Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 6 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Existence Leibniz Holz I 48/49
Existence/world/outside/reason/Leibniz: a sufficient reason for existence cannot be found in the series of facts, but also not in the whole set-up. Because also the composition, like the series needs a reason.
Leibniz calls the existence reason "extramundan" because it cannot be found within the series (series reum).
Holz: that does not mean "outside the world"! Literally it means:
Leibniz: "apart from the world, there is a dominating one."
Not just like the soul in me but more like myself in my body, but of much higher reason.
Existence reason/outside/outer/Leibniz: The reason for unity is the form determinateness of its all-round connection, not the linearity of a sequence or series. To this extent the existence reason of the world (as the totality of the connections) is not in the world, but it conditions it as a world.
This "ultima ratio rerum" establishes the world and makes it". It is the connecting principle.
---
Holz I 70
Existence/Leibniz: of it we can have no idea, except through the perception of beings. Therefore, perception is the formal unity and universality of all the contents that enter into it.
---
I 71
"We have no other idea of existence than that we perceive that the things are perceived". Perception/Leibniz: provides now, as self-perception, the idea of the continuity and contiguity of existence as such (which is evident to us in the existence of our own self).
Existence/Experience/Leibniz: Existence cannot be thought, it has to be experienced, because the sentence "non-being is" is contradictory. (However, only in relation to the whole).
Existence/Being/Leibniz: the falsification of the universal negation allows the tautology "the being is"! In contrast to any particular tautological statement like e.g. "The House is the House", which is only a concept or essence definition and does not include existence.
Only the universal proposition of being transcends from a logical definition into an ontological axiom.
Since it is related to the whole, there can be only one case of necessity of existence, namely that of the whole.
In the bodies themselves, there is no basis of existence, only in the total context, which ultimately includes the entire chain (all relationships in the universe).
In the individual bodies you will never find the reason why they are like that and not different.
Existence/Being/Leibniz: the falsification of the universal negation allows the tautology "the being is"! In contrast to any particular tautological statement like e.g. "The House is the House", which is only a concept or essence definition and does not include existence.
Only the universal proposition of being transcends from a logical definition into an ontological axiom.
Since it is related to the whole, there can only be one case of necessity of existence, namely that of the whole.
In the bodies themselves, there is no reason of existence, only in the total context, which ultimately includes the entire chain (all relationships in the universe).
In the individual bodies you will never find the reason why they are like that and not different.
---
I 72
Existence/Necessity/Identity/Being/Leibniz: the sentences "The being is" and
"Only one being is necessary"
are in a very specific follow-up ratio:
The proposition "the being is" is an identical proposition, i.e. its opposite is contradictory.
Thus existential and copulative (copula) use of "is" coincide here.
One could also say "being is being" in order to make clear that the predicate is necessary for the subject. But:
For example, "the stone is a being stone": this sentence is not identical, the being does not necessarily belong to the stone! The stone could only be thought of. Therefore, we need the perception to be convinced of existence.
But this is not only true of bodies, but also of general, e.g. the genus human, it does not exist neccessarily.
---
I 73
The necessity of existence is valid only by the world as a whole. ---
Holz I 75
Unity/Substance/LeibnizVsSpinoza: the ultimate ratio is necessarily only one reason, not a multiplicity, because it is the structure of the whole. Leibniz, therefore, does not need to sacrifice the multiplicity of things in order to reach the one and only world. The substance of Spinoza is replaced by him with the "harmonie universelle".
Existence/Leibniz: Question: "Why is there anything at all and not rather nothing?".
This question also remains in existence when we have secured the unity of the multiplicity. There could still be nothing!
---
I 76
Assuming that things must exist, one must also be able to specify the reason why they must exist in this way and not otherwise. ---
Holz I 91
Existence/Leibniz: "Why is there something and not rather nothing?" 1. The reason why something exists is in nature: the consequence of the supreme principle that nothing happens without reason.
2. The reason must lie in a real being or in a cause.
3. This being must be necessary, otherwise a further cause would have to be sought.
4. So there is a cause!
---
I 92
5. This first cause also has the effect that everything possible has a striving for existence, since no universal reason for the restriction to only certain possible can be found. 6. Therefore it can be said that everything possible is intended for its future existence. (Because possibility is striving).
7. It does not follow from this that everything that is possible also exists. This would only follow if everything together were possible.
8. However, some possibilities are incompatible with others.
9. Thus arises the series of things that exists through the greatest range of all possibilities.
10. As fluids assume spherical form (largest content), there is in the nature of the universe a series with the greatest content.
11. Thus the most perfect exists, for perfection is nothing but the quantity of materiality. (Best of all worlds, >best world).
12. Perfection, however, is not to be found solely in matter, but in form or variety.
---
I 93
13. It follows from this that matter is not everywhere alike, but is made by the forms itself to be unequal. (There are further 12 theses on the level of consciousness theory).
---
Holz I 120
World/Existenz/Leibniz: is as a whole contingent. There is no reason to see why this world must be. But we can see that it is a totality of all that is real and possible. That is, the principle of deduction fails at the first substance, which can no longer be made intelligible, or is no longer derivable by itself.
---
I 12
Question: Why is anything at all and not nothing? Although we cannot see why this world is, we can still see that this world is possible! And many other possible beside it as well.
Then we can reformulate the question:
Why does this world exist and not another?

