Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 18 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bourgeois/Citizen | Hegel | Mause I 47 Bourgeois/citoyen/HegelVsRousseau/Hegel: Hegel offers a solution to the problem of the relationship between politics and economy raised in the role conflict of bourgeois and citoyen, which is more satisfactory from the point of view of property rights protection and with regard to the question of the transformation of bourgeois to citoyen than that of Rousseau. >Bourgeois/Rousseau. Liberal property rights are guaranteed publicly in Hegel on the basis of their intrinsic rationality and the Republican identification of the citizen with the political community is guaranteed by institutionally secured processes of "education"(1), in which the citizens gain the ability to look beyond the limits of their private interests and to recognize themselves as parts of a moral whole. >Education/Hegel, >Property, >Community. 1.G.W.F. Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundrisse. Werke 7, Hrsg. Eva Moldenhauer und Karl Markus Michel, Frankfurt a. M. 1989, S. 343-345. |
Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Bourgeois/Citizen | Marx | Mause I 49 Bourgeois/citoyen/MarxVsHegel/Marx: The "political state" (Marx 1956b, p. 351), which historically helped the "bourgeois society" (1) to assert it, is the mere guarantor of this atomistic society of the selfish bourgeois pursuing its private interests, whose rights it protects in the form of liberal fundamental and human rights (2). In this way it preserves the bourgeois way of existence of (...) a human being alienated from his "species-being" (3), isolated individual, who sees in his peers not the communitarian opportunity for realization, but the barrier of his freedom. The citoyen is nothing more than the idealized projection of this alienated species-being, and the state, which according to this idealization presents itself as the Republican realizing space of this citoyen, actually proves to be an instrument for stabilizing bourgeois society and the competition of its members. Under the historical conditions of bourgeois society, therefore, the citoyen always remains subordinate to the bourgeois, and likewise the relationship between politics and economy appears in the form of a purpose-means reversal. Republicanism/MarxVsRousseau, MarxVsHegel: The republican goal planned by Rousseau and Hegel is therefore not achievable for Marx within the limits of the existing economic system. >Bourgeois/citizen//Hegel. >Bourgeois/citizen/Rousseau. 1. K. Marx, Zur Judenfrage. In Marx Engels Werke, Bd. 1 (MEW 1), Hrsg. Institut für Marxismus-Leninismus beim ZK der SED, Berlin 1956, S. 354-356,366-370. 2. Ibid. p. 361-367 3. Ibid. p. 366,370. |
Marx I Karl Marx Das Kapital, Kritik der politische Ökonomie Berlin 1957 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Democracy | Böckenförde | Brocker I 782 Democracy/Böckenförde: representative democracy is not only the form required in the territorial state for technical reasons, but also the form superior to direct democracy for reasons of legitimation theory (BöckenfördeVsRousseau). See Legitimation/Böckenförde. BöckenfördeVsDirect Democracy: For him, the idea of an undistorted determination of the will of the people, which is not influenced by procedures, is misleading because it ignores the reality of political contexts for action. Even in the case of direct-democratic decisions on the merits, it depends on the respective procedures. In any case, it requires the organization of domination. (1) Decision/Böckenförde: all political decision making depends on procedures. Brocker I 783 Democracy/People/Schmitt/Böckenförde: Böckenförde uses Carl Schmitt's idea that democracy refers to the people as a political community. (2) Unity/People/Hermann Heller/Böckenförde: with Heller, Böckenförde comes to the thesis: a unit of effect and action that unites a group of people comes about through organizational processes that only align, coordinate and bring the multiple human actions and behaviors into a certain pattern of action in a certain way. (3) The state authorities (Heller speaks of "governing bodies" ((s) source not given)), which in a sense precede the many. (4) This means that in democracy the people can only rule by means of a ruling organization. Power/Hermann Heller/Böckenförde: Heller: "Every organization needs (...) an authority and all exercise of power is subject to the law of small numbers; always those who update the organizationally united power performances must have Brocker I 784 some degree of freedom of choice and thus democratically unattached power." (H. Heller, quoted (5)) Problem: those in power must be accountable to the people and bound to democratic control. (6) Democracy/Böckenförde: is a demanding form of order in so far as it is based on conditions that precede the constitution and are not self-evident. People/Böckenförde: must be supported by "homogeneity" i.e. there must be a "similarity" that "can be given by common religion, common language and culture, common political confession". (7) Homogeneity/BöckenfördeVsSchmitt: Böckenförde does not see homogeneity as a counter term to plurality as Carl Schmitt represented it in National Socialism. (See Democracy/Schmitt). VsBöckenförde: after criticism of his choice of words, Böckenförde changed the concept of "similarity" to that of "commonness". He writes an explanatory note on this. (8) Relative homogeneity/solution/Böckenförde: the socio-economic differences must not be so extreme that irreconcilable conflicts of interest arise. Therefore, the state has a moderating function in market relations. See Citizens/Böckenförde. 1. Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, Staat – Verfassung – Demokratie. Studien zur Verfassungstheorie und zum Verfassungsrecht, Frankfurt/M. 1992 (zuerst 1991), p. 382-386 2. Ibid. p. 332 3. Ibid. p. 386 4. Ibid. p. 387 5. Ibid. p. 387 6. Ibid. p. 388 7. Ibid. p. 333 8. Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde „Demokratie als Verfassungsprinzip“, in: Josef Isensee/Paul Kirchhof (Hg.) Handbuch des Staatsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Bd 2. Heidelberg 2004 p. 461, FN 106 Tine Stein, „Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, Staat – Verfassung- Demokratie“, in: Manfred Brocker (Ed.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Böckenf I Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde State, Society and Liberty: Studies in Political Theory and Constitutional Law, London 1991 German Edition: Staat, Gesellschaft, Freiheit. Studien zur Staatstheorie und zum Verfassungsrecht Frankfurt 1976 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Humans | Fukuyama | Brocker I 808 Human/Recognition/History/FukuyamaVsHobbes/FukuyamaVsLocke/FukuyamaVsRousseau/Fukuyama Thesis: History can ultimately be understood as progress towards the establishment of democracies, but the ultimate driving force for human beings is their own individual struggle for recognition (see Recognition/Fukuyama, Universal History/Fukuyama). The central characteristic of the human for Fukuyama is the ability to sacrifice his/her life for prestige reasons. Brocker I 809 Freedom/Fukuyama: Thesis: only those who have the will to die for prestige alone show that they have the ability to make a truly free choice, i.e. to be able to choose against their natural needs and against their instinct. In liberal democracy, where the struggle for recognition is largely realized, there are few social differences. Human development Brocker I 810 is finished. The type of human being that has emerged is the last of its kind ("Last Man"/Fukuyama). Problem: this state has new problems, e.g. boredom (Fukuyama relies on Nietzsche here). People rebel against being undifferentiated members of a universal and homogeneous state. The mutual recognition of people leads to a value relativism that leads to the dissolution of a firm attachment to tradition, authority and community-building values. Anja Jetschke, „Francis Fukuyama, Das Ende der Geschichte“, in: Manfred Brocker (Ed.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
PolFuku I Francis Fukuyama The End of History and the Last Man New York 1992 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Legitimation | Böckenförde | Brocker I 782 Legitimation/Law/State/Böckenförde: "Legitimation Chain Theory": Thesis: In a democratic state, every factual or personnel decision must be traceable in a chain to the will of the people expressed in a binding manner in elections. (1) This chain may be long but must not be interrupted. (2) BöckenfördeVsRousseau: Thus Böckenförde emphasizes the principle of popular sovereignty (3), but not a direct-democratic understanding for which the ideal image of an identity of governed and government in Rousseau's sense is leading. See Democracy/Böckenförde. 1. Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, Staat – Verfassung – Demokratie. Studien zur Verfassungstheorie und zum Verfassungsrecht, Frankfurt/M. 1992 (zuerst 1991), p. 299 2. Ibid. p. 302 3. Ibid. p. 291 Tine Stein, „Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, Staat – Verfassung- Demokratie“, in: Manfred Brocker (Ed.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Böckenf I Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde State, Society and Liberty: Studies in Political Theory and Constitutional Law, London 1991 German Edition: Staat, Gesellschaft, Freiheit. Studien zur Staatstheorie und zum Verfassungsrecht Frankfurt 1976 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Liberty | Rousseau | Rawls I 264 Liberty/Rousseau/Rawls: Rousseau distinguished between slavery and freedom as follows: to be governed by appetite alone is slavery, while obedience to a law imposed on oneself is freedom. (J. -J. Rousseau, The Social Contract, bk. I. ch. viii). KantVsRousseau/Rawls: Kant tried to give Rousseau's concept of the general will (volonté generale, Gemeinwille) a philosophical foundation. (See L. W. Beck, A Commentary on Kant's Critique of Practical Reason, Chicago, 1960, pp. 200,235f; E. Cassirer, Rousseau, Kant and Goethe, Princeton, 1945, pp. 18-25,30-35,58f.) >Freedom, >General Will, >World/Kant, >State/Kant, >Society/Kant, >Rousseau/Kant, >Rule of Law/Kant, >Republic/Kant, >Power/Kant, >Politics/Kant, >Peace/Kant, >Human Rights/Kant, >Freedom/Kant, >Equal rights/Kant, >Contract theory/Kant, >Cosmopolitanism/Kant, |
Rousseau I J. J. Rousseau Les Confessions, 1765-1770, publ. 1782-1789 German Edition: The Confessions 1953 Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 |
| Parliamentary System | Kelsen | Brocker I 132 Parliamentary System/Kelsen: If the parliament is seen as a representative of the people, the latter is regarded as pre-determined, since it is only just being organised into a unit capable of action through the work of the parliament and the parties. Ideologically, the idea of representation made sense in the struggle against autocracy and now turns against democracy, if, for example, the model of professional representation is derived from this idea. >Democracy/Kelsen. Kelsen's' assumption that the people do not exist politically before parliamentary unification (cf. >People/Kelsen) is also based on the simple observation that there have practically never been consensus decisions, that the population always differentiates its opinions according to majority and minority (or minorities) and that therefore unification can only be found in the form of compromise.