Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
---|---|---|---|
Appearance | Nietzsche | Ries II 29 Appearance/NietzscheVsSchopenhauer: Vs Differentiation of "Apparition" and "Thing in itself" (in Schopenhauer the will). This distinction no longer exists, it was based on Plato. >Things in themselves. Ries II 65 Appearance/Nietzsche: the only real reality of things. "A certain name for this reality would be the will to power", that is, from within, and not from its unfathomable liquid proteus nature." Ries II 101 Dionysos/Nietzsche: the mystery remains unresolved: is Dionysos himself appearance or the other of appearance? --- Danto III 135 Thing per se/NietzscheVsKant/Nietzsche/Danto: the contrast between "thing per se" and "appearance" is untenable (...) as well as the terms "subject" and "object" and ultimately also their various modifications e. g. "matter", "mind" and other hypothetical beings, "eternity and unchangeability of matter" etc. We got rid of materiality.(1) >Things in themselves/Kant, >Matter, >Mind, >Spirit, >Subject/Nietzsche, >Object, >Subject/Object problem. 1. F. Nietzsche Nachlass, Berlin, 1999, p. 540f. |
Nie I Friedrich Nietzsche Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009 Nie V F. Nietzsche Beyond Good and Evil 2014 Ries II Wiebrecht Ries Nietzsche zur Einführung Hamburg 1990 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
Deduction | Thiel | I 84 Deduction/Thiel: Ancient mathematics knew no deduction at all, only calculation rules. I 86 Schopenhauer polemicized against deduction, figure I 86 gives more than the Euclidean proof: insight into the matter and inner firm belief of every necessity and of the dependence of that quality on "right angles". >Proofs, >Provability, >Geometry. I 87 ThielVsSchopenhauer: Of course one will have to say that we do not recognize the state of affairs at a glance, but step by step, by mental rearranging. The figure itself also has generality, but not one that is detached or detachable from the figure, at most one that can be transferred to related figures, namely those constructed according to the same "principle". >Generalization, >Generality. >Principles. I 91 Apodeixis: "the necessary evidence" but also "representation". The Greeks had a method of "psephoi", the numerical figures layed with small stones. The joke is that the construction of the figure is independent of the number of stones. You do not need an induction conclusion. >Presentation, >Ancient Philosophy. |
T I Chr. Thiel Philosophie und Mathematik Darmstadt 1995 |
Determinism | Quine | VI 127 Determinism/Quine: we are free to do what we choose. Whether or not our decisions are then in turn determined by underlying causes is out of the question! These are fictitious attacks on the sentence of the excluded middle. >Excluded Middle/Quine. Theorem of the excluded middle/divalent logic/Quine: Ignorance of the truth value gets along very well with divalent logic and belongs very well to the business. It is compatible with truth and falsity. VI 128 Obviously it is not the (ambiguous) sentences themselves that are true or false, but the corresponding statements. It is incompleteness, not violations of the sentence of the excluded middle. Completion, however, does not lie in the future, as with the theologians. Determinism/free will/Quine: determinism has nothing to do with freedom (Hume, Spinoza ditto) - free is the behavior, because it is caused by internal motives - that motives are caused again, has nothing to do with freedom - QuineVsSchopenhauer. QuineVsPenrose: determinism has been questioned by quantum physics, but this is certainly not a backdoor to free will. >Freedom/Quine. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
Free Will | Berkeley | Berkeley / Breidert I 234f Free will/Schopenhauer: can man also "want, as he wants"? BerkeleyVsSchopenhauer: this is idle philosophical speculation. Schopenhauer: regarded Berkeley as a precursor. Will/Schopenhauer: = "thing in itself". >Free Will/Schopenhauer. >Will/Berkeley. |
G. Berkeley I Breidert Berkeley: Wahrnnehmung und Wirklichkeit, aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der gr. Philosophen, Göttingen (UTB) 1997 Ber I W. Breidert Berkeley In Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen, J. Speck (Hg) Göttingen 1997 |