Lei II
G. W. Leibniz
Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998


Holz II
Hans Heinz Holz
Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994

Lei I
H. H. Holz
Leibniz Frankfurt 1992
Simplicity Spinoza Holz I 38
Simplicity/Spinoza: the simple exists in the world only once, as the substance. Substance/LeibnizVsSpinoza: the world is the infinite manifoldness of simple substances, about which there can be an infinite set of statements.

Spinoza I
B. Spinoza
Spinoza: Complete Works Indianapolis 2002


Holz II
Hans Heinz Holz
Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994

Lei I
H. H. Holz
Leibniz Frankfurt 1992
Substance Kant Strawson V 187
Substance/StrawsonVsKant: it is wrong, to conclude an underlying substance from the variability of the things - even according to his own principles - because if it should be a condition of experience, then it is circlular. ---
Holz I 31
Substance/Spinoza: is according to him unique in its very nature, infinite, and indivisible. Substance/HegelVsSpinoza: whoever starts from the thinking conditions of the substantial unity of the world and the experience conditions of the qualitative difference of beings (of manifoldness) can conceive this manifoldness only as manifestations or aspects of the one substance in which "all that one had thought to be true, has perished".
This, however, reveals the actual thinking condition, the difference in the content of thought. Leibniz saw the danger.
I 32
Hegel: one must not "let the multiplicity disappear in the unity". If deduction is only possible as a reduction (as in Spinoza), this would be the self-abolition of the world in thought.
Kant draws from this the consequence of establishing the unity of the world in the priority of thinking. The unity is then only transcendental or subjectively idealistic justified.
HegelVsKant: tries to renew the metaphysics of substance, which wants to establish the unity of existence in the unity of a being: the self-development of the absolute mind in world history.
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03

Strawson I
Peter F. Strawson
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959
German Edition:
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Strawson II
Peter F. Strawson
"Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit",
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Strawson III
Peter F. Strawson
"On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Strawson IV
Peter F. Strawson
Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992
German Edition:
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Strawson V
P.F. Strawson
The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966
German Edition:
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Strawson VI
Peter F Strawson
Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Strawson VII
Peter F Strawson
"On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950)
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

Holz II
Hans Heinz Holz
Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994

Lei I
H. H. Holz
Leibniz Frankfurt 1992
Substance Leibniz Holz I 90
Substance/LeibnizVsSpinoza: the first and necessary being seems merely to correspond to the substance of Spinoza. In reality, it is only the concept of the totality of the inner-world facts. The notion of the being experienced includes the concept of a true totality.
---
I 91
If, therefore, something is, then also is the one being of all beings and not nothing. ---
Holz I 112
Substance/Causality/Leibniz: Substance does not require causal action because its state is "by itself" (according to its own nature) in correspondence with the states of other substances. ---
I 113
Their autonomy is based on the fact that, in absolute world immobility, they represent nothing more than the particular perspectively realized isomorphism of the individual and the whole. The individual is what it is only by the fact that the whole of the world is the necessary and sufficient condition of its individual being. That's why there is no need for windows.
It is not initiated from the outside, because that would be something outside the world then.
The individual is always a manifestation of the whole (>Mach's principle).

