Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 4 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Experience | Apel | Gadamer I 452 Experience/World/Apel/Gadamer: GadamerVsReflection Philosophy: The consciousness of conditionality does not in any way cancel out the conditionality itself. It is one of the prejudices of reflection philosophy that it understands as a relationship of sentences, which is not at all on the same logical level. >Reflection philosophy, >Levels/order, >Levels of description. Apel: So the reflection argument is out of place here. For it is not at all a matter of relations of judgements that are to be kept free of contradictions, but of living conditions. The linguistic constitution of our experience of the world is capable of encompassing the most diverse living conditions(1). >Experience, >Life, >Language. 1. K. -O. Apel, Der philosophische Wahrheitsbegriff einer inhaltlich orientierten Sprachwissenschaft, Festschrift für Weisgerber, S. 25 f. (Now in: K.-O. Apel, Transformation der Philosophie, 2 vol. Frankfurt 1973, there vol. 1, p. 106—137) shows correctly that someone's talking about oneself is by no means to be understood as an objectively fixed assertion of an essence, so that a refutation of such statements by demonstrating their logical reflexivity and contradictoriness is meaningless. |
Ape I K. O. Apel Transformation der Philosophie: Band I. Sprachanalytik, Semiotik, Hermeneutik Frankfurt/M. 1994 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Picture Theory | Wittgenstein | Danto I 70/71 Image Theory/Picture Theory/Wittgenstein/Danto: thesis: the world has the same shape as the language. - Without that the world itself would be somehow linguistically in its structure i.e. more of a reflection. --- Hintikka I 67 Picture theory/Image theory/Facts/Object/Early Wittgenstein/Hintikka: when the sentence is a linguistic counterpart of the matter... I 68 ...then that connection is no relation, but the existence of a relation. - ((s) The relation of the state of affairs is the existence of the subject matter. - This is Wittgenstein's position before the Tractatus. - WittgensteinVs: Vs later - Russell: pro. I 127 Image/Image Theory/Theory of Reflection/Bild/Abbild/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: comes from Frege - is also found in Tarski again. I 131 Hintikka: thesis: the - image - theory? is in reality an anticipation of the first condition Tarski truth theory. I 132 WittgensteinVsTarski: a truth theory is inexpressible. I 132f ARb/Expressions/Representation/Image Theory/Image theory/Complex/Wittgenstein/Hintikka : not a character (E.g. - R) represents something - but the linguistic relationship attached to it - the linguistic relation is not a class of pairs of individuals (Frege value pattern) - but a real relationship - WittgensteinVsFrege - TarskiVsWittgenstein/CarnapVsWittgenstein/(s): extensional semantics. - Item/WittgensteinVsFrege: Elements of possible facts - then the relation that the - - R always corresponds to a special relation. >Correspondence theory. I 134/35 Image theory/Theory of reflection/(Abbild, Widerspiegelung)/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: no image relation, but isomorphism - (truth conditions) no theory of language, but the truth. >Truth, >Truth conditions. I 135 Can be described as theory but not expressed. (structural equivalence, isomorphism). I 141 Image theory/Theory of reflection/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: only simple sentences are images - not complex sentences - these would only be recipes for the construction of images - if you would permit this, you would have no argument for the special status of some sentences: - namely to be true. I 161 Image theory/Theory of reflection/Reflection/Tractatus/Hintikka: Image unequal reflection - illustration: require that some of the connections allowed to play some of the possible configurations of objects - but it does not follow that the reflection must be complete - i.e. not each link must speak of a possible issue - Name: no image of the object - but it can reflect it - Sentence: Image - logic: reflection of reality (Widerspiegelung, Abbild). >Reflection, >Picture. I 183 Wittgenstein/Early/Middle/late/Plant/Hintikka: Image Theory: was abandoned 1929 - Hintikka: he has never represented a perfect picture theory - later than 1929: Vs the thesis that language functions according to strict rules - Hintikka: that he might never have represented - 1934/35: new: language games. WittgensteinVsTractatus: VsReflection, VsWiderspiegelung. I 184 Language/Medium Wittgenstein 1929: physical language instead of phenomenological language - ((s) > Phenomenology/Quine) - but it is always the ordinary language. >Ordinary language. --- III 144 Language/Thought/World/Reality/Image Theory/Theory of Reflection/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: the actual relationship between language (thinking) and reality cannot be a part of reality itself - because the image B, which should reflect the ratio between A and S, would then be identical with A - hence the sentence can only schow its sense, it cannot express it. >World, >Reality, >Thought. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Proper Names | Wittgenstein | Wolf II 14 Bundle theory/names: proposed by Wittgenstein and Searle > Essential properties; >Bundle theory/Kripke. Wolf II 150 Names/Wittgenstein: I use the name N with no fixed meaning - Philosophical Investigations §79. --- Hintikka I 302/303 Name/Object/Convention/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: as long as the links between language and the world are unanalyzed name-relations, the possible connections of the symbols are determined only by their own nature - by their own nature - name-relations are conventional - but the nature of the signs states itself - if we transform signs into variables, they are only dependent on the nature of the sentence -> logical form.