Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Categorical Imperative Rawls I 251
Categorical Imperative/moral/Kant/Rawls: Kant begins by rationally choosing and rationally judging moral principles.
I 254
Kant/SidgwickVsKant/Sidgwick/Rawls: Sidgwick writes that nothing in Kant's ethics is more striking than the idea that the human expresses his true self by acting according to the moral law. On the other hand, if he/she yields to certain needs, he/she acts according to the law of nature(1). >H. Sidgwick, >I. Kant, >Morals, >Ethics.
I 255
Kant now fails to explain according to Sidgwick why the villain in his bad life does not express his selfhood as the saint does in his life. KantVsSidgwick/KantVsVs/Rawls: Kant should reply that any consistent action according to principles could be the result of a decision of the noumenal self, but that not every action of the phenomenal self reveals this as a free and equal rational being.
RawlsVsKant: Kant has not shown that our action out of the moral law shows our nature in a recognizable way, as acting on contrary principles would not.
Solution/Rawls: our assumption of the initial situation with the veil of non-knowledge corrects this deficiency: we only have to show that our chosen principles are applicable. We accept the initial situation as one considered by the noumenal self in Kant's sense. Qua noumenale they have the free choice between principles.
At the same time they want to express their rationality in the lifeworld, i.e. their independence from contingent features of nature and society. If the argument from the contract theory is correct, only those principles define the moral law.
>Contract theory/Rawls, >Principles/Rawls, >Lifeworld.
I 256
Our desire to be righteous arises, in part, from the desire to express ourselves as free and equally rational beings. I think that is why Kant speaks of it as a cause of shame when we misbehave and not as a cause of guilt. >Emotion/Rawls.

1. Sidgwick, "The Kantian Conception of Free Will," Mind, vol.13, 1888, pp. 511-516.

Rawl I
J. Rawls
A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005

Hedonism Rawls I 554
Def Hedonism/Rawls: in tradition, hedonism is interpreted in two ways: a) as the view that the only intrinsic good is the feeling of something pleasant, or b) as the psychological thesis that enjoyment is the only thing that individuals aspire to.
I 557
Rawls: I see hedonism as an attempt to impose the concept of the ultimate goal, i.e. to show that a rational decision is always possible, at least in principle. Although this attempt fails, it is worthwhile to show the difference between utilitarianism and contract theory in his example. >Rationality, >Utilitarianism, >Contract Theory.
Hedonism/Rawls: therefore assumes that there must be an ultimate goal, because there is no rational way of weighing equal goals against each other. For him, enjoyment is simply a pleasant feeling and thus the only candidate for a superordinate goal, by eliminating competing goals, not by a principle. If there are rational choices, there must be a supreme goal and happiness or another objective goal cannot be it because that would be circular(1).
>Goals, >Purposes.
I 556
Hedonism/Sidgwick/Rawls: even if too little information is available, maximum pleasure conveys an idea of good. For Sidgwick, this is sufficient to ensure that pleasure as a rational goal is an orientation of thought(2). RawlsVsHedonism: he fails to define a reasonable superordinate goal, because once the pleasure is described in sufficient detail,...
I 557
...so that it can be included in the rational considerations of the actor, it is no longer plausible that it should be the sole rational objective(3). ((s) Explanation: For example, when it comes to experiencing the birth of a grandchild, there must be a superordinate goal, namely to live for so long. If the acting person is asked what is more important to him, his own life or the life of the grandchild, he will probably give up his hedonism.)
Pleasure/Sidgwick/RawlsVsSidgwick/Rawls: it is difficult for him to weigh up and evaluate different forms of pleasure against each other(4).
>H. Sidgwick.
Pleasure/Aristotle/Rawls: Aristotle says that a good person gives up his life for a friend if necessary, on the grounds that he prefers a short period of intense pleasure to a long, dull life(5).
Santayana/Rawls: means that we have to weigh up the relative value of pleasure and pain against each other.
>The Good/Aristotle.
Petrarca/Santayana/Rawls: when Petrarca says that a thousand pleasures cannot outweigh a single pain, he adopts a yardstick that goes back beyond both possibilities. The acting person must involve his whole life in the weighing process. So the problem of multiplicity of purposes comes back(6).
I 558
Economic theory/demand theory/Rawls: It is a misunderstanding that in modern economic theory, e. g. demand theory, the problem of hedonism would be solved. Here, needs are arranged convexly and completely as a set of alternatives. Then there is a utility function that selects the best alternative for an individual. RawlsVs: however, this can only be taken as a guideline if an individual wishes to adhere to it. But then we have returned to the issue of rational choice(7)(8)(9).
>Rational Choice.

