Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 32 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Analyticity/Syntheticity | Strawson | Wright I 198 Strawson/Grice: E.g. our daily talk of analyticity is a sociological fact and therefore has enough discipline to be considered minimally capable of truth. >Minimalism, >Convention. StrawsonVsQuine/GriceVsQuine: it is hopeless to deny that a distinction exists, if it is not used within linguistic practice in a pre-arranged way that is capable of mutual agreement. >Analyticity/Quine, >Language use, >Language behavior, >Language community. QuineVsStrawson/QuineVsGrice: this is fully consistent with a cognitive psychology of the practical use of the distinction, which does not assume that we respond to exemplifications of the distinctions. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Attribution | Strawson | Frank I 641f Other Minds/Mental States/Strawson: one has to be both: self- and external attributor. Rorty: self-attribution originally based on the same type of observation as attribution.WittgensteinVsRorty: self-attribution without clues. DavidsonVsRorty: does not show that the attributions with/without clues affect the same entities. >Other minds, >Self-ascription. Donald Davidson (1984a): First Person Authority, in: Dialectica 38 (1984), 101-111 - - - Strawson I 127 StrawsonVsChisholm indirect attribution of direct attribution. ChisholmVsStrawson: reversed. >Attribution/Chisholm, >Self-ascription/Chisholm. I 141 Attribution/Gap/Strawson: there is no logical gap between self- and external attribution - otherwise depression disappears. Solution: special character of P predicates: that they can be attributed both to themselves and to others. >Terminology/Strawson. I 142 Analogy: Signs on playing cards identify them (criterion), but their meaning for the game goes beyond that - I 144 Difference. Self-attribution not because of observation - but predicates are no solution to the mind-body problem. >Predicates/Strawson, >Mind body problem. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Beliefs | Strawson | IV 103 BeliefStrawson: to understand beliefs, we need the concept of action. - We do not first learn how the world is and then learn how we can reshape our relationship to her. IV 113 BeliefStrawson: most beliefs do not start on personal experience with reality. >Convention/Strawson. Some beliefs must be general. - They must be able to be in conflict with others. Meggle I 276/77 Strawson: tautology: that someone who says p, also believes that p. HungerlandVsStrawson: not necessarily. He can speak incorrectly or with intent to deceive. Strawson IV 129 Belief/Wittgenstein: if we start to believe, then not a simple sentence, but a whole system of sentences. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Grice: > Meg I G. Meggle (Hg) Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung Frankfurt/M 1979 |
| Concepts | Millikan | I 253 Def Concept/Millikan: a concept denotes a set of intensions that regulate the repetition of an inner concept. Definition Concept/new/Millikan: (further definition): a concept is the ability to identify a thing. N.B.: then concepts show other dimensions beyond beliefs and intensions. >Identification, >Intension, >Belief. I 255 Concept of higher level/Millikan: a concept of higher level is no ability to identify an object, but correspondingly a higher ability: e.g. to recognize a rotated figure as the same figure. Thus, mental names for forms can be created. >Description level. I 256 For example, the ability to recognize people by their faces. >Recognition. I 272 Concept/property/predicate/Millikan: the relation between a concept and world lies between the head and the world and cannot be internalized. Cf. >Reference. I 273 Therefore, there is not even a one-to-one relationship between concepts and properties. Two concepts could correspond to one property and one concept (if it has ambiguous Fregean sense) can correspond to two properties. Even if we know of a concept that a property corresponds to it, this is never a priori knowledge. Properties/a priori/knowledge/Millikan: there is also no a priori knowledge about the incompatibility or compatibility or identity of properties. At most there is natural necessity (natural necessity). "Competition" between properties/MillikanVsStrawson: competition is just another type of "natural necessity" besides causality and identity. It is not a "logical competition". Logic/Concept/Necessity/Millikan: also "logical possibility" and "logical necessity" between concepts are ultimately natural necessities between concepts. Logic/Millikan: one should better consider logic as an empirical science. For example, "S cannot be at the same time P and not P" is either meaningless, because "S" and "P" have no meaning, or something like true because it is a statement about the nature of the world. I 315 Concept/Millikan: Concepts are abilities. Their adequacy is not destroyed by the appearance of a contradiction. I 323 Concept/Knowledge/Millikan: Concepts are abilities, but in an important respect unlike other abilities: e.g. the ability to start a car is so that we immediately know whether we succeed or not, when applying concepts we do not know immediately whether we succeed. Success/Validity/Concept/Millikan: to know the validity of our concepts, they must be able to occur more than once in the same judgment. This is sufficient to be as secure as we can that the concept is really from something real. >Knowledge, >Judgment. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Context/Context Dependence | Hungerland | I 266 HungerlandVs"Inductive Conception" of the context implication: to claim p implies, believe that p. Instead: if a claim is normal, everything is implied, what you may conclude. That depends on: 1) context, 2) assumptions about normality and 3) rules of use. I 277 HungerlandVsStrawson. > |
Hungerland I Isabel C. Hungerland Contextual Implication, Inquiry, 3/4, 1960, pp. 211-258 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 |
| Deceptions | Grice | Hungerland I 281ff Lying/deception/Hungerland: one must assert something in order to lie. I 300 f Strawson: deception/lie: the deception is the exception to the rule. HungerlandVsStrawson: deception is only possible in front of the right background. Avramides I 52 Deception/Grice: there are additional conditions: 2) there must be no inference element E such that S utters x by intendeding both: a) that A's determination of the reaction r is based on E and b) that A thinks S intends that a) is false. This is to prevent fraudulent intent. I 53 SchifferVs: this fails with the original counter-example. Solution/Schiffer: the solution here is mutual knowledge ad infinitum. Knowing that knowledge of a certain property is sufficient for the knowledge of a proposition. >Sufficiency, >Knowledge, >Communication. Then we also know that knowledge is sufficient. Avramides: e.g. being F, being G: speaker/listener are having intact sensory organs. |
Grice I H. Paul Grice "Meaning", in: The Philosophical Review 66, 1957, pp. 377-388 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Megle Frankfurt/M. 1993 Grice II H. Paul Grice "Utterer’s Meaning and Intentions", in: The Philosophical Review, 78, 1969 pp. 147-177 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Grice III H. Paul Grice "Utterer’s Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning", in: Foundations of Language, 4, 1968, pp. 1-18 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Grice IV H. Paul Grice "Logic and Conversation", in: P. Cple/J. Morgan (eds) Syntax and Semantics, Vol 3, New York/San Francisco/London 1975 pp.41-58 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Hungerland I Isabel C. Hungerland Contextual Implication, Inquiry, 3/4, 1960, pp. 211-258 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Deceptions | Strawson | Meggle I 318 Deception/Lie/Strawson: a lie is an exception to the rule. HungerlandVsStrawson: there are deceptions only before a proper background. Strawson: Lies are no correct use of the language. >Background, >Correctness, >Speech act, >Illocutionary act, >Perlocutionary act, >Errors. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Grice: > Meg I G. Meggle (Hg) Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung Frankfurt/M 1979 |
| Description Levels | Geach | I 202 Order/levels/GeachVsStrawson: statements about variables are not always of "higher order". "p" entails "q" could be only an assertion that the variable "p" entails the variable "q", which is certainly nonsense. We must provide the name of statements by quotes. >Levels/Order, >Quotation marks, >Name of a sentence, cf. >Equivalence/Geach. Negation "~" forms a sentence out of a sentence or a name of a sentence out of a name of a sentence if the name is preceded by: E.g. "~ Q". >Negation, cf. >interior/exterior/Carnap. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Descriptions | Millikan | I 175 Description/Millikan: we are here to find out what the stabilization function of definite and indefinite descriptions is. >Terminology/Millikan. We have to go on our own. We cannot rely on the tradition of Russell-Trawson-Donnellan. Reference/MillikanVsStrawson: we must assume that it is not just speakers who are referring, but we must assume that the linguistic expressions themselves also refer. I 176 Indefinite description/real value/Millikan: The real value is determined by the rest of the sentence, not by the indefinite description itself. I 177 Reference: is something different than an image! Indefinite description: maps, but without referring! Inner name: it is not the task of an indefinite desription to be translated into an inner name. Their normal eigenfunction is to be translated into an inner description, which still contains a general expression. I 178 Indefinite description: an indefinite description as a whole, is not a referential term. Tradition: has assumed however e.g. "an Indian friend of mine gave me this". Here I think of Rakesh. MillikanVsTradition: this leads to confusion. I leave the referent open on purpose. Reference: it is certainly true that I intended Rakesh, so I will also refer to him. N.B.: if Rakesh asks me later: "Did you tell them about me?" The correct answer is "No!". Eigenfunction/Descripion/Millikan: the eigenunction is not here to be translated into an inner name for Rakesh. On the other hand: Natural sign: is causally dependent. And the identification was finally caused by Rakesh, who gave me the book. >Identification, >Reference. I 179 Causality/description/real value/Millikan: The causal connection of an intentional icon with its real value makes it possible for the listener to use it as a natural sign. >Causality, >Causal theory of knowledge. N.B.: thus a new inner name can be coined. ((s) Not an already existing inner name). Definition "natural referent"/indefinite description/Terminology/Millikan: any indefinite description has a real value in accordance with a normal explanation, the "natural referents". This also applies to stories (fiction). But this is not a public reference. Here, causality and mapping rules do not matter. >Fiction. Public referent/Millikan: a definite description or name can have (by chance) a public referent, without having a natural referent. Therefore an indefinite description can have a natural one without having a public one. I 181 Real value/definite descripion/Millikan: the real value of a definite description is determined by the rest of the sentence. E.g.: Which of my friends was it? The one who gave me the book. I 185 Description/Millikan. E.g. "my brother" is neither definite nor indefinite. I can use the description if I have one or more brothers. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Everything he said is true | Strawson | Horwich I 214 Everything he said/Strawson/Cohen: E.g. - what the policeman said is true. - Here "true" is not needed to make a statement. - With that the paradoxes disappear. Solution: mere presupposition that a statement was made. If we would make no statements with that, paradoxes would ever disappear. CohenVsStrawson: a judge could take this as evidence of the character of the policemen - but it is not.(1) 1. 1. Peter F. Strawson, "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950, in: Paul Horwich (ed.) Theories of Truth, Aldershot 1994 --- Horwich I 216 Everything he said/Cohen: E.g. - for all p. if the police officer claims that p, then p.- Here paradoxes may again arise, analog to the truth paradox. >Paradoxes. Paradox/logical form/Cohen: paradoxes can occur when in (p):(x).f(p.x)>. ~ p. This expression can occur as a whole as the value of p.(2) 2. Laurence Jonathan Cohen, "Mr. Strawson’s Analysis of Truth", Analysis 10 (1950) pp. 136-140, in: Paul Horwich (ed.) Theories of Truth, Aldershot 1994 |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Existence | Hungerland | I 312 Existence/Hungerland: the talk about "the S" does not require that there should be only one S in the world! Rather, there should only be one S to which I refer in context. Correct/wrong/HungerlandVsStrawson: Stawson would have to show that Shakespeare was wrong: e.g. Macbeth: "Is that a dagger what I see before me?" Strawson: saying that "the S is P" presupposes the existence of an S! |
