misconception of belief as a relation to facts. ---
I 98
Truth/PriorVsTarski: you could also see it as an adverb (quasi-property) instead regarding it as a property: E.g. "when someone says that snow is white, he says it truthfully" - with me no mention (Tarski left, in quotation marks), only use - only about snow, not about truth - no metalanguage - PriorVsTarski: for me the truth is as much about the things that someone thinks, fears, etc. - then one can also think that you think something wrong. ---
I 106
Truth/meaning/Buridan: every sentence means that it is true itself (in addition to what else it means) - Prior: we have to admit that a sentence can have several meanings at the same time - then the sentence is non-paradoxically wrong (contradictorily) if it is to mean that it is wrong - but no "secondary meaning" and "principle B".

Pri I
A. Prior
Objects of thought Oxford 1971

Pri II
Arthur N. Prior
Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003

Truth Rorty
 
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Richard Rorty
Truth/Rorty: love of truth not as love for something non-human, but as relation to the fellow human beings. Love of truth as affable willingness to talk made the quasi-object as the target of a search (Platonic idea of ​​the natural order or universally valid convictions, Habermas) entirely superfluous. II 116f
Truth/Art/ethics/Rorty: with Davidson, I believe that the distinction true/false can also be applied to sentences of the type "Yeats was a great poet" and "democracy is better than tyranny". III 84 ff
Semantic theory of truth/Tarski: Truth leads back to justification. V 26ff
Truth: absolute concept: in the following sense: true for me, but not for you... in my culture, but not in yours, true back then, but not today such statements are strange and pointless.
It makes more sense: justified for me but not for you.
Justification: relative! Justification is a criterion for truth.
Truth: not a goal of research! A goal is something of which you can know if you are heading towards or coming away from it. VI 7
Truth: Property of sentences!
Truth/existence/Rorty: Of course it was true in the past that women should not be suppressed, just like the planetary orbits were true! Truth is ahistorical, but this is not so because true statements are made true by ahistorical entities! Vi 327
Horwich I 444
Pragmatism/James/Davidson/Rorty: 1) Truth is not used explanatorily. - 2) beliefs are explained by causal relation. - 3) There are no true-makers. - 4) If no true-makers, then no dispute between realism and anti-realism that accepts this true-makers.
Horwich I 454
Truth/DavidsonVsTarski/Rorty: can therefore not be defined in terms of satisfaction or something else. - We can only say that the truth of a statement depends on the meaning of the words and the arrangement of the world. - So we are rid of the correspondence theory.
Horwich I 456
Truth/Putnam: if they were not a property, the truth conditions would be everything you could know about them - (Putnam pro truth as a property - (PutnamVsField?). - Putnam: Then our thoughts would not be thoughts.

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000


Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Truth Tugendhat
 
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I 263
Truth/Tugendhat: an assertion is once and for all true or false, it does not depend on the circumstances or on a situation (> timeless sentence). ---
I 267
Truth/Tugendhat: One must not have reasons for truth, but know them - difference using reasons/truth reason - otherwise lie and deception would be excluded. ---
I 285
Truth/Tugendhat: only made possible by reference to spatiotemporal objects - but reference only possible in controlled language use - VsRussell: not by pseudo-concept idea. ---
III 190
Truth/Tarski/Tugendhat: his definition is not related to verification - TugendhatVsTarski: Scheme to narrow - Reality and subjectivity must be taken into the truth-conception - Tugendhat VsMeta Language - Judgments point beyond themselves, therefore criteria necessary. ---
III 196
Tugendhat: we need to know how we can verify a judgment, otherwise meaningless. ---
III 208
The "dual relationship" (sentence-sense-given), evaporates with Tarski to a simple ratio.

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992

Truth Definition Davidson
 
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K. Glüer, Davidson zur Einführung, 1993
Glüer II 29
T-Definition/Tarski-Schema/Contents/Interpreting/Translation/Tarski/Davidson/Glüer: E.g. "Snow is white" is true iff grass is green. - Such a theory would not be interpretive. - The right side truth conditions have nothing to do with the truth conditions from the left - Problem: the equivalence is purely formal because the truth value is always the same. (Equivalence) solution: menaing holism: a sentence has only meaning in the context - solution/Davidson: T-predicate three-digit: for sentence, speaker, point of time. ---
Glüer II 37f
DavidsonVsTarski: empirical instead of formal - empiricism excludes false additions of law (Goodman) ("falsified theory") - The convention T is not sufficiently empirical - ((e) because it's only providing equivalences.) ---
Glüer II 65
T-equivalences/Davidson/Glüer: equate conviction and belief. ---
Glüer II 40/41
E.g. (TR") for all speakers x, for all t: "It is raining" expressed by x to t is true iff it is raining at t in the surrounding of x. - ((s) That specifies the truth conditions). ---
Glüer II 67
Truth/Davidson: intuitive - meaning: non-intuitive - truth: unanalysable basic concept.

D I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D III
D. Davidson
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

D IV
D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990


D II
K. Glüer
D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993
Truth Definition Putnam
 
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Horwich I 480
Truth Definition/T-Def/truth/PutnamVsTarski: his Truth Definition has nothing to do with understanding or meaning. - Otherwise, it would be absurd: E.g. If "Ws" would have meant in L that snow is black, then it would have been the case that the snow would have been white iff. snow would have been black. - DummettVsTarski: ditto, - otherwise E.g. If x knows that it is not the case that snow is white iff. snow is black, then x knows that "Ws" in L does not mean that snow is black. - Davidson: tries to eliminate the concept of meaning in favor of the truth. - Meaning Theory/Soames: must not appeal to more semantic concepts.

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu II
H. Putnam
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Pu III
H. Putnam
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Pu IV
H. Putnam
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990


Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Truth Definition Stalnaker
 
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I 46 Truth / T-Def / Tarski / BenacerrafVsTarski / Reference / causal theory / Stalnaker: a Tarski-style T-Def is not sufficient to assert the fact that we are really talking about truth. - Stalnaker ditto. - ((s) Problem: homophony does not guarantee any causal connection to abstract or concrete objects). - solution / Stalnaker. connection to practice.

Sta I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003

Truth Predicate Davidson
 
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Rorty VI 20
"True"/Davidson: "true" is not a name of a relationship between language statements and the world. In other words: the expression "true" should neither be analyzed nor defined. There is no thing that makes sentences and theories true. "True" is not synonymous with anything at all. Neither with "justified according to our knowledge", nor with "justified by the circumstances in the world".
---
K. Glüer, Davidson zur Einführung, 1993
Glüer II 27
Truth-Predicate/Tarski: Problem: DavidsonVsTarski: object language and meta language should contain the predicate true. - The T-predicate defined in the metalanguage can be translated back into the object language. Solution/Davidson: do not set up a T-definition at all - instead: T-Theory/Davidson: Reinterpretation of the convention T as a criterion of appropriateness for T-theories of natural languages. ---
Glüer II 28
T-Predicate/Tarski: any predicate that delivers correct translations is a T-predicate. - This presupposes meaning in order to explicate truth. ---
Glüer II
Truth-predicate/TarskiVsDavidson: provides a structural description of a language whose translation is known. - The T-predicate does not contribute to the truth theory. - It is not interpreted in Tarski. - ((s) we do not know what truth is - T-Predicate/DavidsonVsTarski: is interpreted a priori.) - ((s) we already know what truth is.) - Definition interprets/(s): know what a word means. ---
Rorty IV 22
True/Davidson/Rorty: does not correspond to any relationship between linguistic expressions and the world. - No correspondence.

D I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D III
D. Davidson
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

D IV
D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990


Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

D II
K. Glüer
D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993
Truth Theory Davidson
 
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EMD II 34
Truth Theory/Tarski/Davidson: shows how the truth values of the sentences of L depend on their structures, and why some sentences contain others, and how words perform their function through their relationship to things in the world. - Tarski: Meaning as the basic concept. ---
EMD II 35
FosterVsDavidson: Mistake: to overlook that someone could have a clear theory without knowing it. - Then there is no meaning theory. - (Davidson dito). ---
EMD II 37
Truth Theory/Davidson: ""Snow is white" is true" is not an accidental fact about a sentence but a fact that interprets it. - This shows that ability to interpret does not equal translation. ---
Dav I 111
Tarski: defines Truth - Davidson: Truth is an undefined basic concept. - "mine", "wanting to say": presupposes the concept of meaning. ---
l 111
Tarski: formal, Davidson empirical (laws instead of axioms, empirically verifiable) ---
K. Glüer, Davidson zur Einführung, 1993
Glüer II 28f
Truth Theory/DavidsonVsTarski/Glüer: Conversely: it is not required of T-equivalences that the right-hand side translates the left-hand side. - Definition T-equivalence/Tarski: true iff the linked sentences (in the schema) have the same truthvalue under all circumstances . ---
Glüer II 29
Then one must know for Davidson's reinterpreted convention T (provides only true equivalences) when T-equivalences are true. - It is therefore not necessary to know the meaning of both object language sentences and metalanguage sentences. - ((s) the meaning is not presupposed. TarskiVsDavidson: the meaning of the sentence of both the object language and the metalanguage must be known - T-predicate/DavidsonVsTarski: his T-predicate must be interpreted - Davidson: then the T- Theory is an interpretation theory which, for each statement sentence S, a T-equivalence derived from its structure, whose right-hand side indicates the truth conditions under which the left-hand side (S) is true. ---
Glüer II 45
Truth Theory/Davidson/Glüer: for unknown language: 3 steps: 1. The totality of the data must be available, interpreter transmits his logic to the foreign language - basis: observations on sentences that are believed to be true at all times ) - 2. Predicates identified as such become the object of the interpretation (fulfillment conditions are approximated via opportunity sentences) - 3. Extension to general sentences (indirectly developed truth conditions). ---
Glüer II 54/55
Truth Theory/Davidson: because of malapropisms: not structure, but intension has priority. ---
Glüer II 56
T-Theory: in principle, only for certain occasion correct - problem: for a theory of competence: no distinction anymore between the ability to know a language and to know about the world - language competency fuses with worlds.

D I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D III
D. Davidson
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

D IV
D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990


EMD II
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977

Ev I
G. Evans
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989

D II
K. Glüer
D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993
Truth Theory Field
 
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II 21
Truth-Theory/Truth-Definition/TarskiVsField: semantic concepts are not necessary and not philosophically interesting for a T-theory. - - 2. FieldVsTarski: has only lists for denotation: (e)(a) (e is a name which denotes a) ⇔ (e is "c1" and a is c1) or (e is "c2" and a is c2) or ...
---
II 24
Truth-Theory/utterance conditions/Truth/T-theory/Quine: (1953b, p. 138) the conditions of expression are all that is needed to make the concept "true" clear. - (Field dito) - E.g. Alabama-Example: a friend says that in the southern state of Alabama is snow which is a foot high. - Therefore, utterance conditions are important. - Question: why do we need causal theories of the reference beyond the Truth-schema? - That does not work anyway, since we are on Neurath's ship ((s). That is, meanings change in the course of language development). - Still: Solution/Field: psychological models about the (inner) connection to reality. - (Do not attach a theory from the outside). - This psychological connection is still physical.

Fie I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Fie II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Fie III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Truth Theory Peacocke
 
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EMD II 162ff
truth theory / PeacockeVsDavidson / VsTarski: actually empirical - relativise a T-sentence to persons and times - a criterion of acceptance of a truth theory for arbitrary languages already presupposes a general concept of truth - vice versa, we do not know which interpreted language the community uses (> II 149ff), if we only know the truth conditions of the sentences.

Pea I
Chr. R. Peacocke
Sense and Content Oxford 1983


EMD II
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977

Ev I
G. Evans
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989
Understanding Dummett
 
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I 150 ff
Frege: Understanding before truth - truth indefinable (FregeVsTarski). Dummett: in earlier works thesis: the theory of meaning is a theory of understanding.
Today: the relationship is more subtle. Neither of the two can be explained by the other respectively.
We can also express our understanding by means of other words. Replacement, interchangeability.
II 457
On the other hand it cannot apply generally that the understanding of expressions has the form of explicit knowledge and consists in the ability to explain expressions with other expressions. For this would result in a circle.
II 458 ff
Understanding: there are limits: we can only attribute an understanding to ourselves if we can show how to express it. The (metaphysical) realist must therefore show how our understanding (ultimately behavior) discloses that sentences are either true or false (even if we cannot decide). And that’s not possible.
II 463
Understanding: the linguistic understanding of a person cannot include a component that could not be expressed in the use of the language.
EMD II 69
Understanding/Dummett: knowing the corresponding fact is not sufficient to understand a sentence.
EMD II 111
Understanding/Meaning Theory/Dummett: what would be a verification of the sentence - important argument: we need not be able to decide the sentence in order to understand him - 1) Two Dogmas Vs: most sentences involve inferences - 2) Vs: if truth is a basic concept, then there is no reason why we should know enough to deduce the meaning of a complex sentence from the constituents.
Dum III 70/71
Understanding/Truth/Dummett: in order for a sentence to be used for communication of information it must be possible to understand it before you know whether it is true - Transparency: if you attribute one meaning to two words each, one must know whether these meanings are the same - but: someone who grasps the sense (meaning) of two expressions, does not need to know that they have the same reference.
III 83
Language/Meaning/Dummett: E.g. exchange "table" with "eagle": then sentences such as "female tables lay eggs" etc. So the hoax is uncovered - Prerequisite: we already know sentences that do not contain "table" and "eagle"! -> Löwenheim-Skolem - you cannot assume a theory (collection of true sentences at a time) without an additional meaning theory.
III 96
(S) If all sentences contained "table" and "Eagle", then the meaning of the other words in these sentences could depend on these two words).

Du I
M. Dummett
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Du III
M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982


EMD II
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977

Ev I
G. Evans
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989

The author or concept searched is found in the following 42 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Carnap, R. Wittgenstein Vs Carnap, R.
 
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I 134
WittgensteinVsTarski/WittgensteinVsCarnap/Hintikka: would the logical semantics reject in the lump, because it cannot be articulated according to the conception of language as a universal medium.
I 194 ff
WittgensteinVsCarnap/Wittgenstein/Bio/Hintikka: accuses Carnap, he had used his idea of physicalist base language without permission and without reasonable notice. Neurath has demanded, as the first in the Vienna Circle, one should no longer speak of "experience content" and the "comparison between sentence and reality", but only of sentences. (> Coherence theory).

II 333
Logic/WittgensteinVsCarnap: the attempt to construct a logic that should be prepared for any situation, is an absurdity of great importance, such as Carnap's construction of a relation system, but which leaves it open whether something fits to what gives it content.
VI 94
WittgensteinVsCarnap/Schulte: one cannot assume a priori that elementary propositions should consist of binary relations.

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico Philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960
Carnap, R. Soames Vs Carnap, R.
 