Free Will | Nietzsche | Danto III 140 Will/NietzscheVsSchopenhauer/Nietzsche/Danto: The philosophers tend to talk about the will as if it were the most known thing in the world; yes, Schopenhauer suggested that the will alone was known to us.(1) DantoVsSchopenhauer: in reality this is not the case. There is no simple, self-identifiable mental operation that would be recognized as an act of will and intuitively grasped. Nietzsche: There is no 'will': this is just a simplistic conception of the mind.(2) Danto III 141 Will/Nietzsche: Perhaps the worst of all these fallacies is the conclusion that 'wanting is enough for action'.(3) Danto III 143 Will/Nietzsche/Danto: The will does not move anything anymore, therefore it does not explain anything anymore - it merely accompanies processes, it can also be missing.(4) Danto: if there is no will, there is no free or unfree will.(5) Free Will/Nietzsche/Danto: this conclusion is hasty: the doctrine of free will does not depend at all on a psychological theory about the will as a mental phenomenon; 'free' is applied to actions, but not to the will. Nietzsche mostly puts the argument about free will on ice, the idea of free will is due to "logical emergency breeding". >Psychology/Nietzsche, >Free Will/Schopenhauer. 1. F. Nietzsche Jenseits von Gut und Böse, KGW VI.,2 S.25. 2. F. Nietzsche Nachlass, Berlin, 1999, S. 913. 3. F. Nietzsche Jenseits von Gut und Böse, KGW VI.,2 S.27. 4. F. Nietzsche, Götzen-Dämmerung, KGW VI,3 S. 85. 5. Vgl. F. Nietzsche Nachlass, Berlin, 1999, S. 913. |
Nie I Friedrich Nietzsche Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009 Nie V F. Nietzsche Beyond Good and Evil 2014 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
Music | Nietzsche | Pfotenhauer IV 36 Individuation/Music/Philosophy/Nietzsche: Nietzsche speaks of a "mysterious primordial one" of the "World Harmony" and the "higher commonality" into which the one enters(1), who ecstatically forgets himself, who escapes the fate of the individual. >World/Nietzsche. Pfotenhauer: "This thought of redemption in higher harmony is oriented towards music. Nietzsche himself speaks of a "profound metaphysics of music" (section 5, p. 42) in analogy to Schopenhauer. The music in which the Dionysian state is in actual woe is the philosophical place of art, in which the process of becoming is shut down. >Art/Nietzsche, >Schopenhauer. 1.F. Nietzsche, Die Geburt der Tragödie, KGW VI, 3, p. 26. --- Danto III 80 Music/NietzscheVsWagner/Wagner/Nietzsche/Danto: Wagner could not live up to the high artistic demands of "The Birth of the Tragedy"(1). Nietzsche saw himself as a composer, just as Wagner saw himself as a philosopher. Danto III 81 Nietzsche has only heard a very small portion of Wagner's music, and if so, only passages from rehearsals. Danto III 84 NietzscheVsWagner/NietzscheVsSchopenhauer: they deny life, they slander it, so they are my antipodes. (Nietzsche versus Wagner (1888), "Wir Antipoden", KGW VI. 3, p. 423.). Humanity owes a lot of evil to these rapturous drunkards.(2) 1. F. Nietzsche, Die Geburt der Tragödie, KGW VI, 3, p. 26 2. Ibid. Chap. 5, p. 42. |
Nie I Friedrich Nietzsche Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009 Nie V F. Nietzsche Beyond Good and Evil 2014 Pfot I Helmut Pfotenhauer Die Kunst als Physiologie. Nietzsches ästhetische Theorie und literarische Produktion. Stuttgart 1985 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
Music | Schopenhauer | Pfotenhauer IV 45 Music/Schopenhauer: Schopenhauer sees the idea of the return of individuals and the isolated will in the unity of nature, orchestrated by music, as the culmination of the imaginable. >Will, >Individuals, >Nature, >Unity, >Conceivability. NietzscheVsSchopenhauer: admits this, but only "completely detached from the greed of the will, pure unadulterated sun eye (...)" (F. Nietzsche, Die Geburt der Tragödie, KGW Kritische Gesamtausgabe III, 1. p. 47). >Music/Nietzsche, >Will/Nietzsche. |
Pfot I Helmut Pfotenhauer Die Kunst als Physiologie. Nietzsches ästhetische Theorie und literarische Produktion. Stuttgart 1985 |
Nihilism | Nietzsche | Ries II 11 Nihilism/Nietzsche: overcoming nihilism oneself from the "will to nothing", to the will of the Dionysian affirmation of the fatality of all that was and will be. Ries II 69 Nihilism/Return/Nietzsche: Nihilism and return must be thought together. The existence determined for nothing as a self-willing world of creation and destruction. >Eternal return/Nietzsche. "Everything is the same." Only in the "affirmation" the transition from the "mind of revenge" to the "Cupid Fati" takes place, the Dionysian way of saying "yes" to the world. Overcoming the mere temporality of time to the eternity of eternal return. "O human," bell in Sil's Maria. Ries II 112 Nihilism/Nietzsche: the well thought out