(1) Brocker I 135 KelsenVsSchmitt/KelsenVsSmend/Llanque: Kelsen is mainly seen as the author who can clearly be counted among the supporters of parliamentary democracy among the majority of democracy-critical state teachers of the Weimar Republic (Groh 2010)(2). He has published sharp criticisms of opponents in this debate, including Rudolf Smend and Carl Schmitt. Some also consider Kelsen to be the clearest opponent of Schmitt (Diner/Stolleis 1999(3); Dreier 1999(4)). KelsenVsRousseau: unlike Rousseau, who rejects parliamentarism (RosseauVsParlamentarismus), Kelsen explains parliamentarism as a form of division of labour. 1. Hans Kelsen, »Vom Wesen und Wert der Demokratie«, in: Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik 47, 1920/1921, 50-85 (Separatdruck: Tübingen 1920). Erweiterte Fassung: Hans Kelsen, Vom Wesen und Wert der Demokratie, Tübingen 1929 (seitenidentischer Nachdruck:Aalen 1981), S. 57 2. Kathrin Groh, Demokratische Staatsrechtslehrer in der Weimarer Republik. Von der konstitutionellen Staatslehre zur Theorie des modernen demokratischen Verfassungsstaates, Tübingen 2010 3. Dan Diner & Michael (Hg.) Hans Kelsen and Carl Schmitt. A Juxtaposition, Gerlingen 1999 4. Horst Dreier »The Essence of Democracy: Hans Kelsen and Carl Schmitt Juxtaposed«, in: Dan Diner/Michael Stolleis (Hg.), Hans Kelsen and Carl Schmitt. A Juxtaposition, Gerlingen 1999, 71-79 Marcus Llanque, „Hans Kelsen, Vom Wesen und Wert der Demokratie“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Religion | Rousseau | Höffe I 378 Religion/Rousseau/Höffe: {Rousseau represented a] functional state religion, called "religion civile". As with Spinoza, it focuses on the moral core of natural religion, but unlike Spinoza, it does not recognize revelation as an also-legitimate approach. RousseauVsSpinoza, RousseauVsBelief in Revelation. Belief: The core of the civil religion is a (civic) creed with which Rousseau rejects the two extremes: atheism and Christian-ecclesiastical dogmatism. State Religion/Rousseau pro Hobbes: As with Hobbes, whom Rousseau praises for combining secular and spiritual power, the confession is determined by the sovereign and consists of a "spirit of togetherness, without which it is impossible to be a good citizen and a Höffe I 279 faithful subject"(1). Admittedly, the sovereign cannot commit anyone to this faith. Banishment: But anyone who rejects it may be banished, for in accordance with his understanding of the common will, Rousseau declares that whoever inhabits the territory of the state submits to the sovereignty that reigns there. One is banished not because one is godless, but because one "resists to be with one another"(2). >Death Penalty/Rousseau. Dogmas: For the dogmas of bourgeois or civil religion, Rousseau demands simplicity, small numbers and clear formulations. HöffeVsRousseau: Although he undoubtedly fulfills these conditions, his creed is very demanding and difficult for purely secular citizens to accept. Belief/Community/Dogmas/Rousseau: It is necessary to acknowledge the existence of a deity, and to attribute omnipotence, omniscience and charity to it. One must believe in the future life, in which the righteous are happy while the wicked are punished. The social contract and the laws flowing from it must be considered sacred. Negative dogma: prohibition of intolerance. HöffevsRousseau: But because the positive dogmas may be excluded from this, tolerance is kept within limits. Civil Religion/Rousseau/Höffe: [it should] a) (...) exclude any theological claim to sole representation, since this holds too high a potential for conflict. Now the claim to exclusivity results from an - allegedly - divine revelation and its authoritative interpretation on the part of a religious community. Consequently, the civil religion must do without any revelation. (RousseauVsRevelation Religion). b) Its positive task is the foundation of political unity. The civil religion is supposed to create the inner coherence of a community, at least strengthen it and thus preserve it. VsRousseau: The criticism associated with the civil religion Höffe I 280 of the Christian Church has led to condemnations of Rousseau and his expulsion. HöffeVsRousseau: Concerns also arise systematically. For the civil religion tolerates neither atheists, whom Locke already denied the ability to be good citizens, nor the deism spread in the Age of Enlightenment, for example by Voltaire, according to which there is a deity, but he is not a person and does not intervene in the course of nature. Neutrality/RousseauVsSpinoza: Spinoza's position of a religiously neutral state is perhaps not considered by Rousseau because he doubts its ability to achieve stable internal unity. >Religion/Spinoza, >State/Spinoza, >Constitution/Spinoza. 1. Rousseau, The Social Contract (Du contrat social ou Principes du droit politique), 1762, IV, 8 2. Ibid. |
Rousseau I J. J. Rousseau Les Confessions, 1765-1770, publ. 1782-1789 German Edition: The Confessions 1953 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Rousseau | Höffe | Höffe I 269 Rousseau/Höffe: To the prize question of the Academy of Dijon, "whether the restoration of the sciences and arts has contributed to the purification of customs", Rousseau answers with a sharp "no". The award-winning treatise, the rhetorically brilliant First Treatise on the Sciences and Arts (1) hits Paris with force. The unknown vagabond from abroad, Geneva, becomes the centre of the social, literary and philosophical salons. HöffeVsRousseau: If one pays attention to the only basic idea that Rousseau unfolds in many attempts and without outstanding ingenuity, success must be surprising. Even the message is not so unusual, on the contrary, Höffe I 270 most of the submitted texts answer the prize question with a no. What is unusual, however, is the style, the mercilessly fierce polemic against the sciences and arts that have been praised so far. Höffe I 283 Aftermath: [Rousseau], the most widely read French author of the Age of