- Meaningless connections must be prohibited by the convention - they are not excluded by the symbols themselves - so that the reflection is maintained - late : VsReflection - late: VsName-Relation. Hintikka I 22 Names/existence/border/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: in a logically formed language all names must denote something. But one cannot specify how many objects there are. >Denotation, >Ontology. I 51 Object/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: to the widespread misconceptions about the Tractatus counts the notion that what he calls "objects" does not include any relations and properties. Hintikka: the terminological counterpart of this error is: names are logically singular terms, so that predicates (including symbols for relations) cannot fall within that definition (falsely). I 60ff Signs/relation/name/Tractatus/Wittgenstein: not the complex sign "aRb" says that it is in a certain relation to b, but that "a" stands in a certain relation to "b", says aRb. (3,1432) (quotation marks sic) - But Wittgenstein wants something else: The number of names that appear in the elementary proposition must be the same, according to Tractatus as the number of objects in the situation illustrated by the sentence. But about which situation it is, is not determined, however, solely by the name of a and b. Copi: (wrongly) thinks that Wittgenstein through the phrase "in certain respects" basically abstracts from relation-signs and performs an existential generalization. (HintikkaVsCopi). >Existential generalization. I 71 Names/existence/Wittgenstein: "I want to call 'name' only what cannot stand in the connection "X exists". And so one cannot say "Red exists" because, if red did not exist, it could not be talked about it. >Existence statements. Names/existence/Wittgenstein: the existence of an object is seen from the fact that its name is used in the language. For the logical rules of inference is then a well-formed language to be presupposed that the individual constants are not unrelated. >Individual constants. I 85 Object/name/language/Socrates/Theaetetus/Hintikka: for the original elements of which everything is composed, there is no explanation. Everything that actually exists, can only be described with names, another determination is not possible. Neither it is, nor it is not. So the language is also an interweaving of names. I 127 Elementary proposition: does not consist of a series of names for individual things that are held together by additional links, but it consists of a series of "names" for objects that belong to different but matching logic types. I 149 Picture Theory/Image Theory/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: "Names are points, sentences, arrows, they have sense. The sense is determined by the two poles of true and false." >Sense. --- II 84 Name/Meaning/Wittgenstein: the meaning of the words "Professor Moore" is not the owner - 1. the importance does not go for a walk - 2. the same words also appear in a sentence like E.g. "Professor Moore does not exist" - meaning is set within the language - by explanations. II 88 Number/Wittgenstein: the numbers in a pattern book are the names of the patterns. II 365 Name/object/Wittgenstein: between the two there is no real relationship. >Object. --- VI 71 Name/elementary proposition/Wittgenstein/Schulte: the names of the elementary proposition are fundamentally different from the nature of proper names. They are primitive signs that cannot be defined closer by any definition - but they can be explained by explanations - explanations are sentences that contain primitive signs - unlike a code elementary propositions do not obey appointment rules. VI 172 Names/WittgensteinVsFrege/Schulte: late: the owner is not the meaning of the name. --- IV 22 Name/Tractatus/Wittgenstein: the name means the object. (3.203). >Proper names. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 K II siehe Wol I U. Wolf (Hg) Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Reflection | Gadamer | I 347 Reflection/History of Effects/Hermeneutics/Gadamer: Our whole presentation about horizon formation and horizon fusion should (...) describe the full extent of the consciousness of the history of effects. >History of Effect/Gadamer, >Hermeneutics/Gadamer, >Understanding/Gadamer. But what kind of consciousness is this? Here lies the crucial problem. No matter how much one emphasizes that the consciousness of the history of effects is, as it were, inserted into the effect itself. As consciousness it seems to be essentially in the possibility to rise above what it is consciousness of. The structure of reflexivity is basically given with all consciousness. It must therefore also apply to the awareness of the history of effects. Doesn't this force us to agree with Hegel, and doesn't the absolute mediation of history and truth, as Hegel thinks, appear to be the foundation of hermeneutics? Ultimately, it is Hegel's position that legitimizes [19th century historism], even if the historians who were inspired by the pathos of experience preferred to refer to Schleiermacher and Wilhelm von Humboldt instead. GadamerVsSchleiermacher/GadamerVsHumboldt: Neither Schleiermacher nor Humboldt have really thought their position through. They may emphasize the individuality, the barrier of strangeness that our understanding has to overcome, but in the end only in an infinite consciousness the understanding finds its completion and the thought of individuality its justification. Hegel/Gadamer: It is the pantheistic enclosure of all individuality in the Absolute that makes the miracle of understanding possible. Thus, here too, being and knowledge permeate each other in I 348 the Absolute. Neither Schleiermacher's nor Humboldt's Kantianism is thus an independent systematic affirmation of the speculative completion of idealism in Hegel's absolute dialectic. The criticism of the philosophy of reflection(1) that Hegel meets, meets with them. VsHegel/Gadamer: For us it is about thinking of the historical consciousness of the effect in such a way that in the consciousness of the effect the immediacy and superiority of the work does not dissolve again into a mere reflexion reality, thus to think of a reality where the omnipotence of reflection is limited. This was precisely the point against which the criticism of Hegel was directed, and at which in truth the principle of the philosophy of reflection proved to be superior to all his critics. >Reflection/Hegel. I 350 VsReflection Philosophy/Gadamer: [The] question arises how far the dialectical superiority of reflection philosophy corresponds to a factual truth and how far it merely creates a formal appearance. The fact that the criticism of speculative thinking, which is practiced from the standpoint of finite human consciousness, contains something true, cannot be obscured by the argumentation of the philosophy of reflection in the end. >Young Hegelians/Gadamer. Examples for reflection/Gadamer: That the thesis of scepticism or relativism wants to be true itself and in this respect cancels itself out is an irrefutable argument. But does it achieve anything? The argument of reflection, which proves to be so victorious, rather strikes back at the arguing party by making the truth value of reflection appear suspicious. It is not the reality of skepticism or relativism that is affected by this, but the truth claim of formal argumentation in general. 1. The expression philosophy of reflection has been coined by Hegel against Jacobi, Kant and Fichte. Already in the title of "Glauben und Wissen" but as a "philosophy of reflection of subjectivity". Hegel himself counters it with the reflection of reason. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
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