logic of our great values and ideals. Ries II 113 The aim is missing. Return of the same. In vain! Duration, without aim and purpose, the paralyzing thought: one realizes that one is being teased and yet without power. Ries: Nietzsche anticipates the terrorist practice of fascism. Even those who have come to bad fortunes must be convinced that they are no different from their oppressors. Will to nothing. They force the powerful to be their executioners, this is the European form of Buddhism. Danto III 40 Nihilism/Danto: nihilism was essentially a negative and destructive attitude against the set of political, religious and moral doctrines which the nihilists patronize most impressively expressed by Turgenev's fathers and sons. Danto III 41 Nihilism/Nietzsche: Nihilism according to the pattern of St. Petersburg that is, (...) belief in unbelief, up to martyrdom (therefore) always shows the need for belief first.(1) Danto III 42 Nihilism/Turgenev/Danto: the views of the figure of the Basarov from Turgenev's fathers and sons have something touchingly immature: A skilled chemist is twenty times more useful than any poet. Nihilism/Nietzsche/Danto: Nietzsche's negativity was not more moderate, but his nihilism is not an ideology, but a metaphysics. >Metaphysics/Nietzsche. He does not regard science as a source of truth or a method of discovering it, but rather sees it as a certain set of useful fictions or useful conventions, which in reality is not better or worse anchored than any once defined set of fictions which may conflict with it. Danto III 43 Russian Nihilism/NietzscheVsNihilism: In contrast to Schopenhauer's Nihilism, Russian Nihilism is characterised by the fact that outside the world there is an authority, from which the purpose of life can be learned. Danto III 44 Nihilism/Nietzsche/Danto: ... the human reaches the final form of nihilism: the unbelief towards any other imaginable world, which is metaphysically preferable to this one. At the same time, he understands that this world is the only one that exists, however much it may lack design, purpose and value. >Value/Nietzsche. Danto III 46 Eternal Return/Nietzsche/Danto: Nietzsche's nihilism culminates in the doctrine of the Eternal Return, according to which the world repeats itself endlessly and precisely. Nietzsche considered it to be a serious scientific insight and the only alternative to that view, according to which the world has or can have a goal, a purpose or an end state.(2) Danto III 43 Nihilism/Schopenhauer/Danto: the nihilism of emptiness, as well as Schopenhauer's nihilism, presupposes a widespread worldview according to which the goal is established from the outside, given, demanded. (F. Nietzsche: Nachlass, Berlin, 1999, p. 554). NietzscheVsSchopenhauer: Instead of overcoming the state of mind that demands such a purpose, this nihilism is only disappointed by its absence. By overcoming it, all pessimism and despair is deprived of a basis. From his frustration with the all too stingy fairy, the human is able to free himself as soon as it gradually dawns on him that there is neither a stingy nor a generous fairy. >Schopenhauer. 1. F. Nietzsche Fröhliche Wissenschaft, S. 347,, KGW V, 2, S. 264. 2. F. Nietzsche Nachlass, Berlin, 1999, S. 684. |
Nie I Friedrich Nietzsche Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009 Nie V F. Nietzsche Beyond Good and Evil 2014 Ries II Wiebrecht Ries Nietzsche zur Einführung Hamburg 1990 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
Philosophy | Heidegger | Figal I 101 Philosophy/Heidegger/Figal: also according to the conception of being and time, it is a liberation from the bonds of transmitted concepts, but if this liberation no longer leads to the free attention to the beginning of history, but to the actual structure of existence, the history in its essence is no longer historical. The structure of existence exists as long as existence exists. >Dasein/Heidegger, >History/Heidegger, >History. Figal I 102 Solution: Heidegger succeeds the breakthrough in the winter term 1931/32: interpretation of the cave-parable (Politeia). Liberation from fetters, but metaphor of light (for the time), openness, permeability,"liberate." Figal I 104 Freedom/Heidegger: Being and time: existence makes free - later: light makes free. existence designs: 1. Art 2. Natural science 3. History I 107 Art/Heidegger: neither "expression of experiences" nor pleasure. Instead, "the artist has the essential focus for the possible" to bring the hidden possibilities of beings to work. Figal I 171 