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Abstractness | Rorty | VI 173f Abstracts/abstracta/Dennett: can be described by reference to physical forces and other characteristics - Reichenbach: Thesis: the existence of abstractions (Abstrakta") can be attributed to the existence of concreta. >Abstracta/Reichenbach. Reason: conclusions about abstractions are not probability conclusions, but analogies. Illata/Reichenbach: Displayable objects like electrons are no connections of concreta, but separate entities that are inferred from concreta. Ontology/RortyVsReichenbach: today ontological status no longer depends on definability. >Definition, >Definability, >Reichenbach, >Theoretical terms, >Theoretical entities, >Observation language. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
Causes | Fraassen | I 25 Principle of the Common Cause/P.C.C./Fraassen: eventually leads to postulating unobservable entities. - The principle of the common cause cannot be a general principle of science. >Unobservables, >Theoretical entities. I 28 Common Cause/C.C./Fraassen: to say that C is the common cause for the correlation between A and B is to say that relative to C there is no such correlation. C explains the correlation, because we only notice a correlation for as long as we do not consider C. FraassenVsReichenbach: the principle of the common cause does not rule the science of the 20th century, because it requires deterministic theories. I 114 Cause/Explanation/Theory: Def Cause/Mackie: non-sufficient but necessary part of a non-necessary but sufficient condition. >INUS/Mackie). FraassenVsMackie: restriction: otherwise e.g. growth-plus-death-plus-decay may be the cause of death. 1) Not every sufficient condition is a cause. - E.g. the existence of the knife is a necessary part. - 2) A cause must also not be necessary. >Causation, >Causality. It may be that there are no previous sufficient conditions at all. - E.g. radium causes Geiger counter to click. But atomic physics is compatible with that it does not click. Cause/Solution/Lewis: Counterfactual Conditional: if A had not existed, B would not have exited. >Counterfactual conditional. Fraassen: but not literally. - Wrong: that a counterfactual conditional was the same as a necessary condition. Solution/Fraassen: here, the "if/then" logic does not apply, because applies the law of attenuation there. Everyday language: there is no attenuation here. >Everyday language. |
Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 |
Definability | Rorty | VI 173 Definability/RortyVsReichenbach: ontological status no longer depends on definability. >Ontology. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
Definitions | Putnam | I (i) 248/9 Fact/definition/QuineVsReichenbach: Problem: the distinction between "fact" and "definition" has collapsed, on which Reichenbach has depended on. PutnamVsDavidson: the perception of a tree depends on our conceptual scheme. It is a matter of degree, what is a fact, and what is convention. >Conceptual Schemes, >Facts. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
Explanation | Fraassen | I 23 Explanation/FraassenVsReichenbach: the unlimited demand for explanation leads to the demand of hidden variables. I 25 Explanation: if mere regularity makes a macroscopic theory poor, then the same happens to a microscopic one - coincidence: also coincidence can have an explanation. I 39 Explanation/FraassenVsAugustinus: the fleeing of the mouse from the cat must not be explained by perception. But with Darwin: the fleeing mice survive. There is no account by reason. Analogously it applies that the successful sciences survive - without this having to be explained. I 86 Theory/Explanation: For example, one could have two types of mechanics, one for physiologies and one for astronomers. Problem: one cannot explain a complex phenomenon with this - e.g. man who is walking on the moon - if both theories have no common models, a new theory on lunar gravitation must be established - empirical adequacy: requires the integration of these "mini-theories". I 87 Explanation: if we consider some kind of questions to be more important, this is no reason to believe that the theory that explains them is more probable - however, the social situation of the researcher plays a role in the evaluation of theories. >Evaluation. I 93 Explanation/Ernest Nagel: explanation is the organization and classification of our knowledge - FraassenVsFeyerabend: he misunderstood the fact: that this is a function of interests - FraassenVsFeyerabend: then one can stop to research if one believes, what one says - naive view of scientific security - then the scientists ought to swear by an oath that they are looking for explanations -FraassVsFeyerabend: in reality one must always doubt the adequacy. I 97f Explanation/FraassenVsTradition: explanation does not have to be true! a) "we have an explanation" (has to do with acceptance) b) "the