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Horwich I 478
Mengenlehre/T-Def/Tarski/Soames: ["Schnee ist weiß" ist T] und "Schnee ist weiß" sind notwendig äquivalent in elementarer ML. ((s) >Redundanztheorie). T-Predicate/Tarski/Soames: Tarski würde kein Prädikat als W Prädikat anerkennen, wenn [ a ist T] nicht material äquivalent wäre
I 480
zu jeder metasprachlichen Paraphrase des objektsprachlichen Satzes der von a benannt wird. Auf dieser Basis kann man Tarski so interpretieren, dass er implizit annimmt, dass Instanzen von (19) notwendig sind oder a priori. (Soames pro).
(19) Wenn "T" ein T-predicate für L ist und "S" in L bedeutet dass p, dann ist "S" T iff p.
Soames: aber das ist etwas ganz anderes als zu behaupten, dass "T" in (20) durch ein T-predicate für L ersetzt wird, dass dann die resultierenden Instanzen des Schemas notwendig und a priori wären:
(20) Wenn "S" in L bedeutet dass p, dann ist "S" T iff p.
Soames: dies ist es aber, was erforderlich ist um (17) und (18) zu behaupten!
PutnamVsTarski/Soames: hat den Kontrast (17/17 Tarski) gebraucht.
DummettVsTarski/Soames: hat den Kontrast (18/18 Tarski) gebraucht.
Putnam/Dummett/Soames: beide zeigen, dass Tarski’s T-Def nichts mit Verstehen oder semantischer Interpretation zu tun hat.
Davidson/Soames: versteht man am besten so, dass er nicht versucht, Bedeutung in Begriffen von Wahrheit zu analysieren, sondern den Begriff der Bedeutung zugunsten des der Wahrheit zu eliminieren. Dann würde der Verteidiger des Davidson von „Truth and Meaning“ folgendes statt (i) haben:
(i) Wenn x weiß, dass das, was durch die relevante Instanz von „S“ ausgedrückt wird, wahr in L ist iff p, für jeden Satz von L, dann ist x ein kompetenter Sprecher von L.
Soames/Problem: wenn nun "wahr in L" verstanden wird als Abkürzung für das Definiens das von Tarski geliefert wird, dann ist (i) so absurd wie (18Tarski).
SoamesVsCarnap: genau diese Art von Absurdität liegt im folgenden, (was Tarskis Definiens erlauben würde, der zentrale Begriff in einer Bedeutungstheorie (BT) zu sein):
(T) S ist T iff p.
Carnap/Soames: das kommt bei Carnap in Meaning and Necessity S. 5/6 und Abschnitt 7 seiner Introduction to Semantics vor).
meaning theory/M.th./Soames: darf nicht an weitere semantische Begriffe appellieren.
T-predicate/Soames: der Begriff der Wahrheit spielt keine vorgebliche (ostensible) Rolle in unserem ursprünglichen Problem. Die Verfeinerung des Problems führt zu der Sichtweise, dass eine adäquate m.th. ein Prädikat charakterisieren müsste, das gewisse Bedingungen erfüllt.
Soames: es war eine Entdeckung, dass es genau auf die wahren Sätze zutrifft. ((s) Das alle wahren Sätze gemeinsam haben).

Soam I
S. Soames
Understanding Truth Oxford 1999

Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Church, A. Sellars Vs Church, A.
 
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Putnam I 66
Description/PutnamVsSellars: nor does the analysis of the description help Sellars: (1) "wheel" describes a wheel in English.
Putnam: that means that "wheel" plays in English the role that "Rad" has in German.
ChurchVsTarski: (1) is not statement on the German word "Rad".
SellarsVsChurch: introduces a special means: the "point mention" (as Frege's "oblique sense"):
A word in point mention denotes its own linguistic role:
"Rad" and "wheel" are then both names for a certain role, namely the same!
Important: wheel is not synonymous to a description of this role: it is rather a name of that role! That concludes:
(2) "wheel" has in English the role "Rad".
Then the extension of described is a class of ordered pairs (word/role), not (word/thing). (> Description). Sellars: no relation word world but word role.
I 66/67
Description/Sellars: this is not a big restriction for him as nominalist as "roles" are not abstract entities for him. PutnamVsSellars: but this does not cast a particular light on the problem of reference.

Sell I
W. Sellars
Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu II
H. Putnam
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Pu III
H. Putnam
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Pu IV
H. Putnam
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990
Correspondence Theory Davidson Vs Correspondence Theory
 
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I 96
So we get rid of the correspondence theory of truth at the same time. It is the belief in it, which gives rise to relativistic thought. Representations are relative to a scheme. E.g. Something can be a map of Mexico, but only in relation to the Mercator projection, or just a different projection.
Horwich I 443
Truth/Truth theory/tr.th./DavidsonVsCorrespondence theory: a truth theory presents no entities that could be compared with sentences. (A Coherence Theory of Thruth and Knowledge.): Thesis: "correspondence without confrontation."
Davidson/Rorty: this is in line with his rejection of the "dualism of scheme and content". (= Thesis, that something like "mind" or "language" had a relation like "fit" or "organize" to the world).
Rorty: such theories are a remnant of pragmatism.
Pragmatism/Davidson/Rorty: because of the strong connection between Dewey Quine Davidson one can assume that Davidson is part of the tradition of American pragmatism.
Nevertheless, Davidson explicitly denied that his break with empiricism made him a pragmatist.
Def Pragmatism/Davidson/Rorty: Davidson thinks that pragmatism identifies truth with assertibility. Then DavidsonVsPragmatism.
Truth/Davidson: should not be identified with anything.
Truthmaker/Make true/DavidsonVsTruth makers: do not exist.

Correspondence/Fulfillment/Tarski/truth theory/Davidson/Rorty: the correspondence that should be described in terms of "true of" and is supposedly revealed by "philosophical analysis" in a truth theory is not what is covered by Tarski’s fulfillment relation.
The relation between words and objects, which is covered by fulfillment is irrelevant for this philosophical truth. ((s) of "Correspondence").
"true"/Explanation/Rorty: "true" does not provide material for analysis.
Truth/Davidson: is nice and transparent as opposed to belief and coherence. Therefore, I take it as a basic concept.
I 454
Truth/DavidsonVsTarski/Rorty: can therefore not be defined in terms of fulfillment or something else. We can only say that the truth of a statement depends on the meaning of the words and the arrangement of the world. DavidsonVsCorrespondence Theory/Rorty: with that we get rid of them.
Intermediate/Intermediary/Davidson/Rorty: ("tertium", "Tertia") E.g. "perspective", E.g. conceptual scheme, E.g. "point of view", E.g. language, E.g. cultural tradition.
We do not need to worry about these things anymore if we drop correspondence (VsCorrespondence theory).
DavidsonVsSkepticism: is triggered just by the assumption of such "tertia".
"Less is more": we no longer need to worry about the details of the correspondence relation.
Correspondence/Davidson/Rorty: we can regard it as trivial, without the need for an analysis. It has been reduced to a "stylistic variant" of "true".
DavidsonVsSkepticism/Rorty: arises because of these intentionalist concepts that build imaginary barriers between you and the world.
RortyVsDavidson: has still not shown how coherence yields correspondence. He has not really refuted the skeptics, but rather keeps them from the question.

Quine II 56
DavidsonVsCorrespondence Theory: the conception of the fact coincidence which corresponds to the whole of the experience adds nothing relevant to the simple concept of being true. No thing makes sentences and theories true, not experience, not surface irritation, not the world. (> make true).

D I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D III
D. Davidson
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

D IV
D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q II
W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Q III
W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Q IX
W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Q V
W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Q VI
W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Q VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Q VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Q X
W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003
Davidson, D. Brandom Vs Davidson, D.
 
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I 268
Objectivity/error: it is claimed that social practices suffice to impart objective representational content on allegations! These are then objective truth conditions. Even the entire community may be wrong with such an assessment! Universal error only possible with standards, not with concepts). (BrandomVsDavidson).
I 931
Davidson: wants to derive all action from reasons. Therefore, irrational acts constitute a problem for him.
I 932
 BrandomVsDavidson: he confuses a global condition of intentions with a local one, because he makes no distinction between determination and authorization.
I 383
VsDavidson: it may be that only the score keeper (not the actor) can demonstrate the practical justification. Even in such cases, the reasons would not act as causes. I 383 In addition, you can act on the grounds that you have or not. Davidson: intentions are comprehensive judgments in the light of all beliefs and desires.
I 954
BrandomVsDavidson: unsatisfactory because desires and beliefs are treated as unanalyzed basic concepts. He did not explain the practices according to which those contents can be transferred. BrandomVsDavidson: Davidson does not distinguish between interpretations between languages ​​and within a language. The interpretation at Davidson requires explanatory hypotheses and inferences from sounds which are emanated by another person. This was rightly countered with the argument that if you speak a common language, you do not hear sounds but meanings! This is about the necessary subcompetencies.
I 692
Objectivity of conceptual standards: not only can we all individually (each of us) be wrong about it, but also all together! (electron, mass in the universe). Error about proper use. > BrandomVsDavidson: collectively false beliefs possible.
I 957
Davidson: even if the powder had been wet, she would have managed to bend her finger. So there is something in every action that the actor intended and that he succeeded in doing.
I 958
BrandomVsDavidson: our approach does not require such a theoretical definition. Citing RDRD is enough to solve the problem with the nervous mountain climbers (Davidson). This is a concrete alternative to Davidsons’ proposal of the "causation in the right way."
I 729
Brandom: it does not matter whether the usually reliable ability fails in individual cases. If I spill the wine while reaching for the bread, there does not need to be anything that I intended to do and also succeeded in doing, according to our approach.
I 747
Problem: the substitution in the field of "that" does not receive the truth value of the whole attribution. Solution: the sentence tokening in this field does not belong to the actual attribution!  Davidson: reference and truth value changed with attribution.
I 961
BrandomVsDavidson: he does not consider the possibility of considering the relationship between "that" and the following sentence tokening as an anaphoric one instead of a demonstrative one.
II 48
BrandomVsDavidson: establishing prior request! Action/BrandomVsDavidson: we started elsewhere. Three distinctions: II 126 Acting intentionally: recognition of a practical definition b. Acting with reasons: be entitled to a definition. c. Acting for reasons: here, reasons are causes in cases where the recognition of a definition is triggered by suitable reflection.

NS I 166
Referenz/Brandom: ist bei ihm kein fundamentaler Begriff. Er muss sie aber erklären, weil sie dennoch ein zentraler Begriff ist. Lösung/Brandom: Bildung von Äquivalenzklassen von Sätzen, deren Position im Netz von Inferenzen erhalten bleibt, wenn Terme durch koreferentielle Terme ausgetauscht werden.
Wahrheit/BrandomVsTarski/BrandomVsDavidson: er muss ihre Definition so umbiegen, dass statt dass die Wahrheit den Folgerungsbegriff („von wahren Prämissen zu wahren Konklusionen“) charakterisiert, umgekehrt der Begriff der Folgerung den der Wahrheit charakterisiert. Dazu betrachtet Brandom die Stellung von Sätzen, die mit „es ist wahr dass,..“ beginnen, in unserem folgerungsvernetzten Sprachspiel betrachtet.

Bra I
R. Brandom
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001
Davidson, D. Dummett Vs Davidson, D.
 
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Dummett I ~28
DavidsonVsTarski: ... one must have a previous understanding of the concept of truth. - But not of the conditions! Because this knowledge will be determined by the theory of truth!. Dummett: What has to be introduced, however, is the realization of the conceptual link between meaning and truth.
DummettVsDavidson: In Davidson much remains implicit, E.g. this same context, which is required of every speaker. Without the exact nature of this relation the description of the T-Theory is still not a sufficient explanation of the concept of meaning. Correspondence Th./Coherence Th.: meaning before truth - Davidson: truth before meaning (truth conditions defined later by theory) - Dummett both together!.
I 142
Since the vocabulary changes and can be used differently, Davidson no longer assumes the language of a particular individual to be the starting unit, but the disposition for language usage. DummettVsQuine, VsDavidson: not idiolect, but common language prevailing.
I 146
Davidson def idiolect (refined): Language, date, speaker, certain listener. If there was a language that was only spoken by one personn, we could still all learn it. DummettVsDavidson: but in this case remains unresolved: the relation between truth and meaning, more precisely, between truth conditions and use.
Dummett: every participant in the conversation has his own theory of what the words mean. And these theories coincide, or nearly so.
I 187
DummettVsDavidson, DummettVsQuine: It is not permissible to assume that meaning and understanding depend on the private and non-communicable knowledge of a theory. It is not natural to understand precisely the idiolect primarily as a tool of communication. It is then more likely trying to see an internal state of the person concerned as that which gives the expressions of idiolect their respective meanings.
I 149
E.g. What a chess move means is not derived from the knowledge of the rules by the players, but from the rules themselves. DummettVsDavidson: If the philosophy of language is described as actually a philosophy of action, not much is gained, there is nothing language-specific in the actions.

Avramides I 8
DummettVsDavidson: not truth conditions, but verification conditions. The theory of meaning must explain what someone knows who understands one language. (This is a practical ability).
I 9
This ability must be able to manifest itself, namely through the use of expressions of that language. DummettVsDavidson/Avramides: a realistically interpreted theory of truth cannot have a concept of meaning.
I 87
Dummett: talks about translating a class of sentences that contain a questionable word. DavidsonVsDummett: This class automatically expands to an entire language! (Holism). (s) So to speak this "class of relevant sentences" does not exist.
DavidsonVsDummett/Avramides: Davidson still believes that you need a body of connected sentences, he only differs with Dummett on how to identify it. There may be sentences that do not contain the word in question, but still shed light on it. It may also be important to know in what situations the word is uttered.
Solution: "Translation without end".
EMD II 108
Truth Theory/M.Th./Dummett: There is certainly a wide field in non-classical logic for which is possible to construct a m.th that supplies trivial W sets. DummettVsDavidson: whenever this can be done, the situation is exactly reversed as required for Davidson’s m.th. A trivial axiom for any expression does not itself show the understanding, but pushes the whole task of explaining to the theory of meaning, which explains what it means to grasp the proposition expressed by the axiom.

Putnam I 148
Truth/Dummett: Neither Tarski’s theory of truth nor Davidson’s theory of meaning (assuming a spirit-independent world) have any relevance for the truth or falsity of these metaphysical views:. DummettVsDavidson: one has to wonder what this "knowing the theory of truth" as such consists in.
Some (naturalistic) PhilosophersVsDummett: the mind thinks up the statements consciously or unconsciously.
VsVs: but how does he think them, in words? Or in thought signs? Or is the mind to grasp directly without representations what it means that snow is white?.

Du I
M. Dummett
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Du III
M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982

Avr I
A. Avramides
Meaning and Mind Boston 1989

EMD II
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977

Ev I
G. Evans
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990
Deflationism Brandom Vs Deflationism
 
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I 467
Deflationism is in danger to undermine itself. fact. Snow is white
No fact: no fact is claimed when we say "It is true, that snow is white".

NS I 163
Wahrheit/Bedeutung/BrandomVsDavidson: die Zurückführung von Bedeutung auf Wahrheit könnte nur mit einem stärkeren Wahrheits-Begriff gelingen, der nicht zur Verfügung steht. (BrandomVsDeflationismus, BrandomVsTarski). Folgerungsbeziehungen/Brandom: drei Arten von Folgerungen, die die Bedeutung erhellen:
1. solche, die zu weiteren Überzeugungen verpflichten (Bsp deduktive Schlüsse).
2. ...erlauben (induktive und deduktive)
3. ...ausschließen.

Bra I
R. Brandom
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001
Deflationism Davidson Vs Deflationism
 
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Horwich I 457
Reduction/Reductionism/Rorty: all authors who try to strike a balance between reductionism and anti-reductionism like Davidson are constantly attacked by both sides. Davidson: One must distinguish: standards are one thing and descriptions are another. This assumes the following form:
I 457/458
Truth/DavidsonVsDeflationism/Rorty: we get to know infinitely more about what truth is if we say that we now know more than tomorrow, than we learn from Tarski’s disquotation scheme. Rorty: this parallel between Dewey and Davidson is exacerbated by the NI of Leeds:
Naturalistic instrumentalism/NI/Leeds/Rorty: (see above): the combination of the view similar to Quine that the only objective relative to which our methods can be rational, is the objective of predicting observations - with the assertion that the world literally consists of the entities of current science. The NI has to do with:
Semantics/Explanation/Prediction/Theory/Leeds/Arthur Fine/Rorty: you cannot use semantics to explain the success of predictions. That would be circular. The circle comes from attempt to be simultaneously inside and outside of our investigations. That leads to:
Action theory/Davidson/Rorty: you do not need to choose between these two descriptions (external/internal), we just have to distinguish them consistently.