Hungerland I Isabel C. Hungerland Contextual Implication, Inquiry, 3/4, 1960, pp. 211-258 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 |
| Facts | Prior | I 5/6 FactsPrior: true propositions are in order - but not true propositions. >Facts/Austin, >Facts/Brandom. But also partial sentences are facts - they are not tied to utterance. >Clauses, >Utterances. Propositions are not tied to uttering: the sun was hot before man appeared. >Propositions, >Reality. I 23 Fact/Strawson: facts are what statements notice - not what statements (sentences) are. >Facts/Strawson. Prior: They are not an object in addition to objects. - Facts and statements fit together, they were made to fit together. >World/Thinking, >Language and thought. PriorVsStrawson: then "no facts without statement" (false) and "Facts are logical constructions" (also wrong because they are "in the world"). Cf. >World/Rorty. Wittgenstein: facts are the world, not in the world. >Facts/Wittgenstein, >States of affairs/Wittgenstein. Prior: this is harmless, they are not "in" sentences either. Cfr. >Thought/Russell. |
Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
| Facts | Searle | III 44ff Institutional facts/Searle: e.g. money, elections, universities, chess, etc. First, there must be something physical. Fact/Searle: a fact is something outside the statement that makes it true, like a condition. Fact/Austin/Strawson: a fact is what is said, not something that is testified about. III 212 Fact/Searle: a fact is a general name for the conditions how sentences relate to ... something. III 219 Strawson: facts are not complex things or groups of things. Fact and statement are not two independent entities and facts are not language independent. Facts are not what statements are "about". Frege: a fact is a true statement (StrawsonVs, AustinVs). Strawson: they are not identical, because they play different roles: facts are causal statements, not statements. III 214 Facts are "internal accusative" for true statements (spurious relation). III 219 Fact/Searle: a fact can only be formulated but not named. III 215 Searle: facts are not true statements. A fact has a causal relation - several statements are possible for a fact. >Truth makers. III 219 Fact/Searle: a fact is something outside the statement that makes it true - a condition. III 219ff Fact/Strawson: a fact is that what is said, not something that is testified about. ((s) Like Brandom). >Fact/Brandom. SearleVsStrawson: a fact is not a true statement. A fact has causal relation - several statements are possible for a fact. ((s) Like Austin). >Fact/Strawson, >Fact/Austin. V 145 Facts/situations/Searle: misleading: facts about an object. There can be no facts about an object identified independently of facts! >Fact/Wittgenstein, >State of affairs/Wittgenstein. Otherwise one approached the traditional substance (VsWittgenstein, Tractatus). Quantification via objects is misleading. It is better to say: "there are examples". |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| I, Ego, Self | Evans | Frank I 24 I/EvansVsDescartes: the I is the body! - The I-centered space becomes an objective world place only when the subject can transfer it to a public map and recognize it. - The convertibility of the speaker's perspective, which has been described demonstratively, requires an independent space. --- Frank I 485f I/Evans: 1. void of criteria, 2. limited access (not everyone, not at any time) - 3. the manner of givenness is dependent on the existence: I must be in the place to say "here", but change is possible ("new meaning, old meaning "). --- I 488 I-thoughts are de re. (They need information). --- I 503 I/GeachVsDescartes: instead of "I get into a terrible mess!" I can also say: "This is really a terrible confusion" - Strawson: "There is a pain" instead of "I have pain". EvansVsGeach/EvansVsStrawson: a part of the reference is to make its audience do something. --- I 504 I/Evans: our view of ourselves is not idealistic: we can understand the following without being able to justify or decide it: e.g. "I have been stilled" - "I will die". --- I 545 "Here"/"I"/Evans: "here" and "I" are equal, both are not possible without the other. |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| I, Ego, Self | Geach | Frank I 503 I/GeachVsDescartes: instead of "I get into a terrible mess!" I can also say: "This is really a terrible confusion". Strawson: also "there is pain" instead of "I am in pain". EvansVsGeach/EvansVsStrawson: for reference, it is necessary to get one's audience into something. >Reference, >Relations, >Pain, >Situation, >Description, >Self-identification, >Gareth Evans, >R. Descartes, >Dualism. Gareth Evans(1982): Self-Identification, in: G.Evans The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/NewYork 1982, 204-266 |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Identification | Strawson | I 57 Identification/Strawson: if directly due to localization then without mentioning of other particulars - E.g. death depends on living things - e.g. but flash not from something flashing. >Dependence. I 64 Identification/Strawson: observable particulars can also be identified without mentioning their causes or the things on which they depend, - conceptual dependency does not matter - but one cannot always identify births without identifying them as the birth of a living being. I 65 Asymmetry: we do not need necessarily a term in language for births as particulars - but for living beings, because we are living beings ourselves. >Continuant, >Person, >Subject. I 66 Identifiability/particular/Strawson: minimum condition: they must be neither private nor unobservable. >Particulars/Strawson, >Language community, cf. >Private language, >Understanding, >Communication. I 87 Identificaion/Strawson: we cannot talk about private things when we cannot talk about public things. I 153 Identification/StrawsonVsLeibniz: identification requires a demonstrative element: that contradicts Leibniz monads for which there should be descriptions alone in general term. >General terms. Then, according to Leibniz, identification (individuation) is only possible for God: the "complete term" of an individual. That is at the same time a description of the entire universe (from a certain point, which guarantees the uniqueness). >Complete concept. I 245 Identification/Universal/names/particulars/Strawson: speaker/listener each must know a distinctive fact about Socrates. But it must not be the same - E.g. "That man there can lead you". Crucial: that someone stands there - N.B.: no part introduces a single thing, but the statement as a whole presents it. >Particulars/Strawson, >Introduction/Strawson. VII 124 Identification/reference/Strawson: E.g. "That man there has crossed the channel by swimming through it twice" - it has the (wrong!) appearances, that one "refers twice", a) once by stating nothing and consequently making no statement, or b) identifying the person with oneself and finding a trivial identity. StrawsonVs: this is the same error as to believe that the object would be the meaning of the expression. E.g. "Scott is Scott". >Waverley example. --- Tugendhat I 400-403 Identification/Strawson: a) pointing b) description, spacetime points. TugendhatVsStrawson: because he had accepted Russell's theory of direct relation unconsciously, he did not see that there are no two orders. Tugendhat like Brandom: demonstrative identification presupposes the spatiotemporal, non-demonstrative - (deixis presupposes anaphora). >Deixis/Brandom. Difference: specification/Tugendhat: "which of them all?" Identification: only kind: by spacetime points. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Identification | Tugendhat | I 395 Identification/TugendhatVsStrawson: uses identification in the narrow sense. >Frederick Strawson. Tugendhat: my own notion "specification" (which of all objects is meant) is superior to this concept. >Specification. "picking out" (to pick put) is Strawson's expression - (assumed from Searle) - (Quine: "to specify"). I 400ff Identification/Identification/Tugendhat: space-time-location: this is an object - Specification: reference, stand for (another term) (in front of background of all other objects). >Reference, >Background. I 415 Identification/particular/TugendhatVsStrawson: space-time-relation not only anchored perceptively but also system of possible perception stand points - thus a system of demonstrative specification (in front of background). >Space, >Spacetime. I 417 Trough space-time description the perceptible object is specified as more perceptible - an essentially perceptibable cannot be the previous object who it is. Reference: is then to specify a verification situation. >Verification. I 422 Distinguishing objects only from variable usage situations of perception predicates. I 426 Particular/Identification/TugendhatVsStrawson: "here", "now" suffice as object to make space-time locations existent. >Demonstratives, >Index words, >Indexicality. Space-time-locations are the most elementary objects - but there must also be something - at least hypothetically, then the corresponding question of verification provides, for which object the singular term stands. >Singular terms, >Objects. Top-down: the use of all singular terms refers to demonstrative expressions - bottom-up: if the verification situation for the applicability of the predicate is described by demonstratives. I 436 Localization/identification/Tugendhat: only by several speakers - not zero point, but set of surrounding objects. - The subjective zero point may be the own position. >Subjectivity. I 462 Identification/Tugendhat: spatial and temporal relation between objects insufficient - an infinite number of space-time locations, finitely many objects - presupposing space-time system - reference to space-time-points cannot fail. Talk of existence without location is pointless. - Identification only by simultaneous reference to all other (possible) objects. - Therefore existence sentences are general. >Existence, >Existence statements. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Individuation | Pinker | I 148 Individuation/Pinker: e.g. two beams can be at the same time in the same place - PinkerVsStrawson: this shows that "the presence in one place at a time" does not make all our "intellectual definition" of "individual". >Individual, >Particular/Strawson, >Individuation/Strawson. |
Pi I St. Pinker How the Mind Works, New York 1997 German Edition: Wie das Denken im Kopf entsteht München 1998 |
| Logical Proper Names | Strawson | VII 111 Logical proper names/StrawsonVsRussell: "This" is no log pr. name: one must know what the phrase means in order to respond to it. >Context dependence, >Index words, >Indexicality, >Logical proper names/Russell. Tugendhat I 387/388 Logical proper names/StrawsonVsRussell: logical proper names are merely fictional, no ambiguous name but a deictic expression, it has a uniform meaning and shall refer to different objects (according to the use in different situations). >Situations. TugendhatVsRussell: Russell overlooks the fact that the same objects may also be referred to by other terms. TugendhatVsStrawson: Strawson overlooked the fact that he himself presupposed Russell’s theory. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Particulars | Strawson | Graeser I 163 Particulars/Strawson: Particulars have priority in our conceptual system - ability to attribute consciousness to predicates necessary. Condition for them for physical predicates. >Attribution, >Physical/psychic, >Introduction/Strawson. Graeser I 224 Strawson: These particulars take precedence of processes or events that we could not identify without them. >Identification/Strawson, >Individuation/Strawson. --- Newen I 150 VsStrawson/Newen/Schrenk: why should just particulars be the most fundamental reference objects of subject terms and not events? - Strawson: because objects are recognizable after some time - his arguments are transcendental. --- Strawson I 35ff Particular/Strawson: as long as it is isolated from the rest of the knowledge, we can learn nothing new about it. I 51 Particular/Strawson: is there a class of particular on which all others depend? - Maybe dependent "private particular". Elementary: Class of People. Tradition: private particular: "Emotions" fundamental. I 52 Principium indivduationis/Strawson: is based on identity of persons. I 70 Particular/Strawson: material bodies: fundamental for the identification - not for process - StrawsonVsRussell: not biography instead of the names. >Acquaintance. I 72 Description of particular does not force to mention the process - but identification dependency of processes of the particulars in which they take place - because things require space, processes not always. >Space/Strawson, cf. >Process-ontology. I 175 Particular/properties/Strawson: one cannot only refer identifying to particulars - VsTradition: therefore object character is not a criterion for particulars. I 176 RamseyVs Particular/properties/RamseyVsTradition: from the fact that two things are linked, it does not follow that they must have different characters. >Reference/Strawson, >Particularization/Ramsey. Strawson: 1. grammatical criterion for distinguishing between things and activities 2. categorical criterion. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Grae I A. Graeser Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002 New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