theory explains" (without acceptance) - e.g. Newton's theory was wrong nevertheless it explains much. ((s) then a theory cannot be a conjunction of sentences, for then no sentence may be false.) Harman: Explanation leads to acceptance. >Acceptability. Explanation/Fraassen: something does not require that theory coincides with the world as a whole. I 98 One cannot assert the truth of a theory before its explanatory power - Explanation: is not an additional property for empirical adequacy - e.g. "the computer computes" - no one would say "the hammer struck the nail". I 106 Explanation/VsHempel/Morton Beckner: e.g. evolution is not deterministic - e.g. the giraffes's neck is not determined by dietary scarcity - only by the compatibility of genetic and natural selection mechanisms - Putnam: also Newton's explanation is no deduction, but a demonstration of compatibilities. I 110 Definition Explanation/Friedman: S explains P iff P is a consequence S which is "relative" to K and S "reduces" or "unifies" the set of its own consequences relative to K. I 111 Explanation: Problem: Incompleteness: disease explains a rare secondary disease that is triggered by it - but not why this patient is affected. Asymmetry: e.g. length of the shadow: is always in relation with a certain sun position. Causation: only goes in one direction. >Causation, >Equations, >Asymmetry. I 111 Why question: does not occur when the spectrum is explained by the atomic structure. I 124 Explanation: has to do with "why" - to find prominent factors in the causal network. Problem: the network as a whole does not explain typical cases - science, however, describes the network - ((s) therefore science does not equal an explanation. Explanation must at least say that there is a structure that can be described in principle - though never fully.) Cf. >Network/Quine. I 146 Explanation: for evaluating a response to a why question as an explanation, it is not a matter of whether this is true - the evaluation uses only the part of the background information that provides the general theory about these phenomena plus additional information that does not include the facts to be explained - ((s) e.g. framework conditions). >Reference frame. I 155 Explanation/Description/Fractions: explanation and description do not differ in the information - but explanation: is a three-digit relation theory-fact-context - description: is two-digit: theory-fact - Explanation: is an applied science (not pure science). I 205 Explanation/Thomas Aquinas/Fraassen: everything that is explained must be explained by something else. I 206 The premises must contain more than the conclusion - in addition: generalization: e.g. that all magnets attract iron. >Generalization. I 213 Explanation/Fraassen: only observable regularities require explanation. >Regularities, >Observability. |
Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 |
Explanation | Hacking | I 98ff Good explanation/Hacking: a good explanation displays context. However, the same entities can always be explained otherwise. >Additional hypotheses. VsReichenbach/VsSalmon: that we arrive at the same result on various ways, that proves nothing. I 98 The reality is not part of the explanation. >Reality. I 100 It follows: VsConvergence theory: convergence theory is only cumulative. Convergence: is not itself focussed on convergence. >Convergence, cf. >Regularities. I 103 HackingVsPopper: success is no confirmation of a declaration. It shows nothing more than that we reasonably live in a reasonable world (>adequacy, as Aristotle). >Adequacy, >Best Explanation, >Confirmation, >Success, >K. Popper. |
Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
Facts | Putnam | V 266 Def Fact/Putnam: a fact is something to believe that is rational. Fact: a fact is also the idealization of the concept of a credible rational statement. Every fact is value loaden. >Idealization, >Rationality. --- I (i) 248/9 Fact/definition/QuineVsReichenbach: problem: the distinction between "fact" and "definition" has collapsed. Reichenbach did support this collapse. PutnamVsDavidson: the perception of a tree depends on our conceptual scheme. It is a matter of degree, what is a fact, and what is a convention. >Reichenbach. PutnamVsDavidson: The perception of a tree depends on our conceptual scheme. It is a matter of degree what is actual, and what is convention. >Conceptual scheme, >Convention. Parisi I 311/312 Facts/values/economic theories/Putnam: In an economic analysis of law, disputes and conflicts between parties are often framed as disagreements as to facts. When facts are in dispute the parties can undertake further investigation and they can recalculate their choices and reassess their optimal course of action. The focus on factual disagreement lends itself to the objective and rational point of viewlessness that grounds the claim that economics is a science. In law, however, disputes are frequently about