Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 9 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Colour Putnam III 118
On Bernard Williams' approach to the "absoluteness" of the world: Putnam: the world "independent of our experience" is a cold world. Values (as well as colors) are not found in the world, but projected onto the world.
III 118/119
Values are even worse off than colors, because after we discover that they are projections, we lose our ability to use them. This is not the case with color classifications. They belong more to a biological world than to a "social world". ((s) Connection: PutnamVsWilliams, B., PutnamVs"Absolute World", VsB. Williams' approach of an "absoluteness" of the world). >Absoluteness.
III 125
Colors: the situation does not become more favourable (objective) if we look at colors instead of heat. Color vision is not a mere reaction of our physiology and by no means without relationships to objective characteristics of the surface we are looking at. Disjunction/definition/Putnam: for example, a surface is green if it refuses to reflect a significant amount of red light relative to the other colors (including green). Here, the boundaries remain vague but it explains that different compositions can produce the same color impression.
III 126
Colors/Putnam: e.g. "standard green": standard green has no intersubjective stability but from this does not follow that there are no clear cases of green/not green.
III 162
Saussure assumed that the idea of a system of differences from the individual elements should be transferred to language as a whole. But in fact, different languages do not have the same semantic opposites. One language may have only four basic colors, another 7. Such a way out quickly leads to the conclusion that meanings are reserved for specific individual languages. And from here it is not far to the thought that they are reserved for individual "texts".
According to this thesis, two languages never express the same meanings.
Thus, even the concept of the sign's meaning, which is detachable from the sign itself, becomes obsolete (PutnamVsSaussure).
---
V 114
Colors/functionalism/Putnam: when we adopt the "functionalist" theory of subjective colors: "a sensation is a blue sensation when it has the role of signaling the presence of objective blue in the environment": this theory captures a meaning of the expression "blue sensation", but not its desired "qualitative" sense. If this functional role were identical to the qualitative character, one could not say that the quality of the sensation has changed. But the quality has changed. In this case, quality does not seem to be a functional state (VsFunctionalism). >Functionalism.

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

Putnam I (a)
Hilary Putnam
Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (b)
Hilary Putnam
Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (c)
Hilary Putnam
What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (d)
Hilary Putnam
Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (e)
Hilary Putnam
Reference and Truth
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (f)
Hilary Putnam
How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (g)
Hilary Putnam
Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (h)
Hilary Putnam
Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (i)
Hilary Putnam
Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (k)
Hilary Putnam
"Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam II
Hilary Putnam
Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988
German Edition:
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Putnam III
Hilary Putnam
Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Putnam IV
Hilary Putnam
"Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164
In
Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994

Putnam V
Hilary Putnam
Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981
German Edition:
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Putnam VI
Hilary Putnam
"Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Putnam VII
Hilary Putnam
"A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000

Consciousness Dummett I 116
Content of consciousness/Dummett: private contents: fragrance, melody, name "idea" (no background is necessary) - but non-private contents: concepts, thoughts, sense (public). ( VsBritish empiricists: concepts are no "Ideas"). >Concepts/Dummett, >Ideas, >Imagination.
I 117
British Empiricism: identifies concepts with ideas - DummettVsSaussure: imitates this by describing sound transmissions mechanistically. - > Language as code.

