Lexicon of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
[german]

Screenshot Tabelle Begriffes Help us establish new Lexicons of Arguments
Psychology - Economics
History - Politics
Law - Social Sciences
Art Theory - Others

 

Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.

Enhanced Search:
Search term 1: Author or Term Search term 2: Author or Term


together with


The author or concept searched is found in the following 1 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Reality Austin
 
Books on Amazon
Hacking I 62
"Really"/realism/Austin: 1st Ordinary language: "not really cream": to dismiss contemptuously - 2nd There is no clear methodological rule and consistent meaning of "realism". "Really" does not add anything to a declaration - E.g. force lines are unlike electrons: there is nothing that consists of lines of force - FaradayVsSmart: the explanatory force stems from negation.
I 64
SmartVs: "Really" does not change the meaning, (of cream or of electrons) power lines are malleable - hence they exist. Even if the iron filings will be taken away (there were doubts about this before Faraday) - namely, the lines can be cut.
John L. Austin
I Austin Wahrheit in: Wahrheitstheorien Hrsg. Skirbekk, Frankfurt/M 1996
II Jörgen Husted "Austin" aus :Hügli (Hrsg) Philosophie im 20. Jahrhhundert, Reinbek 1993
III Austin: "Ein Plädoyer für Entschuldigungen" aus: Linguistik und Philosophie (Grewendorf/Meggle(Hg)) Frankfurt (Athenäum) 1974/1995

The author or concept searched is found in the following 11 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Best Explanation Fraassen Vs Best Explanation
 
Books on Amazon
Field I 15
Principle of the Best Explanation/Field: Suppose we have a) certain beliefs about the "phenomena" that we do not want to give up
b) this class of phenomena is large and complex
c) we have a pretty good (simple) explanation that is not ad hoc and from which the consequences of the phenomena follow
d) one of the assumptions in the explanation is assertion S and we are sure that no explanation is possible without S.
Best Explanation: then we have a strong reason to believe S.
False: "The phenomena are as they would be if explanation E was correct":
As If/Field: As-if assertions that are piggyback passengers on true explanations may not be constructed as explanations themselves (at least not ad hoc).
Then the principle is not empty: it excludes the possibility that we accept a large and complex set of phenomena as a brute fact.
(van FraassenVsBest Explanation: 1980)
Best Explanation/BE/Field: the best explanation often leads us to believe something that we could also test independently by observation, but also to beliefs about unobservable things, or unobservable beliefs about observable things.
Observation: should not make a difference here! In any case, our beliefs go beyond what is observed.
I 16
Important argument: if no test was done, it should make no difference in the status of the evidence between cases where an observation is possible and those where no observation is possible! A stronger principle of the best explanation could be limited to observable instances of belief.
FieldVs: but that would cripple our beliefs about observable things and would be entirely ad hoc.
Unobserved things: a principle could be formulated that allowed the inference on observed things - that have been unobserved so far! - while we do not believe the explanation as such.
FieldVs: that would be even more ad hoc!
I 25
VsBenacerraf: bases himself on an outdated causal theory of knowledge.
I 90
Theory/Properties/Fraassen: theories have three types of properties: 1) purely internal, logical: axiomatization, consistency, various kinds of completeness.
Problem: It was not possible to accommodate simplicity here. Some authors have suggested that simple theories are more likely to be true.
FraassenVsSimplicity: it is absurd to suppose that the world is more likely to be simple than that it was complicated. But that is metaphysics.
2) Semantic Properties: and relations: concern the relation of theory to the world. Or to the facts in the world about which the theory is. Main Properties: truth and empirical adequacy.
3) pragmatic: are there any that are philosophically relevant? Of course, the language of science is context-dependent, but is that pragmatic?
I 91
Context-Dependent/Context-Independent/Theory/Science/Fraassen: theories can also be formulated in a context-independent language, what Quine calls Def "External Sentence"/Quine. Therefore it seems as though we do not need pragmatics to interpret science. Vs: this may be applicable to theories, but not to other parts of scientific activity:
Context-Dependent/Fraassen: are
a) Evaluations of theories, in particular, the term "explained" (explanation) is radically context-dependent.
b) the language of the utilization (use) of theories to explain phenomena is radically context-dependent.
Difference:
a) asserting that Newton’s theory explains the tides ((s) mention).
b) explaining the tides with Newton’s theory (use). Here we do not use the word "explains".
Pragmatic: is also the immersion in a theoretical world view, in science. Basic components: speaker, listener, syntactic unit (sentence or set of sentences), circumstances.
Important argument: In this case, there may be a tacit understanding to let yourself be guided when making inferences by something that goes beyond mere logic.
I 92
Stalnaker/Terminology: he calls this tacit understanding a "pragmatic presupposition". (FraassenVsExplanation as a Superior Goal).
I 197
Reality/Correspondence/Current/Real/Modal/Fraassen: Do comply the substructures of phase spaces or result sequences in probability spaces with something that happens in a real, but not actual, situation? ((s) distinction reality/actuality?) Fraassen: it may be unfair to formulate it like that. Some philosophical positions still affirm it.
Modality/Metaphysics/Fraassen: pro modality (modal interpretation of frequency), but that does not set me down on a metaphysical position. FraassenVsMetaphysics.
I 23
Explanatory Power/Criterion/Theory/Fraassen: how good a choice is explanatory power as a criterion for selecting a theory? In any case, it is a criterion at all. Fraassen: Thesis: the unlimited demand for explanation leads to the inevitable demand for hidden variables. (VsReichenbach/VsSmart/VsSalmon/VsSellars).
Science/Explanation/Sellars/Smart/Salmon/Reichenbach: Thesis: it is incomplete as long as any regularity remains unexplained (FraassenVs).

