Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Bivalence Dummett II 103
Principle of Bivalence/Truth/Dummett: PoB already presumes the concept of truth - and that is transcendental in the case of undecidable sentences - it goes beyond our ability to recognize what a manifestation would be.
II 103f
Undecidability/anti-realism/Dummett: (without bivalence) The meaning theory will then no longer be purely descriptive in relation to our actual practice.
III (a) 17
Sense/Frege: Explanation of sense by truth conditions - Tractatus: dito: "Under which circumstances" - DummettVsFrege/DummettVsWittgenstein: For that one must already know what the statement that P is true means - Vs: if they then say P is true means the same as asserting P. - VsVs: then you must already know what sense it makes to assert P! But that is exactly what should be explained. - VsRedundancy theory: we must either supplement it (not merely explain the meaning by assertion and vice versa) or abandon the bivalence.

III (b) 74
Sense/Reference/Bivalence/Dummett: bivalence: Problem: not every sentence has such a sense that in principle we can recognize it as true if it is true (e.g. >unicorns, >Goldbach’s conjecture). - But Frege’s argument does not depend at all on bivalence.
III (b) 76
Bivalence, however, works for elementary clauses: if here the semantic value is the extension, it is not necessary to be possible to decide whether the predicate is true or not - perhaps application cannot be effectively decided, but the (undefined) predicate can be understood without allocating the semantic value (truth value) - therefore distinction between sense and semantic value. >Semantic Value.

Dummett I
M. Dummett
The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988
German Edition:
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Dummett II
Michael Dummett
"What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii)
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Dummett III
M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (a)
Michael Dummett
"Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (b)
Michael Dummett
"Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144
In
Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (c)
Michael Dummett
"What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (d)
Michael Dummett
"Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (e)
Michael Dummett
"Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Correspondence Theory Searle III 163
Realism/Searle: realism should not be confused with correspondence theory. Realism is not at all a truth theory and does not imply any truth theory.
III 211
Correspondence/Searle: we need a verb to name the variety of ways in which sentences refer to facts. And this verb is "corresponding" among others. Correspondence theory/Searle: the correspondence theory is not an attempt to define "true".
III 211
Correspondence theory/StrawsonVsAustin: Strawson is considered to have won this debate. Strawson: the correspondence theory does not have to be purified, it has to be eliminated.
III 212
It gave us a false picture of the use of the word "true" and the nature of facts: that facts are a kind of complex things or events or groups of things and that truth represents a special relationship of correspondence between statements and these non-linguistic entities. (This goes back to the Tractatus image theory.)
III 215
StrawsonVsCorrespondence Theory: the correspondence theory makes the false assertion that facts are non-linguistic entities.
III 216
Deflationist truth theory/deflationism/minimalist truth theory: "true" is not a property or relation. The entire content of the concept of truth consists in quoting. Def redundancy theory: there is no difference between the statements "p" and "it is true that p". (SearleVsRedundancy Theory). >Deflationism, >redundancy theory.
III 217
These two theories are usually considered incompatible with correspondence theory.
III 220
Correspondence theory/citation cancellation: because of the definitory connections between fact and true statement, there can be no incompatibility between the correspondence criterion of truth and the citation cancellation criterion. The citation simply indicates the form of what makes any statement true, simply by repeating the statement (Tarski). We do not need additional correspondence as confirmation.
Slingshot Argument/Searle: the slingshot argument originates from Frege, was used by Quine against modal logic and revived by Davidson against the correspondence theory. >Slingshot argument.
III 230
Slingshot argument: if a true statement corresponds to a fact, then it corresponds to any fact. Therefore, the concept of correspondence is completely empty. Example final form: "the statement that snow is white corresponds to the fact that grass is green. SearleVs: this is ultimately irrelevant.
III 235
Slingshot argument: Searle: conclusion: the slingshot argument does not refute the correspondence theory.

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Redundancy Theory Austin I 234
AustinVsRedundancy Theory: the statement that A refers to the world outside - i.e. something outside this statement itself - the statement that the statement is true refers to the world including the statement that A refers to the world. - That only makes sense if the statement has already been made and verified. - The relationship between the st.that A refers to the world and the world whose existence claimed by the statement that A refers to the world is true, is purely conventional. - A statement that says of itself that it is true is just as absurd as the one that says that it was wrong.

Austin I
John L. Austin
"Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 24 (1950): 111 - 128
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Austin II
John L. Austin
"A Plea for Excuses: The Presidential Address" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 57, Issue 1, 1 June 1957, Pages 1 - 3
German Edition:
Ein Plädoyer für Entschuldigungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, Grewendorf/Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Redundancy Theory Black IV 152
Redundancy T heory/Tarski/VsRedundancy theory/BlackVsRedundancy theory: eliminates the separation of object language/meta language - ​​truth is stripped of its dignity.