1. See C. D. Broad, Five Types of Ethical Theory (London, 1930).
2. See H. Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed. (London, 1907), pp. 405-407.
3. Cf. Broad, p. 187.
4. Sidgwick, p. 127.
5. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1169a17-26. 6. G. Santayana, The Life of Reason in Common Sense (New York, 1905) pp. 237f.
7. See L. Walras, Elements of Pure Economics, Homewood, Ill, 1954, p. 256.
8. P. A. Samuelson, Foundations of Economic Analysis (Cambridge, 1947), pp. 90-92.
9. R.D. Luce and H. Raiffa, Games and Decisions (New York, 1957), pp. 16, 21-24, 38.

Rawl I
J. Rawls
A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005

Kant Sidgwick Rawls I 254
Kant/SidgwickVsKant/Sidgwick/Rawls: Sidgwick writes that nothing in Kant's ethics is more striking than the idea that the human expresses his true self by acting according to moral law. >Morals, >Laws, >Principles.
On the other hand, when he/she gives in to certain needs, he/she acts according to the law of nature.(1).
>Natural laws.
SidgwickVsKant/Rawls: according to Sidgwick, this idea collapses: it seems to him to be Kant's view that saints and villains have become what they are at their own free will (as a noumenal self) and at the same time are subject to the causal laws (as phenomenal self).
>Free Will, >Causal laws.
I 255
Kant now, after Sidgwick, fails to explain why the villain in his/her bad life does not express his/her being himself/herself as much as the saint does in his/her life. >Explanation, >Justification.
KantVsSidgwick/KantVsVs/Rawls: Kant should reply that any consistent action according to principles could be the result of a decision of the noumenal self, but that not every action of the phenomenal self reveals this as a free and equal rational being.
>Rationality, >Noumenal self, >Thing in itself.
RawlsVsKant: Kant did not show that our actions under moral law show our nature in a recognizable way, as acting according to contrary principles would not do.
>Manifestation.


1.H. Sidgwick, "The Kantian Conception of Free Will", Mind, vol. 13,1888, pp. 511-516.