Rorty VI 32
Def Deflationism/Rorty: the view that Tarski’s work encompasses all essential characteristics of the truth. DavidsonVsTarski/Rorty: Tarski’s "true in L" is the extension and thus no indication of future or general cases!

D I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D IV
D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Field, H. Tarski Vs Field, H.
 
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Tarski II 142
T-Theory/TarskiVsField: seine Variante ist dagegen rein axiomatisch. FieldVsTarski/FefermanVsTarski: Ansatz mit Schemabuchstaben statt reinen Axiomen: Vorteile:
1. wir haben denselben Vorteil wie Feferman für die schematische disquotation und schematische meta language: Erweiterungen der Sprache werden automatisch berücksichtigt.
2. der Gebrauch von ""p" ist wahr iff p" (jetzt als Schema-Formel als Teil der Sprache statt als Axiom) scheint den Begriff der Wahrheit besser zu fassen.
3. (am wichtigsten) ist nicht abhängig von einem kompositionalen Zugang des Funktionierens der anderen Teile der Sprache. Zwar ist das wichtig, aber es wird von meinem Ansatz auch nicht ausgelassen.
FieldVsTarski: eine axiomatische Theorie ist für Glaubenssätze schwer zu bekommen.

Horwich I 484
TarskiVsField/Soames: dass Tarski’s semantische Eigenschaften nicht von Tatsachen über Sprecher abhängig sind, dadurch geht nichts verloren. Man sollte die Semantik abstrakt angehen und der Pragmatik die Interpretation des Sprecherverhaltens überlassen. Vorteil: so erhält man ein T-predicate für metatheoretische Diskussion, und behält die Möglichkeit philosophische Fragen in anderen Bereichen zu stellen.

Tarsk I
A. Tarski
Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923-38 Indianapolis 1983

Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Field, H. Leeds Vs Field, H.
 
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Field II 304
Indeterminacy/Set Theory/ST/Leeds/Field: e.g. somebody considers the term "set" to be undetermined, so he could say instead: The term can be made "as large as possible". (Leeds 1997,24) (s) "everything that is included in the term"). As such the term can have a wider or narrower definition. Cardinality of the continuum/Indeterminacy/Field: This indeterminacy should at least contain the term set membership.
LeedsVsField: It is not coherent to accept set theory and to qualify its terms as indetermined at the same time. And it is not coherent to then apply classical logic in set theory.
Field: It could also look like this: the philosophical comments should be separated from mathematics. But we do not need to separate theory from practice, e.g. if the belief in indeterminacy is expressed in whether the degree of the mathematician's belief in the continuum hypothesis and his "doubt degree" adds up to 1 ((s) So that there is no space left for a third possibility).
Problem: A mathematician for whom it adds up to 1 could ask himself "Is the continuum hypothesis correct?" and would look for mathematical proof. A second mathematician, however, whose degree of certainty adds up to 0 ((s) since he believes in neither the continuum hypothesis nor its negation) will find it erroneous to look for proof. Each possibility deserves to be analyzed.
The idea behind indeterminacy however is that only little needs to be defined beyond the accepted axioms. ((s) no facts.)
Continuum Hypothesis/Field: Practical considerations may prefer a concept over one another in a particular context and a different one in another context.
Solution/Field: This is not a problem as long as those contexts are hold separate. But is has been shown that its usefulness is independent from the truth.
II 305
Williamsons/Riddle/Indeterminacy/Leeds/Field: (LeedsVsField): (e.g. it must be determined whether Joe is rich or not): Solution/Leeds: i) we exclude the terms in question, e.g. rich (in this example) from the markup language which we accept as "first class"
and
ii) the primary (disquotional) use of "referred" or "is true of" is only used for this markup language.
Indeterminacy/Leeds: Is because there is no uniform best way to apply the disquotional scheme in order to translate into the markup language.
Field: This is genius: To reduce all indeterminacy on the indeterminacy of the translation.
FieldVsLeeds: I doubt that a meaning can be found.
Problem: To differentiate between undetermined termini and those which are only different regarding the extension of the markup language. Especially if we have a number of translations which all have different extensions in our markup language.
Solution/Disquotationalism: It would integrate the foreign terms in its own language. We would then be allowed to cite.(Quine, 1953 b, 135. see above chap. IV II 129-30).
Problem: If we integrate "/" and "", the solution which we obtained above may disappear.
FieldVsLeeds: I fear that our objective - to exclude the indeterminacy in our own language- will not be reached.It even seems to be impossible for our scientific terms!
e.g. the root –1/√-1/Brandom/Field: The indeterminacy is still there; We can simply use the "first class" markup language to say that -1 has two roots without introducing a name like "i" which shall stand for "one of the two".
FieldVsLeeds: We can accept set theory without accepting its language as "first class". ((s) But the objective was to eliminate terms of set theory from the first class markup language and to limit "true of" and "refer" to the markup language.)
Field: We are even able to do this if we accept Platonism (FieldVsPlatonism) :
II 306
e.g. we take a fundamental theory T which has no vocabulary of set theory and only says that there is an infinite number of non-physical eternally existing objects and postulates the consistency of fundamental set theory. Consistency is then the basic term which is regulated by its own axioms and not defined by terms of set theory. (Field 1991). We then translate the language of set theory in T by accepting "set" as true of certain or all non-physical eternally existing objects and interpret "element of" in such a way that the normal axioms remain true.
Then there are different ways to do this and they render different sentences true regarding the cardinality of the continuum. Then the continuum hypothesis has no particular truth value. (C.H. without truth value).
Problem: If we apply mathematical applications to non-mathemtical fields, we do not only need consistency in mathematics but in other fields as well. And we should then assume that the corresponding theories outside mathematics can have a Platonic reformulation.
1. This would be possible if they are substituted by a nominal (!) theory.
2. The Platonic theorie could be substituted by the demand that all nominal consequences of T-plus-set theory are true.
FieldVs: The latter looks like a cheap trick, but the selected set theory does not need to be the one deciding the cardinality of the continuum.
The selected set theory for a physical or psychological theory need not to be compatible with the set theory of another domain. This shows that the truth of the ML is not accepted in a parent frame of reference. It's all about instrumental usefulness.
FieldVsLeeds: We cannot exclude indeterminacy - which surpasses vagueness- in our own language even if we concede its solution. But we do not even need to do this; I believe my solution is better.

Horwich I 378
Truth/T-Theory/T-concept/Leeds: We now need to differentiate between a) Truth Theory (T-Theory) ((s) in the object language) and
b) theories on the definition of truth ((s) metalinguistic, ML) .
Field: (1972): Thesis: We need a SI theory of truth and reference (that a Standard Interpretation is always available), and this truth is also obtainable.
(LeedsVsStandard Interpretation/VsSI//LeedsVsField).
Field/Leeds: His argument is based on an analogy between truth and (chemical)valence. (..+....)
Field: Thesis: If it would have looked as if the analogy cannot be reduced, it would have been a reason to abandon the theory of valences, despite the theory's usefulness!
Truth/Field: Thesis: (analogous to valence ): Despite all we know about the extension of the term, the term also needs a physicalistic acceptable form of reduction!
Leeds: What Field would call a physicalistic acceptable reduction is what we would call the SI theory of truth: There always is a Standard Interpretation for "true" in a language.
Field/Leeds: Field suggests that it is possible to discover the above-mentioned in the end.
LeedsVsField: Let us take a closer look at the analogy: Question: Would a mere list of elements and numbers (instead of valences) not be acceptable?
I 379
This would not be a reduction since the chemists have formulated the law of valences. Physikalism/Natural law/Leeds: Does not demand that all terms can be easily or naturally explained but that the fundamental laws are formulated in a simple way.
Reduction/Leeds: Only because the word "valence" appears in a strict law there are strict limitations imposed on the reduction.
Truth/Tarski/LeedsVsTarski: Tarski's Definitions of T and R do not tell us all the story behind reference and truth in English.
Reference/Truth/Leeds: These relations have a naturalness and importance that cannot be captured in a mere list.
Field/Reduction/Leeds: If we want a reduction à la Field, we must find an analogy to the law of valences in the case of truth, i.e. we need to find a law or a regularity of truth in English.
Analogy/Field: (and numerous others) See in the utility of the truth definition an analogy to the law.
LeedsVsField: However, the utility can be fully explained without a SI theory. It is not astonishing that we have use for a predicate P with the characteristic that"’__’ is P" and "__"are always interchangeable. ((s)>Redundancy theory).
And this is because we often would like to express every sentence in a certain infinite set z (e.g. when all elements have the form in common.) ((s) "All sentences of the form "a = a" are true"), > Generalization.
Generalization/T-Predicate/Leeds: Logical form: (x)(x e z > P(x)).
Semantic ascent/Descent/Leeds: On the other hand truth is then a convenient term, same as infinite conjunction and disjunction.
I 386
Important argument: In theory then, the term of truth would not be necessary! I believe it is possible that a language with infinite conjunctions and disjunctions can be learned. Namely, if conjunctions and disjunctions if they are treated as such in inferences. They could be finally be noted.
I 380
Truth/Leeds: It is useful for what Quine calls "disquotation" but it is still not a theory of truth (T-Theory). Use/Explanation/T-Theory/Leeds: In order to explain the usefulness of the T-term, we do not need to say anything about the relations between language and the world. Reference is then not important.
Solution/Leeds: We have here no T-Theory but a theory of the term of truth, e.g. a theory why the term is seen as useful in every language. This statement appears to be based solely on the formal characteristics of our language. And that is quite independent of any relations of "figure" or reference to the world.

Reference/Truth/Truth term/Leeds: it shows how little the usefulness of the truth term is dependent on a efficient reference relation!
The usefulness of a truth term is independent of English "depicts the world".
I 381
We can verify it: Suppose we have a large fragment of our language, for which we accept instrumentalism, namely that some words do not refer. This is true for sociology, psychology, ethics, etc. Then we will find semantic ascent useful if we are speaking about psychology for example. E.g. "Some of Freud's theories are true, others false" (instead of using "superego"!) Standard Interpretation/Leeds: And this should shake our belief that T is natural or a standard.
Tarski/Leeds: This in turn should not be an obstacle for us to define "T" à la Tarski. And then it is reasonable to assume that "x is true in English iff T (x)" is analytic.
LeedsVsSI: We have then two possibilities to manage without a SI:
a) we can express facts about truth in English referring to the T-definition (if the word "true" is used) or
b) referring to the disquotional role of the T-term. And this, if the explanandum comprises the word "true" in quotation marks (in obliqua, (s) mentioned).

Acquaintance/Russell/M. Williams: Meant a direct mental understanding, not a causal relation!
This is an elder form of the correspondence theory.
I 491
He was referring to RussellVsSkepticism: A foundation of knowledge and meaning FieldVsRussell/M. WilliamsVsRussell: das ist genau das Antackern des Begriffsschemas von außen an die Welt.
Field/M. Williams: His project, in comparison, is more metaphysical than epistemic. He wants a comprehensive physicalistic overview. He needs to show how semantic characteristics fit in a physical world.
If Field were right, we would have a reason to follow a strong correspondence theory, but without dubious epistemic projects which are normally linked to it.
LeedsVsField/M. Williams: But his argument is not successful. It does not give an answer to the question VsDeflationism. Suppose truth cannot be explained in a physicalitic way, then it contradicts the demand that there is an unmistakable causal order.
Solution: Truth cannot explain (see above) because we would again deal with epistemology (theory of knowledge).(>justification, acceptancy).

Fie I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Fie II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Fie III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Field, H. Soames Vs Field, H.
 