Black I
Max Black
"Meaning and Intention: An Examination of Grice’s Views", New Literary History 4, (1972-1973), pp. 257-279
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg) Frankfurt/M 1979

Black II
M. Black
The Labyrinth of Language, New York/London 1978
German Edition:
Sprache. Eine Einführung in die Linguistik München 1973

Black III
M. Black
The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983

Black IV
Max Black
"The Semantic Definition of Truth", Analysis 8 (1948) pp. 49-63
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Redundancy Theory Grover, D. L. Horwich I 319
Redundancy TheoryVs / VsProsentential Theory/CGB/Camp/Grover/Belnap: Problem: Index words: John: "I m greedy." - Mary: "this is true": not clear if mere repetition. - problem: "every word of Mark could be true": no verb for "could".
I 342
Redundancy Theory /Prosentential Theory / CGB: GroverVsRedundancy Theory / CGBVsRedundancy Theory: the Pro Pack-theory does not show that is "true" is redundant! - Not as long as it is involved in pro-sentences, but rather when it is isolated.
Grover, D. L.

Gro I D. Grover, A Prosentential Theory of Thruth, Princeton New Jersey 1992

Kamp/Grover/Belnap
D. L. Grover, J L. Camp, N. D. Belnap
Philosophical Studies 27 (1) 73 – 125 (1975)

See external reference in the individual contributions.

Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Redundancy Theory Logic Texts Hoyningen-Huene II 56
E.g. "The house is beautiful" is about a house - B. "It is true that the house is beautiful" does not speak of a house, but of a statement (Hoyningen-HueneVsRedundancy Theory). ---
Read III 40
Redundancy theory VsCorrespondence theory: denies that truth is a predicate. Truth is redundant, it says, inasmuch as the predication of truth from a statement says no more than the assertion of that statement itself. "It is true that A" is the same as "A". It does not need a theory of truth, because there is no such thing as truth. Tarski's theorems are true because the right and left sides are essentially identical. They differ only by their notation.
Redundancy Theory Vs Metaphysical Object - Truth is not a property- VsRedundancy Theory: "is true" is grammatically required, truth is more than repetition: it is force and universality.
Truth is not a property - true statements have no common characteristic. (Vs "great fact") - the truth-predicate adds universality to the fact.
Logic Texts
Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988
HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998
Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997
Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983
Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001

Re III
St. Read
Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997
Redundancy Theory Meixner I 89
MeixnerVsRedundancy theory: in contrast, the standard ontological analysis provides an additional entity: three names instead of two: e.g. Regensburg and the Danube and as the third: "is situated on": this requires universals - ChisholmVs.

Mei I
U. Meixner
Einführung in die Ontologie Darmstadt 2004

Redundancy Theory Putnam Field IV 407
PutnamVsRedundancy theory: does not explain our understanding. >Understanding/Putnam. ---
Putnam VII 430
Redundancy theory: truth is not a property. cf. >Deflationism, >disquotationalism, >disquotation.

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

Putnam I (a)
Hilary Putnam
Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (b)
Hilary Putnam
Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (c)
Hilary Putnam
What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (d)
Hilary Putnam
Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (e)
Hilary Putnam
Reference and Truth
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (f)
Hilary Putnam
How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (g)
Hilary Putnam
Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (h)
Hilary Putnam
Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (i)
Hilary Putnam
Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (k)
Hilary Putnam
"Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam II
Hilary Putnam
Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988
German Edition:
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Putnam III
Hilary Putnam
Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Putnam IV
Hilary Putnam
"Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164
In
Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994

Putnam V
Hilary Putnam
Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981
German Edition:
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Putnam VI
Hilary Putnam
"Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Putnam VII
Hilary Putnam
"A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000


