Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 19 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Abstraction-Operator | Cresswell | I 128/9 Abstraction operator/Cresswell: basic law for him: ((λx) F (x)) (t) ↔ F (t) - to be an x such that F (x) is true iff t. F(t). t: any Term. - This applies to neo-Russellian language, but fails if F is an intensional predicate, because then we would have O((λx) Oφx)(s) ↔ OOφs. and the distinction would collapse. Solution/Stalnaker: Do not use descriptions as names. But treat them as close as possible. CresswellVsStalnaker: this will not always work because not all are real names. >Names, >Descriptions, >Abstraction, >Operators, >Lambda-abstraction, >Intensionality, >Intensions. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Beliefs | Lewis | V 151 Belief/Perry: always has two objects. - 1st object: Pair of individual and property - (propositional belief: would be a zero-digit relation) - Belief/Perry: not inside the head - Heimson and Hume are the same inside the head - but different pairs of individual and property - problem: then madness would lie in the states of the world - solution/Perry: the first object of Heimson is incorrect - 2nd object: a function with the subject as an argument and the first object (individual-property pair) as a value - according to the 2nd object, beliefs are indeed inside my head - Hume and Heimson have the same 2nd object: the function Hume attributes to the pair Hume and the property to be Hume - both believe the same thing. - Lewis pro. --- IV 152 Belief/LewisVsPutnam: is inside the head. - The self-attribution of the subject is the whole of its belief system - external ascriptions are no other belief attitudes - on the other hand: belief de re: is not inside the head - is not a real belief either - they are facts by virtue of the relation of belief in the things. >de re/Lewis. IV 153 Belief de re/Lewis: not de re: E.g. the attribution of "is a spy" to "smallest spy" ... - E.g. not de re: the attribution "murderer" when the murder is not yet resolved - appropriate descriptions would single out the essence - not de re: E.g. somebody gave me ... IV 155 Solution: acquaintance - E.g. "the man of whom I've heard by the name of Hume ..." is already an acquaintance. - Also: E.g. the driver of the car in front of me - unknown entity is irrelevant. >Acquaintance. --- Schwarz I 179 Belief/Dogma/semantics/LewisVsStalnaker: whether a player knows the best move does not depend on him if he considers the sentence "this is the best move" to be true - he does not have to speak any language - (omniscience/Stalnaker: actual ignorance in apparent ignorance of necessary truth always involves linguistic state of affairs. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Conditional | Lewis | V 145 Definition Stalnaker-conditional/Lewis: A>C (pointed) is true iff the least possible change that makes A true also makes C true - (least possible revision). Lewis: the probability of Stalnaker-conditionals are usually not equal to the conditional probability. V 146 Stalnaker-conditional/Truth conditions/Lewis: T(A>C)) WA(C) if A is possible. V 148 Conditional/Credibility/Belief/Stalnaker: in order to decide whether to believe a conditional: 1) add an antecedent to the set of beliefs - 2) minimal corrections for consistency - 3) decide whether the consequent is true - LewisVsStalnaker: that is just conditionalization and not representation. V 153 Indicative conditional/assertibility/probability/Jackson/Lewis: the discrepancy between the assertibility of P (C I A) and the probability of the truth of P (A>C) lies with one or the other Gricean >implicature. - The right of access to this implicature must depart from the premise that the conditional has the truth conditions of the (truth-functional) A ⊃ C (horseshoe). - (Lewis pro). - Implicature: E.g. "here you are right" (but mostly you are wrong). >Assertibility. V 154 Indicative conditional/Lewis: is a truth-functional conditional that conventionally implies robustness (insensitivity to new information) in terms of the antecedent - hence the probability of both conditionals must be high - therefore the assertibility of the indicative conditional comes with the corresponding conditional probability. - maxim: "assert the stronger one". |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Contradictions | Field | II 100 Contradiction/Stalnaker: it is essential that logical falsehoods are absolutely impossible. - This is the condition that they can not be believed. >Logical truth, >Logical necessity, >Beliefs. Problem/FieldVsStalnaker: Then Cantor could not have established his (later proven to be contradictory) set theory. II 102 Cantor had not "split" belief states that had to be linked. - Rather, they all together explained his actions. >Explanation, >Behavior, >Belief states. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Excluded Middle | Logic Texts | Read III 108 Similarity metrics/the conditionally excluded middle/Read: the conditionally excluded middle: one or the other member of a pair of conditional sentences must be true. - That equals the assumption that there is always a single most similar world. - Stalnaker pro - LewisVsStalnaker: e.g. Bizet/Verdi: all combinations are wrong - Stalnaker: instead of the only similar one at least one similar - LewisVs: The amount of the possible worlds in the Lewis 2 m + e is large, whereby e decreases suitably; it has no limit. - Solution/Lewis: instead of the selection function: similarity relation: he proposes that "if A, then B" is then true in w if there is either no "A or non-B" world, or some "A" and "B" world that is more similar than any "A and non-B" world. >Similarity metrics. --- III 110 Verdi-Example: where there is no unique, most similar world, the "would" condition sentences are false because there is no similar world for any of the most appropriate similar worlds in which they are fellow country men, in which Bizet has a different nationality. - Example: if you get an A, you will receive a scholarship: will be true if there is a more similar world in which you get both for each world in which you get an A and not a scholarship. - ((s) without conditional sentence of the excluded middle). >Similarity. --- III 263 Law of the excluded middle/constructivism/Read: Constructivists often present so-called "weak counterexamples" against the excluded middle - if a is a real number, "a = 0" is not decidable. Consequently, the constructivist cannot claim that all real numbers are either identical to zero or not. - But this is more of a question of representation. >Constructivism, >Presentation. |
Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 |
| Fine-grained/ coarse-grained | Field | II 34 Fine-grained/Field: E.g. sets of possible worlds are coarser than possible belief objects: e.g. the axioms of set theory and the Banach-Tarski theorem (BTT, strongly counter-intuitive) are logically equivalent, i.e. valid in the same worlds. >Possible worlds, >Set theory. But the Banach-Tarski theorem is not believed by all the people who believe the axioms of set theory. Sentence meaning/Lewis: is fine-grained. >Sentence meaning, cf. >Word meaning. Belief/Lewis: what one believes, is coarse-grained. >Beliefs. Punch line: so the conviction is always the same: with and without Banach-Tarski theorem. II 35 FieldVsStalnaker: sets of possible worlds are too coarse-grained to distinguish beliefs. - E.g. set theory with and without Banach-Tarski theorem are the same. >Beliefs/Stalnaker. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Intentionality | Field | II 89 Intentionality/Language/Field: Language comes into play only when "believes that" is attributed. Thesis: serious behavioral attribution works without language. >Behavior, >Behaviorism, >Attribution, >Belief attribution, >Beliefs, >Explanation. II 100 Intentionality/FieldVsStalnaker: we need more than the atomistic approach that everything that suffices a Boolean algebra is sufficient for the explanation of mind states (by sets of possible worlds). >Possible worlds, >Atomism. Instead: we need a systematic approach of content. - Therefore, we need a more fine-grained structure than that of sets of possible worlds. >Hyperintensionality, >Fine-gained/coarse-grained, >Content, >Intentions, >Intensions. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Mental States | Field | II 84 Mental states/intentionality/Stalnaker: per pragmatic image: belief contents are coarse grained - understandable in terms of the role in the characterization of actions. >Fine-grained/coarse-grained. Field: per linguistic image. >Linguistic view/Field. II 88 Representation/FieldVsStalnaker/Field: we should manage without intrinsically representative mental states. >Mental states, >Representations/Stalnaker. Non-intrinsical representational states: also have content, can be synonymous. - On the other hand intrinsically representative: E.g. object of believe as an ordered triple from Caesar, Rubicon, Cross. II 89 Possible world/sets of worlds/Field: what is relevant for sets of possible worlds as objects of mental states is that they form a Boolean algebra. >Possible worlds, >Possible worlds/Field. II 100 Intentionality/FieldVsStalnaker: we need more than the atomistic approach that everything that satisfies a Boolean algebra is sufficient for the explanation of mental states. (Via sets of possible worlds). >Intentionality. Instead: we need a systematic of the connection of content. - Therefore, we need a more fine-grained structure than that of sets of possible worlds. Cf. >Hyperintensionality. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Metaphysics | Inwagen | Schwarz I 27 Metaphysics/being/essential/van InwagenVsLewis/StalnakerVsLewis: knowing about contingent facts about the current situation would in principle not be sufficient to know all a posteriori necessities: Def strong necessity/Chalmers: thesis: in addition to substantial contingent truths, there are also substantial modal truths: e.g. that Kripke is essentially a human being, e.g. that pain is essentially identical to XY. >Necessity, >a posteriori necessity, >necessity de re. Important argument: knowledge of contingent facts is not sufficient to recognize these modal facts. How do we recognize them, perhaps we cannot do this (van Inwagen 1998)(1) or only hypothetically through methodological considerations (Block/Stalnaker 1999)(2). A posteriori necessity/metaphysics/Lewis/Schwarz: normal cases are not cases of strong necessity. You can learn e.g. that Blair is premier or e.g. that the evening star corresponds to the morning star. LewisVsInwagen/LewisVsStalnaker: other cases (which cannot be empirically found) do not exist. LewisVsStrong Necessity: strong necessity has no place in his modal logic. >LewisVsTelescope Theory: worlds are not like distant planets of which one can learn which ones exist. >Possible worlds. 1. Peter van Inwagen [1998]: “Modal Epistemology”. Philosophical Studies, 92: 67–84. 2. Ned Block und Robert Stalnaker [1999]: “Conceptual Analysis, Dualism, and the Explanatory Gap”. The Philosophical Review, 108: 1–46. |
Inwagen I Peter van Inwagen Metaphysics Fourth Edition Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Nonfactualism | Adams | Field II 255 Definition "surface logic"/material conditional/paradoxes of implication/Field: the surface logic tells us which conclusions are acceptable. (This is just the logic of Adams offered by nonfactualism). >Conditional/Adams, >Acceptability. Def "depth logic"/material conditional/Field: the depths logic tells us which conclusions are truth maintaining. This is the standard logic for ">". >Truth transfer. Problem: does the depth logic do anything at all, even if our mental performance is explained by the surface logic? Solution/Field: Perhaps one can say that at the deepest level classical logic prevails and the special conventions of the assertion only come later. II 256 Factualism/Field: It must then distinguish between levels of total unacceptability (i.e., on the surface) and acceptability at a deep level (which only seems unacceptable by a superficial violation of the convention). Deflationism/Field: the deflationism between nonfactualism and factualism can be distinguished in the same way without using the terms "true" or "fact". >Deflationalism. Field II 256 Factualism/Conditional/Stalnaker/Field: (Stalnaker 1984)(1): (here, at first limited to non-embedded conditionals): here his approach provides the logic of Adams, i.e. Factualism is indistinguishable from nonfactualism in relation to which conclusions ("paradox of material implication") are considered correct. >Paradox of Implication. Deflationism/Field: can he differentiate between nonfactualism and factualism? One possibility is that if there are conditionals where the antecedent is logically and metaphysically possible, but not epistemically. Nonfactualism: thesis: in epistemic impossibility of the anteceding of a conditional, there is no question of acceptability. For the joke of conditionals consists in the assumption that their antecedents are possible epistemically. N.B.: then all conditionals with epistemically unacceptable antecedents are equally acceptable. FieldVsStalnaker: for him there is a fact due to which a conditional is true or false. And some conditionals with epistemically impossible antecedents will be true and others false! Factualism/Deflationism/Field: the test of whether someone adheres to this type of factualism is then whether he takes acceptability of such conditionals seriously. 1. R. Stalnaker (1984). Inquiry. Cambridge University Press. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Possible Worlds | Field | I 41 Possible World/difference/differentiation/Field: E.g. we cannot postulate a possibel world which is isomorphic to ours and in which only Nixon is like Humphrey (here) and Humphrey like Nixon (here) - (throughout the whole story). >Cross world identity, cf. >Centered worlds. I 75 Possible Worlds/Lewis: (Counterfactuals, Section 4.1): possible Worlds are 4-dimensional slices of a broader reality, like other possible world. All together form the actual universe. FieldVsLewis. NominalismVsPossible Worlds: these are abstract entities. I 222 Problem of quantities/Possible World/Field: with possible world and cross-world-congruence we could avoid the possibility operator. FieldVs: we exactly wanted to avoid the ontology of the space-time regions. Possible World/Field: are only heuristically harmless. I 223 Possible World/StalnakerVsLewis: (Stalanker 1976)(1): Alternative to Lewis: Speech of possible worlds should be understood as a speech about a property Q, so it is necessary that if the universe has Q, then there is x*, y*, z*, w* and u*, so that F (x*, y*, z*, w*, u*). Problem: How should we understand the cross-world congruence? The last incidents of x* are not bound by quantifiers during the comparison. FieldVsStalnaker: Problem: interpretation of the expression "spatial relation". --- II 89 Possible world/Quantities of/Field: what is relevant for sets of possible worlds as objects of states of the mind is that they form a Boolean algebra. N.B.: then the elements themselves need not be a possible world - any other kind of elements are then just as good for a psychological explanation. They could simply be everything - e.g. numbers. Numbers: do not pretend to represent the world as it is. II 90 Intentionality/Possible world/FieldVsStalnaker/Field: The wit of the possible world assumption is the Boolean Algebra, the boolean relation that prevails between possible worlds. Problem: then the empty set of possible worlds which contains the trisection of the angle, which is a subset of the set of the possible world, in which Caesar crossed the Rubicon. Problem: what fact does that make? - Without it the approach is meaningless. >Nonfactualism. 1. Robert C. Stalnaker, 1976. Possible Worlds. ous 10, 65-75. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Possible Worlds | Lewis | IV 147 Centered possible worlds/De re/de se/Quine/Lewis: (Ontological Relativity, Propositional Objects): E.g., A cat that is being chased by a dog wants to get onto the roof to be safe - de dicto: it wants a state that is the class of all possible worlds where it reaches the roof. Problem: cross-world identity: Question: which of the many counterparts in many possible worlds is the cat itself? Solution/Quine: centered world: Pairs of a world and a designated time-space point in it, the desired state is then a class of centered worlds - no centered world belongs to two classes (desired and dreaded possible worlds). >Centered world, >Counterpart/Lewis, >Counterpart relation/Lewis, >Counterpart theory/Lewis, >Identity across worlds. QuineVs: ultimately better divided theory: here are the objects of simple settings, classes of stimulus patterns that are more complex are linguistic. Property/Lewis: corresponds to a class of centered worlds, more specifically to a property of space-time points, but also a property of cats. IV 148 Possible world/Quine/Lewis: Lewis: large particulars (concrete) - Quine: abstract entities - certain classes of classes of quadruples of real numbers - (space-time points) - Stalnaker: pro Quine: corresponds better to our everyday language: What it could have been like. IV 149 Situation/Possible world/Lewis: Thesis: there can also be alternatives within a possible world - thus distinction situation/Possible world - LewisVsStalnaker: not propositions as belief objects (objects of desire) but attitudes de se - E.g. Lingens with memory loss finds out in the book that there are two people who could be identical with him - a) on the 6th floor at Stanford - b) in the basement of a different library 3km away - two possible situations (possibilities) in the same possible worlds - solution: property instead proposition - the propositions apply to both people in the same way. >Properties/Lewis, >Proposition/Lewis. --- V 42 Centering assumption/Possible world/Lewis: If it was violated, worlds that differed in a non-observed way would be considered to be the same as the actual world. V 262 Possible world/Equality/Identity/Lewis: it is an independent and difficult question whether two possible worlds that exactly match their history also match in all other aspects - e.g. in their probabilities, laws, modal truths, counterfctual conditionals. >Counterfactual conditional/Lewis. Lewis: this is not of interest here. Overall history/Supervenience: supervenes on the history of events, whatever else may in turn supervene on the overall history. >Supervenience/Lewis. --- Schwarz I 216 Possible world/Lewis: no set of ordinary sentences - of which there are not enough in the language. Lewis: counterparts, possible worlds are real (KripkeVs) (PutnamVs). --- Lewis I 59 Possible world/Lewis: you can speak pretty freely and metaphysically guileless and without special ontological reservations about possible worlds. --- II 214 Possible world save separation of object/meta languange - Truth and analyticity cannot be defined in the same language. II 214 Definition Possible World (VsLewis): The concept of a possible world can be explained even by recourse to semantic terms. Possible worlds are models of the analytical sentences of a language or diagrams or theories of such models. II 214 LewisVs: possible worlds cannot be explained by recourse to semantic terms. Possible worlds exist and should not be replaced by their linguistic representations. 1) Such a replacement does not work properly: two worlds that are indistinguishable in the representative language are (falsely) assigned one and the same representation. >ersatz world/Lewis. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Probability Conditional | Lewis | V 133f Conditional/Probability/Lewis: thesis: the probability of conditionals is the conditional probability. - (VsStalnaker). Logical form: P(A->C) and P(C I A) - But not for the truth-functional conditional ⊃ (horseshoe). - Because here they are only sometimes equal. Therefore, the indicative conditional is not truth-functional. We call it probability conditional. Problem: then the probability of conditionals would hint at the relation of probability of non-conditionals. - That would be incorrect. >Conditional, >Probability/Lewis. Solution: assertibility is not possible with not absolute probability in the case of the indicative conditionals. >Assertibility. V 135 Conditionalisation/Lewis/(s): E.g. conditionalisation on B: P(A) becomes P(A I B) the probability A given B. Cf. >Bayesianism. V 135f Probability conditional/prob cond/Lewis: here the probability of the antecedent must be positive. - A probability conditional applies to a class of probability functions - universal probability conditional: applies to all probability functions (Vs). >Probability function. V 137 Right: C and ~ C can have both positive values: E.g. C: even number, A: 6 appears. - Then AC and A~C are both positive probabilities. - Important argument: A and C are independent of each other. - General: several assumptions can have any positive probability if they are incompatible in pairs. - The language must be strong enough to express this. - Otherwise it allows universal probability conditionals that are wrong. V 139 Indicative conditional/Probability/Conditional probability/Lewis: because some probability functions that represent possible belief systems are not trivial - (i.e. assigns positive probability values to more than two incompatible options). The indicative conditional is not probability conditional for all possible subjective probability functions. - But that does not mean that there is a guaranteed conditionalised probability for all possible subjective probability functions. - I.e. the assertibility of the indicative conditional is not compatible with absolute probability. Assertibility is normally associated with probability, because speakers are usually sincere. - But not with indicative conditionals. - Indicative conditional: has no truth value at all, no truth conditions and therefore no probability for truth. V 144 Conditional/Probability/Lewis/(s): the probability of conditionals is measurable - antecedent and consequent must be probabilistically independent. - Then e.g. if each has 0.9, then the whole thing has 0.912. V 148 Probability/conditional/Lewis: a) picture: the picture is created by shifting the original probability of every world W to WA, the nearest possible worlds - (Picture here: sum of the worlds with A(= 1) or non-A(= 0) - This is the minimum revision (no unprovoked shift). - In contrast, the reverse: b) conditionalisation: it does not distort the profile of probability relations (equality and inequality of sentences that imply A). - Both methods should achieve the same. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Probability Conditional | Logic Texts | Read III 101 Conditional/propability conditional/Stalnaker: equates the probability of conditional sentences with the conditional probability. LewisVsStalnaker: there is no statement whose probability is measured by the conditional probability. >Probability conditional/Lewis. |
Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 |
| Propositions | Chalmers | Schwarz I 207 (annotation) Definition Diagonalization/Stalnaker/Lewis/Schwarz: the primary truth conditions are obtained by diagonalization, that is, the world parameter inserts the world of the respective situation (corresponding as time parameter the point of time of the situation, etc.). Definition "diagonal proposition"/terminology/Lewis: (according to Stalnaker, 1978(1)): diagonal propositions are primary truth conditions. Definition horizontal proposition/Lewis: horizontal propositions are secondary truth conditions. (1980a(2), 38, 1994b(3), 296f). Newer Terminology: Definition A Intension/Primary Intension/1-Intension/Terminology/Schwarz: the A intension is for primary truth conditions Definition C-Intension/Secondary Intension/2-Intension/Terminology/Schwarz: the C intension is for secondary truth conditions. Definition A-Proposition/1-Proposition/C-Proposition/2-Proposition/Terminology/Schwarz: corresponding. (Jackson 1998a(4), 2004(5), Lewis 2002b(6), Chalmers 1996b(7), 56,65) Definition meaning1/Terminology/Lewis/Schwarz: (1975(8),173): meaning1 refers to secondary truth conditions Definition meaning2/Lewis/Schwarz: meaning2 is complex function of situations and worlds on truth values, "two-dimensional intension". Schwarz: Problem: this means quite different things: Primary truth conditions/LewisVsStalnaker: in Lewis not determined by meta-linguistic diagonalization as Stalnaker's diagonal propositions. Also not via a priori implication as in Chalmer's primary propositions. 1. Robert c. Stalnaker [1978]: “Assertion”. In P. Cole (ed.), Syntax and Semantics, Vol. 9, New York: Academic Press, 315–332, und in [Stalnaker 1999a] 2. David Lewis [1980a]: “Index, Context, and Content”. In S. Kanger und S. ¨Ohmann (ed.), Philosophy and Grammar, Dordrecht: Reidel, und in [Lewis 1998a] 3. David Lewis [1994b]: “Reduction of Mind”. In Samuel Guttenplan (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Blackwell, 412–431, and in [Lewis 1999a] 4. Frank Jackson [1998a]: From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis. Oxford: Clarendon Press 5. Frank Jackson [2004]: “Why We Need A-Intensions”. Philosophical Studies, 118: 257–277 6. David Lewis [2002a]: “Tensing the Copula”. Mind, 111: 1–13 7. David Chalmers [2002]: “Consciousness and its Place in Nature”. In D. Chalmers (ed.) Philosophy of Mind. Classical and Contemporary Readings, New York: Oxford University Press, 247–272 8. David Lewis [1975]: “Languages and Language”. In [Gunderson 1975], 3–35. And in [Lewis 1983d] --- Chalmers I 64 Propositions/Chalmers: there are primary and secondary propositions corresponding to the primary and secondary intensions shown here. >Two-dimensional semantics, See Kaplan's distinction >content / >character). |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Propositions | Jackson | Schwarz I 207 (Note) Definition Diagonalization/Stalnaker/Lewis/Schwarz: the primary truth conditions are obtained by diagonalization, that is, the world parameter inserts the world of the respective situation (corresponding as time parameter the point of time of the situation, etc.). Definition "diagonal proposition"/terminology/Lewis: (according to Stalnaker, 1978(1)): diagonal propositions are primary truth conditions. >Two-dimensional semantics. Definition horizontal proposition/Lewis: horizontal propositions are secondary truth conditions. (1980a(2), 38, 1994b(3), 296f). Newer Terminology: Definition A Intension/Primary Intension/1-Intension/Terminology/Schwarz: the A intension is for primary truth conditions Definition C-Intension/Secondary Intension/2-Intension/Terminology/Schwarz: the C intension is for secondary truth conditions. Definition A-Proposition/1-Proposition/C-Proposition/2-Proposition/Terminology/Schwarz: corresponding. (Jackson 1998a(4), 2004(5), Lewis 2002b(6), Chalmers 1996b(7), 56,65) Definition meaning1/Terminology/Lewis/Schwarz: (1975(8),173): meaning1 refers to secondary truth conditions Definition meaning2/Lewis/Schwarz: meaning2 is complex function of situations and worlds on truth values, "two-dimensional intension". Schwarz: Problem: this means quite different things: Primary truth conditions/LewisVsStalnaker: in Lewis not determined by meta-linguistic diagonalization as Stalnaker's diagonal propositions. Also not via a priori implication as in Chalmer's primary propositions. Cf >Intensions/Stalnaker. 1. Robert c. Stalnaker [1978]: “Assertion”. In P. Cole (ed.), Syntax and Semantics, Vol. 9, New York: Academic Press, 315–332, und in [Stalnaker 1999a] 2. David Lewis [1980a]: “Index, Context, and Content”. In S. Kanger und S. ¨Ohmann (ed.), Philosophy and Grammar, Dordrecht: Reidel, und in [Lewis 1998a] 3. David Lewis [1994b]: “Reduction of Mind”. In Samuel Guttenplan (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Blackwell, 412–431, and in [Lewis 1999a] 4. Frank Jackson [1998a]: From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis. Oxford: Clarendon Press 5. Frank Jackson [2004]: “Why We Need A-Intensions”. Philosophical Studies, 118: 257–277 6. David Lewis [2002a]: “Tensing the Copula”. Mind, 111: 1–13 7. David Chalmers [2002]: “Consciousness and its Place in Nature”. In D. Chalmers (ed.) Philosophy of Mind. Classical and Contemporary Readings, New York: Oxford University Press, 247–272 8. David Lewis [1975]: “Languages and Language”. In [Gunderson 1975], 3–35. And in [Lewis 1983d] |