Fr I
B. van Fraassen
The Scientific Image Oxford 1980

Fie I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Fie II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Fie III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980
Feyerabend, P. Putnam Vs Feyerabend, P.
 
Books on Amazon
V 156
Incommensurability/PutnamVsFeyerabend: PutnamVsIncommensurability thesis: it refutes itself. It states that the term E.g. "temperature" from the 17th century cannot be equated with ours in terms of meaning or reference. This thesis should apply for the observation language as well as for the so-called "theory language." Feyerabend/language: our normal language is nothing more than a false theory. PutnamVsFeyerabend: we could not translate other languages or earlier stages of our own language, if this hypothesis was really true.
---
V 156/157
According to Feyerabend (and Kuhn when he is in particularly incommensurable mood) we could conceptually grasp the members of other cultures, including the scientists of the 17th century only as living beings that respond to stimuli (and that utter sounds that are similar to English or Italian in an oddly way). So more or less animals. PutnamVsFeyerabend/VsKuhn: it is totally inconsistent, if one wants to make us believe Galileo's concepts are "incommensurable", and then goes on to describe them in detail.
Smart pro Feyerabend: it is certainly a neutral fact that we need to aim with our telescope above this treetop here to see the Mercury, and not, as predicted by the Newtonian theory, above this chimney there.
---
However, Feyerabend could allow that we use Euclidean geometry and a non-relativistic optics for our theory of the telescope. He would say, although this is not the real truth about our telescope, the tree and the chimney, but it is still legitimate to do so.
PutnamVsSmart/PutnamVsFeyerabend: the difficulty is that you need to understand the language of Euclidean non-relativists at least partially, to be able to say that the predictions are the same.
How can I translate the logical particle ("if then", "no", etc.) from Italian of the 17th Century if I cannot find a translation manual?
---
V 158
Translation/Quine/Davidson: (VsKuhn, VsFeyerabend): first, it has to be admitted that we can find a translation scheme, what is the point then in this context, to say that the translation does not "really" capture meaning and reference of the original? The claim that the scheme does not exactly capture the meaning or reference of the original, can be understood in the light of the admission that one could find a better translation scheme. But it is only seemingly reasonable that all possible schemes should fail to capture the "real" meaning or reference.
---
V 160
Convergence/Putnam: is totally rejected by Kuhn and Feyerabend. According to that we do not increase our knowledge, the science is only making instrumentally "progress". (Technology). We are getting better in "transporting people from one place to another". PutnamVsKuhn/PutnamVsFeyerabend: that too is incoherent: we can only understand the idea of the instrumental (technological) progress when such terms as "transport people from one place to another" maintain a certain degree of permanent reference.
---
I 83
Electron/PutnamVsKuhn/PutnamVsFeyerabend: E.g. Bohr's electron refers according to the two to nothing. And only that because not all of Bohr's assumptions have been confirmed. PutnamVs. ---
I 84
Principle of leap of faith/PutnamVsKuhn/PutnamVsFeyerabend: there is nothing that corresponds exactly to Bohr's electron, but they have mass and charge, and that is pretty much so. We must give leap of faith and treat Bohr as someone who refers to these particles. ((s) in order for scientists to able to engage in dialogue and to speak of the same entity.)

