Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Rules | Lyons | I 157 Rules/Grammar/Transformational Grammar/Chomsky/Lyons: Chomsky seems to reject this. In his opinion: ChomskyVsGrammatical rules: Thesis: The grammatical structure of the language is determined ((s) not according to the above rules) and is "intuitively" (unconsciously) mastered by the native speaker. (ChomskyVsRules due to the consequence of "uncertainty of grammar"/ChomskyVsUncertainty of grammar). Lyons: the differences in opinion here are exaggerated. Not all grammar is uncertain. I 219 Phrase structure grammar/Constituent grammar/Rules/Chomsky/Lyons: Each rule brackets the constituents that form the construction defined by it and also describes them. >Constituent grammar, >Phrase structure grammar. Layers: (of the structure) are determined by the order in which the rules are applied. Def Initial symbol/Terminology/Grammar/Chomsky/Lyons: Example ∑ for sentence ((s) stands farthest left or above a branch). Grammar: produces a chain of symbols by applying the rules. >Lexicon. Def End Symbol/Grammar/Lyons: specifies the class of elements of the lexicon e.g. adjective. Def End chain/terminal string/grammar/terminology/Lyons: consists of end symbols. I 220 Sentence/Grammar/Chomsky/Lyons: occurs when we replace the end symbols from the end chain with an element of the lexical class they describe. Its constituent structure is fully determined by the replacement rules that create the end chain. >Terminology/Lyons. I 220 Replacement rules/Grammar/Alternative rules/Extension/Chomsky/Lyons: to distinguish transitive and intransitive verbs, we introduce: (1) ∑ > NP + Vp (2a) VP > V intr + Adv 2b) VP > V tr + Adv (3) Np > A + N. I 221 If we introduce the option between (2a) and (2b), we must change the word classification in the lexicon: V intr = [{ran, etc.} V ir = {love, kill, etc.}. >Word classes. Grammar/problem: it is still unsatisfactory: 1. It still produces illegal sentences such as Poor John kill old women ((s) no special form for 3rd person singular). Solution: we must consider the congruence between the "subject" and the verb. >Congruence/Lyons. 3 (we leave that out here). 2. as it stands now, we can only produce sentences with five words like "Old men love young women" or sentences with four words like "Poor John ran away". The following sentences are not possible: e.g. John ran away, e.g. Men love young women, e.g. Old men love women, e.g. Old men love young women passionately. Optional Rule/Extension/Grammar/Replacement Rules/Lyons: For example: we extend rules (3) by making two rules out of one: (3) NP > N (4) N > A + N We say that (3) is obligatory, but (4) optional. New: then we also get: e.g. John ran away, e.g. Men love young women, e.g. Old men love women etc. All these sentences are subtypes of the sentence type. ∑(NP + VP). This means that their structures are identical at a certain level of analysis. Family Tree/Structure Tree: Example (I) John ran away (II) Poor John ran away (III) Men love women (IV) Old men love women (V) Men love young women, (VI) Old men love young women I 223 Rules/Replacement Rules/Order/Grammar/Chomsky/Lyons: the priority of a certain order of rules over another can significantly change the result of the grammar. optional: e.g. (1) ∑ > NP + VP (2a) VP > V intr + Adv 2b) VP > V tr + Adv (3) Np > A + N. (4) N > T + N (5) N > Adj + N Rules (4) and (5) are optional. New: therefore the grammar now generates men, the men, good men, and the good men. Order: if (5) should come before (4), there would be e.g. good the men. Order: also that of (3) is essential: if it were in front (2b), it would have to be repeated afterwards to guarantee the extension for the complex resulting from VP > V tr + NP. The sequence can therefore prevent inadmissible sentences and reduce the scope of the rule corpus. Order: Assumed, (6) N > N + and + N If (6) operates before (5), we get for example (old men) and women and men and (old women) If (6) operates after (5), we get for example old (men and women). I 224 Semantically, it is the same, despite the different brackets. Def Recursive Rules/recursive/Recursion/Lyons: allow infinitely repeated application (only in infinite cases they are called recursive). Example (6b) N > N + and + N + and + N (6c) N > N + and + N + and + N + and + N (6d) … E.g. This is how you can tell stories: e.g. He came in and he sat down and he said that ...and he... Recursion/Grammar/Lyons: a "realistic" model of grammar I 225 will be designed in such a way that there are more examples of recursive structures with two constituents than with three, more with three than with four, etc. ((s) the simplest forms should be the most likely ones). >Constituent Structure Grammar. Probability/Grammar/Correctness/Lyons: the probability of an occurrence must not be confused with its correctness. Coordination/Recursive rules/Grammar/Lyons: Problem: Coordination using a recursive rule: ambiguity by different possible brackets e.g. Tom and Dick and Harry, (Tom and Dick) and Harry, Tom and (Dick and Harry). Dilemma: a) Intuition: recursive rules do not indicate what the intuitively perceived structural description is. b) and yet recursive rules are necessary. I 227 Formation rules/phrase structure rules/constituent structure grammar/Chomsky/Lyons: Spelling/Terminology: PSG - phrase structure grammar. PS rules - Phrase structure rules. a) Formation rules = phrase structure rules b) Transformation rules: specify how the end chains are transformed into real sentences. I 249 Context Dependence/Rules/Economy/Lyons: the rule growth to cover all other congruence ratios would be small. >Context/Lyons. On the other hand, it would be significant in context-independent grammar. Here, context-dependent grammars are more economical. Correctness/Lyons: both types of grammars formalize the congruence ratios correctly. >Correctness/Lyons. |