| Particulars | Tugendhat | I 422 Particulars/TugendhatVsDonnellan: localizing identifications are fundamental. Cf. >Individuation/Strawson, >Individuation, >Identification, >Localization. With these, there is no longer a distinction between referential and attributive use. >Attributive/referential. Attributive is also referential in a broad sense because, although it does not identify the object, it specifies it (distinguishes it against a background). >Specification. I 426 Einzelding/Identification/TugendhatVsStrawson: "here", "now" suffice to make object and spacetime places existent. >Demonstratives, >Logical proper names. Spacetime places are the most elementary objects. >Ontology. But there must be something there - at least hypothetically, then corresponding question of verification provides for which object the singular term stands. >Singular terms, >Empty space, >Substantivalism, >Relationism. Top-down: the use of all singular terms refers to demonstrative expressions. Bottom-up: when demonstratives denote the verificational situation for the predicate to be true. >Predicates, >Satisfaction, >Situation. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Predicates | Millikan | I 109 Subject/predicate/picture/Millikan: thesis: there is no difference between the way in which logical subjects of sentences map... I 110 ...the world, and the way in which logical predicates do this. 1. Because one can replace predicates by other predicates, e.g. "... swims" by "... flies", they are still not to be viewed as objects. (BrandomVsMillikan/(s): distinction between the frame and the insertion-"gap"). 2. Question: Do predicates have to correspond to universals when we treat them as substances? In any case, we must not look at them as single objects, but rather as in tradition as thought objects or as possibilities. Universals/Millikan: universals as thought objects; are they in nature? Predicates/Millikan: every simple predicate must reflect a historically variability rooted in nature ((s) disjunction, >disjunctive). Complex Predicates/Millikan: They too are supposed to reflect variables of nature, but they do not have to be things. Property/kind/Millikan: property and kind have only one settlement space: that is nature itself. >Natural kind. I 111 3. Relation/property/Millikan: as variants within facts they receive intentionality from causal and explanatory connections! Then they must be in the same way in nature as is their identity or their sameness. >Identity/Millikan, >Terminology/Millikan. I 227 Negation/Predicate/Logical Subject/Millikan: the common basis in the opposite corresponds to the logical subject. E.g. Bill cannot be both large and small at the same time. >Negation/Millikan. Negation: operates on the logical predicate. It does not change the meaning (the mapping rules). It operates on the part of the logical predicate, which is the grammatical predicate of the sentence. E.g. "painfully disappointed, Johnny never came back". Embedded sentence: "Johny was painfully disappointed": is embedded in the grammatical subject. Truthmaker: Problem: e.g. "some day-active bats are not herbivores" is not made true by the fact that all bats are nocturnal. Negative sentence: its function is to give positive information. A useful negative sentence will limit the domain of possibilities. I 228 External negation: "it is not the case that ..." may also affect more than the grammatical predicate. >External negation. I 272 Subject/Predicate/Strawson/Millikan: (Subject and predicate in "Logic and Grammar") Millikan: I replaced "general concept" here by "properties": fundamental asymmetry: particular: space-temporal, exemplifying properties that come from a certain domain. Then we know for each property that it is in competition with others. Asymmetry: there is no such competition for particulars. No individual competes with others for properties within a domain. No things are related to each other, so that for each property that exemplifies the one, it would follow that the other does not exemplify them (even not at the same time). MillikanVsStrawson: but what is "logical competition" among properties? It is traditionally recognized among concepts, but we cannot transfer it to properties and relations. >Particulars/Strawson. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Presuppositions | Hungerland | I 300 Presupposition/Strawson: Definition "S presupposes S'": the truth of S' is a necessary condition of the truth or falsity of the assertion that S. E.g. "All my children sleep tight" presupposes "I have children". I 303 HungerlandVsStrawson: the relationship that it defines is not that of context implication. I also imply that I believe to have children. Strawson's definition does not refer to the beliefs or intentions of speakers or listeners, nor to any circumstances of communication. I 304 HungerlandVsStrawson: the presupposition seems to contain a hidden rule. What is it? It is rather a formal logical rule than one of the normal language. I 309 Strawson/presupposition: "the S is P". Hungerland: a presupposition consists of two independent parts: 1. function of the specific article (relevant grammar). Strawson's model is a logical explanation model. HungerlandVsStrawson: normal communication does not proceed in this way. I 310 HungerlandVsStrawson: Strawson has mixed up rules and exception (in regard to frequency). I 318 StrawsonHungerland: Strawson also takes mistakes as exceptions from the rule (HungerlandVs). I 320 E.g. survey service: "Have you switched on your TV right now?". If one has no device, the answer is "No", correct? Hungerland: all respondents answered "Right!" Exception: a philosopher. I 321 Rules/Hungerland: rules are only useful if they are formulated according to actions that can be considered a standard. |
Hungerland I Isabel C. Hungerland Contextual Implication, Inquiry, 3/4, 1960, pp. 211-258 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 |
| Presuppositions | Rynin | Meggle I 303 Presupposition/RyninVsStrawson: ...then it follows, paradoxically, that all of the prerequisite allegations were true: it should apply: S > S and S ~> S", but it is also true that S v ~ S. It follows that: S" - in other words,. (~ S"> ~ (S v ~ S))> S. HungerlandVsStrawson: Strawson's presupposition is not a context-implication - it implies in addition that I believe to have children. VsStrawson: normal communication does not go like that. >Context, cf. >Implicature. Meggle I 300 Def Presupposition/Strawson: Def "S presupposes S': The truth of S' is a necessary condition of the truth or falsity of the assertion that S. E.g. "All my children sleep tight" presupposes "I have children". Meggle I 303 David RyninVsStrawson: paradoxically from this interpretation follows that all presupposed assertions would be true: S > S' and ~ S > S'; but also this applies: S v ~ S. From this follows: S'. In other words: (~S' (S v ~ S))> S is analytically true in a system of bivalent propositional logic. >Bivalence, >Propositional logic. |
Grice: > Meg I G. Meggle (Hg) Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung Frankfurt/M 1979 |
| Proper Names | Burkhardt | Wolf II 337 Namen/Kripke: haben keinen Fregeschen Sinn (Bedeutung) - BurkhardtVsKripke: der muß aber manchmal ergänzt werden II 341 Namen/BurkhardtVsFrege: seine Ansicht ist falsch, Eigennamen hätte sowohl Bedeutung als auch Sinn - BurkhardtVsStrawson: wenn Namen keinerlei Bezeichnung, was soll dann Konvention sein? Namen/Wittgenstein: doch "mere tags" - Burckhardt: dann muß das Kontextprinzip für Namen aufgegeben werden II 345 Bedeutung/Namen/Burkhardt: drei Möglichkeiten: 1. Namen haben Bedeutung, dann ist das, gemäß der Konventionen der Träger - 2. alle Namen haben dieselbe Bedeutung: nämlich ihre eindeutige Referenzfunktion! (Gebrauchstheorie) - 3. Namen haben gar keine Bedeutung II 358 Namen/Burkhardt: können auch appellative Funktion haben: Bsp "Einstein ist der Kopernikus des 20. Jahrh." - Vorstellungen über Eigenschaften - These so läßt sich die Bedeutung doch in Referent und Sinn aufteilen. So ist alles Subjektive getilgt - die eine oder die andere Seite kann dominieren, der Sinn kann an die Stelle des Referenten treten |
Burk I A. Burkhardt Politik, Sprache und Glaubwürdigkeit. Linguistik des politischen Skandals Göttingen 2003 K II siehe Wol I U. Wolf (Hg) Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993 |
| Properties | Strawson | IV 67/68 properties/Strawson: one could concede that attributes and properties are ontologically of secondary importance. Reference to characteristics presupposes the reference to objects but not vice versa. >Reference, >Attributes, >Things/Strawson, >Properties. IV 69 VsQuine: quantification over properties: e.g. "there is a property that no thing has: perfection". >Quantification/Quine, >Schematic letters/Quine, >Properties/Quine, >Second Order Logic. IV 67 Reference/Strawson: particulars are possible without reference to properties. ((s) QuineVsStrawson: when Quine says being means being value of a bound variable, it means there are no properties without objects). >Bound variable. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Reference | Evans | I 314ff To mean/reference/divine standpoint/Wittgenstein/Evans: for example, someone is in love with one of two identical twins - God, if he could look into his/her head, could not tell with which of them the person is in love, if the person itself does not know in a moment. ((s) Because no additional information could be found in the mental state and in the twin.)- Evans: the (description-) theory of the mind cannot explain why erroneous descriptions cannot give the impetus. I 325 Reference/Evans: Reference is also possible if the description is not fulfilled, but not designation. I 328 Reference/Names/Evans: in general, we refer to the thing that is the source of the prevailing information. I 333ff Reference/Evans: reference is defined by information sets, not by fitting. --- Frank I 22 Evans: between Frege and Perry: saves Fregean sense, but meaning = reference! I 24ff Meaning unequal Reference/Evans: e.g. "today": the meaning remains, the speaker changes. > "Fido"-Fido-Theory/Evans: equals the meaning and the reference: > I/Evans. Frank I 503 EvansVsGeach/EvansVsStrawson: one aspect of the reference is to make your audience do something. Gareth Evans(1982): Self-Identification, in: G.Evans The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/NewYork 1982, 204-266 |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Self- Identification | Strawson | Frank I 521 I/Self-Identification/Strawson: question: "Why are states of consciousness at all attributed to any subject and why are they attributed to exactly the same thing as certain physical properties? >Particulars/Strawson, >I, Ego, Self/Strawson, >Space/Strawson, >Body. EvansVsStrawson: "natural little theory of our world": 1st "I take this to be true and am on place p, so this applies to p" 2nd conversely, "if this does not apply to p, I can not perceive it" 3rd "before I was at p, so now I still have to be at p". Gareth Evans(1982): Self-Identification, in: G.Evans The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/NewYork 1982, 204-266 |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Statements | Strawson | Meggle I 300 According to Hungerland Presupposition/Strawson: Definition "S requires S": The truth of S is a necessary condition of the truth or falsity of the claim that S. E.g. "All my children are fast asleep" presupposes "I have children." David RyninVsStrawson: from this interpretation follows, paradoxically, that all prerequisite statements were true: it should be: S>S" and ~ S>S"; but it is also true that Sv~S. It follows: S". In other words: (~ S"> ~ (Sv ~ S))> S is analytically true in a system of divalent propositional logic. --- Horwich I 186 Statement/Strawson: ambiguous: a) Saying, speech act b) the said, the content what is true or false - the plot is not true or false. AustinVsStrawson: s are the speech acts themselves which are w/f - or truth is attributed to speech acts.(1) >Speech acts. 1. Peter F. Strawson, "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950, in: Paul Horwich (ed.) Theories of Truth, Aldershot 1994 --- Strawson I 193 Statement/Strawson: more comprehensive than assertion. I 205 Statement/Strawson: the binding part of the sentence is the sign of saying "Socrates is ..." If this "is" is seen as autonomous, then no difference between A and B anymore. >"Is", >Copula, >Identity. II 246/47 Statement/Strawson: double meaning: a) what I say, b) my saying. It is about truth, regardless of whether the utterance was made. >Utterance/Strawson. StrawsonVsSpeech Act Theory: truth is not to be attributed to the event. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Grice: > Meg I G. Meggle (Hg) Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung Frankfurt/M 1979 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Subjects | Searle | V 182 Subject/predicate/SearleVsStrawson: there is a functional difference between subject and predicate: the subject identifies the object and the predicate characterizes the already identified object. V 150 Predication/object/existence/Searle: Problem: e.g. "Sam is drunk". Question: Is there anything that corresponds to "is drunk" in the same way as Sam corresponds to "Sam"? V 151 Frege: Yes, a term. Here, it is the term "drunkenness". Problem: this violates the Leibniz Law (interchangeability salva veritate): Example: "Sam is drunkenness". Frege's solution: "the term horse is not a term, but an object". Term/Frege: "term" exhibits a predicament of language. The term "term" is used in a double sense. The term "horse" can be a grammatical subject but not a grammatical predicate of a sentence. The quality of being a horse is not itself an attribution of a quality. V 173 Frege did not succeed in demonstrating a symmetry of subject and predicate. ((s)> Brandom: proves necessary asymmetry). >Singular terms/Brandom. V 174 Term Theory/Strawson/Thesis: both the subject and the predicate identify "non-linguistic entities". They introduce them into the proposition where they are linked by a "non-relational connection". (SearleVs). |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Universals | Searle | V 176 Universals/Searle: universals are harmless, it means that predicates are meaningful. They are not ontological presuppositions. A universal is a purely linguistic entity (VsStrawson). >Universal/Strawson. Universals are identified by meanings, not by facts. "Friendly" is primary - friendliness is derivative. Tradition: universal: coincidence of existence and essence. Searle: universals: are not in the world, only in the language. V 183 Universals/Searle: e.g. "is friendly" presupposes friendliness. This is an > Abstraction of predicate expressions. These take precedence over property names. >Predicates/Searle. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| World | Evans | Frank I 521 EvansVsStrawson: "natural little theory of our world": 1st I take this to be true and am at the point p, so this applies to p 2nd conversely, if this does not apply to p, I can not perceive it 3rd I was at p before, so now I cannot be at p anymore". >Certainty, >Knowledge. Gareth Evans(1982): Self-Identification, in: G.Evans The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/NewYork 1982, 204-266 |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Frege, G. | Burkhardt Vs Frege, G. | Wolf II 341 BurkhardtVsFrege: seine Ansicht ist falsch, Eigennamen hätte sowohl Bedeutung als auch Sinn. II 342 Namen/Burkhardt: unterscheiden sich von allen übrigen Wortarten dadurch, dass sie nur in der aktuellen Verwendung auf etwas referieren können. (parole). Wenn ich einen Namen höre, weiß ich schon, bevor ich weiß, auf wen er referiert, dass er sich auf ein Individuum bezieht. II 343 Referenz/Strawson: nicht Ausdrücke referieren, sondern Menschen mit Hilfe von Sprachzeichen. Burkhardt: das gilt nicht von Eigennamen: bevor sie in der Sprechhandlung auf etwas verweisen können, muss ihre Beziehung zu dem Referenten bereits vorher konventionell festgelegt sein. Namen/Benennen/Wittgenstein: (PI § 15): "Es wird sich oft nützlich erweisen, wenn wir uns beim Philosophieren sagen: Etwas benennen, das ist etwas Ähnliches, wie einem Ding ein Namenstäfelchen anheften". (> mere tags). Namen/Burkhardt: so muss Freges Kontextprinzip (Frege-Prinzip) in Bezug auf Namen aufgegeben werden!. II 343/344 Frege hatte deshalb guten Grund, den Gegenstand als die Bedeutung des Namens anzunehmen! (>"mere tag"). Namen/Strawson: haben keinen Beschreibungsgehalt. BurkhardtVsStrawson: damit ist völlig unklar geworden, was er unter Konventionen verstehen will. Bedeutung/Namen/Träger/Burkhardt: die Namenbedeutung besteht im Trägerbezug. Das sind die allgemeinen Referenzkonventionen. Namen/Bedeutung/Kriterien/Wittgenstein/Searle/Frege/Russell: die Identitätskriterien im Sinne von Vorstellungen über den Träger sind wesentlich für die Bedeutung des Namens. (Lager). Namen/Bedeutung/Existenz/WittgensteinVsFrege: Bsp "Nothung hat eine scharfe Schneide" hat auch dann Sinn, wenn Nothung zerschlagen ist. II 345 Name nicht Träger: wenn Herr N.N. stirbt, ist nicht der Name gestorben. Sonst hätte es keinen Sinn zu sagen "Herr N.N. ist gestorben". Kriterien/Bedeutung/Alltagssprache/Burkhardt: die Alltagssprache gibt kein Kriterium bei philosophischen oder wissenschaftlichen Entscheidungen ab: Die Alltagssprache entscheidet zwar, welche Bedeutung ein Wort hat, aber nicht, was Bedeutung ist! Bedeutung/Namen/Burkhardt: drei Möglichkeiten: 1. Namen haben Bedeutung, dann ist das, gemäß der Konventionen der Träger 2. alle Namen haben dieselbe Bedeutung: nämlich ihre eindeutige Referenzfunktion! (Gebrauchstheorie). 3. Namen haben gar keine Bedeutung. II 349 Sinn/Namen/Identität/BurkhardtVsFrege: dass Identitätsurteile informativ seien, dafür sei es notwendig, dass der Sinn auf beiden Seiten des Gleichheitszeichens verschieden ist, während der Referent identisch ist. II 350 Burkhardt: die Aussage wäre aber auch dann informativ, wenn der Hörer mit keinem der beiden Namen eine Vorstellung verbände. So wird Sinn doppeldeutig. Dass unterschiedliche Vorstellung überhaupt bestehen, ist nur ein Sonderfall. So ist der Sinn etwas Sekundäres. Deshalb kann auch der als subjektiv verstandene Sinn nicht zur Bedeutung gehören. |
Burk I A. Burkhardt Politik, Sprache und Glaubwürdigkeit. Linguistik des politischen Skandals Göttingen 2003 K II siehe Wol I U. Wolf (Hg) Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993 |
| Grice, P.H. | Quine Vs Grice, P.H. | Wright I 198 Disputational Supervenience/Wright: a discourse supervenes another one if disagreements in one depend on disagreements in the other. StrawsonVsQuine/GriceVsQuine: it is hopeless to deny that a discrimination exists when it is used not in a prearranged but in a mutually unifiable way within linguistic practice. QuineVsStrawson/QuineVsGrice: this is fully consistent with a cognitive psychology of the practical use of the distinction, which does not assume that we are responding to instantiations of distinctions. Strawson/Grice: E.g. our daily talk of analyticity is a sociological fact and therefore has enough discipline to be considered as minimally capable of truth. QuineVsGrice/QuineVsStrawson: this is far from proving that a sort of intuitive realism can be seen in it. Obstacle: it remains to be explained how modal judgments generally exert cognitive coercion. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Ordinary Language | Dummett Vs Ordinary Language | Dummett (e) III 185 Oxford Philosophy/Dummett: strongest influence: by Ryle. RyleVsCarnap: false methodology VsHeidegger: Laughing stock - Ryle: influence of Husserl. III (e) 196 Particularism/Utility Theory/Oxford/Dummett: supposedly, the UT could only explain each sentence. The philosopher should not want to discover a pattern where there is none. DummettVs: we do not learn language sentence by sentence, either! However, right: It is the sentences and not the words which have a "use" in the general sense. III (e) 196/197 Everyday language: here the Oxford philosophy could not contribute anything (because of their anti systematic approach) to the better understanding of those principles on the basis of which we obviously learn the language so quickly. (> Chomsky). DummettVsOxford: continuously used psychological and semantic terms that a theory of meaning must not assume but explain! E.g. "Express an attitude" "reject a question", etc. (DummettVsAustin). Likewise "truth" and "falsehood" were constantly used unexplained. III (e) 198 DummettVsParticularism: disregarded the distinction semantic/pragmatic. Anyone who is not in the claws of theory would initially tend to distinguish what a sentence literally says from what one might try to communicate with it in special circumstances. According to the "philosophy of everyday language" only the latter term is considered to be legitimate. "literal meaning" was considered an illegitimate byproduct. III (e) 199 DummettVsOxford, DummettVsStrawson: artificially introduced new concepts such as "presupposition" or "conversation implicature" or DummettvsAustin: the distinction between "illocutionary" and "perlocutionary" acts (DummettVsSpeech act theory) took the place of the general semantic concepts, and without anyone noticing the "normal language" (everyday language) ceased to exist. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Russell, B. | Strawson Vs Russell, B. | Wolf II 17 StrawsonVsRussell: Vs Russell's resolution of singular sentences like "the F, which is G, is H" are general sentences such as "There is exactly one F, which is G, and this F is H" : this is inappropriate. Thus it is not included, that we refer with the singular term to individual things. --- Newen/Schrenk I 92 Reference/StrawsonVsRussell: ("On Referring") in 1950, 45 years after Russell's "On Denoting" (1905)). Strawson: 5 theses (i) one must distinguish between a) the sentence, b) the use, c) the expression (on one occasion) (ii) there is a difference between (logical) implying and presupposition (iii) truth value gaps are allowed (iv) The meaning of an expression is not its referent, but the conventions and rules. In various uses the term can therefore refer to different objects. (v) expressions can be used referential and predicative (attributing properties). Sentence/truth value/tr.v./Strawson: Thesis: sentences themselves cannot be true or false, only their use. Presupposition/implication/Strawson: difference: Definition implication/Strawson: A implies B iff it cannot be that A is true but B is false. On the other hand: Definition presupposition/Strawson: A presupposes B iff B must be true so that A can take a truth value. Existence assertion/uniqueness assertion/Strawson: are only presupposed by a sentence with description, but not implied. E.g. King of France/presupposition/Strawson: the sentence presupposes the existence, however, does not imply it. And also does not claim the existence and uniqueness. Newen/Schrenk VsStrawson: Strawson provides no philosophical-logical arguments for his thesis. Newen/Schrenk I 94 He rather refers to our everyday practice. Truth-value gaps/StrawsonVsRussell: accepted by him. Negative existential statements/existence/existence theorem/Strawson/VsStrawson/Newen/Schrenk: his approach lets the problem of empty existence theorems look even trickier. Referential/predicative/singular term/designation/name/Strawson/Newen/Schrenk: Thesis: Proper names/demonstratives: are largely used referential. Description: have a maximum predicative, so descriptive meaning (but can also simultaneously refer). Identity/informative identity sentences/referential/predicative/Strawson/Newen/Schrenk: here the description has (or two occurring descriptions) such an extreme predicative use that E.g. "Napoleon is identical to the man who ordered the execution of the Duke" is as good as synonymous with the phrase "Napoleon ordered the ...". In principle, both sentences are used for a predication. Thus, the first sentence is informative when it is read predicative and not purely referential. --- Quine I 447 StrawsonVsRussell: has called Russell's theory of descriptions false because of their treatment of the truth value gaps. --- Schulte III 433 StrawsonVsRussell/Theory of descriptions: Strawson brings a series of basic distinctions between types and levels of use of linguistic expressions into play. Fundamental difference between the logical subject and logical predicate. Pleads for stronger focus on everyday language. "The common language has no exact logic" Schulte III 434 King-xample: "The present king of France is bald". Russell: here the description must not be considered a logical subject. Russell: Such sentences are simply wrong in the case of non-existence. Then we also not need to make any dubious ontological conditions. We analyze (according to Russell) the sentence as follows: it is in reality a conjunction of three sentences: 1. There is a king of France. 2. There are no more than a king of France. 3. There is nothing that is King of France and is not bald. Since at least one member in the conjunction is false, it is wrong in total. StrawsonVsRussell: 1. he speaks too careless of sentences and their meanings. But one has to consider the use of linguistic expressions, which shows that there must be a much finer distinction. 2. Russell confused what a sentence says with the terms of the meaningful use of this sentence. 