Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 98 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Acquaintance Field Williams II 490
Acquaintance/Russell/M.Williams: meant a direct grasping, no causal relation. FieldVsRussell: so a conceptual scheme is stapled to the outside of the world.

Field I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Field II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Field III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Field IV
Hartry Field
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994


WilliamsB I
Bernard Williams
Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy London 2011

WilliamsM I
Michael Williams
Problems of Knowledge: A Critical Introduction to Epistemology Oxford 2001

WilliamsM II
Michael Williams
"Do We (Epistemologists) Need A Theory of Truth?", Philosophical Topics, 14 (1986) pp. 223-42
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994
Acquaintance Peacocke I 180ff
Acquaintance / Russell: with sense-data, complexes (aRb), immediate memory, universals - objects are found as a component in thought. PeacockeVsRussell: we reinterpret that: the object specifies the type of the way of givennes - objects appearintensionally in thought, not extensionally. - object as a characteristic of a type of a way of givenness in causal antecedents and consequences of thoughts - descriptive explanation of action / possible world: requires no acquaintance Example (s) of the winner has won the prize - demonstrative: requires acquaintance: ((s) the winner has a beard. ) - acquaintance / Peacocke: something quite different from identification between worlds.

Peacocke I
Chr. R. Peacocke
Sense and Content Oxford 1983

Peacocke II
Christopher Peacocke
"Truth Definitions and Actual Languges"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Acquaintance Wittgenstein Hintikka I 79 f
Acquaintance/Knowledge/Russell/Hintikka: 1) you need to be familiar with the reference of "a", "R" and "b" - 2) and also with the logical form to distinguish aRb from bRa - 1) concrete objects - 2) logical form - WittgensteinVsRussell: eliminates the logical forms, which can be expressed by general propositions - we do not need experience in logic - Tractatus: thus the logical forms get great weight. ---
Hintikka I 315f
Language/Acquaintance/Russell/Hintikka: Russell has to show how his (phenomenological) language of acquaintance can be applied to physical objects - Wittgenstein: has to show, in turn, how a physical language can speak about our immediate experiences.

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958
German Edition:
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921.
German Edition:
Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960


Hintikka I
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
Investigating Wittgenstein
German Edition:
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Hintikka II
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989
Articles Kamp Cresswell I 175
Definite descriptions/Cresswell: so far we have only spoken about undefined descriptions! Undefined descriptions/Russell. Thesis: a man means "at least a man".
Certain descriptions/Russell. Thesis: the man means "this particular man".
Anaphora/HintikkaVsRussell: the tradition has no explanation for the anaphoric use of certain descriptions.
Article/Cresswell: recent attempts to integrate the old linguistic idea into the traditional logic that the indefinite article introduces new objects in the speech while the definite article refers to already introduced entities. This corresponds to:
Article/Kempson: (1975, 111): thesis: definite/indefinite article should be distinguished not semantically but only pragmatically.
Article/old/new/file change semantics/Heim/Cresswell: the distinction between old and new entities in connection with the article is also found in Heim (1983).
---
I 176
There it leads to the file change semantics/Kamp/Heim: Thesis: as entities in the world the objects are not new, but only within the speech, therefore "files". (Files, "new in the files"). Definiton file/Heim/Cresswell: a file represents facts about objects for the speaker.

Kamp I
Kamp
From Discourse to Logic: Introduction to Modeltheoretic Semantics of Natural Language, Formal Logic and Discourse Representation Theory (Studies in Linguistics and Philosophy)


Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984
Articles Millikan I 176
Indefinite article/Millikan: an indefinite article causes a name plus modification (description) to function purely descriptive. E.g. Henry was bitten by a poisonous snake, not by toxicity or the property of being a snake. Truth value/Truth: to have a truth value, the sentence must map a situation that involves a particular individual, that is, it must have a real value. (> Terminology/Millikan).
N.B.: but it is not important which snake it was exactly, so that the sentence works properly ((s) i.e., performs its >eigenfunction).
---
I 189
Definite article/description/Millikan: if it is used with necessary identifying descriptions, it is actually superfluous. It only develops its power with other descriptions. Unambiguous/determinateness/MillikanVsRussell: the definite article does not have the function of establishing unambiguousness.
Exception: necessarily identifying dsignations, which are purely descriptive. But even then a translation into an inner name is always possible.
---
I 189
Randomly identifying/description/definite article/Millikan: randomly identifying descriptions with "the" are indexical. And relative to the identification function, these are also necessary identifying descriptions.

Millikan I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Millikan II
Ruth Millikan
"Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Atomism Quine II 218
QuineVsRussell: VsLogical Atomism (pro Holism) - connection with observation is more complex.
II 107
Atomic Facts/Russell: is sense data - QuineVsRussell: are not atomic but composed. Acquaintance/Russell: is certain with sense data, everything else is fallible.
II 218
Atomism/QuineVsRussell/Quine: the fundamental difference between Russell's logical atomism and my view is that in my opinion the remaining truths are not somehow composed of or implied by the sentences of observation. Their connection with the observation sentences is more mediated and complex. See also >Atoms/Quine.
XIII 14
Def Sensory Atomism/Locke/Hume/Quine: e.g. Locke's "simple ideas", Hume's "simple impressions". This is a mosaic of irreducible sensory bits that can occur repeatedly. Sensibilia/Quine: should therefore again not be considered as atoms, but as types of atoms.
Atom/Quine: is then an occurrence (token) of Sensibilia within the experience.
Gestalt PsychologyVsSensory Atomism/Form Theory/Quine: thesis: forms tend to come from rough (large) forms (which are not composed of building blocks).
XIII 15
Atomism/sensory/Quine: for him again the nature of the neural (neuronal) input speaks. Atom/sensory/Quine: should we then say that they again correspond to types of inputs that then correspond to a receptor? No:
Problem: with a number of species one does not get any further here: each person has an unknown and not further interesting number of receptors. Further research would not help the theory here.
Perception Atomism/Quine: that would be something one could dream of: a repertory of basic properties. Then properties would be the species. Their occurrences are the atoms.
Problem: it was shown that the wavelength of a singular color event does not determine the perceived color, but the respective environment. In addition, it has been found that there are cells which only respond when, for example, a diagonal runs from top left to bottom right, and other cells for corresponding other conditions.
XIII 16
Atomism/Technology/Quine: Atomism is important here. Example Halftone in vision/printing: dots and spaces are its atoms. Example television (TV), newspaper printing, etc. Problem: in film there is no limitation of the atoms. On two (b/w) or the basic colors.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Atomism Wittgenstein Hintikka I 25
Atomism/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: Thesis: all logical forms can be constructed from the shapes of objects. ---
Hintikka I 175
Logical Independence/Elementary Proposition/Atomism/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: (1931) Wittgenstein eventually abandons the quest for logical independence of elementary propositions. - It was a real failure. - Reason: color attributes (color predicates) are not independent - E.g. red exists in the degree q1r and red exists in the degree q2r, then it follows: if q2>q1, q1r follows from q2r. - Later Vs: does not work with impure and opaque colors either. ---
I 176
Atomism/Middle Period/Wittgenstein/Waismann/Hintikka: new: atomic sentences are no longer individually compared with the world, but as a sentence systems. - ("Holistic"). - WittgensteinVsAtomism: middle period: - New: I apply the whole color scale at once. - That is the reason why a point cannot have more than one color. -> Measuring/Wittgenstein, More autors on measurements. - If I apply a set system to reality, then it is thereby said that only one fact can exist at a time. ---
II 138
WittgensteinVsAtomism/WittgensteinVsTractatus: 2 errors: 1) assuming the infinite to be a number and assuming that there would be an infinite number of sentences. - 2) that there are statements that express degrees of qualities - atomism; requires, however, that if p and q are contradictory, they may be further analysed until t and ~t result. ---
II 157
Atomism/Atom Sentence/WittgensteinVsRussell: in the analysis of atomic sentences you do not encounter "particulars", not unlike in chemical analysis. ---
IV 14
Atomism/Substance/Tractatus/Wittgenstein: if the world had no substance, ((s) = unchangeable objects), the atomic sentences would not be independent of each other. ---
ad IV 36ff
Tractatus/Atomism/Wittgenstein/(s): Atoms: undefined objects, quasi material things, (sounds), primitive signs - unclear whether thing (object) or immaterial, only components of the sentence are translated. - Thus, they are open to meaning theory which simultaneously derives from complex of objects, facts as well as connection of words, but (4.0312) the logic of the facts cannot be represented - the logical constants (and, or, not) do not represent. - Representative: sign for the object - internal properties: in the sentence different than the relations to the world (external). WittgensteinVsRussell, VsFrege: confusion mention/Use: internal/external.
---
VII 122
Atomism/Atom Sentence/Truth Value/Truth Functions/Tr. fnc./Laws of Nature/LoN//Tractatus/Te Tens: the truth values of the atom sentences determine the truth of all remaining sentences with logical necessity, also those of the Laws of Nature - but then you should not say that something is only possible impossible or necessary by virtue of natural law or causality. - (6.37) - Laws of Nature are the truth functions of elementary propositions. - Therefore, the world as a whole cannot be explained. ---
VII 124
Laws of Nature: are not the ultimum; that is logical space.

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958
German Edition:
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921.
German Edition:
Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960


Hintikka I
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
Investigating Wittgenstein
German Edition:
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Hintikka II
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989
Attributive/referential Donnellan I 183
Def Referential/Donnellan: is supposed to enable the listener to single out the person the speaker is talking about. - E.g. "The killer of Schmidt is insane": in any case, the person who rioted in court, even if he is not the killer. - Here, empty descriptions do not fail. - ((s) The description may also be wrong, and still identify the person.) Attributive/Donnellan: "whoever it is": E.g. An absent murderer can be anyone, but definitely the murderer - ((s), the description must be apply). -
I 191
Referential/Donnellan: Here it is probable that the speaker believes that the reference is satisfied. An incorrect description would mislead the listeners. - Attributive/Donnellan: the same possibility of incorrect description does not exist here: "Whoever it is" cannot be described incorrectly, the speaker believes a disjunction: "him or him or him..." - attributively used descriptions may fail and yet express something true. E.g. "The House of Deputies (correctly House of Representatives) includes representatives of two parties" - No problem, if it is clear what the speaker means, you can correct him.
I 195
Intent/Intention/Meaning/Donnellan: it's not about what someone wanted to say - otherwise you could take any description - nevertheless, the intention decides about referential or attributive use. I 199 Champagne Example/Donnellan: attributively no problem.
I ~ 202
Referential/Donnellan: could also be called a weak reference: whatever - real reference: attributive. -
I 202
Problem of the Statement/Donnellan: E.g. (Linsky): her husband is kind to her (in the café, but he is not her husband) - referentially true - attributive: if phi, then psi, but there is no phi, then it's not correct to say: he says of him... (de re) - but referential: he said correctly of the so described that he ... ((s) also de re!) - Kripke: precisely not like distinction de re/de dicto - E.g. If the described person is also the president of the college, it is true of the president that he is kind - referential: here the speaker does not even have to agree.
Wolf I 18
Name/Description/Donnellan: a) referential use: the reference can succeed, even if the description is not true: E.g. The man in court is not the murderer, but he is correctly determined as the one who behaves wildly. b) attributive use: "whoever it was" applies if we have no specific person in mind. ((s)> role functional role: what ever it is.)
Chisholm II 109
Donnellan/referentiell/attributiv/Brandl: lässt sich die Unterscheidung nicht schon damit erklären, dass einmal durch Zeichen, ein andermal durch Sprecher Bezug genommen wird? Nein, dann hätte die referentielle Verwendung nur auf ein Problem der Pragmatik aufmerksam gemacht. Dann hätte Russell seine Theorie nur einfach pragmatisch erweitern können. Brandl: man kann die Unterscheidung ref/att noch verschärfen, wenn man sie auf genau jene Kennzeichnungen anwendet, mit denen der Sprecher von vornherein klarstellt, dass er sich nicht auf einen ganzen Bereich von Gegenständen bezieht.

Newen I 94
Referentiell/prädikativ/sing Term/Kennzeichnung/Name/Strawson: These: Eigennamen/Demonstrativa: werden weitgehend referentiell gebraucht - Kennzeichnungen: haben maximal prädikative, also beschreibende Bedeutung (können aber auch gleichzeitig referieren).
Ad Newen I 94
referentiell/(s): ein Objekt herausgreifend - attributiv/(s): Eigenschaften zuschreibend.
Newen I 95
Attributiv/Donnellan/(s): in Abwesenheit des fraglichen Gegenstands - referentiell/(s): in Anwesenheit des fraglichen Gegenstands.
Newen I 95
DonnellanVsRussell: dieser hat die referentielle Verwendung übersehen - er betrachtet nur die attributive, weil Kennzeichnungen/Russell: sind für ihn synkategorematische Ausdrücke, die selbst nicht referieren können.
Newen I 96
Referentiell/Kennzeichnung/KripkeVsDonnellan: der referentielle Gebrauch von Kennzeichnungen hat mit der Semantik von Kennzeichnungen überhaupt nichts zu tun. - Referentieller Gebrauch ist zwar möglich und mit ihm kann Kommunikation gelingen, aber er gehört in die Pragmatik. - Pragmatik: untersucht das, was gemeint wird (kontextabhängig). - Nicht die kontextunabhängige Semantik. - Lösung/Kripke. Unterscheidung Sprecher-Referenz und semantische Referenz. - Dagegen semantische Bedeutung: wird durch die Russellschen Wahrheitsbedingungen angegeben: der Mörder von Schmidt ist wahnsinnig gdw. der Mörder von Schmidt wahnsinnig ist.

Donnellan I
Keith S. Donnellan
"Reference and Definite Descriptions", in: Philosophical Review 75 (1966), S. 281-304
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993


K II siehe Wol I
U. Wolf (Hg)
Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993

Chisholm I
R. Chisholm
The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981
German Edition:
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chisholm II
Roderick Chisholm

In
Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986

Chisholm III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989
German Edition:
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004

New II
Albert Newen
Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005

Newen I
Albert Newen
Markus Schrenk
Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008
Beliefs Davidson Glüer II 44
Def Belief/Davidson: is a sentence plus interpretation considered to be true. Belief/Davidson/McDowell: we cannot get out of our beliefs.

Rorty VI 36
Davidson/Rorty: most of our beliefs must be true. But not congruence subject/object, but: the pattern formed by truth is the same as the pattern formed by the justification that justifies it in our opinion.
Rorty VI 166
Brains in a Vat/Davidson/Rorty: if they have always been in the vat, they have many beliefs about their actual vat-plus-computer environment, no matter what kind of input they receive.
Rorty VI 187
Davidson/Rorty: Most of our beliefs must be true. Beliefs are not more or less accurate representations, but they are states that are attributed to people for the purpose of explaining their behavior.
Rorty VI 205
Davidson/Sellars: avoiding the confusion of justification and cause leads to the thesis: beliefs can only be justified by beliefs. (McDowellVs).
Davidson I (b) 25
Belief/Davidson: is not language-dependent - DavidsonVsRussell: the objects used for identification of a belief do not need to belong to the realm of ​​knowledge of the believer.
I 68
Belief/Deception/Error/Davidson: for identification each depends on other beliefs being in the background - the concept of chair or mouse cannot remain the same independent of its occurrence in different beliefs - you can have beliefs about guanacos from books and correctly identify them when you see one - but: despite knowing that a guanaco is not a lama, he could say "guanaco" to every lama - then, in both cases, the content is not determined by the sight of guanacos, but by the fact that you have appropriated other concepts such as "animal" "lama", "camel", "pet", etc.
Glüer II 127
Belief/Error/Deception/Davidson: beliefs have no objects that might correspond to reality (representations), but causes - these are publicly accessible (inter-subjective) objects - ((s) the meanings that play a role in beliefs, are individuated through the public objects - (through causes)).
Frank I 649
Beliefs/Davidson: cannot all be wrong: a speaker who wants to be understood, makes sure to be interpretable - the interpreter has no other material than the sounds the speaker emits in conjunction with other events.
Donald Davidson (1984a): First Person Authority, in: Dialectica 38 (1984),
101-111
- - -
Frank I 680
Beliefs/Davidson: cannot all be wrong, because the use of our words (in relation to the objects) regularly gives them meaning - use theory.
Donald Davidson (1987) : Knowing One's Own Mind, in: Proceedings and
Adresses of the American Philosophical Association LX (1987),441 -4 58


V 107
Belief/Davidson: most must be correct: reason: the beliefs are identified by their place in the system of beliefs - there must be an endless number of true beliefs regarding this subject area - false beliefs tend to undermine the identification of the subject matter - thus they undermine the validity of the description of a belief as one which deals with its subject matter - thus false beliefs in turn undermine the assertion that a linked belief is wrong.

Davidson I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (a)
Donald Davidson
"Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (b)
Donald Davidson
"What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (c)
Donald Davidson
"Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (d)
Donald Davidson
"Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (e)
Donald Davidson
"The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson II
Donald Davidson
"Reply to Foster"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Davidson III
D. Davidson
Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

Davidson IV
D. Davidson
Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Davidson V
Donald Davidson
"Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005


D II
K. Glüer
D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Beliefs Prior Cresswell II 146
Belief/Prior/Cresswell: Thesis: Belief should not be considered a predicate of that-sentence - but instead believes-that should be seen as a syntactic unit that is applied directly to a sentence.
Prior I 6f
Belief/Prior: no adequate approach without distinction between mind state of belief and that which is believed (state/content) - in case of false beliefs: instead of non-existing object: attribution: E.g. Othello attributes infidelity to Desdemona - PriorVsRussell: Problem: above it is abstract loyalty. - In case of falsity, the belief relation would then need to have an additional position (to the true fact).
I 11
False Belief/Russell: false facts fail in truth-making. - Montague: points in the wrong direction. - PriorVs: not for a neutral observer.
I 27
Belief/Prior: no relation - E.g. ...that nothing is perfect: no object.
I 53
Belief Function/Prior: E.g. X believes that ... not identical in identical propositions: bachelor/unmarried man - (although one may feel that the propositions are self-identical).
I 81
Belief/Prior: you do not have to believe rightly that you believe something - (>about/Prior) - you can also simultaneously believe p and not-p. - You can believe something contradictory - E.g. fear that God will punish you for your disbelief. - You can find out that you did not believe what was thought you believed - If someone believes what he says when he says that he mistakenly believes that it is raining, then this belief is not necessarily mistaken. - No epistemic logic ist necessary, propositional calculus is sufficient.

Pri I
A. Prior
Objects of thought Oxford 1971

Pri II
Arthur N. Prior
Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003


Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984
Causes Cartwright I 74
Cause/Causality/Empiricism/VsCauses - Russell: the law of gravity is given in equations - there are no "causes" and "effects" here. - Equations/Cartwright: are today's generalizations. - They are the heart of science.
I 75
Explanations by equations are often redundant. - I.e. there are alternative equations! - Cause: cannot be redundant. - Equation: causes nothing, but includes phenomena in a frame.
I 79
Alternative equations: offer different laws. - (they compete) - E.g. multiple versions of the Schrödinger equation - CartwrightVsRussell: I prefer causes rather than laws.

Car I
N. Cartwright
How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983

CartwrightR I
R. Cartwright
A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

CartwrightR II
R. Cartwright
Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954

Circularity Russell I XII
Def vicious circle principle/Russell/Gödel: no totality can contain elements that can be defined only in terms of this totality or elements which include or imply this totality. - Vicious circle principle, VCP.
I XII
Circle fault principle/GödelVsRussell: the Principia themselves do not fulfil the principle in their first edition if "definable" means "definable within the system" and no definition methods outside are known, except for those that include even more extensive totalities than those that occur in the system - Gödel: I would rather see this as proof that the circle fault principle is wrong than that classical mathematics is wrong - because one can argue that the reference to a totality necessarily implies a reference to all of its individual elements or, in other words, that "all" means the same as an infinite logical conjunction.
I XIV
"All"/solution/Carnap: "All" alludes to analyticity or necessity or provability. - Circle Fault Principle/Gödel: seems to apply only to entities constructed by ourselves - otherwise totality is nothing absurd.
I 55f
Circle fault principle/Russell: Propositions: only form multiplicities, no entities. - (s) Entities are formed by terms, i.e. that you cannot set up a sentence about "all of its elements". (> "Everything he said"/(s): "say" does not form a category like "next to", "similar" "son of"; "nothing" does not either nor does it form an entity, only a multiplicity but "father of" (unambiguous) (Russell: function, not only relation).
I 57
Circle/Principia Mathematica/Russell: arises when one allows values as possible arguments of a propositional function ​​that require the function.
I 61
Circle fault principle/circle/entitiy/totality/Principia Mathematica/Russell: there must be no propositions about all propositions. - E.g. All propositions are false - therefore two kinds of truth/falsehood: 1st kind: "φ a is true" (special value) - 2nd kind: "Every value of φx^ has truth of the 1st kind".

Russell I
B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead
Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986

Russell II
B. Russell
The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969
German Edition:
Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989

Russell IV
B. Russell
The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912
German Edition:
Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967

Russell VI
B. Russell
"The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202
German Edition:
Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus
In
Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993

Russell VII
B. Russell
On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit"
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996

Classes Wittgenstein II 343
Number/Class/Frege/Russell/Wittgenstein: Frege's Definition: Class of classes. A number is the class of all equal classes. Intension/Class/Quantities/Frege/Russell/WittgensteinVsRussell/WittgensteinVsFrege: the two believed they could handle the classes intensionally because they thought they could transform a list into a property, a function. (WittgensteinVs).
Why were they so keen to define the number?
II 354
Measuring: For example, numerical equality of classes or Calculating: e.g. equal number of roots of a 4th degree equation: one is a measurement,
the other a calculation.
Is there an experiment to determine if two classes have the same number? This may or may not be the case for classes that we cannot get a general view of.
II 355
It is a damaging prejudice to believe that when using strokes we are dealing with an experiment.
II 355
Classes/Assignment/Wittgenstein: Difference: Assignment in Russell's and in the usual sense:
1. by identity
2. how to assign cups and saucers by stacking. In the second case, it does not mean that they cannot be assigned in any other way. Could the same be said about Russell's assignment? No, here no other allocation could exist, if that is not given. What I want to draw attention to is not a natural phenomenon, but a matter of grammar.
II 358
Allocation/Number Equality/Wittgenstein: the requirement that an actual allocation must be made to declare two classes equal in numbers is worrying.
II 367
Classes/Wittgenstein: we must not forget that we do not always talk about the same phenomenon when we talk about two classes containing the same number of elements. How do you know if some pieces will disappear while they are being counted, or if others will not break?
II 419
Classes/Power Equality/Number Equality/Class Equality/Wittgenstein: Question: whether the classes must actually be assigned to the paradigm to have the same number, or whether this only needs to be possible. What is the criterion of existence of the possibility of their assignment?
II 431
Classes/Numbers/Wittgenstein: when it is said that you can just as well calculate with the classes as with the rational numbers, actually no substitution has taken place. The calculation is simply done with the rational numbers.
II 436
Class/Method/Wittgenstein: we must distinguish between a class of coin tosses and a method (rule) - E.g. irrational number: is defined by a method - it is a process - the square root of two is not an extension but a special rule to produce a fraction.
IV 93
Classes/Sets/Tractatus: 6,031 The theory of classes is completely superfluous in mathematics. This is because the generality we need in mathematics is not the random one.

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958
German Edition:
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921.
German Edition:
Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960

Content Field I 253
Modality/Possibility//Physics/Field: a prefixed modal operator would change the content of a physical law. - ((s) This goes beyond the purely logical case p > Mp).
I 254
Contents/Content/Field/(s): is not preserved, although arbitrary conflicting conclusions may be believed as well. - Requirement: separation into two components, one of which remains fixed. - E.g. physics/mathematics.
II 107
Belief state/Contents/Deflationism/Truth Conditions/Field: if belief can be described as the state of acceptance of the sentence "snow is white", it can be described: a) as belief state that snow is white and
b) as a state with the truth conditions that snow is white.
N.B.: the connection of that-sentences with truth conditions is loosened. - (VsFrege, VsRussell).

Field I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Field II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Field III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Field IV
Hartry Field
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Content Strawson Schulte III 434
StrawsonVsRussell: confused what the sentence says, with the utterance conditions

Strawson I
Peter F. Strawson
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959
German Edition:
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Strawson II
Peter F. Strawson
"Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit",
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Strawson III
Peter F. Strawson
"On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Strawson IV
Peter F. Strawson
Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992
German Edition:
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Strawson V
P.F. Strawson
The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966
German Edition:
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Strawson VI
Peter F Strawson
Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Strawson VII
Peter F Strawson
"On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950)
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993


Schulte I
J. Schulte
Wittgenstein Stuttgart 2001

Schulte II
J. Schulte
U. J. Wenzel
Was ist ein philosophisches Problem? Frankfurt 2001

Schulte III
Joachim Schulte
"Peter Frederick Strawson"
In
Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993
de re Davidson I (b) 18
Belief de re/Russell: we can only have an opinion if we know about which object it is - (acquaintance) - DavidsonVsRussell: there is a problem with propositional attitudes.
I (b) 19
Quine, early: belief de re: is an "island of clarity".

Davidson I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (a)
Donald Davidson
"Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (b)
Donald Davidson
"What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (c)
Donald Davidson
"Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (d)
Donald Davidson
"Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (e)
Donald Davidson
"The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson II
Donald Davidson
"Reply to Foster"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Davidson III
D. Davidson
Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

Davidson IV
D. Davidson
Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Davidson V
Donald Davidson
"Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Demonstratives Tugendhat Wolf II 21
logical proper names / "this" / TugendhatVsRussell: is not assigned to an object, but changing objects in changing situations

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992


K II siehe Wol I
U. Wolf (Hg)
Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993
Denotation Russell Hintikka I 165
On Denoting/Russell/Hintikka: (Russell 1905) Problem: with phrases that stand for real constituents of propositions. Problem/Frege: failure of the substitutability of the identity (SI) in intensional contexts.
Informative identity/Frege: that identity can sometimes be informative at all is related to this.
EG/existential generalization/Russell: it, too, can fail in intensional contexts, (problem of empty terms).
HintikkaVsRussell: he does not recognize the depth of the problem and rather avoids the problems with denotating terms.
The present King/Russell: Problem: we cannot prove by existential generalization that there is a present king of France.
HintikkaVsRussell: but there are other problems. (See below: because of the ambiguity of the cross-world identification).
Hintikka I 173
Denotation/Russell/Hintikka: N.B.: a brilliant feature of Russell's theory of the denotation from 1905 is that it is the quantifiers who denote! Theory of Description/Russell: (end of "On Denoting") Thesis: contains the reduction of descriptions on objects of acquaintance.
I 174
Hintikka: this connection is astonishing. It also appears to be circular, only to admit objects of acquaintance. Solution: we must see what successfully denotating phrases actually denote: they denote objects of acquaintance.
Ambiguity/uniqueness/Hintikka: it is precisely ambiguity that leads to the failure of the existential generalization.
E.g. Waverley/Russell/Hintikka: that only objects of acquaintance are allowed, shows its own example: "the author of Waverley" in (1) is actually a primary event, i.e. his example (2).
"Whether"/Russell/Hintikka: only difference: wanted to know "whether" instead of "did not know".
Secondary Description/Russell: can also be expressed in the way that George wanted to know from the man who actually wrote Waverley whether he was Scott.
I 175
That would be the case if George IV had seen Scott (at a distance) and asked "Is that Scott?". HintikkaVsRussell: why does Russell choose an example with a perceptually known individual? Do we not normally deal with individuals of flesh and blood, whose identity is known to us, rather than merely with perceptual objects?
Knowledge who/knowledge what/perception object/Russell/Hintikka: precisely in the case of perception objects, it seems as if the kind of uniqueness that we need for a knowledge-who does not exist.

Russell I
B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead
Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986

Russell II
B. Russell
The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969
German Edition:
Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989

Russell IV
B. Russell
The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912
German Edition:
Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967

Russell VI
B. Russell
"The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202
German Edition:
Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus
In
Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993

Russell VII
B. Russell
On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit"
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996


Hintikka I
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
Investigating Wittgenstein
German Edition:
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Hintikka II
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989
Denotation Hintikka II 173
Denotation/Russell/Hintikka: N.B.: a brilliant feature of Russell's theory of the denotation of 1905 is that it is the quantifiers which denote! Theory of denotation/Russell: (end of "On Denoting") Thesis: the theory of denotation contains the reduction of denotation on objects of acquaintance.
II 174
Hintikka: this connection is amazing. It also appears to be circular, only to admit objects of acquaintance. Solution: we must see what successfully denotating phrases actually denote: they denote objects of acquaintance.
Unambiguity/uniqueness/Hintikka: it is precisely ambiguity that leads to the failure of the existential generalization.
E.g. Waverley/Russell/Hintikka: that only objects of acquaintance are permitted, shows its own example: "the author of Waverley" in (1) is indeed a primary event, that is, his example (2).
"Whether"/"if"/Russell/Hintikka: only difference: Russell and Hintikka wanted to know if "instead of" "did not know".
Secondary Denotation/Russell: one can also say that George wanted to know from the man who actually wrote Waverley if he was Scott.
II 175
That would be the case if George IV had seen Scott (at a distance) and asked "Is that Scott?". HintikkaVsRussell: why does Russell choose an example with a perceptually known individual? Do we not normally deal with individuals of flesh and blood, whose identity is known to us, rather than merely with perceptual objects?
Knowledge who/what/perception object/Russell/Hintikka: precisely in the case of perception objects, it seems as if the kind of uniqueness that we need for a to-know-who does not exist.

Hintikka I
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
Investigating Wittgenstein
German Edition:
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Hintikka II
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

Description Theory Russell Hintikka I 165
Descriptions/Russell/Hintikka: Definition primary description: for them, the substitutability of identity (SI) applies.
Definition secondary description: for them the substitutability of identity (SI) fails.
I 166
E.g. Russell: two readings: (1) George IV did not know whether Scott was the author of Waverley.
Description/Logical Form/Russell/Hintikka: "The Author of Waverley": (ix) A (x)
Primary: the description has the following force:

(2) (Ex)[A(x)&(y)A(y) > y = x) & George IV knew that (Scott = x).
((s) notation: the quantifier is here always a normal existence quantifier, mirrored E).
That is, the quantifier has maximum range in the primary description.
More likely, however, is the second reading:
Secondary:

(3) ~ George IV knew that (Ex)[A(x) & (y) > y = x & (Scott = x)].
((s) narrow range)
Range/HintikkaVsRussell: he did not know that there is a third possibility for the range of a quantifier ((s) "medium range"/Kripke).

(4) ~ (Ex) [A(x) & (y)(A (y)> y = x) & George IV knew that (Scott = x)].

Russell I
B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead
Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986

Russell II
B. Russell
The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969
German Edition:
Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989

Russell IV
B. Russell
The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912
German Edition:
Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967

Russell VI
B. Russell
"The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202
German Edition:
Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus
In
Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993

Russell VII
B. Russell
On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit"
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996


Hintikka I
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
Investigating Wittgenstein
German Edition:
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Hintikka II
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989
Descriptions Field II 18
Description/acquaintance/Russell/Field: according to Russell: "analytical connection". Problem/FieldVsRussell: this is circular, because the reference of descriptions is explained by reference to their parts - they will include names.
RussellVsTradition: you can only give a lecture on something that can be defined from the logically basic concepts. - E.g. "if Cicero existed, then he denounced Catiline".
FieldVsRussell: that makes contingent biographical characteristics become necessary properties.

Field I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Field II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Field III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Field IV
Hartry Field
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Descriptions McDowell I 132
Theory of Descriptions/SearleVsRussell/McDowell: here it is easy to be on the side of Searle (i.e., to assume intentionality). ---
I 132/33
McDowellVsSearle: it is better to give up Searle's desire and clarify what the non-obvious descriptions are. (With Evans): the conceptual area should not be regarded as a "predicative", but as "belonging to the area of Fregean sense".
---
I 210
McDowell Thesis: Fregean sense is effective in the area of reasons. Because rationality is a condition in the community, we do not distinguish between different senses. But in order to attribute rationality to a subject, we must distinguish between senses (rational and irrational).
VsMcDowell: but then we need some theory of descriptions.
Theory of Descriptions/Russell/McDowell: Indirect relation to the world.

McDowell I
John McDowell
Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996
German Edition:
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001

McDowell II
John McDowell
"Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell

Descriptions Prior I 124
Theory of Descriptions/unicorn/Russell/Prior: a) "the so-and-so φ-s" b) "X thinks that the so-and-so φ-s" - in a) and b) the marking has the same meaning whether the object exists or does not exist - in b) the sentence even has the same truth value.
---
I 148
Theory of Descriptions/Russell: singular names: "The only thing that φ-s". Geach: this analysis has two parts:
a) explicitly predicative use: "x is the only thing that φ-s"
b) use as apparent subject: can be explained as an explication of an implicit predicative use: "the only thing that φ-s, ψ-s."
a) as "something that .."
b) "If something ..."
Prior: solution for non-existing. Problem: different scope:
a) as part of a complex predicate: "Something is both the only-thing- that-φ-s and not ψ-s.".
b) as part of a complex sentence: "It is not the case that ..".
Markings: useful: "the φ-re does not exist" not with logically proper name "this".
---
I 152
Champagne-Example/PriorVsRussell: has overlooked that markings can be used differently : "the man over there," does not speak of something that it is "man" or that it is "over there" - if it is true that he is clever, then even if it is a disguised woman - attribution does not require proper identification - it is only required that it is "the only ...".

Pri I
A. Prior
Objects of thought Oxford 1971

Pri II
Arthur N. Prior
Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003

Descriptions Russell Cresswell I 117
Descriptions/Russell: are never names - Other authors VsRussell: Descriptions are names, but not of normal objects but of intensional objects (various objects in different worlds). - CresswellVs intentional objects.
Geach I 61
Description/Russell is never a name: E.g. The Duke of Cambridge is also a pub, but the Duke does not sell beer.
Newen/Schrenk I 90
Theory of Descriptions/Russell: E.g. 1. There is at least one author of "Waverley" (existence assertion) - 2. There is at most one author of "Waverley" (uniqueness assertion) - 3. Whoever wrote "Waverley", was a Scott (statement content) - E.g. The current King of France/empty names: At least one king of France is bald - 2. At most one - 3. whoever ... is bald - E.g. identity: at least one denounced Catiline - 2. At most one ... - 1* at least one wrote "De Oratore" - 2* at most one ... - 3. Whoever denounced Catiline, wrote ... - E.g. negative existence sentences "It is not the case that 1. At least one .. - 2. At most one ... - RussellVsFrege: thus one avoids to accept Fregean sense as an abstract entity.
Truth-value gaps/RussellVsFrege: they too are thus avoided.
I 92
N.B.: sentences that seemed to be about a subject, are now about general propositions about the world.
Russell I VIII
E.g. Waverley - all true sentences have the same meaning - e.g. "Author of Waverley." Is no description of Scott - Description (labeling) is not the same as assertion - this does not refer to an object. - StrawsonVs - A sentence with "Waverley" says nothing about Scott, because it does not contain Scott.
I 46
Descriptions/Russell: are always in the singular E.g. "father of" but not "son of" (not clear - always presuppoes quotes without "the": "jx": "x is φ" - instead of (ix)(jx) in short "R'y": the R of y, "the father of y" - characterizing function, not propositional function all mathematical functions are distinctive features.
I 96
Description/Principia Mathematica/Russell: "The author of Waverley" means nothing - we cannot define (ix)(jx) only its use - (> definition, definability).

Flor III 122
Descriptions/Russell/Flor: are not names - reason: otherwise it would result in a mere triviality: "a = a" or something wrong. E.g. "The Snow man does not exist" is something different than to say, "Paul does not exist" - Descriptions: incomplete symbols - ((s) If description were names, they could not fail.)

Russell I
B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead
Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986

Russell II
B. Russell
The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969
German Edition:
Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989

Russell IV
B. Russell
The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912
German Edition:
Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967

Russell VI
B. Russell
"The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202
German Edition:
Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus
In
Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993

Russell VII
B. Russell
On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit"
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996


Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984

Gea I
P.T. Geach
Logic Matters Oxford 1972

Flor I
Jan Riis Flor
"Gilbert Ryle: Bewusstseinsphilosophie"
In
Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993

Flor II
Jan Riis Flor
"Karl Raimund Popper: Kritischer Rationalismus"
In
Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A.Hügli/P.Lübcke Reinbek 1993

Flor III
J.R. Flor
"Bertrand Russell: Politisches Engagement und logische Analyse"
In
Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993

Flor IV
Jan Riis Flor
"Thomas S. Kuhn. Entwicklung durch Revolution"
In
Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993
Descriptions Searle I 43 f
"Topic-neutral" (Austin): is not nomological - SearleVs "topic-neutral" e.g. digestive does not need an additional state which must be described separately.
II 317
Description/Frege: delivers the sense, but not the definition (otherwise Aristotle is analytically Alexander's teacher).
II 319
Description/SearleVsKripke: some labels are rigid: when they include the identity condition for the object - e.g. "the object that I perceive" - also: every description can be made rigid by taking the actual world as an index - then "the inventor of bifocal glasses" is clear.
V 146
Theory of Descriptions/Russell/Searle: every sentence with reference can be replaced by an existence theorem - Searle: this is the true discovery of the theory of description.
V 236ff
Theory of description/Russell: Sentence with description: hidden existence assertion - SearleVsRussell: propositional act (expression of the proposition, certain reference) can never be identical with the illocutionary act of assertion (p.a. is part of i.a.)- - (s) Reference is not existence assertion.
V 240
Searle: from the fact that a speech can be carried out only under certain circumstances (conditions) does not follow that the mere execution already claims that the conditions are satisfied - e.g. "bring this to the King of France" is not a claim and contains none. Cf. >theory of descriptions.

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Domains Kripke III 372
Domain/Range/Russell/Kripke: "iff" extensional: Moves domain inside - de dicto: always the smallest range: E.g. Jones believes there is ... - dramatic difference to referential quantification: is referential quantification always the largest domain? E.g. there is something that Jones believes. ---
III 216f
Domain/KripkeVsRussell: he wanted to explain the difference de re/de dicto by domains: smallest domain: de dicto - largest domain: de re - KripkeVs: there are three areas: narrowest MN(Ex) (There are exactly x planets and x is even), (de dicto) - largest: (E.g.) (There are exactly x planets and MN(x is even)), (de re) - medium domain: M(Ex) (there are exactly x planets and N(x is even)). ((s) it is possible that there are 8 planets and it is necessary that 8 is even (correct)) - ((s) short range: both operators at front - widest: both in the rear - medium: distributed operators - medium ranges are possible, when operators are repeated).
III 217
Domain/Russell/Kripke: E.g. largest domain/de re: "there is a high official, so that Hoover believes that the Barrigans want to kidnap him" - the smallest domain/de-dicto "Hoover believes that the Barrigans ..." - medium domain "Hoover believes that there is a high official, so ...".
II 217ff
Domain/Kripke: not suitable for illustrating the difference de re/de dicto because of the third domain.

Kripke I
S.A. Kripke
Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972
German Edition:
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981

Kripke II
Saul A. Kripke
"Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

Kripke III
Saul A. Kripke
Is there a problem with substitutional quantification?
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976

Kripke IV
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
In
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984

Element Relation Lesniewski Prior I 163
Epsilon/Klassen/Individuum/LesniewskiVsRussell/Prior: "ε" Konstante für Relation zwischen Klassen - Bsp "a ε b": "Das a ist b" oder "Es gibt genau ein a und jedes a ist b" - Bei Russell gibt es natürlich solche Formen, aber die Form "x ε a" hat nicht diese Bedeutung! - L: "a = b" : "Das a ist das b" das entspricht nicht der Def Klassenidentität/Russell: "die a"s koinzidieren mit den b"s". - Aber die Identität bei Lesniewski ist auch nicht ganz dasselbe wie die individuelle Identität bei Russell -
Prior I 165ff
Epsilon/Lesniewski/Prior: auch höherstufiges: "f ε g": z.B. "die Einheitsklasse-von-Klassen-von f ist in der Klasse-von-Klassen g enthalten".


Pri I
A. Prior
Objects of thought Oxford 1971

Pri II
Arthur N. Prior
Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003
Elimination Hintikka II 180
Elimination/Eliminability/HintikkaVsRussell/Hintikka: in order to eliminate seemingly denotative descriptions, one must assume that the quantifiers and bound variables go over individuals that are identified descriptively. ((s) object of the > description). Otherwise the real Bismarck would not be an admissible value of the variables with which we express that there is an individual of a certain kind.
Problem: then these quantifiers must not be constituents of the propositions, for their domains of values consists not merely of objects of acquaintance. So Russell's mistake was a twofold one.
1.
Quantor/Variable/Russell/Hintikka: in 1905 he had already stopped thinking that quantifiers and bound variables are real constituents of propositions. Definition apparent variable/Russell/Hintikka: an apparant variable is a bound variable.
2.
Aquaintance/Russell: Values of the variables should only be objects of the acquaintance. (HintikkaVsRussell).

Hintikka I
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
Investigating Wittgenstein
German Edition:
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Hintikka II
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

Equations Wittgenstein II 97
A priori/Wittgenstein: expressions that look a priori must be explained. Just as the same expression can be theorem or hypothesis, the same expression can also be equation or hypothesis. We have to distinguish. An equation is necessary. It is a rule of grammar and therefore arbitrary (sic).
Error: since it is true that mathematics is a priori, it was believed that there must also be metaphysics a priori.
Equation/Hypothesis/Wittgenstein: 2 + 2 = 4 is a hypothesis in physical space and requires verification. It cannot happen in the field of vision. Four drops of rainwater in two groups of two can only be seen as four drops, while in the physical world they can converge to form one large drop.
II 354
WittgensteinVsRussell: but how do we know that they are assigned to each other? One cannot know this and therefore one cannot know whether they are assigned the same number, unless one carries out the assignment, that is, you write them down.
II 354
Moreover, Russell's equal signs can be eliminated, and in this case the equations cannot be written down at all. Difference:
Measuring: e.g. numerical equality of classes or
Calculating: e.g. equal number of roots of a 4th degree equation: one is a measurement,
the other a calculation.
Is there an experiment to determine if two classes have the same number? This may or may not be the case for classes that cannot be overlooked.
II 355
It is a damaging prejudice to believe that when using strokes we are dealing with an experiment.
II 409
Def Fundamental Theorem of Algebra/Wittgenstein: according to which each equation has a solution is completely different from the theorem of multiplication: 26x13=419 It seems to be an isolated theorem which has no similarity to the latter. When we ask whether every algebraic equation has a root, the question has hardly any content.
II 424
If we keep doing the math, it is a matter of physics. The mathematical question refers to the whole equation, not to one side! Identity/Meaning/Sense/WittgensteinVsFrege/Tractatus: 6.232 the essence of the equation is not that the sides have different meanings but the same meaning. The actual essence is that the equation is not necessary to show that the two expressions that the equal sign connects have the same meaning, as this can be seen from the two expressions themselves.
VI 118
Equation/Math/Wittgenstein/Schulte: equations are pseudo-propositions. They do not express thoughts but indicate a point of view - from which you look at the terms in the equation.

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958
German Edition:
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921.
German Edition:
Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960

Existence Strawson Meggle I 312
Existence / Strawson / Hungerland: existence does not follow from speech, it is presupposed in the speech. - If there is no reference, a statement is neither true nor false.
Strawson VII 96ff
Existence / Russell / Strawson: only if a sentence really has subject-predicate form, the existence is guaranteed - therefore only logical proper names such as "the" are real names: existence is guaranteed by acquaintance.
VII 102
StrawsonVsRussell: only complete sentences can be true / false - pointless to say "the present King" was needed "as the expression" to make a false statement - A sentence always remains the same - statement and assertion: change over time.

Strawson I
Peter F. Strawson
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959
German Edition:
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Strawson II
Peter F. Strawson
"Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit",
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Strawson III
Peter F. Strawson
"On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Strawson IV
Peter F. Strawson
Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992
German Edition:
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Strawson V
P.F. Strawson
The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966
German Edition:
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Strawson VI
Peter F Strawson
Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Strawson VII
Peter F Strawson
"On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950)
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993


Grice: > Meg I
G. Meggle (Hg)
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung Frankfurt/M 1979
Existence Wittgenstein Chisholm II 181
Existence/Wittgenstein/Simons: we cannot claim of an atom that it exists - atomism/SimonsVsWittgenstein: linguistic analysis cannot show that there are atoms. ---
Hintikka I 71
Name/existence/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: a name cannot occur in the connection "X exists" - if red did not exist, one could not speak of it - subject/existence/general: one cannot say "There are objects" like one can say "There are books "- unity: it is nonsense to talk of the "total number of objects". ---
I 73
Existence/necessary/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: since "possible existence" makes no sense, we need to regard every existing thing as necessary existent. - But this is only transcendental - of course the objects do not really exist necessarily - or the necessity is not expressible. - It follows that one must also interpret the possible facts constructed of the same objects. ---
I 92f
Existence/name/object/description/Russell/Hintikka: pointless: to say "this exists" - also with everything that is designated - against: useful for descriptions. Acquaintance: also provides the reference - so that even complex logical forms are objects of acquaintance - WittgensteinVsRussell: instead actual objects (and their connections).

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958
German Edition:
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921.
German Edition:
Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960


Chisholm I
R. Chisholm
The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981
German Edition:
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chisholm II
Roderick Chisholm

In
Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986

Chisholm III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989
German Edition:
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004

Hintikka I
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
Investigating Wittgenstein
German Edition:
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Hintikka II
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989
Existence Statements Strawson VII 112
Existence theorem / StrawsonVsRussell: he blurs the distinction between pure existence sentences and phrases that contain an expression to point to an object or to refer to it - "Inquiry into Meaning and Truth": logically catastrophic theory of names (logical proper names) - depraves the descriptions of the status of logical subjects, but offers no substitute.

