Lexicon of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
[german]


 

Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.

Enhanced Search:
Search term 1: Author or Term Search term 2: Author or Term


together with


The author or concept searched is found in the following 4 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Independence Simons
 
Books on Amazon
I 301
Absolutely independent/independence/Simons: is an object, if it is not generically dependent. - God/Simons: Problem: is it independent of its own thoughts? - In any case, he must be a monad, because the real parts of an object are separated from him. - The extreme strength of the concept of absolute independence limits its usefulness. ---
I 302
E.g. weak independent: a continuant may still be dependent on a process in its interior. - The process must be separated from the continuant (because of the category difference). - E.g. (s) body not with its metabolism (or unity of all its processes or life story) identical. - Process and object can never be identical. - Event/continuant: are categorically different, and can therefore have no common part. ---
I 325
Independence/nature/world/reality/Simons: There are things in nature that do not interact. - E.g. separate point events. - SimonsVsSchlick - SchlickVsSum: if it should not have internal relations, there are no sums in nature. - SimonsVsSchlick: yes. - Popper pro Schlick. - Therefore, difference in shape (with internal relations) meaningless. PopperVsShape theory.

Si I
P. Simons
Parts Oxford New York 1987

Inverted Spectra Chalmers
 
Books on Amazon:
David Chalmers
I 99
Inverted Spectra/Consciousness/Chalmers: in order to demonstrate the lack of explainability of our consciousness, it suffices to show the logical possibility of a physical world with our identical world where facts about our conscious experience differ from those in our world. This is about positive facts, not about a lack of facts. ---
I 100
Someone who lives in my world might experience something as blue that I perceive as red. Of course, he would call it "red" just like me. The rest of its color perception would be arranged so that no differences could be noticed. Explanation: The simplest explanation would be that two of the axes of our three-dimensional color space are interchanged, the red-green axis and the yellow-blue axis. (An enlightening discussion of the human color space can be found in Hardin, 1988). This is not only conceptually consistent and it does not appear to be excluded from neurophysiology either.
HarrisonVsInverted spectra/HardinVsInverted Spectra/Chalmers: (Harrison 1973, Hardin 1987): Thesis:
The human color space is asymmetric so that such a reversal is not possible. For example, warm/cold colors associated with different functional roles ("positive", "negative").
ChalmersVsVs:
1. Nevertheless, nothing is conceptually contradictory in inverted spectra. 2. Instead of an inversion of red and blue, one could assume an inversion of only slightly different color hues (Levine 1991).
---
I 101
There is also no reason why an inversion of the spectrum needs to use only natural colors. 3. (Shoemaker, 1982): Even though our color space is asymmetric, there is no reason to believe that there might be creatures with a symmetric color space that are physically identical to us.
Conceivability/Reductive explanation/Chalmers: if such assumptions are conceivable, this has an impact on the question of the possibility of reductive explanations.
Consciousness: both the conceivability of zombies as well as the one of inverted spectra show that consciousness does not logically supervene on physical facts. At most the existence of conscious experience could be explained reductively, but not the specific character of our experience.
---
I 263
Inverted Spectra/Chalmers: we must exclude the possibility of inverted spectra for functionally isomorphically structured systems. Inverted Qualia come first in > John Locke.
---
I 264
VsChalmers: even materialists argue that the nature of experiences is based on the physiological nature, that is to say, in the case of differently constructed systems (for example, machines). Inverted Spectra/Schlick (1932): they cannot be ascertained verificationistically. Therefore, there can be no real difference.
ChalmersVsSchlick: this is not sufficient to draw the conclusion that there is no fact here in regard to conscious experiences, namely, because the nature of Qualia is conceptually not linked to behavior. ((s) > nonfactualism).
---
I 265
Invariance Principle/Chalmers: the principle is not shaken by the natural (not only logical) possibility of inverted spectra. It is also not shaken by examples of reorganization, rewiring, etc. (Gert, 1965, Lycan 1973, Wittgenstein, 1968) It is also not shaken by kidnapping to a twin earth with a yellow sky. (Block 1990). Here the representations after an acclimatization period will be about yellow. The invariance principle (the preservation of conscious experiences with a changed physical structure of a functionally consistent system) remains.