Ly II John Lyons Semantics Cambridge, MA 1977 Lyons I John Lyons Introduction to Theoretical Lingustics, Cambridge/MA 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die moderne Linguistik München 1995 |
| Speech Act Theory | Searle | II 25 Sincerity condition: the sincerity condition is internal to the speech acts. --- Husted IV 251 Speech act/Searle: speech acts are rule-determined actions. They always have constitutive (not regulatory) rules. Searle: the speech act is key to the meaning. VsSearle: this is controversial because language rules for e.g. singular term have a fundamentally different nature than for actions. J. Husted "Searle" in: Hügli/Lübke (Hrsg) Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, Reinbek, 1993S. 251 --- V 68 The speech act is an unequal game. An explanation must presuppose rules. Rules are not equal. Convention: speaking rules are governed by behavior. For rules, behavior is not crucial. >Language game, >Convention. V 207 Traditional Speech Act Theory/Austin/Strawson/Hare: the word W is needed to perform speech act A, then e.g. "good" recommends, "true" reaffirms, "knowledge" guarantees something. SearleVs: this only works with performative verbs such as "promise" but not with judgmental ones. This does not satisfy the adequacy condition for semantic analysis: a word must mean in all grammatically different sentences the same; it cannot, if the meaning is supposed to be the execution of various acts. V 213 Wrong: to assume that the conditions for the execution of a speech act follow from the meanings of the words ( "fallacy of assertiveness"). --- IV 27 Speech Act Theory/SearleVsAustin: Austin accepts verbs for acts but one has to differentiate this, e.g. the announcement of a command is not the command. IV 78 Speech Act Theory/Searle: the speech act theory differs from other philosophical approaches in that it gives no set of logically necessary and sufficient conditions for the explicable phenomenon (e.g. linguistics: structural rules). >Structural rules. IV 86 The illocutionary act is the function of the meaning of the sentence. IV 86 Fiction/speech acts/Searle: fiction has no other speech acts but is a predetermined act, e.g. in literature it is no other act than in the newspaper. No semantic or syntactic property proves a text as fictional. IV 204 Speech Act TheoryVsChomsky, VsRules, instead of semantics/pragmatics. --- VII 99 Speech Act/proposition/Searle: difference: from the propositional content does not follow that the assertion conditions are satisfied - the proposition rather implies that the speaker implies within the act that they are satisfied. --- VIII 435 Speech Act/Searle: the speech act is hold together by the semantic intentions of the speaker. VsChomsky: Chomsky does not see the essential connection of meaning and speech acts. >Performance, >Competence, >Semantics, >Language, >Speaking, >Paul Grice, >Anita Avramides, >John Searle, >J.L.Austin, >Illocutionary acts, >Perlocutionary acts. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Husted I Jörgen Husted "Searle" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Husted II Jörgen Husted "Austin" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Husted III Jörgen Husted "John Langshaw Austin" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Husted IV Jörgen Husted "M.A. E. Dummett. Realismus und Antirealismus In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke (Hg) Hamburg 1993 Husted V J. Husted "Gottlob Frege: Der Stille Logiker" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 |
| Transformational Grammar | Lyons | I 157 Rules/Grammar/Transformational Grammar/Chomsky/Lyons: Chomsky seems to reject this. In his opinion: ChomskyVsGrammatical rules: Thesis: The grammatical structure of the language is determined ((s) not according to the above rules) and is "intuitively" (unconsciously) mastered by the native speaker. (ChomskyVsRules due to the consequence of "uncertainty of grammar"/ChomskyVsUncertainty of grammar). Lyons: the differences here are exaggerated. Not all grammar is indefinite. I 252 Transformational grammar/transformational/Lyons: any grammar that claims to provide an analysis of deep and surface structure is a transformational grammar. I 252 Ambiguity/transformational/Gammar/Lyons: there are many more types here, in addition to the various parentheses. E.g. amor