Strawson I
Peter F. Strawson
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959
German Edition:
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Strawson II
Peter F. Strawson
"Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit",
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Strawson III
Peter F. Strawson
"On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Strawson IV
Peter F. Strawson
Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992
German Edition:
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Strawson V
P.F. Strawson
The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966
German Edition:
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Strawson VI
Peter F Strawson
Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Strawson VII
Peter F Strawson
"On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950)
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

Existential Quantification Wittgenstein II 37
Name/function/Wittgenstein: (Ex) .fx. - The values of (Ex) are proper names. ---
II 234
Existential quantification/Variable/Domain/Value/Russell/Wittgenstein: (Ex).fx: Russell regards the "x" in brackets so, as if it were a thing - e.g. "I met a thing which is a man" - WittgensteinVsRussell: the "x" stands for men, not for things - (see I 201: not "this is soz" but "this color is soz").

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958
German Edition:
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921.
German Edition:
Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960

Facts Logic Texts Re III 26
Russell: to differentiate fact from the statement. There are false statements, but no "false facts." VsRussell: but the cost of this explanation is that it undermines the distinction between language and the world! Wittgenstein: has a much more insubstantial view of the statement. Facts are facts relating to objects. Thus, it is characteristic of reality what facts there are. The objects must be common to all possibilities. - Signs: are arbitrary and conventional.
---
Re III 242
Facts: What makes statements about these things true or false are not the things themselves, but the facts. Truthmaking: it is not the bear which makes "the bear is black" true, but the fact that the bear is black.
---
Re III 242
There could be Tarski's theory without any ontological link to facts.
Logic Texts
Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988
HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998
Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997
Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logik Stuttgart 1983
Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001
Formalism Quine XIII 63
Formalism/Quine: deduction is useful if you have previously doubted the truth of the result.
XIII 64
For example, you can test a hypothesis by looking at the consequences of it. Euclid: had difficulties to prove theorems, the truth of which nobody doubted anymore.
Elegance/Science/Euclid: already he tried, for reasons of simplicity, to limit his postulates.
Deduction/Problem/Quine: how can we prevent our already existing knowledge (about the objects ("what is true")) from creeping into the evidence? One tries to simulate ignorance, but to what point?
Knowledge/Truth/Quine/(s): To "know what is true" is more a knowledge of objects than of logic (see below).
Disinterpretation/Reinterpretation/Interpretation/Tradition/Quine: one possibility was reinterpretation: in which it was assumed that the logical constants retained their meaning, but the other terms were merely regarded as provisional. And that in the theorem to be proved as well as in its consequences ((s) thus practically then in everyday use, everyday language).
Pure Mathematics/Quine: this led many authors to regard their object as intrinsically uninterpreted.
Pure Mathematics/Formalism/Russell: here we never know what we are talking about or if what we are saying is true.
QuineVsFormalism/QuineVsRussell: in his favour, he has quickly forgotten that again.
XIII 65
Pure Mathematics/Science/Quine: seems to be on a par with the other sciences. Pure arithmetic, for example, has to do with pure numbers that count objects, but also electrons in the economy. Variables: go over numbers as well as over objects.
Example: speed of light: here a relation is determined between a pure number (300,000) and light waves. Thereby not the number is emphasized as special, but the relation.
Example: price: here the number is formed neither by the object, nor by the currency specially. ((s) Solution/(s): Relation instead of predicate.)
Quine: relation instead of pure numbers and "pure object".
QuineVsDisinterpretation/Disinterpretation/Quine: the purity of pure mathematics is not based on reinterpretation!
Arithmetic/Quine: is simply concerned with numbers, not with objects of daily life.
Abstract Algebra/Quine: if it exists, it is simply the theory of classes and relations. But classes and relations of all possible things, not only abstract ones.
XIII 66
Logic/Quine: there was a similar problem as before with deduction, where we had to suspend our previous knowledge about objects: how can we suspend our previous knowledge about conclusions? Solution/Frege/Tradition: again disinterpretation, but this time of the particle. (>Formalism).
Formalism/Quine: ironically, it spares us from ultimate disinterpretation. We can extend the conclusions allowed by our signs. We can be sure that they are not altered by the meanings of the signs.
Frege/Russell/Principia Mathematica/Principia Mathematica/Quine: the Principia Mathematica was a step backwards from Frege's conceptual writing in terms of formalistic rigor.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Generality Wittgenstein II 62
General/Universality/Wittgenstein: cannot be isolated. - It can be understood only by seeing how it is used. - If you interpret a general term, you’re doing the same thing as if you interpret an isolated case. ---
Hintikka I 152
Universality/General/General sentence/WittgensteinVsRussell: his writing presupposes that there are names for each general proposition. - Which could be called an answer to the question "what" (instead of "what kind?"). - That functions of E.g. "Which people live on the island" - but not for E.g. "Which circle is square".

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958
German Edition:
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921.
German Edition:
Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960


Hintikka I
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
Investigating Wittgenstein
German Edition:
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Hintikka II
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989
Idealism McDowell I 209
Idealism/VsMcDowell/McDowell: his opponents could speak of a "danger of idealism": idealistic basic mood of the "elimination of the outer boundary". This eludes us a possibility which we should not renounce: the possibility of direct contact between the spiritual and the objects.
We became aware of this possibility in the criticism VsRussell, theory of descriptions.
If one accepts the world as all that is the case, then the world is subordinated to the realm of Fregean sense ("kingdom of the conceivable").
Then there are not episodes and acts of thought but identity. Facts in this sense are thoughts; The conceivable, which is the case.
---
I 209
McDowellVs: However, objects do not belong to the sphere of the conceivable (Fregean sense) but to the realm of the object reference (Fregean meaning).

McDowell I
John McDowell
Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996
German Edition:
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001

McDowell II
John McDowell
"Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell

Identity Quine I 208ff
Identity/Davidson/Quine: we are unable to pick out the relationship that is constitutive for the knowledge of the identity of an object. The reason is that every property can be considered as relevant. If the mind can only think if it establishes a clear relationship to the object, then thought is impossible. (QuineVsRussell). Identity: does not work without conceptual scheme.
Identity: QuineVsHume, QuineVsLeibniz: Confusion of word and object: there is no relation between different objects but relationship between singular terms - a = b different names.
---
I 211
Copula forms indefinite singular term: no longer Fa but a = b = E.g. Agnes = a lamb - but: Agnes bleats: Fa. ---
I 211
Synonymy and analyticity is graded, identity is absolute. ---
I 365
Identity conditions strong/weak/(s):> E.g. Paul and Elmer. ---
II 23
Identity/absolutely distinguishable: open sentence only fulfilled by an object. - Relatively distinguishable: only fulfilled in the given order. - Identity: Objects that are not relatively distinguishable, not all objects that are not absolutely distinguishable. ---
I 397
Theseus ship: it is not about the term "the same" but the term "ship" - each general term has its own individuation principle. ---
II 156ff
Individuation: in our world moment-to-moment individuation by predicates - for objects at random (everything can be the object), for predicates crucial truth value. - Identification between possible worlds: is dependent on predicates - for body also from space displacement, composition, etc., therefore not cross-worlds - "The same object" is meaningless. -> singular term, instead predicate. ---
Geach I 238
Identity/GeachVsQuine: Thesis: identity is relative - if someone says x is identical to y, this is an incomplete expression. - It is an abbreviation for "x is the same A as y". - (Weird that Frege has not supported this). Identity/tradition/Geach: can be expressed by a single scheme: (1) l- Fa (x) (Fx ux = a)
in everyday language: whatever is always true of something that is identical to an object y, is true of a and vice versa.
From which we derive the law of self-identity from: l- a = a if we take Fx for x unequal to a then scheme (1) provides us with:
(2) l- (a unequal a) Vx (x unequal a u x = a) - this results in l- a = a.
---
Geach I 240
But Geach per relative identity. ---
Quine V 86
Identity/Quine: initially only means for extending the time pointing - then it is a relative mass term: E.g. "the same dog as" - used for individuation of absolute general term E.g. "dog". Geach: this is a reduction to a relative term - Quine: that does not work when objects overlap.
---
V 89
Identity/Geach: only with respect to general terms, the same thing. ---
V 161
Identity: restricted: in terms of general term: "the same apple" - unrestricted: Learning: 1. anyone who agrees with the sentences [a = b] and [a is a g] also agrees to [b a g] ((s) > transitivity).
2. disposition, to agree on [a = b], if it is recognized that one can agree [b is a g] due to [a is a g] for any g. - Relative identity: also this kind of identity is relative, because the identity scale depends on words. - [a = b] can get wrong when adding new terms.
---
I 162
Definition identity/Set Theory/Quine: x = y as the statement y is element of every class, from which x is element - characterization of the identity by using all relative clauses. ---
V 162
Definition identity/Set Theory/Quine: with quantification over classes is x = y defined as the statement y is a member of each class, from which x is element. - Language learning: here initially still substitutional quantification - then no class, but exhaustion of relative clauses. ---
VII (d) 65ff
Identity/Quine: important: the demand for processes or temporally extended objects - by assuming identity rather than flow kinship, one speaks of the flow instead of stages. ---
IX 24
Definition identity/Quine: we can now simplify: for y = z - y = z stands for x (x ε y x ε z) - because we have identified the individuals with their classes. ---
X 90
Definiton identity/Quine: then we define "x = y" as an abbreviation for:. Ax ↔ Ay (z) (bzx ↔ bzy. Bxz ↔ Byz .Czx ↔ Czy .Cxz ↔ Cyz (z') (Dzz'x ↔.... .. Dzz'y .Dzxz'↔ Dzyz' Dxzz '↔ Dyzz')) - i.e. that the objects u x. y are not distinguishable by the four predicates, not even in terms of the relation to other objects z and z'. ---
X 99
Identity/Quine: only defined (in our appearance theory of set theory) between variables, not defined between abstraction expressions or their schematic letters. ---
XII 71
Relative identity/Quine: results from ontological relativity, because no entity without identity - only explicable in the frame theory. - E.g. distinguishability of income classes.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987


Gea I
P.T. Geach
Logic Matters Oxford 1972
Identity Wittgenstein Hintikka I 22
Definition sense of the sentence/Tractatus: (4.2:) its agreement and disagreement with the possibilities of the existence and non-existence of facts. Hintikka: it follows that the identity of the meaning of two expressions cannot be said linguistically. (6.2322)
---
I 140 Note
Hintikka: ... for Wittgenstein this is about the dispensability of the identity concept. He could also have said that this term already exists in the other elementary propositions. ---
I 364
Experience/perception/identity/Wittgenstein: the comparison between experiences in terms of their identity does not belong to the primary but to the secondary language games. In a certain secondary language game, the relationship can partially be influenced by the possible documentary evidence.
---
II 338
Identity/Relation/Notation/WittgensteinVsRussell: Russell notation triggers confusion, because it gives the impression that the identity is a relationship between two things. We have to differentiate this use of the equal sign from its use in arithmetics, where we may think of it as part of a replacement rule. WittgensteinVsRussell: its spelling gives erroneously the impression that there is a sentence like x = y or x = x. One can remove the identity sign.
---
II 338/339
Identity/logical form/sentence/Wittgenstein: in my writing neither (Ex, y) x = y, nor (Ex) x = x is a set. If there is a thing, then why to express this by a statement about a thing?
What tempts us to believe it is a fundamental truth that a thing is identical with itself? Thus, I did not yet met the sentence of identity.
---
II 416
WittgensteinVsRussell: he was just trying to get next to the list another "entity", so he provided a function that uses the identity to define this entity. ---
II 418
Identity/substitution/equal sign/Wittgenstein: E.g. "a = a": here the equal sign has a special meaning - because one would not say that a can be replaced by a. - Equal sign: its use is limited to cases in which a bound variable exists. ---
IV 103
Identity/meaning/sense/WittgensteinVsFrege/Tractatus: 6.232 the essence of the equation is not that the sides have different sense but the same meaning. - But that this can be already seen at the two sides. ---
VI 179
Identity/Wittgenstein/Schulte: in overlapping silhouettes the question is meaningless, which is A or B after the separation. ---
VI 183
Pain/identity/criteria/Wittgenstein/Schulte: which criterion for identity? Well, simply, the one who is sitting there, or any description. But for my pain? No criterion!

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958
German Edition:
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921.
German Edition:
Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960


Hintikka I
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
Investigating Wittgenstein
German Edition:
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Hintikka II
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989
Idiolect Cresswell II 151
Def "extreme Fregeanism" / KripkeVsFrege / KripkeVsRussell / Cresswell (he ascribes this setting to both of them): thesis that names in general belong to idiolects - problem: then the Pierre-Example is not about Pierre, but the reporter of the case, and his idiolect! -

Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984

Implication Wittgenstein II 74
Implication/Russell: it is also true if p is wrong. Implication/WittgensteinVsRussell: Paradox for two reasons:
1. We confuse implication with reasoning.
2. In everyday life we never use " if... then " in this sense. It is always hypotheses in which we use that expression. Most of the things we talk about in everyday life are in fact always hypotheses. For example, "All humans are mortal."
Just as Russell uses it, it remains true even if there is nothing that corresponds to the description f(x).
II 75
But we do not believe that all humans are mortal even when there are no humans.
II 79
Implication/Wittgenstein: we can say that one sentence follows the other, provided the W's of the latter include those of the former.
II 137
Implication/Paradox/Material/Existence/WittgensteinVsRussell: in Russell's notation both "All S are P" and "No S is P" is true, if there is no S at all. Because the implications are also verified by ~fx. In reality, this fx is independent both times! All S are P: (x) gx >.fx
No S is P: (x) gx > ~fx
This independent fx is irrelevant, it is an idling wheel!
Example: If there are unicorns, they bite, but there are no unicorns = there are no unicorns.

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958
German Edition:
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921.
German Edition:
Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960

Impredicativeness Quine XIII 93
Impredicativeness/Quine: Previously it was said that you had specified a class without knowing anything about it if you could name the containment condition. Russell's Antinomy: showed that there had to be exceptions.
Problem: was to specify a class by a containment condition by directly or indirectly referring to a set of classes that contained the class in question.
Russell's Antinomy: here the problematic containment condition was the non-self elementary. Example x is not an element of x.
Paradox: arises from letting the x of the containment condition be, among other things, just the class defined by this containment condition.
Def impredicative/Poincaré/Russell: is just this condition of containment for a class that exists in the class itself. This must be forbidden to avoid paradoxes.
Circular Error Principle/QuineVsRussell: but that was too harsh a term:
Specification/Class/Sets/Existence/Quine: specifying a class does not mean creating it!
XIII 94
Specification/Circle/Introduce/QuineVsRussell: by specifying something it is not wrong to refer to a domain to which it has always belonged to. For example, statistical statements about a typical inhabitant by statements about the total population that contains this inhabitant. Introduction/Definition/linguistic/Quine: all we need is to equate an unfamiliar expression with an expression that is formed entirely with familiar expressions.
Russell's Antinomy/Quine: is still perfectly fine as long as the class R is defined by its containment condition: "class of all objects x, so that x is not an element of x".
Paradox/Solution/Russell/Quine: a solution: to distort familiar expressions so that they are no longer familiar in order to avoid a paradox. This was Russell's solution. Finally, "x is an element of x" ("contains itself") to be banished from the language.
Solution/Zermelo/Quine: better: leave the language as it is, but
New: for classes it should apply that not every containment condition defines a class. For example the class "R" remains well defined, but "Pegasus" has no object. I.e. there is no (well-defined) class like R.
Circle/George Homans/Quine: true circularity: For example, a final club is one in which you can only be elected if you have not been elected to other final clubs.
Quine: if this is the definition of an unfamiliar expression, then especially the definition of the last occurrence of "final club".
Circle/Circularity/Quine: N.B.: yet it is understandable!
Impredicativeness/impredicative/Russell/Quine: the real merit was to make it clear that not every containment condition determines a class.
Formal: we need a hierarchical notation. Similar to the hierarchy of truth predicates we needed in the liar paradox.
XIII 95
Variables: contain indexes: x0,y0: about individuals, x1,y2 etc. about classes, but classes of this level must not be defined by variables of this level. For example, for the definition of higher-level classes x2, y2 only variables of the type x0 and x1 may be used. Type Theory/Russell/Quine/N.B.: classes of different levels can be of the same type!
Classes/Sets/Existence/Quine: this fits the metaphor that classes do not exist before they are determined. I.e. they are not among the values of the variables needed to specify them. ((s) And therefore the thing is not circular).
Problem/QuineVsRussell: this is all much stricter than you need to avoid paradoxes and it is so strict that it prevents other useful constructions.
For example, to specify the union of several classes of the same level, e.g. level 1
Problem: if we write "Fx1" to express that x1 is one of the many classes in question, then the
Containment condition: for a set in this union, something is element of it iff it is an element of a class x1, so Fx1.
Problem: this uses a variable of level 1, i.e. the union of classes of a level cannot be counted on to belong to that level.
Continuity hypothesis: for its proof this means difficulties.
Impredicativeness/Continuum/Russell/Quine: consequently he dropped the impredicativeness in the work on the first volume of Principia Mathematica. But it remains interesting in the context of constructivism. It is interesting to distinguish what we can and cannot achieve with this limitation.
XIII 96
Predicative set theory/QuineVsRussell/Quine: is not only free of paradoxes, but also of unspecifiable classes and higher indeterminacy, which is the blessing and curse of impredicative theory. (See "infinite numbers", "classes versus sets"). Predicative set theory/Quine: is constructive set theory today .
Predicative Set Theory/Quine: is strictly speaking exactly as described above, but today it does not matter which conditions of containment one chooses to specify a class.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Infinity Axiom Quine IX 205
Def Infinity Axiom/Quine: an infinite number of elements in types should be possible. A possibility: Tarski: that there is a non-empty class x², such that each of its elements is a subclass of another element.
Russell: for each x² e N ³ there is a class y1 with x² elements: short L² ε N³.

(1) Ex² (Ey1(y1ε x²) u ∀y1[y1 ε x² › Ez1(y1 ‹ z1 ε x²)]).

Vs: some thought that the question of whether there were infinitely many individuals was more a question of physics or metaphysics. It is inappropriate to let arithmetic depend on it. Russell and Whitehead regretted the infinity axiom and the axiom of choice, and both made special cases dependent on them, as I do most comprehension assumptions.
Frege's Natural Numbers/Quine: are plagued by the necessity of infinity axioms, even if we allow type theory, liberalization and cumulative types, or finally heterogeneous classes.
Because within each type there is a finite barrier to how large a class can be, unless there are infinitely many individuals.
Zermelo's concept of numbers would be a solution here, but brings problems with complete induction.
IX 206
Real Numbers/Quine: for them and beyond, however, infinity axioms are always necessary. Infinity Axiom/Zermelo:

(5) Ex[Λ ε x u ∀y(y ε x › {y} ε x)].

It postulates a class to which at least all natural numbers in Zermelo's sense belong. It is equivalent to "N ε ϑ" because N is itself an x that satisfies (5), and vice versa, if x satisfies (5), then N < x., and thus "N ε ϑ" according to the exclusion scheme.
Unlike Russell's, this infinity axiom says nothing about the existence of individuals.
But it separates the last connections to type theory. Zermelo's and Neumann's numbers are even antithetic to cumulative type theory, because such a class breaks the boundaries of all types.
Axioms of Infinity/Russell: was caused by the law of subtraction "S'x = S'y > x = y".
In other words, it was used so that the natural numbers would not break off. Similarly for the real numbers. But its meaning goes even further: each subsequent type is the class of all subclasses of its predecessor and thus, according to Cantor's theorem, larger than its predecessor.
To accept infinitely many individuals therefore means to accept higher infinities without end.
For example, the power class in (7) says that {x:x < N} ε ϑ, and this last class is greater than N after the theorem of Cantor. And so it goes further up.
Infinity Axiom/Zermelo: breaks the type limits. Quine pro: this frees us from the burden comparable to the type indices, because even in type theory with universal variables we were forced to Frege's version of the natural numbers, which meant recognition of a different 5 in each type (about classes of individuals) of a different 6 in each type, a different N in each type, etc.
In addition there is, throughout the whole hierarchy, a multiplication of all details of the theory of real numbers. 3/5 is something different in every following type and also π, Q, R.
For all these constants it is practically necessary to keep the type indices.
In Zermelo's system with its axiom of infinity such multiplications do not occur with the task of type boundaries.
Zermelo's protection was that he avoided classes that were too large.
For the reverse assurance that classes cannot exist only if they were larger than all existing classes, very little provision has been made in its segregation scheme.
IX 208
Fraenkel and Skolem first did this in their axiom scheme of substitution.
II 93
Axiom of infinity/QuineVsRussell: Principia Mathematica must be supplemented by the axiom of infinity when certain mathematical principles are to be derived. - Axiom of infinity: ensures the existence of a class with an infinite number of elements - New Foundations/Quine: instead comes with the universal class of ϑ or x^ (x = x).

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Intensions Wittgenstein II 343
Intension/classes/quantities/Frege/Russell/WittgensteinVsRussell/WittgensteinVsFrege: both believed they could deal with the classes intensionally because they thought they could turn a list into a property, a function. ---
II 416
Intension/extension/Mathematics/Wittgenstein: in everyday language intension and extension are not interchangeable - E.g. I hate the man in the chair - I hate Mr. Schmitz - on the other hand in mathematics: here, there is no difference between "the roots of the equation x² + 2x + 1 = 0 and "2"- in contrast difference: counting bodies ((s) extension, also writing down) is something different than to determine them with a law ((s) intension) - Wittgenstein: law and extension are completely different - ((s) Physics). ---
III 136-139
Elementary PropositionVsIntension - (protection of formal logic) - intension/meaning/Tractatus/Flor: irrelevant - it is always about extension.

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958
German Edition:
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921.
German Edition:
Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960

Is Ryle Grasses I 30
"Is"/RyleVsAristoteles: "systematically misleading locutions", "is" should suggest the appearance of a thing/property relationship. ---
I 31
Error: the universal "human" is itself not a thing that breathes. Rather, it is to be interpreted as a class subordination - "if existence is a term of 2nd order, God cannot be a subject term" - rather predicate term like 'infinite beings' - RyleVsRussell: E.g. Pegasus: Problem not in the subject term, but in the predicate term.

Ryle I
G. Ryle
The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949
German Edition:
Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969

Knowledge Russell Frank I 654ff
Proposition/Knowledge/Russell: one can know propositions, even if one is not familiar with all components.
Donald Davidson (1987): Knowing One's Own Mind, in: Proceedings and
Adresses of the American Philosophical Association LX (1987),441-4 58

Russell IV 116
Knowledge/wrong knowledge/false knowledge/Russell: E.g. Someone thinks that the name of the Prime Minister starts with B (Bannerman is correct) - but he thinks Balfour was Prime Minister - no true knowledge.
Hintikka 167
Knowledge/who/what/where/HintikkaVsRussell: Russell cannot explicitly analyze constructions of the form white + W sentence. General: (10) a knows who (e.g., x) is such that A (x)
becomes
(11) (Ex) a knows that A (x).
Hintikka: but this is only possible if we modify Russell's approach:
Problem: the existential generalization now collapses in a way that cannot be traced back to the non-existence, and which cannot be analyzed with Russell's theory of descriptions (ThdK).
Problem: for each person, there are a lot of people whose names the person knows and of whose existence the person knows, but of whom the person does not know who they are. ((s) celebrities, people of whom one has heard, hear-say) not aquaintance, but by description.
I 168
Charles Dodgson, for instance, was for Queen Victoria one person she had heard of, but she did not know herself. Problem: if we assume that (11) is the correct analysis of (10) it applies:
(12) ~ (Ex) Victoria knew that Dodgson = x
But this is trivially wrong, even according to Russell.
The following is certainly true:
(13) Victoria knew that Dodgson = Dodgson
Existential Generalization/EG: results then in:
(14) (Ex) Victoria knew that Dodgson = x
So exactly the negation of (12) is a contradiction.
Descriptions/Hintikka: descriptions are not involved here at all. Therefore Russell's theory of descriptions cannot help here.
I 170
Existential Generalization/EG/Ambiguity/Uniqueness/Russell/Hintikka: What ways Russell could have taken? Knowledge-who/Russell/Hintikka: Russell himself often speaks of the equivalence of knowledge who did something with the existence of an individual of whom is known that it has done so.

Russell I
B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead
Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986

Russell II
B. Russell
The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969
German Edition:
Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989

Russell IV
B. Russell
The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912
German Edition:
Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967

Russell VI
B. Russell
"The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202
German Edition:
Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus
In
Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993

Russell VII
B. Russell
On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit"
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Lexicon Quine VI 81
Dictionary/Lexicon/Quine: does not describe objects, but use of words - is not about synonymy of terms - is not about cognitive equivalence of sentences.
VII (c) 49
Lexicon/Quine: shows couples of synonymous sequences (no monopoly on meaning).
II 65
Lexicon: the lexicographer will often use a so-called "meaning distinction": he will call several partial synonyms, some of which fit into subcontexts, others into others. The contexts must then be kept apart with reference to the topic.
II 99
Lexicon: the definition of words in the lexicon is nothing more than a recursive definition of sentence meanings. Russell's examination of incomplete symbols continues and extends to classes.
II 139
Lexicon of Predicates: You can define an identity in any theory, even in one without classes and elements. This is the method of exhaustion of the Lexicon of Predicates.
Trivial example: Suppose we have only two undefined single-digit predicates. F and G as well as a two-digit predicate H and no constant singular terms or functors, only quantifiers and truth functions. Then we can define "x = y" as

Fx bik Fy.Gx bik GY.(z)(Hxz bik Hyz.Hzx bik Hzy)

which ensures substitutivity in atomic contexts. Now the entire logic of identity can be derived. The method can be applied to any finite lexicon of undefined predicates and it defines real identity or an afterimage indistinguishable from it every time. Undistinguishable in terms of the corresponding theory.
II 139/140
How will it work if our approach to explain identity by exhaustion of the predicates is generalized? Let us assume a rich lexicon of predicates. Certain predicates will be desired in terms of properties, in particular "has". Others will be superfluous (e.g. property "be pink" or property "divisible by four"). Ryle branded such predications as category confusion. Russell and Carnap the same. QuineVsRyle/QuineVsCarnap/QuineVsRussell: for years I have represented a minority of philosophers who prefer the opposite direction: we can simplify grammar and logic by minimizing our grammatical categories and maximizing their scope instead.
II 141/142
Are all cases actually due to "has"? If so, the exhaustion of our encyclopedia would be done in no time at all, which would result in all properties being identical if exactly the same things "have" them. In this case, properties are extensional. We might as well read this "has" as being-contained and call properties classes. But they are classes as multiplicities, not as a unit. Because we declare it ungrammatic to present them as elements of other classes. They occur only through their values.
However, if there are desired contexts of property variables that are not due to "has", it should be possible to create a list and thus individualize properties.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Lists Wittgenstein II 150f
Class/Logical Sum/Logical Product/List/Properties/Wittgenstein: if a class can be specified by a list, it is a logical product or a sum, e.g. tones of an octave. Then the class is not defined by characteristics, but in the grammar. "Tone of an octave" is not a property of a tone. N.B.: it is not necessary to add: "and these are all" - that would apply even if the world consisted only of particulars. By contrast: if a class is defined by properties.
II 265
Ability/Language Game/Circumstance/Wittgenstein:
II 266
For example, a tribe learns certain songs and poems by heart. Before they are performed in public, they are rehearsed in silence. Does "can" mean that the silent rehearsing is successful? The use of "can" is therefore based on this special fact. Without this circumstance it would not have become established. However, the circumstance itself does not enter into the meaning of "can", unless "meaning" means the description of the entire practice of using this word. However, such a description cannot be given, because no list will be long enough. (> Theory of Use of Meaning/Wittgenstein).
II 416
WittgensteinVsRussell: he was looking to get another "entity" besides the list, so he provided a function that uses identity to define that entity. List/Class/Wittgenstein: usually a function is not replaced by a list (class).
Function/List/infinite/Wittgenstein: a harmful consequence of the attempt to exchange function and list results in connection with infinite lists.
For example, the movement of a pendulum can be calculated depending on whether it is attracted by a finite or infinite number of bodies.
II 417
Determining the number of bodies by law is something completely different from counting them.

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958
German Edition:
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921.
German Edition:
Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960

Logical Constants Wittgenstein Hintikka I 139
Logical Constants/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: the structural elements, often referred to as logical constants, and which are the main tool for creating complex sentences from simple ones, are not necessarily needed.
I 140
Logical Constants/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: where there is composition, there are argument and function, these are already all logical constants. Tractatus: 5,441 "Here it becomes clear that "logical objects" and "logical constants" (in the sense of Russell and Frege) do not exist. For: "all results of truth operations with truth functions are identical, which are one and the same truth function of elementary propositions.
II 79
Sheffer Stroke/notation/Wittgenstein: makes the internal relation visible. - WittgensteinVsRussell: his writing style does not make clear that p v q follows from p.q.
VI 95/96
Logical Constants/Elementary Proposition/WittgensteinVsTractatus/WittgensteinVsWittgenstein/Schulte: new: priority of a sentence-system compared to single sentences - formerly VsLogical constants - (do not connect any objects, this is still true for Wittgenstein) - but wrong: that the rules have anything to do with the internal structure of sentences. New: they form part of a broader syntax.
V 70
WittgensteinVsRussell/Tractatus: 5.4 "logical objects" or "logical constants" in Russell's sense do not exist.
IV 71
Logical Constants/Tractatus: 5.441 this disappearance of the apparent logical constant also occurs when "~(Ex) . ~fx" says the same as "(x).fx" or "(Ex).fx.x =a" the same as "fa".
IV 79
Logic/Symbol/Sign/Sentence/Tractatus: 5.515 Our symbols must show that what is indicated by "v" "u", etc. (logical constants) must be propositions. (Logical Form).
IV 80
"p" and "q" requires even the "v","~" etc.! If the sign "p" in "p v q" does not represent a complex sign, then it cannot make sense on its own.
But if "p v p" makes no sense, then "p v q" cannot make sense either.

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958
German Edition:
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921.
German Edition:
Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960


Hintikka I
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
Investigating Wittgenstein
German Edition:
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Hintikka II
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989
Logical Proper Names Strawson VII 111
Logical proper names / StrawsonVsRussell: "This" is no log pr. name: one must know what the phrase means in order to respond to it
Tugendhat I 387/388
Logical proper names / StrawsonVsRussell: log.pr.n. are merely fictional, no ambiguous name but a deictic expression, it has a uniform meaning and shall refer to different objects (according to the use in different situations) - TugendhatVsRussell: overlooks the fact that the same objects may also be referred to by other terms - TugendhatVsStrawson: overlooked the fact that he himself presupposed Russell’s theory.

Strawson I
Peter F. Strawson
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959
German Edition:
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Strawson II
Peter F. Strawson
"Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit",
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Strawson III
Peter F. Strawson
"On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Strawson IV
Peter F. Strawson
Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992
German Edition:
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Strawson V
P.F. Strawson
The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966
German Edition:
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Strawson VI
Peter F Strawson
Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Strawson VII
Peter F Strawson
"On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950)
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993


Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992
Logical Proper Names Tugendhat I 381
This/logical proper names/TugendhatVsRussell: "this" (which of all) will not help us in the specification of objects. It serves no function and could therefore stay away. - Specification/Tugendhat: no relation! - It takes place against the background of all objects. - This works with singular terms, but not with logical proper names.

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992

Logical Proper Names Wittgenstein Hintikka I 94 ff
This/Logical Proper Name/Russell: "this" is a (logical) proper name. WittgensteinVsRussell/Philosophical Studies: The indicative "this" can never become bearerless, but that does not make it a name." (Philosophical Investigation § 45)
I 95
According to Russell's early theory, there are only two logical proper names in our language for particular objects apart from the ego, namely "this" and "that". You introduce them by pointing at them. Hintikka: of these concrete Russellian objects it is true in the true sense of the word that they cannot be pronounced, but only named. (> Mention/Use/Saying/> Showing).
Hintikka I 95
Saying/Pointing/Showing/Logical Proper Names/Russell/Hintikka: "this" cannot be expresed (pronounced) - only named - ((s) > Mention / >Use) - ((s) "This" cannot express the thing in absence of the thing). - ((s) The object cannot be mentioned by the logical proper name.)
I 102
We can only point to the objects of acquaintance.

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958
German Edition:
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921.
German Edition:
Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960


Hintikka I
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
Investigating Wittgenstein
German Edition:
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Hintikka II
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989
Meaning Geach I 28f
Frege: sense/meaning - GeachVsRussell: false equivalence with "means"/"denotes" (refers to) in Principia Mathematica - seeming parallel: a description contains "meaning" (Sinn) as a component, but not on this sense but about the objects. The description denotes. Signifiying expression/Russell: general term with a prefix, all, some, etc.
Meaning/Principia Mathematica: two phrases mean the same thing when they maintain the same assumption - Signify/Frege: two sentences mean the same when they have both the same truth value.
Incomplete symbol/Russell/late: certain descriptions have no meaning.
GeachVs: this is misleading – rather: we do not need a single entity that corresponds to a specific description – E. g "There is a King…".

Gea I
P.T. Geach
Logic Matters Oxford 1972

Meaning Russell I Tugendhat 348
Meaning/Object/Russell: meaning of an expression = object.
I Tugendhat 384
Meaning/Russell: he makes no distinction between meaning and object (-> Meaning/Quine: is no "entity") - Russell: object is literally in the sentence- StrawsonVsRussell: then an empty singular term has no significance.
I 58
Meaning/Principia Mathematica/Russell: here Russell speaks of the fact that a function means an "indeterminate object" (sic). (FregeVs)

Russell I
B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead
Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986

Russell II
B. Russell
The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969
German Edition:
Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989

Russell IV
B. Russell
The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912
German Edition:
Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967

Russell VI
B. Russell
"The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202
German Edition:
Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus
In
Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993

Russell VII
B. Russell
On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit"
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996

Mention Quine V 100
Mention/Use/Language Learning/Quine: the confusion mention/use is necessary for learning: the sound of the word has approximately the same effect as the sight of the object - also transition from observation statements to timeless statements: E.g. from "Fido is a dog" to "A dog is an animal" (the confusion is ignored here).
VII (e) 82ff
Mention/use/expression/Quine: e.g. the term "(F I Y)" itself is not a formula, but a name that describes the formula. ((s) conditional probability).
IX 22
Use/mention/Quine: on the right hand side of "ε" we use quantifiable variables - on the left hand side of "ε" we mention classes.
I 339
Mentioning/Use/Russell/Whitehead/QuineVsRussell/QuineVsWhitehead: Whitehead and Russell, who took the distinction between use and mention lightly, wrote "p implies q" (in the material sense) as if it were interchangeable with "If p, then q" (in the material sense). C. I. Lewis did the same, he wrote "p implies strictly q" and declared it as "It is necessary that not (p and not q)". Hence, he developed a modal logic in which "necessary" is a sentence operator.
Solution/Quine: It is best to consider "implies" and "analytical" as general terms that are predicted by sentences by adding them predictively to names (i.e. quotations) of sentences. Unlike "and", "not", "if so" which are not terms but operators.
I 68
Implication/mention/use/Quine: not sentences or schemata are implied, but their names. For we cannot write "implies" between the sentences themselves, but only between their names. So we mention the sentences by using their names. We are talking about the sentences. ((s) Implication is via the sentences.
different:
Conditional/Quine: (">" or "if...then...") here we use the sentences or schemes themselves, we do not mention them. No reference is made to them. They appear only as parts of a longer sentence or schema.
Example: If Cassius is not hungry, then he is not skinny and hungry
This mentions Cassius but not a sentence. It is the same with conjunction, negation and alternation.

VII (e) 82
Mention/Use/Expression/Quine: For example: the expression"(φ I ψ)" is not a formula itself, but a name describing the formula.
VII (f) 112f
Sentence/Schema/Quine: the distinction between sentence and schema is not the same as that between mention/use.
IX 22
Usage/Mention/Quine: to the right of "ε" we use quantifiable variables, to the left of "ε" we mention classes.
X 62
Object language/meta language/mention/use/(s): the object language is mentioned (it is spoken about), the meta language is used to talk about the object language.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Mention Russell V 38
QuineVsRussell: there is a great confusion in Principia Mathematica between use and mention of linguistic expressions: you do not know whether you are talking about the sign or its meaning.
VI 84
Incident/Mention/Use/Russell: "Scott has written Waverley": here, the name "Scott" does not appear in what I say. - What I say is about the person, not the name. - Constituent element of a sentence: E.g. "the unicorn does not exist": "the unicorn" is not a constituent part (part of the reality, unicorn is not a part of a fact).
Hauptwerke der Philosophie. 20. Jahrhundert, Stuttgart 1992
33
Use/mention/QuineVsRussell: in Principia Mathematica there is a widespread confusion between use and mention of linguistic expressions: you don't know if you are talking about the sign or its meaning.

Russell I
B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead
Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986

Russell II
B. Russell
The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969
German Edition:
Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989

Russell IV
B. Russell
The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912
German Edition:
Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967

Russell VI
B. Russell
"The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202
German Edition:
Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus
In
Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993

Russell VII
B. Russell
On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit"
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996

Mention Searle V 116F
SearleVsRussell: his distinction between mention and >use is too strict.
VI 194
Example: Pragmatic analysis/Ross: Further development: certain elements are present in the context of the speech act and syntactic processes can refer to them.
VI 195
SearleVs: this hardly differs from performative analysis.
SearleVsRoss: confusion of mention and use: he confuses the speaker with the "I" that refers to him, the listener with the "you", and the acts with the verbs they indicate.
VI 196
Of course, the formulation of the rules that speakers, listeners and file mention will use these expressions. Ross makes this mistake because he is under the spell of assuming that the rules should only mention syntactic elements. If we abandon this, our alternative theory will become easier:
1. we use independently motivated semantic and "pragmatic" knowledge
2. we do not have to postulate erased syntactic elements.

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Negation Wittgenstein Hintikka I 150
Negation/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: the negation is the same picture - the sense of which is, however, reversed - (polarized) - so that the sentence negation is eliminated. ---
I 150
Negation/Frege/Russell/Hintikka: negations of the predicate eliminate them and instead add the sentence negation - ((s) inner/outer negation equated?) ---
II 51
Negation/Wittgenstein: its meaning can only be expressed through rules of use. ---
II 51
Denial/negation/Wittgenstein: there must be an agreement: E.g. the red light is on its own not the instruction to stop. It must be explained with the help of language. The meaning of "no" can only be expressed in rules that apply to its manner of use.
---
II 72
Negation/explanation/Russell: explained ~ p by saying that ~ p is true when p is false, and vice versa. ---
II 73
Negation/WittgensteinVsRussell: but that is no explanation of negation, because it could also apply to other than the negative sentences. (> Truth table). ---
II 74
Negation/fact/Wittgenstein: what corresponds to the sentence "the door is not open" if it is open? But here a mistaken analogy comes into play, because it is nothing that corresponds to p. And that, what corresponds to ~ p , is not being the case of p. ---
II 75
Denial/negation/understanding/Wittgenstein: the understanding of "no" is like understanding a chess move. ---
II 113
Fact/negation/Wittgenstein: there are no positive or negative facts. "Positive" and "negative" refer to the form of the sentences and not to the facts. ---
II 114
A negative statement has not meaning in the same way as a positive statement; it cannot be described by positive terms and maintain its negative meaning. ---
II 221
Internal negation/Wittgenstein: the statement "this table is green" does not form part of the statement "this table is not green"? - ((s) claim, not sentence) - Wittgenstein: we rather draw a picture. ---
II 234
Generality/general things/general/negation/Wittgenstein: the grammars of the generality and the negation are ambiguous in incredible ways. E.g. "This square is white" I could translate it as: "all the points of this square are white". Then we cannot say: "a point is not white" without introducing new conventions.
Negation/"all"/Wittgenstein: both have different grammars. One has raised the question whether the negation of sentences implies the same as a disjunction of sentences. In certain cases, it is actually so:
E.g. disjunction: "this is one of the primary colors, but not red", which means: "this is white or yellow or green or blue or black." However, there is no disjunction which corresponds to "Schmitz is not in this room".
Double Negation/Wittgenstein: is frequently used in the sense of a simple negation.
E.g. "I like it and I do not like it".
---
II 239
Who says we do not mean them in that sense, is saying that there are different types of double negation. Some say: "the application will be different." But how can one speak of a system of signs, without talking of the application.
E.g. I can lay my hands together so that they are covering each other. But one can ask: How would you like to explain "cover" with or without reference to something that is brought to cover?
---
II 276
Double negation/Wittgenstein: double negation equals affirmation: it is not a determination about our habits, because then it would be a statement of natural history and not even a true one. It may be that the double negation means the negation in a symbol system. ---
II 282
Negation/disjunction/Repertoire/Wittgenstein: if one has a distinct repertoire one can equate negation "not-p" with a disjunction e.g. "q v r v s" - that does not work, with e.g. "not this red here". - Delimited repertoire: E.g. permutations. Philosophy/Wittgenstein: the words "true" and "false" are two words, of which the philosophy was so far dependent.
The philosophy is always based on questions without sense. We can completely abolish true and false. Instead, "sentence" and "negation". ((s)> referential quantification, > semantic ascent).
---
II 288
Shadow/negation/world/reality/figure/Wittgenstein: we believe the sentences must correspond at least with something like a shadow. But nothing is thus obtained. After all, why in the world should there be a shadow of that reality? The confusing of the negation is in the thought, a symbol must correspond to something. How can you know what is meant when no equivalent is there? Nevertheless, you must know what you mean.
---
II 289
Negation/Wittgenstein: E.g. "here is not a chair" corresponds to that here is the place and somewhere in the world are chairs. E.g. "I wish Schmitz may come" erroneous idea: that the sentence must consist of somehow jointed portions, like a box has a bottom and a lid.
---
II 290
Negation/understanding/Wittgenstein: if one has understood "~ p", one must also have understood "p". But if p is false, there is nothing that corresponds to it. What does it mean to understand a command, if you do not follow him? By forming an image one does not get closer to the execution. ---
IV 79
Negation/denial/Tractatus/Wittgenstein: 5,513 one could say, two sentences are opposed to one another if they have nothing in common - and: every sentence has only one negative - ((s)> completeness,> maximum).

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958
German Edition:
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921.
German Edition:
Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960


Hintikka I
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
Investigating Wittgenstein
German Edition:
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Hintikka II
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989
Non-Existence Frege I 47
Nonexistence/Unicorn-example/truth-value gap/Frege: E.g. unicorn: sentences about non-existent objects are without truth value. - Predicates cannot be switched on or be denied. - The thought is the same whether the name refers (>"meaning"/Frege = reference) or not. For the terminology: see Fregean Sense.
V 102
Name/non-existence/Frege: that the name has a reference is not a condition that it belongs to the language - but vice versa.
I 107
Nonexistence/meaning/FregeVsMeinong/FregeVsRussell: there are quite a lot contradictory terms. - Only no contradictory objects. - The logic may determine only the limitation of terms. - That is, for each object, whether it falls within the definition, or not - a contradictory term is used to prove that there is no corresponding object.
IV 110
Nonexistence/Frege: proper names: a name that refers to nothing, is logically meaningless. - But not a concept under which nothing falls - for a name to be entitled it is necessary that the appropriate term is sharp.
IV 111
Therefore the term should precede the scope.

F I
G. Frege
Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987

F II
G. Frege
Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994

F IV
G. Frege
Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993

Non-Existence Rorty I 136
Reference/Nonexistence/Non-existent/Rorty: "talk about anything" in the sense of reference to non-existent is justified. >Secondary extension/Goodman.
VI 217/218
Reference/Non-existence/Singular term/Davidson/Sellars/BrandomVsRussell: each singular term, which has a use is as good as any other - E.g. >unicorn.

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Numbers Wittgenstein II 32
Number/Wittgenstein: not a concept, but a logical form. ---
II 283
Numbers/cardinal/Wittgenstein: that there are infinitely many cardinals, is a rule that one sets up. ---
II 343
Number/Frege/WittgensteinVsFrege: a number is a property of a property. - Problem: E.g. for blue-eyed men in the room. - Then the five would be a property of a property - to be a blue-eyed man in the room - e.g. to express that Hans and Paul are two, they would then have a property in common, which not exactly belongs to the other. - ((s) each would have the property to be different from the other.) - Solution/Frege: the property of being Hans or Paul. ---
II 344
Number/Wittgenstein: are not merely signs. - One can have two items of the form three, but only one number. - ((s) WittgensteinVsFormalism). ---
II 360
Number/Definition/WittgensteinVsRussell: numerical equality is a prerequisite for a clear correspondence. - Therefore, Russell's definition of the number is useless. - ((s) because circular, if you want to define number via illustration). ---
II 361
Definition/Wittgenstein: instead of a definition of "number" we must figure out the rules of usage. ---
II 415
Number/Russell/Wittgenstein: has claimed, 3 is a property that is common to all triads. - ((s) Frege: classes of classes - does Frege not mean objects with classes (instead of properties)?). ---
II 416
Definition number/WittgensteinVsRussell: the number is an attribute of a function which defines a class, not a property of the extension. - E.g. Extension: it would be a tautology to say, ABC is three. - In contrast, meaingful: to say, in this room are three people. ---
IV 93
Definition number/numbers/Wittgenstein/Tractatus: 6,021 - the number is the exponent of an operation.
Waismann I 66
Def natürlichen Zahlen/Wittgenstein: diejenigen, auf die man die Induktion bei Beweisen anwenden kann.

