Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 15 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Davidson | II 135 DavidsonVsScheme/Inhalt -DavidsonVsRepresentation - DavidsonVsCorrespondence theory: Relativism: Representation immer in Bezug auf ein Schema! - DavidsonVsSense data theory Der Unterschied zwischen dem Interpreten und dem L-Sprecher besteht nicht in dem was sie sehen und fühlen, sondern in dem was sie suchen und für relevant halten. Anomal Monism: mental event tokens sind als einzelne je identisch mit physischen event tokens, ohne daß jedoch mentale event types nomologisch identisch wären mit types physikalischer Ereignisse. Entsprechung auf Einzelebene, nicht auf Typenebene. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
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| Anti-Realism | Putnam | VI 393 Anti-Realism/Anti-RealismVsPhenomenalism/DummettVsHusserl: there is no basis of "hard facts" (DummettVsSense Data). >Sense data, >Fact. Understanding/Dummett: to understand a sentence is to know what its verification would be. >Verification. N.B.: the sentence is verified by being spoken ((s) in such and such circumstances). It is still not incorrigible. The sentence does not need to be bivalent. >Bivalence, >Incorrigibility. Soft Fact/Putnam: soft facts are self-affirmation of observation statements. N.B.: the realistic concept of truth and reference is not needed for that. >Observation sentence, >Reference. Therefore, there is no problem of the "right" (intended) reference relation. If we introduce reference à la Tarski, "'cow' refers to 'cows'" becomes a tautology. Advantage: we need no metaphysical realism for understanding. >Metaphyiscal realism. Verificationism: verificationism must then also be applied in the meta language, i.e. we cannot use any hard facts (nor sense data). Otherwise, Wittgenstein's private language argument applies. >Meta language, >Private language. --- I (d) 124 Anti-Realism/Dummett/Putnam: anti-realism (like intuitionism) requires that a verification process is mastered. Problem: we can never say what the knowledge of the truth conditions consists of -> Löwenheim: this is no problem for the anti-realism: since it is oriented at a process which must always be re-found. It must only renounce models of verification. With a rich meta-language it can introduce Tarski definitions that are model-independent. It can then speak about models again. I (d) 125 It can even define reference à la Tarski. >Truth definition/Tarski. I (e) 150 Anti-Realism/truth/Dummett: we need an "external" concept of truth (or accuracy) above Tarski's internal (tautological) equivalence which is justified assertibility. We need it not only by facts but by perceived and conceived states of affairs. It is about justification conditions, not about mind-external truth conditions. >Assertibility. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Experience | Quine | I 19 QuineVsSense Data Theory: immediate experience is not coherent, it is an autonomous area. >Sense data/Quine. Stroud I 216 Experience/Truth/Quine: the distinction itself is derived from scientific research. II 218 Experience/Quine: my observation sentences are not about experience(!), but they are reasonably naturalistic analogues of sentences about experience, insofar as their use is learned by direct conditioning to the stimulation of sensory receptors. Moreover, simple observation sets are in most cases actually independent of each other. >Observation/Quine. The fundamental difference between Russell's logical atomism and my view is that, in my opinion, the other truths are not somehow composed of or implied by the propositions of observation. Their connection with the observation sentences is more mediated and complex. II 219 Cresswell imposes on me a realm of reified experiences or phenomena that stands in contrast to an inscrutable reality. My naturalistic view has no resemblance to this: I have forces that act on our nerve endings from real objects in the outside world. VII (a) 17 Simplicity/Quine: is itself ambiguous and unclear. It is a double or multiple standard. Depending on the terminology. Immediate experiences can be presented more easily in a physical conceptual scheme. VII (b) 42 Knowledge/Quine: is a man-made network, experiences are only at the edges, in the core logic. Conflicts with experience lead to changes in the centre. New truth values are assigned to some of our statements. The entire field is under-determined by its boundary conditions, therefore there is a large selection of possibilities, which statements are to be revised. VII(b) 43 No specific experience is associated with specific statements within the field, except by indirect considerations on the balance of the field as a whole. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Positivism | Hacking | I 77 Def Positivism/Hacking: 1st Verification, 2nd observation, 3rd VsCausality, 4th VsExplanation (just brings phenomena in an order that does not explain why.), 5th VsTheoretical Entities, 6th VsMetaphysics (leaves nothing that is not verifiable). >Verification, >Observation, >Causality, >Explanations, >Theoretical entities, >Metaphysics. I 80 PopperVs the label "positivist", VsSense Data - not VsMetaphysics: non-verifiable sentences are acceptable as a first step. That was later refuted by Popper. >K. Popper, >Sense data. I 80 Empiricism: empiricism is concerned with measuring (theoretical entities exist). >Empiricism, >Measurements. Positivism: positivism is concerned with seeing, feeling, smelling, hearing, tasting (theoretical entities do not exist). |
Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
| Qualities | Wittgenstein | Hintikka I 113 Quality/Wittgenstein: at least some statements in which a degree is attributed to an experienced quality is also an atomic sentence. Elementary Proposition/Wittgenstein's example for elementary propositions: "Here is green". (> Sentences/Strawson, Statements/Strawson, Attribution/Strawson). I 202 Quality/Experience/Carnap/Hintikka: the base of the "logical" structure: is made of rows of temporary total experiences out of which qualities are formed - unlike sense data. CarnapVsRussell: individual experience must be added: "sensation". Hintikka: these are similar to the objects of Wittgenstein. Difference: Carnap: ephemeral, psychologically - Wittgenstein: is not temporal but a substance of the world. Sensation/Carnap: sensation belongs to psychology, quality belongs to the phenomenology and theory of objects. Phenomenology/Carnap: is a holistic analysis of the experience. I 202 ff Quality/Experience/Carnap/Hintikka: the basis of Carnap's "Construction" is a series of current overall experiences from which qualities are formed. I 203 But not even qualities resemble the sense data of Russell's conception. CarnapVsRussell/CarnapVsSense Data/Carnap: individual experience must be added. Carnap: "If we want to distinguish the two similar components of the two elementary experiences, we must not only describe them according to their quality, but also add the indication of the elementary experience to which they belong. Only such a component is an individual component in the true sense, we want to call it "sensation" in contrast to the component that is represented in the quality class according to its quality only. These "sensations" are thus similar to Wittgenstein's objects. But according to Carnap, they are ephemeral, subjective and time-bound, while the Tractatus objects form the non-temporal "objective" substance of the world. According to Carnap: "Sensations belong to the field of psychology, qualities to phenomenology or object theory". Phenomenology/Carnap/Hintikka: in Carnap limited to a holistic analysis of experience. II 138 Atomism/VsAtomism/Self-criticism/WittgensteinVsTractatus: it was a mistake that there were elementary propositions into which all propositions could be broken down. This error has two roots: 1. That infinity is understood as a number, and assuming there is an infinite number of sentences. 2. Statements that express degrees of quality. ((s) They do not have to exclude every other sentence. Therefore, they cannot be independent). III 141 Def Fact/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Flor: Combination of simple objects without quality features! The facts are completely independent of each other. Example: in the Tractatus there is neither an example for a fact nor for an object! The representation of all objects in proportion to their positions also covers all facts. III 142 There must be an absolute distinction between the simple and the complex. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Representation | Davidson | Glüer II 126 Davidson: there is no representation that could be true/false. - Beliefs are true if they are caused properly. >Facts/Davidson. Davidson I (e) 96 DavidsonVsSchema/Content - DavidsonVsRepresentation - DavidsonVsCorrespondence theory: Relativism: Representation always in relation to a schema. >Conceptual scheme. - DavidsonVsSense data theory Glüer II 126 Representation/DavidsonVsPresentation Mind/Object - (VsSkepticism) - Davidson: there are no facts. ((s) Like Frege: all true propositions have the same meaning: conformity with all facts of the world/"great fact"). Cf. >Slingshot-Argument. Glüer II 127 There are no facts that could be represented. - We do not know anything through the demand for correspondence. Glüer II 127 Representation/Externalism/DavidsonVsRepresentation: Davidson replaces private representations by intersubjectively accessible objects. - These are as public as the meanings. Rorty VI 190 Representation/Brandom/Rorty: would like to save them from Davidson, who has thrown them out. DavidsonVsRepresentation. VsVs: propositional contents are not possible without representations. - No proposition without representation. >Propositions. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Seeing | Quine | XII 100 Seeing/Vision/QuineVsTradition: it is not about the problem if there is an unconscious two dimensional radiation or a conscious three dimensional perception. - instead: stimuli. Also QuineVsGestalt Psychology: if we have only stimuli, then there is no problem, whether we have a gestalt or atoms. >Gestalt theory, >Perception. XII 100 Seeing/Quine: old mystery: Problem: how to solve the epistemological priority: The retina is irradiated two-dimensionally, yet we see things three dimensional without conscious conclusion. Problem: what should be considered as observation, the unconscious two dimensional or the conscious three dimensional? Tradition: here the conscious had priority. New: now we can drop consciousness because we explain observation through stimuli. This makes old paradoxes about unconscious data and chains of conclusions that would have to be completed too quickly obsolete. Gestalt Theory/Gestalt Psychology/Quine: VsSense Atomism. QuineVs Gestalt Psychology: no matter if shape or atoms push themselves into the foreground of consciousness, we take the stimuli as input. >Gestalt Psychology. Priority is what