Field I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Field II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Field III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Field IV
Hartry Field
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994
Redundancy Theory Quine VII (i) 164
Redundancy Theory/Quine: it is doubtful whether the connection of "Fa" with "Fa is true" is analytic.
XIII 214
Redundancy Theory/QuineVsRedundancy Theory/truth/Quine: the truth has been said to disappear, because the truth of the sentence is simply the sentence. ("Disapearance theory of truth") This is wrong: the quotation marks must not be taken lightly. We can only say that the adjective "true" is dispensable if it is applied to sentences that explicitly lie before us.
Truth-predicate/true/generalization/Quine: is necessary to say that all sentences of a certain form are wrong. Or
For example, a sentence that is not literal (not literally passed down) is true or false. Or
E.g. that the slander paragraphs cannot be applied to true sentences or
E.g. that you will tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth.
N.B.: if you translate such sentences into the predicate logic, the subject of the truth- predicate is not a quotation, but a variable. These are the cases where the truth-predicate is not superfluous.
Disquotation/truth/definition/Quine: the disquotational approach may still be useful when it comes to defining truth.
Truth-Definition/truth/Quine: it identifies all discernible truths that the truth of the sentence is communicated by the sentence itself. But that is not a strict definition; it does not show us who could eliminate the adjective "true"
XIII 215
from all contexts in which it can occur grammatically. It only shows us where we can eliminate it in contexts with quotations. Paradox/Quine: we have seen above (see liar paradox) that definability can contain a self-contradiction. It is remarkable how easily definable we found truth in the present context. How easy it can be and at the same time possibly fatal.
Solution/Tarski: Separation object language/meta language.
Recursion/Tarski/Quine: shows how the truth-term is first applied to atomic sentences and then to compositions of any complexity.
Problem: Tarski could not yet define truth because of the variables. Sentences with variables can be true in some cases and false in others. (Open Sentences). Only closed sentences (where all variables are bound by quantifiers) can be true or false.
Fulfillment/Recursion/Tarski/Quine: what Tarski recursively defines is fulfillment of a sentence by an object; is not truth. These objects are then the possible values of the free variables. After that, truth trivially results as a waste product.
Def Truth/Fulfillment/Tarski: a closed sentence is true if it is fulfilled by the sequence of length 0, so to speak.
Liar Paradox/Tarski/Quine: Tarski's construction is masterly and coherent, but why doesn't it ultimately solve the paradox? This is shown by the translation into symbolic logic when the sentence is formulated in object language (see paradoxes above, last section).
Paradox/logical form/liar/Quine: the word "true" has the context "x is true" in the explicit reconstruction where "x" is the subject of quantifiers.
Problem: the recursive definition of truth and fulfillment does not show how to "fulfill x".
XIII 216
or "x is true" is eliminated. Solution: this only works if "x is true" or "fulfilled" is predicated by an explicitly given open or closed sentence.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Redundancy Theory Searle III 216
Def Redundancy Theory: there is no difference between the statements "p" and "it is true that p". (SearleVsRedundancy Theory).
III 217
These two theories are believed to be usually incompatible with the correspondence theory. >Correspondence theory.
III 219
Disquotation/Searle: disquotation tells us only for each individual case, what it is what makes statements true. >Disquotation.
III 223
SearleVsRedundancy Theory: the illusion of redundancy arises from the fact that at disquotation the left side looks like the right.
III 227
SearleVsRedundancy Theory: "true" is not redundant, we need a metalinguistic predicate to evaluate the success. >Metalanguage.
III 223ff
SearleVsRedundancy Theory: there is the illusion that in the disquotation the right side looks as the left. "Is true" is an evaluation of statements. > Rorty: "is true" is a "compliment". >Truth/Rorty.

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Redundancy Theory Tugendhat I 252
Redundancy theory / Tugendhat: there is a surplus in the expression ’p’ incomparison to the incomplete expression ’that p’ - it is this plus that the addition of ’is true’ expressed - that is not at all trivial. - It would be trivial if one presupposes that one already understands the use of assertoric sentences - "true" can be eliminated - (Tugendhat per redundancy theory)
I 266
TugendhatVsredundancy theory: if truth is necessary for determining the meaning of a sentence (by truth conditions), then "true" should not be eliminable.
I 315
Redundancy theory / Tugendhat: presupposes that the difference between ("it is said") "that p" and "p" is already understood.

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992

Redundancy Theory Foucault II 115ff
Statement/Foucault: at first sight the statement appears as the last, indissociable element, which can be isolated and can enter into a play with other elements. A point without surface. Problem: if the statement is the elementary unity of the discourse, what is it then? What are their distinguishing traits? What limits do you have to recognize? For example redundancy theory: the question of whether in logic "A" and "it is true that A" are interchangeable. Foucault: as statements they are not equivalent and not interchangeable. (FoucaultVsRedundancy Theory). They cannot be in the same place in the discourse.
E.g. the present King of France is bald: can only be analyzed by recognizing in the form of a single statement two different propositions, each of which can be true or false. (Strawson: utterance, point of time).
E.g. "I am lying": can only be true in a relation to a claim at a lower level.
The criteria for the identity of a proposition do not apply to the description of the particular unit of a statement.

Foucault I
M. Foucault
Les mots et les choses: Une archéologie des sciences humaines , Paris 1966 - The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, New York 1970
German Edition:
Die Ordnung der Dinge. Eine Archäologie der Humanwissenschaften Frankfurt/M. 1994

Foucault II
Michel Foucault
l’Archéologie du savoir, Paris 1969
German Edition:
Archäologie des Wissens Frankfurt/M. 1981

Speech Act Theory Austin Husted III 240ff
Speech Act Theory: expressive function, accuracy, adequacy VsRedundancy Theory (p = "it is true that p").
Speech Act/Austin: Def lokutionary act: enunciation - E.g. you give an example of the meaningful sentence "the bull is going" - perlocutionary: effect by using the statement - E.g. warning with this sentence - illocutionary: you frighten the listener - III 245 in addition: fulfilling conditions as a "plus" to the statement: the warranty given by the speaker -> Brandom, account Management - II 247 speech act theory -VsLogical Positivism: more than just the two functions 1st description of reality, 2nd expression of emotions - speech acts belong to neither of these two categories - III 248 AustinVsWittgenstein: per continuous similarity - sp. th: shows its strength here.

