Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 34 entries.
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Entry
Reference
Beginning Sandel Brocker I 672
Beginning/Initial State/Criteria/SandelVsRawls/Sandel: what is the criterion for "plausibility" or "reasonability" that underlies this construction of a initial state for a society to be built in Rawls? Problem: there is already a certain philosophical anthropology underlying it, which presupposes that social relations, that intersubjectivity is not constitutive for the identity of subjects at all.(1)

1. Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, Cambridge/New York 1998 (zuerst 1982), p. 48.


Markus Rothhaar, “Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice” in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018

Sand I
Michael Sandel
The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self 1984


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Climate Justice Cosmopolitanism Norgaard I 325
Climate Justice/Cosmopolitanism: The cosmopolitan approach argues that obligations of justice apply across borders as well as within, deriving these obligations in some cases from actual causal interrelationships (e.g. Pogge 2002)(1), sometimes from universal extension of the same egalitarian premises that ground nationally entered theories of justice (Singer 1972(2); Caney 2005b(3)), or both (Beitz 1979(4); Moellendorf 2002(5)). Rejection of such obligation typically relies on the argument that either a shared culture (e.g. Rawls 1999)(6), shared nationality (Miller 1995)(7) or a shared sovereignty (Nagel 2005)(8) is required for the existence of obligations of justice, though proponents of such views —‘communitarians’ taken loosely—do usually advocate beneficence towards persons outside the community.
Norgaard I 326
Climate Justice/Climate Costs/VsRawls/Cosmopolitism: While not all the philosophers who have written on climate change are otherwise engaged in debates about cosmopolitanism (…) most conclude that claims of justice do apply to the international distribution of the costs and benefits of climate policy. However, many authors have still found it necessary to engage John Rawls's famous dismissal of cosmopolitan justice claims (Rawls 1999)(6); most conclude that the inescapable causal relationships of climate change render Rawls's position no longer supportable, if it ever was (see e.g. Vanderheiden 2008)(9). >Climate Costs/Cosmopolitanism, >Climate Costs/Shue/Singer. Cosmopolitanism/Climate Costs/VsRawls/Nagel/Miller/Rawls: Rawls argued that the social ties required to make possible a contractarian theory of justice, like that of ‘original position’ bargaining, do not exist across national borders, and that only ‘well‐ordered societies’—in practice, nations—could plausibly be bound by such a standard of justice. The theories of Nagel and Miller make similar claims on slightly different grounds.
VsRawls: (…) such an argument fails when the status quo involves the imposition of significant cross‐border harms, as from greenhouse pollution; any rejection of international justice claims therefore becomes a de facto endorsement of the right to do harm to non‐citizens, which Rawls did not in fact endorse. And of course the fact that, considered as a resource, the atmosphere is not territorially bound (that is, it is a globally ‘open access’ resource) implies a need for global cooperation, providing further justification for cosmopolitan obligations (Vanderheiden 2008(9); Moellendorf 2009 (10)).



1. Pogge, T. 2002. World Poverty and Human Rights. Cambridge: Polity Press.
2. Singer, P. 1972. Famine, affluence, and morality. Philosophy & Public Affairs 1: 229–43.
3. Caney, S. 2005b. Justice beyond Borders: A Global Political Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
4. Beitz, C. R. 1979. Political Theory and International Relations. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
5. Moellendorf, D. 2002. Cosmopolitan Justice. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
6. Rawls, J. 1999. The Law of Peoples. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
7. Miller, D. 1995. On Nationality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
8. Nagel, T. 2005. The problem of global justice. Philosophy & Public Affairs 33: 113–47.
9. Vanderheiden, S. 2008. Atmospheric Justice: A Political Theory of Climate Change. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
10. Moellendorf, D. 2009. Global Inequality Matters. New York: Palgrave MacMillan.



Baer, Paul: “International Justice”, In: John S. Dryzek, Richard B. Norgaard, David Schlosberg (eds.) (2011): The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press.


Norgaard I
Richard Norgaard
John S. Dryzek
The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society Oxford 2011
Communitarianism Walzer Mause I 198
Communitarianism/Walzer: puts the community above the autonomy of the individual. WalzerVsRawls: Walzer does not establish principles. Assumptions such as that of a primordial social state or the idea of individuals who are free of historical, political and social references are too abstract or too far removed from life.


Mause I
Karsten Mause
Christian Müller
Klaus Schubert,
Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018
Contract Theory Nussbaum Brocker I 900
Contract Theory/NussbaumVsRawls/Nussbaum: Nussbaum does not consider John Rawls' contract-theoretically founded approach, which spells out basic resources in the sense of primary goods, to be convincing. An approach based on resources rather than capabilities cannot address special demands and differences. In this respect, Nussbaum criticizes Rawls's contextualist turn, by which he limits his conception to Western tradition contexts, as a false answer to critique (cf. HonnethVsRawls, Honneth 1992)(1). See >Capabilities/Nussbaum, >Capabilities/Sen.

1. A. Honneth »Einleitung«, in: ders. (ed.), Kommunitarismus. Eine Debatte über die moralischen Grundlagen moderner Gesellschaften, Frankfurt/M./New York 1993, 7-17.