something more than a disagreement as to facts; they involve disagreements as to values (Putnam, 2002)(1). These value-based disagreements shape the facts as people understand them, and influence the relative importance attributed to any given fact by any particular party. Value disputes are not easily resolved by appeal to economic analysis. At best, economics can only offer some indirect input on factors to consider in a given situation, but in the end law must operate to make a judgment—a value choice between and among competing claims that are often based on emotion, culture, and other human characteristics that are not easily subject to an economic calculus. Consequently, when economic analysis is applied to law, it often functions to redirect attention away from a conflict involving deeply held values and translates the disagreement into one of competing facts. The problem with this move is that it may function to “mask” what the law is really doing and can undermine the traditional role of law in working to mediate tensions among competing and deeply held values in our system of democratic governance (Noonan, 1976)(2). 1. Putnam, Hilary (2002). The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 2. Noonan, Jr., John T. (1976). Persons and Masks of the Law. Berkeley: University of California Press. Driesen, David M. and Robin Paul Malloy. “Critics of Law and Economics”. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
Implication | Reichenbach | Geach I 197 Implication/GeachVsReichenbach: "Quasi-implication" is scientifically useless because we can only know pϑq when we know that q "holds" - ("holds": not assertible, not true). >Assertibility, >Truth, >Knowledge. Reichenbach: "when the measurement M is performed, the device will display the value q1." GeachVs: that is scientifically useless - it is also an absurd result: "When the measurement is performed, the measurement is performed" is here not a tautology. >Tautology. Geach: But even non-truth-functional repetitions are tautologies. >Truth functions, >Measurements. |
Reich I H. Reichenbach The Philosophy of Space and Time (Dover Books on Physics) 1st English Ed. 1957 Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
Ontology | Rorty | IV 25 f Ontology: a significant degree of acculturation is required to answer questions such as: does God exist?, there are numbers?, is there justice? RortyVsReichenbach: today ontological status no longer depends on definability. >Ontological Relativity, >Observability, >Platonism, Theory-Dependence, >Definition, >Definability. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
Time | Vollmer | II 51 Time/time direction/time reversal/Vollmer: the designation of a time direction is empirical and is made always only secondarily by additional assumptions. - E.g. initial conditions in the mechanics and thermodynamics - rediance conditions in electrodynamics. >Initial conditions. II 234 Time/logical form/Vollmer: temporal relationships can be expressed by real functions t(e1, e2) that are defined on event pairs. >Events. Asymmetry: is then a formal property of this function to change the sign at reversal. - This has nothing to do with reversibility of physical processes, also not with designation of one direction. >Asymmetry, >Symmetries. Time Reversal: Time Reversal is only a formal operation of changing the sign. >Equations, >Time reversal, cf. >Time travel, >Past, >Present, >Future. II 325 Invariant: a formula is invariant that does not change under time reversal. >Invariants. Time reversal invariance: So is a property of formulas or functions. - E.g. Newtonian equation of motion. >Formulas. On the other hand: The question of whether natural processes are reversible, relates to the real world. Problem: a T-invariant equation can describe both reversible and non-reversible processes. - If, then it does not yet contain complete information. II 236 Definition Time Arrow/time direction/Vollmer: so we will call the fact that there are chains of events, whose part events never happen in reverse order. Time direction is not a characteristic of the time, but of processes. >Processes. That there are different classes of irreversible processes, there are different arrows of time: the expansion of the universe, the electrodynamic of spherical waves - that a process is irreversible, one cannot see that in looking at it. - It can also never be proven. - Causality/cause/effect/VollmerVsReichenbach: cannot define the arrow of time. - Reversed: these are not to defined without time arrow. >Causality, >Cause, >Effect. II 238 Irreversibility/Physics/time reversal/time arrow/Vollmer: We expect that the fundamental equations, equations of motion, laws of force, field equations are T-invariant, that is, that they change with time reversal. II 252 Entropy/universe/Boltzmann/Vollmer: for him, the universe as a whole is in a thermodynamic equilibrium, so in the entropy maximum. II 253 VollmerVsBoltzmann: the observations state the contrary. If we advance into more distant parts of the universe, we can always find low entropy. >Entropy. If there were a region of space with decreasing entropy (increasing order), there would also be irreversible processes, but some time arrows would be reversed. |
Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988 |
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Best Explanation | Fraassen Vs Best Explanation | Field I 15 Principle of the Best Explanation/Field: Suppose we have a) certain beliefs about the "phenomena" that we do not want to give up b) this class of phenomena is large and complex c) we have a pretty good (simple) explanation that is not ad hoc and from which the consequences of the phenomena follow d) one of the assumptions in the explanation is assertion S and we are sure that no explanation is possible without S. Best Explanation: then we have a strong reason to believe S. False: "The phenomena are as they would be if explanation E was correct": As If/Field: As-if assertions that are piggyback passengers on true explanations may not be constructed as explanations themselves (at least not ad hoc). Then the principle is not empty: it excludes the possibility that we accept a large and complex set of phenomena as a brute fact. (van FraassenVsBest Explanation: 1980) Best Explanation/BE/Field: the best explanation often leads us to believe something that we could also test independently by observation, but also to beliefs about unobservable things, or unobservable beliefs about observable things. Observation: should not make a difference here! In any case, our beliefs go beyond what is observed. I 16 Important argument: if no test was done, it should make no difference in the status of the evidence between cases where an observation is possible and those where no observation is possible! A stronger principle of the best explanation could be limited to observable instances of belief. FieldVs: but that would cripple our beliefs about observable things and would be entirely ad hoc. Unobserved things: a principle could be formulated that allowed the inference on observed things - that have been unobserved so far! - while we do not believe the explanation as such. FieldVs: that would be even more ad hoc! I 25 VsBenacerraf: bases himself on an outdated causal theory of knowledge. I 90 Theory/Properties/Fraassen: theories have three types of properties: 1) purely internal, logical: axiomatization, consistency, various kinds of completeness. Problem: It was not possible to accommodate simplicity here. Some authors have suggested that simple theories are more likely to be true. FraassenVsSimplicity: it is absurd to suppose that the world is more likely to be simple than that it was complicated. But that is metaphysics. 2) Semantic Properties: and relations: concern the relation of theory to the world. Or to the facts in the world about which the theory is. Main Properties: truth and empirical adequacy. 3) pragmatic: are there any that are philosophically relevant? Of course, the language of science is context-dependent, but is that pragmatic? I 91 Context-Dependent/Context-Independent/Theory/Science/Fraassen: theories can also be formulated in a context-independent language, what Quine calls Def "External Sentence"/Quine. Therefore it seems as though we do not need pragmatics to interpret science. Vs: this may be applicable to theories, but not to other parts of scientific activity: Context-Dependent/Fraassen: are a) Evaluations of theories, in particular, the term "explained" (explanation) is radically context-dependent. b) the language of the utilization (use) of theories to explain phenomena is radically context-dependent. Difference: a) asserting that Newton’s theory explains the tides ((s) mention). b) explaining the tides with Newton’s theory (use). Here we do not use the word "explains". Pragmatic: is also the immersion in a theoretical world view, in science. Basic components: speaker, listener, syntactic unit (sentence or set of sentences), circumstances. Important argument: In this case, there may be a tacit understanding to let yourself be guided when making inferences by something that goes beyond mere logic. I 92 Stalnaker/Terminology: he calls this tacit understanding a "pragmatic presupposition". (FraassenVsExplanation as a Superior Goal). I 197 Reality/Correspondence/Current/Real/Modal/Fraassen: Do comply the substructures of phase spaces or result sequences in probability spaces with something that happens in a real, but not actual, situation? ((s) distinction reality/actuality?) Fraassen: it may be unfair to formulate it like that. Some philosophical positions still affirm it. Modality/Metaphysics/Fraassen: pro modality (modal interpretation of frequency), but that does not set me down on a metaphysical position. FraassenVsMetaphysics. I 23 Explanatory Power/Criterion/Theory/Fraassen: how good a choice is explanatory power as a criterion for selecting a theory? In any case, it is a criterion at all. Fraassen: Thesis: the unlimited demand for explanation leads to the inevitable demand for hidden variables. (VsReichenbach/VsSmart/VsSalmon/VsSellars). Science/Explanation/Sellars/Smart/Salmon/Reichenbach: Thesis: it is incomplete as long as any regularity remains unexplained (FraassenVs). |
Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
Propensity Theory | Kyburg Vs Propensity Theory | Fraassen I 189 KyburgVsPropensity/KyburgVsPopper/Fraassen: (Henry Kyburg, FN 25): reductio ad absurdum/raa: wie man Propensity interpretations präzise machen könnte: Popper würde vielleicht von einer "hypothetical frequency interpretation" zufriedengestellt: Bsp Angenommen, ich messe die Länge eines Tischbeins drei Mal: 1. 100 cm, 2. 100,3 cm, 3. 100,5 cm. Dann behaupte ich, dass die reale Länge 100,3 cm + 0,3 cm ist. Damit drücke ich mein Vertrauen (> confidence) aus, dass bei wiederholter Messung, die Ergebnisse in diesem Intervall liegen werden. Das heißt nicht zu behaupten, dass es keine außerhalb des Intervalls geben würde, sie würde aber eine zu vernachlässigende Rolle spielen. nicht-aktuale Experimente/Kyburg/Fraassen: Bsp ich werfe eine Münze 100 Mal und 49 Mal kommt Kopf. Dann drücke ich das vertrauen (confidence) aus, dass wenn andere Leute die Münze werfen, ein ähnliches Ergebnis herauskommt. D.h. wir sprechen auf einmal von "möglichen Situationen". (>Modality). I 190 Kyburg: in diesem Ansatz - einem "Kyburg model" - ist (oder hat) jede possible world (p.w.) eine Ereignisfolge in einem Ereignis-Raum. Die meisten oder alle sind endlich. Def maximale poss.w./Kyburg/Fraassen: ist eine, die nicht Teil einer anderen ist, oder die unendlich ist. Hier entspricht die Wahrscheinlichkeit (prblty) eines Ereignisses E r iff in jeder maximalen p.w. im Modell die relative frequency (r.f.) von E = r ist. Prblty: ist manchmal nicht definiert, nämlich dann, wenn es keine Zahl r gibt. VsPopper: diese Sichtweise unterscheidet sich von Poppers darin, dass es hier nicht eine einzige virtuelle Folge gibt, sondern viele. Und die prblty eines Ereignis ist = r iff die r.f. in allen maximal erweiterten Folgen = r ist. Modality/Prblty/Propensity/Frequency/Kyburg/Fraassen: dieser Begriff ist natürlich nicht der der logischen Möglichkeit. Es werden stattdessen empirische Tatsachen reflektiert. Von einem logischen Standpunkt aus ist es nicht so, dass eine wiederholte Messung ähnliche Ergebnisse liefern muss. Popper/Kyburg/Fraassen: wir können Popper’s Sicht als Spezialfall der Situation von Kyburg sehen: bei Popper hat die Menge der p.w. nur ein maximales Element. FraassenVsPropensity: beide Ansätze haben dieselben Probleme, die auch der Ansatz der strikten Häufigkeit (FraassenVsReichenbach) hat: es gibt Modelle, die nur eine einzige MöWe enthalten, nämlich eine einzelne lange Folge. Problem: dann kann es sein, dass der Bereich, der durch die prblty-function definiert ist, kein Borel-Feld ist, und vielleicht überhaupt gar kein Feld. Oder, selbst wenn, dann nicht abzählbar additiv. Lösung: einige Theoretiker der propensity können diese Schwierigkeiten überwinden, indem sie leugnen, dass es überhaupt irgendwelche logischen Verbindungen zwischen prblty und r.f. gibt. |
Kybu I H. E. Kyburg Knowledge Representation and Defeasible Reasoning New York 2013 Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 |
Reichenbach, H. | Fraassen Vs Reichenbach, H. | I 170 Mixture/Probability/prblty/Quantum Mechanics/QM/Fraassen: "mixture" or "mixed state" as opposed to "pure" state: is in quantum mechanics what the difference between micro-state and macro-state is in statistical mechanics. Two problems: (in connection with probability): 1) how mixtures are connected with pure states 2) the relation of pure states to each other. Mixture: is typically introduced in the context of uncertainty. I 171 Ignorance Interpretation/Statistical Mechanics: here you can say likewise that a gas is in macro-state D iff. it is in one of the micro-states which are compatible with D. Problem: VsIgnorance Interpretation, VsReichenbach. Degeneration/QM/prblty/Fraassen: there is usually more than one way to decompose a mixed state, then (1) is compatible with (2) 1/3 w = 1/3 w1 + 1/3 w’2 + 1/3 w’3. VsIgnorance Interpretation: 1) according to it we would now have to come to a probability >1! Namely 1 + 1/3. Because we would have to add up all probabilities of incompatible (disjoint) events. That cannot be: E.g. naive statistical interpretation: says, A) that state w’ cannot be attributed to a single particle, but only to ensembles. And that the number 1/3 expresses the relative size of the sub-ensemble w1, w2, and w3. Problem: we would have to say the same thing also for w’2 and w’3. I 172 With that we end up higher than 1 with 5 x 1/3. That cannot be. They must not overlap, otherwise a particle would simultaneously be in several