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu II
H. Putnam
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Pu III
H. Putnam
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Pu IV
H. Putnam
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990
Identity Theory Searle Vs Identity Theory
 
Books on Amazon:
John R. Searle
I 52
SearleVsIdentity theory: a) common sense puts the identity theory in the following dilemma: Assuming that the theory is actually empirically true: then there must be logically independent from each other features of each concerned phenomen that clearly characterize this same phenomenon in two different ways: as that is identified on the left side of the identity statement, on the other hand, as it is identified on the right side (Stevenson 1960).
Then there must be two features: pain features and neurophysiological characteristics.
We understand such a statement because we understand as follows: one and the same event has been identified with the help of two types of properties.
Dilemma: either the pain features are subjective, mental, introspective features - if they are this, then we have not really gotten rid of the mind. We will still have to deal with a variety of dualism.
Otherwise, if we understand the word "pain" in a way that it does not describe a subjective mental feature, then the meaning of the word remains completely mysterious and unexplained.
I 53
As with behaviorism the mind is skipped here again. Either the identity-theoretical materialism merges the mind, or it does not ignore it; if it ignores it, it is wrong; if it does not ignore it, it is not materialism.
Smart wanted to describe the so-called mental features in a
"Topic-neutral" vocabulary that left the fact of its mindness unmentioned (1959).
SearleVsSmart: but that one can talk about a phenomenon without mentioning it's essential characteristics, does not mean that this phenomenon exists, or does not have these essential characteristics.
Technical objection VsIdentitätstheorie: it is unlikely that there is a for each type of mental state one and only one type of neurophysiological state.
Yet it seems too much to ask for that anyone who believes that Denver is the capital of Colorado has a neurophysiologically seen identical configuration in his brain. (Putnam 1967 and Fodor 1972).
I 54
We do not rule out the possibility that in another species pain is perhaps identical to any other types of neurophysiological configuration. In short, it seems too much to ask for that each type of mental state is identical to a type of neurophysiological state. 3. Technical objection derives from Leibniz law.
LeibnizVsIdentity theory: if two events are identical if they share all their properties, then mental states cannot be identical with physical states clearly, the mental states have certain characteristics, do not have the physical states. E.g. my pain is in the toe, while my corresponding neurophysiological state ranges from the toe to the brain.
So where is the pain really? The identity theorists had not such a big problem with this.
They stated that the analysis unit is in reality the experience of pain and that this experience (together with the experience of the whole body image) presumably takes place in the central nervous system. Searle: so you're right.
4. more radical technical objection: Kripke (1971): Modal argumentation: if it were really true that pain with C fiber stimulation is identical then it would have to be a necessary truth.

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983
Smart, J. C. Dummett Vs Smart, J. C.
 
Books on Amazon
I 73
DummettVsSmart: philosophers who deny that there are colors in the external reality, make a double mistake. They confuse strong objectivity with reality and fail to keep apart sense and reference.

Du I
M. Dummett
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Du III
M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982
Smart, J. C. Hacking Vs Smart, J. C.
 