3. The everyday language and not the formal logic determines the meaning. --- Schulte III 435 Reference/Strawson: an expression does not refer to anything by itself. King-Example/StrawsonVsRussell: with the sentence "The present king of France is bald" no existence assertion is pronounced. Rather, it is "implied". Therefore, the sentence does not need to be true or false. The term does not refer to anything. Definition truth value gap (Strawson): E.g. King-Example: refers to nothing. Wittgenstein: a failed move in the language game. --- VII 95 Description/Strawson: sure I use in E.g. "Napoleon was the greatest French soldier", the word "Napoleon", to name the person, not the predicate. StrawsonVsRussell: but I can use the description very well to name a person. There can also be more than one description in one sentence. VII 98 StrawsonVsRussell: seems to imply that there are such logical subject predicate sentences. Russell solution: only logical proper names - for example, "This" - are real subjects in logical sentences. The meaning is exactly the individual thing. This leads him to the fact that he can no longer regard sentences with descriptions as logical propositions. Reference/StrawsonVsRussell: Solution: in "clear referring use" also dscriptions can be used. But these are not "descriptions" in Russell's sense. VII 99 King-Example/StrawsonVsRussell: claims three statements, one of which in any case would be wrong. The conjunction of three statements, one of which is wrong and the others are true, is false, but meaningful. VII 100 Reference/description/StrawsonVsRussell: distinction: terminology: "Unique reference": expression. (Clearly referring description). Sentence begins with clear referring description. Sentences that can start with a description: (A1) sentence (A2) use of a sentence (A3) uttering of a sentence accordingly: (B1) expression (B2) use of an expression (B3) utterance of an expression. King-Example/StrawsonVsRussell: the utterance (assertion (>utterance) "The present king of France is wise" can be true or false at different times, but the sentence is the same. VII 101 Various uses: according to whether at the time of Louis XIV. or Louis XV. Sentence/statement/statement/assertion/proposition/Strawson: Assertion (assertion): can be true or false at different times. Statement (proposition): ditto Sentence is always the same. (Difference sentence/Proposition). VII 102 StrawsonVsRussell: he overlooks the distinction between use and meaning. VII 104 Sense/StrawsonVsRussell: the question of whether a sentence makes sense, has nothing to do with whether it is needed at a particular opportunity to say something true or false or to refer to something existent or non-existent. VII 105 Meaning/StrawsonVsRussell: E.g. "The table is covered with books": Everyone understands this sentence, it is absurd to ask "what object" the sentence is about (about many!). It is also absurd to ask whether it is true or false. VII 106 Sense/StrawsonVsRussell: that the sentence makes sense, has to do with the fact that it is used correctly (or can be), not that it can be negated. Sense cannot be determined with respect to a specific (individual) use. It is about conventions, habits and rules. VII 106/107 King-Example/Russell/Strawson: Russell says two true things about it: 1. The sentence E.g. "The present king of France is wise" makes sense. 2. whoever expresses the sentence now, would make a true statement, if there is now one, StrawsonVsRussell: 1. wrong to say who uttered the sentence now, would either make a true or a false claim. 2. false, that a part of this claim states that the king exists. Strawson: the question wrong/false does not arise because of the non-existence. E.g. It is not like grasping after a raincoat suggests that one believes that it is raining. (> Presupposition/Strawson). Implication/Imply/StrawsonVsRussell: the predication does not assert an existence of the object. VII 110 Existence/StrawsonVsRussell: the use of "the" is not synonymous with the assertion that the object exists. Principia Mathematica(1): (p.30) "strict use" of the definite article: "only applies if object exists". StrawsonVsRussell: the sentence "The table is covered with books" does not only apply if there is exactly one table VII 111 This is not claimed with the sentence, but (commonplace) implied that there is exactly one thing that belongs to the type of table and that it is also one to which the speaker refers. Reference/StrawsonVsRussell: referring is not to say that one refers. Saying that there is one or the other table, which is referred to, is not the same as to designate a certain table. Referencing is not the same as claiming. Logical proper names/StrawsonVsRussell: E.g. I could form my empty hand and say "This is a beautiful red!" The other notes that there is nothing. Therefore, "this" no "camouflaged description" in Russell's sense. Also no logical proper name. You have to know what the sentence means to be able to respond to the statement. VII 112 StrawsonVsRussell: this blurs the distinction between pure existence theorems and sentences that contain an expression to point to an object or to refer to it. Russell's "Inquiry into meaning and truth" contains a logical catastrophic name theory. (Logical proper names). He takes away the status of logical subjects from the descriptions, but offers no substitute. VII 113 Reference/Name/referent/StrawsonVsRussell: not even names are enough for this ambitious standard. Strawson: The meaning of the name is not the object. (Confusion of utterance and use). They are the expressions together with the context that one needs to clearly refer to something. When we refer we do not achieve completeness anyway. This also allows the fiction. (Footnote: later: does not seem very durable to me because of the implicit restrictive use of "refer to".) VII 122 StrawsonVsRussell: Summit of circulatory: to treat names as camouflaged descriptions. Names are choosen arbitrary or conventional. Otherwise names would be descriptive. VII 123 Vague reference/"Somebody"/implication/Strawson: E.g. "A man told me ..." Russell: existence assertion: "There is a man who ..." StrawsonVsRussell: ridiculous to say here that "class of men was not empty ..." Here uniqueness is also implicated as in "the table". VII 124 Tautology/StrawsonVsRussell: one does not need to believe in the triviality. That only believe those who believe that the meaning of an expression is the object. (E.g. Scott is Scott). VII 126 Presupposition/StrawsonVsRussell: E.g. "My children sleep" Here, everyone will assume that the speaker has children. Everyday language has no exact logic. This is misjudged by Aristotle and Russell. 1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 K II siehe Wol I U. Wolf (Hg) Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993 Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Schulte I J. Schulte Wittgenstein Stuttgart 2001 Schulte II J. Schulte U. J. Wenzel Was ist ein philosophisches Problem? Frankfurt 2001 Schulte III Joachim Schulte "Peter Frederick Strawson" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 |
| Russell, B. | Tugendhat Vs Russell, B. | Wolf II 22 Identification/Individualization/Tugendhat: the subjective and the objective localization are equally original. TugendhatVsStrawson: space-time not only particularly important, but the only possibility of identification. Like Strawson: sortal predicates must be added. (Taking out of the situation, recognition, countability). All singular terms refer to the lowest level of identification. "This F is G", verifiable. (KantVs). TugendhatVsRussell: although the existential statement "there is exactly one F here and now" is still implied here, it is no longer a general statement as with Russell: "among all objects there is one..." but localization. Only with localizing expressions we have singular terms whose reference can no longer fail. Therefore, they no longer imply existential statements! Thus they resemble Russell's logical proper names. Difference: they no longer stand in an isolated assignment to the object, but in a space-time order. Tugendhat I 378 Existential Statements/Tugendhat: contrary to appearances not statements about individual things but always general statements. In principle, the talk of existence always assumes that one speaks of all objects, and therefore one could not even say (VsRussell) of a single object that it exists. I 383 TugendhatVsRussell: but here it's not about a relation at all, specification takes place against the background of all objects. Russell has already seen that correctly with regard to singular terms, but with his logical proper names he was wrong anyway, precisely because he denied them the reference to that background of a peculiar generality. III 214 TugendhatVsRussell: neither the reaction of a living being nor the triggering sign can be true or false, because here there is no assumption that something is so or so, consequently no error is possible. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 K II siehe Wol I U. Wolf (Hg) Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993 |
| Russell, B. | Donnellan Vs Russell, B. | I 18/19 DonnellanVsRussell: has not grasped the referential use, but placed it in a strange construct of "logically proper names". DonnellanVsStrawson: does not see the difference ref/att correctly and mixes the two. Referential/Attributive/Donnellan: varies even when it comes to the importance of the distinction: 1) Text: only pragmatic distinction, 2) later: "semantic significance". KripkeVsDonnellan: denies semantic ambiguity of the use of descriptions. Both can be grasped with the Russell’s analysis: sentences of the form "The F which is G is H" have the same truth conditions, they are true, if the only F that fulfils G is actually H. I 193 DonnellanVsRussell: his strict implication works at most with attributive use. (But he does note make the distinction). I 194 Def Description/Russell: affects an entity which only it fulfills. Donnellan: that is certainly applicable to both uses(!). Ref/Att/Donnellan: if both are not distinguished, the danger is that it must be assumed that the speaker would have to refer to something without knowing it. E.g. "Presidential candidate": we had no idea that it would be Goldwater. Nevertheless, "presidential candidate" would absurdly refer to Goldwater. Solution: DonnellanVsRussell: attributive use. I 205 Logical Proper Names/"This"/Russell: refer to something without attributing properties! (Donnellan pro) Donnellan: It could eb said that they refer to the thing itself, not to the thing under the condition that it has any special properties. DonnellanVsRussell: he believed that this is something that a description cannot do. But it does work with referential use. I 275 Theory of Descriptions/Reference/Existence/Russell/Donnellan: Attributed to himself as a merit to explain the reference to non-existent things without the need to bring the idea of non-existent references of singular terms into play. His fully developed theory of singular terms extended this to the of proper names. Philosophy of logical atomism: names as covert descriptions. I 275/276 Here, the theory "proper names in the strict logical sense" was introduced, which is rarely found in everyday speech. ((s) logical proper names: "this", etc.) DonnellanVsRussell: we want to try to make Russell’s attempt at a solution (which has not failed) redundant with the "historic explanation". (> like ZinK). I 281 Logical Proper Names/DonellanVsRussell: have no place in a correct theory of reference. Proper Names/Historical Explanation/DonnellanVsRussell: Russell’s view is incorrect in terms of common singular terms: it is not true that common proper names always have a descriptive content. Question: does this mean that ordinary singular terms might be able to fulfill the function which according to Russell only logical proper names can have?. I 283 Descriptions/DonellanVsRussell: it seems absurd to deny that in E.g. Waverley that what is described by the description, i.e. Scott, is not "part" of the expressed proposition. Russell: was of the opinion that such statements are not really statements about the described or the reference of the name, that they do not really name the described thing! Only logical proper names could accomplish the feat of actually mentioning a certain particular. "About"/Reference/DonnellanVsRussell: Putting great emphasis on concepts such as "about" would lead us into marshy terrain. We should require no definition of "about"!. It would be a delicate task to show that such a statement is either not a statement in any sense of "about" about the described thing or that there is a clear sense of "about" by it being not. I 285/286 DonnellanVsRussell: For his theory he paid the price of giving up the natural use of singular terms. RussellVsVs: but with the "natural conception" we end up at the Meinong population explosion. Proper Names/Historical Explanation/DonnellanVsRussell: according to my theory names are no hidden descriptions. E.g. "Homer" is not an abbreviation for "The author of the Homeric poems". I 209 DonnellanVsRussell/Kripke: Question: Does he refute Russell? No, in itself not! For methodological