pure states, which is impossible. Or B) if we may not ascribe any state to particles, we ask: which state belongs to sub-ensemble, which is the common part of the sub-ensemble w2 and w’2? Should not any part of an ensemble that is in a pure state also be in a pure state? Solution/Fraassen: weakening the ignorance interpretation: (FN 10). Then we say that the specification of state w is incomplete, that there is lost information about the nature that has been lost in the attribution of the mixed state. I 172 Metaphysics/QM/Fraassen: Thesis: usually the latter is an unintended metaphysical bonus. There is usually no physical difference. But: VsIgnorance Interpretation: 2) There is another situation in which the mixtures are formed naturally: Interaction: according to this, there are sometimes two separate systems X and Y which are isolated, but we only have one pure state for a complex system. Then it may be inconsistent to attribute a pure state each to X and Y. (Schrödinger: call this "the new specialty of QM"). Solution: certain mixed states are attributed to X and Y ("reduction of the density matrix" (FN 11). VsIgnorance Interpretation: that would make it impossible: because according to it, the attribution of a mixed state contains the assertion that the system is in reality in a pure state! According to it we can ascribe neither a pure nor a mixed state. I 183 Probability/Statements/Reichenbach/Fraassen: Solution: we should think of statements about probability in physics as related to ideal extend indefinitely long series. VsReichenbach: that contradicts his assertion that a probability statement is nothing more and nothing less than a statement about relative frequency in an actual reference class (which then also must be able to be small). Problem: how should we consider the actually finite series, as representing a random sample themselves of a non-actual infinite series? But which non-actual series? Thus a modal element is already introduced. ReichenbachVsModality/Fraassen: his approach of strict frequency is precisely an avoidance of modality. Infinite/Fraassen: let’s assume instead the pure case of an actual very long series. (To avoid modality): But how are we to interpret probability then? Reichenbach: we should focus only on the actual results (of a long series). I 184 Questions: 1) Is it consistent to say that probability is the same thing as relative frequency? I.e. they have the functions P(-) and relative frequency(-, s) the same properties? 2) Even if this is consistent, is the interpretation not too wide or too narrow? I.e. does the relative frequency introduce structures such as probability spaces that do not have the right properties, or vice versa, are some probability spaces not capable of providing a function of relative frequency (rel. Fr.) in the long run? FraassenVsReichenbach: the problem of his approach of strict frequency is that he hardly answers these questions. I 185 FraassenVsReichenbach: ...therefore we cannot say that relative frequencies are probabilities. Law of Large Numbers/Loln/Reichenbach/Fraassen: It is often said that these laws provide a connection between probability and relative frequency. They do that, but they do not allow a strict interpretation of the frequency. (FraassenVsReichenbach). |
Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 |
Reichenbach, H. | Quine Vs Reichenbach, H. | Putnam I 248/249 Fact/Definition/QuineVsReichenbach: Problem: the distinction between "fact" and "definition" on which Reichenbach was based has collapsed. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
Reichenbach, H. | Vollmer Vs Reichenbach, H. | II 123 Dimension/Vividness/Reichenbach/ Vollmer: congruence behaviour. (+). Learnable. VollmerVsReichenbach: Topology, but not the metric of spatial view could be genetically determined. |
Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988 |
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Explanation | Fraassen, B. van | I 23 Explanatory Power/criterion/theory/Fraassen: how good is explanatory power as a criterion for choosing a theory? In any case, it is one. Fraassen: thesis: the unlimited demand for explanation leads to the inevitable demand for hidden variables. (VsReichenbach/VsSmart/VsSalmon/VsSellars). Science/Explanation/Sellars/Smart/(Salmon/Reichenbach: thesis: it is imperfect as long as any regularity remains unexplained. (FraassenVs). I 100 Thesis: explanation is not an additional property beyond empirical adequacy. I 134 Def Explanation/Fraassen: Thesis: An explanation is not the same as a proposition or list of propositions, nor an argument, but an answer to a why-question. Even if explanations are propositions, of course. A theory of explanation must therefore be a theory of why-questions. I 213 Explanation/Regularity/Fraassen: Thesis: are only regularities of observable phenomena that must be explained! |
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