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958
German Edition:
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921.
German Edition:
Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960


Waismann I
F. Waismann
Einführung in das mathematische Denken Darmstadt 1996

Waismann II
F. Waismann
Logik, Sprache, Philosophie Stuttgart 1976
Objects (Material Things) Russell Geach I 314
Definition Object/Definition Person/Russell: (logical atomism): an object is a set of classes of particulars, and therefore a logical fiction - "Real things only last a very short time" - GeachVsRussell: he tried to apply two theories of classes at once: 1. the "no-classes theory" that classes are only fictions - 2. the "composition theory": that classes are composed of their elements.

Russell I
B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead
Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986

Russell II
B. Russell
The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969
German Edition:
Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989

Russell IV
B. Russell
The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912
German Edition:
Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967

Russell VI
B. Russell
"The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202
German Edition:
Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus
In
Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993

Russell VII
B. Russell
On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit"
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996


Gea I
P.T. Geach
Logic Matters Oxford 1972
Particulars Strawson Graeser I 163
Particulars/Strawson: Particulars have priority in our conceptual system - ability to attribute consciousness to predicates necessary. Condition for them for physical predicates. ---
Graeser I 224
Strawson: These particulars take precedence of processes or events that we could not identify without them. ---
Newen/Schrenk I 150
VsStrawson/Newen/Schrenk: why should just particulars be the most fundamental reference objects of subject terms and not events? - Strawson: because objects are recognizable after some time - his arguments are transcendental. ---
Strawson I 35 ~
Particular/Strawson: as long as it is isolated from the rest of the knowledge, we can learn nothing new about it. ---
I 51
Particular/Strawson: is there a class of particular on which all others depend? - Maybe dependent "private particular" - Elementary: Class of People - Tradition: private particular: "Emotions" fundamental. ---
I 52
Principium indivduationis/Strawson: is based on identity of persons. ---
I 70
Particular/Strawson: material bodies: fundamental for the identification - not for process - StrawsonVsRussell: not biography instead of the names. ---
I 72
Description of particular does not force to mention the process - but identification dependency of processes of the particulars in which they take place - because things require space, processes not always. ---
I 175
Particular/properties/Strawson: one cannot only refer identifying to particulars - VsTradition: therefore object character is not a criterion for particulars. ---
I 176 RamseyVs
Particular/properties/RamseyVsTradition: from the fact that two things are linked, it does not follow that they must have different characters - Strawson:> 1. grammatical criterion for distinguishing between things and activities - 2. categorical criterion.

Strawson I
Peter F. Strawson
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959
German Edition:
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Strawson II
Peter F. Strawson
"Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit",
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Strawson III
Peter F. Strawson
"On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Strawson IV
Peter F. Strawson
Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992
German Edition:
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Strawson V
P.F. Strawson
The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966
German Edition:
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Strawson VI
Peter F Strawson
Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Strawson VII
Peter F Strawson
"On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950)
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993


Grae I
A. Graeser
Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002
Parts Russell I XVI
Part/whole/mereology/GödelVsRussell: a part may be identical with the whole: - e.g. the structure of the series of integers contains itself as a special part.

Russell I
B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead
Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986

Russell II
B. Russell
The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969
German Edition:
Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989

Russell IV
B. Russell
The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912
German Edition:
Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967

Russell VI
B. Russell
"The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202
German Edition:
Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus
In
Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993

Russell VII
B. Russell
On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit"
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996

Possibility Wittgenstein II 31
Possibility/Wittgenstein: we must not say: "A sentence p is possible." If p was not possible, it would not even be a sentence.
II 139
Possibility/Novelty/News/Wittgenstein: we discover new facts, not new possibilities. There is no point asking if red exists.
II 167/168
Possibility/Necessity/Realism/Idealism/Wittgenstein: in the arguments of idealists and realists the words "can", "cannot" and "must" always appear somewhere. However, no attempt is made to prove their theories through experience. The words "possibility" and "necessity" express a piece of grammar, but they are formed according to the pattern of "physical possibility".
II 228
Possibility/Wittgenstein: we tend to see a possibility as something that exists in nature. "This is possible" here, the real is a certain picture.
II 229
For example, "it is potentially present" gives the impression that we have given an explanation that goes beyond the possibility. But in reality, we have only replaced one expression with another.
II 235
Possible/impossible/possibility/meaning/Wittgenstein: this is in a certain sense arbitrary. We say nobody sits in that chair, but someone could be sitting there. That means: the sentence "someone sits on this chair" makes sense.
II 359
Possibility/Wittgenstein: by this we mean logically possible. Where can we look for the phenomenon of possibility? What justifies a symbolism is its usefulness.
II 362
Possibility/Assignment/Wittgenstein: the possibility of assignment itself seems to be a kind of assignment.
IV 19
Thinking/Possibility/Logic/Tractatus: 3.02 What is conceivable is also possible. 3,031 It was said: God could do anything, but nothing that would be contrary to the logical laws. For we could not say what an "illogical world" would look like.
IV 20
3.032 Something "contrary to logic" cannot be depicted, nor can a figure in geometry whose coordinates contradict the laws of space.
IV 20
Tractatus: 3.13 the sentence includes everything that belongs to projection, but not what is projected.
IV 21
So the possibility of the projected, not this itself. The sentence does not yet contain its meaning, but the possibility of expressing it.
IV 81
Possibility/WittgensteinVsRussell/Tractatus: 5.525 It is incorrect to reproduce the sentence "(Ex).fx" as "fx is possible". - Possibility: is expressed by the fact that a sentence makes sense. Impossibility: by the fact that the sentence is a contradiction.
VI 113
Possibility/Wittgenstein/Schulte: everything that is possible at all is also legitimate. Example: Why is "Socrates is Plato" nonsense?
Because we have not made an arbitrary determination, but not because the sign itself is illegitimate.

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958
German Edition:
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921.
German Edition:
Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960

Predicates Wittgenstein II 80
Predicates/Wittgenstein: the use of predicates is always misleading in logic, since it indicates different "types" of terms, etc., which are differentiated by predicates, for example: "formally confirmed", "internal relations". The description by predicates must have the possibility that it is different!
II 82
Experience/Wittgenstein: is not distinguished by predicates from what is not experience. It is a logical term, not a term like "chair" or "table".
II 157
Individual/Atom/Atoms/Wittgenstein: Russell and I, we both expected to come across the basic elements ("individuals") through the logical analysis. Russell believed that in the end subject-predicate sentences and double-digit relations would result. WittgensteinVsRussell: this is a mistaken idea of logical analysis: like a chemical analysis. WittgensteinVsAtomism.
II 306f
Predicate/WittgensteinVsRussell: For example "man" should not be used as a predicate - otherwise the subject would become a proper name. "Man" as a predicate: at best for a disguised woman.
II 307
"Man" as a predicate cannot be denied to its wearer.
Hintikka I 64
Colour predicates/Colour Words/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: at first glance, their incompatibility violates Wittgenstein's principle of independence from elementary propositions.
I 65
Hintikka: but from the logical simplicity of the colours does not follow that they do not have a "logical form" that allows only some connection possibilities and others do not. The problem is only to design an appropriate symbolism that reflects the scope.
I 71
Def Existence/Wittgenstein: a predicate of higher order is articulated only by the existential quantifier. (Frege ditto).
I 72
Hintikka: Many philosophers think that this is only a technical implementation of the older idea that existence is not a predicate.
I 156 et seqq.
Phenomenology/Atomism/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: there is often the view that a phenomenalistic or phenomenological interpretation of the Tractatus is made impossible by the phenomenon of color incompatibility and also otherwise by any other apparent dependence between simple phenomenalistic predicates of the same kind. (HintikkaVs) Colours/Predicates/Colour Incompatibility/Hintikka: In this view, "red" and "green" cannot refer to simple objects, because otherwise the two elementary propositions "this is red" and "this is green", which are mutually exclusive, would not be independent of each other.
But this is not possible according to 2,062: "The existence or non-existence of one fact cannot be taken as an indication of the existence or non-existence of another.
I 170
Form/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: Wittgenstein understands form as something that can be illustrated by a suitable logical notation. For example, the difference between a two-digit and a one-digit predicate. In 5.55 ff Wittgenstein argues that such differences in form cannot be predicted a priori.
I 172
Colour/colour words/Colour concepts/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: it is clear that he insists that colour attributions have no subject-predicate form.
VI 70
Elementary Proposition/Tractatus/Schulte: are not ordinary sentences, they are characterized by the fact that they cannot contradict each other. (Tractatus4.211). 1. This is the first time said that they do not contain any logical particles, otherwise they would have to contradict each other!
2. Their components do not have any complexes, otherwise it would be possible to derive an objection.
Accordingly, there are no predicates ("table", "left of") in elementary propositions!
What does remain?
"The elementary proposition consists of names." (Tractatus 4.22).

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958
German Edition:
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921.
German Edition:
Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960


Hintikka I
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
Investigating Wittgenstein
German Edition:
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Hintikka II
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989
Proper Names Frege I 54
Proper name/Frege: the extension is presumed. - Otherwise, the negation would be: "Kepler did not die in misery or the name is meaningless".
II 69
The "meaning" of a name is never a concept (predicate), but always only an object.
II 72f
Proper name/Frege: (saturated) can never be a predicate (but part of a predicate). Names/understanding/Frege: understanding a name means to know what object it denotes. Problem: names without a carriers (E.g. unicorn). - Problem: E.g. Different names with the same carrier.
V 99/100
The fact that a name stands for an object is a consequence rather than part of the fact that it has a certain sense.
Chisholm II 144f
Names/Frege: "mixed proper name": contains linguistic and non-linguistic parts: the circumstances. - Circumstances: part of the meaning of an expression. - ChisholmVsFrege: he neglects ostension.
Dummett III 68f
Names/FregeVsRussell: may well have the same sense as a specific description - what is actually considered to be a representation of an object: Valencia from the air, from the ground, within a specific buildin,g on the map? - Recognition: necessary: ​​the awareness that the object falls under the concept that determines the proper identity criterion (here: "city"). - Ability for recognition instead method of picking out. - ("red": recognition, not method for red).
Frege II 69
Name/Frege: can never be a predicate - but certainly part of a predicate.
Stalnaker I 183
Names/Proper Names/Frege/Stalnaker: for him there is a mental representation, i.e. we only have ideas about something that presents itself to us in a certain way. - ((s) This can be reconciled with Donnellan’s attributive use).

F I
G. Frege
Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987

F II
G. Frege
Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994

F IV
G. Frege
Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993


Chisholm I
R. Chisholm
The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981
German Edition:
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chisholm II
Roderick Chisholm

In
Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986

Chisholm III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989
German Edition:
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004

Dummett I
M. Dummett
The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988
German Edition:
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Dummett II
Michael Dummett
"What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii)
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Dummett III
M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (a)
Michael Dummett
"Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (b)
Michael Dummett
"Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144
In
Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (c)
Michael Dummett
"What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (d)
Michael Dummett
"Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (e)
Michael Dummett
"Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Stalnaker I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Proper Names Geach I 46f
Name/Aristotle/Geach: direct reference, no parts (Aristotle: syntactically simple) (Geach ditto) - description: indirect reference, mediation of other characters. ---
I 143
Calculus of Natural Deduction/Gentzen/Geach: here there are "possible names" (> "introduction of existence"). - But not quantification over it. - GeachVsQuine: so he can no longer regard names as "hidden descriptions". ---
I 155
Names/Geach: not knowing the causal chain is important, but its existence. - The right to use a name can exist, even if one does not know that. - Russell: a proper name must name something (Geach dito). - GeachVsRussell: but then he makes a wrong conclusion: "only a name that has to name something is a name". - Just as wrong: fallacy of "what one knows, must be" to "only what must be like this, can be known". ---
I 162
Quasi-names/Geach: in encyclopedias, for foreign gods - (Geach pro) - Quasi-names appear only in object position after intentional verbs. - No "second order existence". - There is no identy criterion to decide whether different peoples worship the same God. ---
I 208
Names/Geach: whether something is a proper name does not depend on who it is given to. - Quasi quotation: is not a name.

Gea I
P.T. Geach
Logic Matters Oxford 1972

Proper Names Prior I 119 ff
Names/Hobbes: are names of our ideas - MillVsHobbes: convey to the others, what we think of someone (something), not only about our idea. - The idea of fire does not cause the heat, even though I must have terms to think. ---
I 158ff
Name/existence/Prior: Vs the thesis, "Name is all what intends to identify a real object": Problem: indirect speech: E.g. The spokesperson believes Holmes exist, but the listener does not: then the speaker is in a position to identify Holmes the listener is not but then the listener cannot tell what the speaker has said (absurd). ---
I 168
Names/KennyVsRussell: covert markings in "B exists". PriorVsKenny: when names must name something then no name can be used in indirect speech with a known non-existence.
---
I 168ff
Theory/PriorVsKenny: cannot set up his own theory. - Kenny Thesis: names must intend reference - then the theorist himself cannot even intend to use the name if he talks in his example sentences of non-existent persons.

Pri I
A. Prior
Objects of thought Oxford 1971

Pri II
Arthur N. Prior
Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003

Proper Names Searle II 288
Names/Searle: presuppose any other representation - have no explicit intentional content.
II 291 ff
Names: SearleVsKripke: VsCausal Theory: exaggerates analogy between reference and perception - overweights parasitic cases - presupposes omniscient observer - Meteorology baptizes future events.
II 291 ff
Names: Mill: no connotation, only denotation - Frege: meaning of a name is detected by description. >Descriptions.
II 292
Names/SearleVsKripke: causal chain can only be detected intentionally: by speaker's intention - causal chain not pure, self-descriptive - baptism itself cannot be causal, otherwise successful reference explained by successful reference (circular).
II 311
Names/meaning/reference/Searle: E.g. Goedel/Schmidt: intentional content determines reference: "discoverer, no matter what his name is" - we speak of the person who has been recognized by his contemporaries - E.g. swapped spots: Identification: "the spot that causes the experience" - Variant: forgotten: "the one I was formerly able to identify as A."
Wolf II 168
Names/Searle: meaning stays ambigious, half of the descriptions could be true - we cannot determine in advance what characteristics apply to Aristotle - (Strawson ditto) - Zink: but then we would say that we do not know the name - solution/Zink: Localisation. ---
Searle V 145
Names/SearleVsMill: it is wrong, that proper names would be "meaningless characters" that they were "denotative" but not "connotative".
V 145
There can be no facts about an independently identified object by facts - otherwise one is approaching traditional substance - Identification/SearleVsTractatus: objects cannot be identified, regardless of facts.
V 245
Names/SearleVsRussell: if they should not contain any description (description), we must unfortunately assume substances. - From the supposed distinction between names and descriptions the metaphysical distinction is derived between object and properties - Tractatus: the name means the object, the object is its meaning - SearleVsWittgenstein.
V 247
Names/Mill: have no sense - FregeVsMill: E.g. then Mt. Everest would be = Gaurisankar, not more informative than Everest = Everest - FregeVs, SearleVs - Searle: names do not describe properties of objects - identity Everest = Tschomolungma provided no other information.
V 256
Names/SearleVsFrege: not entirely clear - E.g. morning star/evening star are actually on the border to description.- SearleVsKripke: names not rigid, otherwise like logical equivalents - Searle: names are there, because it is necessary, to seperate the indicative from the predicative function.

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005


K II siehe Wol I
U. Wolf (Hg)
Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993
Proper Names Strawson VII 16
Names/Strawson: proper names have no meaning. Ignorance of the name is not linguistic ignorance. ---
I 222
Names/adjective/Strawson: also names can be adjectival: E.g. Napoleonic, Russian, even with auxiliary verb is a Hitler. ---
I 224
But: Napoleonic gesture is not connecting gesture with Napoleon but between gesture and similarity principle of the summary which is made possible by Napoleon - but: Ramsey we probably say wisdom is a characteristic of Socrates, but not: wisdom sokratizes (wrong) - particular cannot be predicted - Solution: Language has a pseudo-universal: be feature of. ---
I 226
Only pseudo-universal. otherwise regress: characterized through being characterized by... ---
VI 386 ~
Names/general term/Strawson: cannot be derived syntactically. ---
VII 113
Names/Strawson: Meaning not object - (confusion of utterance and use) - Reference: Expressions plus context - referencing does not mean to say that you refer - (steps). ---
VII 122
StrawsonVsRussell/VsQuine: Summit of circularity: names to treat as camouflaged descriptions - names are chosen arbitrarily or conventionally - otherwise names would be descriptive. ---
VII 122
Quasi names/Strawson: Glorious Revolution, Blue Grotto, Patriotic War.

Strawson I
Peter F. Strawson
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959
German Edition:
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Strawson II
Peter F. Strawson
"Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit",
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Strawson III
Peter F. Strawson
"On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Strawson IV
Peter F. Strawson
Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992
German Edition:
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Strawson V
P.F. Strawson
The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966
German Edition:
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Strawson VI
Peter F Strawson
Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Strawson VII
Peter F Strawson
"On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950)
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

Properties Quine Rorty VI 151
Major property/holism/Quine/Rorty: at best: "property, which is necessary for the use of a certain description" - but not: "property, which is necessary for the identity of an object with itself." ---
Quine I 43
Features: independent existence is pointless. ---
I 218
Mass Terminus/Quine: is archaic(> (> E. Cassirer, Philosophie der symbolischen Formen, Berlin 1923-1929))) - Properties: a) is commonality decisive? b) Is it about cattered clumps? ---
I 217
Features: usually merely convenient abbreviations for long cross-references - Quine/Cassirer: features of archaic remains. ---
I 219
Not all abstract objects are properties: numbers, classes, functions, geometric figures, ideas, possibilities - give up or trace back abstract objects - faithfully distinguished of concrete objects by use of "-ness". ---
I 322
Property abstraction (elimination) instead of "a = x(..x..)" - new: irreducible two-digit operator "0": "a0x(..x..)" - variables remain as the only ones - primacy of the pronoun. ---
I 344/45
Properties/Quine: no necessary or contingent properties (VsModal logic) - only more or less important properties. ---
I 344
Properties/relations: meaning of timeless open sentences - is unidentifiable (How-propositions). ---
I 361
Elimination of relations and properties in favor of classes of ordered pairs, open sentences, general terms - even scattered objects (in the case of color) (46). ---
I 412
QuineVsProperties: fallacy of subtraction: to derive existence from "about" and "deals with" - "round" and "dog" are terms for physical objects - but no additional features. "Round" and "dog" general terms for objects not singular terms for properties or classes. The same argument would be for classes instead of properties: general term symbolizes its extension as well as its intension.
---
I 412
Properties: not every general term is necessarily about properties or classes - properties and classes are acceptable as values of variables. ---
I 464
QuineVsRussell/Whitehead: theory of incomplete symbols: eliminated classes only in favor of properties. ---
II 129f
Properties: hard to individuate - not to define like classes by the same elements - various properties can get to the same things. properties: "Zettsky" (like Russell): properties identical when they were members of the same classes - QuineVs - solution: property identical if two sentences ↔ (follow seperately) - unsatisfactory, less analyticity and necessity-operator.
Properties/Quine: identical when coextensive-classes: are not specified by elements, but by condition of containment (open sentence).
Property is not the same as predicate - property: open sentences - propositions: completed sentences.
Properties not the same as classes: since no individuation principle for properties - solution "last classes" (do not belong to any other class, only have elements themselves) - like Russell: statement function only comes through their values - properties = last classes or properties = statement function.
Properties as last classes every element of the zero class, therefore all identical? - Vs: this identity definition only applies to theories that allow no objects who belong to no class (Unicorn).
Properties/identity: (here) interchangeability in all contexts - Prerequisite: exhaustion of a finite lexicon by interchangeability of atomic contexts - RyleVs: Category confusion.
Properties: QuineVsCarnap/Russell: minimize grammatical categories, expand scope - if all can be attributed to "has", then all properties are extensional - rest could be listed by list.
Properties: contexts with "has" unproblematic - "contained in" prohibited (less classes) - "is" leads to circular definition of properties - properties do not count. "Nap had all properties but one": prohibited. - however: "all properties" allowed.
---
II 144 f
De re: E.g. spy should be an essential property (wrong) - no belief de re (essential property). Modal logic/Quine: entire modal logic is context-dependent - what role does someone or something play? - Same level as essential properties.
Necessity/Quine: the whole concept is only meaningful in context.
Property Einstein/Quine: are preserved. - But not de re.
---
X 95
Properties/Quine: do not exist for lack of distinctness (only amounts) - "synonymy unclear" - open sentences that apply to the same objects never determine different amounts, but differnt properties could underlie.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987


Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Propositional Functions Quine IX 178
Propositional function/Principia Mathematica/Theoretical Terms/Russell: name for attributes and relations - "f", "y"... as variables - i.e. that x has the attribute f, that x is to y in the relation y, etc. "fx",y(x,y)", etc. - ^x: to abstract propositional function from statements he just inserted variables with an accent circonflexe into the argument positions - E.g. the attribute to love: "^x loves y" E.g. to be loved: "x loves ^y" (active/passive, without classes!) (>lambda notation/(s) Third Way between Russell and Quinean classes) - Analog in class abstraction: "{x: x loves y}", "{y: x loves y}" - E.g. relation of loving: "{: x loves y}" or "{: x loves}". Abstraction: Problem: in wider contexts sometimes you have no clues as to whether a variable ^x should be understood as if it caused an abstraction of a short or a longer clause - Solution/Russell: Context Definition - statement function must not occur as a value of bound variables that are used to describe it - it must always have too high an order to be a value for such variables - characteristic back and forth between sign and object: the propositional function receives its order from the abstracting expression, and the order of the variables is the order of the values. ---
IX 185
Propositional function/Attribute/Predicate/Theoretical Terms/QuineVsRussell: overlooked the following difference and its analogues: a) "propositional functions": as attributes (or intensional relations) and
b) proposition functions": as expressions, i.e. predicates (and open statements: E.g. "x is mortal") - accordingly:
a) attributes
b) open statements - solution/Quine: allow an expression of higher order to refer straight away to an attribute or a relation of lower order.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Propositions Russell Horwich I 54
Proposition/Russell: is a complex entity with components: E.g. Smith is taller than Brown: Smith, Brown, the relation taller than - E.g. Brown is smaller than Smith: is therefore equivalent, but is different in all three components! - Letter to Frege: the mountain literally appears in the proposition - Cartwright: thoughts/Frege: are not the same as Russell’s propositions - they do not contain their objects - ((s) ."...but their sense").
Horwich I 56
Proposition/Russell/Cartwright: how can a proposition be wrong if it consists of the components and the nature of their connection? - Solution/Russell: another quality - CartwrightVs: which had already been rejected.
Horwich I 59
Proposition/Principia Mathematica/Russell: φ x (requires function) - Propositional function: φ x^ - not ambiguous - the values ​​are all propositions of the form j x.
Horwich I 60
I.e. the symbol φ (φx^) must not express a proposition as does indeed, if a is a value for φ x^ - indeed j(jx^) must be a symbol that expresses nothing, it is pointless - (neither true nor false) - E.g. -the function- is a human is a human.
Horwich I 60f
Proposition/propositional function/Principia Mathematica/Russell: The symbol (x).j x shall always express the proposition φ x, i.e. the proposition that claims all values ​​for φ x^.
Horwich I 61
This proposition presupposes the function j x^, not just an ambiguous value of the function - the assertion of φ x, where x is not specified, is different from that which claims all values for φ x^, because the former is an ambiguous assertion, and the latter is not ambiguous in any sense. (1)
1. R. Cartwright, „A Neglected Theory of Truth“ , Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93 in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth, Aldershot 1994

Russell I 125
Proposition/Function/Extensional/Tractatus/Wittgenstein: functions of propositions are always truth functions - a function can only occur in a proposition by means of its values. (see above ​​extensional) - consequence: all functions of functions are extensional. E.g. A believes p is not a function of p - (Tractatus 19-20) - ((s) VsRussell: (see above) > Waverley, functions are equivalent, but not identical, because George IV did not want to know if Scott = Scott - ((s) being believed is not a function of the believed object) - ((s)> extrinsic properties, extrinsic) - ((s)> Function of a function of higher level).

Russell I
B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead
Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986

Russell II
B. Russell
The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969
German Edition:
Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989

Russell IV
B. Russell
The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912
German Edition:
Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967

Russell VI
B. Russell
"The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202
German Edition:
Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus
In
Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993

Russell VII
B. Russell
On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit"
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996


Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Qualities Wittgenstein Hintikka I 113
Quality/Wittgenstein: at least some statements in which a degree is attributed to an experienced quality is also an atomic sentence. Elementary Proposition/Wittgenstein's example for elementary propositions: "Here is green". (> Sentences/Strawson, Statements/Strawson, Attribution/Strawson).
I 202
Quality/Experience/Carnap/Hintikka: the base of the "logical" structure: is made of rows of temporary total experiences out of which qualities are formed - unlike sense data. CarnapVsRussell: individual experience must be added: "sensation". Hintikka: these are similar to the objects of Wittgenstein. Difference: Carnap: ephemeral, psychologically - Wittgenstein: is not temporal but a substance of the world. Sensation/Carnap: sensation belongs to psychology, quality belongs to the phenomenology and theory of objects. Phenomenology/Carnap: is a holistic analysis of the experience.
I 202 ff
Quality/Experience/Carnap/Hintikka: the basis of Carnap's "Construction" is a series of current overall experiences from which qualities are formed.
I 203
But not even qualities resemble the sense data of Russell's conception. CarnapVsRussell/CarnapVsSense Data/Carnap: individual experience must be added.
Carnap: "If we want to distinguish the two similar components of the two elementary experiences, we must not only describe them according to their quality, but also add the indication of the elementary experience to which they belong.
Only such a component is an individual component in the true sense, we want to call it "sensation" in contrast to the component that is represented in the quality class according to its quality only.
These "sensations" are thus similar to Wittgenstein's objects. But according to Carnap, they are ephemeral, subjective and time-bound,
while the Tractatus objects form the non-temporal "objective" substance of the world.
According to Carnap: "Sensations belong to the field of psychology, qualities to phenomenology or object theory".
Phenomenology/Carnap/Hintikka: in Carnap limited to a holistic analysis of experience.
II 138
Atomism/VsAtomism/Self-criticism/WittgensteinVsTractatus: it was a mistake that there were elementary propositions into which all propositions could be broken down. This error has two roots: 1. That infinity is understood as a number, and assuming there is an infinite number of sentences.
2. Statements that express degrees of quality. ((s) They do not have to exclude every other sentence. Therefore, they cannot be independent).
III 141
Def Fact/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Flor: Combination of simple objects without quality features! The facts are completely independent of each other. Example: in the Tractatus there is neither an example for a fact nor for an object! The representation of all objects in proportion to their positions also covers all facts.
III 142
There must be an absolute distinction between the simple and the complex.

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958
German Edition:
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921.
German Edition:
Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960


Hintikka I
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
Investigating Wittgenstein
German Edition:
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Hintikka II
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989
Quantification Quine I 283
Indefinite singular term: quantification disappears in "something is an x such that", "everything is an x ..". ---
I 316
Paraphrases by quantification uncover false existence assumptions. ---
VI 41
Quantification/Quine/(s) is a postulation of objects. ---
X 94
Quantification/variable/Quine: in the open sentence after the quantifier "x" stands at a point where a name could be - E.g. also names of numbers - the sentences do not say that names or numbers are walking- "EF" does not say, "is a predicate such and such", but an object that is called by the predicate is so and so" - this object could be a property (pro Frege ) - VsRussell : but not a predicate - mixing up of representation (schema) and quantification (talking about). ---
X 104
Apparent Quantification/Quine : Apparent values ​​of the new quantifiable variables " p", " q ", etc.: truth values - then sentences are exceptionally names of these apparent objects - we can quantify over apparent objects - apparent objects arise from context definition. ---
Lauener XI 38
Quantification/Lauener/(s): truth values can only be attributed to quantified sentences.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987


Q XI
H. Lauener
Willard Van Orman Quine München 1982
Quantifiers Russell Hintikka I 173
Quantification/quantifier/acquaintance/description/Russell/Hintikka: in Russell, the quantifiers (or the domain of bound variables) go only via objects of the acquaintance. ((s) physically present things). Description/Theory of Description/Russell: descriptions are eliminated in the context in favor of quantifiers. There are only quantifiers and bound variables.
Russell/Hintikka: one could paraphrase it as the following: the concept "is always true" is the only one occuring in propositions which originally contained certain descriptions.
Power/Russell/Hintikka: the force ((s) semantic force) of the reduced propositions depends on the individual range of the variable.
N.B./Hintikka: now it is only a part of the story that Russell has successfully eliminated non-existent objects (E.g., the current King of France is bald). His reduction continues:
Quantifier/Russell/Hintikka: the quantifiers go only via objects of the acquaintance. ((s) objects of which we only know by description are not allowed, they cannot be quantified via according to Russell, which is more than the elimination of non-existent objects because there are also existing objects which we know only by description).
Hintikka I 173
Denotation/Russell/Hintikka: N.B.: a brilliant feature of Russell's theory of the denotation of 1905 is that it is the quantifiers which denote! Theory of Description/Russell: (end of "On Denoting") Thesis: contains the reduction of descriptions on objects of acquaintance.
I 174
Hintikka: this connection is astonishing. It also appears to be circular, only to admit objects of acquaintance. Solution: we must see what successfully denotating phrases actually denote: they denote objects of acquaintance.
Ambiguity/uniqueness/Hintikka: it is precisely ambiguity that leads to the failure of the existential generalization.
E.g. Waverley/Russell/Hintikka: that only objects of acquaintance are allowed, shows his own example: "the author of Waverley" in (1) is actually a primary event, i.e. his example (2).
"Whether"/Russell/Hintikka: only difference: wanted to know "whether" instead of "did not know".
Secondary Description/Russell: can also be expressed in the way that George wanted to know from the man who actually wrote Waverley whether he was Scott.
I 175
That would be the case if George IV had seen Scott (at a distance) and had asked "Is that Scott?". HintikkaVsRussell: why does Russell choose an example with a perceptually known individual? Do we not normally deal with individuals of flesh and blood, whose identity is known to us, rather than merely with perceptual objects?
Knowledge who/knowledge what/perception object/Russell/Hintikka: precisely in the case of perception objects, it seems as if the kind of uniqueness that we need for a knowledge-who does not exist.
Hintikka I 178
Quantifier/Quantification/HintikkaVsRussell: Russell systematically confuses two types of quantifiers. (A) of the acquaintance, (B) of the description. Problem: Russell had not realized that the difference cannot be defined solely in relation to the actual world!
Solution/Hintikka: we need a relativization to sets of possible worlds, which change with the different propositional attitudes.
Hintikka I 180
Elimination/Eliminability/HintikkaVsRussell/Hintikka: in order to eliminate merely seemingly denotating descriptions, one must assume that the quantifiers and bound variables go via individuals that are identified descriptively. ((s) >intensional object ). Otherwise the real Bismarck would not be an admissible value of the variables with which we express that there is an individual of a certain kind.
Problem: then these quantifiers must not be constituents of the propositions, for their range of values consists not merely of objects of acquaintance. So Russell's mistake was a twofold one.

1.
Quantifier/Variable/Russell/Hintikka: by 1905 he had already stopped thinking that quantifiers and bound variables are real constituents of propositions. Definition apparent/Russell/Hintikka: = bound variable.

2.
Acquaintance/Russell: values of the variables should only be objects of the acquaintance. (HintikkaVsRussell).

Hintikka I 180
Quantifiers/HintikkaVsRussell: now we can see why Russell did not distinguish between different quantifiers (acquaintance/description): for him, quantifiers were only notational patterns, and for them it is not necessary to define the range of possible interpretation, therefore it does not make a difference when the domain changes! Quantification/Russell: for him it was implicitly objective (referential), in any case not substitutional.

Russell I
B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead
Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986

Russell II
B. Russell
The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969
German Edition:
Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989

Russell IV
B. Russell
The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912
German Edition:
Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967

Russell VI
B. Russell
"The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202
German Edition:
Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus
In
Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993

Russell VII
B. Russell
On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit"
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996


Hintikka I
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
Investigating Wittgenstein
German Edition:
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Hintikka II
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989
Reductionism Logic Texts Re III 28
Reductionism: which was central for Wittgenstein. For Russell it was quite clear that the assumption of an additional fact between two statements was absurd and unnecessary: E.g. "Kennedy is President," and "Oswald killed Kennedy," a third fact, a sort of conjunctural fact that makes the connection absurd and lavish.
---
Re III 28
If you know the two separate facts, you learn nothing new when you connect them. There is no extra fact behind the link, which is added to the separated facts. Similar to disjunctive. What makes "A or B" true is not another strange disjunctive fact, but exactly the same fact that makes one of the two limbs true! Otherwise regress.
---
Re III 30
Reductionism: would have to declare the truth of a negative statement like "Ruby did not kill Kennedy" as the result of the truth of another statement that would be incompatible with "Ruby killed Kennedy." ---
Re III 31
RussellVsReductionism: argues against such argumentation that a regress threatens: "B is incompatible with A" is itself a negative statement. To explain its truth, we would need a third statement C which is incompatible with "C is compatible with A," and so on. ReadVsRussell: this is a strange objection, because it would also be valid against any conjunction. And then truth conditions for conjunctive and disjunctive statements must not be subjunctive or disjunctive.
Logic Texts
Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988
HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998
Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997
Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logik Stuttgart 1983
Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001
Reference Chisholm I 51
Each kind of reference can be understood with the help of self-attribution. - 1. the one who means must be able to make himself an object; 2. He must understand propositions and facts; - direct attribution (self-attribution) original form of all attribution. ---
I 133
But not yet self-consciousness: in addition, knowledge that it is the subject itself, to which the property is attributed. ---
Chisholm II M.David/L. Stubenberg (Hg) Philosophische Aufsätze zu Ehren von R.M. Chisholm Graz 1986

II 112/113
Reference/Brandl: other way of reference, depending on whether description or acquaintance - the latter allows reference without information, or even to ignore information - BrandlVsRussell: different motivation of the distinction. Between the appearance of the object and our knowledge of how the object is the cause of the phenomenon. Description allows us to exceed the limits of our experience.
II 24
really / Rutte: 1 this way of appearing, - 2 arranged in the way it appears - 3rd the right causation - reality must be distinguished from the outside world.
II 105f
Reference/Reference/Brandl: by sign or speaker? by speaker - Strawson: dito, so use of the sign refers, not the sign - problem: intentionality would have to explain sign - BrandlVsChisholm: thesis: it is no use to decide whether the linguistic or psychological (intentionality) should have primacy - directedness is incomprehensible if the designation of the words has not yet been introduced. - A separation of the areas would either lead to total behaviorism or psychologism. ---
II 107
"Unity" would also not explain anything. - Also here question about primacy: either "thinking of" or talking about objects. - Solution: differentiate different kinds of singular term for different types of reference - but only a kind of intentionality. ---
II 108
Domain/Russell: non-singular propositions are always related to a domain of objects, not unambiguous - singular propositions: contain the object as a genuine component" (by acquaintance) - QuineVsRussell: confusion of mention and use.

Chisholm I
R. Chisholm
The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981
German Edition:
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chisholm II
Roderick Chisholm

In
Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986

Chisholm III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989
German Edition:
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004

Russell’s Paradox Wittgenstein IV 29
Russell's paradox/WittgensteinVsRussell/Tractatus: instead of "F(F(u))" we write "(Eφ):F(φu).ψu = Fu". - (Solution).

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958
German Edition:
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921.
German Edition:
Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960

Scheme/Content Rorty ~ I 133ff
Scheme/content/3rd Dogma/world/Rorty: we cannot specify which "joints" of nature belong to the content and which to the scheme. >Content, >Conceptual Scheme.
I 285
Truth/world/Russell/Rorty: thesis: every true statement contains both our own contribution and a contribution from the world - 1) DavidsonVsRussell: Vsthird Dogma: separation of scheme and content. There is no content that is waiting to be organized - 2) PutnamVsRussell. >Two Dogmas.
I 338
However, we have found no intelligible basis from which could be said that schemes are different. But with that we do not reveal the idea of an objective truth, quite the opposite! Without the dogma (scheme/content) this kind of relativity goes overboard. We do not reveal the world, but restore the direct contact with the familiar objects.

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Scope Russell Hintikka I 166
Scope/HintikkaVsRussell: he did not know that there is also a third possibility for the scope of a quantifier ((s) "medium range"/Kripke).

(4) ~(Ex)[A(x) & (y)(A(y) > y = x ) & George IV knew, that (Scott = x)].

Russell I
B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead
Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986

Russell II
B. Russell
The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969
German Edition:
Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989

Russell IV
B. Russell
The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912
German Edition:
Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967

Russell VI
B. Russell
"The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202
German Edition:
Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus
In
Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993

Russell VII
B. Russell
On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit"
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996


Hintikka I
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
Investigating Wittgenstein
German Edition:
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Hintikka II
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989
Scope Hintikka II 166
Scope/HintikkaVsRussell: he did not know that there is a third possibility for the scope of a quantifier ((s) > "medium scope"/Kripke).
(4) ~ (Ex)[A(x) & (y)(A(y) > y = x) & George IV knew that (Scott = x)].

Hintikka I
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
Investigating Wittgenstein
German Edition:
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Hintikka II
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

Sense Data Theory Quine I 19
QuineVsSense-Data Theory: immediate experience is not coherent, autonomous region.
I 404
VsSensory Data: intermediate instances do not explain anything. - Not necessary for the description of illusions - not a substitute for physical objects - double standards: linking to objects/utility - Complete knowledge of sense data guaranteed no translation. ---
II 107
Atomic Facts/Russell: sense data QuineVsRussell: are not atomic but composed - acquaintance: certain with sense-data, all other are fallible (Russell). ---
VII (b) 40
Sense-Data/Quine: is ambivalent: a) event - b) quality.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Sense Data Theory Wittgenstein Hintikka I 78
Sense data/Russell/Hintikka: a) given by the senses, therefore deception possible - b) at the same time they do not belong to the psychic process of perception - but they are their objects, their content. ---
I 107
Sense data/WittgensteinVsRussell/Hintikka: no physical objects. - Much broader: he needs them for semantic purposes: as the building blocks of all logical forms - as well as the substance of all possible situations. - Subject: is itself not an object. ---
I 109
Whether an object is simple or complex, is empirically not question the logic. ---
I 114
Sense data/Moore/Hintikka: makes a difference between spot and its color. Only the spot belongs to the sense data. WittgensteinVsRussell: they are logical constructions - they simplify laws but are not necessary for them. - Later: (note § 498): "private object before my soul." ---
I 180
Sense data/Russell/Hintikka: fails to uphold a strict distinction between a sense datum as a naked individual thing and a sense datum as a complex object. ---
I 322
Sense data/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: middle and late period: the world in which we live is the world of sense data. ---
II 87
Sense data/Wittgenstein: the sentence is a judgement on the sense data, a reading of one's own sense-data, for example, this is red. Here, there is no need for further verification, that is a priori. ---
II 92
Sense data/physical event/Wittgenstein: the physical sound has a duration, the corresponding sense datum not - Listening and remembering are quite different. - Pointless: to say that one hears something and also recalls it - as e.g. one is seeing while one uses the thermometer at the same time. ---
II 100
Sense data/WittgensteinVsRealism: sense data and physical objects are not in a causal relationship with each other. ---
II 101
The relationship between objects and sensations is linguistically - and therefore necessary. ---
II 101
Sense data/term/Wittgenstein: sense data is the source of our terms. ---
II 102
The world in which we live, is the one of sense data - but the one of which we speak is that one of physical objects. ---
II 129
Sense data/Wittgenstein: it is nonsense to speak of the relationship between object and sense datum. ---
II 134
Senseless: to speak of the causes of my sense data.

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958
German Edition:
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921.
German Edition:
Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960


Hintikka I
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
Investigating Wittgenstein
German Edition:
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Hintikka II
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989
Sentences Frege II 48
Truth Value/Frege: A truth value cannot be part of a thought any more than the sun, because it is not a sense but an object. (truth value = object).
II 51
Sentence/Frege/(s): consists of sense components, not of objects. (>FregeVsRussell) Subordinate clauses that begin with "that" (>that-sentence, >opaque contexts, >propositional attitudes) have as meaning a thought, not a truth value.
II 74
Sentence: The idea itself does not yet determine what is to be regarded as the subject (>Ramsey). We must never forget that different sentences can express the same idea. Neither is it impossible that the same thought appears in a decomposition as a singular one, in another one as a particular one, and in a third one as general one.
II 77
Sentence: The three proper names: "the number 2", "the concept prime number", "the relation of the falling of an object under a concept" behave as brittle to each other as the first two alone: ​​no matter how we group them together, we get no sentence.
I 7
Sentence/Frege: does not represent a proposition (only a that-sentence does that, a subset) - but for a truth value. - There is a sentence for each proposition that expresses it and that states the truth conditions. - Vs: problem with sentences without truth value (neither true nor false, not an object, etc.).
Stuhlmann-Laeisz II 68
Sentence/Frege: except the idea (what can be t/f) there are two other aspects: a) "content" - b) "imagination".
Tugendhat II 243
Oblique Meaning//German Original: "odd"/Frege: name of a sentence. - Complex sentences: truth functions of their subsets - where that is not the case, subsets appear as names (oblique ("odd") meaning, Quote) - Nominalized Subset/Frege: only part of a thought - TugendhatVsFrege: such a subset cannot be replaced, so the truth-value potential cannot consist in its truth value.
Tugendhat II 245
Sentence/Frege/Tugendhat: since all sentences are derived from the subject-predicate form, subsets must sometimes be nominalized. - Exception: causal and conditional clauses.

F I
G. Frege
Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987

F II
G. Frege
Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994

F IV
G. Frege
Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993


SL I
R. Stuhlmann Laeisz
Philosophische Logik Paderborn 2002

Stuhlmann II
R. Stuhlmann-Laeisz
Freges Logische Untersuchungen Darmstadt 1995

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992
Skepticism Wittgenstein II 100
Skepticism/Russell: E.g. we could have only existed 5 minutes - WittgensteinVsRussell: then he uses the words with a new meaning. ---
VII 152
Skepticism/philosophy/Wittgenstein/late: the words "error", "doubt", etc., were also learned by the philosophers from the everyday language, they have not been invented for the purpose of philosophizing.

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958
German Edition:
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921.
German Edition:
Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960

Substance Millikan I 109
Substance/Properties/Millikan: Thesis: "Substance" and "properties" are categories that are cut off relative to each other and relative to the operation of the negation. They do not mutually exclude one another. Properties/Millikan: are varied elements of facts, receptive to negation.
Substances/Millikan: are also variable, but relative to other transformations.
---
I 254
Substances/property/Millikan: substance and property are determined in relation to one another. Definition Substance/Millikan: substance is what it is and the same as it is relative to a set of property domains from which it necessarily has a property, while other properties are excluded in the property domain.
E.g. substance category/Millikan: corresponds to a set of substances. The identities are relations to the same opposite-predicate domains. E.g. gold, like other elements of the category of chemical elements, has an atomic number, a valence, a melting point, a color. But it does not have size, shape, mother, birthday, gesture.
Definition property/Millikan: (corresponding to substance) is what it is and the same as it is relative to a domain of opposites and to a set of elements of substance categories whose elements necessarily have a property from this domain and all other properties are excluded.
Grasping/property/Millikan: to grasp a property is to distinguish it from others, or to grasp the opposite parts relative to which the property is the same as that which it is.
---
I 255
Senseless/Millikan: thus we can recognize expressions as meaningless as e.g. "Gold is great". ---
I 274
Property/Object/Predicate/Substance/Individual/Ontology/Millikan: Strawson's distinction between "monogamous" and "non-monogamous" entities is not absolute, but relative: Object/thing: For example, if my ring is made of gold, it cannot be made of silver at the same time.
Polygamous: Gold is relative to my ring ((s) it could also have been silver - the gold could have belonged to another object.). Then gold is a property (unlike another) and my ring is a substance.
But relative to other substances, the identity of gold seems like the identity of an individual.
Ontology/MillikanVsFrege/MillikanVsRussell: we must drop the rigid distinction between concept and object or particular and property.
---
I 275
Variant: not only predicates are variants in world states, but also substances or individuals (they can be replaced). Substance: when we consider gold as a property, it does not prevent us from understanding it as a substance. As Aristotle said:
Individuals/Aristotle/Millikan: are merely primary substances, not the only substances which exist; that is, substances that are not properties of something else.
Substance/Millikan: a substance is actually an epistemic category.
Substance/Millikan: e.g. gold, e.g. domestic cat, e.g. 69s Plymouth Valiant 100.
Substance/Category/Millikan: substances fall into categories, defined by the exclusivity classes with regard to which they are intended.
E.g. Gold and silver fall into this category because they belong to the same exclusivity classes: having a melting point, atomic weight, etc.
---
I 276
Imperfect Substances/Millikan: imperfect substances have only approximate properties. e.g. a domestic cat has a weight between 7 and 14 pounds. Perfect substance/Millikan: a perfect substance can also have time-bound properties:
E.g. Johnny sits at t1, but not at t2
E.g. water has a melting point at 0 degrees, in an atmospheric pressure, but not at 10 atmospheres!
E.g. Johnny has then however once and for all the property, to sit to t1.
---
I 277
Complete concept/Millikan: to have a complete concept, one needs time concepts. Accessibility: complete concepts for durable objects are not as accessible as concepts for substances such as e.g. domestic cat or e.g. gold.
---
I 281
Summary/Substance/Property/Identity/Self-identity/Millikan: Perfect Secondary Substance: e.g. gold: has an identity that is formally the same as that of an individual in relation to its properties.
Imperfect secondary substance: e.g. 69s Plymouth (contradiction to above) e.g. domestic cat: have a kind of identity that is formally analogous to the identity of perfect substances. For example, in accordance with laws in situ, instead of under all natural conditions.