Austin I
John L. Austin
"Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 24 (1950): 111 - 128
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Austin II
John L. Austin
"A Plea for Excuses: The Presidential Address" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 57, Issue 1, 1 June 1957, Pages 1 - 3
German Edition:
Ein Plädoyer für Entschuldigungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, Grewendorf/Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995


Husted I
Jörgen Husted
"Searle"
In
Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993

Husted II
Jörgen Husted
"Austin"
In
Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993

Husted III
Jörgen Husted
"John Langshaw Austin"
In
Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993

Husted IV
Jörgen Husted
"M.A. E. Dummett. Realismus und Antirealismus
In
Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke (Hg) Hamburg 1993

Husted V
J. Husted
"Gottlob Frege: Der Stille Logiker"
In
Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993
Statements Foucault II 115ff
Statement/Foucault: at first sight the statement appears as the last, indissociable element, which can be isolated and can enter into a play with other elements. A point without surface. Problem: if the statement is the elementary unit of the discourse, what is it then? What are their distinguishing traits? What limits do you have to recognize? For example, the question of whether the logic "A" and "it is true that A" are interchangeable. Foucault: as statements they are not equivalent and not interchangeable. (FoucaultVsRedundancy Theory). They cannot be in the same place in the discourse.
For example, the bald king can only be analyzed by recognizing in the form of a single statement two different propositions, each of which can be true or false. (Strawson: utterance, point of time).
E.g. "I am lying": can only be true in a relation to a claim at a lower level.
The criteria for the identity of a proposition do not apply to the description of the particular unit of a statement.
Statement/Foucault: As an example, which is not a statement, could I doodle a few letters? For example, would the letters in a case-room be reasonably regarded as statements? The two examples are not on the same level.
The series of letters Q W E R T Z on a typewriter is not a statement. But the same in a textbook for machine-writing is a statement.
It will not require a regular linguistic constellation for a statement. On the other hand, there is not enough material accumulation.
Statement: is thus an existence function, which is a characteristic of the signs. There are no structural unitary criteria, but one function. This function is not a unit.
Statement: cannot have its own character, is inappropriate for an adequate definition.

Foucault I
M. Foucault
Les mots et les choses: Une archéologie des sciences humaines , Paris 1966 - The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, New York 1970
German Edition:
Die Ordnung der Dinge. Eine Archäologie der Humanwissenschaften Frankfurt/M. 1994

Foucault II
Michel Foucault
l’Archéologie du savoir, Paris 1969
German Edition:
Archäologie des Wissens Frankfurt/M. 1981

Truth Conditions Dummett II 72
Truth Conditions/Dummett: Truth conditions are assumed to be given. - But only for each type of speech act. - A theory of >force must then distinguish between question, command, etc. Being able to specify truth conditions = being able to paraphrase the sentence, not just adding the predicate "true"! - The truth conditions themselves may not presume understanding of the sentence precisely then when the sentence is to be explained. - ((s) But you have to know what the sentence means, if you want to judge whether the fact is given, or whether a paraphrase is correct).
II 95
Truth Conditions/Dummett: E.g. observation of what it means for a tree to be bigger. - Observation of skills: cannot figure out in principle in what exactly the ability consists (the truth conditions for the attribution of skills are needed).
II 100
Truth Conditions/Dummett: you cannot know them if you cannot tell when they are satisfied. ---
III (a) 17
Sense/Frege: An explanation of sense has to be given by truth conditions. - Tractatus/Wittgenstein: dito: Under which circumstances is a sentence true... DummettVsFrege/DummettVsWittgenstein: for this one must already know what the statement that "P is true" means.
Vs: if that means that P is true, it means the same as asserting P.
VsVs: then you must already know what sense it makes to assert P! But that is exactly what was to be explained.
VsRedundancy Theory: we must either supplement it (not merely explain meaning by assertion and vice versa) or abandon the bivalence.
III (c) 122
Thinking-to-be-true/Dummett: the conditions for this are specified by the truth theory! Problem: the truth conditions are not always recognizable, even if met.
Solution: to think that something is true requires only knowledge of the truth conditions, not knowing whether they are fulfilled.