Books on Amazon
Horwich I 467
W Theorie/Wahrheitstheorie/WT/Tarski/Soames: zwei Status: a) als mathematische Theorie mit vielen reichen Resultaten
b) philosophisch signifikant für den Begriff der Wahrheit.
WT/Soames: es gibt Streit drüber, was eine WT sein sollte, allgemein sollte sie eins der folgenden drei Dinge tun:
(i) die Bedeutung des T-predicate für natürliche Sprachen geben.
(ii) diese W Prädikate reduktionistisch ersetzen
(iii) einen schon vorher verstandenen T-concept zur Erklärung von Bedeutung oder für andere metaphysische Zwecke gebrauchen.
Proposition/Soames: für folgende Zwecke braucht man eher Propositionen als Sätze oder Äußerungen: Bsp
(1) a. die Proposition, dass die Erde sich bewegt, ist wahr.
b. Churchs Theorem ist wahr
c. Alles was er sagte, ist wahr.
I 468
SoamesVsPropositionen. T-predicate/Verallgemeinerung/Quine/Soames: Bsp zur Charakterisierung des Realismus:
(5) Es gibt einen Doppelgänger der Sonne in einer entfernten Raumregion, aber wir werden niemals hinreichende Belege dafür finden, dass es ihn gibt.
Soames: natürlich kann man Realist sein, ohne (5) zu glauben. ((s) (5) ist zu speziell, es ist nur ein Beispiel).
Anti Realismus/Soames: was unterschiedet ihn dann vom Realismus? Man ist versucht zu sagen:
(6) Entweder gibt es einen Doppelgänger unserer Sonne.... oder keinen.... und wir werden jeweils keine Belege....
I 470
SoamesVs: das führt zu einer unendlichen Liste, die wir vermeiden sollten. Lösung: semantischer Aufstieg:
(7) Es gibt wenigstens einen Satz S, so dass S wahr ist (auf Deutsch) aber wir werden niemals (hinreichende) Belege für S finden.
I 472
W Def/Field: besteht aus zwei Teilen: 1. "primitive Denotation": Bsp (s) „Cäsar“ bezieht sich auf Cäsar.
2. die T-Def in Begriffen primitiver Denotation.
Das Resultat ist ein Satz der Metasprache:
(8) Für alle Sätze S von L, S ist wahr gdw. T(S).
FieldVsTarski/Soames: (Field: „Tarskis W Theorie“ (diese Zeitschrift, I XIX, 1972): diese Annahme (dass Wahrheit, Zutreffen und Referenz bei Tarski physikalistisch akzeptabel seien) ist falsch!
Field: die vorgeschlagenen Ersetzungen für die Begriffe der primitiven Denotation sind nicht physikalistisch akzeptable Reduktionen
I 474
unserer vortheoretischen Begriffe der Referenz und des Zutreffens. Soames: das gilt nur unter der Voraussetzung, dass Field annimmt, dass Tarski Wahrheit auf primitive Denotation reduziert hat.
T-Def/Korrektheit/Tarski/Field/Soames: Field bestreitet nicht, dass die T-Def extensional korrekt ist.
FieldVsTarski: aber extensionale Korrektheit ist nicht hinreichend.
"Cb" sei ein Satz und die semantische n Tatsachen über ihn sind in (9) gegeben:
(9) a. "b" referiert (in L) auf Boston
b. "C" trifft (in L) auf Städte (und nur Städte) zu
c. "Cb" ist wahr (in L) gdw. Boston eine Stadt ist. (Sprecher abhängig)
Problem: man kann jetzt nicht einfach die Tatsachen aus (10) mit den Tatsachen aus (9) identifizieren.
semantische Eigenschaft/Field: haben Ausdrücke einer Sprache nur Kraft der Weise, wie sie durch Sprecher gebraucht werden (Sprachgebrauch).
Problem: die Tatsachen aus (9) hätten gar nicht bestanden, wenn das Sprachverhalten (im weitesten Sinn) anders gewesen wäre!
Pointe: die Tatsachen aus (10) sind nicht sprecher abhängig. Daher sind sie keine semantischen Tatsachen. Daher kann Tarski sie nicht auf physikalistische Tatsachen reduzieren.
T-predicate/FieldVsTarski: es ist sowohl physikalistisch als auch koextensiv mit "wahr in L", aber es ist dennoch kein physikalistischer T-concept.
Problem: die Inadäquatheit erbt die Charakterisierung der Wahrheit aus den Pseudo Reduktionen die die "base clauses" (s) rekursiven Definitionen?) ((s) u.a. für und, oder usw. (base clauses) konstituieren.
I 475
Lösung/Field: wir müssen echte Reduktionen für die Begriffe der primitiven Denotation finden oder etwas wie ein Modell der Kausaltheorie der Referenz. Field/Soames: das sind wieder zwei Stadien:
1. Tarskis Reduktion von Wahrheit auf primitive Denotation ((s) wie oben)
2. eine vorgestellte, Kausaltheorie artige Reduktion der Begriffe der Referenz von Namen und des Zutreffens von Prädikaten.
Sprachunabhängigkeit/Field/Soames: wenn die physikalischen Tatsachen die die Denotation in einer Sprache bestimmen, dies für alle Sprachen tun, dann gilt die Denotation für alle Sprachen. Wenn logische Konstanten und Syntax konstant gehalten werden, erhalten wir einen W Begriff der sprachunabhängig
Problem: 1. Referenz auf abstrakte Objekte ((s) für diese gibt es keine semantischen Tatsachen).
2. ontologische Relativität und Unterbestimmtheit der Referenz.
SoamesVsField: dieser hat seine Kritik an Tarski (FieldVsTarski) sogar noch untertrieben!
Tarski/Soames: denn wenn Tarski primitive Denotation nicht auf physikalische Tatsachen reduziert hat, dann hat er auch Wahrheit gar nicht auf primitive Denotation reduziert ((s) also Punkt 1 verfehlt).
Bsp zwei Sprachen L1 und L2 die identisch sind außer:
L1: hier trifft „R“ auf runde Dinge zu
L2: hier auf rote Dinge.
truth cond.: sind dann für einige Sätze in beiden Sprachen verschieden:
(11) a. "Re" ist wahr in L1 gdw. die Erde rund ist
b. "Re" ist wahr in L2 gdw. die Erde rot ist.
Tarski/Soames: in seiner W Def wird dieser Unterschied in die Instanzen (base clauses) der beiden T-Def für die einzelnen Sprachen zurückverfolgbar sein. denn hier werden die Anwendungen der Prädikate in einer Liste dargestellt.
FieldVsTarski: seine T-Def teilt korrekt mit (reports), dass "R" auf verschiedene Dinge zutrifft in den zwei Sprachen, aber sie erklärt nicht, wie der Unterschied aus dem Sprachgebrauch durch Sprecher zustanden kommt.
SoamesVsField/SoamesVsTarski: Field sagt aber nicht, dass derselbe Vorwurf VsTarski gemacht werden kann
I 476
in Bezug auf logisches Vokabular und Syntax im rekursiven Teil seiner Definition. Bsp L1: könnte [(A v B)] als wahr behandeln, wenn A oder wenn B wahr ist,
L2: ...wenn A und B wahr sind.
FieldVsTarski: dann ist es nicht hinreichend für die Charakterisierung von Wahrheit, bloß "mitzuteilen" dass die truth conditions verschieden sind. Sie müsste durch das Sprachverhalten in den zwei verschiedenen Sprachen ((s) > Sprecherbedeutung) erklärt werden.
FieldVsTarski: weil dieser nichts über Sprachverhalten (Sprecherbedeutung in einer Gemeinschaft) sagt, erfüllt er nicht die Forderungen des Physikalismus ((s) physikalische Tatsachen des Verhaltens) zu erklären.
Soames: das bedeutet, dass Fields Strategie, eine echte Reduktion von Wahrheit zu erhalten, indem man Tarski mit nichttrivialen Definitionen primitiver Denotation ergänzt, nicht funktionieren kann. Denn Tarski hat nach Field Wahrheit nicht auf primitive Denotation reduziert. Er hat sie bestenfalls auf Listen reduziert von semantischen Grundbegriffen:
(13) der Begriff eines Namens, der auf ein Objekt referiert
der Begriff eines Prädikats, das auf ein Objekt zutrifft
der Begriff einer Formel, die die Anwendung eines n stelligen Prädikats auf ein n Tupel von Terme ist
...
I 477
Soames: das erfordert aber eine Reformulierung jeder Bedingung (clause) in Tarskis rekursiver Definition. Bsp alt: 14 a, neu: 14.b: (14) a. wenn A = [~B] , dann ist A wahr in L (im Hinblich auf eine Sequenz s) gdw. B nicht wahr ist in L (im Hinblick auf s).
b. Wenn A eine Negation einer Formel B ist, dann ist A ....
Soames: die resultierende Abstraktion dehnt die Allgemeinheit der W Def auf Klassen von Sprachen 1. Stufe aus. Diese Sprachen unterscheiden sich willkürlich in Syntax, plus logischem und nichtlogischem Vokabular.
SoamesVsField: Problem: diese Allgemeinheit hat ihren Preis.
Alt: die Originaldefinition stipulierte einfach, dass [~A) eine Negation ist ((s) >Symbol, Festlegung).
Neu: die neue Definition gibt keinen Hinweis darauf, welche Formeln in diese Kategorien fallen.
SoamesVsField: sein Physikalist muss nun jeden einzelnen der semantischen Begriffe reduzieren.
Logische Verknüpfung/Konstanten/logische Begriffe/Soames: wir können sie entweder
a) über Wahrheit definieren, oder
b) festlegen, dass bestimmte Symbole Instanzen dieser logischen Begriffe sein sollen.
SoamesVsField: ihm steht nun keiner dieser beiden Wege offen!
a) er kann nicht Negation als Symbol charakterisieren, dass einer Formel angehängt wird, um eine neue Formel zu bilden, die wahr ist, wenn die ursprüngliche Formel falsch wahr, weil das zirkulär wäre.
b) er kann nicht einfach Negation als Grundbegriff (primitiv) nehmen und festlegen, dass [~s] die Negation von s sei. Denn dann würde es keine Tatsachen über Sprecher geben, ((s) Sprachverhalten, physikalistisch), die die semantischen Eigenschaften von [~s] erklären.
Soames: es gibt Alternativen, aber keine ist überzeugend.
Truth functional operator/Quine: (Wurzeln d. Referenz) werden charakterisiert als Dispositionen in einer Gemeinschaft für semantischen Aufstieg und Abstieg.
Problem/Quine: Unbestimmtheit zwischen klassischen und intuitionistischen Konstruktionen der Verknüpfungen sind unvermeidlich.
SoamesVsField: Reduktion von primitiver Denotation auf physikalische Tatsachen ist schwierig genug.
I 478
sie wird noch viel schwieriger für logische Begriffe. SoamesVsField: das liegt daran, dass semantische Tatsachen auf physikalischen Tatsachen über Sprecher supervenieren müssen. ((s) >Sprecherbedeutung, Sprachverhalten).
Problem: das beschränkt adäquate Definitionen auf solche, die das Einsetzen für semantische Begriffe in Kontexten wie (15) und (16) legitimieren. ((s) (15) und (16) sind in Ordnung, die späteren nicht mehr).
(15) Wenn L Sprecher sich anders verhalten hätten hätte "b" (in L) nicht auf Boston und "C" nicht Städte refereiert und .....((s) Kontrafaktische Konditionale).
(16) Die Tatsache, dass L Sprecher sich so verhalten, wie sie sich verhalten, erklärt, warum „b“ (in L) auf Boston referiert usw.
((s) Beide Male Referenz)
Soames: FieldVsTarski ist überzeugt, dass es eine Möglichkeit gibt, (15) und (16) so zu
entziffern, dass sie wahr werden, wenn die semantischen Terme durch physikalistische ersetzt werden und die Anfangs Teilsätze (initial clauses) so konstruiert werden, dass sie kontingente
physikalische Möglichkeiten ausdrücken. Das ist nicht der Charakter von Tarski’s T-Def.
I 481
primitive Referenz/sprachunabhängig/SoamesVsField: Bsp ein Name n referiert auf ein Objekt o in einer Sprache L iff FL(n) = o. FL: ist dabei ein rein mathematisches Objekt: eine Menge von Paaren vielleicht. D.h. sie beinhaltet keine undefinierten semantischen Begriffe.
T-predicate/Wahrheit/Theorie/Soames: das resultierende T-predicate ist genau das, was wir brauchen, um die Natur, Struktur und Reichweite einer vielfältigen Zahl von Theorien metatheoretisch zu untersuchen.
T-Def/Sprache/Soames: was die T-Def uns nicht sagt, ist etwas über die Sprecher der Sprachen, auf die sie angewendet wird. Nach dieser Auffassung sind Sprachen abstrakte Objekte.
((s) Die ganze Zeit muss man hier zwischen Sprachunabhängigkeit und Sprecherunabhängigkeit unterscheiden).
Sprache/primitive Denotation/sprachunabhängig/Wahrheit/SoamesVsField: nach dieser Auffassung sind Sprachen abstrakte Objekte, d.h. sie können so aufgefasst werden, dass sie ihre semantischen Eigenschaften wesentlich haben ((s) nicht abhängig von Sprachverhalten oder Sprechern, (Sprecher Bedeutung), nicht physikalistisch. D.h. mit anderen Eigenschaften wäre es eine andere Sprache).
D.h. es hätte sich nicht herausstellen können, dass Ausdrücke einer Sprache etwas anderes denotiert haben könnten, als das was sie tatsächlich denotieren. Oder dass Sätze einer Sprache andere truth conditions hätten haben können.
I 483
SoamesVsField: auch dieser wird diese Aufteilung kaum vermeiden können. Indexwörter/Mehrdeutigkeit/Field: (:S. 351ff) Lösung: Äußerungen werden durch den Kontext eindeutig gemacht (contextually disambiguated). Semantische Begriffe: sollten auf eindeutige Entitäten angewendet werden.
D.h. alle Bedingungen (clauses) in einer T-Def müssen so formuliert werden, dass sie auf Tokens angewendet werden. Bsp
Negation/Field
(21) Ein Token von [~e] ist wahr (im Hinblick auf eine Sequenz) iff das Token von e das es beinhaltet, nicht wahr ist (im Hinblick auf diese Sequenz).
SoamesVsField: das funktioniert nicht. Denn Field kann keine W Def akzeptieren, in der irgendeine syntaktische Form einfach nur als Negation festgelegt ist . ((s) Symbol, stipuliert, dann unabhängig von physikalischen Tatsachen).
Soames: denn dies würde keine Tatsachen über Sprecher erklären, kraft derer negative Konstruktionen die semantischen Eigenschaften haben, die sie haben.
semantische Eigenschaft/(s): nicht etwa Negation selbst, sondern, dass die Negation eines bestimmten Ausdruckes, in einer Situation wahr ist oder zutrifft. Bsp "Cäsar" referiert auf Cäsar: wäre völlig unabhängig von Umständen, Sprechern, wenn auch nicht von der Sprache, letzteres betrifft aber eigentlich nur die Metasprache.
Lösung/Soames:
(22) Ein Token einer Formel A, die eine Negation einer Formel B ist, ist wahr (im Hinblick auf eine Sequenz) gdw. ein bezeichnetes (designated) Token von B nicht wahr ist (im Hinblick auf diese Sequenz).
"designated"/(s) : heißt hier: explizit mit einem truth value versehen.

Soam I
S. Soames
Understanding Truth Oxford 1999

Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Frege, G. Searle Vs Frege, G.
 
Books on Amazon:
John R. Searle
II 285
Index words/I/SearleVsFrege: what little Frege says about indexicality is wrong and incompatible with his theory. About "I", he says, this calls for a public and a private sense. "Yesterday" and "Today": if we want to express the same proposition today, we must use the word "yesterday". So he accepted apparently an de re theory of indexical propositions.
II 286
Frege does not notice the self-reference of these expressions. (Unlike morning star/evening star). The idea that expressions have a meaning that cannot be notified, is profoundly anti Frege!
Sense is open to the public. That is what the concept was introduced for.

II 301
The descriptive theory was directed against the three traditional views: VsMill, VsFrege, Vstraditionel Logic. 1. Mill: Names no connotation, but only denotation.
2. Frege: meaning of a name is recognized by individual with it associated identification.
3. logic textbooks: the meaning of the name "N" is simply "called N". (Regress).
Searle: No. 1 refuses to answer, No. 3 brings infinite regress..
II 303
Names/Frege/Searle: his theory is the most promising, I developed it further. There always must exist an intentional content in proper names. SearleVsFrege: Weak point: the semantic content must always be put into words.

II 228
Identity/fact/statement/Searle: the identity of the fact depends on the specific properties of the fact being the same as those that are called by the corresponding statement.
III 229
Facts/Searle: are not the same as true statements. (SearleVsFrege). 1. Facts have a causal function, true statements do not.
2. The relation of a fact to the statement is ambiguous, the same fact can be formulated by different statements.
Disquotation/Searle: the analysis of a fact as that e.g. this object is red, requires more than disquotation.

V 116
SearleVsFrege: wrong: that the word "that" initiates something that has to be considered as "Name of a proposition" (virtually all subordinate clauses). (SearleVsTarski too).
V 117
Regress/quotation marks/Searle: if "Socrates" is the name of Socrates, then I can only talk about it, that means the above-mentioned, when I put it again in quotation marks..: „“Socrates““. Then again I could only speak about this in quotation marks: "" "Socrates" "". - "Xxx" is not the name of a word! It is not a reference! The word refers to neither anything nor to itself.
E.g. an ornithologist, "the sound, the Californian jays produces is ....". What completed the sentence, would be a sound, not the proper name of the sound!

V 144
SearleVsFrege: failed to distinguish between the meaning of an indicative expression and the by it's statement transmitted proposition!
V 152
Predicate/SearleVsFrege: he tried to unite two philosophical positions that are fundamentally incompatible. He wants a) to extend the distinction between meaning and significance to predicates (predicates that have a meaning, an object) and simultaneously
b) explain the functional difference between pointing and predicative expressions.
Why does Frege represent position a). - That means why does he say, predicates have a meaning? Reason: his theory of arithmetic: the need for quantification of properties. (> Logic 2nd stage).

V 155
Concept/Frege: ascribe a property via the use of a grammatical predicate. SearleVsFrege: contradiction: once term = property (a) once feature of the attribution of a property (b).
Properties/SearleVsFrege: properties are not essential predication: you might as well point to them through singular nominal terms.
V 156
Solution/Searle: if you no longer insist that predicate expressions would have to be indicative, everything dissolves. Predicate expressions do not mean properties! They ascribe to a property!
V 172
Summary: 1. Frege: is right: there is a significant difference between the function of an indicative expression and a predicate expression.
V 173
2. VsFrege: his performance is inconsistent when he tries to show that a predicate expression is also indicative. 3. By letting go of this assertion Frege's representation of arithmetic (here he needs quantification of properties) is not questioned. The letting go of the claim is not a denial of universals.
4. There is at least an interpretation which exist according to universals.
5. There is no class of irreducible existence conditions.

V 256
Names/Descriptive support/Searle: E.g. Everest = Tschomolungma: the descriptive support of both names refers to the same object. Names/SearleVsFrege: mistake: that proper names are just as strong and clear as certain descriptions.
To be blamed is his famous example morning star/evening star.
They are not paradigms for proper names, they lie rather on the boundary between certain descriptions and names.

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983
Hilbert, D. Tarski Vs Hilbert, D.
 