is causally closer. QuineVsAntipsychologism. XII 101 Protocol Sentence/Vienna Circle/Quine: there was a debate in the Vienna Circle about what should be considered an observation or protocol sentence: a) Reports on sensory impressions b) Elementary statement about the outside world c) (Neurath): Reports on the relation between perception and reality. Quine: the worst thing was that there was apparently no objective decision. Solution/Quine: we look at them unreservedly in the context of the outside world. Def Observation Sentence/naturalized epistemology/Quine: the sentences that are causally closest to the receptors. Problem: how to measure the distance? Solution: Observation sentences are those that make the least use of stored information in language learning. However, there can be no total independence from stored information. >Holism, >Network/Quine, >Logical particles, >Observation sentences, >Observation language, >Observation. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Sensations | Chisholm | II 190 Sensation/perception/ChisholmVsSense data/Stubenberg: adverbial analysis of sensation: The object appears to us in a certain way: e.g., in a red way. "Red" is not understood here as an adjective. Appearing in a certain way is a non-relational property. II 191 Vs: Question: is this qualitative dimension not a mental or psychic aspect of the world? The existence of the non-relational states of persons requires, in turn, the existence of a mind that has these states. Chisholm/Stubenberg: This could be met with an innocuous definition of "mental." II 192 Def "mental"/Chisholm: that which is immediately known. It is impossible for one to be appeared to in a certain way without knowing that one is appeared to in that way. This corresponds to Chisholm expression "self-presenting". Now there is no reason to assume that only spirits could have such "spiritual" states. The property need not be of material nature! Even in a world which consists only of physical objects, spiritual qualities can be exemplified. >Identification, >Individuation. >Self-knowledge. Stubenberg, Leopold. Chisholm, Fechner und das Geist-Körper-Problem. In: Philosophische Ausätze zu Ehren Roderick M. Chisholm Marian David/ Leopold Stubenberg (Hg), Amsterdam 1986 |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Sensations | Quine | Rorty I 135 Quine: there are no feelings. (As the sun is not "rising".) Quine V 15ff Sensation/Quine: structured wholes (figures) - not flashes of light - VsBerkeley: Depth: is not accessible - perceived shape, not stimuli (> consciousness/Quine) - (this is within reception) - stimuli instead of sense data. V 17 Gestalt TheoryVsSense Data - QuineVsGestalt Theory: meaning related with receptors, not with consciousness. V 63 Observation/Quine: e.g. face, hearing, touch and smell sensation. N.B.: for their role as confirmation or also as semantic reference points, however, it is crucial that they are something socially divided. Problem: two people will judge them differently, partly because they notice different characteristics, partly because they have different theories. V 64 Solution/Quine: one should speak neither of sensations nor of environmental conditions ((s) circumstances), but of language ((s) > semantic ascent). V 65 Observation Sentences/Quine: are the gateway to language and science. They usually do not talk about feelings but about external things. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Sense Data Theory | Dewey | Suhr I 147 Sense data/DeweyVsSense Data Theory/DeweyVsRussell: The experience is reduced to the subjective act of experiencing. Things disappear and are replaced by qualities in the senses. >Perception, >Experience, >Qualities, >Qualia, >Seeing, >Sensory impressions. |
Dew II J. Dewey Essays in Experimental Logic Minneola 2004 Suhr I Martin Suhr John Dewey zur Einführung Hamburg 1994 |
| Sense Data Theory | Millikan | I 302 Sense Data/contradiction/Millikan: a contradiction can only arise if one and the same judgment is applied several times. Object: the same object must have been identified in more than one way. That is, it must be possible that there is more than one intension of an object. >Identification/Millikan, >Intension/Millikan. Sense data/MillikanVsSense Data theory: sense data cannot be the object because a sense date cannot be given in several ways. ((s) There is always only one way of givenness of a sense date, otherwise it is about several sense data). Sense Data/Millikan: Every sense date presents itself only to one sense (e.g. touch, sense of smell). (s) i.e. it cannot be said that this soft object smells rotten or that it is the same object). Millikan: one needs a fully developed theory about law-like relationships between sense data. Otherwise you cannot test them at all! And therefore no concepts can be developed from them. And this would be contrary to the first condition that the concepts to be tested should only form small groups. I 312f Sense Data Theory/today/Millikan: the prevailing view seems to be that neither an inner nor an outer language actually describes sense data, except that the language depends on previous concepts of external things that normally cause sense data. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Sense Data Theory | Quine | I 19 QuineVsSense-Data Theory: immediate experience is no coherent, autonomous region. I 404 VsSensory Data: intermediate instances do not explain anything. - Not necessary for the description of illusions - not a substitute for physical objects. Double standards: linking to objects/utility - Complete knowledge of sense data guaranteed no translation. --- II 107 Atomic Facts/Russell: sense data QuineVsRussell: are not atomic but composed. Acquaintance: certain with sense-data, all other are fallible (Russell). --- VII (b) 40 Sense-Data/Quine: is ambivalent: a) event - b) quality. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Sense Data Theory | Ryle | I 290 f RyleVsSense Data Theory: there is an incorrect alignment of perception and observation and there are no flat areas of color. There are no two objects: object and date - these are not private items. The dazzle is a property of the spotlight - this is hypothetically, not categorically. >Terminology/Ryle. I 295 Perspective/sense data: e.g. an oblique plate looks elliptical - but we do not see the "elliptical appearance" next to the plate. There is no other subject - instead we apply a rule to the actual appearance of the plate. Rule: is partly hypothetical, partly general: mixed categorically. I 297 Mixed-categorical/Ryle: is usually partly general, partly hypothetical: e.g. pedantic appearance: many people look like him - not human + pedantry. --- Flor I 261 Definition mix-categorical/Ryle/Flor: statements about the mental states or acts of a person must be in the form of hypothetical sentences or a mixture of hypothetical and categorical sentences - hypothetical: if-then-categorical: reports on events and states. >Perspective/Ryle, >Seeing/Ryle, >Perception/Ryle, >Aspects. |
Ryle I G. Ryle The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949 German Edition: Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969 Flor I Jan Riis Flor "Gilbert Ryle: Bewusstseinsphilosophie" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Flor II Jan Riis Flor "Karl Raimund Popper: Kritischer Rationalismus" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A.Hügli/P.Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Flor III J.R. Flor "Bertrand Russell: Politisches Engagement und logische Analyse" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Flor IV Jan Riis Flor "Thomas S. Kuhn. Entwicklung durch Revolution" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 |
| Sense Data Theory | Sellars | I XII Sense data/Sellars: sense data cannot be candidates for the foundation of a justification practice. Problem to make them a foundation for justification: the sense data of the empiricists are single objects, but only with respect to facts one can speak of a knowledge. >Knowledge, >Knowledge/Sellars, >Facts, >Facts/Sellars, >Observation sentences. Knowledge: "has the form "this and that is so and so." Known is something about a single object, but not a single object itself. Sense-data theory: is faced with the choice: a) either sense data are individual objects, then the perception of sense data would be no knowledge. b) or the theorist declares the feeling of sense data to a form of knowledge, but then one must admit that there are not individual objects, but facts that are known. >Generality, >Generalization, >cf. >Generality condition/Evans. I XXXVII Sense data/Broad/tradition: internal objects, immediately conscious. SellarsVs: no objects, only causal consequences. N.B.: a red sensation can also occur when the object only appears to be red. >Sensation/Sellars. I 15 Sense data/Sellars: can be used as a code, but not as an analysis or explanation for anything. I 37 Sense-data theory: basic problem of how something can appear, without it being so and without it being perceived. >Appearance, >Perception. I 47 SellarsVsSense Data: it is about public physical objects, not about private objects. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Sense Data Theory | Strawson | V 93 StrawsonVsSense-Data Theory: unlinked sense-data do not give a coherent picture. - But they also do not result in a picture of objects, whose relations were distinguished or distinguishable from the relations of experience about them. >Things/Strawson, >Particulars, >Strawson, >Individuation/Strawson, >Identification/Strawson. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| |||
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Gestalt Theory | Quine Vs Gestalt Theory | V 17 Stimuli/Quine: instead of sensory data. Gestalt Theory: VsSensual Atomism. VsSense Data. Epistemology/Quine: the emancipated epistemologist works as an empirical psychologist ((s) with stimuli instead of sensory data, but renunciation of Gestalt theory). VsGestalt Theory: it is about the relation of the stimuli to the receptors, not to consciousness. XII 100 Gestalt Theory/Gestalt Psychology/Quine: VsSense Data Atomism. QuineVsGestalt Psychology: no matter if Gestalt or atoms push themselves to the forefront of consciousness, we take the stimuli as input. Priority has which is causally closer. QuineVsAntipsychologism. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Russell, B. | Carnap Vs Russell, B. | VI 164 Def visual objects/Russell: classes of their possible aspects. CarnapVsRussell: That’s possible, but we begin our constitution much further down! For the "unseen aspects" this is difficult, therefore we constitute the entire visual world at once, not any "experiences for unseen things." VI 247 CarnapVsRussell: realistic conception that manifests itself by him raising questions regarding whether an object still exists even when it is not observed. Thing in itself/Schlick: real, not given objects. Carnap: that makes them part of the recognizable objects. Wittgenstein I 202 ff Quality/Experience/Carnap/Hintikka: the basis of Carnap's "Structure" is a series of momentary overall experiences from which qualities are formed. I 203 But not even qualities resemble sense data of Russell's conception. CarnapVsRussell/CarnapVsSense Data/Carnap: individual experience must be added. Carnap: "If we want to distinguish the two similar components of the two elementary experiences, we must not only designate them according to their quality, but also add the indication of the elementary experience to which they belong. Only such a component is an individual in the actual sense, we want to call it "sensation" in contrast to the component which is only determined by quality, as it is represented in the quality class. These "sensations" therefore resemble Wittgenstein's objects. But according to Carnap they are ephemeral, subjective and time-bound, while the Tractatus objects form the non-temporal "objective" substance of the world. Accordingly Carnap: "The sensations belong to the field of psychology, the qualities to phenomenology or object theory". Phenomenology/Carnap/Hintikka: in Carnap, this is limited to a holistic analysis of experience. |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| Russell, B. | Dewey Vs Russell, B. | Suhr I 47 DeweyVssense data theory: subjectivism. Things disappear and are replaced by qualities in the senses. DeweyVsRussell. |
Dew II J. Dewey Essays in Experimental Logic Minneola 2004 Suhr I Martin Suhr John Dewey zur Einführung Hamburg 1994 |
| Sellars, W. | Verschiedene Vs Sellars, W. | Rorty I 206 Language/Sellars/Rorty: the peculiarity of language is not that it "changes the quality of our experience" or "opens up new perspectives for consciousness". Rather, its acquisition gives us access to a community whose members justify their claims to each other. I 207 Language/VsSellars: some opponents argue that this is a confusion of terms and words. That having a term and using of a word is one and the same fact in psychological nominalism. I 208 SellarsVsVs: could answer here: either you admit to everything and everyone (e.g. record players) that you are able to react distinctively to certain kinds of objects, or you give an explanation why you want to draw the line between conceptual thinking and its primitive precursor in a place other than between the acquired language and the learning process still in progress. This makes it clear that the: Tradition: (Myth of the Given): has thrown two things together: sensations and differentiation abilities. Sellars I 34 Logical Atomism: VsSellars: he could reply that Sellars 1. overlooks the fact that the logical space of physical objects in space and time is based on the logical space of sensory content. 2. the concepts of sense contents show that logical independence from each other which is characteristic for traditional empiricism. I 34/25 3. Terms for theoretical entities such as molecules have the interdependence that Sellars may rightly have attributed to terms for physical facts, but: the theoretical terms have empirical content precisely because they are based on a more fundamental logical space! Sellars would have to show that this space is also loaded with coherence, but he cannot do that until he has abolished the idea of a more fundamental logical space than that of physical objects in space and time. Sense Data TheoryVsSellars:( > I 103) the individual objects are found in the cosmos of everyday language. Physical redness can be analyzed on the basis of red glow, but red glow must be analyzed on the basis of red sensory content. (SellarsVs). But why should the properties of physical objects not be broken down directly into the properties and phenomenal relationships of sensory content? Sellars: admitted. I 35 SellarsVsSense Data Theory: how does the sensory data theorist get to the system of sensory content? Even if red glow does not play a role in the analysis of physical redness, he hopes to convince us of this system by asking us to think about the experience of red glow of something. But so far my analysis has not even brought to light such things as sensory content! I 36 Glowing/Appear/Sense Data/Sellars: there can be no dispositional analysis of physical redness on the basis of red glow. We have to distinguish between qualitative and existential glowing. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Sense Data | Carnap Vs Sense Data | Wittgenstein I 202 ff Quality/Experience/Carnap/Hintikka: the basis of Carnap's "Structure" is a series of momentary overall experiences from which qualities are formed. I 203 But not even qualities resemble sense data of Russell's conception. CarnapVsRussell/CarnapVsSense Data/Carnap: individual experience must be added. Carnap: "If we want to distinguish the two similar components of the two elementary experiences, we must not only designate them according to their quality, but also add the indication of the elementary experience to which they belong. Only such a component is an individual in the actual sense, we want to call it "sensation" in contrast to the component which is only determined by quality, as it is represented in the quality class. These "sensations" therefore resemble Wittgenstein's objects. But according to Carnap they are ephemeral, subjective and time-bound, while the Tractatus objects form the non-temporal "objective" substance of the world. Accordingly Carnap: "The sensations belong to the field of psychology, the qualities to phenomenology or object theory". Phenomenology/Carnap/Hintikka: for Carnap this is limited to a holistic analysis of experience. |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| Sense Data | Dewey Vs Sense Data | I 47 DeweyVssense-data theory: subjectivism. Things disappear and are replaced by qualities in the senses. DeweyVsRussell. |
