Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Reductionism | Field Vs Reductionism | Avramides I 113 FieldVsReductionism/VsReductive Griceans: the reductive Gricean approach says that one can explain what it means to believe that Caesar was selfish, without somehow referring to the semantic properties of the sentence "Caesar was selfish". Because explaining the semantic properties of the sentence with belief would be circular. The question is whether the Gricean presupposition is true that you can explain belief without reference to the sentence. (84). ((s) This is not the argument of Pieter Seuren that one could not explain linguistic meaning linguistically. ((s)> Evans/McDowellVsSeuren)). Field: I believe that the presupposition is correct. In a typical case, that which in my system makes a symbol a symbol that stands for Caesar that this symbol has acquired its role in my representation system as a result of my learning a name. I 114 Which stands for Caesar in the public language. (85). Meaning/Language/Field: if that’s right, then ... Avramides: then there can be no inner language without public language, according to Field. SchifferVsField: there is no incompatibility. Intention-based Semantics (IBS, Grice) does not need to assume that you have propositional attitude before you have acquired public language. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Various Authors | Evans Vs Various Authors | EMD II VIII Meta Language/Theory Language/Evans/McDowell: often mentioned conditions: 1) if S is meaningful and unambiguous, there is exactly one sentence of L which is registered for S. 2) if S is n times ambiguous, there are n different sentences of L which are registered for S. 3) if S has no meaning, there is no sentence of L which is registered for S. 4) If S entails another sentence S’, there is an effectively decidable relation which is valid between the sentence of L that is registered for S or for S’. Problem/Seuren: the 4th condition leads to a conceptual collapse!. EMD II VIII/IX E.g. "John is a bachelor" entails "John is unmarried". According to the semantic representation, the simple "bachelor" cannot be the same as the complex "unmarried man". Evans/McDowellVsSeuren: this whole thing can be challenged, not because it revives the controversial distinction analytic/synthetic or because the "conceptual collapse" would go on without end, but because we, if we got ourselves into it, would put ourselves into a position where we would be unable to do what we are doing. And that would be that we set up something that, if someone knew about it, would put him into a position to speak and understand a language. It would be unfair to imply that the theorists are unaware of the speaker listener competence. Evans/McDowellVsSeuren: he suggests to people that if they "broke through circle", it would lead to the impossibility of determining the meaning of sentences "outside the language", i.e. "without using language". Vs: there is a fallacy in that: surely we cannot determine meanings without using words. But it does not follow that if we specify the sentence meaning of S using the sentence S’. EMD II X we thus determine a relation between S and S’!. Solution: S is mentioned, and S’ is used. (Use/Mention, T sentence). E.g. (5) "Snow is white" is true iff snow is white does not constitute relation which has the sentence has to itself, but rather constitutes under these circumstances a semantic property of the sentence by using it. This is an exemplification, with which we may well express our belief that snow is white. |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 |
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