Sidgwick I
Henry Sidgwick
Methods of Ethics 2017


Rawl I
J. Rawls
A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005
Morals Kant Stegmüller IV 299
Morality/ethics/Kant: must necessarily apply. -> categorical imperative - as a hypothetical imperatives ("if you want that, do ...") they would be superfluous.
Stegmüller IV 429
Moral/Kant/Stegmüller: is autonomous: the morally right thing is right in itself and mandatory - it can be detected by practical reason. - Every rational being is competent enough to give the moral commandments themself. - If there was divine reward, morality would be corrupted by self-interest. -> Rawls: the veil of ignorance.
Stegmüller IV 430
God/practical reason/Kant: nevertheless, the moral asks us that we set ourselves the highest good for goal - therefore a cause different from nature must be demanded from nature. - The highest good is only possible in the world, if the highest cause of nature is assumed.
Stegmüller IV 431
In addition, the immortality is necessary so that an infinite progress for the first element of the highest good is possible. MackieVsKant: this is a false transition from "should" to "should be possible."
Stegmüller IV 433
MackieVsKant: The consistent recognition of the autonomy of moral should have brought him to a more stoic conception: that moral does not need any other bliss as the consciousness of righteousness itself. ---
Strawson V 134
Moral/Kant: we need that to ensure that the limitations of knowledge do not strengthen the materialism and atheism. ---
Vaihinger 306
Moral/Kant/Vaihinger: the theoretical reason forbids to accept a moral world order - the practical reason dictates that it is necessary to do good. ---
Rawls I 251
Moral/Kant/Rawls: Kant begins with the rational choice of moral principles and their rational assessment.
Rawls I 254
Kant/SidgwickVsKant/Sidgwick/Rawls: Sidgwick writes that nothing in Kant's ethics is more striking than the idea that man expresses his true self by acting according to moral law. On the other hand, when he gives in to certain needs, he acts according to the law of nature. (Sidgwick, "The Kantian Conception of Free Will", Mind, vol. 13,1888, pp. 511-516).
Rawls I 255
Kant now, according to Sidgwick, fails to explain why the villain in his bad life does not express himself as much as the saint does in his life. KantVsSidgwick/KantVsVs/Rawls: Kant should reply that any consistent action according to principles could be the result of a decision of the noumenal self, but that not every action of the phenomenal self reveals this as a free and equal rational being.
RawlsVsKant: Kant did not show that our actions under moral law show our nature in a recognizable way, as acting according to contrary principles would not do.
Solution/Rawls: our assumption of the initial situation with the veil of ignorance resolves this deficiency: we only have to show that our principles to be chosen are applicable. We accept the initial situation as one that is seen by the noumenal self in Kant's sense. Qua noumenale they have the free choice between principles. At the same time, however, they want to express their rationality in the world around them, i. e. their independence from contingent characteristics of nature and society. If the argument from contract theory is correct (see Contract Theory/Rawls), precisely those principles define the moral law.
Rawls I 256
Our desire to behave justly then arises partly from the desire to express ourselves as free and equally rational beings. I think that is why Kant speaks of it as a reason for shame when we behave incorrectly and not as a reason for guilt.
Gadamer I 38
Moral law/"Sittengesetz"/Kant/Gadamer: The application of the moral law to the determination of will is a matter of judgement. But since it is a matter here of discernment under laws of pure practical reason, its task is precisely to protect against the "empiricism of practical reason, which merely places the practical concepts of good and evil in sequences of experience"(1). This is what the typology of pure practical reason does. In addition, there is certainly also for Kant the question of how the strict laws of pure practical reason can be introduced into the human mind. For this task he indeed relies on common human reason and wants to practice and form practical judgement (...).
Gadamer I 39
But the fact that there can be a culture of moral feeling in this way does not really belong to moral philosophy, and in any case does not concern the foundations of it. For Kant demands that our determination of will should remain determined solely by the driving forces based on the self-legislation of pure practical reason. No mere commonality of feeling can form the basis for it, but only an "albeit dark, but certainly guiding practical act of reason", which is precisely the task of the critique of practical reason to enlighten and consolidate.
1. I. Kant. Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, 1787, S. 124.
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03

Carnap V
W. Stegmüller
Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis
In
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987

St I
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989

St II
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987

St III
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987

St IV
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989

Strawson I
Peter F. Strawson
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959
German Edition:
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Strawson II
Peter F. Strawson
"Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit",
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Strawson III
Peter F. Strawson
"On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Strawson IV
Peter F. Strawson
Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992
German Edition:
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Strawson V
P.F. Strawson
The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966
German Edition:
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Strawson VI
Peter F Strawson
Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Strawson VII
Peter F Strawson
"On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950)
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

Rawl I
J. Rawls
A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005

Gadamer I
Hans-Georg Gadamer
Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010