Dummett I
M. Dummett
The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988
German Edition:
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Dummett II
Michael Dummett
"What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii)
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Dummett III
M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (a)
Michael Dummett
"Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (b)
Michael Dummett
"Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144
In
Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (c)
Michael Dummett
"What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (d)
Michael Dummett
"Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (e)
Michael Dummett
"Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982


The author or concept searched is found in the following 12 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Quine, W.V.O. Field Vs Quine, W.V.O. I 129
Nominalism/Philosophy of Science/FieldVsQuine-Putnam Argument: An argument to show that nominalistic resources are adequate for good science would be: (E) For each Platonic scientific theory there is a nominalist theory to which the Platonic one is a conservative extension. But this is trivial if there are no restrictions regarding which sets of sentences that have been completed under a logical entailment count as theories. Of course, any Platonic theory T is a conservative extension of the "theory" which consists of nominalistic inferences from T. We have to reinforce (E) so that uninteresting nominalistic theories are excluded. Science Without Numbers: here I did not argue with (E). (E) or any amplifying extension is an existence assertion of a sufficiently wide variation of nominalist theories, and that goes beyond the assertion of the conservatism of mathematical theory.
I 241
Conservatism/Mathematics/Field: Truth does not require conservatism! True empirical theories are obviously not conservative! But conservatism is certainly also recognized by most realists for mathematics. For they say that good mathematics is not only true, but necessarily true! Conservatism/Field: (see above) conservative mathematics has the properties of necessary truth, without having to be true itself! Quine: is a realist in terms of mathematics. He wants to nip talk of mathematical necessity in the bud. But for that he needs conservatism. FieldVsQuine: for that he would have to make a major renovation to his thesis that mathematics continuously flows into the rest of the other sciences. Logic/Empiricism/Quine: Thesis: logic could be empirically refuted. Conservatism/Field: The fact that mathematics is empirically refuted is consistent with that, while the logic remains intact.
IV 407
Internal Realism/IR/Existence/Ontology/Property/Putnam: what kind of objects exist can only be decided within a theory, according to the IR. FieldVsPutnam: I’m not sure I understand what he means. I suppose he thinks there are several correct theories that answer the question of ontology differently. But this is too trivial. sharper: (Put p 72 74.) two equally correct theories may have different ontologies. PutnamVsRedundancy Theory: does not offer an explanation of our understanding. FieldVsPutnam: this implied neither mind-independence nor theory-dependence, however! And it does not refute the correspondence theory. E.g. you can explain the behavior of electrically charged bodies with or without the assumption of fields. Ontology/Existence/Field: most of us would say that there is more than we are forced to assert. FieldVsQuine: E.g. is rarely critical to assert the existence of unseparated rabbit parts in addition to the existence of rabbits. FieldVsPutnam: if this is clear, then you can hardly draw anti-realistic conclusions from the fact that two equally good theories may differ in ontology.