HeideggerVsPhilosophy: Vs Division into individual areas and thus scientificization. --- Cardorff II 13 Philosophy/Heidegger/Cardorff: Heidegger's philosophy has no subject. It does not want to organize knowledge, make no statements, but create an event with its speech. "Passion for the useless". His philosophy propagates the domination of an admittedly dialogically unlegitimate speaking. Cardorff II 36 Subject/object: HeideggerVs this traditional, space-creating differentiation. >Subject-Object-Problem, >Subject, >Object. Instead: "Walten sui generis". (Walten: prevailing). VsDichotomies: Truth/Untruth - Theory/Practice - Freedom/Necessity - Belief/Knowledge - Divine/Human - Vs Totality-constituting categories: Being as substance, happening as consciousness, God as prima causa, will as thing in itself. (HeideggerVsSchopenhauer). Cardorff II 46 Development in Heidegger's work: the process of condensation, the difference between existence and being becomes lesser; the human makes up less as something withstanding and holding to something and more and more as an executing and fitting in. The difference between being and exist (ontological difference) tends to be stronger than the inner action of being itself. Cardorff II 60 Philosophy/Heidegger/Cardorff: 1. The thing about which it is can never be guilty of an incomprehension. It reigns as it reigns. 2. Heidegger is never to blame for an incomprehension; he is much too much into the thing. 3. The reader can want to be guilty, but ultimately is never guilty, because it is not he who blocks himself, but the one who is turning away. 4. It can always be assumed that Heidegger has been looking for uncertainty. Cardorff II 69 Philosophy/Heidegger/Cardorff: Heidegger's texts draw the reader's attention, inter alia, as both meanings and meaning levels pass into one another. Heidegger is concerned with making it impossible to grasp the subject. Cardorff II 102 Heidegger: all the evaluations of his philosophy are meaningless because they come from wrong questions. |
Hei III Martin Heidegger Sein und Zeit Tübingen 1993 Figal I Günter Figal Martin Heidegger zur Einführung Hamburg 2016 Hei II Peter Cardorff Martin Heidegger Frankfurt/M. 1991 |
Philosophy | Nietzsche | Ries II 10 Philosophy/Nietzsche: What I am telling is the story of the next two centuries. The rising of nihilism. This story can already be told now. >Nihilism/Nietzsche. Ries II 12 Experimental philosophy/Nietzsche: Overcoming the "spirit of revenge", which is conditioned by the moral interpretation of the world and aims at the destruction of inner as well as outer nature, to the pathos of a superhuman "divine lightness in the heaviest", which celebrates the world as a sequence of divine solutions and visions in the illusion. Aesthetic knowledge of meaning and the world. >Aesthetics/Nietzsche. Ries II 44 Philosophy/Schopenhauer/NietzscheVsSchopenhauer: his pessimistic thinking refuses any educational experience that is only aesthetically uplifting. This thinking - because it is no longer an abstract "philosophy" - is not at all consumable. >Schopenhauer. Ries II 76 Philosophy/Beyond Good and Evil(1)/Nietzsche: 2nd main piece: "The Free Mind": A new genre of philosophers comes up: the tempters. 3rd main piece: "The Religious Being": internalized mysticism of masochism: cruelty is the essence of religion. >Religion/Nietzsche. Victim: the futile attempt to break through the destiny of life. Victim: last cruelty: to sacrifice God for nothing: paradoxical mystery. That is left out for the sex that is coming up now. (National Socialism/Fascism?). Ries II 77 5th main piece: "The Natural History of Morality." >God/Nietzsche. 1. F. Nietzsche, Jenseits von Gut und Böse, KGW VI. 2. --- Danto III 90 Philosophy/Nietzsche/Danto: For Nietzsche, the real problem of philosophy was not to give answers (...) but to make it clear how (...) disputes could arise. For Nietzsche, a philosophical problem is a question that is not to be answered, but rather to overcome. |
Nie I Friedrich Nietzsche Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009 Nie V F. Nietzsche Beyond Good and Evil 2014 Ries II Wiebrecht Ries Nietzsche zur Einführung Hamburg 1990 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