Millikan I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Millikan II
Ruth Millikan
"Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Thoughts Evans Frank I 487
Thoughts / EvansVsRussell / EvansVsHume: (with Davidson): it may be that you simply think you have a thought - even about yourself.

Gareth Evans(1982b): Self-Identification, in: Evans (1982a) The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/New York 1982, 204-266

EMD II
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977

Evans I
Gareth Evans
"The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

Evans II
Gareth Evans
"Semantic Structure and Logical Form"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Evans III
G. Evans
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Thoughts Russell Frank I 487
Russell/Evans: Cartesians: Thought: we only have a thought if the object really exists.
I 487 ~
Thoughts/EvansVsRussell/EvansVsHume: (with Davidson): it may be that you simply think you have a thought - even about yourself.

Gareth Evans(1982b): Self-Identification, in: Evans (1982a) The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/New York 1982, 204-266

Russell IV 87/88
Idea/concept/Russell: ambiguous: in a certain sense we can say that blackness "is in our consciousness" as an idea is, so to speak, an object of thought. Russell: Blackness must be an object here so that two people can think of it, or that we can think of it again.
Universals: therefore universals are not mere thoughts but objects of the act of thinking.

Russell I
B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead
Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986

Russell II
B. Russell
The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969
German Edition:
Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989

Russell IV
B. Russell
The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912
German Edition:
Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967

Russell VI
B. Russell
"The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202
German Edition:
Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus
In
Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993

Russell VII
B. Russell
On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit"
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Truth Russell Horwich I 4
Truth/Russell: There are objective truths as objects of judgments, but not objective falsehoods a) false: Judgment as relation to a simple object: E.g. that Charles I died on the scaffold - does not work in the case of false judgments.
b) for a complex: (Russell pro):
Horwich I 9
Truth: exists if the objects have the relation to each other which is claimed in the judgment.
Horwich I 11
The fact that a judgment is made does not alter the objects - this is how falsehood becomes possible. (1)
1. B. Russell, "On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood", in: Philosophical Essays, New York 1996, pp. 170-185 - reprinted in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth, Aldershot 1994

Russell VII 64
Truth/Russell: can only exist if there are also opinions - but it does not depend on the opinions.
IV 127
RussellVsHegel: a truth about a thing is not part of the thing itself, although it has to belong to his "essence". - If the nature of a thing should be all truths, then we cannot recognize the "essence" before we know all its relations with all other things in the universe. - But if we use the word "essence" in this sense, we have to assert that a thing can be recognized, even if its "essence" is unknown - or incompletely known. Contradiction: this confuses knowledge of things and knowledge of truth - acquaintance does not imply knowledge of the essence. (> Naturalistic fallacy).
Therefore we cannot prove that the universe is a harmonious whole.

Tugendhat III 214
Truth/Russell: early: a matter of belief and this one reaction dispo to react near B with "B". (Quine, stimulus meaning). TugendhatVsRussell: neither reaction nor triggering signs are true/false. This is because there is no assumption that something is this way or that. Therefore no mistake is possible.

Russell I
B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead
Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986

Russell II
B. Russell
The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969
German Edition:
Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989

Russell IV
B. Russell
The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912
German Edition:
Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967

Russell VI
B. Russell
"The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202
German Edition:
Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus
In
Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993

Russell VII
B. Russell
On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit"
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996


Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992
Truth Tugendhat I 263
Truth/Tugendhat: an assertion is once and for all true or false, it does not depend on the circumstances or on a situation (> timeless sentence). ---
I 267
Truth/Tugendhat: One must not have reasons for truth, but know them - difference using reasons/truth reason - otherwise lie and deception would be excluded. ---
I 285
Truth/Tugendhat: only made possible by reference to spatiotemporal objects - but reference only possible in controlled language use - VsRussell: not by pseudo-concept idea. ---
III 190
Truth/Tarski/Tugendhat: his definition is not related to verification - TugendhatVsTarski: Scheme to narrow - Reality and subjectivity must be taken into the truth-conception - Tugendhat VsMeta Language - Judgments point beyond themselves, therefore criteria necessary. ---
III 196
Tugendhat: we need to know how we can verify a judgment, otherwise meaningless. ---
III 208
The "dual relationship" (sentence-sense-given), evaporates with Tarski to a simple ratio.

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992

Truth Tables Wittgenstein II 73
Truth panel/Truth Table/Truth-panel/Truth-Table/WittgensteinVsRussell: no explanation, since it could also apply to other sentences. ---
II 322
Truth table/truth value table/WittgensteinVsFrege: he did not recognize that this table can be seen again as a symbol for the function, although it looks as if it would say something about the function. - ((s) As a symbol it is arbitrary and thus no explanation but only set next to it). ---
II 327
True/false/truth value/Truth Table/truth panel/Wittgenstein: the calculus with true/false (truth value) is boring and useless. - Just as the calculus by Russell. - Only justification: the true/false-calculus provides a translation of Russell's calculus. - Calculus: has only then value when it brings clarity over another.

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958
German Edition:
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921.
German Edition:
Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960

Truth Value Gaps Quine I 307
Truth Value Gap/Non-existence/Quine: We interpreted "exists" as (Ex)(y=x) which applies to everything just like "x=x". But also with this procedure anomalies result. It seems strange that "Pegasus exists" should be wrong if "(x)(x exists)" is true and "Pegasus" takes a purely descriptive position. Something is wrong if Pegasus is granted the purely descriptive position.
I 308
The sense should be that the term concerned is used exclusively to indicate an object about which the rest of the sentence can say something. We can call this "truth value gaps" (the expression comes from Strawson). With open sentences we have not been disturbed by the fact that they have no truth value, but they can already be recognized by the way they are written. Here the gaps are disturbing precisely because they are not recognizable. Perhaps best with trivalent logic ("undecidable")?
QuineVs: one does not assume that the difficulties come from a pedantic distinction between what is true and what is neither true nor false. If one were to summarize both categories under the rubric of the false, nothing would be gained.
For they are distinguished from one another by the fact that one category contains the negations of all their elements, while the other does not contain a single negation of their elements.
I 318
Singular descriptions "the", e.g. "the setting of the sun" Iota operator "i" (inverted, without dot) (ix)(...x...) "This x, for that applies" Here no synonymy is claimed by additional information (as in § 33). The logical theory made possible by the canonical framework treats ambiguous terms and indicator words as if they had fixed objects of reference.
I 319
Let us now compare the identity statement "y = (ix)(...x...)" with the quantification: (1) (x)(...x...if and only if x = y)
can be read briefly as
"...y...and exclusively y".
If either (1) or the reformulation applies to an object y, both are probably true. Nevertheless, both may differ in their conditions of falsity with respect to truth values!
Because one can understand these gaps in such a way that "y = (ix)(...x...)" in relation to each object y has no truth value, if it applies to none,
while "...y....and exclusively y" is simply wrong in relation to any object, if it doesn't apply to any.
So we can simply put our aversion to gaps into action and equate "y = (ix)( ...x...) with "...y... and exclusively y" and accordingly fill the truth value gaps of "y = (ix)(...x..)" with the truth value incorrectly.
This step enables us to make the singular identifications disappear at all.
I 327
Definition/singular terms/truth value gaps/Quine: if we interpret definitions as instructions for the transformation of singular terms, we can avoid the annoyance of truth value gaps:
I 328
The definition of the singular descriptions is then simple as follows: Def Singular Description: Write
"y = (ix)(...x...)" and "(ix)(...x...) exists"
as notation variants of
"...y...and exclusively y."
And with recourse to §37: Write "(ix)(...x...) " as abbreviation of
(7) (Ey)[y = (ix)(...x...) and y ],
(In this representation, we have " y " as any open sentence.) If we apply the three parts of the above definition successively and repeatedly, they are sufficient to make "(ix)(...x...)" accessible again to any position where free variables may occur.
I 389/90
Conditional: the indicative conditional is unproblematic. In unquantified form "if p then q" it is perhaps best expressed as containing a truth value gap (§ 37) if its antecedence is false.(See also EFQ (ex falso quodlibet): ex falso quodlibet).
I 449
In the case of the indicative conditional, the initial problems are the truth value gaps and the ambiguity of the truth conditions. They are solved by being able to dispense with the indicative conditional in favor of a truth function.
I 447
StrawsonVsRussell: Strawson has misnamed Russell's theory of descriptions because of their treatment of truth value gaps.
III 282
Truth Value Gap/Quine: comes from everyday language, in logic we have to fill it. And be it arbitrary. Every sentence should have a truth value (true or false).
XI 39
Canonical Notation/Quine/Lauener: closes truth value gaps.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Truthmakers Quine II 56
DavidsonVsCorrespondence Theory: no thing makes sentences true (VsTruthmaker) - Quine: stimuli do not make true, but lead to beliefs.
II 217 ff
Truthmaker/making true/QuineVsCresswell/Quine: Cresswell poses his metaphysical question as follows: "What is it that makes one physical theory true and another false?"
Quine: I can do nothing but answer with unhelpful realism that it is the nature of the world.

Cresswell, however, helpfully adds that this question is often asked in the epistemological sense: How can we know that one theory is true and the other is false?
That is a completely different question, and it must be taken more seriously. One obstacle still lies in the verb "to know". Does it have to imply certainty, infallibility? Then the answer is that we cannot know.
But if instead we ask why belief in one theory is more justified than belief in another, our question has substance.
A complete answer would be a complete theory of observational evidence and the scientific method.
Cresswell quotes Quine briefly and quickly that the final decision lies with the Court of Arbitration of Experience.
II 218
CresswellVsQuine: "Quine's metaphors about the arbitration will never be executed as far as we feel is necessary". Cresswell compares Quine's view with Russell's logical atomism and rightly finds both incompatible. "Quine does not value a theory that would turn atomic facts into simple facts about our experience that are logically independent of any other. Quine: that is correct.
II 218
Experience/Quine: my observation sentences are not about experience (!) but they are reasonably naturalistic analogues of sentences about experience in that their use is learned by direct conditioning on the stimulation of sense receptors. Moreover, simple observational sentences are in most cases actually independent of each other. QuineVsAtomism/QuineVsRussell: the fundamental difference between Russell's logical atomism and my view is that, in my view, the other truths are not somehow composed of or implied by the observation propositions. Their connection with the sentences of observation is more mediated and more complex.
II 219
Cresswell burdens me with a realm of reified experiences or phenomena, which stands in contrast to an inscrutable reality. My naturalistic view has no resemblance to this: I have forces that affect our nerve endings from real objects of the outside world.
III 57
Def Fulfillability/Quine: a sentence-logical scheme is called fulfillable if there is an interpretation of the letters it contains that makes the scheme true. Otherwise unattainable.
I 425
Facts/Object/making true/Quine: one should not take facts as objects just to have something that makes sentences true.
I 426
Facts: Tendency (though not in those who perceive facts as true propositions) to imagine facts as something concrete. Facts are what makes sentences true. For example, "The King's Boulevard is one kilometre long" and "The King's Boulevard is 50 metres wide" are true. In this case they describe two different facts, but the only physical object that plays a role here is the King's Boulevard. We do not want a quibble, but the fact that the meaning of concreteness in the facts is "concrete", does not make facts particularly appealing to us.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Type Theory Quine VII (e) 91ff
QuineVsType theory: 1) universal class: because the type theory only allows uniform types as elements of a class, the universal class V leads to an infinite series of quasi-universal classes, each for one type - 2) negation: ~x stops including all non-elements of x and only includes those non-elements that belong to the next lower level - 3) Zero class: even this accordingly leads to an infinite number of zero classes - 4) Boolean class algebra: is no longer applicable to classes in general, but is reproduced at each level - 5) Relational calculus: accordingly to be established new at every level - 6) arithmetic: the numbers cease to be uniform. At each level (type) there is a new 0, new 1, new 2, etc. ---
IX 186
Definition ramified type theory/Russell/Quine: distinction of orders for statement functions whose arguments are of one single order - in order for two attributes with the same extension to be able to differ in terms of their orders, attributes with the same extension must be distinguished and be called attributes and not classes. - New: this becomes superfluous when we drop the branching. Solution: context definition/Russell: we define class abstraction through context, thus "ε" remains the only basic concept apart from quantifiers, variables and statement-logical links. - Context definition for class abstraction: "yn ε {xn: Fxn}" stands for "∃z n + 1["xn(xn ε z n+1 Fxn) u yn ε z n + 1]".
---
IX 191ff
Cumulative types/Set Theory/Quine: Type 0: Only L is of type 0 - type 1: L and {L} and nothing else - Type n: should generally include only this and the 2n sets that belong to type n-1 - in this way, every quantification only interprets a finite number of cases. Each closed expression can be mechanically tested on being true - that no longer works when the axiom of infinity is added. ---
IX 198
Cumulative types/Quine: advantages: if we equate the zero classes of all class types, (~T0x u ~T0y u ∀w(w ε x ↔ w ε y) u x ε z) › y ε z is a single axiom, no longer an axiom scheme - in int "~T0x u ~T0y" avoids that the individuals L are identified with one another - we need individuals, but we identify them with their classes of one (see above) - but one exception: if x is an individual, "x ε x" shall be considered as true, (Above, "x ε y" became false if both were not objects of sequential types). ---
IX 201
Cumulative Type Theory/Quine: individuals: identified with their classes of one - no longer elementless, have themselves as elements - therefore definite identity: a = b if a ≤ b ≤ a - zero classes of all types can now be identified (formerly: "No individuals" , "no classes", etc.) ---
IX 204
Natural numbers/QuineVsRussell: his type theory even has problems with Frege’s numbers: perhaps the successor relation does not bring something new always: Example 5 is then the class of all classes from five individuals, assuming that there are only five individuals in that universe. So 5 in type 2 equals {ϑ1} ,then 6, or S"5, in type 5 equals {z1: ∃y0(y0 e z1 u z1 n _{y0} = ϑ1)}: this equals Λ², because "y ε z u z n _{y} = ϑ" is contradictory - but then 7, or S"6, equals S'Λ², which is reduced to Λ² - i.e. S'x = x when x equals 6 in type 2, provided that there are no more than five individuals - otherwise the theory of numbers would collapse.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Type Theory Russell Prior I 164
Type Theory/Russell: the variable at the lowest level is not part of the logic - ((s) existence is empirical).
Russell I XXIII
Type Theory/GödelVsRussell: has mixed types (individuals with predications about individuals, etc.). They obviously do not contradict the circle fault principle.

Russell I
B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead
Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986

Russell II
B. Russell
The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969
German Edition:
Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989

Russell IV
B. Russell
The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912
German Edition:
Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967

Russell VI
B. Russell
"The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202
German Edition:
Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus
In
Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993

Russell VII
B. Russell
On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit"
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996


Pri I
A. Prior
Objects of thought Oxford 1971

Pri II
Arthur N. Prior
Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003
Universals Russell IV 44/45
Universals/Knowledge/Russell: all knowledge of truths requires an acquaintance with "things" which are significantly different from the sense data: universals. - E.g. "blackness", "diversity", "brotherhood" - each sentence must contain at least one universal because the meaning of all verbs is general.
IV 82
Universals/Russell: is everything that is not denoted by proper names: it is what nouns, adjectives, prepositions and verbs stand for. - Therefore, there must be a universal in each sentence. Most authors VsRussell.
IV 88
Russell: universals have to be objects because we can think of them repeatedly.

Russell I
B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead
Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986

Russell II
B. Russell
The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969
German Edition:
Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989

Russell IV
B. Russell
The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912
German Edition:
Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967

Russell VI
B. Russell
"The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202
German Edition:
Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus
In
Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993

Russell VII
B. Russell
On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit"
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996


The author or concept searched is found in the following 91 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Atomism Wittgenstein Vs Atomism II 138
WittgensteinVsAtomism/self-criticism/WittgensteinVsTractatus: it was a mistake, that there are elementary propositions, into which all sentences can be dismantled. This error has two roots: 1. that one conceives infinity as a number, and assumes there is an infinite number of sentences.
2. statements that express degrees of qualities. ((s) They must not exclude any other sentence. Therefore, they cannot be independent).
---
II 157
Particular/Atom/Wittgenstein: Russell and I, we both expected to get to the basic elements by logical analysis ("individuals"). Russell believed, in the end subject-predicate sentences and binary relations would arise. WittgensteinVsRussell: this is a mistaken notion of logical analysis: like a chemical analysis. WittgensteinVsAtomism.

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958
German Edition:
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921.
German Edition:
Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960
Atomism Newen Vs Atomism New I 76
Sense Data/Russell/Newen: are material entities! Otherwise Russell's position would be an idealistic one. But RussellVsIdealism. Intersubjectivity/Russell/Newen: is thus created to a certain degree.
NewenVsRussell: but not the materiality of sense data.
I 77
VsAtomism: the materiality of sense data are the weakest point of logical atomism.

New II
Albert Newen
Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005

Newen I
Albert Newen
Markus Schrenk
Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008
Blanshard, B. Armstrong Vs Blanshard, B. Particular/ArmstrongVsRussell/ArmstrongVsBlanshard: particulars are not bundles of universals, however, they cannot exist without properties. The interdependence of universals is better formulated as follows:
III 84
neither individual things nor universals can exist independent of situations (states of affairs).

Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong II (a)
David M. Armstrong
Dispositions as Categorical States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (b)
David M. Armstrong
Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (c)
David M. Armstrong
Reply to Martin
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (d)
David M. Armstrong
Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983
Brandom, R. Russell Vs Brandom, R. Read III 26
Facts/Russell: a fact is different from the corresponding statement. There are false statements, but no "wrong facts". ((s) Brandom: speaks only of true statements as facts). VsRussell: But the cost of this statement is that it undermines the distinction between language and the world.

Russell I
B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead
Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986

Russell II
B. Russell
The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969
German Edition:
Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989

Russell IV
B. Russell
The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912
German Edition:
Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967

Russell VI
B. Russell
"The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202
German Edition:
Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus
In
Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993

Russell VII
B. Russell
On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit"
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996

Re III
St. Read
Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997

Re IV
St. Read
Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic 1st Edition Oxford 1995

Read I
Stephen Read
Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic Oxford 1995
Bundle Theory Newen Vs Bundle Theory New I 233
Def Reference/Newen: Relation between the occurrence of a singular term and the object thus designated. ((s) i.e. general terms do not refer?).
Names/Proper Names/Newen: two problems:
1) Reference definition: how is the reference determined
2) Meaning: what is the meaning of a name.
Names/Description Theory/Newen: E.g. "Aristotle": the meaning would then be "student of Plato".
Vs: Problem: it could be that someone does not know that Aristotle was a student of Plato, but otherwise uses the name correctly.
Bundle Theory/Solution/Searle/Newen/(s): it should not happen that a single failure refutes the entire theory, therefore, a bundle of descriptions should be decisive, not a single description.
I 234
Bundle Theory/Reference Definition/Searle/Newen: Searle's bundle theory simultaneously regards itself as a theory of reference definition. Names/Proper Names/KripkeVsBundle Theory/KripkeVsDescription Theory/KripkeVsSearle/Kripke/Newen: (modal argument): there is a necessary condition for Def meaning equality/Kripke:

(meaning equality) if two expressions a1 and a2 have the same meaning, they are mutually replaceable in sentences that are introduced by the modal operator "It is necessary that", without changing the truth value.
I 235
E.g. It is necessary that Aristotle is K. Here, "student of Plato" is not usable. Hence the name "Aristotle" (quotation marks by Newen) cannot have the same meaning as "student of Plato".
Description Theory/Meta-Linguistic/Names/Newen: special case description theory of proper names: the so-called meta-linguistic description theory:
E.g. the meaning of the name Aristotle can be specified with the description "The bearer of the name "Aristotle"."
Point: this description captures the context-independent knowledge of a speaker with respect to the name.
KripkeVs/Newen: if the modal argument is also true for the meta-linguistic theory, it cannot be right: it is indeed necessary that Aristotle is Aristotle, but not necessary that Aristotle is
I 236
the bearer of the name "Aristotle". He could have been given a different name. Object Theory/Meaning/Names/Proper Names/Newen: Thesis: The meaning of a name is the designated object.
A variation of this theory is Russell's theory of the meaning of logical proper names. ("dis", etc.)
Epistemology/VsRussell/Newen: Russell's epistemology proved untenable.
Solution/Newen: Reference definition by a description: "The only object that satisfies the description associated with the concept "E" (quotation marks by Newen)".
Frege: was the first to specify this (in his theory of sense and meaning)
Names/Frege/Newen: the Fregean meaning of a name is the designated object.
Reference Definition/Frege/Newen: through description. This is Frege's theory of sense.
Sense/Frege/Newen: through description (= reference definition for proper names).
Names/Frege/Newen: Frege combines an object theory of meaning with a description theory of reference definition.
I 237
((s) KripkeVsFrege/KripkeVsDescription Theory/Newen/(s): Kripke also criticized the description theory of reference definition: E.g. Schmidt was the discoverer of the incompleteness theorem, not Gödel. Nevertheless, we refer with "Gödel" to Gödel, and not to an object which is the singled out with a description that can be true or not.) Solution/Kripke: causal theory of proper names.

New II
Albert Newen
Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005

Newen I
Albert Newen
Markus Schrenk
Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008
Carnap, R. Ryle Vs Carnap, R. Read III 32
RyleVsRussell: (review of Carnap s Meaning and Necessity): Error: "Fido"-Fido principle: because the name "Fido" receives its meaning from referring to a single individual, we are tempted to assume that other words function in the same way. > RyleVsRussell

Ryle I
G. Ryle
The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949
German Edition:
Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969

Re III
St. Read
Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997

Read I
Stephen Read
Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic Oxford 1995
Compositionality Cartwright Vs Compositionality Horwich I 57
Relations theory/Belief object/Truth/Easy/Russell/Moore/Cartwright: one question remains: should the doctrine that truth is a simple unanalysable property go together with a relation theory of belief? ((s) Adopted relation to internal objects).
I 58
Solution/Cartwright: (ultimately not entirely satisfactory): E.g. the complicated proposition: (12) Brown is taller than Smith and Robinson is taller than Smith.
... + ...
CartwrightVsCompositionality: but this is not a case of compositionality in the strict sense. And that applies equally to the above case with propositions. Triadic relation: standing in the K (8) and (9) is a function whose arguments are ordered triples and have a value O(p,q). CartwrightVsRussell: but the fact that (12) is such a function of K, p, and q, does not justify to regard these entities as "components". Russell/Moore/Cartwright: would probably have replied that a proposition is in a certain way an entity or a unit that has parts in an indefinable sense. (Principles Ch. 16) They would have said that it’s one thing for (12) to be a function of K, (8) and (9), but another for these entities to be part of (12). Cartwright: with that they would have been right. But we do not need more than functionality. I 60 You might think functionality is too cheap, there is always some function, and that K, (8) and (9) are linked more intimately in (12) than in a function. But the alternative to strong compositionality is not mere functionality, it is rather the determination of what is required to assert the proposition (12)! Thus, a comparison of (12) is prepared with other propositions.

Car I
N. Cartwright
How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983

CartwrightR I
R. Cartwright
A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

CartwrightR II
R. Cartwright
Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954

Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Constructivism Russell Vs Constructivism Quine IX 184
VsConstructivism/Construction/QuineVsRussell: we have seen how Russell's constructivist access to the real numbers failed (least upper bound (Kos), see above). He gave up the constructivism and took refuge in the reducibility axiom (RA). ---
IX 184/185
The way he gave it up, had something perverse in it: Reducibility axiom/QuineVsRussell: the reducibility axiom implies that all the distinctions that gave rise to its creation, are superfluous.
When Russell's system is consistent with reducibility axioms, then no contradictions will arise if we ignore all orders except the predicative.
We can determine that the order of each attribute is always the next highest in comparison to the order of things that have this attribute, according to intensional relations.
If somehow an attribute of the order n + k is referred to, which is an attribute of objects of the order n, so we need this name only as such, which is based on a systematic reinterpretation that refers to an attribute of the order n + 1 with the same extension. According to intensional relations.
Reducibility Axiom: tells us that an equal-extensional attribute or equal-extensional intensional relation of the desired order, and namely in predicative execution, always exists.
Is the axiom planned from the outset, so you should avoid its necessity in that we speak in the beginning only of types of attributes instead of orders of any distinctive sense.
Orders are only excusable if one wants to maintain a weak constructive theory without reducibility axiom.
((s)Axiom/Quine/(s): should not be taken as necessary)

Russell I
B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead
Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986

Russell VII
B. Russell
On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit"
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987
Correspondence Theory Moore Vs Correspondence Theory Hacking I 179
MooreVsCorrespondence Theory: an essential condition of the theory is that a true statement of the reality that in relation to which will include its truth, always deviates in a specific way when the reality again is not itself a sentence.   It is the inability to detect such a specific difference between a true statement and the supposedly matching reality which refutes the theory.
Horwich I 45
Correspondence Theory/CartwrightVsMoore: Problem: then there is also a property of agreement (correspondence) that does not have the wrong proposition. And this seems to depend undeniably on the world! From a fact. Fact: the proposition is true if it is a fact that there are subways in Boston, otherwise wrong.
CartwrightVsMoore/CartwrightVsRussell: it is precisely this that ignores the theory of truth as a simple, unanalyzable property.
But they were both aware of that. ("Meinong's Theory" , p 75).
They stuck to it because of it:
RussellVsCorrespondence Theory, MooreVsCorrespondence Theory.
I 46
Truth/Moore: (Baldwin Dictionary, early): some believe that it consists in a relation of a proposition to reality. ("Correspondence"). MooreVsCorrespondence Theory: assumes that truth differs from reality (in order to be able to establish a relation at all). But such a difference cannot be found at all!
Solution/Moore:
Proposition/Moore/early: Thesis: is not identical with belief, but the object of belief. ((s) >Relation.Theory).
Truth/Moore/Early: Thesis: is identical with reality. It does not differ from it...+....

Hacking I
I. Hacking
Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983
German Edition:
Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996

Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Field, H. Leeds Vs Field, H. Field II 304
Indeterminacy/Set Theory/ST/Leeds/Field: e.g. somebody considers the term "set" to be undetermined, so he could say instead: The term can be made "as large as possible". (Leeds 1997,24) (s) "everything that is included in the term"). As such the term can have a wider or narrower definition. Cardinality of the continuum/Indeterminacy/Field: This indeterminacy should at least contain the term set membership.
LeedsVsField: It is not coherent to accept set theory and to qualify its terms as indetermined at the same time. And it is not coherent to then apply classical logic in set theory.
Field: It could also look like this: the philosophical comments should be separated from mathematics. But we do not need to separate theory from practice, e.g. if the belief in indeterminacy is expressed in whether the degree of the mathematician's belief in the continuum hypothesis and his "doubt degree" adds up to 1 ((s) So that there is no space left for a third possibility).
Problem: A mathematician for whom it adds up to 1 could ask himself "Is the continuum hypothesis correct?" and would look for mathematical proof. A second mathematician, however, whose degree of certainty adds up to 0 ((s) since he believes in neither the continuum hypothesis nor its negation) will find it erroneous to look for proof. Each possibility deserves to be analyzed.
The idea behind indeterminacy however is that only little needs to be defined beyond the accepted axioms. ((s) no facts.)
Continuum Hypothesis/Field: Practical considerations may prefer a concept over one another in a particular context and a different one in another context.
Solution/Field: This is not a problem as long as those contexts are hold separate. But is has been shown that its usefulness is independent from the truth.
II 305
Williamsons/Riddle/Indeterminacy/Leeds/Field: (LeedsVsField): (e.g. it must be determined whether Joe is rich or not): Solution/Leeds: i) we exclude the terms in question, e.g. rich (in this example) from the markup language which we accept as "first class"
and
ii) the primary (disquotional) use of "referred" or "is true of" is only used for this markup language.
Indeterminacy/Leeds: Is because there is no uniform best way to apply the disquotional scheme in order to translate into the markup language.
Field: This is genius: To reduce all indeterminacy on the indeterminacy of the translation.
FieldVsLeeds: I doubt that a meaning can be found.
Problem: To differentiate between undetermined termini and those which are only different regarding the extension of the markup language. Especially if we have a number of translations which all have different extensions in our markup language.
Solution/Disquotationalism: It would integrate the foreign terms in its own language. We would then be allowed to cite.(Quine, 1953 b, 135. see above chap. IV II 129-30).
Problem: If we integrate "/" and "", the solution which we obtained above may disappear.
FieldVsLeeds: I fear that our objective - to exclude the indeterminacy in our own language- will not be reached.It even seems to be impossible for our scientific terms!
e.g. the root –1/√-1/Brandom/Field: The indeterminacy is still there; We can simply use the "first class" markup language to say that -1 has two roots without introducing a name like "i" which shall stand for "one of the two".
FieldVsLeeds: We can accept set theory without accepting its language as "first class". ((s) But the objective was to eliminate terms of set theory from the first class markup language and to limit "true of" and "refer" to the markup language.)
Field: We are even able to do this if we accept Platonism (FieldVsPlatonism) :
II 306
e.g. we take a fundamental theory T which has no vocabulary of set theory and only says that there is an infinite number of non-physical eternally existing objects and postulates the consistency of fundamental set theory. Consistency is then the basic term which is regulated by its own axioms and not defined by terms of set theory. (Field 1991). We then translate the language of set theory in T by accepting "set" as true of certain or all non-physical eternally existing objects and interpret "element of" in such a way that the normal axioms remain true.
Then there are different ways to do this and they render different sentences true regarding the cardinality of the continuum. Then the continuum hypothesis has no particular truth value. (C.H. without truth value).
Problem: If we apply mathematical applications to non-mathemtical fields, we do not only need consistency in mathematics but in other fields as well. And we should then assume that the corresponding theories outside mathematics can have a Platonic reformulation.
1. This would be possible if they are substituted by a nominal (!) theory.
2. The Platonic theorie could be substituted by the demand that all nominal consequences of T-plus-set theory are true.
FieldVs: The latter looks like a cheap trick, but the selected set theory does not need to be the one deciding the cardinality of the continuum.
The selected set theory for a physical or psychological theory need not to be compatible with the set theory of another domain. This shows that the truth of the metalanguage is not accepted in a parent frame of reference. It's all about instrumental usefulness.
FieldVsLeeds: We cannot exclude indeterminacy - which surpasses vagueness- in our own language even if we concede its solution. But we do not even need to do this; I believe my solution is better.

I 378
Truth/T-Theory/T-concept/Leeds: We now need to differentiate between a) Truth Theory (T-Theory) ((s) in the object language) and
b) theories on the definition of truth ((s) metalinguistic) .
Field: (1972): Thesis: We need a SI theory of truth and reference (that a Standard Interpretation is always available), and this truth is also obtainable.
(LeedsVsStandard Interpretation/VsSI//LeedsVsField).
Field/Leeds: His argument is based on an analogy between truth and (chemical)valence. (..+....)
Field: Thesis: If it would have looked as if the analogy cannot be reduced, it would have been a reason to abandon the theory of valences, despite the theory's usefulness!
Truth/Field: Thesis: (analogous to valence ): Despite all we know about the extension of the term, the term also needs a physicalistic acceptable form of reduction!
Leeds: What Field would call a physicalistic acceptable reduction is what we would call the SI theory of truth: There always is a Standard Interpretation for "true" in a language.
Field/Leeds: Field suggests that it is possible to discover the above-mentioned in the end.
LeedsVsField: Let us take a closer look at the analogy: Question: Would a mere list of elements and numbers (instead of valences) not be acceptable?
I 379
This would not be a reduction since the chemists have formulated the law of valences. Physikalism/Natural law/Leeds: Does not demand that all terms can be easily or naturally explained but that the fundamental laws are formulated in a simple way.
Reduction/Leeds: Only because the word "valence" appears in a strict law there are strict limitations imposed on the reduction.
Truth/Tarski/LeedsVsTarski: Tarski's Definitions of T and R do not tell us all the story behind reference and truth in English.
Reference/Truth/Leeds: These relations have a naturalness and importance that cannot be captured in a mere list.
Field/Reduction/Leeds: If we want a reduction à la Field, we must find an analogy to the law of valences in the case of truth, i.e. we need to find a law or a regularity of truth in English.
Analogy/Field: (and numerous others) See in the utility of the truth definition an analogy to the law.
LeedsVsField: However, the utility can be fully explained without a SI theory. It is not astonishing that we have use for a predicate P with the characteristic that"’__’ is P" and "__"are always interchangeable. ((s)>Redundancy theory).
And this is because we often would like to express every sentence in a certain infinite set z (e.g. when all elements have the form in common.) ((s) "All sentences of the form "a = a" are true"), > Generalization.
Generalization/T-Predicate/Leeds: Logical form: (x)(x e z > P(x)).
Semantic ascent/Descent/Leeds: On the other hand truth is then a convenient term, same as infinite conjunction and disjunction.
I 386
Important argument: In theory then, the term of truth would not be necessary! I believe it is possible that a language with infinite conjunctions and disjunctions can be learned. Namely, if conjunctions and disjunctions if they are treated as such in inferences. They could be finally be noted.
I 380
Truth/Leeds: It is useful for what Quine calls "disquotation" but it is still not a theory of truth (T-Theory). Use/Explanation/T-Theory/Leeds: In order to explain the usefulness of the T-term, we do not need to say anything about the relations between language and the world. Reference is then not important.
Solution/Leeds: We have here no T-Theory but a theory of the term of truth, e.g. a theory why the term is seen as useful in every language. This statement appears to be based solely on the formal characteristics of our language. And that is quite independent of any relations of "figure" or reference to the world.

Reference/Truth/Truth term/Leeds: it shows how little the usefulness of the truth term is dependent on a efficient reference relation!
The usefulness of a truth term is independent of English "depicts the world".
I 381
We can verify it: Suppose we have a large fragment of our language, for which we accept instrumentalism, namely that some words do not refer. This is true for sociology, psychology, ethics, etc. Then we will find semantic ascent useful if we are speaking about psychology for example. E.g. "Some of Freud's theories are true, others false" (instead of using "superego"!) Standard Interpretation/Leeds: And this should shake our belief that T is natural or a standard.
Tarski/Leeds: This in turn should not be an obstacle for us to define "T" à la Tarski. And then it is reasonable to assume that "x is true in English iff T (x)" is analytic.
LeedsVsSI: We have then two possibilities to manage without a SI:
a) we can express facts about truth in English referring to the T-definition (if the word "true" is used) or
b) referring to the disquotional role of the T-term. And this, if the explanandum comprises the word "true" in quotation marks (in obliqua, (s) mentioned).

Acquaintance/Russell/M. Williams: Meant a direct mental understanding, not a causal relation!
This is an elder form of the correspondence theory.
I 491
He was referring to RussellVsSkepticism: A foundation of knowledge and meaning FieldVsRussell/M. WilliamsVsRussell: das ist genau das Antackern des Begriffsschemas von außen an die Welt.
Field/M. Williams: His project, in comparison, is more metaphysical than epistemic. He wants a comprehensive physicalistic overview. He needs to show how semantic characteristics fit in a physical world.
If Field were right, we would have a reason to follow a strong correspondence theory, but without dubious epistemic projects which are normally linked to it.
LeedsVsField/M. Williams: But his argument is not successful. It does not give an answer to the question VsDeflationism. Suppose truth cannot be explained in a physicalitic way, then it contradicts the demand that there is an unmistakable causal order.
Solution: Truth cannot explain (see above) because we would again deal with epistemology (theory of knowledge).(>justification, acceptability).

Leeds I
Stephen Leeds
"Theories of Reference and Truth", Erkenntnis, 13 (1978) pp. 111-29
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Field I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Field II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Field III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Field IV
Hartry Field
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994
Frege, G. Kripke Vs Frege, G. Cresswell II 151
Pierre-E.g../Kripke/Cresswell: (Kripke 1979) Cresswell: if de re interpreted, is the belief about London. Description Theory/Cresswell: For this, the example is not a problem ((s) Londres and London are different for Pierre because of different descriptions).
((s) causal theory/(s): the case is a problem for them because they have to assume that the meaning of the name is the carrier and must therefore be the same carrier and therefore contradictory predicates are attributed.)
Description Theory/Cresswell: Here the description is relative to Pierre, but it is not his private matter!
Def "Extreme Fregeanism"/KripkeVsFrege/KripkeVsRussell/Cresswell: (he attributes this disposition to these two): Thesis: that name in general belong to idiolects.
Problem: Then the Pierre-E.g. is not about Pierre but about the speaker, who is reporting this case, and his idiolect.
Cresswell: Unfortunately it is not so simple: e.g. an ancient Greek could have been arrived from the ancient to us. He is initially going to use "Φωσφόρος" instead of "Phosphorus". His disposition towards it will as different from ours, as the Pierre-example demonstrates the different dispositions of "London" and "Londres".
Ambiguity/Cresswell: is caused here because a name can stand for numerous descriptions. The latter allow in most cases that "London" can be translated as "Londres". The only case in which it does not work is the example of Pierre.

Stalnaker I 172
Name/reference/meaning/sense/Stalnaker: 1. Mill/KripkeVsFrege: Thesis: Names are directly addressing the referent without the mediation of an intermediary meaning
Frege/Dummett/Searle: Thesis: The meaning of the name must be adopted in-between the name and his referent.
a) otherwise the object cannot be identified or we cannot explain how it is identified,
b) (DummettVsKripke)since we cannot learn the language.
I 174
Reference/meaning/Searle/Stalnaker: When a statement does not possess a descriptive content, it cannot be linked to an object. Reference/Dummett/Stalnaker: .. the object must be singled out somehow. Stalnaker: in both cases, it comes to skills, use, habits, practices or mental states.
Searle/Dummett/Stalnaker: So both seem to be of the opinion that a satisfactory fundamental semantics (see above that as a fact an expression has its semantic value)cannot be given.
StalnakerVsSearle/StalnakerVsDummett: Both, however, do not state this since they do not separate those two issues.
a) what is the semantics, e.g. for names
b) what circumstances lead to those semantics.
Stalnaker: if we separate them, we can no longer rule out the possibility that each language could be a language spoken by us. Then the community could very well speak a Mill’s language.
Frege’s language/Meaning/Reference/Denotation/Stalnaker: We would need them if these questions were not separate, e.g. if we needed to explain those at the same time.
a) why a name has these referents and
b) what the speaker communicates with his statement (which information, content).
Meaning/ KripkeVsFrege: Kripke (1972) (S.A. Kripke, Naming and Necessity, in D. Davidson and G. Harman (eds.), Semantics of Natural Language, 2nd edition, pp. 253-355; Addenda pp. 763-769, Dordrecht, 1972) The latter should be criticized for using "meaning" in two different ways.
a) as meaning
b) as the way how the reference is determined.
By identifying the two, he assumes that both are created by specific descriptions.that both are given by specific markings.
I 192
Causal chain/Historic chain/Semantics/Metasemantics/Presemantics/Kaplan/Stalnaker: (Kaplan 1989a, 574 ("pre-semantics")
Question: Are causal chains a part of semantics or a part of metasemantics?
Semantics: states, which semantic values hold the expressions of a language.
Metasemantics: what circumstances determine the semantic values.
Presemantics/Kaplan: concerns those who believe that a name signifies something laying at the other end of a historical chain.
Semantics/Kaplan: gives us rather the meaning than explaining how to find it.
Similar to Kripke:
Reference/Meaning/Kripke/Stalnaker: Kripke distinguishes between what the reference fixes (the causal chain) and it signifies.
KripkeVsFrege: he has mixed up those two things.
Name/Kaplan/Stalnaker: he asks whether names are like index words.
I/Kaplan/Stalnaker: Is a rigid designator: The truth conditions (WB) of what is said (propositional content) depend on the actual referent. Contrary to:
Meaning/I/Stalnaker: One indicates the significance by stating how the referent is determined in the context. That would belong to a theory of e.g. the English language.
E.g. "I refer to the speaker" . Who knows this will be taken for someone who knwos the significance of"I", even if
Important Argument: he does not know who was the speaker at a particular occasion.((s) Difference between significance/reference > "whoever was the speaker")
Def Character/Kaplan: = significance. Function of possible contexts of use for referents.

Tugendhat I 440
KripkeVsFrege: Primacy of descriptions not anymore(TugendhatVs). Kripke/Tugendhat: Actually, he is not particularly interested in the definition of the proper name but in the rigid designator.

Kripke I
S.A. Kripke
Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972
German Edition:
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981

Kripke II
Saul A. Kripke
"Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

Kripke III
Saul A. Kripke
Is there a problem with substitutional quantification?
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976

Kripke IV
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
In
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984

Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984

Stalnaker I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992
Frege, G. Russell Vs Frege, G. Dummett I 59
RussellVs distinction sense / reference (meaning / reference) (RussellVsFrege) ---
Stepanians I 44
Proof/Frege/Stepanians: Frege requests with the demand for completeness and rigor much stronger requirements for evidence than his mathematical contemporaries. Mathematics/VsFrege: mathematicians were more interested in truth than in the epistemological status. Intuitively plausible transitions were sufficient.
---
Stepanians I 87
Explicit definition/Frege/Stepanians: must satisfy two conditions 1. Frege's adequacy criterion: Hume's principle must follow from it. The justification for this principle is that the basic laws of arithmetic have to be provable on the principle's basis.
2. the explicit definition must master the problem with recourse to concept scope, where the context definition fails: it must solve the Caesar-problem (see above).
---
I 88
VsFrege: his explicit definition of the number concept does not solve the Caesar problem, but shifts it only to concept scope. Solution: would it only be if the concept scope excluded from the outset that Caesar is such a one.
Solution/Frege: requires here simply that the knowledge of the concept scope excludes this.
Value-over-time/terminology: = concept scope.
I 88
Concept scope/Frege/StepaniansVsFrege/VsFrege/Stepanians: Frege's own view of concept scopes will prove to be contradictory (see Russell's paradox).
I 91
Concept scope/Frege/Stepanians: was a newly introduced logical object by Frege for solving the Caesar-problem. They were not present yet in the concept script. Frege must justify them. Additional axiom: "Basic Law V":
The scope of F = is the scope of G
bik
All Fs are G and vice versa.
Russell's paradox/antinomy/RussellVsFrege/Stepanians: Basic Law V allows the transition from a general statement via terms to a statement about objects that fall under F - the scope of F.
It is assumed that each term has a scope, even if it might be empty.
I 92
RussellVsFrege/Stepanians: shows that not all definable terms in Frege's theory have a scope: Concept scope/Frege/RussellVsFrege: since concept scopes are objects the question has to be allowed whether a concept scope falls under the concept whose extent/scope it is.
If so, it includes itself, otherwise not.
Example: the scope of the term cat is itself not a cat.
On the other hand:
Example: the scope of the term non-cat contains very well itself, since it is not a cat.
Contradiction: a concept scope which includes all concept scopes that do not contain themselves. If it contained itself, it should not to contain itself by definition, if it did not contain itself, it must include itself by definition.
I 96
Object/concept/Frege/Stepanians: we discover (in a purely logical way) objects on concepts as their scopes.
I 97
VsFrege/VsConcept scope/Stepanians: the idea of the concept scope is based on a linguistic deception (See Chapter 6 § 2). That was Frege's own diagnosis.
I 114
Sentence/declarative sentence/statement/designating/VsFrege/Stepanians: one has often accused Frege that a declarative sentence does not want to denote anything but wants to claim (a truth value as an object) something. FregeVsVs/Stepanians: sentences as names for truth values are actually about subsets, whereas these subsets make a contribution to the truth value of the sentence structure (complete sentence).
Sentence/assertion/declarative sentence/Frege: (later, function and concept, 22, footnote): the total sentence means F nothing.
Basic Laws/terminology/Frege: (later): in the basic laws he differentiates terminologically and graphically between sentential "truth value names" that contribute towards the determination of the truth value and "concept type sets" that mean F nothing, but claim something.
---
Horwich I 57
RussellVsFrege/Cartwright: Russell's analysis differs from Frege, by not using unsaturation. (1)
1. R. Cartwright, „A Neglected Theory of Truth“ , Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93 in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth, Aldershot 1994
---
Newen I 61
Meaning determination/meaning/Russell/Newen: Two modes are possible: a) syncategorematic: according to the occurrence in a sentence.
b) categorematic; independent from the occurrence in a sentence.
Relational principle of meaning: applies to categorematic expressions: the meaning is the object (or the property). They are defined by acquaintance.
---
I 62
RussellVsFrege: Thesis: simple expressions mean what they signify. Syncategorematic/meaning/Russell. E.g. "and", "or": indicating their meaning means indicating the meaning of sentences in which they occur. ((s)> Context, contextually).
Contextually/Russell/Newen: syncategorematic expressions: their meaning is indicated by their meaning in schemes (sentence scheme).
---
Quine II 103
Russell: classes, if there are any, must exist, properties at best must be in place (weaker). Quine: I think this is arbitrary. In Russell's analysis of the concept of meaning, its relative indifference reappears opposite the existence-term (subsistence): Frege: threefold distinction
a) expression,
b) what it means,
c) that to what it (if at all) refers to.
This is not natural for Russell.
RussellVsFrege: ~ the whole distinction between mean and designate is wrong. The relationship between "C" and C remains completely mysterious, and where should we find the designating complex that supposedly refers to C?
QuineVsRussell: Russell's position seems sometimes to come from a confusion of terms with their meanings, sometimes from a confusion of the expression with its mention.