Lei II
G. W. Leibniz
Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998


Holz II
Hans Heinz Holz
Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994

Lei I
H. H. Holz
Leibniz Frankfurt 1992
Substance Spinoza Holz I 31
Substance/Spinoza: is with him unique according to its nature, infinite, and indivisible. Substance/HegelVsSpinoza: whoever starts from the thought prerequisite of the substantial unity of the world and the experience prerequisite of the qualitative difference of beings (of manifoldness) can conceive this manifoldness only as manifestations or aspects of the one substance, in which "all that one had taken for true, has perished."
This, however, reveals the actual presupposition of thinking, the difference in the content of thought. Leibniz saw the danger.
---
I 32
Hegel: one must not "let the multiplicity disappear in the unity". If deduction is only possible as a reduction (as in Spinoza), this would be the self-abolition of the world in thought.
---
Holz I 62
Identity Principle/objective cognition/Leibniz: The objective unity of the world can also be shown independently of my perception, it is evident in the way of givenness of every consciousness content in itself. (Everything appears as what it appears). Adequacy does not matter here.
"Tantum est quantum est, tale est quale est". Pre-predictive being a priori.
Problem: then the phenomena are still mere moments of the one and only substance, as in Spinoza.
Substance/Spinoza: no being is to be justified against the universe in its own being. Rather, the reduction of identical sentences would lead to an "ens absolute infinitum" in Spinoza, from which "it follows that there is only one substance and that it is infinite."
However, this reduction can only come to a beginning with a waiver of the substantial existence of the many individuals.
---
I 63
VsSpinoza: if one accepts the existence of the individual, the problem is insoluble for Spinoza. He solves the problem, or it does not come into his field of view, because he conceives the essence of the human only as formed from certain modifications of the attributes of God.
With this, the Cartesian doubt is covered up. The ego cogitans becomes the mere appearance, the annexation of the self-assured unity of God.
Thus Spinoza returns to medieval realism.
Thus the rationality of the factual cannot be justified. ((s) > "What is real, is also reasonable").