Power | Nietzsche | Ries II 65 Will to power/Nietzsche: describes the way in which everything is "real" as dynamically united multiplicity. On the other hand: NietzscheVsSchopenhauer: no identical primary source is hypostasized ontologically. Will to power/self-conquest/Nietzsche: from the "I will" of the "lion" to the "holy saying yes" to the "I am" of the "child ". >Reason/Schopenhauer. --- Pfotenhauer IV 9 Power/Nietzsche: the will to power defeats the will to preserve. >Will/Nietzsche. --- Danto III 258 Power/Will to power/Nietzsche/Danto: the expression 'will to power' appears abruptly in Nietzsche's work, without much explaining what he means by it or the importance of this expression for his thinking. Along with the doctrine of the eternal return, ... Danto III 259 ...of the superhuman and Cupid fati, the will to power should be an affirmation. It is not a property of the strong, but is suitable for all people, strong and weak. It is a generic characteristic of all living beings and no instinct among others, the instincts for their part are only modes of the will to power. >Eternal return/Nietzsche, >Superhuman/Nietzsche. Love/Nietzsche/Danto: one of Nietzsche's unique insights is that sex is not practiced primarily for the sake of pleasure or reproduction, but for the sake of power: love means to become entangled in a power struggle; sex is a means of domination and subjugation. The will to power seems to act as a fundamental drive to the individual instincts like the substance to accident. >Psychology/Nietzsche. Substance/will to power/Nietzsche/Danto: The whole world is will to power; there is nothing more fundamental because there is nothing else but him and his modifications. Then the will is a metaphysical, or rather: an ontological term, because 'will to power' is Nietzsche's answer to the question: 'What is there?' >Ontology. Danto III 269 Survival/Nietzsche: According to Nietzsche, whether you preserve yourself or not has nothing to do with the blind exercise of the will to power, which characterizes every thing at every moment. Something survives, insofar as it emerges victoriously from the struggle of the will; but it does not fight to survive - if so, it would be exactly the other way around: Above all, something alive wants to omit its power - life itself is the will to power -: self-preservation is only one of the indirect and most frequent consequences of it.(1) >Life/Nietzsche. 1. F. Nietzsche, Jenseits von Gut und Böse, KGW VI. 2, S. 21. |
Nie I Friedrich Nietzsche Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009 Nie V F. Nietzsche Beyond Good and Evil 2014 Ries II Wiebrecht Ries Nietzsche zur Einführung Hamburg 1990 Pfot I Helmut Pfotenhauer Die Kunst als Physiologie. Nietzsches ästhetische Theorie und literarische Produktion. Stuttgart 1985 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
Reasons | Armstrong | III 159 Principle of Sufficient Reason/explanation/ArmstrongVsRationalism /VsSchopenhauer/Armstrong: if we accept the principle then we must accept that laws can be brought under laws of a higher level - then again problem that there is no sufficient reasonfor a higher level law. >Explanation/Armstrong, >Laws/Armstrong. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
Will | Nietzsche | Danto III 136 Will/Nietzsche/Danto: If it is true that Nietzsche tries to escape the usual distinction between mental and material, then the will to power must seem contradictory. After all, "will" is an expression concerning the spiritual. (See Causality/Nietzsche, I, Ego, Self/Nietzsche, Subject/Nietzsche). Danto: That is not true. As with Schopenhauer, Nietzsche's usual connotations concerning the spiritual are combined with the concept of "will" in the metaphysical sense. The will to power is not limited to the mental. If we do not respect this, we cannot understand Nietzsche. NietzscheVsActs of Will: Nietzsche attacks the "Acts of Will", which are not only accepted by philosophers. Danto III 137 Acts of Will/Danto: behave to actions like causes to effects. Hume/Danto: Hume rejected the idea that we could have an experience that corresponds to our idea of causal nexus, just how our will becomes active through our body parts or thoughts. Hume: we have absolutely no idea how the will works. Nevertheless, Hume accepts acts of will. NietzscheVsHume: is more radial, there is simply nothing that can be proven to be linked to our actions. Danto III 138 Thinking/Certainty/Subject/NietzscheVsDescartes: Nietzsche disproves the Cartesian thought that our own mental processes are immediately transparent, that we know about our way of thinking. He disproves it by setting up a series of interlinked thoughts and letting them "freeze": When Descartes talks about his doubts about reality being at least certain that these are his own doubts, he drags a lot of tacit assumptions with him. NietzscheVsDescartes: if his argumentation boils down to an "It is thought", our belief in the concept of substance is already assumed and after that a subject is assumed.