Russell I
B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead
Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986

Russell VII
B. Russell
On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit"
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996

Dummett I
M. Dummett
The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988
German Edition:
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Dummett II
Michael Dummett
"What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii)
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Dummett III
M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (a)
Michael Dummett
"Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (b)
Michael Dummett
"Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144
In
Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (c)
Michael Dummett
"What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (d)
Michael Dummett
"Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (e)
Michael Dummett
"Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Step I
Markus Stepanians
Gottlob Frege zur Einführung Hamburg 2001

Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994

New II
Albert Newen
Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005

Newen I
Albert Newen
Markus Schrenk
Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987
Frege, G. Wittgenstein Vs Frege, G. Brandom I 919
TractatusVsFrege: nothing can be considered an assertion, if not previously logical vocabulary is available, already the simplest assertion assumes the entire logic. ---
Dummett I 32
Frege capturing of thought: psychic act - thought not the content of consciousness - consciousness subjective - thought objective - WittgensteinVs
I 35
WittgensteinVsFrege: no personal objects (sensations), otherwise private language, unknowable for the subject itself. WittgensteinVsFrege: Understanding no psychic process, - real mental process: pain, melody (like Frege).
Dummett I 62
Wittgenstein's criticism of the thought of a private ostensive definition states implicitly that color words can have no, corresponding with the Fregean assumption, subjective, incommunicable sense. (WittgensteinVsFrege, color words). But Frege represents anyway an objective sense of color words, provided that it is about understanding.
Dummett I 158
WittgensteinVsDummett/WittgensteinVsFrege: rejects the view that the meaning of a statement must be indicated by description of their truth conditions. Wittgenstein: Understanding not abruptly, no inner experience, not the same consequences. ---
Wolf II 344
Names/meaning/existence/WittgensteinVsFrege: E.g. "Nothung has a sharp blade" also has sense if Nothung is smashed.
II 345
Name not referent: if Mr N.N. dies, the name is not dead. Otherwise it would make no sense to say "Mr. N.N. died". ---
Simons I 342
Sentence/context/copula/tradition/Simons: the context of the sentence provided the copula according to the traditional view: Copula/VsTradition: only accours as a normal word like the others in the sentence, so it cannot explain the context.
Solution/Frege: unsaturated phrases.
Sentence/WittgensteinVsFrege/Simons: context only simply common standing-next-to-each-other of words (names). That is, there is not one part of the sentence, which establishes the connection.
Unsaturation/Simons: this perfectly matches the ontological dependence (oA): a phrase cannot exist without certain others!
---
Wittgenstein I 16
Semantics/Wittgenstein/Frege/Hintikka: 1. main thesis of this chapter: Wittgenstein's attitude to inexpressibility of semantics is very similar to that of Frege. Wittgenstein represents in his early work as well as in the late work a clear and sweeping view of the nature of the relationship between language and the world. As Frege he believes they cannot be expressed verbally. Earlier WittgensteinVsFrege: by indirect use this view could be communicated.
According to the thesis of language as a universal medium (SUM) it cannot be expressed in particular, what would be the case if the semantic relationships between language and the world would be different from the given ones?
Wittgenstein I 45
Term/Frege/WittgensteinVsFrege/Hintikka: that a concept is essentially predicative, cannot be expressed by Frege linguistically, because he claims that the expression 'the term X' does not refer to a concept, but to an object.
I 46
Term/Frege/RussellVsFrege/Hintikka: that is enough to show that the Fregean theory cannot be true: The theory consists of sentences, which, according to their own theory cannot be sentences, and if they cannot be sentences, they also cannot be true ". (RussellVsFrege) WittgensteinVsFrege/late: return to Russell's stricter standards unlike Frege and early Wittgenstein himself.
Wittgenstein late: greatly emphasizes the purely descriptive. In Tractatus he had not hesitated to go beyond the vernacular.
I 65ff
Saturated/unsaturated/Frege/Tractatus/WittgensteinVsFrege: in Frege's distinction lurks a hidden contradiction. Both recognize the context principle. (Always full sentence critical for meaning).
I 66
Frege: unsaturated entities (functions) need supplementing. The context principle states, however, neither saturated nor unsaturated symbols have independent meaning outside of sentences. So both need to be supplemented, so the difference is idle. The usual equation of the objects of Tractatus with individuals (i.e. saturated entities) is not only missed, but diametrically wrong. It is less misleading, to regard them all as functions
I 222
Example number/number attribution/WittgensteinVsFrege/Hintikka: Figures do not require that the counted entities belong to a general area of all quantifiers. "Not even a certain universality is essential to the specified number. E.g. 'three equally big circles at equal distances' It will certainly not be: (Ex, y, z)xe circular and red, ye circular and red, etc ..." The objects Wittgenstein observes here, are apparently phenomenological objects. His arguments tend to show here that they are not only unable to be reproduced in the logical notation, but also that they are not real objects of knowledge in reality. ((s) that is not VsFrege here).
Wittgenstein: Of course, you could write like this: There are three circles, which have the property of being red.
I 223
But here the difference comes to light between inauthentic objects: color spots in the visual field, tones, etc., and the
actual objects: elements of knowledge.
(> Improper/actual, >sense data, >phenomenology).
---
II 73
Negation/WittgensteinVsFrege: his explanation only works if his symbols can be substituted by the words. The negation is more complicated than that negation character.
---
Wittgenstein VI 119
WittgensteinVsFrege/Schulte: he has not seen what is authorized on formalism that the symbols of mathematics are not the characters, but have no meaning. Frege: alternative: either mere ink strokes or characters of something. Then what they represent, is their meaning.
WittgensteinVsFrege: that this alternative is not correct, shows chess: here we are not dealing with the wooden figures, and yet the figures represent nothing, they have no Fregean meaning (reference).
There is simply a third one: the characters can be used as in the game.
---
Wittgenstein VI 172
Name/Wittgenstein/Schulte: meaning is not the referent. (VsFrege). ---
Sentence/character/Tractatus 3.14 .. the punctuation is a fact,.
3.141 The sentence is not a mixture of words.
3.143 ... that the punctuation is a fact is concealed by the ordinary form of expression of writing.
(WittgensteinVsFrege: so it was possible that Frege called the sentence a compound name).
3.1432 Not: "The complex character 'aRb' says that a stands in the relation R to b, but: that "a" is in a certain relation to "b", says aRb ((s) So conversely: reality leads to the use of characters). (quotes sic).
---
IV 28
Mention/use/character/symbol/WittgensteinVsFrege/WittgensteinVsRussell/Tractatus: their Begriffsschrift does not yet exclude such errors. 3.326 In order to recognize the symbol through the character, you have to pay attention to the meaningful use.
---
Wittgenstein IV 40
Sentence/sense/WittgensteinVsFrege/Tractatus: the verb of the sentence is not "is true" or "is wrong", but the verb has already to include that, what is true. 4.064 The sentence must have a meaning. The affirmation does not give the sentence its meaning.
IV 47
Formal concepts/Tractatus: (4.1272) E.g. "complex", "fact", "function", "number". WittgensteinVsFrege/WittgensteinVsRussell: they are presented in the Begriffsschrift by variables, not represented by functions or classes.
E.g. Expressions like "1 is a number" or "there is only one zero" or E.g. "2 + 2 = 4 at three o'clock" are nonsensical.
4.12721 the formal concept is already given with an object, which falls under it.
IV 47/48
So you cannot introduce objects of a formal concept and the formal concept itself, as basic concepts. WittgensteinVsRussell: you cannot introduce the concept of function and special functions as basic ideas, or e.g. the concept of number and definite numbers.
Successor/Begriffsschrift/Wittgenstein/Tractatus: 4.1273 E.g. b is successor of a: aRb, (Ex): aRx.xRb, (Ex,y): aRx.xRy.yRb ...
General/something general/general public/WittgensteinVsFrege/WittgensteinVsRussell: the general term of a form-series can only be expressed by a variable, because the term "term of this form-series" is a formal term. Both have overlooked: the way, how they want to express general sentences, is circular.
IV 49
Elementary proposition/atomism/Tractatus: 4.211 a character of an elementary proposition is that no elementary proposition can contradict it. The elementary proposition consists of names, it is a concatenation of names.
WittgensteinVsFrege: it itself is not a name.
IV 53
Truth conditions/truth/sentence/phrase/Tractatus: 4.431 of the sentence is an expression of its truth-conditions. (pro Frege). WittgensteinVsFrege: false explanation of the concept of truth: would "the truth" and "the false" really be objects and the arguments in ~p etc., then according to Frege the meaning of "~ p" is not at all determined.
Punctuation/Tractatus: 4.44 the character that is created by the assignment of each mark "true" and the truth possibilities.
Object/sentence/Tractatus: 4.441 it is clear that the complex of characters
IV 54
Ttrue" and "false" do not correspond to an object. There are no "logical objects". Judgment line/WittgensteinVsFrege/Tractatus: 4.442 the judgment line is logically quite meaningless. It indicates only that the authors in question consider the sentence to be true.
Wittgenstein pro redundancy theory/Tractatus: (4.442), a sentence cannot say of itself that it is true. (VsFrege: VsJudgment stroke).
IV 59
Meaning/WittgensteinVsFrege/Tractatus: (5.02) the confusion of argument and index is based on Frege's theory of meaning
IV 60
of the sentences and functions. For Frege the sentences of logic were names, whose arguments the indices of these names.
IV 62
Concluding/conclusion/result relation/WittgensteinVsRussell/WittgensteinVsFrege/Tractatus: 5.132 the "Final Acts" that should justify the conclusions for the two, are senseless and would be superfluous. 5.133 All concluding happens a priori.
5.134 one cannot conclude an elementary proposition from another.
((s) Concluding: from sentences, not situations.)
5.135 In no way can be concluded from the existence of any situation to the existence of,
IV 63
an entirely different situation. Causality: 5.136 a causal nexus which justifies such a conclusion, does not exist.
5.1361 The events of the future, cannot be concluded from the current.
IV 70
Primitive signs/WittgensteinVsFrege/WittgensteinVsRussell/Tractatus: 5.42 The possibility of crosswise definition of the logical "primitive signs" of Frege and Russell (e.g. >, v) already shows that these are no primitive signs, let alone that they signify any relations.
IV 101
Evidence/criterion/logic/WittgensteinVsFrege/Tractatus: 6.1271 strange that such an exact thinker like Frege appealed to the obviousness as a criterion of the logical sentence.
IV 102
Identity/meaning/sense/WittgensteinVsFrege/Tractatus: 6.232 the essential of the equation is not that the sides have a different sense but the same meaning, but the essential is that the equation is not necessary to show that the two expressions, that are connected by the equal sign, have the same meaning, since this can be seen from the two expressions themselves. ---
Wittgenstein II 343
Intension/classes/quantities/Frege/Russell/WittgensteinVsRussell/WittgensteinVsFrege: both believed they could deal with the classes intensionally because they thought they could turn a list into a property, a function. (WittgensteinVs). Why wanted both so much to define the number?

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921.
German Edition:
Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960

Bra I
R. Brandom
Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994
German Edition:
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001
German Edition:
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001

Dummett I
M. Dummett
The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988
German Edition:
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Dummett III (e)
Michael Dummett
"Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

K II siehe Wol I
U. Wolf (Hg)
Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993

Simons I
P. Simons
Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987
Frege, G. Verificationism Vs Frege, G. Field II 104
Verifikationstheorie/VsFrege/VsRussell/VsTractatus/VsRamsey/Bedeutung/Field: hier ist der Hauptbegriff nicht Wahrheitsbedingungen (WB) sondern Verifikations-Bedingungen (VB). (Vielleicht über Reize). Diese werden ohne daß-Sätze gegeben. WB/Rege/Russell/Field: einige Vertreter dieser Linie werden sagen, was beim Verifikationismus ausgelassen ist, sind nicht die WB, sondern propositionaler Inhalt.
Proposition/Verifikationismus/Field: kann der Verifikationist dann einfach als Klasse von VB bezeichnen. Für eine Äußerung drückt die entsprechende Proposition dann die Menge der VB aus, die sie hat. So mußten Propositionen im verifikationistischen Sinn nicht mit daß-Sätzen beschrieben werden.
Proposition/Inflationismus/Frege/Russell/Field: würde sagen, daß das keine richtigen Propositionen sind, weil diese WB einschließen müssen. InflationismusVsVerifikationismus.

Field I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Field IV
Hartry Field
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994
Frege, G. Millikan Vs Frege, G. I 102
Relation of projection/language/Millikan: We begin by saying that at least a few words are coordinated with objects. Accordingly, true propositions correspond with facts in the world.
Problem: Incorrect sentences do not correspond to any facts. How can individual words that correspond very well to objects, be composed in a way that in the end the whole sentence does not correspond?
Ex "Theaetetus flies": "Theaetetus" corresponds to Theaitetus, "flies" corresponds to flying.
wrong solution: to say that it was up to the relation between the Theaetetus and the flying. Because the relation corresponds somewhat, this may be instantiated (Ex between Theaitetos and walking) or uninstantiiert. Everything corresponds to something - just not the whole sentence "Theaetetus flies".
Solution/Frege: he joined the singular term with "values" that were the objects in the world.
I 103
Sentence/Frege/Millikan: he interpreted thus similarly to names, as complex characters that marked truth or falsity in the end. (Millikan pro Frege: "elegant") Solution/Wittgenstein/WittgensteinVsFrege/Millikan (Millikan: better than Frege): complex aRb, whereas in the case of false sentences the correspondence with the world lacks.
Correspondence/Wittgenstein/Millikan: but that is another meaning of "corresponding"! Words should correspond with different things than sentences with the world. ((S) double difference: 1. aRb unlike 2. SLW!. It would have already made a difference, if aRb and SRW were opposed.).
((S) Sense/Wittgenstein/(S): corresponds to the possibility of derogations.)

I 190
real value/indexical adaptor/denotation/Millikan: Ex "the ___ N of ....". indexical adaptor: has to be a real value of "N" to be in the embedded clause "N ..." and a real value of "the" in the embedded sentence "the ...".
focused eigenfunction/eigenfunction: to be translated into an internal name, which identifies the individual N. This has the entire denotation if it is properly adapted.
intentional Icon: Ex "the ___m of..." thus includes two intentional icons or projections on facts. But these are different from the purpose of the sentence as a whole or a subset.
embedded sentence: does not only want to introduce the listener to a fact, but o show to which complex category belongs what corresponds to the subject in the independent sentence containing the embedded sentence.
Reference: that's how the reference of a designation is determined.
Sense / Millikan: now it is clear why I have called sense the rules. Because the various markings differ in terms of the rules, even if they have the same references.
Sense according to Frege/Millikan: this difference of rules is the difference in meaning.
Meaning/reference/MillikanVsFrege: but a reference has to take on only a meaning of a certain kind. Thus, there is something that has been previously discriminated before the meaning of the remainder of the sentence has been identified.
I 191
Reference/meaning/Millikan: but the having of meaning or of references are very similar types of "having".
I 274
Property/object/predicate/substance/individual/ontology/Millikan: Strawson'S distinction between "monogamous" and "non-monogamous" entities is not absolute but relative: Object/thing: Ex if my ring is made of gold, it can not be made of silver at the same time.
polygamous: Gold is relative to my ring. ((S) it could have been made of silver - the gold could have belonged to another subject.). Then gold is a property (as opposed to another) and my ring a substance.
But in relation to other substances the identity of gold seems to be like the identity of an individual.
Ontology/MillikanVsFrege/MillikanVsRussell: we must drop the rigid distinction between concept and object or individual thing and property.
I 275
Description: not only predicates are variations in world states, but also substances or individuals (they can be exchanged). Substance: if we consider gold as a property that does not prevent interpreting it also as a substance. As Aristotle said:
Individuals/Aristotle/Millikan: are merely primary substances, not the only substances that exist, that is, substances which are not properties of something else.
Substance/Millikan: is actually an epistemic category.
Substance/Millikan: Ex Gold, Ex Domestic Cat, Ex '69 Plymouth Valiant 100th.
Substance/category/Millikan: substances fall into categories defined by exclusive classes, in regard to which they are determined.
Ex gold and silver fall into the same category because they belong to the same exclusive classes: have a melting point, atomic weight, etc.
I 308
Truth/accuracy/criterion/Quine/Millikan: For Quine a criterion for correct thinking seems to be that the relation to a stimulus can be predicted. MillikanVsQuine: but how does learning to speak in unison facilitate the prediction?
Correspondence/MillikanVsQuine/MillikanVsWittgenstein: both are not aware of what conformity in judgments really is: it is not to speak in unison. If one does not say the same, that does not mean that one does not agree.
Solution/Millikan: correspondence is to say the same about the same.
Mismatch: can arise only if sentences have subject-predicate structure and negation is permitted.
One-word sentence/QuineVsFrege/Millikan: Quine goes so far as to allow the sentence "Ouch!" He thinks the difference between word and sentence in the end only concernes the printer.
Negation/Millikan: the negation of a sentence is not proven by a lack of evidence, but by positive facts (supra).
Contradiction/Millikan: that we do not agree on a sentence and its negation simultaneously lies in the nature (natural necessity).
I 309
Thesis: lack of contradiction is essentially based on the ontological structure of the world.

Millikan I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Millikan II
Ruth Millikan
"Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005
Hintikka, J. Russell Vs Hintikka, J. Hintikka I 179
RussellVsHintikka: he would not have accepted my representation of his position like this. HintikkaVsRussell: but the reason for this lies merely in a further error by Russell: I have not attributed to him what he believed, but what he should have believed.
Quantification/Russell/Hintikka: he should have reduced this to objects of acquaintance. But Russell believed that it was sufficient to eliminate expressions that apparently denote objects, which are not those of acquaintance.
N.B.: with this, his quantifiers do not enter an ontological commitment. Only denoting expressions do so.
Variable/Russell/Hintikka: with Russell only notational patterns.
Ontological commitment/Quine/HintikkaVsRussell: Russell did not recognize the ontological commitment, which languages of 1st order bring with them.
Being/ontology/Quine: "Being means, being a value of a bound variable."
HintikkaVsRussell: that, he did not recognize.

Russell I
B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead
Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986

Russell VII
B. Russell
On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit"
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996

Hintikka I
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
Investigating Wittgenstein
German Edition:
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Hintikka II
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989
Hintikka, J. Peacocke Vs Hintikka, J. I 189
Possible Worlds/Acquaintance/Identification/Hintikka/Peacocke: then we must interpret Hintikka so that he assumes that only demonstrative methods are indispensable for the ability to distinguish between possible worlds.
I 189/190
PeacockeVsHintikka: E.g., it is quite natural that someone who sees a table in front of him also has a "descriptive" condition for the identification between possible worlds (cross-world identity). Whether one is in the right relations in the real world to be familiar with a thing (acquaintance), is one question, the conditions of cross-world identity is quite another!
This can be extended to the semantics of propositional attitudes in terms of possible worlds. It can be seen as a sufficient condition to quantify into belief contexts (!) that there is something in every possible world that is compatible with the belief of the subject that is in a certain relation to him, without asserting that the things that are in relation to him in another possible world are in any sense identical!
Then it is only necessary, but not sufficient for the subject to believe something that this belief must remain true with respect to any possible world compatible with this belief.
But this is something that every theory of possible worlds must assume in relation to propositional attitudes. Especially if these propositional attitudes cannot be formulated in terms of the subject.
Possible World/Quantification/HintikkaVsRussell: R. is unable to explain the cases where we quantify into belief contexts (!) where (according to Hintikka) the quantifier goes beyond "public descriptively identified" particulars.
Hintikka: compares this with a "roman à clef".
Peacocke: it is not clear that (if) this could not be explained by Russell as cases of general thoughts so that the person with such and such properties is so and so.

Peacocke I
Chr. R. Peacocke
Sense and Content Oxford 1983

Peacocke II
Christopher Peacocke
"Truth Definitions and Actual Languges"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976
Kripke, S. A. Donnellan Vs Kripke, S. A. I 27
Names/DonnellanVsRussell: logical proper names ("this") are no meaningful construction: according to the natural conception, it is precisely proper names that stand for an object without describing it. DonnellanVsKripke: for him it looks as if the name would somehow stand directly for the language-independent given object, I 27 Donnellan: but the name is only a means, which could also be replaced by another one. (>Donnellan I 205)
I 27
Causal Chain/Donnellan: must be historically correct. In the case of negative existential propositions it breaks off or is blocked. Names/BurgeVsKripke/BurgeVsDonnellan: not singular terms, but predicates (like Russell). E.g. "There is a time t for the speaker S a reference action x to an object y, so that: y is a Socrates and y is bald". The part sentence "y is a Socrates" thus has a truth condition itself. Reference is not eliminated. Dual reference: To the reference action and to naming.

Donnellan I
Keith S. Donnellan
"Reference and Definite Descriptions", in: Philosophical Review 75 (1966), S. 281-304
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993
Leibniz, G.W. Strawson Vs Leibniz, G.W. Hacking I 162
Monads / StrawsonVsLeibniz: the idea of a complete description is at all useless! ---
VII 116
StrawsonVsLeibniz/StrawsonVsRussell: both assume that the conventions that apply to existence, must also apply to statements of facts.

Strawson I
Peter F. Strawson
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959
German Edition:
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Strawson II
Peter F. Strawson
"Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit",
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Strawson III
Peter F. Strawson
"On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Strawson IV
Peter F. Strawson
Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992
German Edition:
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Strawson V
P.F. Strawson
The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966
German Edition:
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Strawson VI
Peter F Strawson
Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Strawson VII
Peter F Strawson
"On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950)
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

Hacking I
I. Hacking
Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983
German Edition:
Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996
Lesniewski, St. Prior Vs Lesniewski, St. I 43
Abstracts/Prior: Ontological Commitment/Quine: quantification of non-nominal variables nominalises them and thus forces us to believe in the corresponding abstract objects.
Here is a more technical argument which seems to point into Quine's direction at first:
Properties/Abstraction Operator/Lambda Notation/Church/Prior: logicians who believe in the real existence of properties sometimes introduce names for them.
Abstraction Operator: should form names from corresponding predicates. Or from open sentences.
Lambda: λ followed by a variable, followed by the open sentence in question.
E.g. if φx is read as "x is red",
I 44
then the property of redness is: λxφx. E.g. if Aφxψx: "x is red or x is green" (A: Here adjunction)
"Property of being red or green": λx∀φxψx.
To say that such a property characterizes an object, we just put the name of the property in front of the name of the object.
Lambda Calculus/Prior: usually has a rule that says that an object y has the property of φ-ness iff. y φt. I.e. we can equate:
(λy∀φxψx)y = ∀φyψy. ((s) y/x: because "for y applies: something (x) is...")
One might think that someone who does not believe in the real existence of properties does not need such a notation.
But perhaps we do need it if we want to be free for all types of quantification.
E.g. all-quantification of higher order:
a) C∏φCφy∑φyCAψyXy∑xAψxXx,
i.e. If (1) for all φ, if y φt, then φt is something
then (2) if y is either ψt or Xt, then
something results in either ψ or X.
That's alright.
Problem: if we want to formulate the more general principle of which a) is a special case: first:
b) C∏φΘφΘ()
Where we want to insert in the brackets that which symbolizes the alternation of a pair of verbs "ψ" and "X".
AψX does not work, because A must not be followed by two verbs, but only by two sentences.
We could introduce a new symbol A', which allows:
(A’ φψ)x = Aψxψx
this turns the whole thing into:
c) C∏φΘφΘA’ψX
From this we obtain by instantiation: of Θ
d) C∏φCφy∑xφxCA’ψXy∑xA’ψXx.
And this, Lesniewski's definition of "A", results in a).
This is also Lesniewski's solution to the problem.
I 45
PriorVsLesniewski: nevertheless, this is somewhat ad hoc. Lambda Notation: gives us a procedure that can be generalized:
For c) gives us
e) C∏φΘφΘ(λzAψzXz)
which can be instatiated to:
f) C∏φCφy∑xφx(λzAψzXz)y∑x(λzAψzXz)y.
From this, λ-conversion takes us back to a).
Point: λ-conversion does not take us back from e) to a), because in e) the λ-abstraction is not bound to an individual variable.
So of some contexts, "abstractions" cannot be eliminated.

I 161
Principia Mathematica/PM/Russell/Prior: Theorem 24.52: the universe is not empty The universal class is not empty, the all-class is not empty.
Russell himself found this problematic.
LesniewskiVsRussell: (Introduction to Principia Mathematica): violation of logical purity: that the universal class is believed to be not empty.
Ontology/Model Theory/LesniewskiVsRussell: for him, ontology is compatible with an empty universe.
PriorVsLesniewski: his explanation for this is mysterious:
Lesniewski: types at the lowest level stand for name (as in Russell).
But for him not only for singular names, but equally for general names and empty names!
Existence/LesniewskiVsRussell: is then something that can be significantly predicted with an ontological "name" as the subject. E.g. "a exists" is then always a well-formed expression (Russell: pointless!), albeit not always true.
Epsilon/LesniewskiVsRussell: does not only connect types of different levels for him, but also the same level! (Same logical types) E.g. "a ε a" is well-formed in Lesniewski, but not in Russell.
I 162
Set Theory/Classes/Lesniewski/Prior: what are we to make of it? I suggest that we conceive this ontology generally as Russell's set theory that simply has no variables for the lowest logical types. Names: so-called "names" of ontology are then not individual names like in Russell, but class names.
This solves the first of our two problems: while it is pointless to split individual names, it is not so with class names.
So we split them into those that are applied to exactly one individual, to several, or to none at all.
Ontology/Lesniewski/Russell/Prior: the fact that there should be no empty class still requires an explanation.
Names/Lesniewski/Prior: Lesniewski's names may therefore be logically complex! I.e. we can, for example, use to form their logical sum or their logical product!
And we can construct a name that is logically empty.
E.g. the composite name "a and not-a".
Variables/Russell: for him, on the other hand, individual variables are logically structureless.
Set Theory/Lesniewski/Prior: the development of Russell's set theory but without variables at the lowest level (individuals) causes problems, because these are not simply dispensable for Russell. On the contrary; for Russell, classes are constructed of individuals.
Thus he has, as it were, a primary (for individuals, functors) and a secondary language (for higher-order functors, etc.)
Basic sentences are something like "x ε a".
I 163
Def Logical Product/Russell: e.g. of the αs and βs: the class of xs is such that x is an α, and x is a β.

Pri I
A. Prior
Objects of thought Oxford 1971

Pri II
Arthur N. Prior
Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003
Meinong, A. Frege Vs Meinong, A. I 106f
FregeVsMeinong FregeVsRussell: there are contradictory terms, there are only no contradictory objects - the logic may determine only the limitation of terms, ie for each object, whether it falls within the definition, or not - a contradictory term is used to prove that there is no corresponding object.

F I
G. Frege
Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987

F II
G. Frege
Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994

F IV
G. Frege
Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993
Meinong, A. Meixner Vs Meinong, A. I 62
Round Square/Description/Meinong/Meixner: the Meinongian does not say that the round square exists, he goes even further and says that it cannot exist at all, he insists only that it is an entity.
I 63
MeinongVsRussell: if the description "the golden mountain" designates an incomplete individual, then probably also the following description is exactly the same: "the existing golden mountain".
MeixnerVsMeinong: not very convincing. However:
"Weak Sense"/Existence: like Holmes, you can say in the weak sense, "it has the property F to exist".
But that is not the strong sense.
Possibilia/Meixner: individual-like entities that are at least in principle able to exist. ((s) So not a round square).
Question: Is there such a thing?
That would be exactly the ee maximum consistent individuals.
The impossible are not ee maximum consistent.
Maximum consistent individuals: e.g. Meixner, Bush, (sets of properties).
Pure Posssibilia: only possible individuals. Are there any?
Language: interestingly, has no names for pure Possibilia!
I 64
Nevertheless, there is some ontological evidence of the presence of pure possibilia: It is clear that some individuals are actual, but could not have been actual (e.g. humans).
Meixner: Thesis: the reverse assumption, that some are not actual but could have been actual, naturally occurs next to this fact.
Meixner: certain actual individuals refer to non-actual ones: egg and sperm cells from which a human never emerges. Should we now say here that it merely seems as if it refers to a possible human being, and that at the other end there is no reference relationship (reference).
Unrealized Possibilities/Meixner: the merely possible human does not have certain qualities, e.g. an exact date of birth, (i.e. he does not have them in the real (actual) world, but nevertheless he has the negation of these qualities.
Unrealized Possibilities/Meixner: the predisposition for blue eyes (the egg and sperm cells) leave nothing to be desired in positive determination!
Def maximum consistent/Meixner: of every individual characteristic the individual contains either this or his negation. ((s) > continuous determination/Kant).
Pure Possibilia/Meixner: this applies to merely possible. The individual is, so to speak, nothing other than this set of properties (see above).

Mei I
U. Meixner
Einführung in die Ontologie Darmstadt 2004
Metalanguage Wittgenstein Vs Metalanguage VI 78
Figure/sentence/Wittgenstein/Schulte: In the sentence must be distinguished just as much as to the situation that it represents. (4:04). (Mathematical, logic manifold). ---
VI 79
This mathematical multiplicity cannot be reproduced again. One cannot escape it during reproduction. (4041). (WittgensteinVsRussell, WittgensteinVsType theory, WittgensteinVsMetalanguage).       The logical element - which gives the image the multiplicity - cannot be the subject itself of an image.

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921.
German Edition:
Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960
Mill, J. St. Kripke Vs Mill, J. St. Kripke I 36
FregeVsMill/RussellVsMill:Fallacy: in reality, a proper name which is used correctly is only an abbreviated or disguised description.
I 81
KripkeVsMill: Ordinary proper names of people are not characters that have no sense. We could otherwise understand any sentence in which "Socrates" is used if we do not know that "Socrates" means "the individual who is called ’Socrates’".
I 145
Mill: "singular names": connotative: Description. Non-connotative: proper name.
I 145
But Mill: All names for general types are connotative. E.g. "human being" is defined as a conjunction of certain properties which specify the necessary and sufficient conditions to be a human being: rationality, animality and certain physical properties. RussellVsMill: Wrong by common names, right by singular names.
KripkeVsRussell: Mill: Right by singular names, wrong for general names. Maybe some general names ("foolish" ,"fat", "yellow ") express properties. General names like "cow"and "tiger"do not, unless being a cow banally counts as a property. (> Properties/Kripke).
Kripke’s general names such as "cat" do not express any property.

Kripke I
S.A. Kripke
Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972
German Edition:
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981

Kripke IV
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
In
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984
Mill, J. St. Russell Vs Mill, J. St. FregeVsMill/RussellVsMill: error: in reality, a proper name that is used correctly, is only an abbreviated or disguised designation.
---
Kripke I 36
Mill: "singular names": connotative: characteristic. Non-connotative: proper names.
---
I 145
But Mill: all names for general types connotative. E.g. "human being" is defined as a conjunction of certain properties, which specify necessary and sufficient conditions for the being-a-human: rationality, animality and certain physical properties. RussellVsMill: wrong with general names, correct with singular names.
KripkeVsRussell: Mill: correct with singular names, wrong in general names. Maybe some general names express ("foolish", "fat", "yellow") properties. General names like "cow" and "tiger" do not, unless being a cow, counts in a trivial way as a property . (> Properties).
---
I 145
Strand: Kripke general names such as "cat" express no property.

Russell I
B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead
Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986

Russell VII
B. Russell
On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit"
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996

Kripke I
S.A. Kripke
Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972
German Edition:
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981

Kripke IV
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
In
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984
Moore, G.E. Ayer Vs Moore, G.E. Horwich I 52
RussellVsPropositionsRussellVsRussell: (later, Logic and Knowledge, 1956, p. 223): I used to think there were some. But that would only be shadowy additional things to facts. CartwrightVsRussell: we still do not know what the objection against them is!".
Horwich I 53
Fact/AyerVsMoore: expresses himself unclearly when he says, "the fact does not exist". Properly, it should be: "There is no fact". ("There is"/Existing/"Being"). (Ayer, Russell and Moore, p. 210). CartwrightVsMoore: it still remains a poor argument: it cannot be concluded that because a false belief has no fact as an object it has no object at all.
What Moore meant becomes more clear in "Some Main Problems": the proposition "that lions exist" is definitely in the universe, if someone believes that, regardless of whether it is true or false. Because the expressions "that lions exist" and "the existence of lions" are names for that which is believed. (p. 260).
Cartwright: at first this looks like a mistake, but it’s not: because he seems to have accepted (together with Russell) that what is believed can be named with a verb ("verbal noun").
Horwich I 54
Then we seem to have a demonstration that there is no such thing as the proposition that E.g. there is no subway in Boston. Because if there were one, there would also have to be such a thing as the non-existence of a subway in Boston. And this cannot exist, because there is a subway in Boston. Cartwright: what is the basis of this argument, the assumption that what is believed may be referred to by a verb (verbal noun)?.
CartwrightVsMoore: the argument is not very convincing: Maybe the sentence E.g. "Brown believes that God exists" is synonymous with "Brown believes in the existence of God." But it does not follow that what Brown believes is the existence of God. ((s) The "object" (object of the belief) is on the one hand a sentence with "that", and on the other hand the actual existence). (FN 19).
The reason for this lies in Russell’s access to propositions:
(8) Brown is taller than Smith.
Horwich I 56
Fact/proposition/CartwrightVsMoore/CartwrightVsRussell: Problem: now it is just hard to see how a proposition can be anything but true! (FN 23). If in (8) Brown is linked to Smith the way it is said above, how can Brown be anything but taller than Smith?. Russell: E.g. the proposition "A is different from B". The components seem to be only A, B and difference. Nevertheless, they do not constitute the proposition when they are next to each other. The Proposition combines the parts in more ways than a mere list. (FN 24).
Cartwright: nevertheless, if the proposition links the parts like this, it cannot be wrong!.
Cartwright: if a proposition like (8) exists, then Brown is taller than Smith.
Russell: in "Principles" he was also aware that there is a difficulty, but as a solution he could only propose:
Russell: if a proposition is true, it has another quality apart from that which it shares with other propositions. (p. 49).
Cartwright: this additional quality should of course be the simple, unanalysable truth. But this appeal comes too late! Either the components are linked properly, then the proposition is invariably true, or they are not, then we have no proposition at all. (1)


1. R. Cartwright, „A Neglected Theory of Truth“ , Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93, In:
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Ayer I
Alfred J. Ayer
"Truth" in: The Concept of a Person and other Essays, London 1963
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Ayer II
Alfred Jules Ayer
Language, Truth and Logic, London 1936
In
Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke

Ayer III
Alfred Jules Ayer
"The Criterion of Truth", Analysis 3 (1935), pp. 28-32
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Moore, G.E. Cartwright Vs Moore, G.E. Horwich I 45
Correspondence theory/CartwrightVsmoore: Problem: there is also a property of coincidence (correspondence) which does not have the false proposition. And that seems to depend undeniably on the world! On a fact. Fact: the proposition is true if it is a fact that there are subways in Boston, otherwise it is false. CartwrightVsMoore/CartwrightVsRussell: it is precisely this which the theory of truth ignores as a simple, unanalysable property. But both were aware of this. ("Meinong Theory", p 75). They stuck to it, because: RussellVsCorrespondence theory, MooreVsCorrespondence theory.
I 47
Fact/True proposition/Moore/Cartwright: (Moore: Some Main P, pp 262): seems to have explained his former theory wrongly there: Tact/MooreVsMoore: (late): does not consist in a proposition having a simple property while remaining the same, regardless of whether it is true or false. Even if we concede the existence of propositions. The relation of the proposition to the fact is not simply that the proposition is a constituent of the fact, one of the elements of which it is composed. Moore/Cartwright: otherwise, one would have to say that E.g. the fact that lions exist was a fact about the proposition that lions exist. But how is this relevant for Moore’s earlier theory? Because that was not what it was about, but rather that the fact that lions exist simply is the proposition. (Moore, early: fact = true proposition, not part of it) The simple property (truth) is possessed by the proposition itself.
I 48
Anyone who believes that the proposition that lions exist is true, believes the corresponding proposition. The fact here is that the proposition is true. Fact/Moore: (early): consists in that the proposition possesses the simple property of truth. Fact/Moore/late: (Some Main P, misrepresenting his earlier theory): now consists in the possession of the truth (simple property) by the proposition. Important argument: then there is no identity fact = true proposition: because identity does not consist in itself having a property. ((s) A does not consist of the fact that A has the property F,> consist in, consist of, identity). Moore/Cartwright: the time of "Some Main .." he had come to the view that the relation theory of beliefs (acceptance of belief objects) is inconsistent with the identification of facts with true propositions. Now a relation was searched rather than the identity and his solution was the relation of "consisting in": Def Fact/Moore: (Some Main Problems): consists in the possession of truth by the proposition. (still simple property). CartwrightVsMoore: he saw himself that this was not very successful: there are facts that do not consist in a proposition having a certain simple property.
CartwrightVsMoore: worse: once facts and propositions are distinguished, no simple property (truth) is needed anymore. Instead, we now have facts as the corresponding ones! It was precisely this inability to distinguish propositions and facts that had led Moore and Russell to the theory of truth as a simple unanalysable property!.
Fact/Proposition/Moore/Cartwright: what had led Moore to start believing that propositions and facts cannot be identified?.
I 49
E.g. Suppose Brown believes that there are subways in Boston. Moore/Russell/early: then there is a corresponding proposition that Brown believes.
Problem: even if the belief had been wrong, Brown would have needed a faith object. Because what someone believes cannot depend on its truth!.
So the believed proposition is definitely in the universe. But if the proposition is false, there is no corresponding fact in the universe. So propositions cannot be identical with facts. Ayer: this is a compelling argument. Cartwright: but for me it does not refute the early theory!. Russell/Moore/Early/Cartwright: sure, if something is true of a proposition, and it is not true of the corresponding fact, then proposition and fact are not the identical. But is this case given here? According to the early theory, the proposition would be in the universe anyway, even if it were wrong. Question: Is Moore right to say that the same does not apply to the fact? CartwrightVsMoore: it is not obvious that if the belief, e.g. that there are underground trains in Boston, was wrong, it would be necessary that something that actually exists in the universe, (namely that there are underground trains in Boston) would then be missing in the universe. Surely it would not be fact, but that does not mean that an entity would be missing if the belief had been wrong.
I 50
Analogy: e.g. there is someone in the universe who can be correctly described as the author of Word and Object (namely Quine). Now, it could easily have been the case that Quine had not written the book. But that would not require Quine (= author of W + O) to not exist in the universe! E.g. Someone else might also have written the book. Furthermore, all persons who actually are in the universe, would not have had to be in the universe. Moore/Early/Cartwright: According to Moore’s earlier theory one might have thought that by analogy, something could also be in the universe that is "correctly described" with that there are underground trains in Boston, which, in the case that there were no underground trains in Boston, would not be a fact. That is wrong because of the false analogy between people and abstract belief objects). CartwrightVsMoore: (early): a follower of the early theory would have expressed the true same proposition with the following two sentences: (3) The fact that there are underground trains in Boston would not have had to be the fact that there are underground trains in Boston. and
(4) The author of Word and Object would not have had to be the author of Word and Object. CartwrightVsMoore: (early): With that he would have assumed that "the fact that" would have been a rigid designator.

Car I
N. Cartwright
How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983

CartwrightR II
R. Cartwright
Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954

Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Possibilia Lewis Vs Possibilia Schwarz I 87
Possibilia/Possible World/possible worlds/possibilistic structuralism/Lewis/Schwarz: (1991,1993d) here Lewis assumed, thesis: that there are clearly less inhabitants of possible worlds (Possibilia) than sets. Set theory: so for them additional entities had to be accepted besides the Possibilia. These additional entities should then contain the sets (and classes) required by the 5th condition (see above).
Lewis later: accepts that there are at least as many Possibilia as sets (see section 3.2 above). Then one could do without the additional mathematical entities (Lewis pro). Then we delete condition five. Then "many" inhabitants of possible worlds must be sets.
Schwarz I 88
Because Lewis assumes that there are more sets than individuals. Because if there are "many" individuals, then also "many" individual atoms, atoms of individuals exist. But there are more sums of individual atoms than individual atoms. Then there are also more individuals than atoms at all and then, according to conditions (1) and (3), more units than atoms, in contradiction to (2). Possibilia/Lewis/Schwarz: if they have no cardinality, not all Possibilia can be individuals.
Def possibilistic structuralism/Lewis/Schwarz: mathematical statements are not only about mathematical entities anyway, but partly also about Possibilia. Then why not just these?
Pro: not only does he get along without primitive mathematical vocabulary, but also without primitive mathematical ontology. Questions about their origin and our epistemic approach are thus resolved. If mathematical statements are about Possibilia, it results in a modal state from the logic of unlimited modality: For unlimited modal statements truth, possibility and necessity coincide.(see section 3.6 above).
Lewis: can't just delete the mathematical entities. (LewisVsField): Problem: mixed sums. For example, if some atoms in Caesar's brain are classified as single sets and others as individuals, then Caesar is a mixed sum.
Mixed Sum/Mereology/Lewis: is neither individual nor class.
Class: Sum of single sets.
Schwarz I 89
Mixed sums: are not elements of sets in Lewis' original system either. Schwarz: that is unmotivated in terms of set theory: according to the iterative view, absolutely everything has a single set. Lewis usually ignores mixed sums anyway.
Problem: not under every single set relationship is there a single set of Caesar.
Solution: a) also allow a mixed sums single set. Vs: there are more mixed sums than single sets, so that doesn't work.
b) Requirement: that all "small" mixed sums have a single set.
c) More elegant: settle mixed sums by forbidding individuals. If you identify classes with ordinary Possibilia, you could treat each atom as a single set. For example, Caesar is then always a class, his single set is the object of pure set theory.
LewisVs: this does not work in his set theory (unlike ZFC). Because we need at least one individual as an empty set.
Single set/Lewis/Schwarz: since a single individual atom is sufficient, instead of (1) (3) single set relationships, one could also determine arbitrary unambiguous images of small things in all atoms except one. This one atom is then the empty set relative to the respective single set relationship. (> QuineVsRussell: several empty sets, there depending on type).
Solution/Daniel Nolan: (2001, Kaß 7, 2004): VsLewis, VsZermelo: empty set as real part of units:
Def "Esingleton" by A/Nolan: {A} consists of 0 and a thing {A} - 0 . (Terminology: "Singleton": only card of one color).
Esingleton/Nolan: similar assumptions apply to them as in Lewis' single sets.
Mixed Sum/Nolan: this problem becomes that of sums of 0 and atoms other than Esingletons. In Nolan, these are never elements of sets.
Object/Nolan: (2004.§4): only certain "big" things can be considered as 0. So all "small" things are allowed as elements of classes.
Individual/Nolan: many "little" things are individuals according to him among all Esingleton relationships.
Empty Set/Schwarz: all these approaches are not flawless. The treatment of the empty set is always somewhat artificial.
Schwarz I 90
Empty Set/Lewis/Schwarz: set of all individuals (see above): There is a good reason for this! ((s) So there are no individuals and the empty set is needed to express that.). Subset/Lewis/Schwarz: is then defined as disjunctive: once for classes and once for the empty set.
Possibilistic structuralism/Schwarz: is elegant. Vs: it prevents set-theoretical constructions of possible worlds (e.g. as sentence sets).
If you reduce truths about sets to those about Possibilia, you can no longer reduce Possibilia to sets.

