Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 4 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Ethics Spencer Habermas IV 80
Ethics/Spencer/DurkheimVsSpencer/Habermas: Durkheim sees Spencer as a typical representative of an ethics with an empirical approach. This has the following problem: how can a secularized morality then last? Certainly it will not last if secularisation has meant a profanation. (See Holiness/Durkheim). For this would make the basic moral phenomenon of the compulsory character disappear, as in all empirical ethics. DurkheimVsSpencer: Spencer's ethics show a complete ignorance of the nature of commitment. For him, the punishment is nothing more than the mechanical consequence of the action. But that means misunderstanding the characteristics of the moral obligation from the bottom up.(1)


1.E. Durkheim, Sociologie et philosophie, Paris 1951, German Frankfurt 1967, S.95

Spencer I
Herbert Spencer
The Man versus the State Indianapolis 2009


Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988

Ha III
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981

Ha IV
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981
Markets Spencer Habermas IV 176
Market/Spencer/Durkheim/Habermas: Spencer thesis (according to Durkheim): social life, like life in general, can only be organized through an unconscious and spontaneous adaptation, under the simultaneous pressure of needs, and not according to a deliberate, intelligent plan. (…)
Habermas IV 176
The type of social relationship would be the economic relationship (...). (1) Spencer/Durkheim: the unifying mechanism is the market. Integration by the market is "spontaneous" in so far as orientations for action are coordinated not by moral rules but by functional interrelationships.
Question: how can the division of labour be both a natural law of evolution and the mechanism of production for a certain form of social solidarity? (2)
Solution/Spencer/Durkheim: the division of social work, controlled by the non-normative market mechanism, merely finds its normative expression in the "giant system of private contracts".
Habermas IV 176/177
DurkheimVsSpencer: Durkheim, on the other hand, is not about a norm-free control mechanism, for in exchange relationships there is "nothing similar to a control effect". (3) Solution/Durkheim: the socially integrative power of moral rules. "Interest is ((s) on the other hand) the least stable in the world."“(4)


1.E. Durkheim, De la division du travail social, Paris 1930, German Frankfurt 1977, S. 242f
2. Ebenda, S. 81.
3. Ebenda S. 243 4. Ebenda.

Spencer I
Herbert Spencer
The Man versus the State Indianapolis 2009


Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988

Ha III
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981

Ha IV
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981
Morals Durkheim Habermas IV 77
Moral/Durkheim/Habermas: a) Thesis: Moral begins where the attachment to a group of whatever kind begins. (1)
Habermas IV 78
b) Mead: Following Kant: a morally acting subject must submit to authority, (...) but in such a way that it itself assumes the obligations and makes the moral demands its own. The individual is not exposed to external force, but to an awe-inspiring authority. MeadVsKant: Mead: traces back the binding force of commitment to force and attraction at the same time. The moral good is also the desirable. It could not be effective as an ideal (...) if it did not promise the satisfaction of real needs. (2)
Habermas IV 79
The holy awakens the same ambivalent attitude as moral authority, for the holy is surrounded by an aura that at the same time frightens and attracts, terrorizes and enchants. (3) From this structural analogy Durkheim concludes on a sacral basis of morality.
Habermas IV 80
Moral/Durkheim: Thesis: the moral rules ultimately draw their binding force from the sphere of the holy. This explains why they find obedience without being linked to external sanctions. (4) Problem: how can secularized morality last? Certainly it will not last if secularisation has meant a profanation. (See Holiness/Durkheim). For this would make the basic moral phenomenon of the compulsory character disappear, as in all empirical ethics.
DurkheimVsSpencer: Spencer's ethics show a complete ignorance of the nature of commitment. For him, the punishment is nothing more than the mechanical consequence of the action. But that means misunderstanding the characteristics of the moral obligation from the bottom up. (5)


1. E. Durkheim, Sociologie et philosophie, Paris 1951, German Frankfurt 1967, p. 86f
2. Ibid p. 96.
3. Ibid p. 86
4. Ibid p. 125
5. Ibid p, 95

Durkheim I
E. Durkheim
The Rules of Sociological Method - French: Les Règles de la Méthode Sociologique, Paris 1895
German Edition:
Die Regeln der soziologischen Methode Frankfurt/M. 1984


Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988

Ha III
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981

Ha IV
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981
Selection Kauffman Dennett I 550
Scientific camp: KauffmanVsSpencer: Stuart Kauffman: Order is created despite (environmental) selection.
I 46
Order/Biology/Kauffman: Order in the biosphere cannot be traced back to selection and self-organization at the same time! Life/Kauffman: life exists at the edge of chaos, possibly near some kind of phase transition.
I 229
Fitness landscape/Kauffman:"adaptive landscape". (see also Dennett: fitness landscape.) Thesis: Life is an adventure in the high mountains of the fitness landscape.
Order/Kauffman: Thesis: also possible without selection. Today we need a new theoretical framework model.
I 233
Selection/Kauffman: it is not proven that the selection can also successfully accumulate the minor improvements. Smaller catastrophes can also accumulate in a population. (>Error catastrophe).
I 234
Evolution/Kauffman: Example of computer programs that are to perform an operation. Serial programs are extremely sensitive and accumulate errors. It takes more time than the age of the universe to find the "optimal program" among 10300. So the evolution of our lives must have been different.
I 238
Evolution/Optimization/Kauffman: Solution: perhaps evolution could first design a redundant program or organism and then compress it?
I 240
Kauffman: I guess this does not work. The gradual approach to the minimum length program is only useful if the program found at each level helps to find the program that is 1 shorter by the next level.
I 246
Evolution/Darwin/Selection/Kauffman: if the children of both parents are similar, the characteristics must not merge, otherwise the genetic variation would disappear after a few generations and the selection would no longer have an object. Solution: Mendelian inheritance: both forms appear again in the grandchildren.
Question: Assuming that a gene in a population would have two alleles, can the selection increase the frequency of one allele? Yes! However, it depends on the structure of the fitness landscape.
I 248
Selection/Kauffman: our models of fitness landscapes show the limits of natural selection. (Local maximum represent end stations.)
I 253
Evolution/Kauffman: requires fitness landscapes that are not random. Probably favourable landscapes are created by self-organization.