Enlightenment, [is] considered the father of modernity and anti-modernity at the same time - for he became a source of inspiration both for the French Revolution and the subsequent restoration. Höffe I 284 Revolution: The leading revolutionary Maximilien de Robespierre always has a copy of the social contract on his table, and following Rousseau's civil religion (>Religion/Rousseau) he has the existence of the "Supreme Being" and the immortality of the soul raised from convention to law. Restoration: Rousseau can also refer to the Restoration, as he encourages it in that he hardly develops the forward-looking ideas of Spinoza, Pufendorf, Locke and Montesquieu: Höffe: Rousseau is neither a father of basic and human rights nor of the separation of powers. And despite the criticism of Revelation and Christian churches he at least accommodates the Restoration with his verdict against atheism. Nevertheless he will influence the philosophy of the state at least until Marx. Rousseau's influence in Germany is promoted by the early translation of the two treatises and their review by Gotthold Ephraim Lessing. However, the most lasting effect he gets from and through Immanuel Kant. Fichte: Johann Gottlieb Fichte takes over Rousseau's pathos of freedom. In surpassing a Rousseau theorem, he explains: "Anyone who considers himself a master of others is himself a slave". Hegel: In his lectures on the history of philosophy, Hegel calls Hume and Rousseau the two thinkers from whom German philosophy emanates. (...) in the basic lines of the philosophy of law (§ 258), [Hegel] will give credit to Rousseau for "having established the will as a principle of the state". HegelVsRousseau: But afterwards he criticizes the empirical side of Rousseau's social contract, which exposes the state to the arbitrariness of the citizens. HegelVsContract Theory/Höffe: Because Hegel, but also British and French thinkers, criticise contract thinking in general, it loses importance for many generations. 1. Rousseau, Premier Discours sur les sciences et les arts, 1750 |
Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Social Contract | Hegel | Höffe I 333 Social Contract/Hegel/Höffe: Within the considerations of the contract, Hegel rejects the modern patterns of state legitimation, such as the theory of the social contract advocated by Hobbes, Spinoza, Locke and Rousseau, and also by Kant. >Social contract/Hobbes, >Social contract/Locke, >Social contract/Rousseau. HegelVsSpinoza/HegelVsHobbes/HegelVsLocke/HegelVsRousseau/HegelVsKant: For whether one accepts a contract of all with all or a contract "of all with the prince or the government" - the state is subjected to the arbitrariness of the individual(1). In truth, everyone has always lived in a state that has the rank of an end in Höfe I 334 itself. >State/Hegel, >Society/Hegel. VsHegel/Höffe: Contract theorists such as Kant would not contradict the character of an end in itself, but would probably emphasize the legitimizing and critical task of the social contract. Social Contract/Kant: As an "original contract" and as a "mere idea of reason" he submits the "touchstone of legality of every public law": The legislator may (...) give his laws only in such a way "as they could have arisen from the united will of a whole people."(2) 1. Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundriss, 1820, § 75 2. Kant, Über den Gemeinspruch: Das mag in der Theorie richtig sein, taugt aber nicht für die Praxis. 1793, II. Folgerung |
Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Social Contract | Rousseau | Höffe I 273 Social Contract/Rousseau/Höffe: In contrast to his contract-theoretical predecessors Hobbes, Spinoza and Locke, references to the Old and New Testament no longer play a role. The confessional wars are long over, but censorship still prevails. State: The counter-model that [Rousseau] has devised for the alienated societies is the bourgeois Höffe I 274 order in the sense of a state, for which he does not develop a natural history, but only examines its justification(1). Individualism: In doing so, he follows the legitimatory individualism of his predecessors in contract theory. The final basis for the justification of a community that is nevertheless entitled to coercive powers lies with the individual concerned: Each individual must freely consent. Natural state: RousseauVsHobbes/RousseauVsSpinoza: In contrast to Hobbes and Spinoza, but in agreement with Locke, the natural state for Rousseau is not a state of war. The natural state loses its central meaning. >State/Rousseau, >Human/Rousseau. Höffe I 275 Because [the] basic treaty is concluded unanimously, Rousseau can, despite his first state theory thesis that every human being is born free and as master of him- or herself (>Freedom/Rousseau), put forward the fourth thesis of the legitimacy (>Justification/Rousseau) of a community with the power of coercion. Because of the unanimity, the social contract may even be considered "the freest act in the world"(2). >Freedom/Rousseau. Höffe I 277 Justification: Under Rousseau's own principle of self-preservation, the social contract is only worthy of approval if it guarantees (not only physically understood) self-preservation, at least not endangers it. >Justification/Rousseau. 1. Rousseau, The Social Contract (Du contrat social ou Principes du droit politique), 1762 Wilson I 24 Social Contract/Rousseau/Wilson, E. O.: Rousseau had issued the slogan "Freedom, Equality, Fraternity" in his social contract. E. O. WilsonVsRousseau: at the same time he had conceived the fatal abstraction of "collective will" in order to achieve these goals. This collective will, he wrote, forms itself into a "moral law which is objectively justified", since it is the only interest of the "rational will of free individuals" to serve the welfare of society and each of its members. This social contract should create "equal conditions for all". "Each one of us places together his or her person and all of his or her strength under the supreme direction of the common will, and we accept each member as an inseparable part of the whole." Wilson: Those who did not want to give in to this collective will were regarded as dissenters and had to face the "necessary violence" exercised by the assembly. >General Will. |