Dummett I
M. Dummett
The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988
German Edition:
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Dummett II
Michael Dummett
"What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii)
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Dummett III
M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (a)
Michael Dummett
"Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (b)
Michael Dummett
"Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144
In
Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (c)
Michael Dummett
"What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (d)
Michael Dummett
"Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (e)
Michael Dummett
"Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Consciousness Saussure Dum I 117
Content of consciousness: private: fragrance, melody, name, "idea" (no background necessary) -but not: concepts, thoughts, sense (public) (VsBritish empiricists: concepts no "ideas") British Empiricism: equates concepts with imagination - DummettVsSaussure: mimics this by mechanistically describing the transmission of sound - language as code.
---
I 118
Meaning/Grasping/DummettVsSaussure: too simple explanation, like periodic pain - we would then also need an explanation of what it means to use this concept - e.g. if someone knows nothing about trees, it does not help to say that every time he heard the word concept would enter his mind.
I 120 t
Thoughts can only be grasped as a complex - >holism. - What someone thinks about an object must be able to apply to other objects - >Universality Condition/Evans: the object must also be able to have other predicates
F. de Saussure
I Peter Prechtl Saussure zur Einführung Hamburg 1994 (Junius)
Imagination Dummett I 117
DummettVsSaussure: This representation of the communication process is obviously untenable. It imitates the equation of idea and concept by the British empiricists. (Vs) Concepts are represented as mental images (ideas).
I 117ff
DummettVsFrege: (consciousness subjective - thoughts objective): Dummett: categorial difference: mental images (ideas)/thoughts.
I 127
DummettVsFrege: all thoughts and ideas can be communicated because they are used only in a certain way - by this determination they can be communicated.

Dummett I
M. Dummett
The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988
German Edition:
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Dummett II
Michael Dummett
"What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii)
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Dummett III
M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (a)
Michael Dummett
"Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (b)
Michael Dummett
"Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144
In
Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (c)
Michael Dummett
"What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (d)
Michael Dummett
"Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (e)
Michael Dummett
"Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Incommensurability Putnam III 161f
Incommensurability/Putnam: even before Kuhn the following could be found in Saussure: basic units of language cannot be determined from the sounds. Whorf: if individual languages have many quite different color predicates, then the meaning is reserved for individual languages. > Idiolect.
DerridaVsWhorf: the meanings are not only individual languages but reserved for the individual texts. > Deconstruction.
DerridaVsSaussure: the concept of the sign can be completely forgotten.
PutnamVsDerrida: Derrida misunderstands Saussure's project of a theory of meaning.
III 165
Solution/Putnam: the solution is to maintain the concept of meaning equality, but realizing that it may not be understood as in the sense of self-identity of objects and signified. PutnamVsDerrida (HowVsFodor): "meaning equality" is interest relative, and presupposes a normative judgment on rationality in a situation.
---
V 157
Incommensurabilityy/PutnamVsFeyerabend: it is contradictory to state, Galileo's concepts are incommensurable and then to describe them in detail afterwards. One must also understand the old language to be able to say that the predictions are identical.

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

Putnam I (a)
Hilary Putnam
Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (b)
Hilary Putnam
Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (c)
Hilary Putnam
What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (d)
Hilary Putnam
Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (e)
Hilary Putnam
Reference and Truth
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (f)
Hilary Putnam
How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (g)
Hilary Putnam
Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (h)
Hilary Putnam
Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (i)
Hilary Putnam
Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (k)
Hilary Putnam
"Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam II
Hilary Putnam
Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988
German Edition:
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Putnam III
Hilary Putnam
Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Putnam IV
Hilary Putnam
"Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164
In
Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994

Putnam V
Hilary Putnam
Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981
German Edition:
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Putnam VI
Hilary Putnam
"Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Putnam VII
Hilary Putnam
"A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000

Language Ricoeur II 6
Language/RicoeurVsSaussure/Ricoeur: To [the] unidimensional approach to language, for which signs are the only basic entities (>Structural linguistics/Ricoeur), I want to oppose a two-dimensional approach for which language relies on two irreducible entities, signs and sentences. This duality does not coincide with that of langue and parole as defined in Saussure's Cours de linguistique générale(1), or even as that duality was later reformulated as the opposition between code and message. In the terminology of langue and
II 7
parole (...). Language/Emile Benveniste/Ricoeur: [according to Benveniste] language relies on the possibility of two kinds of operations, integration into larger wholes, and dissociation into constitutive parts. The sense proceeds from the first operation, the form from the second. >Discourse/Ricoeur.
II 20
Language is not a world of its own. It is not even a world. But because we are in the world, because we are affected by situations, and because we orient ourselves comprehensively in those situations, we
II 21
have something to say, we have experience to bring to language. >Utterer’s Meaning/Ricoeur. [The] notion of bringing experience to language is the ontological condition of reference, an ontological condition reflected within language as a postulate which has not immanent justification; the postulate according to which we presuppose the existence of singular things which we identify.