Field I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Field II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Field III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Field IV
Hartry Field
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994
Ramsey, F. P. Grover Vs Ramsey, F. P. Horwich I 319
VsRedundancy Theory/VsRamsey/Camp, Grover, Belnap/CGB/Grover: the first two objections assume that the data base is too narrow, i.e. that there are cases that are not covered by the theory. (See Redundancy Theory).
I 320
1)
Index words: (Here: repetition of indices): (14) John: I’m greedy - Mary: That is true Problem: here no mere repetition, or else she would say "I am,..." Problem: there is no general scheme for such cases. 2)
Modification: Here, a translation is absolutely impossible: (here with indirect reference and quantification):
(15) Every thing that Mark said could be true Problem: there is no verb for "could". Similar:
(16) Something that Charlie said is either true or not true.
(17) Everything that Judith said was true then, but none of it is still true today. Of course you can try:
(15’)(p) Mark said that p > It could be the case that p) or
(15’)(p) (Mark said that p > that might p exist) Vs: "being the case" and "existing" are variations of "being true". This would make the redundancy theory a triviality. In this case, Ramsey’s "direct" theory would be wrong. CGBVsRamsey: we improve the redundancy theory by we let by not only allowing propositional quantification for the target language, but also an indeterminate field of links, such as M (for "might"), "P" (for past tense), "~" for negation, etc.
I 321
The reader has likely already assumed that we have introduced the negation long ago. But that’s not true. Then: (16’)(p) (Mark said that p > Mp)
(17’)(Ep) (Charlie said that p & (p v ~p))
(17’)(p) (Judith said that p > (Pp & ~p))
Redundancy Theory/Ramsey/CGB: it is this variant of the theory of Ramsey, enriched by the above links and propositional quantification, which we call redundancy theory (terminology) from now on. The thesis is that "true" thus becomes superfluous. Thesis this allows translations in Ramseyan sense to be found always.
VsRedundancy Theory/VsRamsey: 3) "About"/Aboutness/Accuracy of the Translation/CGB: some authors: argue that "snow is white" is about snow, and "That snow is white, is true" is about the proposition. And that therefore the translation must fail.
CGB: this involves the paradox of analysis. We do not directly touch upon it. ((s) Paradox of analysis, here: you’d have to act more stupid than you are in order not to realize that both sentences are about snow; to be able to name the problem at all (as the opponents do) you need to have it solved already.)
4)
PragmatismVsRedundancy Theory: even if the translation preserves the alleged content, it neglects other features which should be preserved. Case of recurrence: E.g.
(3) Mary: Snow is white. John: That is true.
(3’) Mary: Snow is white. John: Snow is white. Is that supposed to be a good translation?.
I 322
Strawson: "true" and "not true" have their own jobs to do!. Pro-Sentence/Pronoun/Anaphora/"True"/CGB: "that is true" presupposes that there is an antecedent. But that is not yet taken into account in Ramsey’s translation (3’). So Ramsey’s translation fails in pragmatic terms.
VsPropositional Quantification/PQ/VsRedundancy Theory/VsRamsey/CGB: 4) redundancy: at what price? Propositional quantification is mysterious: it is not consistent with everyday language. It is not shown that "is true" is superfluous in German, but only in a curious ad hoc extension. 5) Grammar: (already anticipated by Ramsey): variables need predicates that are connected with them, even if these variables take sentence position. CGBVsRamsey: unfortunately, Ramsey’s response is not convincing. Ramsey: (see above) "p" already contains a (variable) verb. We can assume the general sentence form as aRb here, then.
I 232
(a)(R)(b): If he says aRb, then aRb). Here,"is true" would be a superfluous addition. CGBVsRamsey: We must assume an infinite number of different sentence forms ((s)> language infinite). Redundancy Theory/CGB: But that does not need to worry us. 1) Propositional quantification can be set up formally and informally proper. 2) Variables which take sentences as substituents do not need a verb that is connected to them. That this was the case, is a natural mistake which goes something like this:
E.g.(4’) (p)(John says p > p).
If we use pronouns that simplify the connected variable:
For each sentence, if John said it, it then it.
Heidelberger: (1968): such sentences have no essential predicate!.
Solution/Ramsey:
(4’) For each sentence, if John said that it is true, then it is true. T-Predicate/CGB: "T": reads "is true".
(4’) (p) (John said that Tp > Tp) Problem: because "T" is a predicate, and "Tp" is a sentence, "p" must be a term of the language, i.e. it must take a nominal position. I.e. the quantifiers bind individual variables (of a certain type), and not variables about sentences.
I 335
Disappearance Cases/Pro-Sentence: some of them can be regarded as a translation in Ramsey language. Def Ramsey Language/CGB/(s): Language in which "true" is entirely superfluous. English*/CGBVsRamsey: for the purpose of better explanation. E.g. (26) It is true that snow is white, but in Pittsburgh it rarely looks white.
(27) It is true that there was unwarranted violence by the IRA, but it is not true that none of their campaigns was justified. T-Predicate/CGB: used in (25) and (26) to concede a point in order to determine afterwards by "but" that not too much emphasis should be placed on it. English*.
I 336: E.g.
(26’) There was unwarranted violence by the IRA, that’s true, but it is not true that none of their campaigns was justified. These are all disappearance cases.
I 342
VsProsentential Theory/Spurious Objections/CGB:
I 343
Index Words: Laziness pro-sentences refer to their antecedent. Therefore, the theory must be refined further when it comes to indexical expressions. Otherwise E.g. John: "I’m lazy." Mary: "That’s true." Is not to say that Mary means "I (Mary) am lazy". CGB: but that’s a common problem which occurs not only when speaking about truth: E.g. John: My son has a wart on his nose. Bill: He is the spitting image of his father. E.g. Lucille: You dance well. Fred: That’s new to me. Pragmatics/CGBVsRamsey: our approach represents it correctly, in particular, because we exclude "plagiarism". Ramsey’s theory does not.
I 344
Quote/VsPro-Sentence Theory/VsCGB: The pro-sentence theory is blamed to ignore cases where truth of quotes, i.e. names of sentences, is expressed. E.g. (27) "Snow is white" is true. CGB: We could say with Ramsey, that (27) simply means that snow is white. CGBVsRamsey: that obscures important pragmatic features of the example. They become more apparent when we use a foreign language translation. E.g.
(28) If "snow is white" is true, then... Why (28) instead of If it’s true that snow is white, then or If snow is white, then... CGB: There are several possible reasons for this. It may be that we want to make clear that the original sentence was said in German. Or it is possible that there is no elegant translation, or we are not sufficiently familiar with German grammar. Or E.g. "snow is white" must be true, because Fritz said it, and everything Fritz says is true.
I 345
Suppose, English* had a possibility to present a sentence formally: E.g. "consider __".
(29) Consider: Snow is white. This is true. CGB: why should it not work just like "Snow is white is true" in normal English? VsCGB: it could be argued that this requires a reference on sentences or expressions, because quotation marks are name-forming functors. Quotation Marks/CGB: we depart from this representation! Quotation marks are not name-forming functors.
I 353
Propositional Variable/Ramsey: Occupies sentence position. (Quantification over propositions). CGBVsRamsey: Such variables are of pro-sentential nature. Therefore, they should not be connected to a T-predicate. ((s) otherwise, "true" appears twice). T-Predicate/Ramsey/Redundancy Theory/CGB: this answers the old question of whether a Ramsey language has to contain a T-predicate: see below. Our strategy is to show how formulas can be read in English*, where there is no separable T-predicate. E.g. (4’) For each proposition, if John says it is true, then it is true. CGB: in this case,propositional variables and quantificational pro-sentences do the same job. Both take sentence position and have the cross-reference that is required of them. Important argument: (4’) is just the candidate for a normal English translation of (4’). Problem: this could lead to believing that a Ramsey language needs a T-predicate, as in
(4’) (p)(John said that Tp > Tp). ((s) then, "true" implicitly appears twice).
I 354
But since (4’) is perfect English, there is no reason to assume that the T-predicate is re-introduced by that. Or that it contains a separately bound "it" (them).