Cha I
D.Chalmers
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996

Cha II
D. Chalmers
Constructing the World Oxford 2014

Mathematics Schlick
 
Books on Amazon
Thiel I 40/41
Mathematics/Moritz Schlick/Thiel: Mathematics is a system of signs with exclusively syntactic relations, and accordingly the field of application is not the world of facts, but only the sign system of language. There is no point in asking questions about the application conditions of mathematics. ThielVsSchlick: can the problem really be solved like this? The language of Schlick is not the everyday language, but already strictly regulated. Our interpretations always give the signs additional meaning.
Why are some sign systems transferable to reality, but not others?
---
I 42
Russell (1903), if "empirical constants" are used for variables, it must be examined each time whether the formulas are fulfilled. Mathematics would then only be transferable insofar as it is "isomorphic" (equal in structure) with the world of experience.

Schli I
M. Schlick
General Theory of Knowledge 1985


T I
Chr. Thiel
Philosophie und Mathematik Darmstadt 1995
Statements Schlick
 
Books on Amazon
Horwich I 91f
Facts/propositions/HempelVsSchlick: cannot be compared with each other - propositions can only be compared with propositions (> coherence theory) - SchlickVsHempel: statements (here = propositions) may well be compared with the reality - "E.g. this cathedral has two towers - with the cathedral".

Schli I
M. Schlick
General Theory of Knowledge 1985


Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994

The author or concept searched is found in the following 9 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Carnap, R. Brendel Vs Carnap, R.
 
Books on Amazon
I 275
logischer EmpirismusVsSkeptizismus/Empirismus/Skeptizismus/Schlick/Carnap/Brendel: VerifikationismusVsSkeptizismus: (Wiener Kreis): verifikationistische BT: nicht verifizierbare Aussagen sind sinnlos.
Skeptizismus: die Frage nach seiner Wahrheit oder Falschheit zählt auch zu den sinnlosen fragen bzw. „Scheinproblemen“.
I 276
Verifizierbarkeit/BrendelVsWiener Kreis/BrendelVsSchlick/BrendelVsCarnap/Brendel: dieser Begriff war damals schon ständig schwankend.
I 277
Problem: welches sollte die empiristische Basis für Aussagen der verschiedenen Gebiete bilden? VsEmpirismus: Problem: Theoretische Termini.
BrendelVsEmpirismus: dennoch ist die therapeutische Diagnose richtig, weil nicht alles sinnlos ist, das dem empiristischen Sinnkriterium nicht genügt.

Bre I
E. Brendel
Wahrheit und Wissen Paderborn 1999
Frege, G. Nagel Vs Frege, G.
 
Books on Amazon
III 107
Psychology/Nagel: it is characteristic for psychological terms that we imagine they could be separated from the objective side effects! E.g. the question whether sugar tastes for other people like "this here" is a perfectly well-defined question! Even if it is unanswerable! ((s) NagelVsFrege/NagelVsSchlick/ >Cresswell II "Frege-Schlick view")).

N I
Th. Nagel
Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999

N II
Th. Nagel
Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990

N III
Th. Nagel
Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991

NagE I
E. Nagel
The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979
Gestalt Theory Schlick Vs Gestalt Theory
 
Books on Amazon
Simons I 290
Ontological Dependence/oD/mereology/Simons: VsMereology: criticizing the existence of arbitrary sums. Instead, an individual should only be something that has a certain inner connection. arbitrary sums/Simons: they are algebraically ok and do not lead to contradictions.
Individuals / Simons: it is not clear what properties they hold on the "right side" of respectability (versus sums).
Problem: connection is a gradual thing, but being individual is not!
Gestalt/SimonsVsGestalt theory/VsWholeness/Simons: it has never clearly stated what this is to be.
Individual/Frege/Simons: everything that is named by a name.
SimonsVsFrege: of which one has recovered late. But there are also plural names (> plural designation, plural reference (> Black) see above). And also empty names.
Simons I 324
Wholeness/Gestalt/SchlickVsGestalt theory/SchlickVsDriesch/Simons: (Schlick 1935): There is no ontological difference between wholenesses and sums. These are only differences in the presentation (representation) of the same object. "Micro-Reductionism"/Schlick: (per): (Simons: for today's tastes too extreme).
Schlick/Simons: yet never denies the usefulness of a holistic view.
Sum/SimonsVsSchlick: has in any case a precisely defined meaning.
stronger/weaker/Simons: e.g. the equivalence of various formulations collapses when the principles of the theory are weakened.