Rousseau I J. J. Rousseau Les Confessions, 1765-1770, publ. 1782-1789 German Edition: The Confessions 1953 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 WilsonEO I E. O. Wilson Consilience. The Unity of Knowledge, New York 1998 German Edition: Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge New York 1998 |
| Social Contract | Wilson | I 24 Social contract/Rousseau/Wilson, E. O.: In his social contract, Rousseau had issued the slogan "Freedom, Equality, Fraternity". E. O. WilsonVsRousseau: at the same time he had conceived the fatal abstraction of the "common will" in order to achieve these goals. This common will, he wrote, forms itself into a "moral law which is objectively justified", since it is the only interest of the "rational will of free individuals" to serve the welfare of society and each of its members. This social contract should create "equal conditions for all". "Each one of us places together his or her person and all his or her strength under the supreme direction of the common will, and we accept each member as an inseparable part of the whole." Wilson: Those who did not want to give in to this community will were regarded as dissenters and had to face the "necessary violence" exercised by the assembly. |
WilsonEO I E. O. Wilson Consilience. The Unity of Knowledge, New York 1998 German Edition: Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge New York 1998 |
| State (Polity) | Hegel | Mause I 47 State/society/Hegel: Hegel reconstructs the relationship between the social order of the market and the political order of the constitutional-monarchical state within the framework of a theory of modern "morality" (1), which he describes on the basis of the three institutionalized spheres of socialization and action of "family", "bourgeois society" and "state" (2). I 48 Bourgeois society/Hegel: Hegel describes this as the "state of need and understanding" (3), which he distinguishes from the "state" as the "reality of the moral idea" (4), that is, from the "state" of the third section of morality. (5) HegelVsRousseau: Hegel reconstructs the monarchical-constitutional state as a supraindividual moral communication and meaning context and thus reconstructs the Republican primacy of politics over the economy. MarxVsHegel, State/Marx. Brocker I 794 State/Hegel/HonnethVsHegel/Honneth: instead of understanding the moral sphere of the state as an intersubjective relationship of reciprocal acts of recognition, Hegel treats the state in his later writings as if it were always an existing entity before all interaction. >Intersubjectivity/Hegel. Consequently, it is only the vertically conceived relationships that the individuals maintain "to the higher authority of the state" as "the embodiment of the mental", "which in its approach suddenly assume the role that certain, highly demanding forms of mutual recognition should have played in a concept of moral recognition theory".(6) Solution/HonnethVsHegel: this results in the task of replacing Hegel's speculative categories with concepts of empirical science and thus making them Brocker I 795 "empirically controllable". (7) 1.G. W. F. Hegel Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundrisse. Werke 7, Hrsg. Eva Moldenhauer und Karl Markus Michel, Frankfurt a. M. 1989, p. 292. 2. Ibid. p. 307. 3. Ibid. p. 340 4. Ibid. p. 389 5. Cf. K. Löwith, Von Hegel zu Nietzsche. Der revolutionäre Bruch im Denken des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts, Hamburg 1986, S 261-264. 6. Axel Honneth, Kampf um Anerkennung. Zur moralischen Grammatik sozialer Konflikte, mit einem neuen Nachwort, Frankfurt/M. 2014 (zuerst 1992) p. 98 7. Ibid. p. 150 Hans-Jörg Sigwart, „Axel Honneth, Kampf um Anerkennung“, in: Manfred Brocker (ed.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 Höffe I 331 State/Hegel/Höffe: Hegel develops his system of political thought, the philosophy of law and state, against the background of his now expanded philosophical system(1). HegelVsKant: Against the - allegedly threatening in Kant - the danger of a purely through thought Höffe I 332 conceived construction of normative claims, the subject area of the philosophy of law and state is considerably expanded. Instead of being content with a normative theory, an a priori theory of law and justice, Hegel also focuses on motivational, social, and above all institutional factors (...). Philosophical Philosophy of Law/Hegel: "(...) the idea of the law, (...) the concept of the law and its realization becomes the object"(2). State: (...) [is the] "moral universe," [which] is to be understood as something reasonable. Freedom: The guiding principle in legal and state theory is free will. From it Hegel wants to show how, under the condition of modernity, an epoch of alienation, he gradually attains his full, alienation-absorbing reality. >Freedom/Hegel, >Morals/Hegel, >Customs/Morality/Hegel. Höffe I 336 The culmination of morality, its synthesis, at the same time the summit of Hegel's entire philosophy of law, is the state as a "mediated by itself", which is now far more than just a state of necessity and understanding. As a community in the literal sense it is the public institution responsible for the common good, the "reality of the moral idea". Because in it freedom attains its perfect form, it is not "something arbitrary" but "supreme duty," i.e. again a categorical imperative, for man to be a member of