Dew II J. Dewey Essays in Experimental Logic Minneola 2004 |
| Sense Data | Fraassen Vs Sense Data | I 72 Observation/Evidence/Theory/Fraassen: if a theory is only about the observable, empirical adequacy and truth coincide. But this leads to conclusions about the structure of the observable phenomena and that goes beyond the available evidence. VsFraassen: It might be objected that I have drawn the line observable/unobservable arbitrarily. E.g. Sense data and experiences are also theoretical entities if they are not understood in the context of phenomena in advance. They are even worse, because they come from an armchair philosophy. FraassenVsVs: I am sure that sense data do not exist, but I am agnostic when it comes to the existence of unobservable aspects of the world as it is described by the sciences. (FraassenVsSense Data). |
Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 |
| Sense Data | Husserl Vs Sense Data | Dummett I 53 Noema/Husserl: Husserl perceives by the noema, but he doesn't perceive the noema nor realizes it otherwise in any way. HusserlVsSense Data Theory/Dummett: his sense data theory is therefore different from a sense data theory in the usual sense, which takes sense data as actual primary objects of consciousness. Only the philosophy can cope with the difficult task to consider the noemata and thus can obtain their description. |
E. Husserl I Peter Prechtl, Husserl zur Einführung, Hamburg 1991 II "Husserl" in: Eva Picardi et al., Interpretationen - Hauptwerke der Philosophie: 20. Jahrhundert, Stuttgart 1992 Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Sense Data | Quine Vs Sense Data | I 404 When you step up for sense data, you turn against physicalism, if anything, and not against nominalism. Vs: The establishment of subjective sensations serves no sufficient purpose. a) such objects would not be enough if physical objects are excluded. b) (QuineVsFirth): we do not need any sense data in addition to the objects to describe with their help, for example, delusions. c) We do not need sense data to underpin our knowledge of physical objects or to explain our comments about them. Mediating instances (for example, nerve paths) explain nothing! I 406 VsSense Data: double standard 1) relative directness of the link between the sense data with the objects 2) Another standard, the theoretical usefulness of sense data. I 407 VsSense Data: Complete knowledge of sense data is not sufficient to make a radical translation nor even to recognize a term as such. |
Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Sense Data | Ryle Vs Sense Data | I 301 RyleVsSense Data. E.g. someone who says: "The headlamps are blinding!" need not be blinded himself. - It is a fallacy to say that the blinding is therefore not a property of the headlamps, but a characteristic of the sense-data of blinded individual. --- I 280 SenseData/RyleVsSense Data/Ryle: some theorists want us to turn away from robins and cheeses, and to turn to such things as looking at something and fragrances (sense data). That would mean, if I can observe this sight when I catch the sight of the robin, then I must catch something like a sight of the sight. Or a fragrance of a fragrance. Regress. E.g. When someone is watching horses racing the question is whether he had a good seat, but not if someone is itchy. Hence, also not the question whether the sensation of his itching was superficial. --- I 282 Attention/Ryle: Observing or sighting include noticing, but noticing does not include observing. RyleVsSense data/Ryle: it was wrong from the start to compare the objects of the open observation, such as cheese and robins to objects, which are supposed to be accessible only to a privileged observation: namely, my sensations. Sensations are, in fact, not objects of observation. We do not need to build a "theater of the outside world" in order to compare it to an inner "theater", the mind. The properties that observable objects can have, cannot be sensibly attributed or denied for sensations. --- I 283 It is senseless to say sensations had a position, size, temperature, color, or smell. Also no place. In any case, not in response to a question such as "Where was the robin?" In a certain sense this is already the tingling in my foot or "burning in my nose" but that is a different sense than pepper grains in my nose or pointy stones under my foot. My cringing is not hidden from the shoemaker because it is within me. On the contrary, it cannot at all be described as a needle, object within or outside public access. Or within the public object that I am myself. Likewise, letters cannot be classified as main words or time words as property words. --- I 286 Seeing/hearing/tasting/Ryle: are not used to describe "pure" or "unmixed" sensations, for we are talking about seeing horse races and listening to trains, tasting wines. Horse racing, trains and wines are not sensations, horse racings do not stop when I close my eyes, good wines are not destroyed when I have a cold. We need, therefore, apparently ways of talking about what ceases when I close my eyes, etc. Sense data/RayleVsSense data: the sight or the appearance of the horses actually changes as tears flow, or the taste of the wine is affected by the cold, and the sounds of the train become quieter