Schli I
M. Schlick
General Theory of Knowledge 1985

Si I
P. Simons
Parts Oxford New York 1987
Hempel, C. Schlick Vs Hempel, C.
 
Books on Amazon
Horwich I 91
Context: Schlick: The foundation of knowledge" (1934) HempelVsSchlick). HempelVsSchlick: he was a "metaphysician and poet".
Proposition/reality/HempelVsSchlick: you cannot compare statements with facts!
SchlickVsHempel: you can without being a metaphysician.
I 92
E.g. I compare this sentence in my Baedeker "This cathedral has two towers" with reality: namely simply by looking at the cathedral. If someone has something against it, it may just be that he understands "Proposition" in another sense.
Coherence theory/HempelVsSchlick/HempelVscorrespondence theorie: you can only compare propositions with each other. ((s) Not propositions with reality).
Schlick: we can distinguish between cases where a written, printed or spoken proposition is compared with another written, printed or spoken proposition.
Schlick: and I call that the comparison a proposition with a fact.
HempelVsSchlick: statements can only be compared with other statements. ((s)> coherence).
SchlickVsHempel: Why? I take out the modest freedom to compare everything with everything. If propositions and facts are to be too far from each other? Too different? Should it be a mysterious property of propositions that they cannot be compared with anything?
Fact/statement/Hempel: the gap between them is only a metaphysical.
SchlickVsHempel: that may be so, but who believes because in such a gap?
I 93
Def Proposition/Schlick: is a string along with the logical rules for their use. ((s) So almost a proposition, along with the importance of rules). Proposition meaning/Schlick: these rules culminate in "deictic" definitions that make up the meaning of the proposition.
Verification/compliance/correspondence/SchlickVsHempel: to verify the proposition, I have to find out if the (meaning-) rules were followed. Why should it be impossible? E.g. I look at the cathedral and then at the proposition and realize that the symbol "two" is used in the proposition in connection with the symbol "towers" and so I will get to the same icon when applying the rules of counting the cathedral towers.
Coherence theory/fact/proposition/Compare/Schlick: sometimes it is said that "in a logical sense" propositions can be compared only with other propositions. That may be so, but I do not know what is meant by a "comparison in a logical way".
Comparison/HempelVsSchlick: we cannot say exactly what a comparison of statements and facts is,
I 94
Because we cannot determine the structure of facts. Fact/structure/SchlickVsHempel: that we cannot determine the "structure of a fact" reminds me of the metaphysics of "things in themselves". If one does not deny the existence of facts, then why deny the possibility to determine their structure?
Structure of a fact: E.g. if I count the towers of a cathedral, I become familiar with the structure of a certain fact. If you wanted to say that it is meaningless to speak of "structures of facts" at all that would be merely a question of terminology. One proposition is also not per se meaningful, but only in conjunction with the rules for its use.
Fact/propositions/Compare/Vscorrespondence theory/SchlickVsHempel: that is what the whole controversy is about, if it should be impossible to compare propositions and facts, Hempel uses the words simply in a different sense. The easiest way to deny that you can compare them would be to say that there are simply no facts! (In formal speech: the rule of the word "fact" is such that it should not be used).
Or maybe the comparison is simply never applied in the sciences? I think this is true for purely logical sciences such as mathematics, but not in experimental sciences.
I 95
SchlickVsHempel: here is the psychological motivation of his criticism: it is about a vision that completely settles within the sciences. Science as a system of propositions. This should be a substitute for reality. Then "protocol statements" are used as a material, without subjecting them to an empirical test. Science/Schlick: But science is not the world! The universe of discourse is not the universe.
It's one thing to ask how their whole system is constructed and why it is generally regarded as true, and another, why I even look at them as true. This is a psychological question. But none of the "cultural subordination". My trust in science and colleagues is that I found them trustful, every time I checked their allegations.
I 96
Def confirmation/Schlick: the final step in the comparison between a statement and a fact. But one should not attach too much importance to the concept.
I 97
Fact/proposition/compare/match/correspondence/HempelVsSchlick: his example for comparison is not quite adequate. (E.g. "The cathedral has two towers"). Hempel: I agree that one can consider propositions as empirical objects that can be compared with any other empirical object. But if we take that literally it leads to something like:
I 98
E.g. "The proposition contains more parts, "the words" referred to" than the cathedral has towers". Correspondence/SchlickVsHempel: There is a different kind of comparison between proposition and fact: Comparison of symbols "two" in the sentence and the counting by looking at the cathedral.
HempelVsSchlick: so by that he compares a proposition in Baedeker with the result of an action by himself.
Coherence theory/Pointe: this result of the action is determined in a second proposition. And these two are compared! That is what I meant with "logical point".
Revision/verification/coherence theory/HempelVsSchlick: it's about whether the propositions contradict each other. This goes even without knowing the meanings of the propositions! (> Carnap: "The logical syntax of the language", "Philosophy and logical syntax"). Example, the above two propositions, both contain an icon that is shaped like "two".