1. Ferdinand de Saussure, Cours de linguistique générale (Paris: Payot, 1971); English trans., by Wade Baskin, Course in General Linguistics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966).

Ricoeur I
Paul Ricoeur
De L’interprétation. Essai sur Sigmund Freud
German Edition:
Die Interpretation. Ein Versuch über Freud Frankfurt/M. 1999

Ricoeur II
Paul Ricoeur
Interpretation theory: discourse and the surplus of meaning Fort Worth 1976

Linguistics Saussure Gabriele Röttger-Denker Barthes zur Einführung Hamburg 1989

I 26
Linguistics/Saussure: Postulate: the linguistics is contained in the semiology. ---
I 27
BarthesVsSaussure: that must be reversed! All signs are linguistically written!
F. de Saussure
I Peter Prechtl Saussure zur Einführung Hamburg 1994 (Junius)
Linguistics Barthes Röttger-Denker I 26
Linguistics/Saussure: Postulate: the linguistics is contained in the semiology.
Röttger-Denker I 27
BarthesVsSaussure: that must be reversed! All characters are linguistically written!

Barthes I
R. Barthes
Mythologies: The Complete Edition, in a New Translation New York 2013


Röttger I
Gabriele Röttger-Denker
Roland Barthes zur Einführung Hamburg 1997
Values Saussure Sau I 77
Def value/linguistics / Saussure: unfixed meaning - only in relation to others - a) moment of equality, similarity - b) moment of inequality, dissimilarity - sound: does not have a positive quality, only one function.
I 81
Meaning: remains unchanged, even if the values ​​are shifting. - DerridaVsSaussure: this is a remnant of dualism.
F. de Saussure
I Peter Prechtl Saussure zur Einführung Hamburg 1994 (Junius)

The author or concept searched is found in the following 9 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Derrida, J. Putnam Vs Derrida, J. III 96 ff
However, the typical representatives of relativism paradoxically believe they had made something like a metaphysical discovery. Deconstructivism/Derrida/Putnam: he completes step from relativism to nihillism. This concept of truth is incoherent and belongs to a "metaphysics of presence" (Derrida). Derrida, allegedly: "the concept of truth is inconsistent, but absolutely essential!"
PutnamVsDerrida: What do you mean, every use of the word "true" contains a contradiction?
III 97
The failure of a number of mutually exclusive philosophical explanations of the concept of truth is something completely different from the failure of the concept of truth itself! LL Wittgenstein: the failure of a number of philosophical analyses of certainty is something other than the failure of the normal concept of certainty.
PutnamVsDerrida: but the collapse of a particular worldview is far from being a collapse of the concepts of representation and truth. Because if we equate this metaphysical tradition with our lives and our language, we would be giving metaphysics an entirely exaggerated importance.