when I cover my ears. It seems, then, that we can talk about "pure" sensations when we talk about "appearance" "sound" "taste", "fragrance", "tingling", etc. It also seems that with these expressions we can make distinctions and exclude those sensations which are achieved by reasoning, education, memory, presumption, habit, imagination, or association. (Covering one's ears does not help in the memory). --- I 287 SenseData/RyleVs: but what does it mean to get a momentary sight or a momentary scent? And what is the sight or smell like that you get? 1. The sight of a horse race is not a sporting event on a racing field. Just as anyone can be a witness of the race, not everyone can be a witness of the sight. (Already because of the perspective, not the point of view) Nor can anyone else have my tingling. Definition Sense Data/Ryle: (e.g. scent, sight, tingling, ringing) is private property of a single perceiver. Further, the sight of a horse race is described as a short-lived patchwork of color spots. RyleVsSense Data: but the visual appearance of things or the sight which is described as color spots can not be viewed as surfaces of ordinary flat objects. They are simply spots of color, not spots of colored plaster or colored canvas. Tradition: the representatives of the theory of sense data agree that sense data is something private, but not in that, --- I 288 that they are of a psychical nature or "in my mind". Tradition: the representatives now ask themselves the question: What is the fact that their recipient has it or receives it? Answer is simple: according to some, he should perceive or observe, some even say that people do not see a horse race, but only observe color spots. --- I 290 Sense data/deception/Ryle: It is claimed, in particular, that the theory solves paradoxes in the description of illusions. If the squinting man asserts that he sees two candles and the drunk says, he sees white mice, one can now translate that the squinting one sees two "candle appearances" and the drunken one in reality "white mouse appearances". Their only error then lies in the conclusion of existence. Next: For example a forward tilted plate looks elliptical (in fact is wrong). There is an elliptical white spot in the field of view. RyleVsSense data theory: the whole theory is based on a logical blunder, namely, the approximation of the concept of sensation to that of observation. --- I 291 Sense data/RyleVsSense data/Ryle: Having a look at a horse race is explained by having something else, namely a color combination. Regress: If having the sensation of a horse race implies having something else, then having that other, the color spot must again imply having something else, an earlier sense-date. --- I 294 SenseData/RyleVsSense data/Ryle: one cannot say meaningfully, one sees the appearance of a plate and not the plate itself, because appearance is already a main word for seeing. There is no other object, the "appearance" next to the plate. One does not say "I see a flat elliptical spot of white" but: "Maybe I see an elliptical and not slanted piece of white porcelain." E.g. We can say that a closer plane looks faster than the one more distant, but we cannot say "it has a faster look". "Looks faster" means, looks as if it was flying faster. Talking about the apparent speeds of airplanes does not mean talking about the speeds of the appearances of airplanes. --- I 298 Indeterminacy/VsSense data theory/Ryle: one who is peeking through a hole in the hedge may say he sees an area of yellow ... but will not be able to tell if it is dandelion or yellow canvas. He could only say, "I saw something yellow." Contrary to this normal use of expressions of indeterminacy, the sense data theory supports continuous talking of this kind. |
Ryle I G. Ryle The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949 German Edition: Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969 |
| Sense Data | Sellars Vs Sense Data | I 9 SellarsVsSense Data Theory: mistake: as with the naturalistic fallacy: to consider the reality as a fact that requires no learning! It looks indeed strange that one would have to learn a sensation of pain or sensation of color. But if the sensation is not learned, then the theorists cannot perform any analysis that assumes the acquired skills. But a classificatory distinction does not work without learning and without conceptualization, or even without the use of symbols. I 10 SellarsVsSense Data Theory: three assumptions are contrary to each other: A. The proposition X perceives a red sense content s stating that X in a non-inferential way knows that s is red. B. The ability to feel the meaning content is not learned. C. The ability to know facts of the form x is φ is learned. A and B together contain non-C; B and C contain non-A; A and C contain non-B. ((s) ratio of three propositions that in pairs respectively exclude the third.). Three possibilities: (1) you can drop A. Then the sensation becomes a noncognitive fact. This can, of course, build a necessary condition, even a logically necessary condition for a non-inferential knowledge. I 11 (2) One can drop B. Thus the concept of the sense data is detached from our everyday speech on sensations, feelings, itching. (3) to drop C would, however, be contrary to the nominalistic trends that were prevalent within the empiricist tradition. Sense data/Sellars: the concept of the sense data seems to be a hybrid of two ideas: 1. the idea that there are certain inner episodes as red sensations, without a process of learning or