Kau II
Stuart Kauffman
At Home in the Universe: The Search for the Laws of Self-Organization and Complexity New York 1995

Kauffman I
St. Kauffman
At Home in the Universe, New York 1995
German Edition:
Der Öltropfen im Wasser. Chaos, Komplexität, Selbstorganisation in Natur und Gesellschaft München 1998


Dennett I
D. Dennett
Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995
German Edition:
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Dennett II
D. Dennett
Kinds of Minds, New York 1996
German Edition:
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999

Dennett III
Daniel Dennett
"COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots"
In
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996

Dennett IV
Daniel Dennett
"Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Boole, G. Peirce Vs Boole, G. Berka I 32
Algebra/PeirceVsBoole: this notation has one drawback: it expresses sentences in two different ways, in the form of variables and in the form of equations. And the variables are of two kinds, namely those that are either equal to t is equal to f, and those which are equal to zero. Solution/Peirce: We will not use any equations and perform any operations anymore that result in values other ​​than t or f. We only need one of the operations with a single variable. Because there are only two things that can be said about a single sentence by itself: that it is true and it is false. x = t and x = f
I 34
Arithmetic/PeirceVsBoole/PeirceVsSpencer Brown: the whole system of introducing the arithmetic in the object is artificial and modern representatives of BA do not use it. The algebra of logic should arise from itself and arithmetic should be part of the logic, instead of resorting to it.(1)

1. Ch. S. Peirce, On the algebra of logic. A contribution to the philosophy of notation. American Journal of Mathematics 7 (1885), pp. 180-202 – Neudruck in: Peirce, Ch. S., Collected Papers ed. C. Hartstone/P. Weiss/A. W. Burks, Cambridge/MA 1931-1958, Vol. III, pp. 210-249

Peir I
Ch. S. Peirce
Philosophical Writings 2011

Berka I
Karel Berka
Lothar Kreiser
Logik Texte Berlin 1983
Various Authors Dewey Vs Various Authors Suhr I 57
DeweyVsAbility: there is no "ability in itself", but only in connection with a task! Thinking is trial treatment.
I 95
DeweyVsDualismus: experience does not come from nature but is in nature.
Hacking I 109
Dewey/Hacking: it has the (false) appearance that for Dewey everything is a social construct. DeweyVsDualism, all dualisms. Theory/Practice, Mind/Matter, Thinking/Action, Fact/Value. Vs "Spectator Theory of Knowledge".
Putnam III 237
Durkheim: had come to the conclusion that political opinions should be based on the "opinion of experts".
III 238
DeweyVsDurkheim: perhaps did not even know this treatise, yet Vs: "It cannot fail to happen that an expert class moves so far away from the interests of the community that it becomes a class with private interests and private knowledge. And private knowledge is not knowledge at all in relation to social affairs."
Rorty VI 88
Truth/Goal/DeweyVsSpencer: there is no goal of a truth to be achieved (this goal is also represented today by Peirce and by Bernard Williams).

Dew II
J. Dewey
Essays in Experimental Logic Minneola 2004

Suhr I
Martin Suhr
John Dewey zur Einführung Hamburg 1994

Hacking I
I. Hacking
Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983
German Edition:
Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

Putnam I (a)
Hilary Putnam
Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (b)
Hilary Putnam
Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (c)
Hilary Putnam
What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (d)
Hilary Putnam
Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (e)
Hilary Putnam
Reference and Truth
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (f)
Hilary Putnam
How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (g)
Hilary Putnam
Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (h)
Hilary Putnam
Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (i)
Hilary Putnam
Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (k)
Hilary Putnam
"Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam II
Hilary Putnam
Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988
German Edition:
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Putnam III
Hilary Putnam
Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Putnam IV
Hilary Putnam
"Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164
In
Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994

Putnam V
Hilary Putnam
Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981
German Edition:
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Putnam VI
Hilary Putnam
"Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Putnam VII
Hilary Putnam
"A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

The author or concept searched is found in the following disputes of scientific camps.
Disputed term/author/ism Pro/Versus
Entry
Reference
Spencer/Social Darwinism Versus Dennett I 550
KauffmanVsSpencer: Stuart Kauffman: order emerges in spite of the (environmental) selection.

Dennett I
D. Dennett
Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995
German Edition:
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Dennett II
D. Dennett
Kinds of Minds, New York 1996
German Edition:
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999

Dennett III
Daniel Dennett
"COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots"
In
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996

Dennett IV
Daniel Dennett
"Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005