Jackson I Frank C. Jackson From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis Oxford 2000 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Reliability Theory | Field | II 96 Reliability Theory/Reliability/FieldVsReliability theory: Problem: most people are not reliable about politics. False: to say that they are under "abnormal conditions". Correct: they are not under optimal conditions. Problem: Optimum: is difficult to determine non-intentionally. Problem: E.g. a sect member is not reliable in relation to reality but reliable in relation to the opinions of the guru. Cf. >Bounded optimality. II 99 Solution: FieldVsStalnaker: Stalnaker needs something that he does not want: more delicate belief states than those with Boolean structure. >Beliefs/Stalnaker, >Belief states. II 369 Reliability/Field: cannot be everything we strive for. For example, there are completely reliable inductive rules: e.g. to believe in nothing at all, no matter what evidence there is. - E.g. to only believe in logical truths. But the theory of reliability wants more. It wants to pick out a special class which constitutes the rationality of a believe. Reliability/Field: is divided into many different terms: a) over short - over long time b) high probability, exact truth - high probability approximate truth c) providing reliability in the actual world. Reliability via a lot of similar possible worlds. >Possible worlds. II 380 Reliability/Field: For example, an initial observation turns out to be wrong. - Three possibilities: i): The rule is not reliable at the beginning, but it becomes more reliable. ii) there is no rule at the beginning, the later ones are better. (FieldVs, GoldmanVs.) Vs: this makes reliability unreachable and declares us to be unreasonable forever. iii) The rule was always reliable, only the observation period was too short. II 384 Field: we also need goals and effectiveness: then a rule can be more reliable but less powerful. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Similarity Metrics | Logic Texts | Read III 104ff Similarity Metrics/Stalnaker: smallest possible revision - i.e. the most similar world. Selection function: f(A, w) - "If you get a one, you will receive a scholarship" is true if the world in which you receive a scholarship is most similar to the world in which you are getting a one. Possible world view: deviates from the probability function if the fore-link is wrong". - Because all combinations can be realized in a possible world. >Possible world, >Similarity. III 105 Similarity Metrics/possible world/conditional sentence/Read: some classical logical principles fail here: e.g. contraposition that "if B, then not-A" follows from "if A, then not B" - the similar world in which it rains, can be very well one in which it rains only lightly. But the most similar world in which it rains violently cannot be one in which it does not rain at all. >Conditional. III 106 Another principle that fails: the reinforcement of the if-sentence: "If A, then B. So if A and C, then B." - For example, when I put sugar in my tea, it will taste good. So when I put sugar and diesel oil in my tea, it will taste good. In the most similar world in which I put diesel oil like sugar in my tea, it tastes horrible - further: the results of the conditionality principle are invalid: - If A, then B. So if A and C, then B - and if A, then B. If B, then C. So if A, then C - Reason: the conditional sentence has become a modal connection. We must know that these statements are strong enough in any appropriate modal sense - to ensure that the most similar A and C world is the most similar A-world, we must know that C is true everywhere. III 108 Similarity metrics/the conditionally excluded middle/Read: the sentence of the conditionally excluded middle: one or other member of a pair of conditional sentences must be true. This corresponds to the assumption that there is always a single most similar world. - (Stalnaker pro). >Conditionally excluded middle. LewisVsStalnaker: e.g. Bizet/Verdi - All combinations are false. Stalnaker: instead of the only similar one at least one similar world. LewisVs: the set of possible world in which Lewis is 2 m + e tall, whereby e decreases appropriately, this has no boundary. Solution/Lewis: instead of the selection function: similarity relation: Lewis proposes, that "if A then B" is true in w if there is either no "A or non-B"-world, or any "A and B"-world that is more similar than any "A and not-B"-World. III 110 Bizet/Verdi-example: where there is no unique most similar world, the "would" conditional sentences are wrong because there is no most similar world for any of the most appropriate similar worlds in which they are compartiots, where Bizet has a different nationality. >Bizet/Verdi case. E.g. If you get a one, you will receive a scholarship: will be true, if there is for every world in which you get a one and do not receive scholarship, is a more similar world in which you get both (without conditional sentence of the excluded middle). III 115 Similarity metrics/similarity analysis/possible world/ReadVsLewis: problem: e.g. (assuming John is in Alaska) If John is not in Turkey, then he is not in Paris. - This conditional sentence is true according to the "similarity statement", because it only asks, whether the then-sentence is true in the most similar world. >Conditional, >Counterfactual conditional. |
Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 |
| Terminology | Chalmers | I 20 Deflationary/Terminology/Chalmers: a deflationary concept of belief would be purely psychological (explaining behavior), not phenomenal (connected with Qualia). Which is the true concept, is not so decisive for my project. More important is the separation of the psychological and the phenomenal. I 28 Alertness/Attention/awareness/Terminology/Chalmers: Consciousness is always accompanied by attention, but not always vice versa. Awareness (also attention) falls more on the psychological side of differentiation. I 29 Newell (1992)(1) distinguishes between "awareness" and "consciousness". Chalmers: With "awareness" (attention) I will mean from now on "psychological consciousness" (behavior explaining, functional). I 154 Definition Proto-phenomenal Property/Chalmers: as the only one, a proto-phenomenal property does not contain experience itself, but it can contain several simultaneously present ones. This is strange to us, but cannot be excluded a priori. This would suggest a causal role of the phenomenal. To represent such a theory would simply mean to accept another possible world where something else had the role of causation, but such a world would not be logically excluded. > Dualism. I 232 Registration/Chalmers: registrations are judgments in a weaker sense: representational states, e.g. of the facial field, which are not yet judgments. 1. A. Newell, SOAR as a unified theory of cognition: Issues and explanations. Behavioral and Brain Studies 15, 1992: pp.464-92. Schwarz I 207 (annotation) Definition Diagonalization/Stalnaker/Lewis/Schwarz: the primary truth conditions are obtained by diagonalization, that is, the world parameter inserts the world of the respective situation (corresponding as time parameter the point of time of the situation, etc.). Definition "diagonal proposition"/terminology/Lewis: (according to Stalnaker, 1978(1)): diagonal propositions are primary truth conditions. Definition horizontal proposition/Lewis: horizontal propositions are secondary truth conditions. (1980a(2), 38, 1994b(3), 296f). Newer Terminology: Definition A Intension/Primary Intension/1-Intension/Terminology/Schwarz: the A intension is for primary truth conditions Definition C-Intension/Secondary Intension/2-Intension/Terminology/Schwarz: the C intension is for secondary truth conditions. Definition A-Proposition/1-Proposition/C-Proposition/2-Proposition/Terminology/Schwarz: corresponding. (Jackson 1998a(4), 2004(5), Lewis 2002b(6), Chalmers 1996b(7), 56,65) Definition meaning1/Terminology/Lewis/Schwarz: (1975(8),173): meaning1 refers to secondary truth conditions Definition meaning2/Lewis/Schwarz: meaning2 is complex function of situations and worlds on truth values, "two-dimensional intension". Schwarz: Problem: this means quite different things: Primary truth conditions/LewisVsStalnaker: in Lewis not determined by meta-linguistic diagonalization as Stalnaker's diagonal propositions. Also not via a priori implication as in Chalmer's primary propositions. 1. Robert c. Stalnaker [1978]: “Assertion”. In P. Cole (ed.), Syntax and Semantics, Vol. 9, New York: Academic Press, 315–332, und in [Stalnaker 1999a] 2. David Lewis [1980a]: “Index, Context, and Content”. In S. Kanger und S. ¨Ohmann (ed.), Philosophy and Grammar, Dordrecht: Reidel, und in [Lewis 1998a] 3. David Lewis [1994b]: “Reduction of Mind”. In Samuel Guttenplan (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Blackwell, 412–431, and in [Lewis 1999a] 4. Frank Jackson [1998a]: From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis. Oxford: Clarendon Press 5. Frank Jackson [2004]: “Why We Need A-Intensions”. Philosophical Studies, 118: 257–277 6. David Lewis [2002a]: “Tensing the Copula”. Mind, 111: 1–13 7. David Chalmers [2002]: “Consciousness and its Place in Nature”. In D. Chalmers (ed.) Philosophy of Mind. Classical and Contemporary Readings, New York: Oxford University Press, 247–272 8. David Lewis [1975]: “Languages and Language”. In [Gunderson 1975], 3–35. And in [Lewis 1983d] |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Actualism | Lewis Vs Actualism | Stalnaker I 6 Possible Worlds/Existence/Stalnaker: Dilemma: a) Realism: one can say that there is a variety of worlds. b) Actualism: one can say that only one - our real world - is actual, the rest is only possible. Then actualism contradicts realism. Actualism/realism/possible worlds/Stalnaker: both positions say it can be explained as a misunderstanding. Realism/Stalnaker: according to Stalnaker, the misunderstanding can be found in the realm of the quantifier: if it is unlimited, then the statement that there are many possible worlds is true. But the quantifier is often limited to a subset of what exists, and if interpreted as such, the statement is false. I 7 Actualism/Stalnaker: this explanation is not at his disposal because he says that the actual concurs with the real, so that both limited and unlimited quantification concur. For him the misunderstanding is embedded in the term "world". When we are talking about the actual world, we are talking about the state of something. Existence/to exist/instance/to be instantiated/Stalnaker: there are, however, many different modes of how a world can be and these modes are presently existing. But only one of those modes is instantiated. And only one universe is instantiated. Possible worlds/Stalnaker: it would not be true to say that there is a number of possible worlds. It would, however, be true to say that there is number of modes. Possible worlds/Stalnaker: it could be said that they can exist without having instances. Ersatz world/Ersatzwelt/LewisVsStalnaker/LewisVsActualism: this is what Lewis calls "ersatz worlds": in the same vein: a current king of France would be an "ersatz king". >Ersatz World/Lewis. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Carnap, R. | Stalnaker Vs Carnap, R. | I 43 Def Liberal Platonism/LP/terminology/Stalnaker: I developed the liberal platonism (LP) earlier to explain the difference between reference to numbers and normal things. But it is not a defense of the MR: thesis: one starts with facts of mathematical discourse e.g. existence of a practice that contains among others assertions, inference, arguments. If we then have Tarskian semantics (and require a domain of goods we are talking about) then this explains the facts about the discourse. Thesis: when we say that our practice is legitimate it is not a sufficient reason to say that we really make assertions and the semantics really tells us what the statements say? ((s) >content, >assertion). ((s) short: LP: thesis: practice is sufficiently without immaterial realm). I 44 Problem: then the LP says carelessly, that the existence of numbers is constituted by the fact that there is a legitimate practice. FieldVsStalnaker: that is a kind of linguistic idealism. Field pro Carnap: (Carnap: "Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology", 1950): as an external issue what numbers are it violates Carnap's principle. Platonism/Field: two theses: 1. numbers, functions and sets exist 2. they are mind-independent. Stalnaker: if I had formulated more cautiously, I would have set up a real platonism. Empiricist sense criterion/Carnap/Stalnaker: would say as we all: if the language did not exist, the statements would not be meaningful. Stalnaker: but that is still compatible with the fact that it still could be true. Internal issues: within a frame External issues: purely practical questions of whether to accept the frame. QuineVsCarnap/Stalnaker: thesis: all questions are asked in any linguistic context, and questions such as "Is it reasonable to accept a frame of numbers?" and "Are there numbers?" are not easy to separate. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Endurantism | Stalnaker Vs Endurantism | I 135 Vague identity/time/possible world/poss.w./Stalnaker: I ask with some examples for temporal and for cross world identity whether Salmon refuted vague identity with his argument. E.g. in Philadelphia, there are two prominent fish restaurants named "Bookbinder's". They compete with each other. B1: "Bookbinder’s classic fish restaurant" B2: "The old original Bookbinder's". B0: The original, only restaurant from 1865. Today's two restaurants may go back to the old and have a entangled history. Question: does Salmon's argument show, I 136 that there must be a fact (about the history) that decides on which restaurant is the original? One thing is clear: B1 unequal B2. Transitive identity/transitivity/Stalnaker: then due to the transitivity of the identity B0 = B1 and B0 = B2 cannot exist at the same time. Semantic indeterminacy/Stalnaker: but one is tempted to say that there is a certain semantic indeterminacy here. Question: can we reconcile this with Salmon's argument (SalmonVsVague identity)? Stalnaker: I think we can do so. Perdurantism/perduration/Stalnaker: e.g. if we say the name "B0" dates back to the time of 1865 when there was a certain restaurant "Bookbinder's" this is the most natural way. Endurantism/enduration/Stalnaker: e.g. but we can also say B0 is one of the today existing two restaurants "Bookbinder’s". StalnakerVsEndurantism. Endurantism/Stalnaker: here it is similar to vague descriptions: example "B0" is ambiguous! It is unclear whether he refers to B1 or to B2. (Indefinite reference). Perdurantism/Stalnaker: here the reference is clear. ((s) Because the original restaurant does not exist anymore. B0 therefore clearly means the original restaurant because it cannot be confused with one of the two today existing) Also, of course "B1" and "B2" are unambiguous. Question: given Salmon's argument: how can it then be indefinite if B0 = B2? Stalnaker: that just depends on if we understand continuants as endurant or perdurant. continuant/perdurantism/endurantism/Stalnaker: Perdurantism/Stalnaker: can understand continuants e.g. as four-dimensional objects (four dimensionalism) which are extended in time exactly as they are extended in space. Then the example of the restaurants corresponds to the example of buildings (see above). Example buildings: the indeterminacy is there explained by the indeterminacy of the concept "building". One building is maybe a part of another. Example restaurants: according to this view each has a temporal part in common with the original. It is indeterminate here which of the temporal parts is a restaurant and which is a composition of multiple temporal parts of different restaurants. I 137 Therefore, it is indefinite to which of these different entities "B0" refers (indefinite reference). Perdurantism/continuant/Stalnaker: one might think, but we have a specific reference, like in the example of the building through a demonstrative with a ostension: when we say "this building". But that does not work with the perdurantistic conception of restaurants. ((s) As an institution, not as a building. This should be perdurant here that means not all temporal parts are simultaneously present and anyway not as material objects). Four dimensionalism/Stalnaker: therefore has two possible interpretations: perdurantistic (here) and endurantistic (see below). Endurantism/four dimensional/four dimensionalism/continuant/Stalnaker: some authors: thesis: continuants have no temporal parts like events. That means they are at any moment with all their (only spatial) parts present. Nevertheless, they exist in time. LewisVsEndurantism: (Lewis 1986a, 203) this view uses the terms "part" and "whole" in a very limited sense. StalnakerVsLewis: that may not be quite so because the representatives acknowledge that some things e.g. football matches, wars, centuries indeed have temporal parts. Endurantism/Stalnaker: even if the whole thing is an obscure doctrine some intuitions speak for it. I will neither defend nor fight him. Endurantism: example restaurants: In 1865 there is only one restaurant "Bookbinder's" there are no other candidates for this description. Even if our criterion for "restaurant" is unclear. It seems that we have a definite reference for an endurant thing B0. Also for the today existing restaurant B1 we seem to have definite reference. Salmon/Stalnaker: if we accept his argument again, there must then be a fact which decides whether B0 is identical to B1 or not? StalnakerVs: here the semantic indeterminacy may be subtle but it still exists. We show this like that: Identity in time/Stalnaker: example statue/clay: yesterday there was the pile, today the statue, so both can not be identical. They have different historical properties. This known argument does not require four dimensionalism. Four dimensionalism/statue/clay/Stalnaker: statue and pile as four dimensional objects: here only parts of them exist today. Endurantism/statue/clay/Stalnaker: if we say both - Statue and pile - are at today "fully present" (it would have to be explained how) Salmon's argument still shows that both are (now) different. The argument does not depend on the fact that they have different parts. It requires only that they have different historical properties. Endurantism/Stalnaker: example restaurants: suppose the concept Restaurant is indefinite. After some arbitrary clarifications B0 = B1 will be, after others B0 = B2. Disambiguation/Stalnaker: then B0 has after some disambiguations temporal properties it would not have after other disambiguations. Semantic indeterminacy/reference/StalnakerVsSalmon, Nathan: the reference of "B0" is then dependent on the way of our arbitrary assumptions for disambiguation. SalmonVsStalnaker/Stalnaker: accuses me of some inconsistencies but I have shown indeterminacy of reference while Salmon refers to indeterminacy of identity between certain objects. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Field, H. | Stalnaker Vs Field, H. | Field II 28 Equality of the inferential role/Field: must be defined only in relation to an idiolect here. This solves the problem that we otherwise might incorporate the meaning of the token in what the reference comes from. ((s) circular). VsField: (Wallace 1977, Davidson 1977, 1979, McDowell 1978 Stalnaker 1984): the reduction of the truth conditions on the semantics of the basic concepts were too atomistic. It takes too little account that the proposition itself is a unit of meaning. FieldVsVs: I should understand reduction a bit "wider". Field II 94 StalnakerVsField: would argue 1. that the causal theories of reference require the public language intentional concepts: what a word means depends on the attitude of the language user. ((s) Problem: >Humpty Dumpty theory VsVs: is this about the >speech community? Or >attitude semantics?). Field: then a non-intentional causal theory would be more successful for the "morphemes" of a thought language than words for a public language. A non-intentional theory for the public language seems irrelevant. StalnakerVsField. 2. (deeper): Field's access was too atomistic: he thinks the basic representation exists between words instead of between propositions or "morphemes" of the thought language instead of whole states. Field: he might be right with this. Two points about this: FieldVsStalnaker: 1. he thinks for me the "name-object"- or "predicate-property"-relations come first. The sentence-proposition-relation is then derived. Does that mean that people first invented names and predicates and then awesomely put them together? I have never claimed that. Rather, truth conditions are characterized by "name-object" - or "predicate property"-relations. 2. an atomistic theory can explain much of the interaction between the atoms. Stalnaker's theory is not atomistic enough. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Functionalism | Field Vs Functionalism | II 43 Belief/Functionalism/Stalnaker/Lewis/Field: the thesis that belief is a functional state. (Regardless of the physical realization). Important argument: this involves no relation to a sentence or sentence analogue in a system of internal representations. II 44 Stalnaker: E.g. beings from other planets: ...Here we look at sensory inputs and assume that they are correlated with their survival. ...Then we manipulate the environment. Belief/Martians/Stalnaker: then we would not only attribute analogues of beliefs and desires, but them themselves. But we do not need to assume any language, not even Mentalese. (Stalnaker 1976, p. 82). Representation/FieldVsStalnaker: that does not allow us to distinguish whether such a functional theory of belief requires a system of internal representations. 1) We have not observed the entire behavior. 2) Even if: an assertion about behavior is not simply an assertion about behavior, it is an assertion about how the behavior is caused. FieldVsStalnaker: we need knowledge (or reasonable belief) about how behavior is produced in order to know (or believe) that a being has belief. Functionalism/Inner State/Field: an assertion about internal states of an organism is an assertion about those and not reducible to behavior. II 49 Functional Relation/Field: the functional relation psi is not itself a physical relation. FieldVsFunctionalism: Problem: even if we consider belief to be a functional relation, it does not solve Brentano’s problem, because here we would have to show that there could be physical relations between people and propositions. The only thing functionalism says is trivial: that my relation to propositions may differ from that of dogs or of myself 20 years ago. II 50 Def Orthographic Coincidence/Predicate/Single-Digit/Multi-Digit/Belief/Field: Thesis: all the various attributions E.g. "X believes Russell was bald", E.g. "X believes Russell was bald or snow is white", etc. should be regarded as primitive single-digit predicates. Then we could drop all two-digit predicates like E.g. "X believes that p" entirely. Orthographic coincidence: then the fact that the expression "believes that" occurs in both (supposedly) single-digit predicates would be without meaning, a mere orthographic coincidence. Likewise, the fact that both contain "Russell was bald". FieldVs: that cannot be taken seriously. But suppose it was serious, what would follow? FieldVsOrthographic coincidence: it would follow that there does not have to be a physical relationship between people and propositions. Because since we did not speak of a psychological relation, it is clear that there is no realization in which a physical relation would be needed. ((s) then there must be an infinite number of single-digit predicates that reflect the most complicated attitudes.) Field: although the error is so crude, it occurred to me myself (in the first paragraph of this section) when I tried to explain that functionalism makes representations superfluous: I said: "A state of an organism is a state of belief that p, if this state plays the right (appropriate) role in the psychology of the organism." II 51 Vs: in order for this to make sense the letter "p" must be understood here as an abbreviation for a particular sentence, E.g. "Either Russell was bald or snow is white". Field: I’m not saying that it is meaningless. But "appropriate role" suggests that we can define this particular state in a directly functional way. And that in turn suggests that the procedure that we need for "pain" could also be applied to "Russell was bald or snow is white". ((s) and that it is only an orthographic coincidence that we are not doing it). And that the corresponding simple expression represents a property. Solution: in order to avoid the "orthographic coincidence","X believes that p0" should not be considered as functionally definable for certain sentences p0, in such a way as that which is right for "X is in pain". ((s) as a function, no (too) specific sentence should be assumed, but something more general). Solution: It should be non-functionally defined from a relational predicate "X believes that p", which is functionally defined by (3). N.B.: then we need physical properties and quantities of possible worlds. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 |
| Glanzberg, M. | Stalnaker Vs Glanzberg, M. | I 105 Infinite language/infinite/Stalnaker: we assumed here one with infinite quantification-prefixes and infinite Boolean combinations. Michael GlanzbergVsStalnaker: (2001) showed that only finite quantifications are sufficient. In such a language one can express that there are infinitely many different to each other objects by saying that there are at least n objects for each n. I 106 Stronger/weaker/language/Glanzberg: problem: such a language is too strong to deliver the kind of supervenience that we need for our philosophical discussion. A supervenience basis due to an infinite language will be too weak because then one can define arbitrary properties. Relevance/Glanzberg: to build an interesting concept of supervenience we need restrictions that exclude arbitrary properties. Only then we will get a strong thesis. (> stronger/weaker: >Strength of theories). StalnakerVsGlanzberg: I think our thesis is as strong as we need it. Namely because the strong supervenience from A to B’ is equivalent to the global one from A to B. This is the converse of the main thesis that was proved in the appendix. This follows from the following three facts that apply to any three sets of properties X, Y and Z where X' is the set of properties that can be defined in concepts of X properties in the infinite language. 1. If X strongly supervenes on Y, then X supervenes globally on Y ((s) strong supervenience implies a global one). 2. if X supervenes globally on Y and Y globally on Z then X supervenes globally on Z ((s) transitivity of global supervenience). 3. X’ supervenes globally on X. Global supervenience/Stalnaker: is clearly never trivial. It is obviously not true for arbitrary sets of properties A and B that A supervenes globally on B and is therefore also not generally true that A globally or strongly supervenes on the infinite closure (infinitary closure) B'. How expressive the infinite language may be it is not give us the strength to define properties that distinguish between B-undistinguishable possible worlds (poss.w.). StalnakerVsGlanzberg: with him it only seems so because his formal argument assumes that a full B-description of a poss.w. completely describes it but that is only true if all the properties globally supervene on the B-properties. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Kamp, H. | Stalnaker Vs Kamp, H. | II 104 Possible worlds semantics//KampVsPossible worlds semantics/KampVsStalnaker: the approach is not rich enough to represent all differences. Kamp (1988)(1) adopts an example by Barbara Partee: Example Pronoun/pronouns/anaphora/presupposition: (2) a. Exactly one of 10 balls is not in the bag b. It is under the sofa (3) a. Exactly 9 of 10 balls are in the bag b. It is under the sofa. Kamp: Suppose the discourse takes place in the same initial context. That means 1. statement: changes the context. 2. statement: is made in the changed context. II 105 Important argument: the first statements of the two pairs (2a) and (3) are truth conditionally equivalent. – that means they are true in exactly the same set of poss.w.. Context/possible world/poss.w./Kamp: if context are now sets of poss.w. and if assertions add only the truth conditional content to the context, the context will later be the same. But the contexts on the other side must surely be different in both cases because although (2b) and (3b) are the same sentence it must express different propositions in both cases. "In the second case it cannot refer to "the ball". KampVsPossible worlds semantics: if the sentences are truth conditionally equivalent no two different sets of poss.w. can be distinguished here. StalnakerVsVs: it is true that our abstract approach does not predict this difference, namely, because it says nothing about how pronouns function. Two dimensional semantics/Stalnaker: is no meaning theory. StalnakerVsKamp: it is not correct that you have to conclude from the fact that the former contexts are identical that the later contexts are also identical. By this you ignore the first way how a speech act changes the context (see above II 102 above). That a statement was made at all is sufficient, together with any information that follows from it, along with a permanent background information on conventions. Thus one can distinguish two later contexts, relative to which (2b) and (3b) are interpreted. Pronoun/Stalnaker: "it" apparently requires a context in which a particular individual is prominent. II 106 Context/possible worlds semantics/StalnakerVsKamp/Stalnaker: solution: as long as the minimal assumption makes that information to determine the content may be relevant only if it is assumed by the speaker that this information is also accessible to the listener, we can be sure that the set of poss.w. that defines the presuppositions is sufficient to represent a context. An assertion changes the context already alone by the fact that it is made! (1) Kamp, Hans (1988): Comments on Stalnaker, Belief Attribution and Context. In Robert H. Grimm and Daniel D. Merrill (Eds.): Contents of Thought: Proceedings of the 1985 Oberlin Colloquium in Philosophy. Tucson, University of Arizona Press. pp. 156-181. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Lewis, C.I. | Schwarz Vs Lewis, C.I. | Schwarz I 31 Personal identity/SchwarzVsLewis: his criterion is not accurate and provides in interesting cases no answer. E.g. continuity after brain surgery, etc. But Lewis does not want that. Our (vague) everyday term should only be made explicitly. Beaming/Teleportation/Doubling/Lewis: all this is allowed by his theory. Schwarz I 60 Identity/Lewis/Centered world/Possible world/Schwarz: my desire to be someone else, does not refer to the whole world, but only to my position in the world. E.g. Twin Earth/Schwarz: one of the two planets is blown tomorrow, the two options (that we are on the one or the other) do however not correspond to two possible worlds! Detailed knowledge would not help out where we are, because they are equal. ((s) so no "centered world"). Actually, we want to know where we ourselves are in the world. (1979a(1),1983b(2),1986e(3):231 233). SchwarzVsLewis: says too little about these perspective possibilities. It is not enough here to allow multiple counterparts (c.p.) in a world. It should not just be possible that Humphrey is exactly as the actual Nixon, he should also to be allowed to be different. Humphrey may not be a GS of himself. (> Irreflexive counterpart relation,> see below Section 9.2. "Doxastic counterparts". Similarity relation. No matter what aspects you emphasize: Nixon will never be more similar to Humphrey than to himself. Schwarz I 100 Fundamental properties/SchwarzVsLewis: this seems to waver whether he should form the fE to the conceptual basis for the reduction of all predicates and ultimately all truths, or only a metaphysical basis, on which all truths supervene. (>Supervenience, >Reduction). Schwarz I 102 Naturalness/Natural/Property/Content/Lewis: the actual content is then the most natural candidate that matches the behavior. "Toxic" is not a perfectly natural property (p.n.p.), but more natural than "more than 3.78 light years away" and healthy and less removed and toxic". Naturalness/Degree/Lewis: (1986e(3):, 61,63,67 1984b(4):66): the naturalness of a property is determined by the complexity or length of their definition by perfectly natural properties. PnE: are always intrinsically and all their Boolean combinations remain there. Problem: extrinsic own sheep threaten to look unnatural. Also would e.g. "Red or breakfast" be much more complicated to explain than e.g. "has charge -1 or a mass, whose value is a prime number in kg. (Although it seems to be unnatural by definition). Naturalness/Property/Lewis: (1983c(5), 49): a property is, the more natural the more it belongs to surrounding things. Vs: then e.g. "cloud" less natural than e.g. "table in the vicinity of a nuclear power plant or clock showing 7:23". Schw I 103 Naturalness/Properties/Lewis: (1983c(5): 13f): naturalness could be attributed to similarity between characteristics: E.g. a class is more natural, the more the properties of its elements resemble each other. Similarity: Lewis refers to Armstrong: similarity between universals 1978b(6),§16.2,§21, 1989b(7): §5.111997 §4.1). Ultimately LewisVs. Naturalness/Lewis/Schwarz: (2001a(8):§4,§6): proposing test for naturalness, based on similarity between individual things: coordinate system: "intrinsic" and "extrinsic" axis. A property is then the more natural, the more dense and more compact the appropriate region is. Problem: 1. that presupposes gradual similarity and therefore cannot be well used to define gradual naturalness. 2. the pnE come out quite unnatural, because the instances often do not strongly resemble each other. E.g. if a certain mass property is perfect, of course, then all things with this mass build a perfectly natural class, no matter how dissimilar they are today. SchwarzVsLewis: it shows distinctions between natural and less natural properties in different areas, but does not show that the distinction is always the same. Naturalness/SchwarzVsLewis: could also depend on interests and biological expression. And yet, can in various ways the different types of natural - be determined by perfect naturalness. That is not much, because at Lewis all, by definition, by the distribution of p.n.p. is determined. ((s)>Mosaic). Schwarz I 122 Naturalness/SchwarzVsLewis: not reasonable to assume that it was objectively, regardless of how naturally it appears to us. Lewis introduced objective naturalness as a metaphysical basis for qualitative, intrinsic similarity and difference, as some things resemble each other like eggs and others do not. (see above 5.2). Intrinsic Similarity: also qualitative character and duplication: these terms are intended to be our familiar terms by Lewis. SchwarzVsLewis: but if objective naturalness is to explain the distinction of our opinions about similarity, one cannot ask with sense the question whether the distinction serves exactly this. So although there are possible beings (or worlds) whose predicates express relatively unnatural properties and therefore are wrong about natural laws, without being able to discover the error. But we can be sure a priori that we do not belong to them. Problem: the other beings may themselves believe a priori to be sure that their physical predicates are relatively natural. Solution: but they (and not we) were subject to this mistake, provided "natural" means in their mouth the same as with us. ((s) but we also could just believe that they are not subject to error. Respectively, we do not know whether we are "we" or "they"). Schwarz: here is a tension in our concept of natural law (NL): a) on the one hand it is clear that we can recognize them empirically. b) on the other hand they should be objective in a strong sense, regardless of our standards and terms. Problem: Being with other standards can come up with the same empirical data to all other judgments of NL. Schwarz I 134 Event/SchwarzVsLewis: perhaps better: events but as the regions themselves or the things in the regions: then we can distinguish e.g. the flight from the rotation of the ball. Lewis appears to be later also inclined to this. (2004d)(9). Lewis: E.g. the death of a man who is thrown into a completely empty space is not caused by something that happens in this room, because there is nothing. But when events are classes of RZ regions, an event could also include an empty region. Def Qua thing/Lewis/Schwarz: later theory: “Qua-things” (2003)(10): E.g. „Russell qua Philosoph“: (1986d(9a),247): classes of counterpieces – versus: LewisVsLewis: (2003)(10) Russell qua Philosoph and Russell qua Politician and Russell are identical. Then the difference in counterfactual contexts is due to the determined by the respective description counterpart relation. These are then intensional contexts. (Similar to 1971(11)). counterfactual asymmetry/Lewis/Schwarz: Lewis' analysis assumes similarity between possible worlds. HorwichVsLewis: (1987(15),172) should explain why he is interested in this baroque dependence. Problem/SchwarzVsLewis: so far, the analysis still delivers incorrect results E.g. causation later by earlier events. Schwarz I 139 Conjunctive events/SchwarzVsLewis: he does not see that the same is true for conjunctive events. Examples A, B, C, D are arbitrary events, so that A caused B and C caused D. If there is an event B&C, which exactly occurs when both B and C happen, then A is the cause of D: without A, B would not have happened, neither B&C. Likewise D would not have happened without B&C. Because causation is transitive, thus any cause causes any effect. Note: according to requirement D would not happen without C, but maybe the next possible world, in which B&C are missing, is one in which C is still taking place? According to Lewis the next possible world should however be one where the lack of cause is completely extinguished. Schwarz: you cannot exclude any conjunctive events safely. E.g. a conversation or e.g. a war is made up of many events and may still be as a whole a cause or effect. Lewis (2000a(13), 193) even used quite unnatural conjunctions of events in order to avoid objections: E.g. conjunction from the state of brain of a person and a decision of another person. Absence/Lewis/Schwarz: because Lewis finds no harmless entities that are in line as absences, he denies their existence: they are no events, they are nothing at all, since there is nothing relevant. (200a, 195). SchwarzVsLewis: But how does that fit together with the Moore's facts? How can a relationship be instantiated whose referents do not exist?. Moore's facts/Schwarz: E.g. that absences often are causes and effects. Something to deny that only philosopher comes to mind. I 142 Influence/SchwarzVsLewis: Problem: influence of past events by future. Example had I drunk from the cup already half a minute ago, then now a little less tea would be in the cup, and depending on how much tea I had drunk half a minute ago, how warm the tea was then, where I then had put the cup, depending on it the current situation would be a little different. After Lewis' analysis my future tea drinking is therefore a cause of how the tea now stands before me. (? Because Ai and Bi?). Since the drinking incidents are each likely to be similar, the impact is greater. But he is not the cause, in contrast to the moon. Schwarz I 160 Know how/SchwarzVsLewis: it is not entirely correct, that the phenomenal character must be causal effect if the Mary and Zombie pass arguments. For causal efficacy, it is sufficient if Mary would react differently to a phenomenally different experience ((s) >Counterfactual conditional). Dualism/Schwarz: which can be accepted as a dualist. Then you can understand phenomenal properties like fundamental physical properties. That it then (as above Example charge 1 and charge 1 switch roles in possible worlds: is possible that in different possible worlds the phenomenal properties have their roles changed, does not mean that they are causally irrelevant! On the contrary, a particle with exchanged charge would behave differently. Solution: because a possible world, in which the particle has a different charge and this charge plays a different role, is very unlike to our real world! Because there prevail other laws of nature. ((s) is essential here that besides the amended charge also additionally the roles were reversed? See above: >Quidditism). SchwarzVsLewis: this must only accept that differences in fundamental characteristics do not always find themselves in causal differences. More one must not also accept to concede Mary the acquisition of new information. Schwarz I 178 Content/Individuation/Solution/LewisVsStalnaker: (1983b(2), 375, Fn2, 1986e(3), 34f), a person may sometimes have several different opinion systems! E.g. split brain patients: For an explanation of hand movements to an object which the patient denies to see. Then you can understand arithmetic and logical inference as merging separate conviction fragments. Knowledge/Belief/Necessary truth/Omniscience/SchwarzVsLewis/SchwarzVsFragmentation: Problem: even within Lewis' theory fragmentation is not so easy to get, because the folk psychology does not prefer it. Schwarz I 179 E.g. at inconsequent behavior or lie we do not accept a fragmented system of beliefs. We assume rather that someone changes his beliefs or someone wants to mislead intentionally. E.g. if someone does not make their best move, it must not be the result of fragmentation. One would assume real ignorance contingent truths instead of seeming ignorance of necessary truths. Fragmentation does not help with mathematical truths that must be true in each fragment: Frieda learns nothing new when she finally finds out that 34 is the root of the 1156. That they denied the corresponding proposition previously, was due to a limitation of their cognitive architecture. Knowledge/Schwarz: in whatever way our brain works, whether in the form of cards, records or neural networks - it sometimes requires some extra effort to retrieve the stored information. Omniscience/Vs possible world/Content/VsLewis/Schwarz: the objection of logical omniscience is the most common objection to the modeling mental and linguistic content by possible worlds or possible situations. SchwarzVsVs: here only a problem arises particularly, applicable to all other approaches as well. Schwarz I 186 Value/Moral/Ethics/VsLewis/Schwarz: The biggest disadvantage of his theory: its latent relativism. What people want in circumstances is contingent. There are possible beings who do not want happiness. Many authors have the intuition that value judgments should be more objective. Solution/Lewis: not only we, but all sorts of people should value under ideal conditions the same. E.g. then if anyone approves of slavery, it should be because the matter is not really clear in mind. Moral disagreements would then in principle be always solvable. ((s)>Cognitive deficiency/Wright). LewisVsLewis: that meets our intuitions better, but unfortunately there is no such defined values. People with other dispositions are possible. Analogy with the situation at objective probability (see above 6.5): There is nothing that meets all of our assumptions about real values, but there is something close to that, and that's good enough. (1989b(7), 90 94). Value/Actual world/Act.wrld./Lewis: it is completely unclear whether there are people in the actual world with completely different value are dispositions. But that does not mean that we could not convince them. Relativism/Values/Morals/Ethics/Lewis/Schwarz: Lewis however welcomes a different kind of relativism: desired content can be in perspective. The fate of my neighbor can be more important to me than the fate of a strangers. (1989b(14), 73f). Schwarz I 232 Truthmaker principle/SchwarzVsLewis: here is something rotten, the truth maker principle has a syntax error from the outset: we do not want "the world as it is", as truth-makers, because that is not an explanation, we want to explain how the world makes the truth such as the present makes propositions about the past true. Schwarz I 233 Explanation/Schwarz: should distinguish necessary implication and analysis. For reductive metaphysics necessary implication is of limited interest. SchwarzVsLewis: he overlooks this when he wrote: "A supervenience thesis is in the broader sense reductionist". (1983,29). Elsewhere he sees the difference: E.g. LewisVsArmstrong: this has an unusual concept of analysis: for him it is not looking for definitions, but for truth-makers ". 