considerations, Russell’s theory is better than many thought. Nevertheless, it will probably fail in the end. I 222 Statement/Donnellan/VsRussell/Kripke: It’s not so clear that Donnellan refutes Russell. E.g. "Her husband is kind to her": had Donnellan flatly asserted that this is true iff. the lover is nice, without regard to the niceness of the husband (is perhaps also nice), he would have started a dispute with Russell. But he does not assert this! If we now asked "Is the statement is true?", Donnellan would elude us. Because if description is used referentially, it is unclear what is meant by "statement". If the statement is to be that the husband is nice, the problem is: to decide whether ref. or att. Referential: in this case, we would repeat the speech act wrongly, Attributive: we ourselves would be referring to someone, and we can only do that if we ourselves believe that it is the husband. I 232 DonnellanVsRussell/Kripke: Are the two really conflicting? I propose a test: Test: if you consider whether a particular linguistic phenomenon in English is a counterexample to an analysis, you should consider a hypothetical language that is similar to English, except that here the analysis is assumed to be correct. If the phenomenon in question also appears in the corresponding (hypothetical) community, the fact that it occurs in English cannot refute the hypothesis that the analysis for English is correct!. DonnellanVsRussell/Kripke: Test: would the phenomenon ref/att occur in different languages?. I 234 E.g. Sparkling Wine: speakers of the weaker and middle languages think (albeit erroneously) that the truth conditions are fulfilled. Weak: here, the apparatus seems to be entirely adequate. The semantic reference is the only object. Our intuitions are fully explained. Strong: Here, the phenomenon may occur as well. Even ironic use may be clear if the affected person drinks soda. I 235 These uses would become more common in the strong language (which is not English, of course), because the definite article is prohibited. This leads to an expansion of the speaker reference: If the speaker thinks an item to be fulfilling (Ex)(φ x u ψx), it is the speaker reference, then it may indeed be fulfilling or not. Middle: if speaker reference is applicable in the strong one, it is just as easily transferred to the middle one, because the speaker reference of "ψ(ixφ(x)" is then the thing that the speaker has in mind, which is the only one to fulfill φ(x) and about which he wants to announce that it ψ-s. Conclusion: because the phenomenon occurs in all languages, the fact that it occurs in English can be no argument that English is not a Russell language. Newen/Schrenk I 95 Def Attributive/Donnellan/Newen/Schrenk: E.g. "The murderer of Schmidt is insane" in the view of the body of Schmidt ((s) In the absence of the person in question, no matter whether it is them or not, "Whoever ...".). Def referential/Donnellan/Newen/Schrenk: E.g. "The murderer of Schmidt is insane" in the face of a wild rampaging man at court - while Schmidt comes through the door - ((s) in view of the man in question, no matter whether it’s him or not. "This one, whatever he did..."). |
Donnellan I Keith S. Donnellan "Reference and Definite Descriptions", in: Philosophical Review 75 (1966), S. 281-304 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Shoemaker, S. | Evans Vs Shoemaker, S. | Frank I 540 Memory/Evans: There is also memory activity on a non-conceptual level: that of the information system (perception state). E.g. It seems that something was the case in this or that way. These are no freely floating images whose reference to the past is read into them by the subject. I 542 ShoemakerVsEvans: the impression that memory-based judgments about oneself are free of identification is based on a linguistic triviality: we would not say of a person whose information comes from someone else "he remembers". EvansVsShoemaker: but it is not true that the freedom of identification is a mere illusion: EvansVsStrawson: rather, he exposes himself to the accusation. Fra I 543 Of taking advantage of the linguistic phenomenon, when he tries to prove the freedom of identification in question looking at the extraordinary utterance "I remember clearly that this memory took place, but did it take place in me?". Memory/Shoemaker: Memory-based judgments depend on identification and are therefore not immune to misidentification: E.g. we can imagine that the apparent memories of a person were in reality causally derived from other people (false memory). E.g. complete duplicate of a person (clone). (s) too absurd to be a convincing example. Fra I 544 Shoemaker: "Quasi Memory": "Q memory". E.g. if there are such false memories, then it seems to make sense to say "someone stood before a burning tree, but was it me?" EvansVsShoemaker: even if this is possible, it does not follow that normal judgments must be based on an identification! It’s not about distinction: "someone stood ... I was the one". Gareth Evans(1982): Self-Identification, in: G.Evans The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/NewYork 1982, 204-266 |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Skepticism | Strawson Vs Skepticism | Frank I 641 Authority/First Person/Other Minds/StrawsonVsSkepticism: if the skeptic understands his own question then ("How does one know, what is going on in the mind of another?") he also knows the answer. Because if he knows what a mind is, he knows that he must be in a body and that he has thoughts. He also knows that we ascribe thoughts to other on the basis of behavior, but us without such a base. Mental property/mind/Strawson: to possess this concept, you have to be both: a self-ascriber and a foreign-ascriber of mental predicates. One must also consider every other as a self-ascriber. To understand the concept, you have to acknowledge that there is a kind of predicate that is univocally (unambiguously) and adequately ascribable on observation base, as well as without. DavidsonVsStrawson: this is not a satisfactory answer to the skeptics: he will answer that Strawson may have described the asymmetry correctly, but he has not explained it. Why should we believe that a predicate that is once attributed due to observation, and the other eventually not, is unambiguous. Donald Davidson (1984a): First Person Authority, in: Dialectica38 (1984), 101-111 --- Strawson I 44 StrawsonVsSkepticism: The skeptic pretends to accept a certain conceptual system and rejects at the same time under the hand one of the conditions for its application. His doubts are not real doubts, not simply because they are logically unresolvable, but because they constitute a refusal of the entire concept system in which such doubts alone would be useful. --- I 45 It is not enough, to say "the same thing", we must also be able to say "the same place". --- I 46 The identity of places boils down to the identity of things. The recognition of places is not totally different from the recognition of things. Interplay. That is not mysterious, but simply a description of criteria. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Solipsism | Strawson Vs Solipsism | I 106 StrawsonVsSolipsism: we not only ascribe actions, intentions, and sensory perception of things outside ourselves to ourselves, but also physical properties. We have material bodies, we ascribe to ourselves thoughts, feelings, pain. We think of us in exchange with others. It is not obvious which of these properties is essential for a non-solipsistic system. And which we therefore must reproduce in our purely auditory world. We could provide our person with his voice. The problem, to provide him with a constantly audible body would be released from the leading tone. Every resident of the world could have its own leading tone, and no one would know of the other. Only if by chance the same pitch occurs: two listeners would be then at the same place. --- I 127 Strawson: the fact, not taken into account, is this: A necessary condition for ascribing states of consciousness and experiences to oneself is that you also ascribe them to others (central argumentVsSolipsism). VsStrawson: against the unrestricted stronger form of this assertion one argument is conceivable: Certainly the idea of a uniquely applicable predicate is not absurd, but: you have to have a concept of when such an opportunity occurs to apply the predicate on others than to oneself. But not necessary that one actually applies it. StrawsonVsVs: the weaker assertion is sufficient. But one must point out that we are not talking about a single predicate, but of an entire broad class of predicates. The essential point is a purely logical: There is a mutual dependence between the idea of a predicate and the idea of a series of distinct individuals, to which the predicate can be assigned usefully even if it does not necessary apply to them. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Strawson, P. F. | Armstrong Vs Strawson, P. F. | Armstrong III 55 Justification/Strawson: simply analytical! From the meaning of the words used: it is simply part of the meaning of "rational" that inductive inferences are rational. ArmstrongVsStrawson: this is extremely unsatisfactory! (It comes too early, ultimately same result, see below). E.g. if someone said the justification for the fact that nothing could be green and red at the same time, resulted from the meaning of "green" and "red". Absurd. That would tell us nothing. Induction/Armstrong: why is it a necessary truth that it is rational?. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
| Strawson, P. F. | Austin Vs Strawson, P. F. | AustinVsStrawson: he rejects the semantic definition of truth for the completely right reason, that the expression ’is true’ is not used to talk about sntences. He speaks of a confusion of meaning and truth. I 240 But that is not enough to show what he would like to show: that ’is true’ is not used when speaking about something (that truth is no property of something). Austin: The term is used when speaking about statements. Strawson: believes that to say that A is true is more than the mere assertion that A. |
Austin I John L. Austin "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 24 (1950): 111 - 128 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Austin II John L. Austin "A Plea for Excuses: The Presidential Address" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 57, Issue 1, 1 June 1957, Pages 1 - 3 German Edition: Ein Plädoyer für Entschuldigungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, Grewendorf/Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Strawson, P. F. | Frege Vs Strawson, P. F. | SMD II 269 Descriptions/Fregean Language/FregeVsStrawson: Def Fregean decriptions: descriptions that apply to more than one object (according to a certain interpretation), then they should apply only to one element. ((s) i.e. no truth value gap as in Strawson). Using them exerts least force on classical logic. The simplest of such a convention could be that an element of interpretation should be an element that is designated by all basal descriptions, which makes it idle. Identity ("creates" (s) "Identity operator")). Alternatively: complicated convention, then an idle description should be considered as indicative of a set that fulfills the embedded formula. Formulas that contain idle descriptions either turn out as true or false. Classical logic is preserved. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 |
| Strawson, P. F. | Kripke Vs Strawson, P. F. | I 106 Strawson demands obviously that the speaker must know from whom he has his reference. KripkeVsStrawson: my theory bears no such requirement. I could even remember wrong! |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 |
| Strawson, P. F. | Prior Vs Strawson, P. F. | I 23 Correspondence Theory/Austin/Prior: Austin defended it in the 50s: These facts are "in the world", not only signs, so communication can take place. There must be something else in addition to the signs! True-Making/Austin: if a statement is to be true, then there must be something beyond this statement ("in the world"), which makes it true. StrawsonVsAustin: "in the world" are only objects to which our statements refer ("about which they are") and not also "facts" (like Geach, camp). Facts/Strawson: are what statements (if true) find, they are not "about what" statements (sentences) are. The only plausible candidate as truthmaker of statements is the fact that states them, but this fact is nothing in the world. It is not an object. Strawson/Prior: seems to say with this that the facts are logical constructions. So far so good, but there still seems to be more that is not clear: he means: Strawson: of course statements and facts go together. They were made for each other: if we (prise) eliminate the statements from the world (prise), then (prise) we also eliminate the facts from the world. It would not become poorer because of this! PriorVsStrawson: that seems to imply that there are no facts without statements, or that there would be no facts without statements, and if that is the case, then it is a) certainly wrong, b) not the result of facts being logical constructions (Chapter 2). And there is certainly a close relationship between a fact, and its being in the world! Reality/Realism/Prior: idioms like "in the world" get their strength from the confrontation with "all in the head" or "only in Homer". I 24 It suggests the idea of different boxes, in which this could be sorted. That should not be taken too seriously: "In Homer" means that Homer says that such and such is a fact. To say that gods exist only in the mind, means that it is merely a thought that they exist. And saying that something is a fact in the world, simply means omitting all these prefixes and saying that it is a fact. (That it is the case). Facts/Wittgenstein: are the world! Not in the world. Nor are they "in" sentences. |
Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
| Strawson, P. F. | Quine Vs Strawson, P. F. | I 299 Strawson/Quine: he introduces a category of "process-things" which can be identified neither with the processes nor with the things. QuineVsStrawson: unnecessary as a category. Strawson takes proper examples from the usage of language, unnecessary for canonical notation. (>Strawson I 72). Tugendhat II 76 QuineVsStrawson: he made a fundamental mistake to assume that the elimination of singular terms by the Theory of Descriptions leads to the elimination of demonstratives. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Strawson, P. F. | Searle Vs Strawson, P. F. | Searle V 160 Referential/attributive/Donnellan: E.g. we come across the mangled corpse of Smith without knowing who committed the murder. We might then say: "The murderer of Smith is crazy" without meaning someone specific. V 161 E.g.' The man who is (falsely) accused, rioted in the courtroom. In this case, we do not mean: "The killer, whoever he was" but a certain man. referential: should it turn out that Smith committed suicide, our statement about the man in the courtroom would at least in a certain sense still be true. attributiv: in the attributive meaning it cannot be true if the description doe not apply to anything. (DonnellanVsRussell, DonnellanVsStrawson: both do not account for the distinction). referential: S has talked about e, regardless of whether e is actually φ. He said something true or false about it independent of whether e is actually φ. But he implied it. >Attributive/referential. One can report correctly about his speech act that he talked about e, because one can report also with other expressions than with "the φ". If the identification was used attributively, there were no such entity e. (And the speaker would not even have had in mind that it exists). V 176 Term theory/object/universals/SearleVsStrawson: in what sense is the is by "is red identified term a non-linguistic form? Is the universal in a similar sense a non-linguistic form like the material object? >Term theory. Can the existence of a non-linguistic entity follow from the existence of a linguistic entity? >Universals. V 177 Universals/Searle: they do not persist in the world, but in the language of our representation of the world. They are however not linguistic in the way as words are (as phonemes), but linguistic in the way in which the meanings of words are linguistic! SearleVsStrawson: considering the usual criteria for distinguishing between linguistic and non-linguistic entities his finding that universals are not linguistic is therefore wrong. V 178/179 Universals/Searle: so are not identified with the help of facts, but with the help of meanings! Universals/predicate/SearleVsStrawson: shows that "to identify" has both times completely different meanings in the model of the term theory. V 179/180 According to Strawson we would be forced to assume that also subject expressions identify universals. E.g. "The rose is red". If "is red" identified redness, then "rose" would identify the property of being a rose, something like "roseness". Or e.g. The thing that is a rose is red. By this proposition no more and no less universals are identified than by: The thing that is red is a rose. I cannot imagine any argument with which it could be shown that hereby "is red" a universal is identified without necessarily showing at the same time, that "is a rose" identifies a universal. The term theory is not consistent enough. If predicate expressions identify universals (what the theory claims) then subject expressions necessary do this as well! V 181 Universals/SearleVsStrawson: no non-linguistic entities! |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Strawson, P. F. | Tugendhat Vs Strawson, P. F. | Wolf II 20 Identification/TugendhatVsStrawson: he underestimates the importance of the space-time system for identification. Most basic statements: those with perception predicates. I 387/388 StrawsonVsRussell: logical proper names are only fictitious. "This" is not an ambiguous proper name but has a uniform meaning as a deictic expression and designates a different object depending on the situation of use. TugendhatVsStrawson: but you cannot oblige Russell to use this word as we use it in our natural language. Russell fails because he does not take into account another peculiarity: the same object for which a deictic expression is used in the perceptual situation can be designated outside that situation by other expressions. (Substitutability). I 389 TugendhatVsStrawson: what StrawsonVsRussell argues does not actually contradict his theory, but seems to presuppose it. I 433 Learning: the child does not learn to attach labels to objects, but it is the demonstrative expressions that point beyond the situation! The demonstrative expressions are not names, one knows that it is to be replaced by other deictic expressions, if one refers from other situations to the same. (TugendhatVsRussell and StrawsonVsRussell). I 384 StrawsonVsRussell: Example "The present King of France is bald" (King-Example). It depends on what time such an assertion is made. So it is sometimes true. I 385 Example "The present king of France is bald" has a meaning, but no truth value itself. (>expression, >utterance): RussellVsStrawson: that would have nothing to do with the problem at all, one could have added a year. StrawsonVsRussell: if someone is of the opinion that the prerequisite for existence is wrong, he will not speak of truth or falsehood. RussellVsStrawson: it does not matter whether you say one or the other in colloquial language, moreover, there are enough examples that people speak more of falsity in colloquial language. I 386 TugendhatVsStrawson: he did not realize that he had already accepted Russell's theory. It is not about the difference between ideal language and colloquial language. This leads to the Oxford School with the ordinary language philosophy. It is not about nuances of colloquial language as fact, but, as with philosophy in general, about possibility. I 387/388 StrawsonVsRussell: logical proper names are only fictitious. "This" is not an ambiguous proper name but has a uniform meaning as a deictic expression and designates a different object depending on the situation of use. TugendhatVsStrawson: but you cannot oblige Russell to use this word as we use it in our natural language.) Russell fails because he does not take into account another peculiarity: the same object for which a deictic expression is used in the perceptual situation can be designated outside that situation by other expressions. (Substitutability). I 389 TugendhatVsStrawson: what StrawsonVsRussell argues does not actually contradict his theory, but seems to presuppose it. I 395 Identification/TugendhatVsStrawson: uses identification in the narrower sense. Tugendhat: my own term "specification" (which of all objects is meant) is superior to this term. "To pick put" is Strawson's expression. (Taken from Searle). (>Quine: "to specify"). I 397/398 TugendhatVsStrawson: example "The highest mountain" is no identification at all: which one is the highest? Something must be added, an ostension, or a name, or a location. For example, someone can be blindfolded and led to the highest mountain. He will also not know more. I 399 Identification/Strawson: distinguishes between two types of identification a) Direct pointing b) Description by marking. Space-time locations. Relative position to all other possible locations and all possible objects (in the world). I 400 TugendhatVsStrawson: he overlooked the fact that demonstrative identification in turn presupposes non-demonstrative, spatio-temporal identification. Therefore, there are no two steps. Strawson had accepted Russell's theory of the direct relation so far that he could not see it. ((s) > Brandom: Deixis presupposes anaphora.) I 415 TugendhatVsStrawson: he has overlooked the fact that the system of spatio-temporal relations is not only demonstratively perceptively anchored, but is also a system of possible positions of perception, and thus a system of demonstrative specifications. I 419 TugendhatVsStrawson: he did not ask how the meaning of singular terms is explained or how it is determined which object a singular term specifies. This is determined with different objects in very different ways, sometimes by going through all possible cases. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 K II siehe Wol I U. Wolf (Hg) Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993 |
| Strawson, P. F. | Verschiedene Vs Strawson, P. F. | Grice I 277 Strawson: Tautology: that someone who says p also believes p. HungerlandVsStrawson: not necessary. He may speak incorrectly or with intent to deceive. Grice I 300 Presupposition/Strawson: Def "S presupposes S": "The truth of S" is a necessary condition of the truth or falsity of the assertion that S. For example, "All my children sleep soundly" presupposes "I have children". I 303 David RyninVsStrawson: from this interpretation paradoxically follows that all presupposed assertions would be true: it should apply: S > S" and ~S > S"; but it also applies: S v ~S. From this follows: S". In other words: (~S" > ~(Sv~S)) > S is analytically true in a system of bivalent propositional logic. I 309 HungerlandVsStrawson: the relationship he defines is not that of context implication. I additionally imply that I believe to have children. His definition makes no reference whatsoever to the beliefs or the intentions of so-speakers or listeners, nor to any circumstances of communication. Strawson/Presupposition: "The S is P". Hungerland: consists of two independent parts: 1. function of the particular article, (relevant grammar). Strawson's model is a logical explanatory model. VsStrawson: normal communication does not do this. HungerlandVsStrawson: he has confused rule and exception (in terms of frequency). Strawson: also interprets errors as exceptions to the rules (HungerlandVs). Strawson I 103 VsStrawson: the idea of the simultaneous existence of what is perceived and what is not perceived is certainly linked to the idea of the simultaneous presentation of elements, each of which has a certain character, but which at the same time stand in a system of relations that goes beyond those established in the respective character of the elements. The first idea is necessarily an extension of the latter. It is simply the idea that such a system of relations extends beyond the limits of what is observable. StrawsonVs: the critic could argue this way, but he would overreach himself! He ignores the idea of change between observer and scene. If he claims to have given only a necessary, not a sufficient condition for such an extension, we cannot reply to that. Strawson I 131 VsStrawson: "What right do we have to speak of the unambiguous subject in this way? Why should there not be any number of experiential subjects, perhaps indistinguishable? The uniqueness of the body does not guarantee a unified Cartesian soul." StrawsonVs: in order to free ourselves from these difficulties, we must recognize the concept of the person as a primitive (not fundamental) concept. Def Person/Strawson: type of entities such that both states of consciousness and physical characteristics can be attributed. Initial questions: not independent on each other: 1. Why are states of consciousness ascribed to a subject at all? 2. why the same thing as physical qualities? Strawson I 170 VsStrawson: isn't there a danger for us that there could be any number of exactly the same individual consciousness that are connected in the same way to a single body? I 171 Strawson: the concept of a single consciousness can exist only as the concept of a non-essential, secondary type of single things. Only in this way. |
Grice I H. Paul Grice "Meaning", in: The Philosophical Review 66, 1957, pp. 377-388 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Megle Frankfurt/M. 1993 Grice II H. Paul Grice "Utterer’s Meaning and Intentions", in: The Philosophical Review, 78, 1969 pp. 147-177 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Grice III H. Paul Grice "Utterer’s Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning", in: Foundations of Language, 4, 1968, pp. 1-18 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Grice IV H. Paul Grice "Logic and Conversation", in: P. Cple/J. Morgan (eds) Syntax and Semantics, Vol 3, New York/San Francisco/London 1975 pp.41-58 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Strawson, P. F. | Avramides Vs Strawson, P. F. | Avra I 162 AvramidesVsStrawson: he must explain: 1) is pre-conventional communication plausible? 2) How is linguistic boot strapping possible? |
Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Strawson, P. F. | Schiffer Vs Strawson, P. F. | Avramides I 49 Counter Example/SchifferVsStrawson: E.g. someone whistles loudly in the presence of someone of whom he knows that he finds loud whistling unbearable to get rid of him. But he wants that the other one knows that he wants to get rid of him, because he does not like him as a person and not because of the whistling, and he knows that the other knows ((s) No property of the expression). By S showing his reluctance, condition (f) is even met. Problem: did the whistling mean something? (That A should leave the room?). If (5) would be adequate, yes. But there is no communication here! It is not a case of meanings. Solution/Schiffer: (6) (g) that A the intention (e) of S. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Strawson, P. F. | Donnellan Vs Strawson, P. F. | I 181 Donnellan/Brandom: E.g. "The republican presidential candidate in 1968 will be a conservative." This cannot be said separated from a certain situation. However, Strawson and Russell both seem to assume that. DonnellanVsStrawson: it is a mistake to assume that a description has a referential function if it is not used. I 182 Presupposition/Donnellan: If I assert that the king sits on the throne, I assume or imply that there is a king. (> Presupposition, Strawson pro). DonnellanVsStrawson: he means that empty descriptions fail. Donnellan: this is not true for referential use. I 195 Descriptions/Strawson: ("A Reply to Mr. Sellars" 1954): can fail and still say something true. E.g. "The Chamber of Deputies (correctly: House of Representatives) includes representatives of two parties." No problem, if it is clear what the speaker means. You can improve it. DonnellanVsStrawson: this will only work if the speaker had a right intention regardless of that. But what description is to be used in the improvement? The speaker could still refuse it, because he is misinformed. It’s not about what he "wanted" to say, otherwise you can take any description. There is no particular improved statement. ((s) I.e. not "any intention" but the right intention is decisive). I 196 Strawson: if the speaker refers to nothing, he cannot say anything true or false. DonnellanVsStrawson: in attributive use ("whoever") he can still say something wrong (e.g. "killer of Schmidt": in case of natural death). For referential use (man in court) he can still say something true. |
Donnellan I Keith S. Donnellan "Reference and Definite Descriptions", in: Philosophical Review 75 (1966), S. 281-304 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Strawson, P. F. | Cohen Vs Strawson, P. F. | Horwich I 214 Paradoxes/true/Strawson/Cohen: occur under the assumption that the words "true" and "false" can be used to make claims of 1st level. Solution: (formal). The paradoxes are formally solved by declaring that "true" and "false" may only be used in level 2 claims. Paradoxes/Strawson: disappear under the much more radical thesis that "true" and "false" are not used at all to make claims. True/Redundancy Theory/CohenVsStrawson: that is unsatisfactory. It is also not only a "descriptive use" done by "true" and "false". ((s) Redundancy theory is not really the issue here). For example, a judge might interpret a lawyer's remark "What the policeman said is true" as an assertion about the character of the policeman. And then there could be empirical evidence about the character. CohenVsStrawson: but this claims much more than the presupposition that the policeman made a statement at all. The judge would set up a formula ((s) scheme) to indirectly verify a number of further statements. But the verification would not consist of confirming the presupposition "The policeman made a statement". Cohen: You do not have to assume that "true" here works as a logical predicate to describe the policeman's statements. CohenVsStrawson: but the sentence cannot be paraphrased by "The policeman made a statement, I confirm it," as Strawson assumes. I 215 Because this is not a statement about the character of the policeman. VsCohen: one could argue that it is only a summary of some statements like e.g. "the defendant was riding 50 on the wrong side", "the plaintiff was riding his bike on the right side", etc. Then one could say that it is these statements that are indirectly verified by empirical evidence on the character of the policeman Strawson/Cohen: could then say that the lawyer said: e.g. "I confirm what the policeman said, the defendant was riding...". CohenVsStrawson: this does not work, 1. if the content is unknown 2. if the number of statements made is indefinite ((s) or infinite). ((s) >"Everything he said".) For then "what he said is true" cannot be replaced by a set of auxiliary statements confirmed by the reporter. He seems to make a single complete assertion: For example, "Smith's observation reports are always true" and he can do that without having read all his reports. Cohen: I had suggested that this be verifiable by evidence of the character of the person concerned. Then you could also say that conclusions can be drawn from it. And this leads to paradoxes. This often occurs in journalism, in historical and scientific research and in jurisprudence. I 216 Redundancy Theory/paradoxies/everything he said/Ramsey/Cohen: Ramsey's solution of eliminating "true" and "false" from such contexts has the price of introducing logical jargon. RamseyVsStrawson/Cohen: but he still assumes that the sentence is used as a statement (assertion). Example "For all p, if the policeman claims that p, then p". Problem/Cohen: here again we can get paradoxes, analog to the truth paradox. For example "Every statement I claim is false". Logical Form: (p): (x).phi(p . x) >. ~p. Logical Form/everyday translation: phi(p, x): "The statement that ... is made by ..." ((s) in brackets one point, one comma). "Is true"/Truth/Logical Form/Question/(s): not "wx" or "wp" (for P is true") but better "x is a statement and x" or p is a statement and p": (Ex)(Ae . x) or (Ep) (Ap . p). But that means "there is a true statement" and not: "the statement p is true"?). Paradox/Logical Form/Cohen: can occur when in (p): (x). phi (p . x) >. ~p. this expression as a whole can occur as value of p. Solution/Cohen: you can even take "all my statements are wrong" as a statement about the character. Then you do not get a paradox. CohenVsStrawson: but if that amounts to "the policeman is a reliable witness" then that is more a recommendation than a description! Solution: I should specify the type of statement I classify as unreliable. I 217 Strawson/Cohen: may still be right that "true" is not used as a logical predicate: Logical Predicate/Cohen: Example Analysis as description: here it is "true statements maker". Analysis as recommendation: here "true" is not a logical predicate. Analysis as verification: "true" can be eliminated here. (But not in everyday language). |
Cohen I Laurence Jonathan Cohen "Some Remarks on Grice’s Views about the Logical Particals of Natural Languages", in: Y. Bar-Hillel (Ed), Pragmatics of Natural Languages, Dordrecht 1971, pp. 50-68 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Cohen II Laurence Jonathan Cohen "Mr. Strawson’s Analysis of Truth", Analysis 10 (1950) pp. 136-140 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Strawson, P. F. | Millikan Vs Strawson, P. F. | I 175 Denotation/Millikan: for us the goal here is to find out what the stabilization function of definite and indefinite denotations is. We have to proceed on our own. We can not rely on the tradition Russel-Strawson-Donnellan. Reference/MillikanVsStrawson: we have to assume that there are not only speakers who makes references, but must assume that the linguistic expressions make references themselves, too. I 272 Subject/predicate/Strawson/Millikan: (S a P in "Logic and Grammar" Millikan: "general concept" is replaced by "characteristics". Fundamental asymmetry: Individual things: in space and time, exemplify characteristics that come from a particular area. Then we know for every property that it is in competition with others. Asymmetry: no such competition applies for individual things. No individual competes with others for characteristics within an area. No things are related to each other in such a way that for each property, which exemplifies one thing, it would follow that the others do not exemplify it (not simultaneously). MillikanVsStrawson: but what is "logical competition" among properties? For concepts it is traditionally accepted, but we can not apply that to properties and relations. Concept/property/predicate/Millikan: the relation between one word and the world lies between the head and the world and can not be internalized. (see above). I 273 Therefore, there is not even a one-to-one relation between concepts and properties. Two concepts could correspond to one property and a concept (if it has ambiguous Fregean sense) may correspond to two properties. Even if we know of a concept that a property corresponds to it, that is never a priori knowledge. Properties/a priori/knowledge/Millikan: on incompatibility or compatibility or identity of properties, there is no a priori knowledge. At most there is a natural necessity. "Competition" between properties/MillikanVsStrawson: is just another type of "natural necessity" besides causality and identity. No "logical competition". Logic/concept/necessity/Millikan: also "logical possibility" and "logical necessity" between concepts are ultimately natural necessities between concepts. Logic/Millikan: should furthermore be understood as an empirical science. Ex "S can not simultaneously be P and not P" is either meaningless, because "S" and "P" have no meaning, or something like true because it is a statement about the nature of the world. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Wittgenstein | Strawson Vs Wittgenstein | Horwich I 195 Fact/situation/VsStrawson: it could be argued that they (because they are connected to that-sentences) are used as placeholders for yet to be specified expressions. Just as E.g. "thing" for nouns E.g. "event " for certain verbs, etc. StrawsonVsVs: the answer is twofold: World/StrawsonVsWittgenstein: the world is the totality of things, not of the facts. All the charm of these expressions like "situation", "state" (state of affairs), "fact", etc. is that we look at them as things or quantities of things. (StrawsonVs). StrawsonVsAustin: this urge is overwhelming. Austin does not resist it. He needs for concealment "feature" (feature) as a substitute for "fact". Definition feature/feature/Strawson: E.g. nose can be a feature of a face. E.g. a mountain feature a landscape.(1) 1. Peter F. Strawson, "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950, in: Paul Horwich (ed.) Theories of Truth, Aldershot 1994 --- Strawson II 265 StrawsonVsWittgenstein: the world is the totality of things, not of the facts. --- Wittgenstein VI 172 StrawsonVsWittgenstein/Schulte: actually one should only talk in very specific cases of the meaning of names: E.g. "Peter" (Pierre) means "stone". Schulte: that is quite foreign to Wittgenstein. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Pro/Versus |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Grice | Pro | Avramides I 162 Strawson: reductive Gricean, per Reductionism - AvramidesVsStrawson |
Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Redundancy | Strawson, P.F. | Horwich I 213 True/Everyday Language/Redundancy/Strawson: (Analysis Vol 9, No. 6) thesis "true" and "false": all their non-technical functions can be performed without the use of "true" and "false" themselves. You can make a statement without using "true". CohenVsStrawson: there is at least one important non-technical function where this is not possible. I 213 True/Everyday Language/Redundancy Theory/Strawson: Thesis: For example "It is true that the sun shines": here we can replace "It is true" by performative expressions like "I confirm", "I admit", "I guarantee", etc. without a special change of meaning. |
Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Term Theory | Strawson, P.F. | Searle V 174 Term Theory/Strawson Thesis: ("term theory") both the subject and the predicate identify "non-linguistic entities". They introduce them into the sentence where they are linked by a "non-relational connection". Thus, he avoids saying that the proposition is an enumeration. Strawson: stresses that he does not provide an explanation of the difference between subject and predicate, but only a description. SearleVsStrawson: wrong description. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
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