Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Natural Laws Swinburne Stegmüller IV 420
Laws of nature / Swinburne: are not explainable by themselves. This makes the hypothesis of God’s existence more likely - VsSwinburne: from the inexplicable follows no greater likelihood of any divine instance.

Swinburne I
R. Swinburne
Justification of Induction Oxford 1974


Carnap V
W. Stegmüller
Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis
In
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987

St I
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989

St II
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987

St III
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987

St IV
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989
Proof of God’s Existence Swinburne Stegmüller IV 404
Kosmologischer Gottesbeweis/Stegmüller: Naturgesetze erklären nichts: - 1. Diese Naturgesetze hätten auch anders sein können. - 2. Es hätte auch sein können, dass nichts existiert.
Stegmüller IV 406
Gott/Swinburne: unser Hintergrundwissen enthält alles Wissen über die Welt, aber keine religiösen Annahmen - dann ist es wahrscheinlicher, dass es Gott gibt, als dass es keinen gibt.
Stegmüller IV 408
Gottesbeweis/Swinburne/MackieVsSwinburne/Stegmüller: wenn man die Ordnung der natürlichen Welt durch göttlichen Plan erklären will, muss man die Ordnung im göttlichen Plan erklären.
Stegmüller IV 419
Ordnung/Gottesbeweis/Stegmüller: eine geistige Ordnung bedarf nicht weniger der Erklärung als eine materielle.
Stegmüller IV 427
Gottesbeweis/Stegmüller: ontologisch: allein auf Vernunft - kosmologisch: mit empirischen Prämissen - teleologisch: auf Ordnungsstrukturen, Anschein von Zweckhaftigkeit - moralische Beweise: nicht nur theoretisches Wissen, sondern auch moralische Annahmen zweiter Ordnung.

Swinburne I
R. Swinburne
Justification of Induction Oxford 1974


Carnap V
W. Stegmüller
Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis
In
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987

St I
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989

St II
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987

St III
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987

St IV
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989

The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Materialism Stegmüller Vs Materialism Stegmüller IV 384
StegmüllerVsMaterialism: (i) It is surprising how well our two-dimensional perceptions are coordinated with each other. Largely Euclidean.
(ii) There is a constant interplay of data that Berkeley has to explain with a constant intervention of God (>occasionalism).
...(v) we can trace and explain the sensory physiology of the eye.
Such explanations are a problem for Berkeley's theory. How does it deal with it?
Stegmüller IV 422
Consciousness/Mind Body Problem/SwinburneVsMaterialism: 1. There must be a clear or ambiguous correspondence between any kind of conscious process and one or more kinds of brain processes.
2. This relationship must be interpreted causally. The materialist must show that all consciousness processes are predictable due to brain states.
3. He must show that causation is based on natural laws simple enough to serve explanatory purposes.
Mackie: agrees that we must adopt a dualism of physical and experiential (phenomenal) properties.
IV 423
MackieVsSwinburne: this dramatises and distorts materialism: it does not claim that physical explanations are given for everything. Only in principle should this be possible. Supervenience/Stegmüller: Thesis: that there can be no world different from our world without at least one physical difference.

Carnap V
W. Stegmüller
Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis
In
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987

St I
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989

St II
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987

St III
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987

St IV
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989
Swinburne, R. Mackie Vs Swinburne, R. Stegmüller IV 405
Proof for the existence of God/confirmation/MackieVsSwinburne: 1. How can we assert an output probability indicating that there is a God, if no such universe existed?
The data have to be taken from background knowledge.
IV 406
Then the background knowledge only contains logical and mathematical truths. How should they make the God hypothesis more likely? Swinburne: seemingly only compares two competing hypotheses:
a) That there is no specific cause and no further explanation for the complex universe
b) That there is a God.
Both hypothesis assume that there is the universe.
Background knowledge/Swinburne: our background knowledge includes all the knowledge about the world, but not religious assumptions. Then it is more likely that God exists than not.
proof of the existence of God/confirmation/MackieVsSwinburne:
2. The fact that the uncaused universe cannot be explained further, does not justify Swinburne's notion that it is "strange and surprising" or "very unlikely".
A hypothesis involving a divine creation is, on the other hand, quite unlikely!
If there were a God in the sense of traditional theism, it would certainly be very likely; but this is about the existence and not to the actions of an existing God.
IV 407
proof of the existence of God/Swinburne/Stegmüller: leans on considerations of simplicity: to accept omnipotence, infinite knowledge and infinite goodness means as much as "to assume the simplest kind of person"! MackieVs: contradictions between theists. greatness (Anselm) Vs simplicity.
MackieVsSwinburne: 1. The simplicity is achieved through the adoption of a series of actual infinities.
2. The peculiarity is not eliminated, but merely covered: why had God the preference, to create exactly this world?
3. A disembodied spirit is very unlikely. (And especially Swinburne workes with his scientific background and probabilities).
IV 408
4. If one wants to explain the order of the natural world by a divine plan, one has to explain the order in the divine plan! MackieVsSwinburne: doesn't call for complete explicability and universal intelligibility of the world (as did Leibniz). But he still demands explicability. He attempts to reduce the inexplicable part. Hew ants to do so without relying on a "sufficient reason" or "essential existence".
Unfortunately, it turns out that then he has nothing to justify that by adding God we explain something more.
IV 425/426
Explanation/MackieVsSwinburne: we as philosophers do not have the right to, first, mentally isolate and/or idealise that simple relation that interests us and is known to us from a truly very complicated procedure, and second to use this as a familiar model. (Argument). SwinburneVsMackie: might reply that it could belong to God's abilities to elicit the appropriate intentions in us. Stegmüller: but that is highly mysterious.
Explanation/Theism/MackieVsSwinburne: the personal explanation is not even a competitor but a special case of causal explanation!
1. It is just as fantastic and unlikely as the evolutionary explanation.
2. If each body soul relationship were to be explained, that would be a relapse into occasionalism
3. Locke: if divine omnipotence gave humans the ability to think, then why not also the stones? (> Thinking stones).

Macki I
J. L. Mackie
Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong 1977

St IV
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989

The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of an allied field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Theism Swinburne, R. Stegm IV 425
Theismus/Swinburne: personale Erklärung durch Schöpfer einfach plausibler als der Dualismus mit problematischer Wechselwirkung zwischen Physischem und Psychischem. Evolution/Swinburne: bestreitet nicht die Evolutionstheorie! (>Position).
IV 425/426
Erklärung/MackieVsSwinburne: wir haben als Philosophen nicht das Recht, in einem ersten Schritt aus einem in Wahrheit sehr komplizierten Vorgang diejenige einfache Beziehung, die uns interessiert und die uns bekannt ist, gedanklich zu isolieren und oder Idealisierungen anzustellen und in einem zweiten Schritt als vertrautes Modell zu verwenden. (Argument). SwinburneVsMackie: könnte erwidern, daß es zu Gottes Fähigkeiten gehören könnte, die entsprechenden Absichten in uns hervorzurufen. Stegmüller: das ist aber höchst mysteriös.

St IV
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989