1. David Lewis [1979a]: “Attitudes De Dicto and De Se”. Philosophical Review, 88: 513–543. 2. David Lewis [1983b]: “Individuation by Acquaintance and by Stipulation”. Philosophical Review, 92: 3–32. 3. David Lewis [1986e]: On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell 4. David Lewis [1984b]: “Putnam’s Paradox”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 61: 343–377 5. David Lewis [1983c]: “New Work for a Theory of Universals”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 61: 343–377. 6. David M. Armstrong [1978b]: Universals and Scientific Realism II: A Theory of Universals. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 7. David M. Armstrong [1989b]: Universals: An Opinionated Introduction. Boulder: Westview Press 8. David Lewis [2001a]: “Redefining ‘Intrinsic’ ”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 63: 381-398 9. David Lewis [2004d]: “Void and Object”. In [Collins et al. 2004], 277–291 9a. David Lewis [1986d]: “Events”. In [Lewis 1986f]: 241–269 10. David Lewis [2003]: “Things qua Truthmakers”. Mit einem Postscript von David Lewis und Gideon Rosen. In Hallvard Lillehammer und Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (Hg.), Real Metaphysics: Essays in Honour of D.H. Mellor, London: Routledge, 25–38. 11. David Lewis [1971]: “Counterparts of Persons and Their Bodies”. Journal of Philosophy, 68: 203–211. 12. David Lewis [1987]: “The Punishment that Leaves Something to Chance”. Proceedings of the Russellian Society, 12: 81–97. 13. David Lewis [2000a]: “Causation as Influence”. Journal of Philosophy, 97: 182–197. Gekürzte Fassung von [Lewis 2004a] 14. David Lewis [1989b]: “Dispositional Theories of Value”. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 63: 113-137. 15. Paul Horwich [1987]: Asymmetries in Time. Cambridge (Mass.): MIT Press |
Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Lewis, D. | Stalnaker Vs Lewis, D. | Bigelow I 117 StalnakerVsLewis: (1968(1), 1981(2)) defends the conditional proposition of the excluded third against Lewis. Lewis V 183 "hidden property"/LewisVs: "My opponent": thinks that no real probability but a "fake" probability is in play. (see above) E.g. 88%,3%). (s) A "given variation" which then comes into force if c is withdrawn. Lewis: if this is true then it would be okay, then e would be somehow predetermined. It would be so to speak easier for the counterfactual conditional (co.co.). LewisVs: but we still have to accept real probability. Opponent: sounds like Stalnaker if he says: e would have happened either with c or without c. But his position is not the same although he accepts the same disjunction of co.co. and Stalnaker's defenses do not help him. Opponent: thinks that there are two relevant ways how the world could be, one would make a co.co. true, the other way the other. Thus the disjunction is in any case true. StalnakerVs: (Lewis pro): there is only one relevant way of how the world is and it makes none of the co.co. definitely true or false. Ontology/semantics/StalnakerVsLewis: the two co.co. are true or false relative to alternative arbitrary resolutions of a semantic indeterminacy. ((s) Semantic assumptions shall make ontological assumptions superfluous). V 184 What causes that the co.co. does not determine the truth is that different solutions involve different approaches. But any solution makes the one or the other true, the disjunction is certainly true despite the complementary vagueness of the disjoint. This alleged semantic indeterminacy is not a real property in the world. Stalnaker differs with me in a small semantic question, with my opponents in a great ontological question. Schwarz I 60 Counterpart/c.p./counterpart theory/c.p.theory/counterpart relation/c.p.r./StalnakerVsLewis: if you already allow almost any relations as counterpart relation you could also use non-qualitative relationships. (Stalnaker 1987a)(3): then you can reconcile the counterpart with Haecceitism: if you do not stumble against the fact that at Lewis (x)(y)(x = y > N(x = y) is false, (Lewis pro contingent identity, see above) you can also determine that a thing always only has one GS per possible world (poss.w.). >Counterpart Theory. Stalnaker/Schwarz: that does not work with qualitative counterpart relation as it is always possible that several things - e.g. in a fully symmetrical world - are exactly equally similar to a third thing in another poss.w.. LewisVsStalnaker: Vs non-qualitative c.p.r.: all truths including the modal truths are to be based on what kind of things exist (in act.wrld. and poss.w.) and which (qualitative) properties they have (> "Mosaic": >Humean World). 1. Robert C. Stalnaker [1968]: “A Theory of Conditionals”. In Nicholas Rescher (Hg.), Studies in Logical Theory, Oxford: Blackwell, 98–112 2. Robert C. Stalnaker [1981]: “Indexical Belief”. Synthese, 49. 3. Robert C. Stalnaker [1987a]: “Counterparts and Identity”. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 11: 121–140. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Possible Worlds | Stalnaker Vs Possible Worlds | I 49 Possible world/poss.w./knowledge/mathematics/StalnakerVsLewis/Stalnaker: I am inclined to say that the poss.w.-theory makes assumptions about the nature of their properties that are - unlike the corresponding assumptions of mathematical platonism - incompatible with the representation of the connection between the knowledge subjects and their objects in the case of poss.w.. poss.w./MR/VsModal realism/knowledge/verificationism/StalnakerVsLewis: the modal realist cannot cite any verificationist principles for what he calls his knowledge. Conclusion: problem: the MR cannot on the one hand say that poss.w. things are of the same kind as the actual world (contingent physical objects) and say on the other hand that poss.w. are things of which we know by the same kind like of numbers, sets, functions. ((s) Namely no real existing things.). I 53 StalnakerVsLewis: he contradicts himself because his other thesis about poss.w. about which we can have substantial beliefs contradicts his definition of content (see above). I 58 Contradiction/Lewis: there is no object howsoever fantastic about which one could tell the truth by contradicting oneself. Footnote: Takashi YagisawaVsLewis: why not? What should you expect otherwise? Impossible things are impossible. II 20 Belief ascription/solution/Stalnaker: I always wonder how the poss.w. would be according to what the believer believes. E.g. Pierre: for him there are two cities (Londres and London) E.g. Lingens in the library: for him there are two men, one named "Lingens" about which the other reads something. Relations theory/RelTh/Stalnaker: this can reconcile with the assumption that propositions are the belief objects. (Team: Stalnaker pro Relations theory? (1999)) Index/belief/Stalnaker: nevertheless I believe that convictions have an irreducible indexical element. Solution/Lewis: sets of centered poss.w. as belief objects. StalnakerVsLewis: although I have accepted that such poss.w. then include a representation of the mental state of the believer. But that is not what it is about! It is not sufficient that poss.w. that are compatible with one's convictions then include a person who has these convictions (> e.g. Lingens), the believer must identify himself with the person who has this thought! Proposition/identification/self-identification/Stalnaker: I am not suggesting that this identification is fulfilled by the belief in a proposition. I now think that this is not at all about some kind of cognitive performance. Indexical conviction/Stalnaker: (E.g. Perry: memory loss, library, e.g. Lewis: 2 gods (2 omniscient gods, e.g. Castaneda: memory loss): indexical unknowing. Stalnaker: thesis: people do not differ in what they believe. II 21 E.g. O'Leary knows that he is in the basement and that Daniels is in the kitchen. And Daniels knows the same thing: that he is in the kitchen and O'Leary in the basement. Everyone knows who and where he is and who and where the other is. The poss.w. that are compatible with the convictions of the two are the same. They argue about nothing. Yet there is an obvious difference in their doxastic situation: O'Leary identifies himself with the one in the basement and Daniels identifies himself as one who is in the kitchen. poss.w. semantics/StalnakerVsPossible worlds semantics/Stalnaker: this difference in the belief states of the two is not reflected by a set of poss.w. as belief state. Solution/Lewis: self-ascription of properties, or - equivalently - sets of centered poss.w.. StalnakerVsLewis: I do not want that. StalnakerVsLewis: problem: it is wrong to treat the difference in perspective as a dispute (disagreement). The two argue about nothing. Problem: it is not sure if one can express their agreement with the fact that the set of their uncentered poss.w. is the same. Because E.g. Heimson/Perry/Stalnaker: (Heimson believes "I am David Hume") all his impersonal beliefs about Hume are correct. Suppose they are the same convictions as the convictions of Hume about Hume. Stalnaker: nevertheless it would be wrong to say that they argue about nothing. ((s) unlike O'Leary and Daniels). II 134 Localization/space/time/self-localization/logical space/Lewis/Stalnaker: logical space/Lewis/Stalnaker: set of poss.w. from which one selects one. Self-localization/physical: in space and time. We usually know where we are. ((s) but we never know all poss.w. in which we could be localized, we cannot distinguish all poss.w. because we do not know everything). Gods example/Stalnaker: the two know exactly where they are in the logical space. II 135 But they do not know where within this poss.w. they are. LewisVsTradition: the doctrine of the proposition is focused only on one of the two types of localized belief. Generalization: is what we need and for that the transition from propositions to properties (as belief objects) serves. II 144 Gods example/Stalnaker: this is also a case of unknowing, which of two indistinguishable poss.w. is actual. One is actually the actual world while the other exactly the sam, with the exception that the god who sits in the actual world on the highest mountain is this time sitting on the coldest mountain and in fact with all the properties that the god on the highest mountain actually has. ((s) two individuals change places but keep all the properties. This is only possible if localization is not a property) Omniscience/Stalnaker: then you have to say, the two gods are not really omniscient regarding propositions, but rather omniscient in relation to purely qualitative criteria. LewisVsStalnaker: Lewis rejects this explanation for two reasons: 1. because he represents the counterpart theory (c.th.) that makes the cross world identity superfluous or meaningless. 2. even without counterpart it would not work because Assuming that the two gods of world W have traded places in world V assuming the god on the highest knows that his world is W, not V. Assuming he is omniscient with respect to all propositions not only the qualitative propositions. II 145 V: the world V cannot be relevant because he knows that he does not live there. Problem: there are still two mountains in a poss.w. W where he after all what he knows can live. StalnakerVsLewis: that does not answer the question: you cannot simply stipulate that the God in W knows something and not V. Because after the explanation we proposed that leads to the fact that he knows on which mountain he lives. Lewis/Stalnaker: his explanation is plausible if one conceives it as a metaphor for a location in the logical space: logical space/Lewis/Stalnaker: assume that a map of the logical space divided into large regions match the poss.w. and in smaller subdivisions represent the locations within poss.w.. Important argument: then we can tell someone in which large region he is without telling him exactly where he is located in it. Modal Realism/MR/logical space/Stalnaker: for him this image might be appropriate. Actualism/logical space/localization/Stalnaker: for the actualism this image is misleading: to know in which country you are is different to know where in the country you are but it is not so clear that there is a difference between the fact that one knows anything about in which poss.w. one is and knowing which poss.w. is the actual. Lewis also admits this. Stalnaker: my approach seems to be really close to the one of Lewis, but no. Centered poss.w.: one should perhaps instead of indistinguishable poss.w. speak of centered worlds (after Quine). These are then distinguishable. Indistinguishability/poss.w./Stalnaker: distinct but indistinguishable poss.w. would then be the same worlds but with different centers. Attitude/properties/propositions/centered world/Lewis: to treat objects of attitudes as sets of centered poss.w. makes them to properties instead of propositions. Centered poss.w./Stalnaker: I agree that possible situations normally, perhaps even essential, are centered in the sense of a representation of a particular mental state. II 146 StalnakerVsLewis: but this makes the approach (gods example) more complicated when it comes to the relations between different mental states. E.g. to compare past with current states is then more difficult, or relations between the convictions of different people. Information/communication/Stalnaker: we need then additional explanation about how information is exchanged. Two examples: E.g. O'Leary is freed from his trunk and wonders at around nine: a) "What time was it when I wondered what time it was?" Stalnaker: that is the