a State. [This is a] modern, namely no longer eudaimony-based, but freedom-based way (...). Only in the living together of free and equal people can [the human] complete both his/her rational nature and his/her nature based on right and justice. >Society/Hegel. Höffe I 337 From abstract law to morality, the "idea of free will in and for itself" finally develops into the unity and truth of both moments. In it, in morality, Hegel in turn advances from the natural spirit, the "family," through the stage of separation, the "bourgeois society," to objective freedom, the "State. Within the section "the State," however, there is surprisingly, instead of a further stage, now a regression. For the opposition to free will, the full legal relations and the moral whole, is achieved already at the first stage, the "internal constitutional law". On the second stage, however, the "external constitutional law," the moral whole is exposed to chance. And the last stage is determined ambivalently with respect to free will. 1. Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundriss, 1820 2. Ibid. § 1 |
Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Toleration | Rawls | I 214 Tolerance/Toleration/Rawls: The characteristic feature of arguments for freedom of consciousness and thought is that they are based only on one concept of justice. Tolerance is not derived from practical necessities or reasons of state. Morality and religious freedom follow from the principle of equal freedoms for all. A limitation can only be justified by the fact that otherwise greater injustice or a loss of freedom would follow. Arguments for freedom are not derived from specific metaphysical or philosophical doctrines. Neither do they presuppose that all truths can be derived in a way that corresponds to the Common Sense, nor that everything in a definable sense is a logical construction of observable rational scientific studies. It is actually appealed to the Common Sense, but without these further assumptions. --- I 216 Tolerance/Locke/Rousseau/Th. Aquinas/Aquinas/Rawls: There is an important difference between Rousseau and Locke, who advocated for limited tolerance, and Thomas Aquinas and the Protestant reformers who did not(1)(2). Locke and Rousseau limited freedom on the basis of what they considered to be clear and obvious consequences of public order. If Catholics and atheists could not be tolerated, it was because it seemed obvious that one could not rely on such people to abide by the limits of civil society. RawlsVsLocke/RawlsVsRousseau: Perhaps a larger historical overview would have convinced the two of them that they were wrong. Intolerance/Protestants/Th. Aquinas/Aquinas/Rawls: for Thomas and the Protestant reformers, the reasons for intolerance are rooted in belief itself. That is a crucial difference, then at this moment they can no longer be refuted with empirical arguments. Intolerance/Rawls: must it be tolerated? For example, some political parties in democratic states would restrict constitutional freedoms if they had power. For example, there are people who hold positions at universities and at the same time reject intellectual freedoms. It might seem that tolerance towards them would be contrary to the principles of justice. We discuss this using the example of religious toleration: --- I 217 Question: 1. would a religious sect have any reason to complain if it is not tolerated? Under what circumstances do tolerant sects have a reason not to tolerate other intolerant sects? 3. if they have this right, for what purpose should it be exercised? Ad 1.: a person only has the right to complain if principles that he or she respects are violated. Otherwise, the person acts inconsistently. A problem may arise if a specific interpretation of a religious truth is to be extended to the community in its validity. --- I 218 Ad. 2.: Tolerant sects have no right to suppress intolerant sects. On the basis of the principle of justice, they would have the right to complain about a violation of the principle of justice. Question: Does a threat to the security of tolerant sects justify an exception? This follows from the right to self-preservation accepted in the initial situation of a society to be established. --- I 219 Ad. 3.: Basically, the stability of a well-ordered society is guaranteed by the two principles of justice (see Principles/Rawls). This stability also means that people trust that this prosperity is not immediately threatened by intolerant phenomena. An exception to this is a sect, which quickly becomes a threat. (1) For Protestant reformers see J. E. E. D. Acton, "The Protestant Theory of Persecution" in The History of Freedom and Other Essay, London, 1907. (2) For Locke see J. Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration, incl. The Second Treatise of Government, ed. J. W. Gough, Oxford, 1946, pp. 156-158. |
Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 |
| Toleration | Rousseau | Rawls I 215 Tolerance/Rousseau/Rawls: when reasons for limiting tolerance are given, they often violate the principle of freedom. For example, Rousseau thought that people would not consider it possible to live together in peace with others whom they considered condemned. For loving them would be tantamount to hating God who punishes them. Anyone who looks at others as damned would have to fight or convert them according to Rousseau. RawlsVsRousseau: Rousseau would not tolerate those religions which say that there is no redemption outside the church.(1) Rawls: but the consequences are not based on experience. An a priori psychological argument, however plausible, is not sufficient to give up tolerance. Justice, on the other hand, assumes that disturbances of public order or freedom are detected in community experience. >Social Contract, >Social Contract/Rousseau, >Freedom/Rousseau, >Community. 1. See Rousseau, The Social Contract, bk. IV, ch. VIII. |