Lewis I
David K. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

Lewis I (a)
David K. Lewis
An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (b)
David K. Lewis
Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (c)
David K. Lewis
Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis II
David K. Lewis
"Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Lewis IV
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

Lewis V
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

Lewis VI
David K. Lewis
Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LewisCl
Clarence Irving Lewis
Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970

LewisCl I
Clarence Irving Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991

Schw I
W. Schwarz
David Lewis Bielefeld 2005
Principia Mathematica Gödel Vs Principia Mathematica Russell I XIV
Circular Error Principle/VsPrincipia Mathematica/PM/Russell/Gödel: thus seems to apply only to constructivist assumptions: when a term is understood as a symbol, together with a rule to translate sentences containing the symbol into sentences not containing it. Classes/concepts/Gödel: can also be understood as real objects, namely as "multiplicities of things" and concepts as properties or relations of things that exist independently of our definitions and constructions!
This is just as legitimate as the assumption of physical bodies. They are also necessary for mathematics, as they are for physics. Concept/Terminology/Gödel: I will use "concept" from now on exclusively in this objective sense.
A formal difference between these two conceptions of concepts would be: that of two different definitions of the form α(x) = φ(x) it can be assumed that they define two different concepts α in the constructivist sense. (Nominalistic: since two such definitions give different translations for propositions containing α.)
For concepts (terms) this is by no means the case, because the same thing can be described in different ways.
For example, "Two is the term under which all pairs fall and nothing else. There is certainly more than one term in the constructivist sense that satisfies this condition, but there could be a common "form" or "nature" of all pairs.
All/Carnap: the proposal to understand "all" as a necessity would not help if "provability" were introduced in a constructivist manner (..+...).
Def Intensionality Axiom/Russell/Gödel: different terms belong to different definitions.
This axiom holds for terms in the circular error principle: constructivist sense.
Concepts/Russell/Gödel: (unequal terms!) should exist objectively. (So not constructed). (Realistic point of view).
When only talking about concepts, the question gets a completely different meaning: then there seems to be no objection to talking about all of them, nor to describing some of them with reference to all of them.
Properties/GödelVsRussell: one could surely speak of the totality of all properties (or all of a certain type) without this leading to an "absurdity"! ((s) > Example "All properties of a great commander".
Gödel: this simply makes it impossible to construe their meaning (i.e. as an assertion about sense perception or any other non-conceptual entities), which is not an objection to someone taking the realistic point of view.
Part/whole/Mereology/GödelVsRussell: neither is it contradictory that a part should be identical (not just the same) with the whole, as can be seen in the case of structures in the abstract sense. Example: the structure of the series of integers contains itself as a special part.
I XVI/XVII
Even within the realm of constructivist logic there are certain approximations to this self-reflectivity (self-reflexivity/today: self-similarity) of impredicative qualities, namely e.g. propositions, which as parts of their meaning do not contain themselves, but their own formal provability. There are also sentences that refer to a totality of sentences to which they themselves belong: Example: "Each sentence of a (given) language contains at least one relational word".
This makes it necessary to look for other solutions to the paradoxes, according to which the fallacy does not consist in the assumption of certain self-reflectivities of the basic terms, but in other assumptions about them!
The solution may have been found for the time being in simple type theory. Of course, all this refers only to concepts.
Classes: one should think that they are also not created by their definitions, but only described! Then the circular error principle does not apply again.
Zermelo splits classes into "levels", so that only sets of lower levels can be elements of sets of higher levels.
Reducibility Axiom/Russell/Gödel: (later dropped) is now taken by the class axiom (Zermelo's "axiom of choice"): that for each level, for any propositional function
φ(x)
the set of those x of this level exists for which φ(x) is true.
This seems to be implied by the concept of classes as multiplicities.
I XVIII
Extensionality/Classes: Russell: two reasons against the extensional view of classes: 1. the existence of the zero class, which cannot be well a collection, 2. the single classes, which should be identical with their only elements. GödelVsRussell: this could only prove that the zero classes and the single classes (as distinguished from their only element) are fictions to simplify the calculation, and do not prove that all classes are fictions!
Russell: tries to get by as far as possible without assuming the objective existence of classes. According to this, classes are only a facon de parler.
Gödel: but also "idealistic" propositions that contain universals could lead to the same paradoxes.
Russell: creates rules of translation according to which sentences containing class names or the term "class" are translated into sentences not containing them.
Class Name/Russell: eliminate by translation rules.
Classes/Principia Mathematica/Russell/Gödel: the Principia Mathematica can do without classes, but only if you assume the existence of a concept whenever you want to construct a class.
First, some of them, the basic predicates and relations like "red", "colder" must be apparently considered real objects. The higher terms then appear as something constructed (i.e. something that does not belong to the "inventory of the world").
I XIX
Ramsey: said that one can form propositions of infinite length and considers the difference finite/infinite as not so decisive. Gödel: Like physics, logic and mathematics are based on real content and cannot be "explained away".
Existence/Ontology/Gödel: it does not behave as if the universe of things is divided into orders and one is forbidden to speak of all orders, but on the contrary: it is possible to speak of all existing things. But classes and concepts are not among them.
But when they are introduced as a facon de parler, it turns out that the extension of symbolism opens the possibility of introducing them in a more comprehensive way, and so on, to infinity.
To maintain this scheme, however, one must presuppose arithmetics (or something equivalent), which only proves that not even this limited logic can be built on nothing.
I XX
Constructivist posture/constructivism/Russell/Gödel: was abandoned in the first edition, since the reducibility axiom for higher types makes it necessary that basic predicates of arbitrarily high type exist. From constructivism remains only
1. Classes as facon de parler
2. The definition of ~, v, etc. as valid for propositions containing quantifiers,
3. The stepwise construction of functions of orders higher than 1 (of course superfluous because of the R-Axiom)
4. the interpretation of definitions as mere typographical abbreviations (all incomplete symbols, not those that name an object described by the definition!).
Reducibility Axiom/GödelVsRussell: this last point is an illusion, because of the reducibility axiom there are always real objects in the form of basic predicates or combinations of such according to each defined symbol.
Constructivist posture/constructivism/Principia Mathematica/Gödel: is taken again in the second edition and the reducibility axiom is dropped. It is determined that all basic predicates belong to the lowest type.
Variables/Russell/Gödel: their purpose is to enable the assertions of more complicated truth functions of atomistic propositions. (i.e. that the higher types are only a facon de parler.).
The basis of the theory should therefore consist of truth functions of atomistic propositions.
This is not a problem if the number of individuals and basic predicates is finite.
Ramsey: Problem of the inability to form infinite propositions is a "mere secondary matter".
I XXI
Finite/infinite/Gödel: with this circumvention of the problem by disregarding the difference between finite and infinite a simpler and at the same time more far-reaching interpretation of set theory exists: Then Russell's Apercu that propositions about classes can be interpreted as propositions about their elements becomes literally true, provided n is the number of (finite) individuals in the world and provided we neglect the zero class. (..) + I XXI
Theory of integers: the second edition claims that it can be achieved. Problem: that in the definition "those cardinals belonging to each class that contains 0 and contains x + 1 if it contains x" the phrase "each class" must refer to a given order.
I XXII
Thus whole numbers of different orders are obtained, and complete induction can be applied to whole numbers of order n only for properties of n! (...) The question of the theory of integers based on ramified type theory is still unsolved.
I XXIII
Theory of Order/Gödel: is more fruitful if it is considered from a mathematical point of view, not a philosophical one, i.e. independent of the question of whether impredicative definitions are permissible. (...) impredicative totalities are assumed by a function of order α and ω .
Set/Class/Principia Mathematica/Russell/Type Theory/Gödel: the existence of a well-ordered set of the order type ω is sufficient for the theory of real numbers.
Def Continuum Hypothesis/Gödel: (generalized): no cardinal number exists between the power of any arbitrary set and the power of the set of its subsets.
Type Theory/VsType Theory/GödelVsRussell: mixed types (individuals together with predications about individuals etc.) obviously do not contradict the circular error principle at all!
I XXIV
Russell based his theory on quite different reasons, similar to those Frege had already adopted for the theory of simpler types for functions. Propositional functions/statement function/Russell/Gödel: always have something ambiguous because of the variables. (Frege: something unsaturated).
Propositional function/p.f./Russell/Gödel: is so to speak a fragment of a proposition. It is only possible to combine them if they "fit together" i.e. are of a suitable type.
GödelVsRussell: Concepts (terms) as real objects: then the theory of simple types is not plausible, because what one would expect (like "transitivity" or the number two) to be a concept would then seem to be something that stands behind all its different "realizations" on the different levels and therefore does not exist according to type theory.
I XXV
Paradoxes in the intensional form/Gödel: here type theory brings a new idea: namely to blame the paradoxes not on the axiom that every propositional function defines a concept or a class, but on the assumption that every concept results in a meaningful proposition if it is claimed for any object as an argument. The objection that any concept can be extended to all arguments by defining another one that gives a false proposition whenever the original one was meaningless can easily be invalidated by pointing out that the concept "meaningfully applicable" does not always have to be meaningfully applicable itself.

Göd II
Kurt Gödel
Collected Works: Volume II: Publications 1938-1974 Oxford 1990
Principia Mathematica Wittgenstein Vs Principia Mathematica II 338
Identity/Relation/Notation/WittgensteinVsRussell: Russell's notation triggers confusion, because it gives the impression that the identity is a relationship between two things. This use of the equal sign, we have to differentiate from its use in arithmetics, where we may think of it as part of a replacement rule. WittgensteinVsRussell: its spelling gives erroneously the impression that there is a sentence like x = y or x = x. But one can abolish the signs of identity.
---
II 352
Definition number/Russell/Wittgenstein: Russell's definition of number as a property of a class is not unnecessary, because it states a method on how to find out if a set of objects had the same number as the paradigm. Now Russell has said, however, that they are associated with the paradigm, not that they can be assigned.
---
II 353
The finding that two classes are associated with one another, means, that it makes sense to say so. WittgensteinVsRussell: But how do you know that they are associated with one another? One cannot know and hence, one cannot know, if they are assigned to the same number, unless you carry out the assignment, that is, to write it down.
---
II 402
Acquaintance/description/WittgensteinVsRussell: misleading claim that, although we have no direct acquaintance with an infinite series, but knowledge by description. ---
II 415
Number/definition/WittgensteinVsRussell: the definition of the number as the predicate of a predicate: there are all sorts of predicates, and two is not an attribute of a physical complex, but a predicate. What Russell says about the number, is inadequate because no criteria of identity are named in Principia and because the spelling of generality is confusing.
The "x" in "(Ex)fx" stands for a thing, a substrate.
Number/Russell/Wittgenstein: has claimed, 3 is the property that is common to all triads.
WittgensteinVsRussell: what is meant by the claim that the number is a property of a class?
---
II 416
It makes no sense to say that ABC was three; this is a tautology and says nothing when the class is given extensionally. By contrast, it makes sense to claim that in this room there are three people. Definition number/WittgensteinVsRussell: the number is an attribute of a function which defines a class, not a property of the extension.
WittgensteinVsRussell: he wanted to get ,next to the list, another "entity", so he provided a function that uses the identity to define this entity.
---
II 418
Definition number/WittgensteinVsRussell: a difficulty in Russell's definition is the concept of the clear correspondence. Equal sign/Russell/Wittgenstein: in Principia Mathematica, there are two meanings of identity. 1. by definition as 1 + 1 = 2 Df. ("Primary equations")
2. the formula "a = a" uses the "=" in a special way, because one would not say that a can be replaced by a.
The use of "=" is limited to cases in which a bound variable occurs.
WittgensteinVsRussell: instead of (Ex):fx . (y).fy > (x=y), one writes (Ex)fx: ~ (Ex,y).fx.fy, (sic) which states that there are no two things, but only one.
---
IV 47/48
So you cannot introduce objects of a formal concept and the formal concept itself, as primitive concepts. WittgensteinVsRussell: one cannot introduce the concept of function and special functions as primitive concepts, or e.g. the concept of number and definite numbers.
---
IV 73
WittgensteinVsRussell/Tractatus: 5.452 in Principia Mathematica (PM) definitions and basic laws occur in words. Why suddenly words here? There is no justification, and it is also forbidden. Logic/Tractatus: 5.453 All numbers in logic must be capable of justification. Or rather, it must prove that there are no numbers in logic.
5.454 In logic there is no side by side and there can be no classification. There can be nothing more universal and more special here.
5.4541 The solutions of logical problems must be simple, because they set the standard of simplicity.
People have always guessed that there must be a field of questions whose answers are - a priori - symmetrical, and
---
IV 74
lie combined in a closed, regular structure. In an area in which the following applies: simplex sigillum veri. ((s) Simplicity is the mark (seal) of the truth).
Primitive signs/Tractatus: 5:46 the real primitive signs are not "pvq" or "(Ex).fx", etc. but the most general form of their combinations.
---
IV 84
Axiom of infinity/Russell/Wittgenstein/Tractatus: 5.534 would be expressed in the language by the fact that there are infinitely many names with different meanings. Apparant sentences/Tractatus: 5.5351 There are certain cases where there is a temptation to use expressions of the form
"a = a" or "p > p": this happens when one wants to talk of archetype, sentence, or thing.
WittgensteinVsRussell: (Principia Mathematica, PM) nonsense "p is a sentence" is to be reproduced in symbols by "p > p"
and to put as a hypothesis before certain sentences, so that their places for arguments could only be occupied by sentences.
That alone is enough nonsense, because it does not get wrong for a non-sentence as an argument, but nonsensical.
5.5352 identity/WittgensteinVsRussell: likewise, one wanted to express "there are no things" by "~ (Ex).x = x" But even if this was a sentence, it would not be true if there
IV 85
would be things but these were not identical with themselves? ---
IV 85/86
Judgment/sense/Tractatus: 5.5422 the correct explanation of the sentence "A judges p" must show that it is impossible to judge a nonsense. (WittgensteinVsRussell: his theory does not exclude this). ---
IV 87
Relations/WittgensteinVsRussell/Tractatus: 5.553 he said there were simple relations between different numbers of particulars (ED, individuals). But between what numbers? How should this be decided? Through the experience? There is no marked number.
---
IV 98
Type theory/principle of contradiction/WittgensteinVsRussell/Tractatus: 6.123 there is not for every "type" a special law of contradiction, but one is enough, since it is applied to itself. ---
IV 99
Reducibility axiom/WittgensteinVsRussell/Tractatus: (61232) no logical sentence, if true, then only accidentally true. 6.1233 One can think of a possible world in which it does not apply. But the logic has nothing to do with that. (It is a condition of the world).

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921.
German Edition:
Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960
Quine, W.V.O. Burge Vs Quine, W.V.O. Wol I 260
Names/Christening/Burge: Thesis: (as Kripke): a name is true when the object has been named in an appropriate manner. The name itself goes into the conditions of its applicability. In this, names differ from many predicates. E.g. the predicate "is a dog": an object could also be a dog, if the word "dog" was never used as a symbol.
But an object could not be a Jones, unless someone used "Jones" as a name.
E.g.
(2) Jones is necessarily a Jones
(3) This entity named "Jones" is necessarily an entity named "Jones"
Both turn out to be wrong! Names behave like ordinary predicates: they do not necessarily apply to objects.
I 261
BurgeVsQuine/BurgeVsRussell: we avoid the artificiality by we not assuming that names abbreviate any predicates, nor produce artificial predicates. Our theory also seems to counter the accusation that proper names do not convey information on the subject and do not attribute properties.
Burge: you give at least the information that E.g. someone was called Aristotle.

Burge I
T. Burge
Origins of Objectivity Oxford 2010

Burge II
Tyler Burge
"Two Kinds of Consciousness"
In
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996
Quine, W.V.O. Kripke Vs Quine, W.V.O. III 368
Ramified ed Type Theory/vTT/QuineVsRussell/Kripke: Is intended for propositions. QuineVsRussell: Does not give significant ontological improvement vis-à-vis normal set theory.
KripkeVsQuine: Our ability to apply the substitutional quantification at higher levels (in strong resemblance to vTT) shows that it is not irrelevant to semantic paradoxes. The failure of not branching brought in problems for the pseudo substitutional language.
III 411
KripkeVsQuine: Uses criteria to reduce and others to revalue his favored things, and does not discuss why he uses these criteria.

Kripke I
S.A. Kripke
Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972
German Edition:
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981

Kripke IV
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
In
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984
Ramsey, F. P. Wittgenstein Vs Ramsey, F. P. II 332
Russell/Ramsey/Wittgenstein: the two believed one could prepare in any sense, the logic for the possible existence of certain entities, one could construct a system to welcome the results of the analysis. WittgensteinVsRussell/WittgensteinVsRamsey: the construction of a relation does not depend on that one finds a phenomenon. The discovery of a word game is something else than the discovery of a fact.

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921.
German Edition:
Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960
Reductionism Read Vs Reductionism Read III 131
VsReduktionismus: müsste die Wahrheit einer negativen Aussage wie »Ruby hat Kennedy nicht getötet« als Ergebnis der Wahrheit einer anderen Aussage erklären, die mit »Ruby tötete Kennedy« unvereinbar wäre. RussellVsVs: wendete gegen solche Argumentation ein, dass ein Regress droht: »B ist unvereinbar mit A« ist selbst eine negative Aussage. Um ihre Wahrheit zu erklären, bräuchten wir eine dritte Aussage C, die unvereinbar wäre mit »C ist vereinbar mit A« usw. - ReadVsRussell: das ist ein seltsamer Einwand, denn er würde auch gegen jede Konjunktion gelten. Und dann dürfen Wahrheitsbedingungen für konjunktive und disjunktiv Aussagen nicht konjunktiv bzw. disjunktiv sein.
III 132
VsReduktionismus: seine Mängel können an zwei Spielarten betrachtet werden: 1. Mengentheoretische Kombinationen, Raum-Zeit-Punkte, Atome oder dergleichen. Problem: die Beschränkung, die es auferlegt. Es bedeutet, dass die grundlegenden Bestandteile aller Welten dieselben sind, und das gerät mit unserer Intuition in Konflikt, dass nämlich die Welt im mindesten Fall geringfügig andere, wenn nicht sogar tatsächlich gänzlich andere Bestandteile hätte haben können.(Wittgenstein hat das allerdings bestritten, für ihn waren die Gegenstände allen Welten gemeinsam.) 2. eine Parallele zu einem ähnlichen Problemen im Reduktionismus hinsichtlich Zahlen: Bsp die so genannten
Def Neumann-Zahlen haben einen strukturellen Isomorphismus zur Menge natürlicher Zahlen. Wir verstehen jede Zahl als die Menge, die aus allen ihren Vorgängern besteht.
Philosophisch sind die Neumann-Zahlen unannehmbar.

Re III
St. Read
Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997

Read I
Stephen Read
Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic Oxford 1995
Rorty, R. Quine Vs Rorty, R. Did you mean: Acquaintance/QuineVsRussell: there is not only a problem with proper names, but in general. If the mind can only think if it establishes an unambiguous relationship to the object, then thought is impossible! Davidson I21 Quine: we are unable to single out "the" relationship that is constitutive of the knowledge of the identity of an object. The reason is that any property can be considered as relevant.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987
Rousseau, J. J. Cartwright Vs Rousseau, J. J. I 21
Laws of Nature/Cartwright: There are at least two kinds: a) Laws of association/Association/Hume/Cartwright: they are the ones with which philosophy deals normally. They tell us how many times two qualities or quantities are co-associated. ((s) occur together?). This may be probabilistic or deterministic.
This includes the equations of physics: E.g.: whenever the force on an object with the mass m is f, the acceleration is f/m. The laws of association may have a time index. E.g. the probabilistic Mendelian laws.
Causality: does not matter here, instead: co-occurrence.
b) Causal laws/Cartwright: E.g. Smoking causes cancer, e.g. force causes a change in movement. ((s) different from above!).
Russell: Thesis: 1) there are only laws of association.
2) Causal principles cannot be derived from causally symmetric laws of association.
Cartwright: Vs 1) pro 2)
Causal principles/CartwrightVsRussell: Although they cannot be derived from laws of association, we cannot do without them. This has to do with our strategies.
I 74
CartwrightVsRussell: I prefer causes rather than laws in science and explanation.
I 111
Law/Cause/Effect/Analogy/Russell: (On the Notion of Cause, NY 1953 p 392): the principle of "same cause, same effect" is pointless. Once the antecedent (which represents the circumstances) is determined accurately enough to allow calculating the consequences, it becomes so complex that it is unlikely that the case ever occurs again! This would make science sterile. Fundamental laws/RussellVsCartwright: with that Russell pleads for fundamental laws.
Fundamental laws/CartwrightVsRussell: the fundamental laws represent more the relations between properties than between individuals. But in practice the engineer wants functional laws, albeit only "with a certain accuracy".

Car I
N. Cartwright
How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983

CartwrightR II
R. Cartwright
Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954
Russell, B. Austin Vs Russell, B. I 226
Russell: Truth is primarily a property of beliefs (early work). AustinVsRussell: then belief is essentially an image substantially. It can not be true, but for example, exact.

Austin I
John L. Austin
"Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 24 (1950): 111 - 128
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Austin II
John L. Austin
"A Plea for Excuses: The Presidential Address" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 57, Issue 1, 1 June 1957, Pages 1 - 3
German Edition:
Ein Plädoyer für Entschuldigungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, Grewendorf/Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995
Russell, B. Carnap Vs Russell, B. VI 164
Def visual objects/Russell: classes of their possible aspects. CarnapVsRussell: That’s possible, but we begin our constitution much further down! For the "unseen aspects" this is difficult, therefore we constitute the entire visual world at once, not any "experiences for unseen things."
VI 247
CarnapVsRussell: realistic conception that manifests itself by him raising questions regarding whether an object still exists even when it is not observed. Thing in itself/Schlick: real, not given objects. Carnap: that makes them part of the recognizable objects.
Wittgenstein I 202 ff
Quality/Experience/Carnap/Hintikka: the basis of Carnap's "Structure" is a series of momentary overall experiences from which qualities are formed.
I 203
But not even qualities resemble sense data of Russell's conception. CarnapVsRussell/CarnapVsSense Data/Carnap: individual experience must be added.
Carnap: "If we want to distinguish the two similar components of the two elementary experiences, we must not only designate them according to their quality, but also add the indication of the elementary experience to which they belong.
Only such a component is an individual in the actual sense, we want to call it "sensation" in contrast to the component which is only determined by quality, as it is represented in the quality class.
These "sensations" therefore resemble Wittgenstein's objects. But according to Carnap they are ephemeral, subjective and time-bound, while the Tractatus objects form the non-temporal "objective" substance of the world.
Accordingly Carnap: "The sensations belong to the field of psychology, the qualities to phenomenology or object theory".
Phenomenology/Carnap/Hintikka: in Carnap, this is limited to a holistic analysis of experience.

Ca I
R. Carnap
Die alte und die neue Logik
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996

Ca II
R. Carnap
Philosophie als logische Syntax
In
Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993

Ca IV
R. Carnap
Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992

Ca IX
Rudolf Carnap
Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Ca VI
R. Carnap
Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998

CA VII = PiS
R. Carnap
Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Ca VIII (= PiS)
R. Carnap
Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921.
German Edition:
Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960
Russell, B. Davidson Vs Russell, B. I (b) 24
Ontology/knowledge: DavidsonVsRussell: from the fact that the thinking subject knows what he thinks, it does not follow that it must be acquainted with the subject, or even know anything about it! It does not even follow that he knows anything at all about any object. >Acquaintance, >knowledge/Davidson, >thinking/Davidson.

Davidson I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (a)
Donald Davidson
"Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (b)
Donald Davidson
"What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (c)
Donald Davidson
"Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (d)
Donald Davidson
"Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (e)
Donald Davidson
"The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson II
Donald Davidson
"Reply to Foster"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Davidson III
D. Davidson
Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

Davidson IV
D. Davidson
Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Davidson V
Donald Davidson
"Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005
Russell, B. Dewey Vs Russell, B. Suhr I 47
DeweyVssense data theory: subjectivism. Things disappear and are replaced by qualities in the senses. DeweyVsRussell.

Dew II
J. Dewey
Essays in Experimental Logic Minneola 2004

Suhr I
Martin Suhr
John Dewey zur Einführung Hamburg 1994
Russell, B. Field Vs Russell, B. II 19
Description/Reference/FieldVsRussell: VsClassical Theory: asserts that you can only refer to something that is "definable from "logically proper" primitives". Problem: this requires the existence of certain sentences, E.g. "If Cicero existed, then Cicero denounced Catiline." ((s) Necessary biographical characteristics instead of contingent ones). Solution/Names/Kripke/Field: causal theory of denotation. Causal network between E.g. Cicero ((s) without quotes, the person, not the name) and users. Or between E.g. Myon and the speakers. (> Causal chain).
II 20
Problem: (4) No common English name denotes something that does not exist (s) assumed here merely as an example) would become
(4') For each name N that is currently in use, N is "France", then France exists, and ... and N is "Germany", then Germany exists. ((s) 4’: only here follows existence from the use of the word). E.g.
(5) For any elements A and B, when an atom of A is combined with two of B, then the valency of A - 2 times that of B.
(5’) For arbitrary elements A and B, when an atom of A is combined with two of B, then A is either sodium and B is sodium and +1 = -2 (+1), or ... or A is sulfur and B is sodium and +2 = +2 (+1), or ... Field: if you want to eliminate "denotes" or "valence", then these definitions are what you need.

Field I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Field IV
Hartry Field
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994
Russell, B. Fodor Vs Russell, B. Fodor/Lepore IV 54
Meaning Holism/MH/Fodor/Lepore: Quine suggests a curious additional argument, derived from Incomplete Symbol/Russell: is defined in use - that would imply a
"Statement Holism": because the unit of meaning is the statement and not the term (phrase, word >Frege).
Fodor/LeporeVs: this is a modal thesis and therefore the last thing Quine would appreciate.
That is, not only that expressions are not defined in use, but that they must be defined like this.
IV 55
VsRussell: mildly speaking, it is unclear whether Russell’s remarks about certain descriptions guarantee that. It is not clear whether definition in use guarantees anything about meaning!.
E.g. Suppose some words were defined in terms of their context, as Russell believed: then it remains to be seen in relation to which aspects!.
In particular, it depends on whether words that are defined in use are ipso facto defined relative to the semantic properties of their contexts!.
Fodor/Lepore: maybe, maybe not: Vs: this suggests: that a sentence is a syntactic unit. (Dennett pro).
Semantic Properties/Fodor/Lepore: it is not at all clear that the semantic properties are something that words have by virtue of their relationship to the sentences in which they occur!.
Nor is it clear that the units of the semantic and syntactic analysis should be the same.

F/L
Jerry Fodor
Ernest Lepore
Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992

Fodor I
Jerry Fodor
"Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115
In
Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992

Fodor II
Jerry Fodor
Jerrold J. Katz
Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Fodor III
Jerry Fodor
Jerrold J. Katz
The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995
Russell, B. Frege Vs Russell, B. Read III 149
FregeVsMeinong FregeVsRussell: there are quite contradictory concepts, just no contradictory objects - logic can only determine the limitation of concepts, i.e. for each object, whether it falls under the concept, or not - a contradictory concept is needed to prove that there is no corresponding object. Russell/Read: statements, meanings of sentences, and objects of belief: have individual things and universals as constituents. "Socrates is wise" literally has Socrates and wisdom as constituent elements. The meaning of "Socrates" for him was the philosopher himself. (>Meaning). Russell: (naive realist: meaning = extension or reference, FregeVs).

F I
G. Frege
Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987

F IV
G. Frege
Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993

Re III
St. Read
Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997

Read I
Stephen Read
Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic Oxford 1995
Russell, B. Gödel Vs Russell, B. Russell I VI
GödelVsRussell: the syntax of formalism is not executed! There is a lack of formal precision (order of elimination of symbols). Relations Calculus: previously carried out by Schrödinger and Peirce.
I VII
Russell/Gödel: very realistic attitude. The things discussed may exist, but we have no direct perception of them! He compares the axioms of logic and mathematics with the laws of nature.
I VIII
Meaning/Russell/Gödel: the example "author of Waverley" surprisingly leads to the fact that all true sentences have the same meaning. Author v. Waverley: is not a description of Scott. Description is not equal to assertion. It does not denote an object.
StrawsonVs: a sentence with Waverley says nothing about Scott because it does not contain it.
Description: means nothing at all outside of a context! "The author of Waverley" claims (strictly speaking) nothing about Scott, (Since he contains no constituents that denotes Scott). Description
is not equal to assertion.
I XIII
GödelVsRussel: the circular error principle in its first form is not sufficient, because the axioms imply the existence of real numbers, which in this formalism are definable only with reference to all real numbers. Circular Error Principle/GödelVsRussell: the principia themselves do not satisfy the principle in their first edition, if "definable" means "definable within the system", and no definition methods outside are known, except those which comprise even more extensive totalities than those which occur in the system.
Gödel: I would rather see this as proof that the principle of circular error is wrong than that classical mathematics is wrong.
For one can deny with good reasons that the reference to a totality necessarily implies a reference to all its individual elements, or in other words that "all" means the same thing as an infinite logical conjunction.
I XII/XIV
"All"/solution/Carnap: "all" means analyticity or necessity, or provability. Gödel: besides, the circular error principle (PT) seems to apply only if the entities concerned are constructed by ourselves. In this case, a definition must clearly exist, namely the description of the construction.
However, when it comes to independent objects, there is nothing absurd about the existence of totalities that contain members that can only be described (i.e. unambiguously characterized) by reference to totality.
Def Description/Russell/Gödel: an object is called Def described by a propositional function φ(x) if φ(x) is true for x = a and for no other object.
Second form: "comprise": one cannot even say that an object described with reference to a totality "comprises" this totality, although the description itself does.
Third form: "presuppose": just as little would it contradict the third form, if "presupposed" means: "presupposed for existence", not "for perceptibility".

Göd II
Kurt Gödel
Collected Works: Volume II: Publications 1938-1974 Oxford 1990
Russell, B. James Vs Russell, B. I 105
Belief/Russell: differentiates whether we believe in something that exists or in something that does not exist. PragmatismVsRussell/JamesVsRussell: but particularly the effect of a content of imagination has a specific effect.
Russell, B. Kripke Vs Russell, B. I 36
FregeVsMill/RussellVsMill: Error: In reality, a proper name which is used correctly is only a shortened or disguised description.
I 87
Description: Kneale and partly Russell as well say that it is not an insignificant message that Socrates was the greatest philosopher in Ancient Greece. It is, however, an insignificant message that we called Socrates "Socrates". KripkeVs: it is not an insignificant message: If it is some sort of fact, it can be wrong! sie ist keineswegs eine unbedeutende: wenn das irgendeine Art von Tatsache ist, kann es falsch sein! A wrong message is indeed that Jesajah was called "Jesaja". The prophet would never have recognized this name! And naturally the Greeks have not given their country the name "Greece" nor a similar one. It is, however, insignificant that we call Socrates that way. I do not believe that it is analytic or necessary.
Sentences as "Socrates is called ’Socrates’" are very interesting indeed, and their analysis can be discussed for hours.
I 145
Mill: "singular names": connotative: description. non-connotative: proper names.
I 145
But Mill: all names are connotative for general types, e.g. "human being". It is defined as a conjunction of specific characteristics which are sufficient and necessary to be human: rationality, animality and specific physical characteristics. RussellVsMill: Wrong by common names, right by singular names.
KripkeVsRussell: Mill: Right by singular names, wrong for general names. Maybe some general names ("foolish" ,"fat", "yellow ") express properties. General names like "cow"and "tiger"do not, unless being a cow banally counts as a property. (> Properties/Kripke).
Kripke’s general names such as "cat" do not express any property.

Wolf II 209
KripkeVsRussell: Artificial descriptions are not always elliptic.
II 216
Domain/KripkeVsRussell: It does not work: No two-tier distinction can take on this task because it requires a tripartite. Ex: (2) The number of planets could necessarily have been a straight number.
(The number could have been eight, for example, and that would have been a straight number.)
II 217
Kripke: If(2) is interpreted as true, it is neither de re nor de dicto, i.e. the description has neither the smallest nor the biggest domain (according to Russell). (M= möglich= possible, N= notwendig= necessary)
(2a) MN(Ex)(There are exactly x planets and x is a straight number). (Smallest domain, de dicto)
(2b) (Ex)(There are exactly x planets and MN(x is a straight number)).(Biggest domain, de re)
(2c) M(Ex)(there are exactly x planets and N (x is a straight number)). (Middle domain,).
Middle domains are possible if operators are repeated.
(2c) renders (2) true.
(2a) states, probably erroneously, that it might have been necessary that there is a straight number of planets.
(2b) erroneously states that the real number could necessarily have been a straight one.
e.g. The newspapers wrote: "FBI Chef Hoover leveled an accusation that the Barrigan were planning to kidnap an American senior civil servant". (It was Kissinger)
a) there is a senior civil servant, so that Hoover believes...(biggest domain, de re)
b) Hoover believes that the Barrigan were planning...(smallest domain, de dicto)
c) Hoover believes that there was a senior civil servant. (middle domain)
The more intentional constructions (or others)are repeated, the more possible domains exist.
II 218
Kartunnen showed that no n-partite differentiation suffices for each specific n.

Kripke I
S.A. Kripke
Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972
German Edition:
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981

Kripke IV
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
In
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984

K II siehe Wol I
U. Wolf (Hg)
Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993
Russell, B. Lewis Vs Russell, B. Schwarz I 211
Theory of Descriptions/Tradition/Russell: here the description associated with a name should be given to the carrier! Name/Identification/LewisVsRussell: in modal contexts, the identification is not necessary for the carrier, this is regulated by secondary truth conditions.

Lewis I
David K. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

LewisCl I
Clarence Irving Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991

Schw I
W. Schwarz
David Lewis Bielefeld 2005
Russell, B. Moore Vs Russell, B. Stroud I 116
External Knowledge/Philosophy/Bio/Russell/Stroud: Russell tells that he came to philosophy because he wanted reasons to believe the truth of mathematics. I.e. he searched for it within (sic) the field. Intern/MooreVsRussell: surely it is the mathematician's job to decide whether something in his field is true or false.
I 117
What should the philosopher do? He cannot give better reasons than the mathematician. Stroud: this also applies to all other sciences. One cannot deny that Moore is right in a certain way.

Stroud I
B. Stroud
The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984
Russell, B. Pragmatism Vs Russell, B. James I 105
Belief / Russell: R. distinguishes, whether we believe in something that exists, or believe in something that does not exist. PragmatismVsRussell: but just the effect of the content of an idea has a specific effect. ((s) But he does not go so far as to call this effect a "truth maker").
Russell, B. Prior Vs Russell, B. PriorVsRussell
I 7
Belief/Theory of Multiple Relation/Meinong/Russell/Prior: (also realistic): Proposition/Meinong: he calls "objects" and facts a subclass: the true propositions. Thus, only two instead of three types of abstract objects remain. But for some this is still too much.
Russell/Moore: they eliminated "falsity", but kept facts as abstract objects.
Russell: represented two variants:
a) major difference: between belief and knowledge. (Theory of multiple relations)
b) between true and false beliefs.
ad a): Knowledge is always of facts and is a double-digit relation between two real objects, the knower and the known fact.
Belief, however, is not a double-digit relation,
I 8
but a multi-digit one between the believer and various elements, which (if they existed) would be the believed proposition. E.g. Othello believes that Desdemona loves Cassio, or believes in Desdemona's infidelity. Problem: There is no object that is Desdemona's infidelity.
Solution: Attribution! He attributed infidelity!
I.e. the story is about two real objects, Desdemona and infidelity, and Othello is in the complex relation of attribution.
I 9
 Russell: in this sense, propositions are logical constructions. PriorVsRussell: propositions are logical constructions, but not for this reason.
1) Although Russell's theory does not require us to believe that there is an object such as Desdemona's infidelity, it nevertheless requires us to believe that about Desdemona herself there is an object as her fidelity!
2) Russell's construction is a four-term relation instead of a three-term relation.
Russell: revised (1) (following Wittgenstein), but not (2).
Belief/Russell: (late): sentences that describe beliefs have two verbs and none is swallowed by an abstract noun. (?).
Prior: neverthelss, precisely in the attribution of infidelity, this abstract object infidelity requires an explanation.
And also a kind of "universal infidelity".

I 31
PriorVsRussell: multiple relations: With his solution, Russell burdens himself with new abstract entities. And the same might be said about Ramsey's solution.
Abstract Entities/Verb/Predicate/Prior: but we cannot get rid of all of them, anyway!
Verb: I can dissolve it: instead of "Jones smokes" I can say "I predict the smoking of Jones".
But then I have another verb again: "I predict"!
Verbs and nouns are always needed.

Pri I
A. Prior
Objects of thought Oxford 1971

Pri II
Arthur N. Prior
Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003
Russell, B. Putnam Vs Russell, B. I (e) 135
Name/reference/PutnamVsRussell: Vs synonymy of general term and necessary and sufficient conditions for a belonging in the corresponding class: E.g. Multiple Sclerosis: the underlying status is caused by a virus. The interesting question is not the >"extension" of the expression, but what (if anything) is in correspondence with our >concept of multiple sclerosis.

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

Putnam I (a)
Hilary Putnam
Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (b)
Hilary Putnam
Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (c)
Hilary Putnam
What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (d)
Hilary Putnam
Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (e)
Hilary Putnam
Reference and Truth
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (f)
Hilary Putnam
How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (g)
Hilary Putnam
Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (h)
Hilary Putnam
Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (i)
Hilary Putnam
Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (k)
Hilary Putnam
"Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam II
Hilary Putnam
Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988
German Edition:
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Putnam III
Hilary Putnam
Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Putnam IV
Hilary Putnam
"Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164
In
Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994

Putnam V
Hilary Putnam
Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981
German Edition:
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Putnam VI
Hilary Putnam
"Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Putnam VII
Hilary Putnam
"A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000
Russell, B. Quine Vs Russell, B. Chisholm II 75
Predicates/Denote/Russell: denoting expressions: proper names stand for individual things and general expressions for universals. (Probleme d. Phil. p. 82f). In every sentence, at least one word refers to a universal. QuineVsRussell: confusion!
II 108
Theory of Descriptions/VsRussell/Brandl: thus the whole theory is suspected of neglecting the fact that material objects can never be part of propositions. QuineVsRussell: confusion of mention and use.
Quine II 97
Pricipia mathematica, 1903: Here, Russell's ontology is rampant: every word refers to something. If a word is a proper name, then its object is a thing, otherwise it is a concept. He limits the term "existence" to things, but has a liberal conception of things which even includes times and points in empty space! Then there are, beyond the existent things, other entities: "numbers, the gods of Homer, relationships, fantasies, and four-dimensional space". The word "concept", used by Russell in this manner, has the connotation of "merely a concept". Caution: Gods and fantasies are as real as numbers for Russell!
QuineVsRussell: this is an intolerably indiscriminate ontology. Example: Take impossible numbers, e.g. prime numbers that are divisible by 6. It must be wrong in a certain sense that they exist, and that is in a sense in which it is right that there are prime numbers! Do fantasies exist in this sense?

II 101
Russell has a preference for the term "propositional function" against "class concept". In P.M. both expressions appear. Here: Def "Propositional Function": especially based on forms of notation, e.g. open sentences, while concepts are decidedly independent of notation. However, according to Meinong Russell's confidence is in concepts was diminished, and he prefers the more nominalistic sound of the expression "propositional function" which is now carries twice the load (later as Principia Mathematica.)
Use/Mention/Quine: if we now tried to deal with the difference between use and mention as carelessly as Russell has managed to do sixty years ago, we can see how he might have felt that his theory of propositional functions was notation based, while a theory of types of real classes would be ontological.
Quine: we who pay attention to use and mention can specify when Russell's so-called propositional functions as terms (more specific than properties and relations) must be construed as concepts, and when they may be construed as a mere open sentences or predicates: a) when he quantifies about them, he (unknowingly) reifies them as concepts.
For this reason, nothing more be presumed for his elimination of classes than I have stated above: a derivation of the classes from properties or concepts by means of a context definition that is formulated such that it provides the missing extensionality.
QuineVsRussell: thinks wrongly that his theory has eliminated classes more thoroughly from the world than in terms of a reduction to properties.
II 102
RussellVsFrege: "~ the entire distinction between meaning and designating is wrong. The relationship between "C" and C remains completely mysterious, and where are we to find the designating complex which supposedly designates C?" QuineVsRussell: Russell's position sometimes seems to stem from a confusion of the expression with its meaning, sometimes from the confusion of the expression with its mention.
II 103/104
In other papers Russel used meaning usually in the sense of "referencing" (would correspond to Frege): "Napoleon" particular individual, "human" whole class of such individual things that have proper names.
Russell rarely seems to look for an existing entity under any heading that would be such that we could call it the meaning that goes beyond the existing referent.
Russell tends to let this entity melt into the expression itself, a tendency he has in general when it comes to existing entities.
QuineVsRussell: for my taste, Russell is too wasteful with existing entities. Precisely because he does not differentiate enough, he lets insignificance and missed reference commingle.
Theory of Descriptions: He cannot get rid of the "King of France" without first inventing the description theory: being meaningful would mean: have a meaning and the meaning is the reference. I.e. "King of France" without meaning, and "The King of France is bald" only had a meaning, because it is the short form of a sentence that does not contain the expression "King of France".
Quine: actually unnecessary, but enlightening.
Russell tends commingle existing entities and expressions. Also on the occasion of his remarks on
Propositions: (P.M.): propositions are always expressions, but then he speaks in a manner that does not match this attitude of the "unity of the propositions" (p.50) and of the impossibility of infinite propositions (p.145)
II 105
Russell: The proposition is nothing more than a symbol, even later, instead: Apparently, propositions are nothing..." the assumption that there are a huge number of false propositions running around in the real, natural world is outrageous." Quine: this revocation is astounding. What is now being offered to us instead of existence is nothingness. Basically Russell has ceased to speak of existence.
What had once been regarded as existing is now accommodated in one of three ways
a) equated with the expression,
b) utterly rejected
c) elevated to the status of proper existence.

II 107
Russell/later: "All there is in the world I call a fact." QuineVsRussell: Russell's preference for an ontology of facts depends on his confusion of meaning with reference. Otherwise he would probably have finished the facts off quickly.
What the reader of "Philosophy of logical atomism" notices would have deterred Russell himself, namely how much the analysis of facts is based on the analysis of language.
Russell does not recognize the facts as fundamental in any case. Atomic facts are as atomic as facts can be.
Atomic Facts/Quine: but they are composite objects! Russell's atoms are not atomic facts, but sense data!

II 183 ff
Russell: Pure mathematics is the class of all sentences of the form "p implies q" where p and q are sentences with one or more variables, and in both sets the same. "We never know what is being discussed, nor if what we say is true."
II 184
This misinterpretation of mathematics was a response to non-Euclidean geometry. Numbers: how about elementary arithmetic? Pure numbers, etc. should be regarded as uninterpreted. Then the application to apples is an accumulation.
Numbers/QuineVsRussell: I find this attitude completely wrong. The words "five" and "twelve" are nowhere uninterpreted, they are as much essential components of our interpreted language as apples. >Numbers. They denote two intangible objects, numbers that are the sizes of quantities of apples and the like. The "plus" in addition is also interpreted from start to finish, but it has nothing to do with the accumulation of things. Five plus twelve is: how many apples there are in two separate piles. However, without pouring them together. The numbers "five" and "twelve" differ from apples in that they do not denote a body, that has nothing to do with misinterpretation. The same could be said of "nation" or "species". The ordinary interpreted scientific speech is determined to abstract objects as it is determined to apples and bodies. All these things appear in our world system as values ​​of variables.
II 185
It even has nothing to do with purity (e.g. of the set theory). Purity is something other than uninterpretedness.
XII 60
Expression/Numbers/Knowledge/Explication/Explanation/Quine: our knowledge of expressions is alone in their laws of interlinking. Therefore, every structure that fulfills these laws can be an explication.
XII 61
Knowledge of numbers: consists alone in the laws of arithmetic. Then any lawful construction is an explication of the numbers. RussellVs: (early): Thesis: arithmetic laws are not sufficient for understanding numbers. We also need to know applications (use) or their embedding in the talk about other things.
Number/Russell: is the key concept here: "there are n such and suches".
Number/Definition/QuineVsRussell: we can define "there are n such and suches" without ever deciding what numbers are beyond their fulfillment of arithmetic addition.
Application/Use/QuineVsRussell: wherever there is structure, the applications set in. E.g. expressions and Gödel numbers: even the mention of an inscription was no definitive proof that we are talking about expressions and not about Gödel numbers. We can always say that our ostension was shifted.

VII (e) 80
Principia Mathematica/PM/Russell/Whitehead/Quine: shows that the whole of mathematics can be translated into logic. Only three concepts need to be clarified: Mathematics, translation and logic.
VII (e) 81
QuineVsRussell: the concept of the propositional function is unclear and obscures the entire PM.
VII (e) 93
QuineVsRussell: PM must be complemented by the axiom of infinity if certain mathematical principles are to be derived.
VII (e) 93/94
Axiom of infinity: ensures the existence of a class with infinitely many elements. Quine: New Foundations instead makes do with the universal class: θ or x^ (x = x).

VII (f) 122
Propositional Functions/QuineVsRussell: ambiguous: a) open sentences
b) properties.
Russell no classes theory uses propositional functions as properties as value-bound variables.

IX 15
QuineVsRussell: inexact terminology. "Propositional function", he used this expression both when referring to attributes (real properties) and when referring to statements or predicates. In truth, he only reduced the theory of classes to an unreduced theory of attributes.
IX 93
Rational Numbers/QuineVsRussell: I differ in one point: for me, rational numbers are themselves real numbers, not so for Russell and Whitehead. Russell: rational numbers are pairwise disjoint for them like those of Peano. (See Chapter 17), while their real numbers are nested. ((s) pairwise disjoint, contrast: nested)
Natural Numbers/Quine: for me as for most authors: no rational integers.
Rational Numbers/Russell: accordingly, no rational real numbers. They are only "imitated" by the rational real numbers.
Rational Numbers/QuineVsRussell: for me, however, the rational numbers are real numbers. This is because I have constructed the real numbers according to Russell's version b) without using the name and the designation of rational numbers.
Therefore, I was able to retain name and designation for the rational real numbers

IX 181
Type Theory/TT/QuineVsRussell: in the present form our theory is too weak to prove some sentences of classical mathematics. E.g. proof that every limited class of real numbers has a least upper boundary (LUB).
IX 182
Suppose the real numbers were developed in Russell's theory similar to Section VI, however, attributes were now to take the place of classes and the alocation to attributes replaces the element relation to classes. LUB: (Capters 18, 19) of a limited class of real numbers: the class Uz or {x:Ey(x ε y ε z)}.
Attribute: in parallel, we might thus expect that the LUB of a limited attribute φ of real numbers in Russell's system is equal to the
Attribute Eψ(φψ u ψ^x).
Problem: under Russell's order doctrine is this LUB ψ is of a higher order than that of the real numbers ψ which fall under the attribute φ whose LUB is sought.
Boundary/LUB/QuineVsRussell: You need LUB for the entire classic technique of calculus, which is based on continuity. However, LUB have no value for these purposes if they are not available as values ​​of the same variables whose value range already includes those numbers whose upper boundary is wanted.
An upper boundary (i.e. LUB) of higher order cannot be the value of such variables, and thus misses its purpose.
Solution/Russell: Axiom of Reducibility:
Def Axiom of Reducibility/RA/Russell/Quine: every propositional function has the same extension as a certain predicative one. I.e.
Ey∀x(ψ!x φx), Eψ∀x∀y[ψ!(x,y) φ(x,y)], etc.
IX 184
VsConstruktivism/Construction/QuineVsRussell: we have seen Russell's constructivist approach to the real numbers fail (LUB, see above). He gave up on constructivism and took refuge in the RA.
IX 184/185
The way he gave it up had something perverse to it: Axiom of Reducibility/QuineVsRussell: the RA implies that all the distinctions that gave rise to its creation are superfluous! (... + ...)