same question like the one he asked then. When he learns that it was three o'clock, his doubt has been eliminated. Solution: the doubt is eliminated since all possible situations (poss.w.) in which a thought occurs at two different times are involved. The centers of these situations have moved in the sense that it is now nine o'clock and O'Leary no longer in the trunk but it may be that the first occurrence of the then thought is what O'Leary is now thinking about. Important argument: this moving of the center does not require that the poss.w. that the propositions characterize are changed. b) "What time was it when I wondered if it was three or four?". (If he wondered twice) Indistinguishability: even if the two incidents were indistinguishable for O'Leary, it may still be that it was the first time which O'Leary remembers at around nine o'clock. StalnakerVsLewis: his approach is more complicated. According to his approach we have to say at three o'clock, O'Leary wonders about his current temporal localization in the actual world (act.wrld.) instead of wondering in what poss.w. he is. Versus: at nine, things are quite different: now he wonders if he lives in a poss.w. in which a particular thought occurred at three or four. This is unnecessarily complicated. E.g. Lingens, still in the library, meets Ortcutt and asks him "Do you know who I am?" – "You are my cousin, Rudolf Lingens!". Stalnaker: that seems to be a simple and successful communication. Information was requested and given. The question was answered. II 147 Proposition/Stalnaker: (Propositions as belief objects) Ortcutt's answer expresses a proposition that distinguishes between possible situations and eliminates Lingen's doubt. StalnakerVsLewis: according to his approach (self-ascription of properties), it is again more complicated: Lingens: asks if he correctly ascribes himself a certain set of properties i. Ortcutt: answers by ascribing himself a completely different set of properties. Lingens: has to conclude then subsequently himself the answer. So all the answers are always indirect in communication. ((s) also StalnakerVsChisholm, implicit). Communication/Lewis/Chisholm/StalnakerVsLewis/StalnakerVsChsholm: everyone then always speaks only about himself. Solution/Stalnaker: Lewis would otherwise have to distinguish between attitudes and speech acts and say that speech acts have propositions as object and attitudes properties as an object. Problem/StalnakerVsLewis: Lewis cannot say by intuition that the content of Ortcutt's answer is the information that eliminates Lingen's doubt. That is also a problem for Perry's approach. (> StalnakerVsPerry) |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Stalnaker, R. | Field Vs Stalnaker, R. | II 35 Proposition/Mathematics/Stalnaker: (1976, p 88): There are only two mathematical propositions, the necessarily true one and the necessarily false one. And we know that the first one is true and the second one is false. Problem: The functions that determine which of the two ((s) E.g. "This sentence is true", "this sentence is false"?) is expressed by a mathematical statement are just sufficiently complex to doubt which of the two is being expressed. Solution/Stalnaker: therefore the belief objects in mathematics should be considered as propositions about the relation between sentences and what they say. FieldVsStalnaker: it does not work. E.g. "the Banach-Tarski conditional" stands for the conditional whose antecedent is the conjunction of the set theory with the axiom of choice (AoC) and whose consequent is the Banach-Tarski theorem (BTT). Suppose a person doubts the BTT, but knows the rule of language which refers sentences of the language of the ML to propositions. By Stalnaker, this person would not really doubt the proposition expressed by the BT conditional, because it is a logical truth. Field: what he really doubts is the proposition that is expressed by the following: (i) the language rules connect the BT conditional with necessary truth. Problem: because the person is familiar with the language rules for the language of the ML, he can only doubt (i) even if he also doubted the proposition expressed by the following: (ii) the language rules __ refer the BT conditional to the necessary truth. wherein the voids must be filled with the language rules of the language. Important argument: FieldVsStalnaker: the proposition expressed by (ii) is a necessary truth itself! And because Stalnaker supposes coarse sets of possible worlds, he cannot distinguish by this if anyone believes them or not. ((s) because it makes no difference in the sets of possible worlds, because necessary truth is true in every possible world). FieldVsStalnaker: the rise of mathematical propositions to metalinguistic ones has lead to nothing. Proposition/FieldVsStalnaker: must be individuated more finely than amounts of possible worlds and Lewis shows us how: if we accept that the believing of a proposition involves an attitude towards sentences. E.g. Believing ML is roughly the same thing as believing* the conjunction of its axioms. The believed* sentences have several fine-grained meanings. Therefore (1) attributes different fine-grained propositions to the two different persons. II 45 Representation/Functionalism/Field: 1) Question: Does an adequate belief theory need to have assumptions about representations incorporated explicitly?. Functionalism/Field: does not offer an alternative to representations here. By that I mean more than the fact that functionalism is compatible with representations. Lewis and Stalnaker would admit that. Representation/Lewis/Stalnaker/Field: both would certainly admit that assuming one opened the head of a being and found a blackboard there on which several English sentence were written, and if, furthermore, one saw that this influenced the behavior in the right way, then we would have a strong assumption for representations. This shows that functionalism is compatible with representations. Representation/FieldVsStalnaker/FieldVsLewis: I’m hinting at something stronger that both would certainly reject: I think the two would say that without opening the head we have little reason to believe in representations. II 46 It would be unfounded neurophysiological speculation. S-Proposition/Stalnaker: 2 Advantages: 1) as a coarse-grained one it fits better into the pragmatic approach of intentional states (because of their ((s) more generous) identity conditions for contents). 2) this is the only way we can solve Brentano’s problem of the naturalistic explanation of mind states. II 82 Belief/Stalnaker: Relation between the cognitive state of an acting person and S-propositions. II 83 FieldVsStalnaker. Vs 1) and 2) 1) The whole idea of E.g. "the object of", "the contents of" should be treated with caution. In a very general sense they are useful to determine the equality of such contents. But this is highly context-dependent. II 84 2) Stalnaker does not only want to attribute entities to mind states as their content, but even. Def intrinsically representational entities/iR/Field: in them, it is already incorporated that they represent the real universe in a certain way. 3) Even if we attribute such intrinsically representational entities as content, it is not obvious that there could be only one type of such iR. Fine-grained/Coarse/FieldVsStalnaker: for him, there seems to be a clear separation; I believe it is not so clear. Therefore, it is also not clear for me whether his S-propositions are the right content, but I do not want to call them the "wrong" content, either. Field: Thesis: We will also need other types of "content-like" properties of mind states, both for the explanation of behavior and for the naturalistic access to content. Intentionality/Mind State/Stalnaker/Field: Stalnaker represents what he calls the pragmatic image and believes that it leads to the following: 1) the belief objects are coarse. Def Coarse/Stalnaker: are belief objects that cannot be logically different and at the same equivalent. 2) StalnakerVsMentalese/StalnakerVsLanguage of Thought. Mentalese/Language of Thought/Stalnaker/Field: apparently, Stalnaker believes that a thought language (which is more finely grained) would have to lead to a rejection of the pragmatic image. FieldVsStalnaker: this is misleading. Def Pragmatic Image/Intentionality/Stalnaker/Field: Stalnaker Thesis: representational mind states should be understood primarily in terms of the role they play in the characterization of actions. II 85 StalnakerVsLinguistic Image: Thesis: Speaking is only one type of action. It has no special status. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Stalnaker, R. | Lewis Vs Stalnaker, R. | Read III 101/102 Stalnaker equates the probability of the conditional clauses with the conditional probability. LewisVsStalnaker: there is no statement whose probability is measured by the conditional probability! (+ III 102) According to Lewis, based on Stalnaker's assumption, the odds of drawing cards are independent. But this is obviously wrong (as opposed to throwing dice). Thus, the probability of the conditional clause cannot be measured by the conditional probability. III 108 Example from Lewis If Bizet and Verdi were compatriots, Bizet would be Italian. and If Bizet and Verdi were compatriots, Bizet wouldn't be Italian. Stalnaker: one or the other must be true. Lewis: both are wrong. (Because only subjunctive conditional sentences are not truth functional). The indicative pieces would be entirely acceptable to those who do not know their nationality. Lewis IV 149 Action/Rationality/Stalnaker: Propositions are the suitable objects of settings here. LewisVsStalnaker: it turns out that he actually needs a theory of attitudes de se. Stalnaker: the rationally acting is someone who accepts various possible rational futures. The function of the wish is simple to subdivide these different event progressions into the desired and the rejected ones. Or to provide an order or measure of alternative possibilities in terms of desirability. Belief/Stalnaker: its function is simple to determine which the relevant alternative situations may be, or to arrange them in terms of their probability under different conditions. Objects of attitude/Objects of belief/Stalnaker: are identical if and only if they are functionally equivalent, and they are only if they do not differ in any alternative possible situation. Lewis: if these alternative situations are always alternative possible worlds, as Stalnaker assumes, then this is indeed an argument for propositions. ((s) Differentiation Situation/Possible world). Situation/Possible world/Possibility/LewisVsStalnaker: I think there can also be alternatives within a single possible world! For example, Lingens now knows almost enough to identify himself. He's reduced his options to two: a) he's on the 6th floor of the Stanford Library, then he'll have to go downstairs, or b) he is in the basement of the Widener College library and must go upstairs. The books tell him that there is exactly one person with memory loss in each of these places. And he found out that he must be one of them. His consideration provides 8 possibilities: The eight cases are spread over only four types of worlds! For example, 1 and 3 do not belong to different worlds but are 3000 miles away in the same world. In order to distinguish these you need qualities again, ((s) the propositions apply equally to both memory artists.) V 145 Conditionals/Probability/Stalnaker: (1968)(1) Notation: ">" (pointed, not horseshoe!) Def Stalnaker Conditional: a conditional A > C is true if and only if the least possible change that makes A true, also makes C true. (Revision). Stalnaker: assumes that P(A > C) and P(C I A) are adjusted if A is positive. The sentences, which are true however under Stalnaker's conditions, are then exactly those that have positive probabilities under his hypothesis about probabilities of conditionals. LewisVsStalnaker: this is probably true mostly, but not in certain modal contexts, where different interpretations of a language evaluate the same sentences differently. V 148 Conditional/Stalnaker: to decide whether to believe a conditional: 1. add the antecedent to your set of beliefs, 2. make the necessary corrections for the consistency 3. decide if the consequence is true. Lewis: that's right for a Stalnaker conditional if the fake revision is done by mapping. V 148/149 LewisVsStalnaker: the passage suggests that one should pretend the kind of revision that would take place if the antecedens were actually added to the belief attitudes. But that is wrong: then conditionalisation was needed. Schwarz I 60 Counterpart/c.p./counterpart theory/c.p.th./counterpart relation/c.p.r./StalnakerVsLewis: if you allow almost arbitrary relations as counterpart relations anyway, you could not use qualitative relations. (Stalnaker 1987a)(2): then you can reconcile counterpart with Haecceitism: if you come across the fact that Lewis (x)(y)(x = y > N(x = y) is wrong, (Lewis pro contingent identity, see above) you can also determine that a thing always has only one counter part per world. Stalnaker/Schwarz: this is not possible with qualitative counterpart relations, since it is always conceivable that several things - for example in a completely symmetrical world - are exactly the same as a third thing in another possible world. LewisVsStalnaker: VsNon qualitative counter part relation: all truths including modal truths should be based on what things exist (in the real world and possible worlds) and what (qualitative) properties they have (>"mosaic": >Humean World). Schwarz I 62 Mathematics/Truthmaking/Fact/Lewis/Schwarz: as with possible worlds, there is no real information: for example, that 34 is the root of 1156, tells us nothing about the world. ((s) That it applies in every possible world. Rules are not truthmakers). Schwarz: For example, that there is no one who shaves those who do not shave themselves is analogously no information about the world. ((s) So not that the world is qualitatively structured). Schwarz: maybe we'll learn more about sentences here. But it is a contingent truth (!) that sentences like "there is someone who shaves those who do not shave themselves" are inconsistent. Solution/Schwarz: the sentence could have meant something else and thus be consistent. Schwarz I 63 Seemingly analytical truth/Lewis/Schwarz: e.g. what do we learn when we learn that ophthalmologists are eye specialists? We already knew that ophthalmologists are ophthalmologists. We have experienced