Schli I
M. Schlick
General Theory of Knowledge 1985

Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Holism Neurath Vs Holism
 
Books on Amazon
Brendel I125
Definitional Coherence Theory/Truth/Neurath/Brendel: Representatives: Neurath. (Neurath did not explicitly refer to himself as a coherence theorist NeurathVsCoherence Theory/NeurathVsHolism).
I 126
Neurath: pro empiricism. Truth/Neurath: Thesis, the truth definition must be exhausted in a empiricist truth criterion.
Log Sentence/Schlick: foundation, unrevisable. "purely observational sentences".
Log Sentence/NeurathVsSchlick: revisable. Since they are selected on the basis of decisions.
Reality/Neurath/Brendel: Thesis: talking about it is sheer metaphysics.
Truth/Neurath/Brendel: Therefore, can only be understood relative to a system of sentences (>coherence theory).
NeurathVsCorrespondence Theory: "correspondence with reality": is rejected. "True World": pointless.
I 127
Selection/Neurath: from several consistent statement sets: without truth criterion, by extralogical moments.

Neur I
O. Neurath
Philosophical Papers 1913-1946: With a Bibliography of Neurath in English (Vienna Circle Collection, Volume 16) 1983
Schlick, M. Ayer Vs Schlick, M.
 
Books on Amazon
Horwich I 101
SchlickVsCoherence theory: beyond the consistency of a system, one can determine the correspondence with reality. Ayer: per Schlick.
AyerVsSchlick: but we have no class of synthetic propositions which are indubitable.
Horwich I 103
Def Truth criterion/Verification criterion/Ayer: the criterion by which we test the validity of our synthetic propositions is their conformity with reality (= sensation). I.e. the criterion is the agreement with our observations.
Observation sentence/AyerVsSchlick: unfortunately is not content with that, but asserts that the sentences with which we describe our observation sentences, would be absolutely unquestionable.
I 104
Observation sentence/AyerVsSchlick: the only sense in which a sentence can be absolutely sure is that its negation would be self-contradictory. And it is not self-contradictory E.g. saying "that’s not green" if someone says "this is green". Synthetic sentences are just not true because of their form alone. Observation sentence/Schlick: would say that he never asserted this. But that he only talked about the truth of such a proposition at the moment of perception.
AyerVsSchlick: yet we must distinguish between false and such propositions that are true but trivial.
What Schlick says, is nothing more than p implies p. But it is wrong to say that when I feel pain the sentence that I feel pain is objectively certain. Because that would be a different form:
p implies that (p is objectively certain).
And that is wrong if it is a synthetic proposition.
I 105
Confirmation/Schlick/AyerVsSchlick: that Schlick felt uncomfortable with this himself is due to the vagueness of his concept. "Confirmations", of which he believed they were indubitable. Confirmation/Schlick: is nothing that could be identified with something that can be expressed. This suggests that he thinks of actual perceptions, as opposed to the sentences that describe them.
AyerVsSchlick: Dilemma:
a) if confirmations are not entences but perceptions themselves, it makes no sense to say that they are indubitable or not indubitable. Because perceptions are not the sort of thing that can be doubted. It simply occurs.
b) if they are observation sentences, they cannot be indubitable (see above).
A.J.Ayer
I Ayer Wahrheit, aus "Wahrheitstheorien" Hrsg. Skirbekk Frankfurt/M 1996
II Hügli ()Hrsg.) Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, Reinbek 1993

Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Schlick, M. Carnap Vs Schlick, M.
 
Books on Amazon
Schurz I 14
Beobachtungssätze/logischer Empirismus: neu: Beobachtungssätze gelten nicht mehr als unwiderlegbar. ("Protocol sentence debate", CarnapVsSchlick und NeurathVsSchlick). Empirismus: heißt dann nur noch, dass Beobachtungssätzen eine bevorzugte Rolle zukommt.

Ca I
R. Carnap
Die alte und die neue Logik
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg), Frankfurt 1996

Ca III
R. Carnap
Philosophie als logische Syntax
In
Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg), Reinbek 1993

Ca IV
R. Carnap
Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992

Ca VI
R. Carnap
Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998

CA VII = PiS
R. Carnap
Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Ca VIII (= PiS)
R. Carnap
Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Schu I
G. Schurz
Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006
Schlick, M. Tugendhat Vs Schlick, M.
 
Books on Amazon
III 202
Sinn/Schlick: Sinn (Bedeutung) = Umstände! "Die Angabe der Umstände, unter denen ein Satz wahr ist, ist dasselbe wie die Angabe seines Sinnes." TugendhatVsSchlick.
III 203
Alle Sätze, die weder zu Mathematik und Logik noch zur Naturwissenschaft gehören, sind sinnlos.

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992
Schlick, M. Verschiedene Vs Schlick, M. Hempel I 102
Basissätze/Schlick: Vs vollkommenen Verzicht auf ein System unveränderlichen Basissätze: führt zum Relativismus. VsSchlick: man findet nirgends in der Wissenschaft ein absolut unbezweifelbares Kriterium.
I 103
Konstatierungen/Schlick: im Unterschied zu gewöhnlichen empirischen Aussagen werden sie in einem Akt verstanden und verifiziert, nämlich durch Vergleich mit den Tatsachen. Damit kehrt er also zu der materialen Sprechweise zurück. Anders als Aussagen können sie nicht aufgezeichnet werden und sind nur in einem Moment gültig.

Thiel I 41
ThielVsSchlick: lässt sich das Problem wirklich so auflösen? Die Sprache Schlicks ist ja nicht die Alltagssprache, sondern bereits streng geregelt. Unsere Deutungen verleihen den Zeichen immer erst zusätzlichen Sinn. Warum sind manche Zeichensysteme übertragbar auf die Wirklichkeit, andere aber nicht?
I 42
Russell (1903) wenn "empirische Konstanten" für Variablen eingesetzt werden, muss jedes Mal untersucht werden, ob die Formeln erfüllt werden. Mathe wäre dann nur übertragbar, insoweit sie "isomorph" (strukturgleich) mit der Erfahrungswelt ist.





T I
Chr. Thiel
Philosophie und Mathematik Darmstadt 1995

The author or concept searched is found in the following disputes of scientific camps.
Disputed term/author/ism Pro/Versus
Entry
Reference
Coherence Theory Versus Horwich I 91
Coherence theory: Hempel per (VsSchlick)
Horw I 101
SchlickVs coherence theory: on the consistency of a system, one can determine the correspondence with the reality - Ayer: per Schlick.

Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Independence Pro Simons I 324
independence: SimonsVsSchlick:there are things that do not interact.

Si I
P. Simons
Parts Oxford New York 1987