IX 185
Propositional Function/PF/Attribute/Predicate/TT/QuineVsRussell: overlooked the following difference and its analogs: a) "propositional functions": as attributes (or intentional relations) and
b) proposition functions: as expressions, i.e. predicates (and open statements: e.g. "x is mortal") Accordingly:
a) attributes
b) open statements
As expressions they differ visibly in the order if the order is to be assessed on the basis of the indices of bound variables within the expression. For Russell everything is "AF".
Since Russell failed to distinguish between formula and object (word/object, mention/use), he did not remember the trick of allowing that an expression of higher order refers straight to an attribute or a relation of lower order.

X 95
Context Definition/Properties/Stage 2 Logic/Quine: if you prefer properties as sets, you can introduce quantification over properties, and then introduce quantification over sets through a schematic context definition. Russell: has taken this path.
Quine: but the definition has to ensure that the principle of extensionality applies to sets, but not to properties. That is precisely the difference.
Russell/QuineVsRussell: why did he want properties?
X 96
He did not notice at which point the unproblematic talk of predicates capsized to speaking about properties. ((s) object language/meta language/mention/use). Propositional Function/PF: Russell took it over from Frege.
QuineVsRussell: he sometimes used PF to refer to predicates, sometimes to properties.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Chisholm I
R. Chisholm
The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981
German Edition:
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chisholm II
Roderick Chisholm

In
Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986

Chisholm III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989
German Edition:
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004
Russell, B. Read Vs Russell, B. Read III 31 +
VsReductionism: would have to explain the truth of a negative statement like "Ruby didn't kill Kennedy" as the result of the truth of another statement that would be incompatible with "Ruby killed Kennedy". RussellVsVs: objected to such argumentation that recourse is imminent: "B is incompatible with A" is itself a negative statement. To explain its truth, we would need a third statement, C, which would be incompatible with "C is compatible with A", and so on.
ReadVsRussell: this is a strange objection, because it would also apply against every conjunction. And then truth conditions for conjunctive and disjunctive statements must not be subjunctive or disjunctive.
III 156
VsRussell: his theory cannot be right because it leads to false truth values: it says (wrongly) that any statement about non-existent objects is false. It is, however, an improvement on traditional theory, which says that all such statements are meaningless.

Re III
St. Read
Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997

Read I
Stephen Read
Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic Oxford 1995
Russell, B. Rorty Vs Russell, B. I 187
RortyVsRussell: confuses the specific semantic doctrines of Frege and Wittgenstein, which had indeed emerged from the new logic, with epistemological teachings. >Language/Frege, >Language/Quine.
Rorty I 189
Russell/Rorty: distinguishes "truth by virtue of meaning" and "truth by virtue of experience". >Acquaintance. QuineVsRussell/Rorty: (Quine in >Two Dogmas): VsTradition: Vs the conventional belief that philosophy relates to the empirical sciences like the study of structures to the study of contents.
I 190
Quine: (like Wittgenstein): we can hardly distinguish when we respond to the pressure of experience and when to the pressure of language. Quine/Rorty: Thesis: "every statement can be revised". >Theories/Quine.
Sellars/Rorty: "It may turn out that there are no colored objects."

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Russell, B. Ryle Vs Russell, B. Read III 33
Russell fell into the trap in his account of universals: according to his opinion, atomic statements consists of a number of individuals and a universal. E.g. "Fido is a dog." What does "dog" refer to? According to the "Fido"-Fido-theory of the Fido, it must get its meaning through the fact that it is assigned to a single thing, to "being-a-dog" or the universal, dog. (>RyleVsCarnap).
Statement/Russell's statements were designed by him to make the meaning of sentences. Consequently, he said, they must contain these generic entities, universals.
This is an unjustified step.
---
Read III 296
"Fido"-Fido principle: RyleVs: reference equals meaning. ---
Read III 34
> Various AuthorsVsRussell: >statements, >facts. Russell: believed that predicate expressions, verbs, and adjectives related to universals, "is president" refers to presidency, "runs" to what is common to all things that are going. But many philosophers deny that the concept of the object reference can be applied to such parts of speech.
Meaning: Russell and others simply identify meaning and object reference. (>reference/VsRussell).

Ryle I
G. Ryle
The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949
German Edition:
Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969

Re III
St. Read
Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997

Read I
Stephen Read
Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic Oxford 1995
Russell, B. Searle Vs Russell, B. V 122
Theory of descriptions/Russell/Searle: Russell went as far as to negate that a specific description could ever be used as reference! ((s) This is about fictions) Description/fiction/SearleVsRussell: of course you can refer to literary figures. Condition: they must exist (in the literature). You cannot refer to the wife of Sherlock Holmes, because he was not married.
V 129
Theory of descriptions/Russell/problem: E.g. "The man insulted me" means that one might assume that only one man exists in the universe. SearleVsRussell: actually asserted something like this in the theory of descriptions.

V 245
Names/descriptions/SearleVsRussell: from the supposed distinction between proper names and certain descriptions the metaphysical distinction between objects and properties is derived.
V 131
definite article/reference/SearleVsRussell: there is absolutely no use of the definite article, which implies in itself that only one object can be meant.
V 132/133
definite article: its function is rather to indicate that the speaker intends a singular reference.
V 144
Proposition/Searle: only the expression in a particular context (circumstances) ensures the transmitting of a proposition! SearleVsRussell: no class of logically proper names can exist at all (this, now, there). If their expressions gave no descriptive content (Russell), there is no way to establish a relation between the expression and the object. How could one explain that this term refers to that object?

V 238
Searle: a propositional act can never be identical to the illocutionary act of the assertion, since a propositional act can never occur independently but only as part of an illocutionary act. SearleVsRussell: the attempt to equate the specific reference (propositional act) with the setting up of assertions (illocutionary act) was bound to fail.
V 239
Because Russell used the formal notation, complete statements must be prepared for him, even if there is no object.
V 240
But from the fact that a certain type of acts can be carried out only under certain conditions, does not simply follow that implementation of such an act in itself already represents the assertion that these conditions were met. Searle: The command "Bring this to the King of France" is neither a statement nor does it contain such. (> E.g. "The present King of France is bald.")

IV 113
Sense/Russell: E.g. pointless: "Four-pageness drinking postponement": SearleVsRussell: is read by many authors as a metaphorical statement about the Quadripartite Agreement after WW2. But none of the words occurs here literally!

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005
Russell, B. Strawson Vs Russell, B. Wolf II 17
StrawsonVsRussell: Vs Russell's resolution of singular sentences like "the F, which is G, is H" are general sentences such as "There is exactly one F, which is G, and this F is H" : this is inappropriate. Thus it is not included, that we refer with the singular term to individual things.
---
Newen/Schrenk I 92
Reference/StrawsonVsRussell: ("On Referring") in 1950, 45 years after Russell's "On Denoting" (1905)). Strawson: 5 theses
(i) one must distinguish between a) the sentence, b) the use, c) the expression (on one occasion)
(ii) there is a difference between (logical) implying and presupposition
(iii) truth value gaps are allowed
(iv) The meaning of an expression is not its referent, but the conventions and rules. In various uses the term can therefore refer to different objects.
(v) expressions can be used referential and predicative (attributing properties).
Sentence/truth value/tr.v./Strawson: Thesis: sentences themselves cannot be true or false, only their use.
Presupposition/implication/Strawson: difference:
Definition implication/Strawson: A implies B iff it cannot be that A is true but B is false. On the other hand:
Definition presupposition/Strawson: A presupposes B iff B must be true so that A can take a truth value.
Existence assertion/uniqueness assertion/Strawson: are only presupposed by a sentence with description, but not implied.
E.g. King of France/presupposition/Strawson: the sentence presupposes the existence, however, does not imply it. And also does not claim the existence and uniqueness.
Newen/Schrenk VsStrawson: Strawson provides no philosophical-logical arguments for his thesis.
Newen/Schrenk I 94
He rather refers to our everyday practice. Truth-value gaps/StrawsonVsRussell: accepted by him.
Negative existential statements/existence/existence theorem/Strawson/VsStrawson/Newen/Schrenk: his approach lets the problem of empty existence theorems look even trickier.
Referential/predicative/singular term/designation/name/Strawson/Newen/Schrenk: Thesis:
Proper names/demonstratives: are largely used referential.
Description: have a maximum predicative, so descriptive meaning (but can also simultaneously refer).
Identity/informative identity sentences/referential/predicative/Strawson/Newen/Schrenk: here the description has (or two occurring descriptions) such an extreme predicative use that E.g. "Napoleon is identical to the man who ordered the execution of the Duke" is as good as synonymous with the phrase "Napoleon ordered the ...".
In principle, both sentences are used for a predication. Thus, the first sentence is informative when it is read predicative and not purely referential.
---
Quine I 447
StrawsonVsRussell: has called Russell's theory of descriptions false because of their treatment of the truth value gaps. ---
Schulte III 433
StrawsonVsRussell/Theory of descriptions: Strawson brings a series of basic distinctions between types and levels of use of linguistic expressions into play. Fundamental difference between the logical subject and logical predicate. Pleads for stronger focus on everyday language.
"The common language has no exact logic"
Schulte III 434
King-xample: "The present king of France is bald". Russell: here the description must not be considered a logical subject. Russell: Such sentences are simply wrong in the case of non-existence. Then we also not need to make any dubious ontological conditions. We analyze (according to Russell) the sentence as follows: it is in reality a conjunction of three sentences:
1. There is a king of France.
2. There are no more than a king of France.
3. There is nothing that is King of France and is not bald.
Since at least one member in the conjunction is false, it is wrong in total.
StrawsonVsRussell: 1. he speaks too careless of sentences and their meanings. But one has to consider the use of linguistic expressions, which shows that there must be a much finer distinction.
2. Russell confused what a sentence says with the terms of the meaningful use of this sentence.
3. The everyday language and not the formal logic determines the meaning.
---
Schulte III 435
Reference/Strawson: an expression does not refer to anything by itself. King-Example/StrawsonVsRussell: with the sentence "The present king of France is bald" no existence assertion is pronounced. Rather, it is "implied".
Therefore, the sentence does not need to be true or false. The term does not refer to anything.
Definition truth value gap (Strawson): E.g. King-Example: refers to nothing. Wittgenstein: a failed move in the language game.
---
VII 95
Description/Strawson: sure I use in E.g. "Napoleon was the greatest French soldier", the word "Napoleon", to name the person, not the predicate. StrawsonVsRussell: but I can use the description very well to name a person.
There can also be more than one description in one sentence.
VII 98
StrawsonVsRussell: seems to imply that there are such logical subject predicate sentences. Russell solution: only logical proper names - for example, "This" - are real subjects in logical sentences. The meaning is exactly the individual thing.
This leads him to the fact that he can no longer regard sentences with descriptions as logical propositions.
Reference/StrawsonVsRussell: Solution: in "clear referring use" also dscriptions can be used. But these are not "descriptions" in Russell's sense.
VII 99
King-Example/StrawsonVsRussell: claims three statements, one of which in any case would be wrong. The conjunction of three statements, one of which is wrong and the others are true, is false, but meaningful.
VII 100
Reference/description/StrawsonVsRussell: distinction: terminology:
"Unique reference": expression. (Clearly referring description).
Sentence begins with clear referring description.
Sentences that can start with a description:
(A1) sentence
(A2) use of a sentence (A3) uttering of a sentence
accordingly:
(B1) expression
(B2) use of an expression (B3) utterance of an expression.
King-Example/StrawsonVsRussell: the utterance (assertion (>utterance) "The present king of France is wise" can be true or false at different times, but the sentence is the same.
VII 101
Various uses: according to whether at the time of Louis XIV. or Louis XV. Sentence/statement/statement/assertion/proposition/Strawson:
Assertion (assertion): can be true or false at different times.
Statement (proposition): ditto
Sentence is always the same. (Difference sentence/Proposition).
VII 102
StrawsonVsRussell: he overlooks the distinction between use and meaning.
VII 104
Sense/StrawsonVsRussell: the question of whether a sentence makes sense, has nothing to do with whether it is needed at a particular opportunity to say something true or false or to refer to something existent or non-existent.
VII 105
Meaning/StrawsonVsRussell: E.g. "The table is covered with books": Everyone understands this sentence, it is absurd to ask "what object" the sentence is about (about many!). It is also absurd to ask whether it is true or false.
VII 106
Sense/StrawsonVsRussell: that the sentence makes sense, has to do with the fact that it is used correctly (or can be), not that it can be negated. Sense cannot be determined with respect to a specific (individual) use.
It is about conventions, habits and rules.
VII 106/107
King-Example/Russell/Strawson: Russell says two true things about it: 1. The sentence E.g. "The present king of France is wise" makes sense.
2. whoever expresses the sentence now, would make a true statement, if there is now one,
StrawsonVsRussell: 1. wrong to say who uttered the sentence now, would either make a true or a false claim.
2. false, that a part of this claim states that the king exists.
Strawson: the question wrong/false does not arise because of the non-existence. E.g. It is not like grasping after a raincoat suggests that one believes that it is raining. (> Presupposition/Strawson).
Implication/Imply/StrawsonVsRussell: the predication does not assert an existence of the object.
VII 110
Existence/StrawsonVsRussell: the use of "the" is not synonymous with the assertion that the object exists. Principia Mathematica: (p.30) "strict use" of the definite article: "only applies if object exists".
StrawsonVsRussell: the sentence "The table is covered with books" does not only apply if there is exactly one table
VII 111
This is not claimed with the sentence, but (commonplace) implied that there is exactly one thing that belongs to the type of table and that it is also one to which the speaker refers. Reference/StrawsonVsRussell: referring is not to say that one refers.
Saying that there is one or the other table, which is referred to, is not the same as to designate a certain table.
Referencing is not the same as claiming.
Logical proper names/StrawsonVsRussell: E.g. I could form my empty hand and say "This is a beautiful red!" The other notes that there is nothing.
Therefore, "this" no "camouflaged description" in Russell's sense. Also no logical proper name.
You have to know what the sentence means to be able to respond to the statement.
VII 112
StrawsonVsRussell: this blurs the distinction between pure existence theorems and sentences that contain an expression to point to an object or to refer to it. Russell's "Inquiry into meaning and truth" contains a logical catastrophic name theory. (Logical proper names).
He takes away the status of logical subjects from the descriptions, but offers no substitute.
VII 113
Reference/Name/referent/StrawsonVsRussell: not even names are enough for this ambitious standard. Strawson: The meaning of the name is not the object. (Confusion of utterance and use).
They are the expressions together with the context that one needs to clearly refer to something.
When we refer we do not achieve completeness anyway. This also allows the fiction. (Footnote: later: does not seem very durable to me because of the implicit restrictive use of "refer to".)
VII 122
StrawsonVsRussell: Summit of circulatory: to treat names as camouflaged descriptions. Names are choosen arbitrary or conventional. Otherwise names would be descriptive.
VII 123
Vague reference/"Somebody"/implication/Strawson: E.g. "A man told me ..." Russell: existence assertion: "There is a man who ..."
StrawsonVsRussell: ridiculous to say here that "class of men was not empty ..."
Here uniqueness is also implicated as in "the table".
VII 124
Tautology/StrawsonVsRussell: one does not need to believe in the triviality. That only believe those who believe that the meaning of an expression is the object. (E.g. Scott is Scott).
VII 126
Presupposition/StrawsonVsRussell: E.g. "My children sleep" Here, everyone will assume that the speaker has children. Everyday language has no exact logic. This is misjudged by Aristotle and Russell.

Strawson I
Peter F. Strawson
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959
German Edition:
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Strawson VII
Peter F Strawson
"On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950)
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

K II siehe Wol I
U. Wolf (Hg)
Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Schulte I
J. Schulte
Wittgenstein Stuttgart 2001

Schulte II
J. Schulte
U. J. Wenzel
Was ist ein philosophisches Problem? Frankfurt 2001

Schulte III
Joachim Schulte
"Peter Frederick Strawson"
In
Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993
Russell, B. Tugendhat Vs Russell, B. Wolf II 22
Identification/Individualization/Tugendhat: the subjective and the objective localization are equally original. TugendhatVsStrawson: space-time not only particularly important, but the only possibility of identification.
Like Strawson: sortal predicates must be added. (Taking out of the situation, recognition, countability).
All singular terms refer to the lowest level of identification. "This F is G", verifiable. (KantVs).
TugendhatVsRussell: although the existential statement "there is exactly one F here and now" is still implied here, it is no longer a general statement as with Russell: "among all objects there is one..." but localization.
Only with localizing expressions we have singular terms whose reference can no longer fail. Therefore, they no longer imply existential statements!
Thus they resemble Russell's logical proper names. Difference: they no longer stand in an isolated assignment to the object, but in a space-time order.
Tugendhat I 378
Existential Statements/Tugendhat: contrary to appearances not statements about individual things but always general statements. In principle, the talk of existence always assumes that one speaks of all objects, and therefore one could not even say (VsRussell) of a single object that it exists.
I 383
TugendhatVsRussell: but here it's not about a relation at all, specification takes place against the background of all objects. Russell has already seen that correctly with regard to singular terms, but with his logical proper names he was wrong anyway, precisely because he denied them the reference to that background of a peculiar generality.
III 214
TugendhatVsRussell: neither the reaction of a living being nor the triggering sign can be true or false, because here there is no assumption that something is so or so, consequently no error is possible.

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992

K II siehe Wol I
U. Wolf (Hg)
Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993
Russell, B. Turing Vs Russell, B. Hofstadter II 522/523
Turing: worked on the question of whether such undecidable assertions should be isolated, or whether they "grew through" the whole of mathematics. He found out that one cannot build a machine that can recognize infallibly undecidable sentences. (Reason: Gödel).
Universal Turing machine: could act indistinguishably from other machines.
TuringVsHilbert,VsRussell: assuming there was such a universal Turing machine, it would lead to a contradiction with itself.
This universal machine could accept the symbolic number of any other machine and simulate it. Problem: what does it do with its own number? Contradiction.
This is the reason why undecidable problems run through all mathematics and cannot be isolated.
Can also be applied to humans: Example: "Will you answer this question with "no"? This shows: no matter how conscious one is of one's own mind, one cannot fully calculate one's own complexity if one tries to understand each other.
So even machines cannot predict their own behaviour (in such cases).

Hofstadter I
Douglas Hofstadter
Gödel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid
German Edition:
Gödel, Escher, Bach - ein Endloses Geflochtenes Band Stuttgart 2017

Hofstadter II
Douglas Hofstadter
Metamagical Themas: Questing for the Essence of Mind and Pattern
German Edition:
Metamagicum München 1994
Russell, B. Wittgenstein Vs Russell, B. Carnap VI 58
Intensional logic/Russell: is not bound to certain statement forms. All of their statements are not translatable into statements about extensions. WittgensteinVsRussell. Later Russell, Carnap pro Wittgenstein.
(Russell, PM 72ff, e.g. for seemingly intensional statements).
E.g. (Carnap) "x is human" and "x mortal":
both can be converted into an extensional statement (class statement).
"The class of humans is included in the class of mortals".
---
Tugendhat I 453
Definition sortal: something demarcated that does not permit any arbitrary distribution . E.g. Cat. Contrast: mass terminus. E.g. water.
I 470
Sortal: in some way a rediscovery of the Aristotelian concept of the substance predicate. Aristotle: Hierarchy: low: material predicates: water, higher: countability.
Locke: had forgotten the Aristotelian insight and therefore introduced a term for the substrate that, itself not perceivable, should be based on a bunch of perceptible qualities.
Hume: this allowed Hume to reject the whole.
Russell and others: bunch of properties. (KripkeVsRussell, WittgensteinVsRussell, led to the rediscovery of Sortals).
E.g. sortal: already Aristotle: we call something a chair or a cat, not because it has a certain shape, but because it fulfills a specific function.
---
Wittgenstein I 80
Acquaintance/WittgensteinVsRussell/Hintikka: eliminates Russell's second class (logical forms), in particular Russell's free-floating forms, which can be expressed by entirely general propositions. So Wittgenstein can say now that we do not need any experience in the logic.
This means that the task that was previously done by Russell's second class, now has to be done by the regular objects of the first class.
This is an explanation of the most fundamental and strangest theses of the Tractatus: the logical forms are not only accepted, but there are considered very important. Furthermore, the objects are not only substance of the world but also constitutive for the shape of the world.
I 81
1. the complex logical propositions are all determined by the logical forms of the atomic sentences, and 2. The shapes of the atomic sentences by the shapes of the objects.
N.B.: Wittgenstein refuses in the Tractatus to recognize the complex logical forms as independent objects. Their task must be fulfilled by something else:
I 82
The shapes of simple objects (type 1): they determine the way in which the objects can be linked together. The shape of the object is what is considered a priori of it. The position moves towards Wittgenstein, it has a fixed base in Frege's famous principle of composite character (the principle of functionality, called Frege principle by Davidson (s)> compositionality).
I 86
Logical Form/Russell/Hintikka: thinks, we should be familiar with the logical form of each to understand sentence. WittgensteinVsRussell: disputes this. To capture all logical forms nothing more is needed than to capture the objects. With these, however, we still have to be familiar with. This experience, however, becomes improper that it relates to the existence of objects.
I 94ff
This/logical proper name/Russell: "This" is a (logical) proper name. WittgensteinVsRussell/PU: The ostensive "This" can never be without referent, but that does not turn it into a name "(§ 45).
I 95
According to Russell's earlier theory, there are only two logical proper names in our language for particularistic objects other than the I, namely "this" and "that". One introduces them by pointing to it. Hintikka: of these concrete Russellian objects applies in the true sense of the word, that they are not pronounced, but can only be called. (> Mention/>use).
I 107
Meaning data/Russell: (Mysticism and Logic): sense data are something "Physical". Thus, "the existence of the sense datum is not logically dependent on the existence of the subject." WittgensteinVsRussell: of course this cannot be accepted by Wittgenstein. Not because he had serious doubts, but because he needs the objects for semantic purposes that go far beyond Russell's building blocks of our real world.
They need to be building blocks of all logical forms and the substance of all possible situations. Therefore, he cannot be satisfied with Russell's construction of our own and single outside world of sensory data.
I 108
For the same reason he refused the commitment to a particular view about the metaphysical status of his objects. Also:
Subject/WittgensteinVsRussell: "The subject does not belong to the objects of the world".
I 114
Language/sense data/Wittgenstein/contemporary/Waismann: "The purpose of Wittgenstein's language is, contrary to our ordinary language, to reflect the logical structure of the phenomena."
I 115
Experience/existence/Wittgenstein/Ramsey: "Wittgenstein says it is nonsense to believe something that is not given by the experience, because belonging to me, to be given in experience, is the formal characteristics of a real entity." Sense data/WittgensteinVsRussell/Ramsey: are logical constructions. Because nothing of what we know involves it. They simplify the general laws, but they are as less necessary for them as material objects."
Later Wittgenstein: (note § 498) equates sense date with "private object that stands before my soul".
I 143
Logical form/Russell/Hintikka: both forms of atomic sentences and complex sentences. Linguistically defined there through characters (connectives, quantifiers, etc.). WittgensteinVsRussell: only simple forms. "If I know an object, I also know all the possibilities of its occurrence in facts. Every such possibility must lie in the nature of the object."
I 144
Logical constants/Wittgenstein: disappear from the last and final logical representation of each meaningful sentence.
I 286
Comparison/WittgensteinVsRussell/Hintikka: comparing is what is not found in Russell's theory.
I 287
And comparing is not to experience a phenomenon in the confrontation. Here you can see: from a certain point of time Wittgenstein sees sentences no more as finished pictures, but as rules for the production of images.
---
Wittgenstein II 35
Application/use/WittgensteinVsRussell: he overlooked that logical types say nothing about the use of the language. E.g. Johnson says red differed in a way from green, in which red does not differ from chalk. But how do you know that? Johnson: It is verified formally, not experimentally.
WittgensteinVsJohnson: but that is nonsense: it is as if you would only look at the portrait, to judge whether it corresponds to the original.
---
Wittgenstein II 74
Implication/WittgensteinVsRussell: Paradox for two reasons: 1. we confuse the implication with drawing the conclusions.
2. in everyday life we never use "if ... then" in this sense. There are always hypotheses in which we use that expression. Most of the things of which we speak in everyday life, are in reality always hypotheses. E.g.: "all humans are mortal."
Just as Russell uses it, it remains true even if there is nothing that corresponds to the description f(x).
II 75
But we do not mean that all huamns are mortal even if there are no humans.
II 79
Logic/Notation/WittgensteinVsRussell: his notation does not make the internal relationships clear. From his notation does not follow that pvq follows from p.q while the Sheffer-stroke makes the internal relationship clear.
II 80
WittgensteinVsRussell: "assertion sign": it is misleading and suggests a kind of mental process. However, we mean only one sentence. ((s) Also WittgensteinVsFrege). > Assertion stroke.
II 100
Skepticism/Russell: E.g. we could only exist, for five minutes, including our memories. WittgensteinVsRussell: then he uses the words in a new meaning.
II 123
Calculus/WittgensteinVsRussell: jealousy as an example of a calculus with three binary relations does not add an additional substance to the thing. He applied a calculus on jealousy.
II 137
Implication/paradox/material/existence/WittgensteinVsRussell: II 137 + applicable in Russell's notation, too: "All S are P" and "No S is P", is true when there is no S. Because the implications are also verified by ~ fx. In reality this fx is both times independent.
All S are P: (x) gx > .fx
No S is P: (x) gx > ~ fx
This independent fx is irrelevant, it is an idle wheel. Example: If there are unicorns, then they bite, but there are no unicorns = there are no unicorns.
II 152
WittgensteinVsRussell: his writing presupposes that there are names for every general sentence, which can be given for the answer to the question "what?" (in contrast to "what kind?"). E.g. "what people live on this island?" one may ask, but not: "which circle is in the square?". We have no names "a", "b", and so on for circles.
WittgensteinVsRussell: in his notation it says "there is one thing which is a circle in the square."
Wittgenstein: what is this thing? The spot, to which I point? But how should we write then "there are three spots"?
II 157
Particular/atom/atoms/Wittgenstein: Russell and I, we both expected to get through to the basic elements ("individuals") by logical analysis. Russell believed, in the end there would be subject predicate sentences and binary relations. WittgensteinVsRussell: this is a mistaken notion of logical analysis: like a chemical analysis. WittgensteinVsAtomism.
Wittgenstein II 306
Logic/WittgensteinVsRussell: Russell notes: "I met a man": there is an x such that I met x. x is a man. Who would say: "Socrates is a man"? I criticize this not because it does not matter in practical life; I criticize that the logicians do not make these examples alive.
Russell uses "man" as a predicate, even though we almost never use it as such.
II 307
We could use "man" as a predicate, if we would look at the difference, if someone who is dressed as a woman, is a man or a woman. Thus, we have invented an environment for this word, a game, in which its use represents a move. If "man" is used as a predicate, the subject is a proper noun, the proper name of a man.
Properties/predicate/Wittgenstein: if the term "man" is used as a predicate, it can be attributed or denied meaningfully to/of certain things.
This is an "external" property, and in this respect the predicate "red" behaves like this as well. However, note the distinction between red and man as properties.
A table could be the owner of the property red, but in the case of "man" the matter is different. (A man could not take this property).
II 308
WittgensteinVsRussell: E.g. "in this room is no man". Russell's notation: "~ (Ex)x is a man in this room." This notation suggests that one has gone through the things in the room, and has determined that no men were among them.
That is, the notation is constructed according to the model by which x is a word like "Box" or else a common name. The word "thing", however, is not a common name.
II 309
What would it mean, then, that there is an x, which is not a spot in the square?
II 311
Arithmetics/mathematics/WittgensteinVsRussell: the arithmetic is not taught in the Russellean way, and this is not an inaccuracy. We do not go into the arithmetic, as we learn about sentences and functions, nor do we start with the definition of the number.

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921.
German Edition:
Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960

Ca I
R. Carnap
Die alte und die neue Logik
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996

Ca VIII (= PiS)
R. Carnap
Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992
Russell, B. Verschiedene Vs Russell, B. Me I 55
Hugo BergmannVsRussell: the claim of the logician to have explained the concept of existence completely through the use in mathematical logic, is an unwarranted exaggeration. MenneVsRussell: a logical analysis of the concept of existence, which is not fixed from the outset on the existence operator, provides a satisfactory result, and also a response to the question of universals.
EMD II 255
Change/Existence/Phases Sortal/Michael Woods: For example, it was true of something that it was a seed in my garden. But it is not true that the seedling ceased to exist just because it is no longer a seedling. Instead, it is the case that it was true of something, that it was a seedling, and that it is no longer true of anything.
Descriptions/Michael WoodsVsRussell: can we not align the name in Russell's way.
"(Ex)(x is the F)": this varies in the truth values with time, provided that "the F" denotes an object only at the time of utterance.
Vs: as above in relation to existence (connection to the existence quantifier).
Problem: for example, "the F no longer exists": how can it ever express a truth if it is to involve the time of the past?
Berka I 292
BernaysVsRussell: (1926) the 4th axiom of Principia Mathematica is not independent.





EMD II
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977

Evans I
Gareth Evans
"The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

Evans II
Gareth Evans
"Semantic Structure and Logical Form"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Evans III
G. Evans
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989

Berka I
Karel Berka
Lothar Kreiser
Logik Texte Berlin 1983
Russell, B. Peacocke Vs Russell, B. I 131
Acquaintance/Russell: objects of acquaintance: E.g. sense data. They are obvious to the subject. Sense Data/Russell: correspond to the positions of singular terms in a sentence.
They are at the same time real constituents of the sentence.
And without givenness at that! (Without intension). Purely extensional occurrence of objects in the sentence.
PeacockeVsRussell: 1) that may mollify FregeVsRussell's criticism of his concept of proposition.
But it does not justify Russell: because he did not refer to obviousness for the thinker.
2) physical objects that, according to Russell, "cause the sense data" are therefore demonstrative and descriptive in a mix.
PeacockeVs: our approach, on the other hand, assumes that demonstrative ways of givenness are not descriptive.
But Russell's mixed approach is not entirely irrelevant: if we replace "sense data" by "experience":
PeacockeVsRussell: he confused a plausible determination of the the constitutive role with "content".

I 180
Acquaintance/Russell: (B. Russell, Problems of Philosophy, 1973, p. 32) "Each understandable sentence must be composed of constituents with which we are familiar." PeacockeVs: that got bad press. Problem: Excessive proximity to Humean empiricism.
SainsburyVs: Russells ideas should be defended without the principle of acquaintance if possible.
Peacocke: but if you free the principle of non-essential epistemological attachments, it is a correct and fundamental condition for the attribution of contents.
Acquaintance/Russell: we are familiar with the sense data, some objects of immediate memory and with universals and complexes.
Earlier: the thinker is also familiar with himself.
Later: Vs.
Complex/Russell: aRb. Acquaintance/PeacockeVsRussell: he had a correct basic notion of acquaintance, but a false one of its extension (from the things that fall under it).
The salient feature is the idea of ​​relation. One is dealing with the object itself and not its deputy.
 I 182
Def Principle of Acquaintance/PeacockeVsRussell: Thesis: Reconstruction, reformulated principle of acquaintance: The thinker is familiar with an object if there is a way of givenness (within its repertoire of concepts) that is ruled by the principle of sensitivity and he is in an appropriate current mental state, which he needs to think of the object under this way of givenness.
For this, we need a three-digit relation between subject, object and type of the way of givenness
The type of the way of givenness (as visual or aural perception) singles out the object.
"Singling out" here is neutral in terms of whether the object is to be a "constituent of thoughts" or not.
This preserves two features of Russell's concept:
1) acquaintance enables the subject to think about the object in a certain way because of the relationship that it has with it.
2) The concept of the mental state may preserve what Russell meant when he spoke of acquaintance as a relation of presentation.
Constituent/Thoughts/Russell: he thought that objects occurred downright as parts of the thought.
PeacockeVsRussell: we will interpret this as an object that indicates a type of a way of givenness (indexing).
We do not allow an object to occur as part of a thought, just because it is the only component of the thought that corresponds to a singular term position in a sentence that expresses a thought.
I 183
This is a Neo-Fregean theory, because an object can only exist as part of the thought by the particular way of its givenness (intension). (VsRussell: not literally part of the thought or sentence).

I 195
Colors/Explanation/Peacocke: to avoid circularity, colors themselves are not included in the explanation of a response action, but only their physical bases. Different: E.g. 'John's favorite color': which objects have it, depends on what concepts φ are such that φ judges the subject, 'John's favorite color is φ' together with thoughts of the form 't is φ'.
Analog: defined description: E.g. the 'richest man'. He is identified by the relational way of givenness in context with additional information:
Complex/Acquaintance/Russell/Peacocke: E.g. a subject has an experience token with two properties:
1) It may have been mentioned in the context with sensitivity for a specific demonstrative way of givenness of an object (e.g. audible tone).
2) At the same time it may be an experience token of a certain type. Then, to be recognized the two must coincide in the context
I 196
with a sensitivity for a specific concept φ in the repertoire of the subject. VsAcquaintance/VsRussell/Peacocke: one can argue:
E.g. Cicero died long ago
E.g. arthritis is painful.
We can attribute such beliefs when the subject understands the meanings of the concepts.
Nevertheless, the readiness to judge that Cicero died long ago depends on a mental state, with regard to which there must be an evidence.
What kind of a mental state should that be?
It need not remember the occasion when it first heard the name 'Cicero'.
But neither: 'F died long ago', where 'F' is a defined description.
Name/Peacocke: semantic function: simply singling out a particular object.
Understanding: if you can identify the reference of the name in one way or another.
There is no specific way in which you have to think of the Roman orator to understand the name.
VsAcquaintance/VsPeacocke: that may even endanger the reformulated principle: if the name only singles out the object, then the subject must have a relation to a thought which contains the object as a constituent.
PeacockeVs: I dispute the last conditional.
We must distinguish sharply between
a) beliefs, where the that-sentence contains a name, and
b) the presence of the reference of a name as constituent of a Neo-Fregean thought. The latter corresponds to the relation 'Bel'.
I 196/197
Def Relation 'Bel'/Terminology/Belief/Propositional Attitudes/Peacocke: a belief which contains the reference of a name as constituent of a Neo-Fregean thought: E.g. not only 'NN died a long time ago', but propositional attitude.
((s) not only belief about someone or something, but about a particular object.)
Relation Bel/Belief/Peacocke: three reasons for distinguishing beliefs:
a) we want to exclude that someone can acquire a new belief simply by introducing a new name. (Only a description could do that).
E.g. if we wanted to call the inventor of the wheel 'Helle':
Trivialization: 1) it would be trivial that such a stipulation should be enough for the reference in a community.
2) Nor is it a question of us being able to give outsiders a theoretical description of the community language.
You cannot bring about a relation Bel by linguistic stipulation.
I 198
b) Pierre Example/Kripke/Peacocke: this type of problem arises in cases where the language is too poor for a theory of beliefs in this sense: if someone understands a sentence, it is not clear what thoughts he expresses with it. (>Understanding/Peacocke). Because the semantics only singles out the object, not the way of thinking about the object (intension). This is different with pure index words and certain descriptions.
E.g. a person who says 'I'm hot now' expresses the thought:
^[self x]^[now t].
But that involves nothing that would be 'thinking of something under a name'!
Pierre Example/Kripke/Solution: a complete description of Pierre's situation is possible (for outsiders) without embedding 'London' in belief contexts.
Peacocke: at the level of 'Bel' (where the speaker himself is part of the belief) beliefs can be formulated so that proper names are used: 'He believes that NN is so and so'.
c) Perception/Demonstratives/Way of Givenness/Peacocke: here, the way of givenness seems to have a wealth that does not need to be grasped completely, if someone uses demonstratives.
The wealth of experience is covered by the relation Bel, however.
But this way we are not making certain commitments: E.g. we do not need to regarded 'Cicero died long ago' as metalinguistic, but rather as meant quite literally.

I 201
Logical Operators/Quantification/Logic/Acquaintance/PeacockeVsRussell: our reconstructed principle of acquaintance implicitly includes the obligation to recognize entities that can only be preserved inferentially: E.g. uniqueness operators, other quantifiers, connections, also derived ones.
This can even apply to logical constants and some truth functions and not only for ways of givenness of these functions.
RussellVs: the principle of acquaintance is not applicable to logical constituents of thoughts.

Peacocke I
Chr. R. Peacocke
Sense and Content Oxford 1983

Peacocke II
Christopher Peacocke
"Truth Definitions and Actual Languges"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976
Russell, B. Hintikka Vs Russell, B. II 165
On Denoting/Russell/Hintikka: (Russell 1905) Problem: with phrases that stand for genuine constituents of propositions. Problem/Frege: failure of substitutivity of identity (SI) in intensional contexts.
Informative Identity/Frege: the fact that identity can even sometimes be informative is connected to this.
EG/Existential Generalization/Russell: it, too, may fail in in intensional contexts, (problem of empty terms).
HintikkaVsRussell: he does not recognize the depth of the problem and rather circumvents the problems of denoting terms.
E.g. The bald king of France/Russell: Problem: we cannot prove by existential generalization that there is a present king of France.
HintikkaVsRussell: But there are also other problems. (see below for ambiguity of cross world identificaiton).
Description/Russell/Hintikka:
Def Primary Description: the substitutivity of identity applies to them (SI)
Def secondary description: for them, substitutivity of identity (SI) fails.
II 166
Existential Generalization/Russell: two readings: (1) George IV did not know whether Scott was the author of Waverley.
Description/Logical Form/Russell/Hintikka: "the author of Waverley": (ix)A(x)
primarily: the description has the following power:
(2) (Ex)[A(x) & (y) A(y) > y = x) & ~ George IV knew that (Scott = x)].
((s) notation: quantifier here always normal existential quantifier, mirrored E).
I.e. the quantifier has the maximum range in the primary identification.
The second reading is more likely, however: Secondary:
(3) ~George IV knew that (Ex)[A(x) & (y)(A(y) > y = x & (Scott = x)].
((s) narrow range):
Range/HintikkaVsRussell: he did not know that there is also a third option for the range of a quantifier ((s) >"medium range"/Kripke).
(4) ~(Ex)[A(x) & (y)(A(y) > y = x ) & George IV knew that (Scott = x)].
II 166
Existential Generalization/HintikkaVsRussell: he did not see that there was a reason for the failure of the existential generalization, which is not caused by the non-existence of the object. E.g.
(5) George IV knew that the author of Waverley is the author of Waverley.
a) trivial interpretation:
I 167
(6) George IV knew that (Ex)(A(x) & (y)(A(y) > y = x)) everyday language translation: he knew that one and only one person wrote Waverley.
I 166
b) non-trivial interpretation: (7) (Ex)(A(x) & (y)(A(y) > y = x) & George IV knew that (A(x) & (y)(A(y) > y = x))).
((s) no quantifier after "knew that
everyday language translation: George knew of the only person who actually wrote Waverley, that they did.
Because knowledge implies truth, (7) is equivalent to
(8) (Ex) George IV knew that (Ez)(A(z) & (y)(A(y) > y = z) & x = z).
this is equivalent to.
(9) (Ex) George IV knew that (the author of Waverley = x)
Here, the description has secondary (narrow) range.
Everyday language translation: George knew who the author of Waverley is.
I 167
Knowledge/Who/What/Where/HintikkaVsRussell: Russell cannot explicitly analyze structures of the form knows + W-sentence. General: (10) a knows, who (Ex x) is so that A(x)
becomes
(11) (Ex) a knows that A(x).
Hintikka: this is only possible if we modify Russell’s approach:
Problem: the existential generalization now collapses in a way that cannot be attributed to non-existence, and which cannot be analyzed by Russell’s Theory of Descriptions (ThoD).
Problem: for every person, there are a lot of people whose names they know and of whose existence they know, but of who they do not know who they are.
II 168
E.g. Charles Dodgson was for Queen Victoria someone of whom she had heard, but whom she did not know. Problem: if we assume that (11) is the correct analysis of (10), the following applies.
(12) ~(Ex) Victoria knew that Dodgson = x)
But that’s trivially false, even according to Russell.
Because the following is certainly true:
(13) Victoria knew that Dodgson = Dodgson)
Existential Generalization/EG: then yields
(14) (Ex) Victoria knew that Dodgson = x)
So exactly the negation of (12) contradiction.
II 168
Descriptions/Hintikka: are not involved here. Therefore, Russell’s description theory cannot help here, either. E.g. we can also assume that Victoria knew of the existence of Dodgson.
Empty Terms/Empty Names: are therefore not the problem, either.
Ontology/Hintikka: so our problem gets an ontological aspect.
Existential Generalization/EG/Being/Quine/Ontology/Hintikka: the question of whether existential generalization may be applied on a singular term "b", E.g. in a context "F(b)", is the same as whether b may be value of a bound variable.
Existential Generalization/Hintikka: does not fail here because of non-existence.
II 169
We are dealing with the following problems here: Manifestation used by
a) no SI Frege, Russell
b) no EG
(i) due to non-existence Russell
(ii) because of ambiguity Hintikka
Ambiguity/Solution/Hintikka: possible worlds semantics.
E.g. (12) - (14) the problem is not that Dodgson did not exist in the actual world or not in one of Victoria’s worlds of knowledge, but that the name Dodgson singles out different individuals in different possible worlds.
Hence (14) does not follow from (13).
II 170
Existential Generalization/EG/Ambiguity/Clarity/Russell/Hintikka: Which way would have been open to Russell?. Knowing-Who/Russell/Hintikka: Russell himself very often speaks of the equivalence of knowledge, who did something with the existence of another individual, which is known to have done... + ...
II 173
Denotation/Russell/Hintikka: Important argument: an ingenious feature of Russell’s theory of denotation from 1905 is that it is the quantifiers that denote! Theory of Denotation/Russell: (end of "On Denoting") includes the reduction of descriptions to objects of acquaintance.
II 174
Hintikka: this relation is amazing, it also seems to be circular to allow only objects of acquaintance. Solution: We need to see what successfully denoting expressions (phrases) actually denote: they precisely denote objects of acquaintance.
Ambiguity/Clarity/Hintikka: it is precisely ambiguity that leads to the failure of the existential generalization.
Existential Generalization/Waverley/Russell/Hintikka: his own example shows that only objects of acquaintance are allowed: "the author of Waverley" in (1) is in fact a primary incident i.e. his example (2).
"Whether"/Russell/Hintikka: only difference: wanted to know "if" instead of "did not know". (secondary?).
Secondary Description/Russell: can also be expressed like this: that George wanted to know of the man who actually wrote Waverley whether he was Scott.
II 175
That would be the case if George IV had seen Scott (in the distance) and had asked "Is that Scott?". HintikkaVsRussell: why does Russell select an example with a perceptually known individual? Do we not usually deal with beings of flesh and blood whose identity is known to us, instead of only with objects of perception?.
Knowing Who/Knowing What/Perception Object/Russell/Hintikka: precisely with perception objects it seems as if the kind of clarity that we need for a knowing-who, is not just given.
Identifcation/Possible Worlds Semantics/HintikkaVsRussell/Hintikka: in my approach Dodgson is a bona fide individual iff. he is one and the same individual in all worlds of knowledge of Victoria. I.e. identifiable iff.
(15) (E.g.) in all relevant possible worlds it is true that (Dodgson = x).
Problem: What are the relevant possible worlds?.
II 178
Quantifier/Quantification/HintikkaVsRussell: Russell systematically confuses two types of quantifiers. (a) of acquaintance, b) of description). Problem: Russell has not realized that the difference cannot be defined solely in terms of the actual world!.
Solution/Hintikka: we need a relativization to sets of possible worlds that change with the different propositional attitudes.
II 179
RussellVsHintikka: he would not have accepted my representation of his position like this. HintikkaVsRussell: but the reason for this merely lies in a further error of Russell’s: I have not attributed to him what he believed, but what he should have believed.
Quantification/Russell/Hintikka: he should have reduced to objects of acquaintance. Russell believed, however, it was sufficient to eliminate expressions that seemingly denote objects that are not such of acquaintance.
Important argument: in that his quantifiers do not enter any ontological commitment. Only denoting expressions do that.
Variable/Russell/Hintikka: are only notational patterns in Russell.
Ontological Commitment/Quine/HintikkaVsRussell: Russell did not recognize the ontological commitment that ​​1st order languages bring with them.
Being/Ontology/Quine: "Being means being value of a bound variable".
HintikkaVsRussell: he has realized that.
II 180
Elimination/Eliminability/HintikkaVsRussell/Hintikka: in order to eliminate merely seemingly denoting descriptions one must assume that the quantifiers and bound variables go over individuals that are identified by way of description. ((s) Object of the >Description). Otherwise, the real Bismarck would not be a permissible value of the variables with which we express that there is an individual of a certain species.
Problem: then these quantifiers may not be constituents of propositions, because their value ranges do not only consist of objects of acquaintance. Therefore, Russell’s mistake was twofold.
Quantifier/Variable/Russell/Hintikka, 1905, he had already stopped thinking that quantifiers and bound variables are real constituents of propositions.
Def Pseudo Variable/Russell/Hintikka: = bound variable.
Acquaintance/Russell: values of the variable ​​should only be objects of acquaintance. (HintikkaVsRussell).
Quantifiers/HintikkaVsRussell: now we can see why Russell did not differentiate between different quantifiers (acquaintance/description): For him quantifiers were only notational patterns, and for them the range of possible interpretations need not be determined, therefore it makes no difference if the rage changes!.
Quantification/Russell: for him, it was implicitly objectional (referential), and in any event not substitutional.