Spinoza I
B. Spinoza
Spinoza: Complete Works Indianapolis 2002


Holz II
Hans Heinz Holz
Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994

Lei I
H. H. Holz
Leibniz Frankfurt 1992
Unity Leibniz Holz I 25
Unity/Leibniz: Leibniz emphasizes unity by saying that "something is not truly a being, which is not truly a being." ---
I 26
Holz: The plural presupposes the singular. Unity/Monadology/Leibniz: there must be simple substances, because there are composite ones.
Problem: the simple, the unified, and the individual is not to be thought of in itself, for thinking it means determining, that is, delimitations against others, defining.
Plato/Parmenides: the one as one implies the other and is as one with respect to many.
Marsilius Ficino: Commentary on Parmenides: "The power of otherness itself, when inserted into the ideal forms, is the negation."
Being/Holz: when apart from all ontic differences, the Absolute Otherness is the logical bivalence, which corresponds ontologically to the mixing of the non-being with the being.
Leibniz: "non ens cum ente confusum".
---
Holz I 43
Unity/Experience/Perception/World/Leibniz: The diversity of the world is as indisputable as it is unprovable. The unity of this multiplicity must be gained from itself as a principle of demonstration.
Thinking: for the use of thought, the decline is enough for the first positing of the identity principle.
Recognition: for this the positing itself needs a reason.
---
Holz I 58
Identity/multiplicity/manifoldness/substance/LeibnizVsSpinoza: the origin of the identity-evidence from experience leaves the multiplicity of the given unaffected. In contrast to Spinoza, where everything is reduced to the unity of a single substance. The principle of identity is purely logical in Leibniz. But:
Epistemic/ontological/Leibniz: the ontological quality of the principle of identity is not found in itself, but in sense perception.
The senses show that "A is A" is a proposition whose opposition "A is not A" includes a formal contradiction.
The senses show that the predicate is inherent to the subject and that it is a contradiction to deny it to the predicate.
Holz: this is not an irrational empiricism: the system of the truths of reason which must be necessarily valid in this possible world must be given in the facticity of this world.
But the logical fact is always only given by reason in the way of deduction.
---
I 59
This is blocked from us directly and has to be deduced first. In order that the pre-predicative evidence does not turn into the irrational, it must be justified in an ontological construct, in which identity proves to be the necessary structure of the manifold and changing world. (Reflection).
---
Holz I 75
Unity/Substance/LeibnizVsSpinoza: the ultimate ratio is necessarily only one reason, not a multiplicity, because it is the structure of the whole. Leibniz, therefore, needs not to sacrifice the multiplicity of things in order to reach the one and only world. The substance of Spinoza is replaced by his "universal harmony".
Existence/Leibniz: Question: "Why is there anything at all and not rather nothing?".
This question remains, even if we have secured the unity of the multiplicity. There could still be nothing!
---
I 76
Assuming that things must exist, one must also be able to specify the reason why they must exist in this way and not otherwise. ---
Holz I 97f
Unity/Leibniz: a motionless unity of the world would only be one with many qualities. ---
Holz I 127
Unity/multiplicity/modality/modal/Leibniz/Holz: the difference between the world in its totality and the diversity of its parts requires a modal distinction in the concept of the world. The fact that the world is, may mean that it is summed up in one point, or that it is perceived as an extended multiplicity "extensive" or "perceived".
As a set of separate parts.
Scholasticism: "partes extra partes".
---
I 128
Unity: unity is a substance or an aspect of being. Multiplicity: multiplicity is a phenomenon or an appearance aspect.

Lei II
G. W. Leibniz
Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998


Holz II
Hans Heinz Holz
Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994

Lei I
H. H. Holz
Leibniz Frankfurt 1992

The author or concept searched is found in the following 4 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Spinoza, B. Leibniz Vs Spinoza, B. I 12
Metaphysics/Holz: Spinoza is an example of the highest level of traditional metaphysics LeibnizVsSpinoza.
I 38
Substance/LeibnizVsSpinoza: The world is the infinite diversity of simple substances; for the latter therefore, there can be an infinite number of statements.
I 58
Identity/Multiplicity/Diversity/Substance/LeibnizVsSpinoza: The origin of identity's evidence does not touch upon the multiplicity of the given. Spinoza, however, reduces everything on the unity of a single substance. The principle of identity is purely logical formal. But:
epistemic/ontological/Leibniz: The ontological quality of identity's principle is not to be found in itself but in the sensory perception.
The senses let see that "A is A" is a sentence, and that the opposite of it, "A is not A", is a formal contradiction.
The senses show that the predicate lives in the subject, and that is a contradiction to deny this.
Holz: However, this is not irrational empiricism: the system of vérités de raison [Vernunftwahrheiten], which necessarily pertain in this possible world, must be possible in the facticity of this world.
But the logical in the facticity is only perpetually given by reason in the course of deduction.
I 59
We do not have a direct access to it. It must be deduced at first. In order to not have pre-predicative evidence transform into irrationality, deduction needs to be firstly grounded in an ontological construction. This is done by identity which shows itself to be the necessary structure of a diverse and changing world. (Reflection).
I 63
VsSpinoza: For Spinoza, the problem cannot be solved if one accepts the existence of the individual. He solves the problem or rather it does not appear in his field of vision because for him the human is formed from particular modifications of God's attributes.
As such, the Cartesian doubt is not considered. The ego cogitans becomes a mere appearance, it is an annex to the self-assured unity of God.
Thus, Spinoza turns back to the realism of the Middle Ages.
Thus, facticity's rationality cannot be established.


