Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 1 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Probability Suppes Wright I 156
Probability/Suppes/Wright, G. H.: on the role of probability in a causal analysis (P. Suppes, A Probabilistic Theory of Causality, Amsterdam, 1970). Suppes defines the concept of cause with reference to probability (p. 12). Definition prima facie cause/Suppes: another event for which the original probability of the first event after the occurrence of the second event is less than the probability of the first event after the occurrence of the second event.
HG. H. von WrightVsSuppes: it seems doubtful to me whether this is consistent with any common or natural use of "cause" (or "prima-facie cause").
Relevance/von WrightVsSuppes: however, the relevance of an event for the probability of another event can be called a kind of "causal relevance".

Suppes I
P. Suppes
Introduction to Logic Mineola 1999

Suppes II
P. Suppes
Models and Methods in the Philosophy of Science: Selected Essays New York 2010


WrightCr I
Crispin Wright
Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001

WrightCr II
Crispin Wright
"Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

WrightGH I
Georg Henrik von Wright
Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971
German Edition:
Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008

The author or concept searched is found in the following controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Suppes, P. Fraassen Vs Suppes, P. I 65
Mathematics/Philosophy of Science/Suppes: Thesis: Philosophy of science should use mathematics and not meta-mathematics.
I 66
Theory/Suppes: the form of theories: he used the set theory. E.g. a system of mechanics is a mathematical structure, in which points are replaced by a set-theoretic predicate. Fraassen: two interesting questions:
1) How can classical mechanics have a model that covers all phenomena without mentioning electricity? (see above, charge affects mutual attraction).
Solution: the mathematical structure could go beyond mechanics.
2) Unintended realizations: could it not be that a system of mechanics is also one of the optics at the same time? Fraassen: probably not, but there may be other examples of this kind. E.g. same formula regulates diffusion of gases and heat transport.
Important argument: then it’s possible that the intended realization of the theory is not empirically adequate, but rather if the phenomena in their models are integrated in an unexpected way.
Intention/Intended/Unintended/Fraassen: then it looks as if the intention was part of the theory? No, this is not necessary: ​​unintended realizations disappear if we consider a larger observable part of the world. E.g. optics and mechanics of moving light sources together.
Theory/FraassenVsSuppes: his approach is still a bit too shallow.

Fr I
B. van Fraassen
The Scientific Image Oxford 1980