Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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Entry
Reference
Capitalism Schumpeter Brocker I 250
Capitalism/Schumpeter: Thesis: a) Capitalism is best understood not as a system of market equilibria, but rather as a competitive dynamic process, driven by innovative companies, to disrupt equilibria; this process not only captures and transforms the structures of the economy, but all structures of modern society. b) For the sake of scientific progress, one must strictly distinguish between positive and normative analysis:
Brocker I 251
SchumpeterVsClassical Economy/SchumpeterVsRicardo/SchumpeterVsKeynes: these authors did not make the distinction between positive and normative analysis. ((s) Distinction descriptive/normative.).
Brocker I 254
Schumpeter's thesis: Capitalism will not perish from its failures, but from its successes. In contrast to Marx, however, this is presented as a conditional prognosis rather than an unconditional one. The condition is that no disturbing influences occur in the future development. (1) Schumpeter pro capitalism: see Civilization/Schumpeter.
Brocker I 255
Innovation/Schumpeter: the development of capitalism can only be described taking into account the innovation competition for ever new products, processes and organizational forms, which is essential for the process of creative destruction. (2)
Brocker I 262
Schumpeter's main message is that the (supposed) strengths of socialism should be feared as totalitarianism and that the (supposed) weaknesses of capitalism should be acknowledged as civilized in modern society and thus worthy of preservation. (See also Socialism/Schumpeter).

1. Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, New York 1942. Dt.: Joseph A. Schumpeter, Kapitalismus, Sozialismus und Demokratie, Tübingen/Basel 2005 (zuerst: Bern 1946). S. 105, 263.
2. Ebenda S. 142.
Ingo Pies, „Joseph A. Schumpeter, Kapitalismus, Sozialismus und Demokratie (1942)“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018.

EconSchum I
Joseph A. Schumpeter
The Theory of Economic Development An Inquiry into Profits, Capital, Credit, Interest, and the Business Cycle, Cambridge/MA 1934
German Edition:
Theorie der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung Leipzig 1912


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Economics Schumpeter Brocker I 251
Economic Theory/Schumpeter: For the sake of scientific progress, a strict distinction must be made between positive and normative analysis: SchumpeterVsClassical Economy/SchumpeterVsRicardo/SchumpeterVsKeynes: these authors did not make the distinction between positive and normative analysis. ((s) Distinction descriptive/normative.).


Ingo Pies, „Joseph A. Schumpeter, Kapitalismus, Sozialismus und Demokratie (1942)“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018.

EconSchum I
Joseph A. Schumpeter
The Theory of Economic Development An Inquiry into Profits, Capital, Credit, Interest, and the Business Cycle, Cambridge/MA 1934
German Edition:
Theorie der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung Leipzig 1912


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Equivalence Theorem Ricardo Mause I 277
Equivalence Theorem/government debt/Ricardo/Barro: Thesis: the financing of public expenditure via taxes or via government debt is equivalent. However, this requires a number of restrictive assumptions. The theorem goes back to Ricardo, but was only brought into its present form by Barro. (1) N.B.: The question is whether additional expenditure makes sense in consideration of the need for private cutting consumption to finance it, but not in what way it is financed.
Reason: If government debt rises, private households will anticipate future tax increases and adjust their consumption patterns accordingly.
VsEquivalence Theorem: the empirical relevance of these questions can be questioned.
For example, there could be altruism between the generations: Parents plan with a basically infinite time horizon.
Another problem: it is also assumed that the path of expenditure policy is independent of the financial instrument used. This is only plausible if intergenerational altruism works and voters are perfectly informed.
Behavioral Economics/BuchananVsRicardo/BuchananVsBarro/BuchananVsEquivalence theorem: if government debt is perceived less strongly than taxes, debt-financed higher spending may be politically enforceable. Then Ricardo's equivalence collapses. (2)
This problem also exists when the capital markets are not perfect, allowing households to easily shift consumption between the present and the future, even without public debt instruments.
VsBarro: another problem: distorting taxes: If you move away from the first best tax system, it may well play a role for the welfare of individuals whether the state is in debt. Hereto:
Solution/Barro: subsequently introduced the argument of tax smoothing into the discussion. (3) In this case, it makes sense to compensate for fluctuations in tax revenue by increasing and reducing government debt, but to keep tax rates relatively constant.
BarroVsKeynesianism: The reason for this is not an economic policy countermeasure for Keynesian motives, but the fact that welfare losses caused by distorting taxes increase disproportionately with tax rates. For further problems: see Growth/Diamond.