Books on Amazon
Horwich I 127
Wahrheit/Philosophie/Mathematik/HilbertVsTarski: (einziger „philosophischer“ Einwand überhaupt, von einem Mathematiker!): die W Def hätte nichts mit dem „philosophischen Problem „ zu tun. Das sollte aber keine Kritik sein. Begriff/TarskiVsHilbert: ich habe nie verstanden, was das „Wesentliche“ an einem Begriff sein soll. ((s) >Frege: Begriffe haben Merkmale, die man als notwendig ansehen kann, da es sonst ein anderer Begriff ist, im Gegensatz zu Gegenständen, die sich auch als etwas anderes herausstellen können, aber immer noch der betrachtete Gegenstand sind.)
Wahrheit/Tarski: ich glaube, hier gibt es gar kein „philosophisches Problem“.

Tarsk I
A. Tarski
Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923-38 Indianapolis 1983
Inflationism Ramsey Vs Inflationism
 
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Horwich I XIII
Wahrheit/Tradition/Inflationism/Horwich: erkennt Tarskis Idee an, aber betrachtet sie als nicht hinreichend. Bsp PragmatismVsTarski: dieser erklärt nicht die Nützlichkeit von Wahrheit.
Inflationism/Horwich: verlangt, Wahrheit zusätzliche Eigenschaften zuzuschreiben: "X ist wahr iff X die Eigenschaft P hat". Damit soll man spezifizieren können was, Wahrheit ist. (z.B. Nützlichkeit).
RamseyVsInflationism: (> Redundancy theoryVsInflationism): (Kapitel 4, AyerVsInflationism, Kapitel 8 und 15, StrawsonVsInflationism Kapitel 13): Wahrheit braucht keine zusätzliche Spezifikation.

Rams I
F. P. Ramsey
The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays 2013
Juhos, B. Tarski Vs Juhos, B.
 
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Horwich I 139
Wahrheitsdefinition/JuhosVsTarski: (Juhos kennt die T-Def selbst gar nicht): behauptet bewiesen zu haben, dass eine solche Definition prinzipiell nicht zu geben sei.
I 123
TarskiVsJuhos: hält das Schema (T) irrtümlich für die Definition selbst. JuhosVsTarski: das ist unzulässig kurz und unvollständig. Statt dessen müsse man nehmen:
(T’) X ist wahr iff p ist wahr.
Oder
(T’ ‚ ) X ist wahr iff p ist der Fall (d.h. das, was p feststellt, ist der Fall).
I 124
"Genau dann wenn"/Äquivalenz/TarskiVsJuhos: Juhos sieht nicht, dass der Ausdruck "iff" ("dann und nur dann", "genau dann wenn") keine Relation zwischen Sätzen ausdrückt, denn es kombiniert keine Namen von Sätzen.
I 124
TarskiVsJuhos: verwechselt durchgehend Sätze mit Namen von Sätzen. Seine Schemata (T’) und (T’ ,) sind "unzulässig lang". Def "unzulässig lang"/TarskiVsJuhos: ist ein Ausdruck, wenn er (i) bedeutungslos ist, und (ii) aus bedeutungslosen Ausdrücken zusammengesetzt wurde, indem überflüssige Wörter eingefügt wurden.

Tarsk I
A. Tarski
Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923-38 Indianapolis 1983

Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Kripke, S. A. Antirealism Vs Kripke, S. A.
 
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Field I 249
Anti Realismus/A R/Metalogik/Field: kann der A R überhaupt etwas mit metalogischen Begriffen wie Konservativität und Konsistenz anfangen? Er möchte ja diese auch von einer mathematischen Theorie behaupten. Problem: Konsistenz ist normalerweise definiert als "ein Modell haben", Konservativität auch in modelltheoretischen Begriffen ((s) setzt ein Ontologie von Mengen voraus, die der A R ablehnt).
Pointe: wenn der A R diese Begriffe gebraucht, dann kann er nicht nicht leer zwischen Konsistenz und Inkonsistenz bzw. Konservativität und Nicht Konservativität unterscheiden, (s) weil alle Aussagen trivial falsch sind wegen trägerloser Begriffe).
Konservativität/Konsistenz/A R/Field: also darf der A R die beiden Begriffe nicht modelltheoretisch definieren. genauso wie:
Wahrheit/Anti RealismusVsTarski/Anti RealismusVsKripke: der A R sollte auch die Wahrheits Definition (W Def) der beiden ablehnen.

Fie I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Fie III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980
Metalanguage Prior Vs Metalanguage
 
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I 100
Metalanguage/Prior: must contain: a) a systematic method for naming sentences
b) a translation of every sentence of the given language.
Easiest method for b): the object language should be part of the metalanguage (?), then its sentences are their own translation!
Truth Definition/Tarski/Prior: general form:
x is true iff. p
"x": represents the name in the metalanguage.
"p": represents the translation.
Truth Definition/PriorVsTarski/PriorVsMetalanguage: in our own system, we do not need any metalanguage.
That gives us certain ways of self-reference that are not provided in Tarski.
In Tarski, no sentence can say anything about its own truth, nor about other sentences of the object language.
Prior: with us it is possible under favorable circumstances that people think, speak or fear about the truth or falsity of their speech, thinking, fearing, etc.
This then also counts among the things that he thinks, fears, etc.
((s) absurd: someone would have to fear something, but not that the corresponding sentence is true, because that is not part of the object language.)
Prior: but that is a difference with Tarski, not a conflict with his theory.
Because we do not use "true" and "false" in his sense.
We have only roughly outlined such a language and said nothing about the means it may have to refer to its own sentences.
I 144
Belief/Relation/Theory/Prior: the second theory we are considering says that a relation only comes about if the believer infallibly knows that the object exists: Russell: knowledge by acquaintance.
Names/Russell: mainly resorts to Mill.
Names/Mill: a) singular ones
b) general ones
each . "connotative ones", . not connotative ones. (Special character).
General names: nouns and adjectives all connotative.
PriorVsMill: better "apply to" than "denote".
Meaning/Names/Mill: the objects attribute nothing to meaning! We can understand a name in principle without knowing the object. (However, with reductions with e.g. "red").
But here the meaning is not changed either when the word is applied to different things!
I 145
Thus a noun or adjective retains its meaning even when it is applied to non-existent things. Understanding/Mill: to understand a word we need to know which attributes a thing must have so that a word can be applied to it.
Connotation/Mill: are the attributes that fix the meaning of the noun or adjective by determining whether the noun or adjective can be applied to a thing.
Singular Term/Mill: may be connotative, but not necessarily.
Proper Names/Mill: meaningless signs. We may have information previously, and the name may invoke it, but it does not carry it.
Prior: his Platonist "attributes" are not essential to his theory.
Information/Connotation/Mill: connotative expressions bring information with them. >Peirce, verbs!
Noun/Predicate/Verb/Peirce: nouns and adjectives might be banned from the language. There is nothing that could not be accomplished better and less ambiguous by verbs.
Denote/Peirce: nouns, verbs and adjectives have in common that they do not denote, but are merely applied to objects.
The word "chair" is applied to x if x is a chair, and accordingly to white if x is white, or the verb "smokes" if x smokes.
Noun and Adjective: are always implicit parts of verbs!
E.g. "every man runs':
I 146
here "man" is not explicitly part of "is a man", but the verb "to be a man", "is a man" is implicit. Reason: "Whatever is a man runs". E.g. adjective: "X is a bad person": "bad" is not explicitly part of the verb "is bad", but implicitly: "X is bad and is a person".
Connotative Names: we might say they are not names at all, but "predicative".
Connotation/Mill: E.g. "The Chimborazo is white": subject: not connotative, predicate: connotative. The individual thing denoted by the subject has the attributes connoted by the predicate.
E.g. "All men are mortal": both connotative: whatever has the attributes connoted by the subject, also has those connoted by the predicate.
Point: in both cases, the analysis shifts the connotative expression to the predicate position. (>Verb).

Pri I
A. Prior
Objects of thought Oxford 1971

Pri II
Arthur N. Prior
Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003
Metaphysics Nagel, E. Vs Metaphysics
 
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Horwich I 128
Ernest NagelVsTarski: (among others) his truth concept (or the whole theoretic semantics) had something metaphysical. (Ernest NagelVsSemantics). I 129 Metaphysics/TarskiVsVs: the concept as such is too vague. Some cynics say Z, this is how the philosophers called their unborn children. VsMetaphysics: some think it crept in on the way through the definitions, namely, if the definition does not provide us with criteria for deciding whether an object falls within the definition or not.
VsTarski: and the concept of truth is simply too general to prevent that. I 130 Truth Criterion/Criteria/TarskiVsVs: it's true, we will probably never find a truth criterion. (see above, Kant ditto). But this is not how the truth concept differs from almost all other concepts, especially in theoretical physics (TT). Metaphysics/Tarski: the concept is used in such a broad sense that it certainly encompasses methods of logic, mathematics or the empirical sciences, and thus a fortiori also semantics!

Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Positivism Fodor Vs Positivism
 
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II 107
Ordinary LanguageVsPositivism: this formalization is only useful where its structure mirrors the natural language. Otherwise, languages ​​can be constructed so that they have any desired property.
II 108
When a system is selected at random, no solutions can be expected. Formal Language/Fodor: there can be as many artificial languages as there are solutions to a problem.
II 109
Most have been formed on the model of Principia Mathematica. This is not the best idea, because everyday language is much more complex. The positivist argues here that many aspects are disregarded, because they are unsystematic.
II 110
FodorVsPositivism: he then asserts that his theory applies except in those cases in which it does not apply.
II 112
Positivism/Language: distinguishes two branches of semantics: 1) The theory of meaning: relations between linguistic units: analyticity, synonymy, meaning. 2) The theory of designation: relations between linguistic units and reality: denoting, designating, truth, scope of concept. With regard to natural languages, ​​semantic theories in which such concepts are unanalyzed basic concepts are empirically empty. Attempt at a solution: determining those basic concepts operationally.
II 113
Vs: that ignores the possibility to construct a systematic theory of the semantic structure of a natural language. In addition, it cannot be expected that the search for operational rules clarifies the elementary semantic concepts if the second path is not taken simultaneously.
II 117
Designation/FodorVsTarski: it is obvious that such systems cannot capture the designation problems in natural languages. E.g. "I want to be the Pope" does not designate the Pope. E.g. "I want to meet the Pope" designates the Pope. E.g. "I shot the man with the gun" may refer to "the man" or "the man with the gun". E.g. "The black blue dress" can refer to a checkered dress or the darker one. FodorVsPositivism: after questioning the positivist theories of designation we do not know more about the relationship between the natural language and the environment than before.
Fodor/Lepore IV 49
Propositions/Fodor/Lepore: if statements are propositions, then they have their contents essentially (because they are individuated through them): IV 49/50 Now, if contents is determined through their its verification method (Peirce’s thesis), then statements have their confirmation methods essentially QuineVsPeirce: the Quine-Duhem thesis says that confirmation conditions are contingent! (It may always turn out to be wrong, nothing follows from the meaning about the confirmation).

F/L
J. Fodor/E. Lepore
Holism Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992
Possibilia Tarski Vs Possibilia
 
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Bigelow I 101
Namen/Individuenkonstanten/BigelowVsTarski: dieser ließ als Referenten nur Dinge zu, die einen Ort zu einer Zeit besetzen können. Wir dagegen werden auch Possibilia zulassen.

Tarsk I
A. Tarski
Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923-38 Indianapolis 1983

Big I
J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter
Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990
Putnam, H. Brendel Vs Putnam, H.
 
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I 70
T-Def/WT/PutnamVsTarski/Putnam/Brendel: Tarski’s Theorie sei von vornherein kontraintuitiv: das gilt auch für die modelltheoretischen Varianten. Sie werden unserem intuitiven Begriff von "wahr" nicht gerecht.
I 71
Sein T-Begriff sei noch nicht einmal "semantisch". BrendelVsPutnam: sein Begriff von "intuitiver Wahrheit" ist selbst ganz unklar.
I 105
Disquotationstheorie/Zitattilgungstheorie/Disquotationalismus/Putnam/Brendel: Thesis: ist nur eine Variante der Redundanztheorie. BrendelVsPutnam/Brendel: das ist ein Irrtum: denn die Redundanztheorie nimmt einen Operator an und ein disquotationstheoretischer Wahrheitsbegriff kann kein aussagenlogischer Operator sein und damit nicht redundanztheoretisch.
I 278
Brains in a vat/BIV/PutnamVsSkepticism/Putnam: Thesis: die Aussage, wir seien BIV kann sich gar nicht als wahr herausstellen, weil Repräsentationen keine intrinsische Verbindung zu ihren Repräsentanten haben ("magische Referenz") - unabhängig von Verursachung.
I 279
SkeptizismusVsPutnam/Brendel: den Skeptizismus muss das nicht beeindrucken. Er kann Putnam’s Argument als transzendentales Argument einstufen: es bezieht sich auf die Voraussetzungen der Möglichkeit, den Satz "Wir sind BIV" zu formulieren. StroudVsPutnam/Brendel: solche transzendentalen Argumente setzen schon bestimmte verifikationistische Annahmen voraus.
I 280
Problem: daraus kann man noch nicht schließen, dass es die Welt tatsächlich gibt. Dazu müsste man noch annehmen, dass erkenntniskonstituierende Prinzipien die Welt notwendigerweise so beschreiben, wie sie tatsächlich ist. StroudVsTranszendental Argument/Brendel: petitio principii.
I 281
BrendelVsStroud: Lösung: semantische Wahrheit/Brendel: die skeptische Hypothese ist keine sinnvolle wahrheitsfähige Aussage im Sinn der semantischen Wahrheit.
BIV/Putnam/Brendel: Putnam selbst räumt ein, dass BIV physikalisch möglich sind. Aber was bedeutet das, außer, dass es eine mögliche solche Beschreibung gibt?
I 282
BrendelVsPutnam: es wird gar keine physikalische Möglichkeit gezeigt, nur eine black box. (David WardVsPutnam Ward, 1995, 191f). er müsste die Denkmöglichkeit oder Denkunmöglichkeit zeigen. ((s) Weil er selbst letztlich von einem Argument der Denkunmöglichkeit (Unmöglichkeit der Referenz) ausgeht.)
Gedankenexperiment/th.e.Brendel: dass etwas physikalisch möglich ist, ist auch noch kein Argument für die Legitimität von th.e.
I 283
Begriffsanalyse/Brendel: lässt sich nur durch begriffliche Möglichkeiten bestätigen oder widerlegen.
I 284
BrendelVsPutnam: die Welt der BIV ist uns gar nicht so verschlossen, wir haben eine Vorstellung, wie es wäre.
I 285
Verstehen/Skeptizismus/BrendelVsPutnam/Brendel: daher ist die skeptische Hypothese uns gar nicht unverständlich. Und dann auch wahrheitsfähig. "alles anders"/Brendel: hier kommen dann allerdings Grenzen unseres Vorstellungsvermögens herein.

Bre I
E. Brendel
Wahrheit und Wissen Paderborn 1999
Quine, W.V.O. Tarski Vs Quine, W.V.O.
 
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Field II 25
Wahrheit/QuineVsTarski/Field: das Schema (T) ist alles was wir brauchen. (Oder zusätzlich noch eine Übersetzungstheorie). TarskiVsQuine/Field: das war nicht Tarskis Ansicht!
FieldVsTarki: maß Pseudo-Theorien wie D2, A2 und F2 zu viel Bedeutung bei.
Field These T1 repräsentiert Tarskis echten Beitrag zur W-Theorie adäquat.

Tarsk I
A. Tarski
Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923-38 Indianapolis 1983

Fie I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Fie III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980
Tarski, A. Austin Vs Tarski, A.
 