Books on Amazon
I 64
Realism / FaradayVsSmart: power lines exist well! Namely, it is possible to exert pressure on the lines and deform them. (Hacking per). HackingVsSmart: This is a reality conception that goes beyond the simple thinking in building blocks. Hacking: Faraday stands in the tradition of physics, where matter is downplayed, and energy and force fields are accentuated.
The search for building blicks fizzles after a while.

Hack I
I. Hacking
Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996
Smart, J. C. Putnam Vs Smart, J. C.
 
Books on Amazon
V 110
Identity theory: the property of the person, that it has the sensation Q could be the same property, like the one that it is in the brain condition G. Identity theory/Materialism: modern form: J.C. Smart: a specific blue sensation is identical with a certain neurophysiological condition.
---
V 111
Functionalism: Putnam: I have proposed a variant of this theory under the name of functionalism. PutnamVsSmart: he has considered the wrong brain property as the other equation member. According to the functionalism, the brain has properties that are, in a sense, not physical. What are non-physical properties? Properties that can be defined in terms that leave the physical or chemical structure of the brain unmentioned. E.g. Abacus: The program is non-physical, in the sense that a system can bring them about independently from its, so to say, metaphysical or ontological composition.
E.g. it could be that a disembodied mind, a brain and a machine each have a particular program and that the functional structure of these three programs would be exactly the same, although their matter is completely different.
---
I 60
Mind/sensation/Smart: Thesis: "I see a yellow spot" means: What is going on in me is the same process as that which is going on when I see a yellow spot whereby the latter "see" means "actually perceive". PutnamVsSmart: that makes all reports about sensations to hypotheses.
(s)VsSmart: it is not apparent from where any intermediate entity ("the same process as") should come and this could even have explanatory value).
PutnamVsSmart: we would also have to assume that visual impression and "actual perception" are two different processes.
Then the materialism must come to the conclusion that we never really see yellow spots.

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990
Smart, J. C. Searle Vs Smart, J. C.
 
Books on Amazon:
John R. Searle
I 443
Smart (1959) tried to find a "topic-neutral" vocabulary and to avoid the so-called nomological appendage.
I 443/444
SearleVsSmart: SearleVs "topic-neutral" Note that no one has the impression that digestion must be described in a "topic-neutral" vocabulary. No one feels the need to say, "something is going on in me that resembles that what is going on in me when I digest a pizza."
I 53
Smart wanted to describe the so-called mental features in a "Topic-neutral" vocabulary that left the fact of their spirituality unmentioned (1959).
SearleVsSmart: but that you can talk about a phenomenon without mentioning its essential characteristics, does not mean that this phenomenon exists, or that it does not have these essential characteristics.

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983
Smart, J. C. Verschiedene Vs Smart, J. C. I 64
Realism / FaradayVsSmart: lines of force exist well! Namely, it is possible to exert pressure on the lines of force and deform them. (Hacking per).




Smart, J. C. Peacocke Vs Smart, J. C.
 
Books on Amazon
I 103
Instrument/Smart: (Between Science and Philosophy, 1969) Thesis: extension of the senses. We du use theory, but it corresponds to the theory that we use when we perceive objects at a distance. (>Position). PeacockeVsSmart: nevertheless, the cases are different from the perspective of the subject: for seeing a number of objects in the distance we do not need the concept of convergence, corresponding retinal points, etc. Even if you have these concepts, they are not analogous to the epistemic possibility I 104 which are needed like active current for theoretical concepts. "Extension of the senses" should not be merely metaphorical. But this would require the existence of a way of thinking, that there is a physical property x [a current flows through x], and that it is not epistemically possible that under normal circumstances..., etc. and yet there is no current. I am not saying that such concepts are impossible, but this is about different concepts. Those concepts would take other places in the net of epistemic possibility. Better instruments never give us new concepts by themselves. ((s) We would also need to know that they are better or that e.g. that a higher resolution of a microscope simply shows similar structures in a better way, and not entirely new structures. >Presupposition.)

Pea I
Chr. R. Peacocke
Sense and Content Oxford 1983
Smart, J. C. Cartwright Vs Smart, J. C.
 