Grover I
D. L. Grover
Joseph L. Camp
Nuel D. Belnap,
"A Prosentential Theory of Truth", Philosophical Studies, 27 (1975) pp. 73-125
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Redundancy Theory Austin Vs Redundancy Theory I 19
AustinVsRedundancy theory: a statement has other functions than just being true or false. Statements, not propositions (as in Tarski), are candidates for the predicates "true" and "false". "Is true" describes a satisfactory relationship between words and the world. (StrawsonVs). ---
I 234
AustinVsRedundancy theory: it has been argued that saying that an assertion is true is not another assertion. It is logically redundant. Austin: but that’s not true. DAdA refers to the world outside of dAdA. That is, to everything except this statement itself! DAdAW refers to the world including dAdA, although the statement itself, i.e. dAdAW, in turn is excluded! DadAW is appropriate only if one imagines that dAdA is already made and verified.
---
I 236
AustinVsRedundancy theory: a statement that says that it is true is just as absurd as one with the content that it is wrong itself! The crreation of hierarchies formation is not a solution either. ---
Strawson II 263
AustinVsRedundancy Theory: AustinVsRamsey and StrawsonVsRamsey: we contradict the thesis that the expression "is true" is logically superfluous. "True" has its own tasks. When we use it, we do not simply assert that something is so, we assert it as we could not do it if certain conditions were not fulfilled. We can also grant, deny, confirm something etc. StrawsonVsAustin: but that does not mean the assumption of the thesis that we assert something about a statement by the use of "true". It is not a new assertion at all!
II 265
By looking ((s) by pointing) one can also determine whether a statement is true without the performative use of "true". E.g. someone reported, "he saw that the statement was true". What does he report? He reports that I've seen a cat on the mat. But only in certain circumstances. This also means that one has heard such a statement.

Austin I
John L. Austin
"Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 24 (1950): 111 - 128
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Austin II
John L. Austin
"A Plea for Excuses: The Presidential Address" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 57, Issue 1, 1 June 1957, Pages 1 - 3
German Edition:
Ein Plädoyer für Entschuldigungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, Grewendorf/Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Strawson I
Peter F. Strawson
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959
German Edition:
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Strawson II
Peter F. Strawson
"Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit",
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Strawson III
Peter F. Strawson
"On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Strawson IV
Peter F. Strawson
Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992
German Edition:
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Strawson V
P.F. Strawson
The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966
German Edition:
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Strawson VI
Peter F Strawson
Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Strawson VII
Peter F Strawson
"On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950)
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993
Redundancy Theory Black Vs Redundancy Theory IV 155
Truth/Tarski/Philosophy/Everyday language/Black: then one could say that "true" is an "incomplete symbol", a part of the assertion stroke "I-". Redundancy theory/BlackVsRedundancy theory: with that truth will lose its dignity. One might tend to call "true" "redundant".
IV 156
Redundancy/Definition/Black: in this sense, every defined character is redundant (eliminable). Truth/Everyday language/Black: We do not need to fear that the paradoxes occur again, because we can always stratify (distinguish semantic types).
Truth/Everyday language/Philosophy/Tarski/Black: Thesis: a "philosophical t-theory will bring little more than platitudes and tautologies".

Black I
Max Black
"Meaning and Intention: An Examination of Grice’s Views", New Literary History 4, (1972-1973), pp. 257-279
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg) Frankfurt/M 1979

Black II
M. Black
The Labyrinth of Language, New York/London 1978
German Edition:
Sprache. Eine Einführung in die Linguistik München 1973

Black III
M. Black
The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983

Black IV
Max Black
"The Semantic Definition of Truth", Analysis 8 (1948) pp. 49-63
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994
Redundancy Theory Brandom Vs Redundancy Theory I 434
E.g. Vsredundancy theory "Goldbach s conjecture is true".
I 438
This sentence is not interchangeable with "Goldbach s conjecture".VsRamsey. E.g. »everything the oracle says is true," is not open to simpler approaches of redundancy and disquotation.
I 468
Brandom: "true" expresses a pro-sentence-forming operator. Its syntax and grammar is very different from that of a predicate. Just as "no" is not the necessary grammatical form to pick out a person .