Peacocke I 190
Possible Worlds/Quantification/HintikkaVsRussell: R. is unable to explain the cases in which we quantify in belief contexts (!) where (according to Hintikka) the quantifier over "publicly descriptively identified" particulars is sufficient. Hintikka: compares with a "roman à clef".
Peacocke: it is not clear that (whether) this could not be explained by Russell as cases of general ideas, so that the person with such and such characteristics is so and so.
Universals/Acquaintance/Russell/Peacocke: we are familiar with universals and they are constituents of our thoughts.
HintikkaVsRussell: this is a desperate remedy to save the principle of acquaintance.
PeacockeVsRussell: his arguments are also very weak.
Russell: E.g. we cannot understand the transitivity of "before" if we are not acquainted with "before", and even less what it means that one thing is before another. While the judgment depends on a consciousness of a complex, whose analysis we do not understand if we do not understand the terms used.
I 191
PeacockeVsRussell: what kind of relationship should exist between subject and universal?. Solution: the reformulated PB: Here we can see to which conditions a term is subject, similar to the principle of sensitivity in relational givenness.
I 192
HintikkaVsRussell: ("On denoting what?", 1981, p.167 ff): the elimination of objects with which the subject is not familiar from the singular term position is not sufficient for the irreducibility of acquaintance that Russell had in mind. Quantification/Hintikka: the quantifiers will still reach over objects with which the subject is not familiar.
But such quantifiers cannot be constituents of propositions, if that is to be compatible with the PB. Because they would certainly occur through their value range Occur and these do not consist of particulars with which one is familiar.

Hintikka I
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
Investigating Wittgenstein
German Edition:
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Hintikka II
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

Peacocke I
Chr. R. Peacocke
Sense and Content Oxford 1983

Peacocke II
Christopher Peacocke
"Truth Definitions and Actual Languges"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976
Russell, B. Berka Vs Russell, B. Berka I 388
Proposition/Terminology/Russell: identifies the concept of statement with its meaning, ("proposition") while "sentence" and "statement" are purely linguistic entities. VsRussell: did not consistently maintain this distinction. He also sometimes treats his "proposition" as a linguistic entity.

Berka I
Karel Berka
Lothar Kreiser
Logik Texte Berlin 1983
Russell, B. Gentzen Vs Russell, B. Berka I 213
Logizismus/logistisch/GentzenVsRussell: wesentlicher Unterschied: bei Russell, Hilbert und Heyting ("logistischer" Ansatz) werden die richtigen Formeln aus einer Reihe von "logischen Grundformeln" ((s) Axiomen) hergeleitet. natürliches Schließen/nS/Gentzen: geht nicht von logischen Grundsätzen ((s) Axiomen) aus, sondern von Annahmen.
Schluß/Unabhängigkeit/Gentzen: durch einen späteren Schluß wird dann das Ergebnis wieder von der Annahme unabhängig gemacht.

Berka I
Karel Berka
Lothar Kreiser
Logik Texte Berlin 1983
Russell, B. Hempel. Vs Russell, B. II 108
Verifiability/Hempel: must show the logical possibility of evidence through observation. But not the technical one, and even less the possibility of finding a corresponding object. Verifiability/Russell: real existence of a set of events.
HempelVsRussell: has never been so represented by an empiricist.
Absurd:
1) the sense could not be justified without empirical facts.
2) allows no conclusive evidence the statements.
HempelVsRussell: the decision of whether a class of observation statements exists, i.e. whether they can be formulated, is a matter of logic and requires no factual information at all.
Verifiability/Hempel: error: to assume true = "principally verifiable". (has also never been represented by a positivist. Is logically absurd:
E.g. we can easily describe the conditions which, if they are given,would verify the statement "The Chrysler Building is painted yellow".
II 109
Problem: according to this principle, the statement and its negation would then both have to be considered to be true.
Russell, B. Chisholm Vs Russell, B. Chisholm II 113
Knowing/Knowledge/BrandlVsRussell: We can know much more about an object, without knowing him, than we often know about those people and things with which we are well familiar. For us the distinction of knowledge has been transformed by acquaintance or description: II 114 1) There is a way in which the objects of the external world appear to us and 2) our knowledge about how these objects are designed as the cause of these experiences. The border has now shifted to the effect that our own experience are separated from what we can know at second hand. Brandl: although Russell must come to completely different results, we can agree with his justification of the distinction: Russell: insight by description is so important because it allows us to go beyond the limits of our experience. BrandlVsRussell: We do not equate "personal experience" with "immediate experience".
II 118
Identification/Chisholm/Brandl: introduces a more sophisticated concept of third-party attribution (briefly: de-re attribution): II 119 1) I need to have at least two relations R and R’ with this and only this object 2) I have to own independent evidence for both relationships 3) I need to know that I am in these relationshipy with the object. Identification/Chisholm: this goes further than Russell, who requested that in order to pass judgment on an object I would have to know which one it is. Russell: If I do not know which object so and so is, I cannot know or believe anything about it. ChisholmVsRussell: if I can only not identify the object, on the other hand, it is not impossible that I will make it the object of an indirect attribution. I can then even relate "to" it.

Chisholm I
R. Chisholm
The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981
German Edition:
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chisholm III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989
German Edition:
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004
Russell, B. Castaneda Vs Russell, B. Frank I 382
CastanedaVsRussell: his reduction has devastating effects on ethical contexts. (Theory of Descriptions).

Hector-Neri Castaneda (1987b): Self-Consciousness, Demonstrative Reference,
and the Self-Ascription View of Believing, in: James E. Tomberlin (ed) (1987a): Critical Review of Myles Brand's "Intending and Acting", in: Nous 21 (1987), 45-55

James E. Tomberlin (ed.) (1986): Hector-Neri.Castaneda, (Profiles: An
International Series on Contemporary Philosophers and Logicians,
Vol. 6), Dordrecht 1986

Cast I
H.-N. Castaneda
Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Russell, B. Donnellan Vs Russell, B. I 18/19
DonnellanVsRussell: has not grasped the referential use, but placed it in a strange construct of "logically proper names". DonnellanVsStrawson: does not see the difference ref/att correctly and mixes the two.
Referential/Attributive/Donnellan: varies even when it comes to the importance of the distinction: 1) Text: only pragmatic distinction, 2) later: "semantic significance". KripkeVsDonnellan: denies semantic ambiguity of the use of descriptions. Both can be grasped with the Russell’s analysis: sentences of the form "The F which is G is H" have the same truth conditions, they are true, if the only F that fulfils G is actually H.
I 193
DonnellanVsRussell: his strict implication works at most with attributive use. (But he does note make the distinction).
I 194
Def Description/Russell: affects an entity which only it fulfills. Donnellan: that is certainly applicable to both uses(!). Ref/Att/Donnellan: if both are not distinguished, the danger is that it must be assumed that the speaker would have to refer to something without knowing it. E.g. "Presidential candidate": we had no idea that it would be Goldwater. Nevertheless, "presidential candidate" would absurdly refer to Goldwater. Solution: DonnellanVsRussell: attributive use.
I 205
Logical Proper Names/"This"/Russell: refer to something without attributing properties! (Donnellan pro) Donnellan: It could eb said that they refer to the thing itself, not to the thing under the condition that it has any special properties. DonnellanVsRussell: he believed that this is something that a description cannot do. But it does work with referential use.
I 275
Theory of Descriptions/Reference/Existence/Russell/Donnellan: Attributed to himself as a merit to explain the reference to non-existent things without the need to bring the idea of ​​non-existent references of singular terms into play. His fully developed theory of singular terms extended this to the of proper names. Philosophy of logical atomism: names as covert descriptions.
I 275/276
Here, the theory "proper names in the strict logical sense" was introduced, which is rarely found in everyday speech. ((s) logical proper names: "this", etc.) DonnellanVsRussell: we want to try to make Russell’s attempt at a solution (which has not failed) redundant with the "historic explanation". (> like ZinK).
I 281
Logical Proper Names/DonellanVsRussell: have no place in a correct theory of reference. Proper Names/Historical Explanation/DonnellanVsRussell: Russell’s view is incorrect in terms of common singular terms: it is not true that common proper names always have a descriptive content. Question: does this mean that ordinary singular terms might be able to fulfill the function which according to Russell only logical proper names can have?.
I 283
Descriptions/DonellanVsRussell: it seems absurd to deny that in E.g. Waverley that what is described by the description, i.e. Scott, is not "part" of the expressed proposition. Russell: was of the opinion that such statements are not really statements about the described or the reference of the name, that they do not really name the described thing! Only logical proper names could accomplish the feat of actually mentioning a certain particular. "About"/Reference/DonnellanVsRussell: Putting great emphasis on concepts such as "about" would lead us into marshy terrain. We should require no definition of "about"!.
It would be a delicate task to show that such a statement is either not a statement in any sense of "about" about the described thing or that there is a clear sense of "about" by it being not.
I 285/286
DonnellanVsRussell: For his theory he paid the price of giving up the natural use of singular terms. RussellVsVs: but with the "natural conception" we end up at the Meinong population explosion. Proper Names/Historical Explanation/DonnellanVsRussell: according to my theory names are no hidden descriptions. E.g. "Homer" is not an abbreviation for "The author of the Homeric poems".
I 209
DonnellanVsRussell/Kripke: Question: Does he refute Russell? No, in itself not! For methodological considerations, Russell’s theory is better than many thought. Nevertheless, it will probably fail in the end.
I 222
Statement/Donnellan/VsRussell/Kripke: It’s not so clear that Donnellan refutes Russell. E.g. "Her husband is kind to her": had Donnellan flatly asserted that this is true iff. the lover is nice, without regard to the niceness of the husband (is perhaps also nice), he would have started a dispute with Russell. But he does not assert this! If we now asked "Is the statement is true?", Donnellan would elude us. Because if description is used referentially, it is unclear what is meant by "statement". If the statement is to be that the husband is nice, the problem is: to decide whether ref. or att. Referential: in this case, we would repeat the speech act wrongly, Attributive: we ourselves would be referring to someone, and we can only do that if we ourselves believe that it is the husband.
I 232
DonnellanVsRussell/Kripke: Are the two really conflicting? I propose a test: Test: if you consider whether a particular linguistic phenomenon in English is a counterexample to an analysis, you should consider a hypothetical language that is similar to English, except that here the analysis is assumed to be correct. If the phenomenon in question also appears in the corresponding (hypothetical) community, the fact that it occurs in English cannot refute the hypothesis that the analysis for English is correct!. DonnellanVsRussell/Kripke: Test: would the phenomenon ref/att occur in different languages?.
I 234
E.g. Sparkling Wine: speakers of the weaker and middle languages think (albeit erroneously) that the truth conditions are fulfilled. Weak: here, the apparatus seems to be entirely adequate. The semantic reference is the only object. Our intuitions are fully explained. Strong: Here, the phenomenon may occur as well. Even ironic use may be clear if the affected person drinks soda.
I 235
These uses would become more common in the strong language (which is not English, of course), because the definite article is prohibited. This leads to an expansion of the speaker reference: If the speaker thinks an item to be fulfilling (Ex)(φ x u ψx), it is the speaker reference, then it may indeed be fulfilling or not. Middle: if speaker reference is applicable in the strong one, it is just as easily transferred to the middle one, because the speaker reference of "ψ(ixφ(x)" is then the thing that the speaker has in mind, which is the only one to fulfill φ(x) and about which he wants to announce that it ψ-s. Conclusion: because the phenomenon occurs in all languages, the fact that it occurs in English can be no argument that English is not a Russell language.
Newen/Schrenk I 95
Def Attributive/Donnellan/Newen/Schrenk: E.g. "The murderer of Schmidt is insane" in the view of the body of Schmidt ((s) In the absence of the person in question, no matter whether it is them or not, "Whoever ...".). Def referential/Donnellan/Newen/Schrenk: E.g. "The murderer of Schmidt is insane" in the face of a wild rampaging man at court - while Schmidt comes through the door - ((s) in view of the man in question, no matter whether it’s him or not. "This one, whatever he did...").

Donnellan I
Keith S. Donnellan
"Reference and Definite Descriptions", in: Philosophical Review 75 (1966), S. 281-304
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993
Russell, B. Hilbert Vs Russell, B. Klaus von Heusinger, Eselssätze und ihre Pferdefüsse
Uni Konstanz Fachgruppe Sprachwissenschaft Arbeitspapier 64; 1994
Heusinger I 1
Epsilon/Heusinger: brings a new representation of certain and undefined NP: these are interpreted like pronouns as context-dependent terms, which are represented by a modified epsilon operator. This is interpreted as a selection function. VsRussell/VsIota Operator: this operator is less flexible because it is subject to the uniqueness condition.
Context Dependency: is also dynamic in that the context reflects the advancing state of information.
I 30
EO/Hilbert/Bernays/Heusinger: term building operator that makes the term x Fx from a formula F and a variable x. It can be understood as a generalized iota operator to which neither the condition of uniqueness nor the condition of existence applies. Iota Operator/HilbertVsRussell: has no contextual definition for Hilbert, but an explicit definition. I.e. ix Fx may be introduced if the condition of uniqueness and existence expressed in (48i) is derivable for the formula F.
Problem: this is impractical because you do not always see if the formula meets the conditions.
Eta Operator/Solution/Hilbert: may be introduced as in (48ii) if there is at least one element that makes F true. Its content is interpreted as a selection function.
Uniqueness Condition: has therefore been replaced by the selection principle.
Problem: also this condition of existence cannot be seen in the formula.
Solution/Hilbert:
Epsilon Operator/EO: is defined according to (48iii) even if F is empty, so that an epsilon term is always well defined.
I 38
Determination/VsRussell/Heusinger: this means that determination is not attributed to uniqueness (>Iota operator) but to the more general concept of salinity (according to Lewis). Generality/(s): whether salience (which is itself context-dependent) is more general than uniqueness is questionable).
Determination/Heusinger: is either
a) a global property, such as it applies to unique and functional concepts (deictic use), or
b) local: determined by the context. (anaphoric use)
Both have a dynamic element.

Rucker I 263
HilbertVsRussell: improved shortly after the publishing of Principia Mathematica the techniques to elaborate with their help his idea of the "formal system". Mathematics/Logics/Hilbert: idea to understand all relations like x = y, x = 0, and z = x + y as special predicates in predicate logic:
G(x,y), N(x), and S(x,y,z).
Then the axioms of mathematics can be regarded as formulae of predicate logic and the proof process becomes the simple application of the rules of logic to the axioms.
I 264
This allows mechanical solution methods.
Russell, B. Holz Vs Russell, B. Leibniz I 64f
Facts of Truth/FoT/Leibniz: are contingent - Reason truths: are necessary. HolzVsRussell: the difference lies in the proof. Otherwise Russell would be right: Truth/necessity/contingent/Russell: it is senseless to say of a true sentence that it is not true in the sense of another, apodictically true proposition. ((s) I.e. that a rational truth would contradict a factual truth).
Holz: for the proof of facts of truth we need the preceding chain of links and (because of the infinite divisibility of the body) an infinite number of sentences.

Holz II
Hans Heinz Holz
Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994

Lei I
H. H. Holz
Leibniz Frankfurt 1992

Lei II
G. W. Leibniz
Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998
Russell, B. Lewis, C.I. Vs Russell, B. HC I 190
Strict implication/C.I.LewisVsRussell/LewisVsPrincipia Mathematica/PM: (1912) a series of systems, VsParadoxes of (material implication). Paradoxes of implication/Hughes/Cresswell: usually from Principia Mathematica:
a) a true statement is implied by any statement:
(1) p > (q > p)
b) a false statement implies any statement: (2) ~p > (p > q)
Both together are called the paradox of (material) implication.
Since either the antecedens of (1) or the antecedens of (2) must be true for each statement p, it is also easy to derive (3) from (1) and (2):
(3) (p > q) v ( q > p).
I 191
i.e. of two statements always the first implies the second or vice versa.
I 191
Paradox of material implication: summarized: of two statements the first always implies the second or vice versa C.I.Lewis: did not intend to reject this thesis, on the contrary, (1) and (2) were "neither mysterious wisdom, nor great discoveries, nor great absurdities", but they reflect the truth-functional sense with which "implicate" is used in Principia Mathematica.
Strict implication/C.I.Lewis: there is a stronger sense of "imply", according to which "p implies q" means that q follows from p.
Here it is not the case that a true one is implied by every statement, or that out of a false one any follows.
This stronger form leads to pairs of statements, none of which imply the other.
Strict implication: necessary implication. Notation(s): "strimp".
Strict disjunction/C.I.Lewis: analog to the strict implication: necessary disjunction. analog:
Strict equivalence/C.I.Lewis: necessary equivalence.
I 191
Strict implication/C.I.Lewis: p strimp q: "p follows from q" avoids paradox of (material) implication leads to pairs of statements, none of which implies the other. C.I.Lewis: introduces a whole series of systems, e.g. in the book "A Survey of Logic": the "Survey System". Basic operator here: logical impossibility, and conjunction/negation).
strict implication: first comprehensively discussed in "Symbolic Logic" Lewis and Langford, (1932). (Systems S1 and S2). (Also the first comprehensive treatment of modal logical systems ever).
Basic operator here: Possibility.
Russell, B. Sciama Vs Russell, B. Kanitscheider I 375
Laws of Nature/VsMach's Principle: may the equations of motion of mechanics depend on the random distribution of matter in the universe? Then they are not the same in all possible worlds. (>Lewis).
I 376
Russell: if the laws of nature of the whole dynamic world can be formulated without regard to existence (and they can) then it cannot be part of their meaning that matter exists. SciamaVsRussell: the content has the same meaning as its laws.

Sciam I
D. Sciama
The Physical Foundations of General Relativity 1969

Kanitsch I
B. Kanitscheider
Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991

Kanitsch II
B. Kanitscheider
Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996
Russell, B. Burkhardt Vs Russell, B. II 364
Name/Meaning/Bearer/Burkhardt: even if one assumes the bearer as the meaning of the name, this does not mean that an existential presupposition is implied. Strawson: sentences can only be true or false in current usage situations.
Non-existence/Name/BurkhardtVsRussell: was deceived by the logical form of the sentence. "Scott does not exist" does not mean, analog to f(x) "There is Scott and he does not exist" but: a person who satisfies the criteria we require to identify someone as the person who is conventionalized as Scott does not exist".
Searle: "Aristotle never existed": means that a sufficient but so far unspecified number of descriptive supports of "Aristotle" are wrong. (Speachacts, 171).

Burk I
A. Burkhardt
Politik, Sprache und Glaubwürdigkeit. Linguistik des politischen Skandals Göttingen 2003
Russell, B. Burks Vs Russell, B. Wolf II 144
Logical Proper Names/BurksVsRussell: are also dependent on pointing gestures (works like description) and are therefore incomplete.

Burks I
Arthur W. Burks
"A Theory of Proper Names", in: Philosophical Studies 2 (1951)
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

Burks II
A. W. Burks
Chance, Cause, Reason 1977

K II siehe Wol I
U. Wolf (Hg)
Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993
Russell, B. Meixner Vs Russell, B. I 162
Proposition/MeixnerVsRussell: Identification of sense of sentence with proposition wrong. The proposition is not a composition of a certain concept and a certain B-singularization, but what the name "the Evening Star" refers to as the evening star also enters into the constitution.

Mei I
U. Meixner
Einführung in die Ontologie Darmstadt 2004
Russell, B. Millikan Vs Russell, B. I 189
Definite article/denotation/Millikan: when used with necessarily identifying denotation it is actually superfluous. Develops its strength only in other denotations. unambiguous/determinateness/MillikanVsRussell: the definite article does not have the function of establishing unambiguity.
Exception: necessarily identifying deotations which are purely descriptive. But even then a translation into an internal name is always possible.

Millikan I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Millikan II
Ruth Millikan
"Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005
Russell, B. Newen Vs Russell, B. New I 74
Description/Russell/Newen: descriptions are only possible with whole sentences. Therefore atom sentences must be added to the minimum vocabulary.
I 75
Ontology/State of Affairs/Russell/Newen: Point: therefore, the ontology of facts is added to the ontology of objects. NewenVsRussell: this connection between epistemology and ontology has implausible consequences, however.

New II
Albert Newen
Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005

Newen I
Albert Newen
Markus Schrenk
Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008
Russell, B. Lesniewski Vs Russell, B. Quine VII 81
Classes/Element/Quine: at first glance it looks as if "x ε y" requires y to be a class.
VII 82
But we can also allow the case that it says: "x is the single thing y". This works with the postulate P1 (Principa Mathematica): the connection of every single thing with its unit class. This is harmless. ((s) >Prior shows that this is possible with >LesniewskiVsRussell).
VII 87
Logical Sum/Abstraction/Quine: (x U y) is z^ ((z ε x) v (z ε y)). ((s) union corresponds to "or"). Universal class: ϑ is x^(x = x)
((s) Then the universal class cannot be empty. But >Prior. - LesniewskiVsRussell: it should be able to be empty).

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987
Russell, B. Wessel Vs Russell, B. I 14
Ontology/Logic/Psychology/RussellVsLaws of Thought: it is not important that we think in accordance with laws of thought, but that the behavior of things corresponds to them. Russell: what we believe when we believe in the sentence of contradiction is not that our consciousness is constructed this way. We do not believe, for example, that we cannot think at the same time that a tree is a beech and not a beech either. We believe that if the tree is a beech, it cannot be not a beech at the same time.
I 15
And even if belief in the sentence of contradiction is a thought, the sentence of contradiction itself is not a thought, but a fact concerning the things of the outside world. If what we believe would not apply to the things of the outside world, then the fact that we are forced to think like this would not guarantee that the sentence of contradiction cannot be wrong (this shows that it cannot be a law of thought).
WesselVsRussell: logical laws do not concern the outside world! They do not give us any information about the outside world.
The validity results only from the determination of the use of the signs!
Of course, such phrases can also be formulated ontologically, but they are not ontological statements. Where else would we have the certainty that they are unrestrictedly valid? We cannot search the world endlessly.
I 123
Subjunction/Material Implication/Frege/Wessel: Frege calls it "conditionality".
I 123/124
Difference: between the subjunction A > B and a logical conclusion in which the only conclusion rule accepted by Frege is to conclude from A > B and A to B. ((s) modus ponens).
Russell/Whitehead/Principia Mathematica: took over from Frege.
"Essential property" of the implication: what is implied by a true statement is true. Through this property, an implication provides evidence.
Def Implication/Russell/Principia Mathematica: p > q = def ~ p v q.(Materials Implication).
WesselVsRussell: this is just inappropriate and misleading! It is purely formal!
Implication/Conclusion/Wessel: the implication has a completely different logical structure than the consequence:
Subjunction: > is a two-digit proposition-forming operator and p > q is synonymous with ~p v q.
Conclusion (implication): "q follows logically p" or "P implies q" is a statement about statements: "From the statement p follows logically the statement q". "Follows from" is a two-digit predicate - not an operator.
Conclusion (also called implication) refers to linguistic structures. Notation l-.
Subjunction: > refers to facts.

Wessel I
H. Wessel
Logik Berlin 1999
Searle, J.R. McDowell Vs Searle, J.R. I 132/133
Theory of Designations/SearleVsRussell: McDowell: here it is easy to be on the side of Searle. (Intentionality). McDowellVsSearle: it is better to give up this wish and to relaize what non-obvious descriptions are about.
(With Evans): the conceptual area should not be construed as "predicative" but as "belonging to the area of the Fregean sense."

McDowell I
John McDowell
Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996
German Edition:
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001

McDowell II
John McDowell
"Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell
Searle, J.R. Donnellan Vs Searle, J.R. I 287
Names/Searle: are correlated with a set of descriptions (descriptions). The one that best meets the description, because it has the properties that are designated by the predicate, is thus the object. ((s) E.g. "Hans comes": is coming a property then?). Donnellan: Searle’s view is weaker than that of Russell. (Theory of "identifying descriptions": the answer you get if you ask: what are you refering to"?.
I 288
DonnnellanVsRussell, DonnellanVsSearle: now it is possible that the properties do not apply to a substantial degreeto the object to which I refer or to another one. Names/KaplanVsRussell: the idea that the reference of a proper name is to be associated with it by the descriptions that are currently connected to it is not plausible! > historical explanation.

Donnellan I
Keith S. Donnellan
"Reference and Definite Descriptions", in: Philosophical Review 75 (1966), S. 281-304
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993
Sense Data Carnap Vs Sense Data Wittgenstein I 202 ff
Quality/Experience/Carnap/Hintikka: the basis of Carnap's "Structure" is a series of momentary overall experiences from which qualities are formed.
I 203
But not even qualities resemble sense data of Russell's conception. CarnapVsRussell/CarnapVsSense Data/Carnap: individual experience must be added.
Carnap: "If we want to distinguish the two similar components of the two elementary experiences, we must not only designate them according to their quality, but also add the indication of the elementary experience to which they belong.
Only such a component is an individual in the actual sense, we want to call it "sensation" in contrast to the component which is only determined by quality, as it is represented in the quality class.
These "sensations" therefore resemble Wittgenstein's objects. But according to Carnap they are ephemeral, subjective and time-bound,
while the Tractatus objects form the non-temporal "objective" substance of the world.
Accordingly Carnap: "The sensations belong to the field of psychology, the qualities to phenomenology or object theory".
Phenomenology/Carnap/Hintikka: for Carnap this is limited to a holistic analysis of experience.

Ca I
R. Carnap
Die alte und die neue Logik
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996

Ca VIII (= PiS)
R. Carnap
Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921.
German Edition:
Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960
Sense Data Dewey Vs Sense Data I 47
DeweyVssense-data theory: subjectivism. Things disappear and are replaced by qualities in the senses. DeweyVsRussell.

Dew II
J. Dewey
Essays in Experimental Logic Minneola 2004
Sense Data Putnam Vs Sense Data Putnam I (e) 133
RussellVsRussell: self-criticism: later Vs the idea that all meaningful statements could be reduced to sense data. Putnam: but most philosophers still hold onto it today.

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000
Strawson, P. F. Searle Vs Strawson, P. F. Searle V 160
Referential/attributive/Donnellan: E.g. we come across the mangled corpse of Smith without knowing who committed the murder. We might then say: "The murderer of Smith is crazy" without meaning someone specific.
V 161
E.g.' The man who is (falsely) accused, rioted in the courtroom. In this case, we do not mean: "The killer, whoever he was" but a certain man. referential: should it turn out that Smith committed suicide, our statement about the man in the courtroom would at least in a certain sense still be true.
attributiv: in the attributive meaning it cannot be true if the description doe not apply to anything.
(DonnellanVsRussell, DonnellanVsStrawson: both do not account for the distinction).
referential: S has talked about e, regardless of whether e is actually φ.
He said something true or false about it independent of whether e is actually φ. But he implied it. >Attributive/referential.
One can report correctly about his speech act that he talked about e, because one can report also with other expressions than with "the φ".
If the identification was used attributively, there were no such entity e. (And the speaker would not even have had in mind that it exists).

V 176
Term theory/object/universals/SearleVsStrawson: in what sense is the is by "is red identified term a non-linguistic form? Is the universal in a similar sense a non-linguistic form like the material object? >Term theory. Can the existence of a non-linguistic entity follow from the existence of a linguistic entity? >Universals.
V 177
Universals/Searle: they do not persist in the world, but in the language of our representation of the world. They are however not linguistic in the way as words are (as phonemes), but linguistic in the way in which the meanings of words are linguistic! SearleVsStrawson: considering the usual criteria for distinguishing between linguistic and non-linguistic entities his finding that universals are not linguistic is therefore wrong.
V 178/179
Universals/Searle: so are not identified with the help of facts, but with the help of meanings! Universals/predicate/SearleVsStrawson: shows that "to identify" has both times completely different meanings in the model of the term theory.
V 179/180
According to Strawson we would be forced to assume that also subject expressions identify universals. E.g. "The rose is red". If "is red" identified redness, then "rose" would identify the property of being a rose, something like "roseness". Or e.g.
The thing that is a rose is red.
By this proposition no more and no less universals are identified than by:
The thing that is red is a rose.
I cannot imagine any argument with which it could be shown that hereby "is red" a universal is identified without necessarily showing at the same time, that "is a rose" identifies a universal.
The term theory is not consistent enough. If predicate expressions identify universals (what the theory claims) then subject expressions necessary do this as well!
V 181
Universals/SearleVsStrawson: no non-linguistic entities!

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005
Strawson, P. F. Tugendhat Vs Strawson, P. F. Wolf II 20
Identification/TugendhatVsStrawson: he underestimates the importance of the space-time system for identification. Most basic statements: those with perception predicates.
I 387/388
StrawsonVsRussell: logical proper names are only fictitious. "This" is not an ambiguous proper name but has a uniform meaning as a deictic expression and designates a different object depending on the situation of use. TugendhatVsStrawson: but you cannot oblige Russell to use this word as we use it in our natural language.
Russell fails because he does not take into account another peculiarity: the same object for which a deictic expression is used in the perceptual situation can be designated outside that situation by other expressions. (Substitutability).
I 389
TugendhatVsStrawson: what StrawsonVsRussell argues does not actually contradict his theory, but seems to presuppose it.
I 433
Learning: the child does not learn to attach labels to objects, but it is the demonstrative expressions that point beyond the situation! The demonstrative expressions are not names, one knows that it is to be replaced by other deictic expressions, if one refers from other situations to the same. (TugendhatVsRussell and StrawsonVsRussell).
I 384
StrawsonVsRussell: Example "The present King of France is bald" (King-Example). It depends on what time such an assertion is made. So it is sometimes true.
I 385
Example "The present king of France is bald" has a meaning, but no truth value itself. (>expression, >utterance): RussellVsStrawson: that would have nothing to do with the problem at all, one could have added a year.
StrawsonVsRussell: if someone is of the opinion that the prerequisite for existence is wrong, he will not speak of truth or falsehood.
RussellVsStrawson: it does not matter whether you say one or the other in colloquial language, moreover, there are enough examples that people speak more of falsity in colloquial language.
I 386
TugendhatVsStrawson: he did not realize that he had already accepted Russell's theory. It is not about the difference between ideal language and colloquial language. This leads to the Oxford School with the ordinary language philosophy. It is not about nuances of colloquial language as fact, but, as with philosophy in general, about possibility.
I 387/388
StrawsonVsRussell: logical proper names are only fictitious. "This" is not an ambiguous proper name but has a uniform meaning as a deictic expression and designates a different object depending on the situation of use. TugendhatVsStrawson: but you cannot oblige Russell to use this word as we use it in our natural language.)
Russell fails because he does not take into account another peculiarity: the same object for which a deictic expression is used in the perceptual situation can be designated outside that situation by other expressions. (Substitutability).
I 389
TugendhatVsStrawson: what StrawsonVsRussell argues does not actually contradict his theory, but seems to presuppose it.
I 395
Identification/TugendhatVsStrawson: uses identification in the narrower sense. Tugendhat: my own term "specification" (which of all objects is meant) is superior to this term.
"To pick put" is Strawson's expression. (Taken from Searle). (>Quine: "to specify").
I 397/398
TugendhatVsStrawson: example "The highest mountain" is no identification at all: which one is the highest? Something must be added, an ostension, or a name, or a location. For example, someone can be blindfolded and led to the highest mountain. He will also not know more.
I 399
Identification/Strawson: distinguishes between two types of identification a) Direct pointing
b) Description by marking. Space-time locations. Relative position to all other possible locations and all possible objects (in the world).
I 400
TugendhatVsStrawson: he overlooked the fact that demonstrative identification in turn presupposes non-demonstrative, spatio-temporal identification. Therefore, there are no two steps. Strawson had accepted Russell's theory of the direct relation so far that he could not see it. ((s) > Brandom: Deixis presupposes anaphora.)
I 415
TugendhatVsStrawson: he has overlooked the fact that the system of spatio-temporal relations is not only demonstratively perceptively anchored, but is also a system of possible positions of perception, and thus a system of demonstrative specifications.
I 419
TugendhatVsStrawson: he did not ask how the meaning of singular terms is explained or how it is determined which object a singular term specifies. This is determined with different objects in very different ways, sometimes by going through all possible cases.

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992

K II siehe Wol I
U. Wolf (Hg)
Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993
Type Theory Gödel Vs Type Theory Russell I XXV
Type Theory/Gödel: in the realistic (intensional) interpretation there is an additional assumption: "Whenever an object x can replace another object y in a meaningful proposition, it can do so in every meaningful proposition". The consequence of this is that the objects are divided into mutually exclusive areas of meaning.
GödelVsRussell: suspect that his assumption itself makes his formulation as a meaningful principle impossible: because x and y then have to be narrowed down to definite realms of meaning that are either the same or different and in both cases the statement does not express the principle or even part of it.
Other consequence: the fact that an object x is of a given type (or not) cannot be expressed by a meaningful proposition either.
I XXVI
A solution is not impossible. It might turn out that any concept is meaningful everywhere except for certain "singular points" or "boundary points" so that the paradoxes appeared as something like the "division by zero".
I XXVI
Axioms/Russell/Gödel: Question: are they analytical (as Russell claims here?). Analyticity/Gödel: can mean two things: 1. purely formal, eliminable. In this sense, even the theory of integers is non-analytical, provided one requires the elimination to be carried out in a finite number of steps. ((s) Otherwise e.g. for each number individually).
But the whole of mathematics as applied to propositions of infinite length must be assumed to prove this analyticity, e.g. the axiom of choice can only prove that it is analytical if it is assumed to be true!
I XXXIV
Analyticity in the 2. sense: "Due to the sense of the terms occurring in it". Thereby this "sense" is perhaps indefinable (i.e. irreducible to something more fundamental). For example, if one defined "class" and "" as "the concepts (terms) which satisfy the axioms", one would not be able to prove their existence. "Concept" could perhaps be defined in terms of "proposition", but then certain axioms about propositions become necessary, which can only be justified by reference to the undefined sense of this term.
This view of analyticity in turn makes it possible that perhaps any mathematical proposition could be reduced to a special case of a = a.
I XXVII
Russell: went the way of seeing both classes and concepts (except for the logically uninteresting basic predicates) as non-existent and replacing them with our own constructions. Russell/Gödel/(s): constructivist.
Reducibility Axiom: is provably wrong in the case of infinitely many individuals, unless one assumes the existence of classes or infinitely many "qualitates occultae".
The actual development of mathematical logic has gone the way of the existence of classes and concepts, and Russell himself was later forced to go that way.

Göd II
Kurt Gödel
Collected Works: Volume II: Publications 1938-1974 Oxford 1990
Type Theory Wittgenstein Vs Type Theory II 439
Type Theory/Theory of types/WittgensteinVsRussell: f(a) = U's coat is red
F(a) = U's coat has one of the colors of the rainbow
φ(f) = Red is a color of the rainbow
Question: Now, φ (F) has a meaning? ((s) This is not mentioned in this combination above).
Russell: would say that "a color of the rainbow has the property to be a rainbow color" has no meaning, so that "f(f)" generally has no meaning.
But if we now create a rule of grammar in order to exclude a replacement option (and exactly this does the theory of types, in order to avoid contradictions), then we must make the replacement rule dependendet exclusively on the characteristics of symbols.
Replacement rule: if we introduce "f(x)" we must not give "f (f)" a meaning.
E.g. Consider ~ f(f) = F(f) and the expression that is obtained by replacing "f" through "F": the property to not have oneself as a property that has itself in turn as a property. The root of the contradiction is that one considers a function to function of itself. ((s)> heterology).
From ~ f(f) = F(f) results the contradiction F(F) = ~ F(F).
Problem: arises when one declares a function to its function of itself.
II 440
"f" in "f(x)" cannot be used as an argument itself. But why should this not occur as that which one presupposes, is not a sentence? It is not true to say that here the principle of contradiction has been violated, because that could only be the case if one was talking about sentences.
Hardy said it would be unbearable to have real numbers of different orders.
See his discussion, after which a sequence of real numbers belongs to another order, because it is defined by reference to a entirety whose barrier it is itself.
An analog example is the maximum of a curve, which is defined as the highest points of all on this curve.

IV 68
Operation/Form Series/Type theory/TT/Tractatus: 5.252 only like this the progression from member to member in a form series (from type to type in Russell) is possible. WittgensteinVsRussell: in Principia Mathematica (PM), they have not given the possibility of this progression, but have made use of it repeatedly.
5.2521 The repeated application of an operation to its own result ((s)> recursion) I call its successive application ("O'O '=' a" is the result of a triple application of "O'ζ" to "a").
5.2522 the general term of a form series a, O 'a, O'O'a ... I write:
IV 69
"[a,x,O'x]". This expression in brackets is a variable.
1. member: beginning of the form series
2. member: The form of any member x of the series
3. member: Form of the immediate successor this x. (Successor: O').
IV 70
WittgensteinVsRussell/Tractatus: 5.4 "Logical objects" or "logical constants" in the sense of Russell do not exist. Primitive signs/WittgensteinVsFrege/WittgensteinVsRussell/Tractatus: 5.42 The possibility of crosswise definition of the logical "primitive signs" of Frege and Russell (e.g. >, v) already shows that these are not primitive signs, let alone that they do not signify any relations.

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921.
German Edition:
Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960
Various Authors Prior Vs Various Authors I 123
Intentionality/Findlay: relational property with only one side. ((s) Vs: absurd.) Of course, "thinking about T" is a property of the thinker.
I 124
Touchstone for Intentionality: is the "built-in reference to what is not part of it and what does not need to exist anywhere". There is absolutely no intrinsic difference between thinking and speaking about what does and what does not exist. (>Anscombe pro: >Objects of Thougt/Anscombe).
That would only be a Pickwickian distinction (>difference without a difference).
FindlayVsRussell: VsTheory of Descriptions.
PriorVsFindlay: that's not fair, because he just offered the solution.
I 127
PriorVsReid/VsAnscombe/VsFindlay: it is not easy to hold the following two sentences together: (1) What X thinks of Y, plans to do with him, appreciates about him, always involves Y as much as X.
(2) There are cases in which X thinks of Y (appreciates, etc.), and there is no Y at all.
At least it's difficult in this case to dismiss the following three considerations that merely seem to make them consistent:
a) Thinking about an unreal object is a different kind of thinking than that about a real object.
b) our thinking would not put us in relation to an object, but only to an "idea" of it.
c) there would be strong and weak types of reality. (>Subsistence).
I 128
Thinking/Anscombe/Prior: could "think" not be replaced with any other (at least intentional) verb? Object/Tradition/Anscombe: something cannot just be an object without being object of something. I.e. "relational property" of being an object.

Simons I 119
Identity/Simons: is transitive. Prior: this is questionable (the only one). (PriorVsTransitivity of identity).

Pri I
A. Prior
Objects of thought Oxford 1971

Pri II
Arthur N. Prior
Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003

Simons I
P. Simons
Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987
Wittgenstein Russell Vs Wittgenstein Read III 65
Proposal by Wittgenstein: a long conjunction for "each F is G": "This is G and that is G and that is any further G ...   RussellVs: these two statements are not equivalent because the long conjunction needs a final clause "and these are all F". ReadVsRussell: error: if a conjunction is exhausted, then the two statements are equivalent. If not, the extra clause has no effect because it is wrong. It does not provide extra work.

Russell I
B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead
Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986

Russell VII
B. Russell
On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit"
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996

Re III
St. Read
Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997

Read I
Stephen Read
Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic Oxford 1995

The author or concept searched is found in the following disputes of scientific camps.
Disputed term/author/ism Pro/Versus
Entry
Reference
Description Th./nat.Kind Versus Cresswell II 98
Names / descriptions CresswellVsRussell: names are no descriptions, but nominal (noun phrases, NP).

Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984
Causal Th./Names Pro Donnellan II 286
DonnellanVsRussell: names are no hidden descriptions - Homer is no shortcut for "the author of the Homeric poems."

Donnellan I
Keith S. Donnellan
"Reference and Definite Descriptions", in: Philosophical Review 75 (1966), S. 281-304
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993
Mentalism Versus Quine2 XI 66
Mentalism: Russell QuineVsMentalism/QuineVsRussell

The author or concept searched is found in the following 10 theses of the more related field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Description Cresswell, M.J. I 175
Certain Descriptions/Cresswell: so far we have only talked about indefinite ones! Indefinite Description/Russell: Thesis: a man means "at least a man".
Certain Description/Russell: Thesis: the man means "this particular man".
Anaphora/HintikkaVsRussell: tradition has no explanation for the anaphoric use of certain descriptions.
Article/Cresswell: more recent attempts: to incorporate the old linguistic idea into traditional logic, that the indefinite article introduces new objects into speech, while the definite article refers to already introduced entities. This corresponds to:
Article/Kempson: (1975, 111): Thesis: definite/indefinite articles should not be distinguished semantically, but only pragmatically.
Old/new/article/file change semantics/Heim/Cresswell: the distinction between old and new entities in connection with the article can also be found in Heim (1983).
I 176
There it leads to file change semantics/Kamp/Heim: Thesis: as entities in the world, the objects are not new, but only within the speech, hence "files". ("files", "new in the files"). Def File/Heim/Cresswell: represents facts about objects for the speaker.
Names Frege, G. Wolf I 13
Names/FregeVsRussell: singular term.
Newen/Schrenk I 101
Meaning/Name/Frege: Thesis: The meaning of a name is expressed by its identification. This is the so-called designation theory, a simple variant of the description theory.
Staln I 172
Name/Reference/Sense/Stalnaker: 1. Mill/KripkeVsFrege: Thesis: Names have their reference directly, without mediation of an intermediate meaning.
Frege/Dummett/Searle: thesis: between the name and its reference one must assume the sense of the name
a) because otherwise the object cannot be identified at all, or we cannot explain how it is identified,
b) (DummettVsKripke) because then we cannot learn the language.

K II siehe Wol I
U. Wolf (Hg)
Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993
Idiolect Kripke, S.A. Cresswell II 151
Def "extreme Fregeanism" / KripkeVsFrege / KripkeVsRussell / Cresswell: the thesis that names in general belong to idiolects.   Problem: then the Pierre-Example is not about Pierre, but about the speaker who reports the case, and about his idiolect.

Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984
Acquaintance Peacocke, Chr. I 182
Def principle of acquaintance / PeacockeVsRussell: Reconstruction, reformulated p.o.ac.:   The thinker is acquainted with an object when there is (within his term repertoire) a way of givenness, which is dominated by the principle of sensitivity and it is in a suitable current psychological state, which he takes to the object under this way of givennes.
  For this we need a three-place relation between subject, object and type of givennes.
Acquaintance Russell, B. Hintikka(Wittg I 93
Bekanntschaft/Russell/Hintikka: These die Bekanntschaft liefert nicht bloß die Bausteine unseres Wissens - sondern, wichtiger, auch die Bedeutungen (Bezüge ((s) Referenz)) unserer Basisausdrücke. Russell postuliert komplexe logische Formen als tatsächlich existierende Gegenstände der Bekanntschaft.
WittgensteinVsRussell: ersetzt diese durch Kombinationen von Gegenständen.

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921.
German Edition:
Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960
Fido-Fido-Principle Russell, B. Read I 32
Russell made ​​the same mistake: he assumed atomic propositions consist of a number of individuals and a Universal - E.g. "Fido is a dog." To what does "dog" refer? According to the "Fido"-Fido theory it needs to get its meaning from the fact that it is associated with a single thing, the dog, or an universal, dog - RyleVsRussell: reference is not the same as meaning.

Re III
St. Read
Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997

Read I
Stephen Read
Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic Oxford 1995
Proposition Russell, B. Horwich I 45
Proposition/Tatsache/VsRussell: (früh): gegen die These, dass Wahrheit eine einfache Eigenschaft ist könnte man einwenden: wahre Propositionen drücken Tatsachen aus ((s) statt mit ihnen identisch zu sein) falsche Propositionen drücken keine Tatsachen aus.
I 46
RussellVsVs: dann wäre - wenn Tatsachen mit wahren Propositionen gleichgesetzt werden - jede bedeutsame Behauptung einfach eine Tautologie. (Meinongs These 75).
Horwich I 62
Proposition/Identität/Ãquivalenz/Kennzeichnung/Name/Cartwright: Frage: wenn eine Kennzeichnung für einen Namen eingesetzt wird, sind die zwei Propositionen identisch oder nicht? - Das ist mehrdeutig! Problem: gegeben eine Objekt x, welches ist die Proposition, dass x größer ist als Smith? - Wenn x Brown ist, dann wahrscheinlich nicht "Smith*s Angestellter..." (obwohl = Brown). - Wenn wir nicht wissen, welche Kennzeichnung die richtige ist, wissen wir auch nicht, welche Proposition.
Principia Mathematica/PM/Russell: (früh) These: Die Propositionen sind identisch, wenn Green ein Pseudonym für Brown ist.

Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
referential /attrib. Russell, B. Newen / Schrenk I 96
DonnellanVsRussell: he has clearly overlooked the referential use. He considers only the attributive. This is because Descriptions / Russell: Thesis: d. are syncategorematic for him. Expressions that can not refer themselves.
Language/World Russell, B. Rorty I 285
Truth / World / Russell / Rorty: Thesis: every true statement contains both our own contribution and a contribution of the world. This has spawned two attacks 1 DavidsonVsRussell: VsDrittes dogma: separation of scheme and content. There is no content that is waiting to be organized.
2 PutnamVsRussell.

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Kausality Russell, B. Cartwright I 21
Russell: These 1. es gibt nur Assoziations-Gesetze. 2. Kausalprinzipien können nicht von kausal symmetrischen Gesetzen der Assoziation abgeleitet werden.
Cartwright: Vs 1. pro 2.
Kausalprinzipien/CartwrightVsRussell: können zwar nicht aus Assoziationsgesetzen abgeleitet werden, wir können aber auch nicht auf sie verzichten. Das hat mit unseren Strategien zu tun.

Car I
N. Cartwright
How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983

CartwrightR II
R. Cartwright
Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954