Books on Amazon
I 54
Biology/Smart: Thesis: biology does not have any own laws, it is more like engineering. CartwrightVsSmart: I do think that it has its own laws, but in any case it is not a second-rate science. (What Smart himself does not believe).
Physics/Cartwright: There is more reason to regard physics as a second-rate science. Its laws - unlike biology - do have exceptions and are also not true. (Unlike in biology).

Car I
N. Cartwright
How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983
Smart, J. C. Bradley Vs Smart, J. C.
 
Books on Amazon:
Francis H. Bradley
Frank I 590
Dualismus/Materialismus/BradleyVsSmart: ontologisch neutral: unverständlich, wenn weder physikalisch noch phänomenal +.

Brad I
F. H. Bradley
Essays on Truth and Reality (1914) Ithaca 2009

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994

The author or concept searched is found in the following 4 theses of the more related field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Explanation Fraassen, B. van
 
Books on Amazon
I 23
Erklärungskraft/Kriterium/Theorie/Fraassen: wie gut ist Erklärungskraft als Kriterium für die Wahl einer Theorie? Auf jeden Fall ist sie eins. Fraassen: These die unbeschränkte Forderung nach Erklärung führt zur unvermeidlichen Forderung nach verborgenen Variablen. (VsReichenbach/VsSmart/VsSalmon/VsSellars).
Wissenschaft/Erklärung/Sellars/Smart/(Salmon/Reichenbach: These sie ist unvollkommen, solange irgendeine Regularität unerklärt bleibt. (FraassenVs).
I 100
These Erklärung ist nicht eine zusätzliche Eigenschaft jenseits von empirischer Adäquatheit.
I 134
Def Erklärung/Fraassen. These eine Erklärung ist nicht dasselbe wie eine Proposition oder Liste von Propositionen, auch kein Argument, sondern eine Antwort auf eine Warum-Frage. Auch wenn Erklärungen natürlich Propositionen sind. Eine Theorie der Erklärung muß also eine Theorie der Warum-Fragen sein.
I 213
Erklärung/Regularität/Fraassen: These es sind nur Regularitäten der beobachtbaren Phänomene, die erklärt werden müssen!
Mistake Peacocke, Chr.
 
Books on Amazon
I 103
Instrument/Smart: (Between Science and Philosophiy,1969) These Verlängerung der Sinne. Wir verwenden wohl Theorie, aber die entspricht der Theorie, die wir einsetzen, wenn wir Gegenstände in der Entfernung wahrnehmen. (>Position). PeacockeVsSmart: dennoch sind die Fälle aus der Sicht des Subjekts verschieden: für das Sehen einer Reihe von Gegenständen in der Entfernung braucht man nicht den Begriff der Konvergenz, korrespondierenden Netzhautpunkten usw.
Biology Smart, J.C.
 
Books on Amazon
Cartwright I 54
Biologie/Smart: These die Biologie hat keine eigenen Gesetze, sie ist mehr wie Ingenieurskunst. CartwrightVsSmart: ich denke doch, dass sie eigene Gesetze hat, aber jedenfalls ist sie keine zweitrangige Wissenschaft. (Was Smart selbst auch nicht glaubt).
Physik/Cartwright: es gibt eher Veranlassung, die Physik als eine zweitrangige Wissenschaft anzusehen. Ihre Gesetze haben nämlich - anders als die der Biologie - Ausnahmen und sind auch gar nicht wahr. (anders als die der Biologie).

Car I
N. Cartwright
How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983
Instrument Smart, J.C.
 
Books on Amazon
Peacocke I 103
Instrument / Smart: (Between Science and Philosophiy, 1969) Thesis: the i. is an extension of the senses. We probably use a theory, but this corresponds to the theory that we use when we perceive objects in the distance.   PeacockeVsSmart: yet the cases from the point of view of the subject are different: for seeing a number of objects in the distance one does not need the concept of convergence, corresponding retinal points, etc.

Pea I
Chr. R. Peacocke
Sense and Content Oxford 1983