conceptualization would have preceded. Without these inner episodes one could in some way not see! 2. the idea that there are certain inner episodes that are non-inferential content of knowledge. These episodes are necessary conditions of empirical knowledge as evidence base ("evidence") for all other empirical claims. I 12 Right now, it does not follow that the sensation of a red triangle is a cognitive or epistemic fact. You are of course tempted to equate "To have the sensation of a red triangle" with the "Thinking of a heavenly city", then the former is epistemic and intentional, the latter only intentional. But this temptation can be resisted. Because you can claim that the sensation is a fact sui generis that is neither epistemic nor physically and that has its own logical grammar! Unfortunately, that was often associated with a false reasoning: False: we might describe "seeing that a facing side of a physical object is red and is triangular," as "apparent act of seeing" of which some are not reliable. From a subjective perspective there is no indicator which ensures that any such information is reliable! By more precise information on the circumstances a class some more reliable observations can be created. But no complete reliability. I 13 Sellars: that confuses a lot: we remember that the sensations of red triangles have exactly those advantages that they are missing the apparent acts of seeing physical surfaces. From the analogy of sensations with the "thinking of a heavenly city", one might think that sensations were in the same category as thoughts. So that both are cognitive facts. Then you will find that sensations are much closer to mental processes than external physical objects. Mistake: to overlook the fact that one can only describe an experience as reliable when it is also useful to refer to it as unreliable. I 24 To appear/to seem/theory of the appearance/Sellars: VsSense data theory: assume that the facts of the form "x seems to be φ for S" are atomically and irreducible and that you need sense data neither for its analysis nor for an explanation of these facts. (Sellars pro). The proposition that something seems to be red for someone who has the idea that he is in any relationship with something that is red, not as part of its meaning! Sellars: to seem prima facie = to be. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Sense Data | Strawson Vs Sense Data | V 92 StrawsonVsSense data theory: unlinked sense data give a coherent picture. But they also do not give a picture of objects, whose relations would be distinguished or distinguishable from the relations of impressions about them. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Sense Data | Chisholm Vs Sense Data | II 190 Sense data fallacy/ChisholmVsSense data: false conclusion from (A) to (B): (A) There is something that seems so and so (B) There is an appearance that is so and so. E.g. This dog seems to be 10 years old. There is a dog-like appearance, which seems to be 10 years old. If you leave aside the sense data, you do not need a container. Sensation/Perception/ChisholmVsSense data/Stubenberg: adverbial analysis of the sensation: the object appears to us in a certain way: for example, in a red way. "red" is not understood here as an adjective. Being appeared in a certain way is a non-relational property. II 191 Vs: Question: is this qualitative dimension not a mental or psychological aspect of the world? The existence of non-relational states of people in turn requires the existence of a mind that has these states. Chisholm/Stubenberg: this could be countered with a harmless definition of "mental": II 192 Def "mental"/Chisholm: what is immediately known. It is impossible that someone is appeared to in a certain way, without knowing that one is being appeared to in this way. This corresponds Chisholm term "self-representing". Now there is no reason to assume that only spirits could have such "mental" states. The property need not be of non-material nature! Even in a world that consists only of physical objects, intellectual properties can be exemplified. |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Sense Data | Millikan Vs Sense Data | I 302 Contradiction/Millikan: can only arise if one and the same judgment is applied several times. Subject: the same object must have been identified in more than one way. That is, it must be possible that there is more than one intension of an object. Sense data/MillikanVsSense data theory: sense data can therefore not be the object because a sense date can not be given in several ways. ((S) There is only one givenness of a sense datum, otherwise it is several sense data). Sense datum/Millikan: each sense datum presents itself only to one sense (Ex touch, Ex sense of smell). ((S) that is, one can not say that this soft object smells rotten or that it is the same object, respectively.) Millikan: one would need a fully developed theory of law-like relationships between sense data. Otherwise you can not test them! And hence you can not develop concepts from them. But that would violate the first condition, that the concepts to be tested should form only small groups. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Pro/Versus |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Sense Data Theory | Versus | Fraassen I 72 FraassenVsSense Data - agnostic with respect to unobservable aspects of the world as described by science. |
Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 |
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