I 73
LeibnizVsSpinoza: World's unity is its structure, not a substance, which defines everything.
I 75
Unity/Substance/LeibnizVsSpinoza: However, it is necessary that the ultima ratio is a reason and not a plurality, because the reason is the structure of the whole. Therefore, Leibniz does not need to sacrifice the plurality of things in order to come to a single and only world [die eine und einzige Welt]. Instead of Spinoza's substance, there is the "harmonie universelle".
I 90
Substance/LeibnizVsSpinoza: the first and necessary ens [Seiende] only seems to correspond to Spinoza's substance. In reality, it is only the term for the totality of the inner-worldly [innerweltlich] facts. (Holz: " All that is the case" ["Alles, was der Fall ist"]; Wittgenstein). Der Begriff des als seiend Erfahrenen schließt den Begriff der wirklichen Totalität ein.
I 91
Therefore, if something is, then the one is the being of all, and not of nothing.[Wenn daher etwas ist, dann ist auch das eine Sein aller Seienden und nicht nichts.]

Lei II
G. W. Leibniz
Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998
Spinoza, B. Rorty Vs Spinoza, B. II (e) 104
World/Mind/Matter/Spinoza/Rorty: two equally valid ways of describing the world: one in terms of matter, then in terms of the mind. The order based on the connection of the corpuscles is the same as the order and connection of our ideas. The mind only knows as long as the body is well and vice versa.  "We know God all the more, the more we understand individual things."
SpinozaVsSocrates: we should not, like Socrates, be discouraged by the fact
that there are no teleological explanations for natural events.
II (e) 105
The Spirit of God is no more and no less than the comprehension of all relations between individual things. RortyVsSpinoza: as soon as the ways of description are recognized as equivalent, the idea of ​​the natural order is in danger. Also both ways of description can be illusory. >Description Levels.
Thus entering the slippery slope down to Kant's unrecognizable thing in itself. Ultimately, the relativism of Protagoras. >Relativism/Protagoras.

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Spinoza, B. Strawson Vs Spinoza, B. Rorty I 28
Wittgenstein/Strawson/Rorty: thesis: there is nothing but the human body, VsDescartes: Vs splitting in res cogitans and res extensa. Aspect/VsSpinoza: "Two aspects". That is okay as long as you do not ask: "Are organisms something physical?"


Strawson I
Peter F. Strawson
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959
German Edition:
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Strawson II
Peter F. Strawson
"Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit",
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Strawson III
Peter F. Strawson
"On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Strawson IV
Peter F. Strawson
Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992
German Edition:
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Strawson V
P.F. Strawson
The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966
German Edition:
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Strawson VI
Peter F Strawson
Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Strawson VII
Peter F Strawson
"On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950)
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Spinoza, B. Hegel Vs Spinoza, B. Leibniz I 31
Substance/HegelVsSpinoza: who starts from the thinking requirement of substantial unity of the world and the experience requirement of the qualitative diversity of beings (the manifold), can comprehend this manifold only as manifestations or aspects of a substance in which "all which was thought to be true, has gone down." However, with this the the actual condition of thinking, the distinctiveness of thought content, is exposed!Leibniz saw the danger.
---
I 32
Hegel: one must not "let the multiplicity disappear in unity". If the deduction was only possible as a reduction (as in Spinoza), that would be the self-destruction of the world in thinking.
Kant: draws the consequence to establish the unity of the world in the priority of thought. The unit is then justified only transcendentally or subjectively idealistic.
HegelVsKant: attempts to renew the metaphysics of substance that would justify the unity of being in the unity of a being: the self-development of the absolute spirit in world history.

Rorty II 112
Truth/HegelVsSpinoza/Rorty: relinquishes the belief of Spinoza, that we recognize the truth when we see it. Truth/Spinoza: Thesis: W. we recognize when we see it.

Lei II
G. W. Leibniz
Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Mind Rorty, R. I 28
Wittgenstein / Strawson / Rorty thesis: there is nothing but the human body, VsDescartes: Vs splitting into res cogitans and res extensa. Aspect / VsSpinoza "two aspects". That s okay as long as you do not ask: "Are organisms something physical?"

The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of an allied field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Truth Spinoza, B. Rorty II 112
Wahrheit/Spinoza: These erkennen wir, wenn wir sie sehen. - HegelVsSpinoza.

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997