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I 240
Thread: StrawsonVsTarski, AustinVsTarski: truth is no property - Tarski: Truth is a property
John L. Austin
I Austin Wahrheit in: Wahrheitstheorien Hrsg. Skirbekk, Frankfurt/M 1996
II Jörgen Husted "Austin" aus :Hügli (Hrsg) Philosophie im 20. Jahrhhundert, Reinbek 1993
III Austin: "Ein Plädoyer für Entschuldigungen" aus: Linguistik und Philosophie (Grewendorf/Meggle(Hg)) Frankfurt (Athenäum) 1974/1995
Tarski, A. Ayer Vs Tarski, A.
 
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I 276
AyerVsTarski: there are objections against making truth a property of sentences instead of a property of statements or propositions: sentences expressing a time ratio can be used on several occasions for various statements.   In any case where we can define truth as a property of sentences, we can define it also as properties of statements.
A.J.Ayer
I Ayer Wahrheit, aus "Wahrheitstheorien" Hrsg. Skirbekk Frankfurt/M 1996
II Hügli ()Hrsg.) Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, Reinbek 1993
Tarski, A. Davidson Vs Tarski, A.
 
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II 28
Tarski tests his definitions through that they only imply -equivalences where the sentence on the right side translates the one quoted on the left. The T-predicate used may remain uninterpreted. Because: Def T-predicate: every predicate that provides correct translations is a T-predicate. Tarski assumes meaning in order to explicate the truth. Davidson: vice versa! It is not required of T-equivalences that the right side translates to the leftd.
II 29
Def T-equivalence: true iff. the linked sentences have the same truth value in all circumstances. Those who want to apply Davidson’s "Convention T" need to know when T-equivalences are true. With Tarski, one must know the meaning of both object-language and meta-language sentences. Davidson’s T-predicate, however, must be interpreted.
II 29
Vs: Why should T-equivalences indicate truth conditions if there needs to be no substantive connection between the linked sentences? Translation: E.g. "Snow is white" is true iff. grass is green.
How could T-equivalences be prevented from implying such equivalences?.
Answer: Such a theory would not be too interpretive. Right has nothing to do with the truth conditions of left.
DavidsonVsTarski: empirical rather than formal - empiricism excludes false law amendments (> Goodman).- Convention T insufficiently empirical.
II 50 ff
Tarski-like T-theories include no reference to meanings in the sense defined clearly assignable entities. Davidson: two radical consequences: 1) Understanding: for understanding it’s basically irrelevant which language the speaker speaks (DavidsonVsTarski).
II 51
Every language is accessible via the causal relationships. 2) It is considered trivial that meaning is conventional. What words and sentences mean is a matter of social practice.
DavidsonVs: the thesis of the conventional character of language has to be abandoned in the radical interpretation.
II 122
DavidsonVsTarski: The radical interpreter can only develop a T-theory for his L if he uses an interpreted T-predicate for the construction of his T-equivalences, i.e. his own, intuitive concept of truth. While Tarski’s T-predicates provide a structural description of a language whose translation is known, and precisely do not make a contribution to a truth theory, because for that it would be interesting to see what T-predicates in different languages have ​​in common.
Dummett I 25
DavidsonVsTarki: presumes, however, that the concept of truth must already be understood! If we knew nothing about it, except that it applies to sentences of the language concerned, according to the definition of truth, we cannot learn anything about the meaning of a sentence by stating the truth conditions. Therefore, you need a previous understanding of the concept of truth. - But not of the conditions! because this knowledge will be determined by the truth theory.
Frank I 633
Truth/Meaning/Interpretation/DavidsonVsTarski: without interpretation the assertion that a particular physical entity has truth conditions or meaning remains an empty presumption.

D I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D IV
D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Du I
M. Dummett
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Du III
M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Tarski, A. Field Vs Tarski, A.
 
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Brendel I 68
T-Def/FieldVsTarski: does not do justice to physicalistic intuitions. (Field 1972). Semantic concepts and especially the W concept should be traceable to physical or logical-mathematical concepts. Tarski/Brendel: advocates for a metalinguistic definition himself that is based only on logical terms, no axiomatic characterization of "truth". (Tarski, "The Establishment of Scientific Semantics").
Bre I 69
FieldVsTarski: E.g. designation: Def Designation/Field: Saying that the name N denotes an object a is the same thing as stipulating that either a is France and N is "France" or a is Germany and N is "Germany"... etc.
Problem: here only an extensional equivalence is given, no explanation of what designation (or satisfiability) is.
Bre I 70
Explanation/FieldVsTarski/Field: should indicate because of which properties a name refers to a subject. Therefore, Tarski’s theory of truth is not physicalistic. T-Def/FieldVsTarski/Field/Brendel: does not do justice to physicalistic intuitions - extensional equivalence is no explanation of what designation or satisfiability is.
Field I 33
Implication/Field: is also in simpler contexts sensibly a primitive basic concept: E.g. Someone asserts the two sentences.
a) "Snow is white" does not imply logically "grass is green".
b) There are no mathematical entities such as quantities.
That does not look as contradictory as
Fie I 34
John is a bachelor/John is married FieldVsTarski: according to him, a) and b) together would be a contradiction, because he defines implication with quantities. Tarski does not give the normal meaning of those terms.
VsField: you could say, however, that the Tarskian concepts give similar access as the definition of "light is electromagnetic radiation".
FieldVsVs: but for implication we do not need such a theoretical approach. This is because it is a logical concept like negation and conjunction.
Field II 141
T-Theory/Tarski: Thesis: we do not get an adequate probability theory if we just take all instances of the schema as axioms. This does not give us the generalizations that we need, for example, so that the modus ponens receives the truth. FieldVsTarski: see above Section 3. 1. Here I showed a solution, but should have explained more.
Feferman/Field: Solution: (Feferman 1991) incorporates schema letters together with a rule for substitution. Then the domain expands automatically as the language expands.
Feferman: needs this for number theory and set theory.
Problem: expanding it to the T-theory, because here we need scheme letters inside and outside of quotation marks.
Field: my solution was to introduce an additional rule that allows to go from a scheme with all the letters in quotation marks to a generalization for all sentences.
Problem: we also need that for the syntax,... here, an interlinking functor is introduced in (TF) and (TFG). (see above).
II 142
TarskiVsField: his variant, however, is purely axiomatic. FieldVsTarski/FefermanVsTarski: Approach with scheme letters instead of pure axioms: Advantages:
1) We have the same advantage as Feferman for the schematic number theory and the schematic set theory: expansions of the language are automatically considered.
2) the use of ""p" is true iff. p" (now as a scheme formula as part of the language rather than as an axiom) seems to grasp the concept of truth better.
3) (most important) is not dependent on a compositional approach to the functioning of the other parts of language. While this is important, it is also not ignored by my approach.
FieldVsTarski: an axiomatic theory is hard to come by for belief sentences.
Putnam I 91
Correspondence Theory/FieldVsTarski: Tarski’s theory is not suited for the reconstruction of the correspondence theory, because fulfillment (of simple predicates of language) is explained through a list. This list has the form
"Electron" refers to electrons
"DNS" refers to DNS
"Gene" refers to genes. etc.
this is similar to
(w) "Snow is white" is true iff....
(s)> meaning postulates)
Putnam: this similarity is no coincidence, because:
Def "True"/Tarski/Putnam: "true" is the zero digit case of fulfillment (i.e. a formula is true if it has no free variables and the zero sequence fulfills it).
Def Zero Sequence: converges to 0: E.g. 1; 1/4; 1/9; 1/16: ...
Criterion W/Putnam: can be generalized to the criterion F as follows: (F for fulfillment):
Def Criterion F/Putnam:
(F) an adequate definition of fulfilled in S must generate all instances of the following scheme as theorems: "P(x1...xn) is fulfilled by the sequence y1...yn and only if P(y1...yn).
Then we reformulate:
"Electron (x)" is fulfilled by y1 iff. y1 is an electron.
PutnamVsField: it would have been formulated like this in Tarskian from the start. But that shows that the list Field complained about is determined in its structure by criterion F.
This as well as the criterion W are now determined by the formal properties we desired of the concepts of truth and reference, so we would even preserve the criterion F if we interpreted the connectives intuitionistically or quasi intuitionistically.
Field’s objection fails. It is right for the realist to define "true" à la Tarski.

Fie I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Fie III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Bre I
E. Brendel
Wahrheit und Wissen Paderborn 1999

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990
Tarski, A. Frege Vs Tarski, A.
 
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Dummett I 25
Understanding / Frege / Dummett: understanding before truth - truth is indefinable (FregeVsTarski)
I 105
FregeVscorrespondence theory: any attempt to define truth is a headless undertaking. If the truth of a proposition were a property, in order to decide its truth, one would have to decide the truth of another sentence! (> regress). FregeVstruth-definition.

F I
G. Frege
Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987

F II
G. Frege
Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994

F IV
G. Frege
Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993

Du I
M. Dummett
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Du III
M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982
Tarski, A. Kripke Vs Tarski, A.
 
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EMD II 337
Expansion/Language/Kripke: Here we need Set Theory, at least the sets of the expressions of L. (As Tarski, who is dealing, however,with referential language). DavidsonVsTarski/Kripke: he needs less ontology and less richness of metalanguage.
EMD II 367
Substitutional quantification/sQ/KripkeVsTarski: substitution quantification together with the formula Q(p,a) solves Tarski’s problem to define a "true sentence".
EMD II 410
Language/Kripke: When a language is introduced, an explicit definition of W is a necessary and sufficient condition that the language has mathematically defined (extensional) semantics. Otherwise, the language can be explained in informal English. The semantics is then intuitive. Before Tarski, semantics have generally been treated that way.
Convention T/DavidsonVsTarski/Kripke: for Davidson the axioms must be finite in number. Kripke: his work is much more controversial than that of Tarski.
Field I 245
Def disquotational truth/dW/Field: can be defined with the help of substitution quantification (/(s): for all sentences, not objects .... is valid) für alle Sätze, nicht Gegenstände, gilt") definiert werden. S is true iff Pp(if S = "p", p).
where "p" sentences are substituents. But which sentences?.
Konjunctions/Understanding/Paradoxies/Field: Konjunctions of sentences: makes only sense if the sentences have been understood beforehand, i.e. that the conjunctions themselves (and sentences constructed from them) are not allowed as conjuncts. (>semantic Paradoxies, (s) >all that he said).
Solution: Tarski similar hierarchy of T-predicates.
Predicates: then the definition of the dW by substitutional quantification (sQ)is typically ambiguous: each element of the hierarchy is provided by the corresponding sQ.
KripkeVsTarski: (Kripke 1975): he is to restrictive for our aim: as such we do not obtain all ueK that we need.
Solution/Kripke: others, quasi imprädikative Interpretation von dW. Analog für
Fie I 246
Substitutional Quantification/sQ/Kripke: Authorizes sentences to be a part of themselves and things, which are build from those sentences, to be conjuncts. However, the truth value of those quasi impredicative conjuncts are to be objectively indeterminate until the truth value is assigned to a certain level. sQ/Field: Allows then ueK without semantic ascent. If we want to talk about the non-linguistic world, why should we use sentences which we do not need?.
→ sQ: Could then be used as a basic term.
→ Basic term/Field: This means that a) the basic term is not defined by even more basic termini.
→ b) the basic term does not try to explain even more basic terms in theory (Field for each a) and b).
→ If we accept a), we need, however, to explain how the term obtains its meaning. Perhaps from logical laws which regulate its use. If we accept a), it is not a problem to accept b) as well.
→ Explanation/Field: e.g. the issue regarding mentalistic terms is not to give a meaning, but to show that the term is not primitive (basal). The ideology in logical terms does not need to be reduced that much.

K I
S.A. Kripke
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981

K III
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
In
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg), Oxford/NY 1984

EMD II
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977

Ev I
G. Evans
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989

Fie I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Fie III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980
Tarski, A. Prior Vs Tarski, A.
 
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I 98
Truth/Falsity/PriorVsTarski: the concepts of truth and falsity discussed in the last chapter are not the concepts of Tarski. Prior: ours could be described as properties not of sentences, but of propositions.
I.e. quasi-properties of quasi-objects!
Not adjectives "true", "false", but rather adverbs "correctly" (accurate, truthful, rightly) and "falsely".
I 99
PriorVsTarski:
(A) If someone says that snow is white, he says it truthfully iff. snow is white.  Tarski:
(B) The sentence "snow is white" is true iff. snow is white.
The truth of all true sentences of a language can be derived from Tarski's definition with normal logic. And that is for him the criterion of satisfiability of the truth definition.
Quotation Marks/Truth/Truth Definition/PriorVsTarski: for me there are no quotation marks. But in Tarski, these belong more to informal preparation than to strict theory.
Use/Mention/Tarski/Prior: left: the sentence is mentioned (by the name of the sentence)
right: used.
Prior: in my version () there is no mention, only use.
(A) is not about sentences from start to finish, but about snow.
(B) is about the sentence "snow is white".
Self-Reference/Foreword Paradox/Tarski/Paradox/Prior: it remains the case that it looks as if self-reference were involved when we speak about people and what they say, think, fear, etc., which seems to exclude Tarski's semantics.
But we must take a closer look:
In Tarski, the predicates "true" and "false" do not belong to the same language as the sentences by which they are stated.

I 103
PriorVsTarski: we say instead "x says something true if..." Or: "x says during the interval t t'that __"
If we abbreviate this last phrase as "Sx!, "Sxp", then we could insert it in theorems like:
CSx∑pKSxpNp∑pKSxpNp.
Problem: (see above) If I says that he says something wrong between t and t', then it cannot be the only thing he says. This is a problem for very short intervals.
How about if poor old x had to express theorems, and only had such a short time available for it? To the above theorem he would also have to express the consequent ∑pKSxpNp, and for that he might not have time! Above all, it may be that I will not do it ex hypothesi!
Metalanguage/Point: this means that the language in which these theorems are expressed cannot be the same language that is used for that at some other occasions!

Pri I
A. Prior
Objects of thought Oxford 1971

Pri II
Arthur N. Prior
Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003
Tarski, A. Putnam Vs Tarski, A.
 
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Brendel I 70
Truth Def/theory of truth/PutnamVsTarski/Putnam/Brendel: Tarski's theory is counterintuitive from the outset: this also applies to the model theoretical variants. They do not do our intuitive concept of "true" justice.
I 71
His concept of truth is not even "semantic". BrendelVsPutnam: his concept of "intuitive truth" itself is quite unclear.
I 72
"True-in-L"/PutnamVsTarski: doesn't consider the speaker nor their use of expressions. It depends only on syntactic features. Problem: Then "snow is white" is also true in such possible worlds in which the words have an entirely different meaning! Then they correspond to another issue. Then what is semantic about it? And what does it mean that in a counterfactual situation a sentence is true-in-L, but not "true"? It must then be said, in what language the phrase is "not true".
I 73
It should also be explained why such a "counterfactual situation" shows that "truth" was not analyzed conceptually. Ex
I1: "Snow is white" here means that snow is white (L1).
I2: here that water is liquid.
I2: in a trivial sense "snow is white" is also L1-true! This is the case even if in a world "snow" and "white" are interpreted in a way that they express a false sentence in this possible world.
Ex ""The earth is at rest" is true in a geocentric worldview" is true also in the heliocentric worldview.
Counterfactual situation/Putnam/Brendel: here, the expressions are supposed to have a different meaning, and the issue to continue to hold that snow is white.
I 73
Counterfactual situation/Putnam/Brendel: expressions have a different meaning, but the SBV are equal.
Putnam I 16
PutnamVsTarski: it must be added a certain substantial understanding of reference and truth, in which both are not made conditional on the possibility of human knowledge. (That would be the case of instrumentalism which thinks a sentence must be true if certain criteria are met, such as "sensations xyz are present."). Truth has to go beyond basic recognizability according to realism.
I 66
PutnamVsTarski: many think that he has completely and precisely defined reference, I do not. Truth/reference/Field: (1972) has shown that the "definitions of truth" and "definitions of reference" of logic did not do their job at all.
PutnamVsTarski: his "Convention T" does not clarify the concepts of truth and reference, because it uses the terms of the designation of a sentence and "following from something". These concepts are closely related to truth and reference, but need to be clarified.