a contingent semantic fact. Modal logic/Modality/Modal knowledge/Stalnaker/Schwarz: Thesis: Modal knowledge could always be understood as semantic knowledge. For example, when we ask if cats are necessary animals, we ask how the terms "cat" and "animal" are to be used. (Stalnaker 1991(3),1996(4), Lewis 1986e(5):36). Knowledge/SchwarzVsStalnaker: that's not enough: to acquire contingent information, you always have to examine the world. (Contingent/Schwarz: empirical, non-semantic knowledge). Modal Truth/Schwarz: the joke about logical, mathematical and modal truths is that they can be known without contact with the world. Here we do not acquire any information. ((s) >making true: no empirical fact "in the world" makes that 2+2 = 4; Cf. >Nonfactualism; >Truthmakers). Schwarz I 207 "Secondary truth conditions"/truth conditions/tr.cond./semantic value/Lewis/Schwarz: contributing to the confusion is that the simple (see above, context-dependent, ((s) "indexical") and variable functions of worlds on truth values are often not only called "semantic values" but also as truth conditions. Important: these truth conditions (tr.cond.) must be distinguished from the normal truth conditions. Lewis: use truth conditions like this. 1986e(5),42 48: for primary, 1969(6), Chapter V: for secondary). Def Primary truth conditions/Schwarz: the conditions under which the sentence should be pronounced according to the conventions of the respective language community. Truth Conditions/Lewis/Schwarz: are the link between language use and formal semantics, their purpose is the purpose of grammar. Note: Def Diagonalization/Stalnaker/Lewis/Schwarz: the primary truth conditions are obtained by diagonalization, i.e. by using world parameters for the world of the respective situation (correspondingly as time parameter the point of time of the situation etc.). Def "diagonal proposition"/Terminology/Lewis: (according to Stalnaker, 1978(7)): primary truth conditions Def horizontal proposition/Lewis: secondary truth condition (1980a(8),38, 1994b(9),296f). Newer terminology: Def A-Intension/Primary Intension/1-Intension/Terminology/Schwarz: for primary truth conditions Def C-Intension/Secondary Intension/2-Intension/Terminology/Schwarz: for secondary truth conditions Def A-Proposition/1-Proposition/C-Proposition/2-Propsition/Terminology/Schwarz: correspondingly. (Jackson 1998a(10),2004(11), Lewis 2002b(12),Chalmers 1996b(13), 56,65) Def meaning1/Terminology/Lewis/Schwarz: (1975(14),173): secondary truth conditions. Def meaning2/Lewis/Schwarz: complex function of situations and worlds on truth values, "two-dimensional intention". Schwarz: Problem: this means very different things: Primary truth conditions/LewisVsStalnaker: in Lewis not determined by meta-linguistic diagonalization like Stalnaker's diagonal proposition. Not even about a priori implication as with Chalmer's primary propositions. Schwarz I 227 A posteriori necessity/Metaphysics/Lewis/Schwarz: normal cases are not cases of strong necessity. One can find out for example that Blair is premier or e.g. evening star = morning star. LewisVsInwagen/LewisVsStalnaker: there are no other cases (which cannot be empirically determined). LewisVs Strong Need: has no place in its modal logic. LewisVs telescope theory: possible worlds are not like distant planets where you can find out which ones exist. 1. Robert C. Stalnaker [1968]: “A Theory of Conditionals”. In Nicholas Rescher (ed.), Studies in Logical Theory, Oxford: Blackwell, 98–112 2.Robert C. Stalnaker [1987a]: “Counterparts and Identity”. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 11: 121–140. In [Stalnaker 2003] 3. Robert C. Stalnaker [1991]: “The Problem of Logical Omniscience I”. Synthese, 89. In [Stalnaker 1999a] 4. Robert C. Stalnaker — [1996]: “On What Possible Worlds Could Not Be”. In Adam Morton und Stephen P. Stich (Hg.) Benacerraf and his Critics, Cambridge (Mass.): Blackwell. In [Stalnaker 2003] 5. David Lewis [1986e]: On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell 6. David Lewis[1969a]: Convention: A Philosophical Study. Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University Press 7. Robert C. Stalnaker [1978]: “Assertion”. In P. Cole (ed.), Syntax and Semantics, Vol. 9, New York: Academic Press, 315–332, und in [Stalnaker 1999a] 8. David Lewis [1980a]: “Index, Context, and Content”. In S. Kanger und S. ¨Ohmann (ed.), Philosophy and Grammar, Dordrecht: Reidel, und in [Lewis 1998a] 9. David Lewis [1994b]: “Reduction of Mind”. In Samuel Guttenplan (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Blackwell, 412–431, und in [Lewis 1999a] 10. Frank Jackson [1998a]: From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis. Oxford: Clarendon Press 11. Frank Jackson [2004]: “Why We Need A-Intensions”. Philosophical Studies, 118: 257–277 12. David Lewis [2002b]: “Tharp’s Third Theorem”. Analysis, 62: 95–97 13. David Chalmers [1996b]: The Conscious Mind. New York: Oxford University Press 14. David Lewis [1975]: “Languages and Language”. In [Gunderson 1975], 3–35. And in [Lewis 1983d] |
LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Stalnaker, R. | Pragmatism Vs Stalnaker, R. | Stalnaker II 62 Pragmatics/VsStalnaker: I was accused of unfounded optimism in relation to the possibilities of a future formal pragmatic theory. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Stalnaker, R. | Read Vs Stalnaker, R. | Re III 109 Similarity metric / Stalnaker: his semantics makes another assumption, namely, that there is always at least one most similar world. III 109/110 ReadVsStalnaker: just as well as there are connections for the proximity as in the Verdi example, it is conceivable that there is not always a world at all that is the most similar. Example of Lewis: If Lewis is about 2 meters tall, he can join the basketball team. Similarity: Problem: worlds where Lewis is 2.02, 2.01, 2.005 meters tall are progressively similar to the real world, but this result has no limit. |
Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 |
| Stalnaker, R. | Verschiedene Vs Stalnaker, R. | II 215 VsInformation-theoretical approach/VsStalnaker: 1. it is controversial whether the approach can be reductionist. a) one must distinguish states of belief from simpler states such as those of thermostats. b) we need a non-circular concept of normal conditions. 2. concerns the identity conditions for propositional contents: VsInformation-theoretical approach: it provides only coarse-grained individuation of content ((s) about truth conditions). Problem: x can believe P without believing Q, even if P and Q are necessarily equivalent. StalnakerVsVs: but this is enough for our purposes. And fine grained contents still define truth-conditional (informational) contents. |
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| Stalnaker, R. | Schiffer Vs Stalnaker, R. | I 46 The second position in the logical space for the "propositionalist": (Stalnaker) represents a major divergence from functionalism: he concedes that no psychological theory will provide a definition of belief itself as E.g. x believes that some dogs have fleas. ((s) with content). but probably of x is a belief. ((s) without content). 1. you have to find a psychological theory, with which you can define the monadic predicate "x is a conviction". 2. define a functional property, for each composite belief property via non-functional, explicit definition of the form (R) x believes p iff (Es)(s is a belief; x is in s; & R(s,p)) for a given specified relation R. Stalnaker: takes up an idea of Dennis Stampe. Stampe: (1977, unpublished) as the completion of (R ) (FG) x believes p iff x is in a belief system, that x would not have under optimal conditions, if it were not the case that p. FG/Fuel gauge/Fuel gauge/Representation/Dretske/Terminology/Schiffer: (Dretske 1986): "Fuel gauge"-model of representation: it represents the fuel level, because it is a reliable indicator. ((s) By regularity to representation. Additional assumption: Counterfactual conditional). I 47 Representation/Schiffer: is not only a feature of mental states! >fuel gauge example. SchifferVsStalnaker/Belief/theory: the fuel gauge model is only a first step. It implies that one has no wrong beliefs under optimal conditions. That may be. Problem: 1. What shall these optimum conditions be then that will never be fulfilled? 2. how should they be fulfilled without the fuel gauge model becoming circular?. "Optimal"/Condition/(s): as a condition in itself is suspicious circular: they are fulfilled when everything is ok. (R)/belief/Schiffer: FG is only a proposal for the completion of (R). This should best determine the truth conditions in a system of mental representations. Conclusion: if belief is a relation to propositions, and there is a non-mentalist specification of this relation, then it cannot be functionalist. I 282 Belief content/Stalnaker: (1984): his approach refers to public language, but would be, based on Mentalese, the approach by Fodors, b) there is a ("optimum" -) Condition D - unfulfilled but fulfilled - and be specified in naturalistic vocabulary so An M function f the truth-conditions for function x * lingua mentis M is if for every sentence s of M: D would consist, then x would believe if and only if f(s) consists). Comparable, with "only if" rather than "if and only if". Then one is merely infallible under optimal conditions. SchifferVsStalnaker: that is not much better. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Stalnaker, R. | Cresswell Vs Stalnaker, R. | I 129 Labeling/Name/Reference/Solution/Stalnaker/Thomason: Thesis: descriptions cannot be treated consistently as a names, but we will try to get as close as possible to them. CresswellVsStalnaker/CresswellVsThomason: this solution has its drawbacks, because not all things that function syntactically as names are real names, in the sense that they can be used for variables in valid wff. This also applies to the intensional object viewVsStalnaker. > universal instantiation: it, too, will fail ... + ... |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Stalnaker, R. | Williamson Vs Stalnaker, R. | I 159 Identity/Indistinguishability/Timothy WilliamsonVsStalnaker: (1996): Actuality Operator/@/Williamson: if we add it to K, we can prove the necessity of diversity from the necessary identity. I.e. actual different things are then necessarily different: Logical form: I- @ (∀x)(∀y)(x ≠ y > Nx ≠ y). I 160 Stalnaker: my independence argument above for necessary diversity was based on two assumptions 1. the extensional logic of identity is the same as the logic of indistinguishability, but 2. in a modal semantics without symmetry condition for the accessibility relation, individuals can be distinguishable in a possible world while they are not in another possible world. If one cannot "look back", the information about the distinction may be lost. Actuality Operator/Williamson: preserves the information because you can always look back to the actual world. General: the information about every possible world accessible from the actual world is reflected in the actual world and thus also in every other possible world in the model. Williamson: general thesis: I- Ni (x ≠ y > Nj x ≠ y) In our classical system, the universal generalization is invalid and unprovable with this (∀x)(∀y)(Ni (x ≠ y > Nj x ≠ y) because the predication implies existence and thus the negation of an identity statement can be true, not because the expressions refer to different things, but because these do not exist at all. But: the version with the quantifiers within the necessity operator Ni (∀x)(∀y) (x ≠ y > Nj x ≠ y) Will be valid even if the equal sign is defined as indistinguishable. But it will not be provable. Reason: K + @ is an incomplete quantified modal logic. Actuality Operator/Stalnaker: Problem: the semantic limitations for its interpretation have consequences that are not reflected in the propositional logic for this operator, consequences that occur when the range may change from possible worlds to possible worlds. There are propositions without identity which are valid but not provable, e.g. I- @ N (∀x)(Fx > @MFx) Counterpart Semantics/counterpart theory/necessity diversity/Stalnaker: the absence of the need of diversity in the counterpart theory. I 161 Is not connected with the limits of the expressiveness of modal logic (it is even missing in S5). The necessary identity is valid and provable here. Rather, the necessary difference cannot be proven with or without the actuality operator. StalnakerVsWilliamson: therefore I think that his argument does not threaten the thesis, Thesis: the necessity (or essentiality) of identity is more central in identity logic than the necessity of diversity. |
EconWillO Oliver E. Williamson Peak-load pricing and optimal capacity under indivisibility constraints 1966 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mathematics | Stalnaker, R. | Cresswell II 139 Stalnaker: Thesis: a mathematical proposition is in fact about linguistic expressions. This has the consequence that it expresses a necessary proposition. (Stalnaker 1976, 88). Cresswell: if this is true, mathematical propositions in various worlds can be true. CresswellVsStalnaker: that can not be true FieldVsStalnaker: (1978, 15) ditto. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Possibility | Stalnaker, R. | Field II 100 Possibility/stronger/weaker/real/epistemic/Stalnaker/Field: Stalnaker thinks worlds are possible in a stronger sense: in which not only denial of logical truths are impossible, but also denial of mathematical truth (pp. 73-7), and even denial of a posteriori identity between name and denial of certain "essentialist" assertions. II 103 FieldVsStalnaker: Thesis: There is no plausible way to describe apparent cases of inconsistent beliefs (e.g. Cantor) so that they match Stalnaker's image. I 40 Possibility/Stalnaker: 1. Semantic Thesis: claims about what is possible and necessary should be analysed in terms of what is true in some or all parts of reality. 2. Metaphysical Thesis: about the existence of worlds. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Non-Knowledge | Stalnaker, R. | Sch I 179 Knowledge / belief / LewisVsStalnaker / SchwarzVsStalnaker: such examples speak against Stalnakers thesis that the actual ignorance in apparent ignorance of necessary truths always concerned linguistic facts, according to the meta-linguistic "diagonal" Proposition of one mind attribution. (Stalnaker 1981.1987 b). |
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