(1) Danto III 140 Will/NietzscheVsSchopenhauer/Nietzsche/Danto: The philosophers tend to talk about the will as if it were the most known thing in the world; yes, Schopenhauer suggested that the will alone was known to us.(2) DantoVsSchoepenhauer: in reality this is not the case. There is no simple, self-identifiable mental operation that would be recognized as an act of will and intuitively grasped. Nietzsche: There is no 'will': this is just a simplistic conception of the mind.(3) Danto III 141 Will/Nietzsche: Perhaps the worst of all these fallacies is the conclusion that 'wanting is enough for action'.(4) Danto III 143 Will/Nietzsche/Danto: The will does not move any more, therefore it does not explain anything - it merely accompanies processes, it can also be missing.(5) Danto: if there is no will, there is no free or unfree will.(6) Freedom of will/Nietzsche/Danto: This conclusion is hasty: the doctrine of free will does not depend at all on a psychological theory about the will as a mental phenomenon; 'free' is applied to actions, but not to the will. Nietzsche mostly puts the argument about free will on ice, the idea of free will is due to "logical emergency breeding". 1. F. Nietzsche Nachlass, Berlin, 1999, S. 577. 2. F. Nietzsche Jenseits von Gut und Böse, KGW VI.,2 S.25. 3. F. Nietzsche Nachlass, Berlin, 1999, S. 913. 4. F. Nietzsche Jenseits von Gut und Böse, KGW VI.,2 S.27. 5. F. Nietzsche, Götzen-Dämmerung, KGW VI,3 S. 85. 6. Vgl. F. Nietzsche Nachlass, Berlin, 1999, S. 913. |
Nie I Friedrich Nietzsche Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009 Nie V F. Nietzsche Beyond Good and Evil 2014 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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Schopenhauer, A. | Danto Vs Schopenhauer, A. | I 304 Schopenhauer: we perceive ourselves quite differently from the world, we are the thing itself, direct access to the will. DantoVsSchopenhauer: Problem, why cannot all people wiggle their ears and why cannot carbohydrate splitting become a matter of will. |
Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
Schopenhauer, A. | Verschiedene Vs Schopenhauer, A. | Thiel I 84 Ancient mathematics knew no deduction at all, only calculation rules. I 86 Schopenhauer polemicized against deduction. Picture I 86 gives at a glance more than the Euclidean proof: insight into the matter and inner firm belief of every necessity and of the dependence of that quality on "right angles". I 87 ThielVsSchopenhauer: of course one will have to say that we do not recognize the facts at a glance, but step by step, by mental rearranging. The figure itself also has generality, but not one that is detached or detachable from the figure, at most one that can be transferred to related figures, namely those constructed according to the same "principle". |
T I Chr. Thiel Philosophie und Mathematik Darmstadt 1995 |
Various Authors | Heidegger Vs Various Authors | I 186 HeideggerVsCatholicism: (against the re-admission of a Catholic student fraternity): "one still does not know the Catholic tactic. And one day this will severely take revenge". Habermas Seyn: spelling in late work, Vs traditional ontology. I 123 HeideggerVsHerder: there is no general language. >Language/Foucault, Language/Davidson. HeideggerVsPhilosophy: Vs Division into individual areas and thus scientification. I 171 Subject/Object: HeideggerVs this traditional, space-creating differentiation. Instead: "Walten sui generis". VsDichotomies: Truth/Untruth, - Theory/Practice - Freedom/Necessity - Belief/Wisdom - Divine/Human - Vs Categories constituting totality: Being as substance, happening as consciousness, God as prima causa, will as thing in itself (VsSchopenhauer). II 36 HeideggerVsLogic: "dissolves in the vortex of an original questioning..." II 56 Signs/Heidegger: Vs The becoming predominant of the sign character of the word. This must be destroyed. (>Rorty: Sounds become more important, search for original words: Language/Rorty) . II 66 "Indian thinking": does not need the human. (Heidegger Vs). II 131 HeideggerVs "culture enterprise". But he respectfully speaks of "culture", no contemporary thinker is "big enough" to bring thinking directly and in a shaped form before his cause and thus on his way. (Spiegel Interview with M. Heidegger: R. Augstein,Der Spiegel Nr. 23, 31. 05. 1976). |
Hei III Martin Heidegger Sein und Zeit Tübingen 1993 |