Gadamer II
H. G. Gadamer
The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986
German Edition:
Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977
Preference Utilitarianism Singer I 13
Definition Preference Utilitarianism/P. Singer/SingerVsBentham/SingerVsMill/SingerVsSidgwick: my utilitarianism is not about the growth of happiness and the reduction of suffering, but about promoting the preferences of those involved. General Public/ethics/P. Singer: Preference Utiliarianism cannot be inferred from the universal aspects of ethics.
Preference: the preferences of the individual must be weighed against the preferences of others and the community.
I 14
Where do we get a theory from that governs this? We approach simple, pre-ethical choices. However, we cannot rely on intuitions because they can be inherited evolutionarily and therefore be unreliable in terms of what is right. >Preferences.
Preferences: can be for different individuals at quite different levels. Someone who would like to be a poet may forgo other forms of happiness. This cannot be pursued further here.
>Comparisons, >Comparability.
I 80
Killing/Preference Utilitarianism/Animals/P. Singer: for the preference utilitarianism, killing a person is worse than killing another being (which could still be a member of the Homo Sapiens species!). The reason for this is that people are more orientated towards the future. Beings with no sense for the future have no preferences regarding them. Of course, such creatures can still fight their deaths like a fish on a hook. Preference Utilitarianism has no reason, however, to reject a more painless method of killing fish when it is available. The fight against pain in an instant does not prove that the fish would be able to compare different perspectives for the future.
>Animals.
I 81
This argument, however, only holds in connection with considerations of what is wrong with killing a person (with prospects for the future).
I 81
Life/Preference Utilitarianism/P. Singer: does a person have the right to life according to preference utilitarianism? According to the preference utilitarianism a right cannot be offset against the preferences of others. Cf. >Utilitarian Liberalism.

For Utilitarianism see Carlyle - Chapman - Dworkin - Gaus - Habermas - Hooker - Kant - David Lewis - Mill - Talcott Parsons - Rawls - Sen - Singer - Smart

Counter concept to Utilitarianism: >Deontology.

SingerP I
Peter Singer
Practical Ethics (Third Edition) Cambridge 2011

SingerP II
P. Singer
The Most Good You Can Do: How Effective Altruism is Changing Ideas About Living Ethically. New Haven 2015