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Bre I
E. Brendel
Wahrheit und Wissen Paderborn 1999
Tarski, A. Strawson Vs Tarski, A.
 
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Austin I 240
Thread: StrawsonVsTarski, AustinVsTarski: truth is no property - Tarski: Truth is a property of sentences.

Str I
P.F. Strawson
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Str IV
P.F. Strawson
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Str V
P.F. Strawson
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981
Tarski, A. Tugendhat Vs Tarski, A.
 
Books on Amazon
III 191
TugendhatVsTarski: sein Schema ist zu eng. Außerdem VsMetalanguage. Irgendwie müssen Realität und Subjektivität (Intersubjektivität) in die Wahrheitsauffassung hineingenommen werden. Frage: ob nicht doch Kriterien in die Wahrheitstheorie eingebaut werden müssen, da Urteile über sich hinaus, auf die Realität verweisen.
III 197
TugendhatVsTarski: seine implizite Verwendung der Äquivalenz verdeckt die Verweisung auf die Urteilswahrheit.

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992
Tarski, A. Wittgenstein Vs Tarski, A.
 
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I 134
WittgensteinVsTarski/WittgensteinVsCarnap/Hintikka: would reject the logical semantics as a whole, because according to the view of language as a universal medium it cannot be articulated.

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico Philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960
Tarski, A. Wright Vs Tarski, A.
 
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Rorty VI 40
WrightVsTarski/Rorty: es ist ihm nicht gelungen, eine Norm anzugeben. Wright: zwei Normen: berechtigte Behauptbarkeit und Wahrheit. Unterschied: das Streben nach dem einen ist notwendig auch ein Streben nach dem anderen, aber ein Erfolg beim einen ist noch nicht notwendig ein Erfolg beim anderen.

Wri I
Cr. Wright
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001

WriGH I
G. H. von Wright
Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Tarski, A. Verschiedene Vs Tarski, A. Eigen VII 303
v. WeizsäckerVsTarski: zur Beschreibung der Metasprache brauchte man wieder eine Metametasprache. Regress.
Sainsbury V 180
Tarski: der gewöhnliche alltägliche Wahrheitsbegriff ist inkohärent: er muss durch eine hierarchische Reihe von Wahrheitsprädikaten ersetzt werden. Die Objektsprache darf kein Prädikat enthalten, das genau auf ihre wahren Sätze zutrifft.
SainsburyVsTarski: einige Autoren meinen, daß unsere Alltagssprache nicht wirklich mangelhaft sei, sondern die geforderte Hierarchie bereits enthalte. z.B. bei Wendungen wie
"Was Sie soeben gesagt haben, ist nicht wahr".
Es scheint zu radikal, unseren gewöhnlichen Wahrheitsbegriff zu verwerfen. Andererseits ist es wohl nicht korrekt anzunehmen, unser alltäglicher Begriff enthalte schon die ganze Trennung.
Verstärkter LügnerVsTarski : (L2: L2 ist nicht wahr"). Trotz Tarski könnten wir formulieren:
LN: LN ist nicht wahrN
Version 1: Wenn das mangelhaft ist, weil es die Trennung der Ebenen nicht respektiert, dann ist es nicht wahrN. aber das es das ist, was es sagt, muß es doch wahrN sein!
Version 2: Ein Satz, der die Ebenen durchbricht, ist semantisch mangelhaft und also nicht wahr. Man kann also immer einen Verstärkten-Lügner-Satz konstruieren, um einen Ansatz über Ebenen zu widerlegen!

Horwich I 122
Truth Definition/T-Def/VsTarski: Einwände wegen angeblicher fehlender Korrektheit richten sich gegen den semantischen T-concept im allgemeinen. VsTarski: die T-Def sei zirkulär, weil in der Form "p iff q" Wahrheit implizit vorkomme: nämlich, weil die Äquivalenz gilt, wenn entweder beide Seiten wahr oder beide Seiten falsch sind.
TarskiVsVs: wenn dieser Einwand gültig wäre, gäbe es überhaupt keine formal korrekte T-Def. Denn wir können keinen zusammengesetzten Satz bilden ohne die Hilfe von Verknüpfungen und anderen logischen Termen, die mit ihrer Hilfe definiert werden,.
I 123
Lösung/Tarski: eine strenge deduktive Entwicklung der Logik wird oft eingeleitet durch eine Erklärung der Bedingungen, unter denen Sätze der Form „wenn p dann q“ usw. als wahr betrachtet werden. (WW-Tabellen).
Eigen VII 303
v. WeizsäckerVsTarski: zur Beschreibung der Metasprache brauchte man wieder eine Metametasprache. Regress.
Sainsbury V 180
Tarski: der gewöhnliche alltägliche Wahrheitsbegriff ist inkohärent: er muss durch eine hierarchische Reihe von Wahrheitsprädikaten ersetzt werden. Die Objektsprache darf kein Prädikat enthalten, das genau auf ihre wahren Sätze zutrifft.
SainsburyVsTarski: einige Autoren meinen, daß unsere Alltagssprache nicht wirklich mangelhaft sei, sondern die geforderte Hierarchie bereits enthalte. z.B. bei Wendungen wie
"Was Sie soeben gesagt haben, ist nicht wahr".
Es scheint zu radikal, unseren gewöhnlichen Wahrheitsbegriff zu verwerfen. Andererseits ist es wohl nicht korrekt anzunehmen, unser alltäglicher Begriff enthalte schon die ganze Trennung.
Verstärkter LügnerVsTarski : (L2: L2 ist nicht wahr"). Trotz Tarski könnten wir formulieren:
LN: LN ist nicht wahrN
Version 1: Wenn das mangelhaft ist, weil es die Trennung der Ebenen nicht respektiert, dann ist es nicht wahrN. aber das es das ist, was es sagt, muß es doch wahrN sein!
Version 2: Ein Satz, der die Ebenen durchbricht, ist semantisch mangelhaft und also nicht wahr. Man kann also immer einen Verstärkten-Lügner-Satz konstruieren, um einen Ansatz über Ebenen zu widerlegen!

Horwich I 122
T-Def/VsTarski: Einwände wegen angeblicher fehlender Korrektheit richten sich gegen den semantischen T-concept im allgemeinen. VsTarski: die W-Def sei zirkulär, weil in der Form "p iff q" Wahrheit implizit vorkommen: nämlich, weil die Äquivalenz gilt, wenn entweder beide Seiten wahr oder beide Seiten falsch sind.
TarskiVsVs: wenn dieser Einwand gültig wäre, gäbe es überhaupt keine formal korrekte T-Def. Denn wir können keinen zusammengesetzten Satz bilden ohne die Hilfe von Verknüpfungen und anderen logischen Termen, die mit ihrer Hilfe definiert werden,.
I 123
Lösung/Tarski: eine strenge deduktive Entwicklung der Logik wird oft eingeleitet durch eine Erklärung der Bedingungen, unter denen Sätze der Form "wenn p dann q" usw. als wahr betrachtet werden. (Truth-value-tables).
Horwich I 127
VsTarski: wegen seines Schemas, das ihn auf Tatsachen verpflichte, sei er auf einen Realismus festgelegt. (GonsethVsTarski). TarskiVsVs: dass der Ausdruck ... Schnee "tatsächlich" weiß ist...wurde von meinen Kritikern fälschlich eingefügt.
Truth conditions/T-Def/Tarski: der Bezug auf Tatsachen fehlt ganz bewusst im T-Schema! Es geht nämlich nicht um Wahrheitsbedingungen (tr.cond.)
T Schema/Tarski: impliziert nur, dass wenn wir den Satz
(1) Schnee ist weiß
behaupten oder negieren, dass wir dann auch den korrelierten Satz (2) Der Satz "Schnee ist weiß" ist wahr
behaupten oder negieren müssen.
I 128
Pointe: damit können wir unsere jeweilige epistemologische Einstellung behalten: wir können Realisten, Idealisten, usw. bleiben, wenn wir es vorher schon waren. Realismus/Tarski: der semantische T-concept verpflichtet uns keineswegs auf einen naiven Realismus.
((s) Wenn Wahrheit Zitattilgung ist, dann müssen sich die "Disziplinen" unterscheiden lassen eben durch Sätze, die disquotational wahr sind, anstatt "immanent wahr").
TarskiVsVs: reductio ad absurdum: wenn es einen anderen T-concept gäbe (nach dem Willen dieser Kritiker, dann müsste er sich irgendwie unterscheiden und dann müsste letztlich herauskommen, dass "Schnee ist weiß" wahr ist, iff Schnee nicht weiß ist! Denn sonst wäre es ja kein anderer T-concept sondern derselbe T-concept!.
Dennoch wäre ein solcher "neuer" T-concept nicht unbedingt absurd. Jedenfalls hätte aber jeder T-concept, der mit der semantischen T-Def inkompatibel ist, solche Konsequenzen.

Tarski I 160
VsTarski: Frage: Ist die semantische Konzeption der Wahrheit die einzig "richtige"? TarskiVsVs: ich muss gestehen, dass ich diese Frage nicht verstehe, denn das Problem ist so unbestimmt, dass keine klare Lösung möglich ist.
I 162
VsTarski: bei der Formulierung der Definition gebrauchen wir notwendigerweise Aussageverknüpfungen wie "wenn...., dann.....", "oder" usw.. Diese kommen in Definiens vor. Es ist jedoch wohlbekannt, dass der Sinn von Aussageverknüpfungen in der Logik mit Hilfe der Wörter "wahr" und "falsch" erklärt wird. (Zirkel). TarskiVsVs: es ist zweifellos der Fall, dass einer streng deduktiven Entwicklung der Logik häufig bestimmte Feststellungen vorangehen, die die Bedingungen erklären, unter denen Aussagen der Form "wenn, dann..." wahr oder falsch sind.
Diese Feststellungen liegen jedoch außerhalb des Systems der Logik und sollten nicht als Definition der betreffenden Terme angesehen werden!
I 163
Diese Feststellungen beeinflussen die deduktiven Entwicklung der Logik in keiner Weise. Denn hier erörtern wir nicht die Frage, ob eine Aussage wahr ist, sondern ob sie beweisbar ist! (Wahrheit/Beweisbarkeit).
I 163
logische Verknüpfung/Aussagenverknüpfung/Tarski: in dem Moment, wo wir uns im deduktiven System der Logik (oder der Semantik, die auf der Logik basiert) befinden, behandeln wir die Aussagenverknüpfungen entweder als undefinierte Terme, oder wir definieren sie mit Hilfe anderer Aussagenverknüpfungen. Wir definieren die Verknüpfungen jedoch nicht mit Hilfe von Termen wie "wahr" oder "falsch".
(p oder q) genau dann, wenn (wenn nicht p, dann q).
Diese Definition enthält offensichtlich keine semantischen Terme.
Fehler: das Schema
(T) X ist wahr genau dann, wenn p.
für eine Definition der Wahrheit zu halten!
VsTarski: ein Kritiker, der diesen Fehler begeht, hielt diese angebliche Definition für "unzulässig kurz, d. h.: unvollständig".
I 164
Es sei nicht zu entscheiden ob mit "Äquivalenz" eine logische formale oder eine nicht logische Beziehung gemeint sei. Er schlägt vor zu ergänzen: (T’) X ist wahr genau dann, wenn p wahr ist. ((s) Vs: hier kommt zweimal "wahr" vor ).
(T’’) X ist wahr genau dann, wenn p der Fall ist.
TarskiVsVs: das ist ein Missverständnis hinsichtlich der Natur der Aussagenverknüpfungen. (Verwechslung von Name und Gegenstand/Verwechslung von Aussagen und ihren Namen, Erwähnung/Gebrauch). ((s) p (rechts) ist die Aussage selbst, nicht die Behauptung über ihre Wahrheit. Das hat mit der Richtigkeit Redundanztheorie nichts zu tun).
I 168
VsTarski: die formale Definition der Wahrheit hat aber nichts mit dem "philosophischen Problem der Wahrheit" zu tun. Sie gibt wohl notwendige und hinreichende Bedingungen, aber nicht das "Wesen" dieses Begriffs. TarskiVs: ich bin nicht imstande zu verstehen, was das "Wesen" eines Begriffs sein soll.
((s) FregeVsTarski: Begriffe haben notwendige Merkmale.)
I 172
Kriterium/criterion of truth/VsTarski: einige argumentieren, Definitionen statten uns nicht mit allgemeinen Kriterien für die Entscheidung aus, ob ein Gegenstand unter den definierten Begriffen fällt. Und der Term "wahr" sei von dieser Art, da aus der Definition unmittelbar kein universelles Kriterium der Wahrheit hervorgeht. (> criterion of truth). ((s) RescherVsTarski). Tarski: das ist völlig korrekt, aber das unterscheidet den Begriff nicht von vielen Begriffen der Wissenschaften wie z. B. der theoretischen Physik. (> Begriff).
I 174
Semantik/Tarski: semantische Begriffe sind tatsächlich in vielen Bereichen der Wissenschaften und insbesondere der empirischen Wissenschaften enthalten.





E I
M. Eigen
Das Spiel München 1975

Sai I
R.M. Sainsbury
Paradoxien Stuttgart 1993

Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994

Tarsk I
A. Tarski
Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923-38 Indianapolis 1983
Tarski, A. Loar Vs Tarski, A.
 
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EMD II 149
LoarVsTarski: es gibt ein intensionalistisches Gegenstück zu seiner Theorie: dabei sind semantische Begriffe vollständig in Begriffen von abstrakten Korrelationen zwischen Ausdrücken und gewissen intensionalen Entitäten definierbar. Angenommen, wir sollten Sprache als eine Funktion von Sätzen auf satzförmige Intensionen (die wir ihrerseits mit Funktionen von möglichen Welten auf Wahrheitswerte identifizieren können) auffassen.
Würden wir damit einen semantischen Begriff definieren? Ist es so, dass alles, was eine Satzbedeutung hergibt, durch eine abstrakt definierte Funktion auf eine Intension abgebildet werden kann?

Loar I
B. Loar
Mind and Meaning Cambridge 1981

EMD II
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977

Ev I
G. Evans
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989
Tarski, A. Peacocke Vs Tarski, A.
 
Books on Amazon
EMD II 162
T-Sentence/PeacockeVsTarski: logical form for a language with index words: ApAt (true (s,p,t) ↔ A(p.t)).
s: "structurally descriptive name" of a sentence
A(p,t) is a formula that does not contain "true" and "fulfilled".
p, t: people, time points.
(s) this takes circumstances into account, unlike Tarski, thus making it empirical.
Truth/PeacockeVsTarski/PeacockeVsDavidson: Point: i.e. we must assume a certain access to the concept of truth already!
When we omit this empirical tendency, the question is what makes one language the language of a community instead of another language (>Loar).
EMD II 163
Then we do not know what "true in L" means for a particular population P. Demanding an answer here does not mean to criticize Davidson's program. We merely sought to fill a gap.
Vs: it could be argued that this gap is already closed by the requirement that every truth definition must satisfy convention T.
(Convention T: right side must be a translation of the left, material equivalence, extension is not enough).
Davidson: himself speaks of the assimilation of a translation manual.
PeacockeVsDavidson: but that only leads us back to the general concept of truth that we are looking for. (Circular).

Pea I
Chr. R. Peacocke
Sense and Content Oxford 1983

EMD II
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977

Ev I
G. Evans
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989
Tarski, A. Brendel Vs Tarski, A.
 