Rousseau I J. J. Rousseau Les Confessions, 1765-1770, publ. 1782-1789 German Edition: The Confessions 1953 Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 |
| Utopia | Rousseau | Brocker I 27 Utopia/KropotkinVsRousseau/Rousseau: Kropotkin criticized Rousseau as the protagonist of a positive-optimistic image of the human. (See also Anarchism/Kropotkin, Darwinism/Kropotkin.) VsKropotkin: Overall, however, "Mutual Aid: A Factor of Evolution" (1) seems like a biological interpretation ((s too) under positive-optimistic signs, despite a few inserts to the contrary: Behaviour in the sense of solidarity and support are regarded as suphistoric constants of human social behaviour, which are ultimately natural and inherent in all individuals. 1. Pjotr Alexejewitsch Kropotkin, Mutual Aid: A Factor of Evolution, London 1902. Dt.: Peter Kropotkin, Gegenseitige Hilfe in der Tier- und Menschenwelt. Mit einem Nachwort neu herausgegeben von Henning Ritter, Frankfurt/M./Berlin/Wien 1975. |
Rousseau I J. J. Rousseau Les Confessions, 1765-1770, publ. 1782-1789 German Edition: The Confessions 1953 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Utopia | Kropotkin | Brocker I 27 Utopia/KropotkinVsRousseau/Rousseau: Kropotkin criticized Rousseau as the protagonist of a positive-optimistic image of the human. (See also Anarchism/Kropotkin, Darwinism/Kropotkin.) VsKropotkin: Overall, however, "Mutual Aid: A Factor of Evolution" (1) seems like a biological interpretation ((s too) under positive-optimistic signs, despite a few inserts to the contrary: certain ways of behaviour in the sense of solidarity and support are regarded as suphistoric constants of human social behaviour, which are ultimately natural and inherent in all individuals. Cf. >History, >Historiography. 1. Pjotr Alexejewitsch Kropotkin, Mutual Aid: A Factor of Evolution, London 1902. Dt.: Peter Kropotkin, Gegenseitige Hilfe in der Tier- und Menschenwelt. Mit einem Nachwort neu herausgegeben von Henning Ritter, Frankfurt/M./Berlin/Wien 1975. |
Kropot I Peter Kropotkin Gegenseitige Hilfe in der Tier- und Menschenwelt Frankfurt/Berlin/Wien 1975 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Voltaire | Höffe | Höffe I 263 Voltaire/Höffe: [Voltaire] (...) is the most representative example of the French Enlightenment. Less an original thinker than a brilliant writer, he takes the right to judge biased as an advocate for justice and compassion. VoltaireVsRousseau: Against Rousseau, he even writes "that a godless novelist is only mildly punishable, but an insurgent scoundrel deserves the death penalty". Through rhetoric and wit, Voltaire creates an influential political public for the aforementioned guiding concepts of the Enlightenment, for reason, freedom and tolerance, as well as for criticism of the arrogant authority of king, bureaucracy and church (...). |
Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| |||
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Lévi-Strauss | Derrida Vs Lévi-Strauss | I 35 Levi-Strauss/Derrida: is a rousseauist thinker. I 36 DerridaVsLevi-Strauss, VsRousseau: reveals ethnocentrism in both. The humiliation of indigenous people is reversed by praising the beauty, harmony and innocence of their culture. DerridaVsLevi-Strauss: e.g. the chief learns writing: the chief understands the function of the control, which is connected with the writing ability, very fast, before he has grasped the meaning of the characters. He pretends to write and read. Thus the chief gains - temporarily - prestige and power. Later he is disempowered and left alone as one who has abandoned the common foundations of tribal culture. This story not only shows the connection between writing and dominion, but also that from the anthropologist's retrospective reflection the difference between cultures that know writing and those that do not is contradictory in itself! DerridaVsLevi-Strauss: rejects this distinction and presupposes writing for all cultures. Some voices have a word for writing: "make signs" although they do not master them. |
Derrida I J. Derrida De la grammatologie, Paris 1967 German Edition: Grammatologie Frankfurt 1993 |
| Levy-Strauss, Cl. | Derrida Vs Levy-Strauss, Cl. | Levi-Strauss/Derrida: rousseauistischer Denker. I 35 DerridaVsLevi-Strauss, VsRousseau: deckt bei beiden den Ethnozentrismus auf. Die Erniedrigung der Naturvölker wird umgekehrt, indem die Schönheit, Harmonie und Unschuld ihrer Kultur gerühmt wird. DerridaVsLevi-Strauss: Bsp der Häuptling lernt Schreiben: die Funktion des Beherrschung, die mit dem Schreibenkönnen verbunden ist, begreift der Häuptling sehr schnell, ehe er noch die Bedeutung der Schriftzeichen erfaßt hat. Er gibt vor zu schreiben und zu lesen. So gewinnt der Häuptling - vorübergehend - an Ansehen und Macht. Später wird er entmachtet und alleingelassen als einer, der die gemeinsamen Grundlagen der Stammeskultur verlassen hat. I 36 An dieser Geschichte läßt sich nicht nur der Zusammenhang zwischen Schrift und Herrschaft ablesen, sondern auch, daß aus einer nachträglichen Besinnung des Anthropologen der Unterschied zwischen schriftkundigen und schrift osen Kulturen in sich widersprüchlich ist! DerridaVsLevi-Strauss: verwirft diese Unterscheidung und setzt für alle Kulturen Schrift voraus. Einige Stimme haben nämlich durchaus ein Wort für Schrift: »Zeichen machen« obwohl sie sie nicht beherrschen. |
|
| Rousseau, J. J. | Derrida Vs Rousseau, J. J. | I 35 Levi-Strauss / Derrida: rousseauean thinker. DerridaVsLevi-Strauss, DerridaVsRousseau: uncovers the ethnocentrism of both. The humiliation of primitive peoples is reversed by the beauty, harmony and innocence that is praised in their culture. |
|