DerridaVsSaussure: approves this, he criticized Saussure only in that he did not go further and abandoned the concept of the character altogether.
III 163
PutnamVsDerrida: Derrida overlooks here that Saussure's way of thinking was based on a utopian project. It had been hoped that a a stringent scientific explanation of the concept of meaning could be given. This hope has failed, but we are not forced to the absurd view that nobody could understand a language other than their own idiolect. Even Derrida himself does not go that far. He recognizes the indispensability of translations indeed.
III 164
Solution/Putnam: the alternative to Saussure's view is that retaining the concept of "meaning equality", while realizing that it must not be interpreted in the sense of self-identity of objects called "meaning" or "significate".
III 165
Can it be that Derrida makes the same mistake as Jerry Fodor? He does not even consider the possibility that the kind of "meaning equality" aimed at in translation could be an interest-relative (but still very real) relationship, which presupposes a normative judgment, i.e. a judgment about what is reasonable in the individual case.
III 168
Derrida/Putnam: his attitude is much harder to pin down. (DerridaVsLogocentrism.) Derrida himself emphasizes that the logocentric quandary was no "pathology" for which he had a cure to offer. We must fall into this quandary by fate. >Logocentrism.
By his leftist supporters Derrida has often been interpreted as if this justified even a consistent rejection of the idea of ​​the rational justification.
Forgery/Bernstein: "You cannot falsify just anything."
Richard BernsteinVsDerrida: what do the texts by Derrida have about them that permits, or even demands this double interpretation? It is ultimately true that "not just anything can be falsified".
III 171
PutnamVsDerrida: Derrida's quandary is one in which those fall who, albeit not wanting to be "irresponsible", also want to "problematize" the concepts of reason and truth by teaching that these concepts have failed. His steps amount to the fact that the concepts "rationale", "strong reason", "justification", etc. correspond to repressive practices more than anything. And this view is dangerous indeed, because it offers help and comfort to all sorts of left and right extremists.

I (a) 22
PutnamVsDerrida: its criticism of "logocentrism" is not only wrong, but dangerous.
I (k) 266
Deconstruction/PutnamVsDerrida: is right in that a certain philosophical tradition (for example, binary logic) is simply bankrupt. But identifying this tradition with our lives and our language is to give metaphysics a completely exaggerated importance. Meaning Equality/PutnamVsDerrida: is actually an interest-relative one! It contains a judgment about what is reasonable in each case.
I (k) 273
PutnamVsDerrida: deconstruction without reconstruction is irresponsibility. >Deconstructionism.

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

Putnam I (a)
Hilary Putnam
Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (b)
Hilary Putnam
Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (c)
Hilary Putnam
What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (d)
Hilary Putnam
Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (e)
Hilary Putnam
Reference and Truth
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (f)
Hilary Putnam
How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (g)
Hilary Putnam
Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (h)
Hilary Putnam
Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (i)
Hilary Putnam
Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (k)
Hilary Putnam
"Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam II
Hilary Putnam
Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988
German Edition:
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Putnam III
Hilary Putnam
Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Putnam IV
Hilary Putnam
"Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164
In
Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994

Putnam V
Hilary Putnam
Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981
German Edition:
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Putnam VI
Hilary Putnam
"Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Putnam VII
Hilary Putnam
"A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000
Empiricism Dummett Vs Empiricism DummettVsEmpiricism, British:
Saussure:.. "... A term triggers in the brain a particular sound. This is a psychological phenomenon which in turn is followed by a physiological process, the brain initiates a pulse on to the vocal organs, then the sound waves to the ear of the other to be transmitted, a purely physical process.
I 117
DummettVsSaussure: This representation of the understanding process is obviously untenable. It mimics the equation of the British empiricists of idea and concept. (Vs). Terms are represented as mental images (ideas). Content of consciousness: private: fragrance, melody, name "idea" (no background necessary) - But not: ideas, thoughts, sense (public) - (VsBritish Empiricists: "ideas" are not terms).

Dummett I
M. Dummett
The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988
German Edition:
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Dummett II
Michael Dummett
"What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii)
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Dummett III
M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (a)
Michael Dummett
"Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (b)
Michael Dummett
"Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144
In
Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (c)
Michael Dummett
"What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (d)
Michael Dummett
"Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (e)
Michael Dummett
"Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982
Saussure, F. de Barthes Vs Saussure, F. de Saussure: Postulate: linguistics is included in the semiology.
I 27
BarthesVsSaussure: this has to be reversed! All signs are linguistic.

Barthes I
R. Barthes
Mythologies: The Complete Edition, in a New Translation New York 2013
Saussure, F. de Derrida Vs Saussure, F. de Saussure I 81
DerridaVsSaussure: preserves residual moments of criticized dualism: still gives priority to the moment of meaning. (Because of Saussure: "the meaning of a thing remains unchanged, even if the values would shift".) DerridaVsSaussure: rejection of timelessness. (Does not apply to Saussure.)