Principles Rawls I 4
Principles/Society/Rawls:
1. Everyone accepts and knows that the other members of society accept the same principles of justice.
2. The basic social institutions fulfill these principles in general and are known for doing so.
I 7
Principles/Rawls: we are only interested in general principles of the justice of society as a whole, not in such special or private communities or for cross-national institutions.
I 10/11
Principles/Justice/Rawls: Principles must be defined at the beginning. Our point of departure, the situation of equality, which should follow an election, corresponds to the natural state of the traditional theories of the social contract, but it is neither a concrete historical situation nor a primitive culture.
>Social contract, >Natural state, >Equality.
It is a purely hypothetical situation which should lead to a certain realization of justice.
>Justice/Rawls.
I 41
Principles/MillVsIntuitionism/Mill/Rawls: Mill argued that the principle of usefulness could be the only supreme principle, since otherwise there could be no arbitrator between competing criteria(1). >J.St. Mill, >Competition, >Interests, >Utility principle, >Utilitarianism.
Principles/Sidgwick: the principle of usefulness is the only one that can play this role(2).
>H. Sidgwick.
Rawls: that is what made the classical doctrine so attractive: that it tries to solve the problem of priorities and avoids intuitionism.
>Intuitionism/Economics, >Priorities, >Preferences.
RawlsVsMill/RawlsVsSidgwick/RawlsVsUtilitarism: we need to realize that there may be no way to dissolve the plurality of the different principles.
>VsUtilitarianism.
I 43
Principles/Rawls: I suggest that even in the "lexical order" (the piecemeal processing of principles according to an external order) the principle of equal distribution of rights should be treated as a priority rather than the regulation of economic or social inequalities.
I 61
Principles/justice/Rawls: provisional wording: 1. every person must have the same right to the widest possible fundamental freedom, insofar as it is compatible with the same freedom for others.
2. social and economic inequalities shall be arranged in such a way that they
(a) are reasonably expectable for everyone's benefit; and
(b) are linked to positions and administrative procedures that can be held by anyone.
The two principles are applied in chronological order. This means that abandoning the first principle cannot be offset by greater social or economic benefits.
I 62
Deviations from equal distribution of social rights or economic benefits can only be justified by the fact that this is to everyone's advantage. ((s) This is a reference to utilitarianism.
I 63
The chronological order of compliance also excludes that fundamental freedoms can be exchanged for economic benefits.
I 64
Similarly, the chronological order of the principles means that people can only ever be talked about in the form of social role holders.
I 83
Principles/Rawls: Redrafting of the Second Principle: Social and economic inequality must be arranged in such a way that (a) it provides the greatest benefit for the worst-off people and
(b) it is linked to administrative bodies and positions which are open to all under conditions of fair equal opportunities.
I 89
I assume that the two parts of the principle are arranged lexically.
I 116
Principles/Rawls: there is nothing inconsistent about the fact that fairness makes unconditional principles possible. It is sufficient to show that, in the initial situation (of a society to be established), the parties agree to principles that define the natural obligations that then apply without fail. ((s)VsRawls: Contradiction: Rawls himself says that the natural duties, for example not to be cruel, are not subject to agreements. (See Rawls I 114).
I 250
Principles/Rawls: reformulation in the light of the consideration of contingent individual and historical inequalities: First principle: Every person must have an equal right to the most comprehensive system of equal fundamental rights that is compatible with an equal system of freedom for all.
Priority rule: the principles of justice are built in lexical order and therefore freedom can only be restricted for the benefit of freedom. There are two cases here: a) a less comprehensive freedom must increase the freedom of the total system of freedom shared by all, b) a restricted freedom must be acceptable to those affected by it.
I 253
Principles/Categorical imperative/Kant/Rawls: in the sense of Kant, these principles are also categorical imperatives. They do not require any particular social conditions or individual goals. Only an interest in primary public goods (e. g. freedom) is assumed. The preference for these in turn is derived from the most general assumptions about rationality and the conditions of human life.
I 302
Principles/Rawls: final version for Institutions/Rawls: the two principles of justice (see above) plus priority rules: 1. Priority rule: the principles of justice must be dealt with in lexical order, so that freedom may only be restricted in favour of greater freedom. Two cases are possible: a) Restricted freedom must strengthen the overall system of freedoms that benefit all. b) Freedom that is not equal must be accepted by those who enjoy fewer freedoms.
2. Priority rule: (Justice precedes efficiency and prosperity): The second principle of justice is lexical superior to the principle of efficiency and the one of maximizing benefits,...
I 303
.... fair equal opportunities are superior to the difference principle. Two cases are possible: a) Opportunity inequality must increase the chances of the disadvantaged.
b) An extreme savings rate must reduce the burdens on those affected.
>Equal opportunities.
General conception: all primary social goods (freedoms, rights, income, prosperity, conditions for self-esteem, etc.) shall be distributed equally, except where an unequal distribution of some or all of these goods is to the benefit of the least favoured.
I 446
Principles/Rawls: while the principles of justice are those chosen in the initial position, the principles of rational decision or rationality are not chosen at all. This leads to the distinction between right and good. >Society/Rawls.

1. Mill, A System of Logic, bk. VI, ch. XII, sec. 7 and Utilitarianism, ch. V, paers. 26-31.
2. Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, bk. IV ch. II and III.