Books on Amazon
I 49
W-Def/Tarski/Brendel: enthält keine Objektkonstanten und nur einen Relationsausdruck für die Klasseninklusion. Aussage/Eigenschaft/Benennen/Modelltheorie/Brendel: gegenüber Tarski brauchen wir einige Veränderungen:
1. Aussagen entstehen jetzt nicht mehr dadurch, dass freie Variable n AF durch Allquantifikation gebunden werden, sondern z.B. dass Objektkonstanten Eigenschafts- oder Relationsausdrücke zugeschrieben werden. Bsp „Hans liebt Paula“.
2. Eigenschaft/Modelltheorie: hier muss man auch für jede Eigenschaft angeben was es heißt, dass
I 50
eine Folge von Objekten diese Eigenschaft oder Relation erfüllt. 3. Benennen/Modelltheorie: es muss eine semantische Relation des Benennens von Objekten durch Objektkonstanten formuliert werden.
Interpretation/Modelltheorie/Brendel: (statt Erfüllung) neu: jetzt können sowohl die Konstanten als auch die Variablen und die Eigenschafts- und Relationsausdrücke als deskriptive Zeichen gelten.
Und zwar durch eine Funktion der Zuordnung. (Zuordnungsfunktion).
Variablen/Modelltheorie: neu: jetzt werden auch Variablen semantisch interpretiert. Daher sind auch Formeln mit freien Variablen wahrheitsfähige Aussagen.
W-Def/Modelltheorie/BrendelVsTarski: neu: jetzt ist auch eine rekursive W-Def über den Aufbau von Aussagen möglich. Bsp für die Sprache L mit abzählbar unendlich vielen Eigenschafts- und Relationsausdrücken …+…
I 51
Modelltheorie/W-Def/BrendelVsTarski: diese modelltheoretische W-Def ist allgemeiner als Tarskis Definition, da sie nicht nur über mengentheoretisch Entitäten Aussagen machen kann. semantisch: ist sie aber auch, weil „Wahrheit“ durch „Interpretation auf einem Gegenstandsbereich“ definiert wird, d.h. es wird eine Funktion beschrieben, die sprachliche Entitäten mit nichtsprachlichen in Verbindung bringt.
I 58
semantische Wahrheit/W-Begriff/Brendel: soll ontologisch neutral in Bezug auf die WW-Träger sein. VsRealismus: sollte der W-Begriff eine realistische Position erzwingen, könnte er nicht als minimaler Konsens aller Wissenskonzeptionen fungieren.
VsTarski: es wird ihm oft vorgeworfen, sein W-Begriff beruhe auf einem unkritischen Realismus. (Wegen des Bestehens von SV als Wahrmachern.
TarskiVsVs: kein Realismus wird impliziert, sondern nur, dass wenn eine Aussage verwerfen, dann auch die Behauptung der Wahrheit dieser Aussage. (Tarski 1944, 169).
I 59
JenningsVsTarski: sein W-Begriff ist zwiespältig: a) semantisch, als Relation zwischen Aussagen und SV b) dass lediglich eine Äquivalenz zweier Aussagen (Bsp „Schnee ist weiß“ und, „“Schn…“ ist wahr“) (Jennings 1987). D.h. die Behauptbarkeitsbedingungen sind dieselben. Dann ist die semantische Dimension aber aufgegeben!
Brendel. These: wir sollten den semantischen W-Begriff beibehalten, der allerdings nicht ontologisch neutral ist.

Bre I
E. Brendel
Wahrheit und Wissen Paderborn 1999
Tarski, A. Hilbert Vs Tarski, A.
 
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Horwich I 127
Wahrheit/Philosophie/Mathematik/HilbertVsTarski: (einziger „philosophischer“ Einwand überhaupt, von einem Mathematiker!): die W Def hätte nichts mit dem „philosophischen Problem „ zu tun. Das sollte aber keine Kritik sein. Begriff/TarskiVsHilbert: ich habe nie verstanden, was das „Wesentliche“ an einem Begriff sein soll. ((s) >Frege: Begriffe haben Merkmale, die man als notwendig ansehen kann, da es sonst ein anderer Begriff ist, im Gegensatz zu Gegenständen, die sich auch als etwas anderes herausstellen können, aber immer noch der „betrachtete Gegenstand“ sind.)
Wahrheit/Tarski: ich glaube, hier gibt es gar kein „philosophisches Problem“.
Tarski, A. Barcan Vs Tarski, A.
 
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Quine X 124
Substitutional Quantification/SQ/Truth Conditions//tr.cond./Barcan-MarcusVsTarski/Quine: the truth conditions for quantification where names replace the variables ((s) truth conditions: i.e. that names exist) were accepted by Ruth Barcan. They are in an interesting contrast to Tarski's truth conditions. (5) (see above X 67) (5) For all x, y and i: x satisfies the existential quantification of y in which variant (i) is quantified iff. y is fulfilled by an n tuple x', for which applies: xj = x’j for all j unequal i. The new truth conditions also have the circularity described in the middle of Chapter 3: the existential quantification is true if at least one of its cases is true ((s) "true" appears twice). old: the big difference is that (5) speaks only of the values ​​of variables and uses no names. ((s) analogous to constructivism: the method of proof must be known like the objects here, which is to be proved by assigning names). (5): Is much more complicated than the new form (SQ). SQ: so far, we do not have any deviation, only different descriptions of the same quantification, as long as all objects have a name. Problem: in a not too limited world, there are never enough names for all objects, never as many names as there are objects. Even if there are infinitely many names. E.g. If a set is not determined by an open sentence, it does not have a name: otherwise, if the name was "a", for example, the name of the corresponding open sentence would be "x ε a". X 125 E.g. we cannot have many different names for the irrational numbers, because we cannot assign them to the integers. E.g. we cannot form Gödel numbers for each irrational number.

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003
Wittgenstein, L. Cresswell Vs Wittgenstein, L.
 
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I 55
CresswellVsLogical atomism/CresswellVsAtomism/CresswellVsWittgenstein/CresswellVsTractatus: the error of the logical atomists was to think that if only they found the correct total physical theory and brought it into a 1st-stage language, that then every speech about the world (in everyday language) would be translatable into the language of this theory. ((s) i.e. the contrary of what Cresswell does here). Cresswell: I want to show both here: how we can keep our everyday language without giving up any claims with respect to the adequacy of a 1st order physical theory. ---
Hintikka I 133
... The process of the logical semanticist (Carnap, Tarski) violates the above-mentioned principle of the categorical analogy. ((s) that R corresponds to a relationship in the world). This difference is important for Wittgenstein (not for Frege): because the objects are elements of possible facts and circumstances. This is a big difference to Frege.
Therefore, it is not enough to simply indicate an "R", and thus a value course, but you have to specify what the relation is in all the different possible worlds. (VsTarski)
CresswellVsWittgenstein/FregeVsWittgenstein/Hintikka: could now argue that the indication of all these value courses was identical with the specification of the relation (the so-called possible worlds semantics is based on that).
---
I 134
But precisely there, the difference between the image theory of the Tractatus (the modal logic extended) and the logical semantics prove to be (largely) an illusion. Tractatus/Hintikka: Thesis: in the Tractatus you are dealing with a variety of possible facts, so it is actually a modal logic.

Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984

Hin I
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

W I
J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996
Wright, Cr. Rorty Vs Wright, Cr.
 
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Richard Rorty
VI 40
WrightVsTarski/Rorty: he has not succeeded to specify a standard. Wright: two standards: legitimate assertibility and truth. Difference: the pursuit of one is necessarily also the pursuit of the other, but success with one is not necessarily a success with the other.
Metaphysics/Wright/Rorty: "metaphysical activism". Wants to keep correspondence and representation alive.
RortyVsWright: from the fact that beliefs can be justified without being true (admittedly) it does not follow that two standards are followed. Nor that we have two obligations.
1) to justify actions, and
2) another obligation to do the right thing.
It simply shows that what is justified with one audience is not necessarily so in front of another.
Disquotation/Deflationism/Wright: the deflationist thinks that by the disquotation principle the content of the truth predicate is completely fixed.
Wright: There is a "biconditional connection between the claim a proposition is true, and the appropriate use of this sentence produced by the disquotation principle, which serves and the purpose of explanation."
VI 41
"Any genuine assertion practice is just the same as it would be if truth were the goal consciously set." Rorty: Wright believes that two choices can be distinguished by asking whether they are "de facto" not "guided" by one but by other consideration.
RortyVsWright: is it sufficient for the actual existence of such a power, however, if the player believes the relevant fact is given?
E.g. I believe I fulfill the will of the gods by a certain behavior. My critic - Atheist - says there is no will of the gods, so it could not be my standard.
VI 42
I reply that this is reductionist and that my own belief of what standard I fulfill makes the difference. RortyVsWright: he should not be happy about this defense strategy of atheists. An imaginative player will always have more and more control systems in function than you can tell apart.
VI 42/43
Wright: must either admit that his goal is then normative in a descriptive sense when the player believes this, or specify another criterion (recourse). Wright: the thesis that possession of truth consists in the "fulfillment of a normative condition distinct from the claim authorization" is equal to the thesis that "truth is a real property".
Truth/Wright: thesis: truth is an independent standard. (Sic, VI 42/43) WrightVsDeflationism, Wright pro type of minimalism with truth as an independent standard in addition to a mere property of sentences.
VI 45
Representation/Convergence/RortyVsWright: but his example is highly revealing: he thinks, e.g. what the "intuitive" linking of representationality with convergence is based on is the following "truism" about "convergence/representation": "If two devices for representation fulfill the same function, a different output is generated in favorable conditions when there is a different input."
VI 46
Wright: must distinguish here between different discourses (for example, about physics or the comical), in which the cognitive is appropriate or not. The humor (the "base") could be different, although people could not be blamed for that. Metaphysics/Wright/Rorty: such questions can only be decided a priori. Namely: e.g. the question of the cognitive status of a discourse!
VI 46/47
Crispin Wright/RortyVsWright: he defines a cognitive commandment according to which a speaker is to function like a well oiled representation machine. This follows the pattern of all epistemologists by whom prejudice and superstition are like sand in the gears. Ultimately, for them humans are machines!
Rorty: right Input/Output function is fulfilled by countless functions in an uninteresting manner.
What Wright needs: we should recognize a priori: What are the proper functions (through knowledge of the content).
VI 48
PragmatismVsWright/Rorty: Pragmatism doubts that cognitivity is more than a historically contingent consensus about the appropriate rationale.
VI 48/49
Content/RortyVsWright: he believes philosophers could consider the "content" of a discourse and then say whether it complied with the cognitive commandment. Representation/RortyVsWright: fundamentally different outputs can be considered a representation of the same inputs. Basically anything can be a representation of anything. You only have to previously agree on it.
Cognitivity/Rorty: the content is of minor importance when it comes to the determination of cognitivity. It is almost exclusively about approval of conventions. Therefore, it is a historical sociological term.
VI 50
WrightVsWittgenstein/Rorty: (Following a rule) "in metaphysic perspective a killjoy" (Evans also). Only concession to the "Qietisten": that truth and falsehood are even possible where realism is not up for debate. (Comedy, morality). Two varieties of Wittgenstein's spoilsport: Kripke and McDowell.
McDowellVsNoncognitivism/Rorty: the moral non-cognitivist is "driven by an erroneous interpretation of ethical facts and ethical objectivity". The same applies for him as for his Platonic opponents, the moral realists:
VI 51
struggles with the quest for an independent position. That is impossible. (McDowellVsRealism of moral).
Wright/Rorty: Wright is against this attempt "to undermine the debate between realism and anti-realism in general".
Advantage of his concept of the cognitive commandment: does not include an overly objectified fact concept" (as would be criticized by Wittgenstein and McDowell).
We refer to what we can understand as the range of possible causes of these differences of opinion.
Representation/Relevance/Cognition/Function/RortyVsWright: this is not enough to rebut McDowell: to arrive at a concept of the range of possible causes we must first specify an Input Output function, otherwise we cannot distinguish the smooth functioning of a representative machine from a malfunction.
Wittgenstein has shown that the "relevant object area" is never in the relevant sense "there". Therefore question: whether there is a way to isolate the input without reference to the "evaluative standpoint".
World/Thinking/Davidson/DeweyVs: we do not have the ability to separate the contribution by "the world" to the process of judgment from our own contribution.
VI 52
True Making/Wright/Rorty: does not doubt the existence of isolated "truth-makers". (WrightVsDavidson).
VI 56
PragmatismVsWright/Rorty: here there are only historical sociologically variable differences between patterns of justifications. These patterns should not be introduced into the concept of truth.

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

The author or concept searched is found in the following disputes of scientific camps.
Disputed term/author/ism Pro/Versus
Entry
Reference
Truth Definition Versus Frege IV 19/20
Truth / definition / FregeVsTarski: can not be defined!    Reason: in a definition we indicate certain features. When applied to a specific case, it then comes down to whether they have been met. So came round in a circle on the definition of truth.

F I
G. Frege
Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987

F IV
G. Frege
Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993
Truth Definition Versus Horwich I 213
StrawsonVsTarski -

Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994

The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 theses of the more related field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Tarski Field, Hartry
 
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II 3
W-Theorie/Tarski/Field: er gebrauchte keinerlei undefinierte semantische Begriffe. Viele sagen: damit machte er den Begriff der Wahrheit hoffähig für den wissenschaftlichen Diskurs seiner Zeit
FieldVs: These das ist ganz falsch. In Wirklichkeit hat Tarski es geschafft, den Begriff der Wahrheit auf andere semantische Begriffe zurückzuführen.
II 141
W-Theorie/Tarski: These wir bekommen keine adäquate W-Theorie, wenn wir nur alle Instanzen des Schemas als Axiome nehmen. Das gibt uns nicht die Verallgemeinerungen die wir brauchen, z.B. daß der modus ponens die Wahrheit erhält. FieldVsTarski.
Horwich I 358
W-Def/Tarski/Field: (Field 1973): These Tarskis W-Def wurde teilweise durch den Wunsch motiviert, den Physikalismus zu stützen.

Tarsk I
A. Tarski
Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923-38 Indianapolis 1983

Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Picture Theory Wittgenstein, L.
 
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Danto I 70/71
Abbildtheorie/Wittgenstein/Danto: These die Welt hat die gleiche Form hat wie die Sprache. Ohne daß die Welt selbst ihrer Struktur nach irgendwie linguistisch wäre, also mehr Spiegelung.
Sellars II 318
Def Abbildung/Tractatus: Relation zwischen Tatsachen über sprachliche Ausdrücke einerseits und Tatsachen über nicht-sprachliche Gegenstände andererseits.
Hintikka I 131
Hintikka These: die "Bildtheorie" ist in Wirklichkeit eine Vorwegnahme der ersten Bedingung Tarskis WT - I 132 WittgensteinVsTarski: eine WT ist unausdrückbar -
I 136
Bildtheorie/Abbildtheorie/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka These: Wittgensteins Bildkonzeption ist kaum mehr als eine besonders anschauliche Formulierung der gleichen Idee, die auch den üblichen Wahrheitsbedingung für Atomsätze zugrunde liegt.
VII 72
Modell/Tractatus/Tetens: Bsp das Verhältnis zwischen Schallplatte und Partitur ist ein Modell für die Abbildungsbeziehung zwischen Sprache und Wirklichkeit. Das ist die These der Abbildtheorie des Tractatus. ((s) Also nicht die Partitur als Modell der Symphonie, sondern es geht um ein Modell einer Relation oder einer Isomorphie).

Dt I
A. C. Danto
Wege zur Welt München 1999

Dt III
Arthur C. Danto
Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998

Dt VII
A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005

Sell I
W. Sellars
Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999

Hin I
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

W I
J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996