| Various Authors | Mackie Vs Various Authors | Stegmüller IV 399 "Kalam" argument: (common among Islamic scholars): operates with paradoxes of infinity to show that there can be no actual infinity. (> Al Ghassali). Infinity/MackieVsKalam argument: the possibility of an unlimited past cannot be ruled out on purely logical grounds! MackieVsKant: this prejudice can also be found in the thesis about the first antinomy. IV 400 Kalam argument/Al Ghassali: nothing that comes into existence in time, arises out of itself. ("Rational necessity"). Therefore, a creator is required. MackieVsAl Ghassali: 1. do we really know that from necessity of reason? 2. There is no reason why on one hand an uncaused thing should be impossible, but on the other hand the existence of a God with the power to create out of nothing, should be acceptable! God/Mackie/Islam: this concept of God raises difficult problems: 1. Has God simply emerged with the time? 2. Has he always existed in infinite time? Then the formerly rejected actual infinity would be reintroduced! 3. Does God have a non-temporal existence: that would be an incomprehensible mystery again. Mackie: additionally, one also has to assume: a) that God's existence and creative power explain themselves and b) that the unexplained existence of a material world would be incomprehensible and therefore unacceptable. IV 401 Existence/MackieVsLeibniz: there is no reason a priori to indicate that things do not just occur without causation! Cosmology/proof of the existence of God/existence/Mackie: problem: either the notion of "causa sui" makes sense or not. a) it does not make sense: then the cosmological assumption that a divine cause must be assumed for the beginning of material existence collapses. b) it makes sense: then it can even be awarded as a property to matter itself! Stegmüller IV 447 Def. God/Feuerbach: "God is the sense of self of human kind freed from all loathsomeness." Religion/Feuerbach: utopia of a better religion: God's freedom from all limitations of individuals that was imputed by traditional religions now recovered in humanity as a whole. MackieVsFeuerbach: humanity as a whole is undoubtedly not free from all limitations of individuals, it is not omnipotent, not omniscient, not all good. (vide supra: entirety as a wrong subject, cannot even act. IV 472 Theodicy/faith/Stegmüller: Argument: God has made the earth a vale of tears, so that people would develop a religious need. MackieVs: only a very human deity could want people so submissive. Theodicy/Gruner: insinuates to skeptics the demand for a world that is liberated from all evils. He rejects this demand as inconsistent. MackieVsGruner: shifts the burden of proof. The skeptic demands nothing at all. IV 271 Ethics/Education/Rousseau: Parents and teachers should refrain from any prerational teaching of children. MackieVsRousseau: understandable but unrealistic. Stegmüller IV 502 Religion/Faith/Wittgenstein: Ex. if one makes a choice, the image of retaliation always appears in their mind. Meaning/Mackie/Stegmüller: one possibility: the believer wants his pronouncements to be understood literally. S_he stands by a statement of fact. But notwithstanding, such pronouncements outwardly serve to support their sense of responsibility and to justify it. Then, according to Wittgenstein, their faith would be superstition! When asked for proof, they do not hold his pronouncements capable of truth. But then they change their position again and literally believe what they must believe. Other possibility: faith has a literal meaning, but comparable with the plot of a novel, fiction. One can accept that the corresponding values have a meaning for life. IV 503 Therefore we could accept that there is a God only in our practical moral reasoning. T. Z. Phillips: if the questions about God and immortality are undestood literally, as factual questions, then the skeptical response given by Hume is correct. Thesis: one can and must interpret religious convictions and statements in a way that the criticism of Hume is irrelevant! It is true that logical and teleological proof of the existence of God cannot be upheld. The reality of God must not be interpreted as the reality of an object, "God" isn't the name of a single being, it refers to nothing. IV 504 According to Phillips metaphysicians misunderstand the everyday meanings of words. MackieVs: one doesn't dissolve the real problems of skepticism by pointing to normal parlance. Just as ordinary language philosophers couldn't prevail VsHume. Faith/Religion/Phillips: magical and religious language should be interpreted in the sense of performative actions. Mackie pro, but: it is wrong to say that an expressive language could not at the same time be descriptive in a literal sense. IV 504/505 Actions of faith are both: ways to address happiness and misery in the world as well as to explain them. Religion/faith/R. B. Braithwaite: thesis: the core of the Christian faith is the determination to live by the principles of morality. The "Christian stories" are accompanied by that, although the Christian is not required to believe them literally! They are religious attitudes! PhillipsVsBraithwaite: the grammar of "believing" and "being true" in religious convictions is not the same as in empirical statements. MackieVs: thereby we lose any firm ground under your feet! Braithwaite rightly used the usual notions of truth and falsehood! IV 506 MackieVsPhillips: there is no alternative to that which is discarded by Phillips, namely to continue in superstitions or to reduce religion such as that the "basic characteristics of faith are lost". MackieVsBraithwaite: certainly, numerous religious statements can be interpreted as moral attitudes, but this does not apply to the central statements of theism. Faith/Mackie: needs an object of reference! |
Macki I J. L. Mackie Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong 1977 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| |||