Rawl I
J. Rawls
A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005

Rights Consequentialism Gaus I 107
Rights/Consequentialism/Gaus: L. W. Sumner (1987)(1) presents an especially influential consequentialist case for rights. Sumner recognizes the paradoxical air of a thoroughly consequentialist argument for rights: in so far as the consequentialist seeks to maximize achievement of a certain goal, and rights are a constraint on the ways goals are achieved, it looks as if the consequentialist must argue that the best way to achieve the goal is to constrain our efforts to achieve it. The key to resolving this paradox, says Sumner, is to distinguish consequentialism as a theory of moral justification from the preferred theory of moral decision-making (1987(1): 179) or, we might say, consequentialism as a theory of evaluation from a theory of deliberation. This argument for rights consequentialism (or, more generally, rule consequentialism) argues that there is no easy transition from the claim that the right action is that which maximizes good consequences to the claim that the best decision procedure is to perform that action which one thinks has the best consequences. Sidgwick: This type of argument was advanced by Sidgwick (1962(2): 489), who accepted that utilitarianism may be self-effacing, in the sense that it could instruct us not to encourage its use as a theory for making decisions. It may be better, he argued, if many people are guided by common sense morality.
>Rights/Utilitarianism.
VsSidgwick/VsSumner: Two problems confront such a view.
1) First, it is often not realized that rule utilitarianism puts more, not less, computational burdens on those devising the system of rules.
2) Second, by divorcing utilitarianism as a standard of evaluation from its role as a standard of deliberation, we invite the sort of moral elitism that attracted Sidgwick: perhaps hoi polloi should be restricted to non-utilitarian reasoning, but the class of excellent calculators may be able to better promote utility by employing utilitarianism as a method of deliberation (1962(2): 489ff). Drawing inspiration from Sidgwick, Robert E. Goodin (1995(3): ch. 4) has recently defended ‘government house’ utilitarianism, which casts utilitarianism as a ‘public philosophy’ to be employed by policy-makers, rather than a guide to individual conduct.

1. Sumner, L. W. (1987) The Moral Foundations of Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
2. Sidgwick, Henry (1962) The Methods of Ethics, 7th edn. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
3. Goodin, Robert E. (1995) Utilitarianism as a Public Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. „The Diversity of Comprehensive Liberalisms.“ In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications.


Gaus I
Gerald F. Gaus
Chandran Kukathas
Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Rights Sumner Gaus I 107
Rights/Consequentialism/Sumner/Gaus: L. W. Sumner (1987)(1) presents an especially influential consequentialist case for rights. Sumner recognizes the paradoxical air of a thoroughly consequentialist argument for rights: in so far as the consequentialist seeks to maximize achievement of a certain goal, and rights are a constraint on the ways goals are achieved, it looks as if the consequentialist must argue that the best way to achieve the goal is to constrain our efforts to achieve it. The key to resolving this paradox, says Sumner, is to distinguish consequentialism as a theory of moral justification from the preferred theory of moral decision-making (1987(1): 179) or, we might say, consequentialism as a theory of evaluation from a theory of deliberation. This argument for rights consequentialism (or, more generally, rule consequentialism) argues that there is no easy transition from the claim that the right action is that which maximizes good consequences to the claim that the best decision procedure is to perform that action which one thinks has the best consequences. Sidgwick: This type of argument was advanced by Sidgwick (1962(2): 489), who accepted that utilitarianism may be self-effacing, in the sense that it could instruct us not to encourage its use as a theory for making decisions. It may be better, he argued, if many people are guided by common sense morality. >Rights/Utilitarianism.
VsSidgwick/VsSumner: Two problems confront such a view.
1) First, it is often not realized that rule utilitarianism puts more, not less, computational burdens on those devising the system of rules.
2) Second, by divorcing utilitarianism as a standard of evaluation from its role as a standard of deliberation, we invite the sort of moral elitism that attracted Sidgwick: perhaps hoi polloi should be restricted to non-utilitarian reasoning, but the class of excellent calculators may be able to better promote utility by employing utilitarianism as a method of deliberation (1962(2): 489ff).
>Utilitarian Liberalism/Goodin.

1. Sumner, L. W. (1987) The Moral Foundations of Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
2. Sidgwick, Henry (1962) The Methods of Ethics, 7th edn. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. „The Diversity of Comprehensive Liberalisms.“ In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications.


Gaus I
Gerald F. Gaus
Chandran Kukathas
Handbook of Political Theory London 2004


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