Derrida I
J. Derrida
De la grammatologie, Paris 1967
German Edition:
Grammatologie Frankfurt 1993
Saussure, F. de Dummett Vs Saussure, F. de Saussure: ... a term triggers the image of a particular sound in the brain. This is a psychic phenomenon, which in turn is followed by a physiological process. The brain sends a pulse to the vocal organs, then the sound waves are transmitted to the ear of the other, a purely physical process.
I 117
DummettVsSaussure: This representation of the understanding process is obviously untenable.It imitates the equating of the British empiricists of idea and concept. (DummettVsEmpirists) terms are represented as mental images (ideas).

Dummett I
M. Dummett
The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988
German Edition:
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Dummett III (e)
Michael Dummett
"Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982
Saussure, F. de Luhmann Vs Saussure, F. de AU Cass 12
Language/Luhmann: Language is structural coupling. That is their task, their function. This means: language is not a system!
Language Theory/Tradition/Luhmann: traditional theories: Saussure: language is a system! Luhmann: but his concept of system is not related to operation! Rather on structures, differences etc.
LuhmannVsSaussure: in his distinction between spoken word and language it remains empirically unclear what the basal operation actually is. Unless one refers to communication. But that would force us to distinguish more strongly between mental and social systems than is usual in linguistics.
Language/Luhmann: 1. It is not a system. 2. Language does not have its own mode of operation. So no linguistic operation that is not communication or non-linguistic thinking. ((s) A genuinely linguistic operation would therefore have to be non-linguistic itself.) Luhmann: this has to do with the deep storage of the concept of the operation and with the precision with which one empirically asks what is to be excluded.
Saussure/Luhmann: the sign means the meaning of the object.
Saussure/Luhmann: or the sign means what the speaker thought.
LuhmannVsSaussure: and thus his theory loses its uniqueness! Then the sign no longer denotes the object, but the inner state of the speaker. Double reference to subject and object of the sign.

AU I
N. Luhmann
Introduction to Systems Theory, Lectures Universität Bielefeld 1991/1992
German Edition:
Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992

Lu I
N. Luhmann
Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997
Saussure, F. de Putnam Vs Saussure, F. de Putnam III 162
Saussure assumed that the idea of a system of differences should be transferred as a whole by the individual elements to the language . (to semantics). But in fact it is so that different languages do not have the same semantic opposites available. A language might only have four basic colors, another 7. Such a way out leads quite quickly to the conclusion that meanings are reserved to specific individual languages. And from here it is not far to the thought that they are reserved for different "texts".
According to this thesis two languages never express the same meanings.
So even the concept of the meaning that can release itself from the sign, collapses.
DerridaVsSaussure: is that good, he criticized Saussure only that he did not go further, and that he dropped the concept of the sign completely.
---
I (k) 276
Definition signifié/Putnam: this signified is in the French semiology the meaning of the signified, the intension, not the extension. ---
I (k) 266/269
PutnamVsSaussure: the alternative to his view is to maintain the concept of "meaning equality", while one recognizes that it must not be interpreted as the self-identity of objects, which are called "meaning" or "signified". There is no question of a mathematically clean equivalence or non-equivalence of contrast systems, when two uses of a word can be seen as "same" or "not the same".

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000
Saussure, F. de Wittgenstein Vs Saussure, F. de I 162
Definition Name/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: in no sense an image of its object. However, it can reflect its object in the sense that the possibilities of the connection of the name correspond with other names of the possibilities of the connection of its object with the appropriate objects. (Therefore, the choice of names according to Wittgenstein is in important respects not arbitrary.) (VsSaussure).

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958
German Edition:
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921.
German Edition:
Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960
Saussure, F. de Verschiedene Vs Saussure, F. de Saussure I 66
VsSaussure: he has often been misinterpreted by his critics: functionalism without the participation of subjects. But this is not true, for Saussure it is always about the communication structure of at least two individuals. The step to structuring results from the needs of a language community.