Bra I
R. Brandom
Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994
German Edition:
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001
German Edition:
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001
Redundancy Theory Dewey Vs Redundancy Theory Brandom I 418
Dewey: the assertion that "I assert that p" and "it is true that p" have the same force can easily be misunderstood as if the expressed facts were the same. (Vsredundancy theory). (> Wright).

Dew II
J. Dewey
Essays in Experimental Logic Minneola 2004

Bra I
R. Brandom
Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994
German Edition:
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001
German Edition:
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001
Redundancy Theory Searle Vs Redundancy Theory III 216
Def Redundancy Theory: there is no difference between the statements "p" and "it is true that p". (SearleVsRedundancy Theory).
III 217
These two theories are believed to be usually incompatible with the correspondence theory. >Correspondence theory.
III 219
Disquotation/Searle: disquotation tells us only for each individual case, what it is what makes statements true. >Disquotation.
III 223
SearleVsRedundancy Theory: the illusion of redundancy arises from the fact that at disquotation the left side looks like the right.
III 227
SearleVsRedundancy Theory: "true" is not redundant, we need a metalinguistic predicate to evaluate the success. >Metalanguage.

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005
Redundancy Theory Tugendhat Vs Redundancy Theory III 196
Truth/Tugendhat: but one cannot completely do without verification. Of course a judgement is also true if it is not recognized as true. But what the truth of a judgment means can of course only be determined with regard to the way we recognize it. We would not know how to ask for the truth. Thus the word "truth" would lose all meaning! TugendhatVsRedundancy Theory: if the meaning of "true" is exhausted in that we replace "p" is true" by "p", then any question about the truth of judgments is irrelevant. We would only have the judgments themselves, and would not understand what it would mean to ask beyond them.

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992
Redundancy Theory Verschiedene Vs Redundancy Theory HH II 56
Hoyningen-HueneVsredundancy theory: The statement A and "it is true that A" are different. Example A 1 and "it is true that A" here are different combinations played out. Result: there are two different connectives linked to the same truth table. This shows that the tables do not specify the connectives clearly.   Example A: "The house is beautiful" is about a house - B. "It is true that the house is beautiful", is not of a house but of a statement!




Redundancy Theory Cresswell Vs Redundancy Theory II 37
Redundancy theory/Reference/T-predicate/Cresswell: according to the redundancy theory "it is true that a" has the same referee as "a". CresswellVsRedundancy theory: is wrong here! (because of the propositional attitude). The redundancy theory cannot be applied to sentences that attribute prop propositional attitude.
that: is used independently because of other predicates that are also included in the sentence, apart from "is true".
T-predicate: "is true" is used because other complementary sentences may occur as well.
Ex
(9) What Helen said is true. ((s) "All he said").
Redundancy/Cresswell: arises only if one connects the two predicates. ((s) taken for itself in each particular case, redundancy is not a context-independent phenomenon).
T-predicate/Cresswell: is then ambiguous itself: Then there are two possibilities:
a) as paradox-forming: as a predicate of sentences.
b) as harmless predicate of propositions.
ad (9) we assume here - like most authors - that the meaning of (9) is unclear, as long as we do not know which T-predicate exists here.

Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984
Redundancy Theory Ramsey Vs Redundancy Theory Horwich I 213
Redundancy Theory/RamseyVsRedundancy Theory/Ramsey: (Foundations of Mathematics, p. 142f)(1): there are statements from which we cannot eliminate "true" and "false" in everyday language. (143).(2)

1. F. P. Ramsey, The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays 2013
2. L. Jonathan Cohen, "Mr. Strawson's Analysis of Truth", in Analysis 10, (1950), pp. 136-40, in: Paul Horwich (ed.) Theories of Truth, Aldershot 1994

Ramsey I
F. P. Ramsey
The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays 2013

Ramsey II
Frank P. Ramsey
A contribution to the theory of taxation 1927

Ramsey III
Frank P. Ramsey
"The Nature of Truth", Episteme 16 (1991) pp. 6-16
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Redundancy Theory Meixner Vs Redundancy Theory I 89
MeixnerVsRedundancy Theory/Meixner: is a mere triviality: the sentence "Fritz is a human" is true, "because Fritz is a human to t". In contrast, ontological standard analysis certainly provides an analysis and a further entity:
I 90
Example Regensburg, the Danube, and as a further entity "situated at". Thus three names occur! The needed universal. ((s) ChisholmVs: "situated at" is not a property.).

Mei I
U. Meixner
Einführung in die Ontologie Darmstadt 2004

The author or concept searched is found in the following disputes of scientific camps.
Disputed term/author/ism Pro/Versus
Entry
Reference
Redundancy Theory Versus Horwich I 161
ThomsonVsRedundancy Theory? BlackVsRedundancy Theory?).

Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Redundancy Theory Versus Horwich I 430
Redundancy Theory: truth is not a property - correspondence theory VsRedundancy Theory.

Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994