dei: the love of God: a) from God, b) to God. Subjective or objective genitive. I 253 Chomsky: famous example: Flying planes can be dangerous a) Planes can be dangerous b) Flying can be dangerous. Tradition: would explain this by the difference between participle and gerund: Def Participle/Lyons: is a word derived from a verb and used as an adjective. Def Gerund/Lyons: is a word derived from a verb and used as a noun. Solution: a) Flying planes are dangerous b) Flying planes is dangerous. I 254 Lexeme/Lyons: a certain word (here in the abstract sense) can be verbal in a sentence and nominal in a transformationally related sentence. (Participle/Gerund). Solution/Transformation/Lyons: then we can say that for example the syntagma Flying planes is derived by a rule that transforms the structure underlying the sentence Flying planes can be dangerous. I 256 Subject/Object/Grammar/Transformational Grammar/Lyons: e.g. John eats the apples, John is eating: then The eating of the apples has an object meaning. Problem: whether s also has a subject meaning depends on whether a sentence like The apples are eating can be generated. ((s) Grammatical, not semantic!). Solution: whether it works then depends on whether the noun apple and the verb eat can be subclassified in the lexicon (by grammatical features) in such a way that the grammatical rules allow the assignment of a feature (e.g. inanimate) to a noun as subject of the verb class to which eat belongs to or not. I 258 Active/Passive/Transformational Grammar/Chomsky/Lyons: although subject and object are reversed, identity or similarity prevails between the two corresponding sentences in the deep structure. But this is also the prerequisite that the interchange of subject and object can be determined at all. Problem: there is disagreement as to whether there is dissimilation or not. For example, assuming that the shooting of the hunters is not ambiguous. Problem: then we would still require the grammar to establish relations a) between the shooting of the hunters and the transitive theorem NP1 shoot the hunters as well as b) between the hunters shooting and the intransitive the hunters shoot. I 270 Transformational Grammar/Chomsky/Lyons: does not actually connect sentences, but the structures on which the sentences are based. Conjunction transformation: connects sentences within a larger sentence. However, no sentence is subordinate but both retain their sentence status. The P-marker for the larger sentence will therefore contain two (or more) ∑ coordinated with each other at the topmost ∑. >Terminology/Lyons. |
Ly II John Lyons Semantics Cambridge, MA 1977 Lyons I John Lyons Introduction to Theoretical Lingustics, Cambridge/MA 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die moderne Linguistik München 1995 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Various Authors | Chomsky Vs Various Authors | Lyons I 157 Rules/grammar/transformational grammar/Chomsky/Lyons: Chomsky seems to reject this. In his opinion, ChomskyVsGrammatical rules: Thesis: the grammatical structure of language is determined ((s) not according to the above rules) and is mastered by the speaker of the mother tongue "intuitively" (unconsciously). (ChomskyVsRules: because of the consistency of the "indeterminacy of grammar"/ChomskyVsIndeterminacy of grammar). Lyons: the differences of opinion are exaggerated here. Not the whole grammar is indeterminate. |
Chomsky I Noam Chomsky "Linguistics and Philosophy", in: Language and Philosophy, (Ed) Sidney Hook New York 1969 pp. 51-94 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky II Noam Chomsky "Some empirical assumptions in modern philosophy of language" in: Philosophy, Science, and Method, Essays in Honor of E. Nagel (Eds. S. Morgenbesser, P. Suppes and M- White) New York 1969, pp. 260-285 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky IV N. Chomsky Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Cambridge/MA 1965 German Edition: Aspekte der Syntaxtheorie Frankfurt 1978 Chomsky V N. Chomsky Language and Mind Cambridge 2006 Ly II John Lyons Semantics Cambridge, MA 1977 Lyons I John Lyons Introduction to Theoretical Lingustics, Cambridge/MA 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die moderne Linguistik München 1995 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Rules | Chomsky, N. | I 272 Chomsky thesis: then one could suggest that a language contains rules that relate depth structures to representations from universal semantics. (Analogous to phonology). Lyons I 157 Rules/Grammar/Transformational Grammar/Chomsky/Lyons: Chomsky seems to reject this. In his opinion: ChomskyVsGrammatical Rules: thesis: the grammatical structure of the language is determined ((s) not according to the above rules) and is dominated "intuitively" (unconsciously) by the native speaker. (ChomskyVsRules due to the consequence of "Indetermination of Grammar"/ChomskyVsIndetermination of Grammar). Lyons: the differences of opinion are exaggerated here. Not all grammar is indefinite. |
Ly II John Lyons Semantics Cambridge, MA 1977 |
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