1. Robert J. Barro. 1974. Are government bonds net wealth? Journal of Political Economy 82 (6): 1095 – 1117.
2. James M. Buchanan & Richard E. Wagner. Democracy in deficit. The political legacy of Lord Keynes. New York 1977.
3. Robert J. Barro. 1979. On the determination of the public debt. Journal of Political Economy 87 (5): 940– 971.

EconRic I
David Ricardo
On the principles of political economy and taxation Indianapolis 2004


Mause I
Karsten Mause
Christian Müller
Klaus Schubert,
Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018
Equivalence Theorem Barro Mause I 277
Equivalence Theorem/government debt/Ricardo/Barro: Thesis: the financing of public expenditure via taxes or via government debt is equivalent. However, this requires a number of restrictive assumptions. The theorem goes back to Ricardo, but was only brought into its present form by Barro. (1) N.B.: The question is whether additional expenditure makes sense in consideration of the need for private cutting consumption to finance it, but not in what way it is financed.
Reason: If government debt rises, private households will anticipate future tax increases and adjust their consumption patterns accordingly.
VsEquivalence Theorem: the empirical relevance of these questions can be questioned.
For example, there could be altruism between the generations: Parents plan with a basically infinite time horizon.
Another problem: it is also assumed that the path of expenditure policy is independent of the financial instrument used. This is only plausible if intergenerational altruism works and voters are perfectly informed.
Behavioral Economics/BuchananVsRicardo/BuchananVsBarro/BuchananVsEquivalence theorem: if government debt is perceived less strongly than taxes, debt-financed higher spending may be politically enforceable. Then Ricardo's equivalence collapses. (2)
This problem also exists when the capital markets are not perfect, allowing households to easily shift consumption between the present and the future, even without public debt instruments.
VsBarro: another problem: distorting taxes: If you move away from the first best tax system, it may well play a role for the welfare of individuals whether the state is in debt. Hereto:
Solution/Barro: subsequently introduced the argument of tax smoothing into the discussion. (3) In this case, it makes sense to compensate for fluctuations in tax revenue by increasing and reducing government debt, but to keep tax rates relatively constant.
BarroVsKeynesianism: The reason for this is not an economic policy countermeasure for Keynesian motives, but the fact that welfare losses caused by distorting taxes increase disproportionately with tax rates. For further problems: see Growth/Diamond.


1. Robert J. Barro. 1974. Are government bonds net wealth? Journal of Political Economy 82 (6): 1095– 1117.
2. James M. Buchanan & Richard E. Wagner. Democracy in deficit. The political legacy of Lord Keynes. New York 1977.
3. Robert J. Barro. 1979. On the determination of the public debt. Journal of Political Economy 87 (5): 940– 971.

EconBarro I
Robert J. Barro
Rational expectations and the role of monetary policy 1976

EconBarro II
Robert J. Barro
David B. Gordon
Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policcy 1983


Mause I
Karsten Mause
Christian Müller
Klaus Schubert,
Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018
Theoretical Economics Ricardo Mause I 41
Theoretical Economics/Ricardo: Ricardo was the first economist to work predominantly in theory. With him, the "pure" theoretical economy began - and the danger that its results, despite the often very restrictive assumptions, would be used as economic policy guidelines. VsRicardo: For example, one can only justify free trade with Ricardo's model if one of the central premises of this model applies, that of the (international) immobility of production factors - a premise that is no longer fulfilled today.

EconRic I
David Ricardo
On the principles of political economy and taxation Indianapolis 2004


Mause I
Karsten Mause
Christian Müller
Klaus Schubert,
Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018