Sandra Seubert, „Martha C. Nussbaum, Women and Human Development (2000)“, in:Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Contract Theory Sandel Brocker I 675
Contract Theory/Sandel: for the political philosophy of modern times from Hobbes to Kant, the idea of contracts is so attractive not least because, according to its model, the establishment of states and legal systems can be thought of as an act of a free agreement of previously unattached individuals with different interests and life plans. The formal nature of the procedure and the free consent of all parties is crucial. SandelVsRawls: Rawls is not, however, concerned with justifying the establishment of a state and legal order in general, but with justifying certain substantive principles of justice.
Problem: Rawls then has to justify certain principles in content with a purely formal criterion. He succeeds only by dropping the idea of justification by negotiation in favor of a derivation of principles from his implicit subjectivity theory (see Subjectivity/Sandel). See Veil of Ignorance/Sandel.
The "conclusion of a contract" is therefore not based on a free agreement but - in the Kantian sense of the word - on the realization that implies such a conceived practical subjectivity in terms of principles of justice from the outset. (1)


1. Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, Cambridge/New York 1998 (zuerst 1982), p. 130, 132.

Markus Rothhaar, “Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice” in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018

Sand I
Michael Sandel
The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self 1984


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Difference Principle Sandel Brocker I 674
Difference Principle/SandelVsRawls/Sandel: the difference principle states that social and economic inequalities only have a right to exist if they bring the greatest possible advantage to the least beneficiaries in a society. (1) Sandel: does not deny that in an assumed initial situation for a society to be established (see Veil of ignorance/Rawls), this leads to subjects choosing in their own interest a principle that is as advantageous as possible for the less beneficiaries (since they do not know whether they themselves will belong to the less beneficiaries). See Rawls/Nozick).
Solution/Sandel: one can only defend Rawls against Nozick's accusations if one assumes that the talents that lead to different social and economic positions are not at all the talents of individual individuals, but talents that are ascribed from the outset to the community of all subjects behind the "veil of ignorance. (2)
Problem: that would run counter to Rawl's own theory of intersubjectivity. (See Subjectivity/Sandel); more entries on >difference principle.


1. John Rawls, Theorie der Gerechtigkeit,1975, (engl. 1971) p. 96.
2. Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, Cambridge/New York 1998 (zuerst 1982), p. 101, 141.


Markus Rothhaar, “Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice” in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018

Sand I
Michael Sandel
The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self 1984


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Equality Singer I IX
Equality/Animal/Human/Equal rights/Ethics/P. Singer: thesis: my book Practical Ethics fights the attitude that all members of the human species would have higher-ranked rights solely because of their belonging to this species. P. SingerVs: it would be unphilosophical to forbid any comparisons beyond a species. This is about injustice that we inflict on animals and the damage we do to our environment.
---
I 16
Equality/ethics/P. Singer: what does it actually mean when we say that all people are equal? Problem: the more we investigate individual cases, the more the belief in the universal validity of the principle of equality disappears. Example:
Intelligence/Jensen/Eysenk/P. Singer: (Debate in the 1970s between Arthur Jensen, psychologist UC Berkeley and Hans Jürgen Eysenk, psychology at the University of London):
---
I 17
Question: to what extent do variances of intelligence depend on genetic differences? This dispute was again taken up by Herrstein/Murray The Bell Curve, 1994.
Racism: the critics of these authors say their theses, if justified, would justify racial discrimination. Are they right?
Similar problem: was Larry Summers a sexist when he - at that time president of the Harvard University - claimed biological factors in connection with difficulties to appoint more women to chairs in mathematics and sciences?
Similar question: should disadvantaged groups receive special preferential treatment in access to jobs or to the university?
P. Singer: Differences between genders and differences between giftedness exist in any case.
Range property/John Rawls: (in Rawls, Theory of Justice) if one belongs to a domain, one simply has the property to belong to this domain and all within the domain have this property alike.
---
I 18
Equality/Rawls/P. Singer: Rawl's thesis: a moral attitude is the basis for equality. VsRawls: 1. One might object that this is a gradual matter.
2. Small children are not capable of having a moral personality.
Solution/Rawls: small children are potentially moral personalities.
---
I 19
VsRawls: Rawls does not provide a solution for people with irreparable impairments. ---
I 20
Suffer/Interest/Third person/P. Singer: Problem: we have to explain whether the pain of a certain person is less undesirable than that of another person. ---
I 20
Interest/P. Singer: Principle: When it comes to equality, we should weigh interests as interests and not as interests of persons, as mine or someone else's interests. If then X loses more by an action than Y wins, the action should not be executed. ---
I 21
Then the race plays no role anymore in the weighing of interests. This is the reason why the Nazis were wrong: their policy was based only on the interests of the Aryan race.

SingerP I
Peter Singer
Practical Ethics (Third Edition) Cambridge 2011

SingerP II
P. Singer
The Most Good You Can Do: How Effective Altruism is Changing Ideas About Living Ethically. New Haven 2015

Good Rawls I 396
Good/The Good/Goodness/being good/Justice/Rawls: we must distinguish between two theories of good, since in the theory of justice as fairness the concept of law precedes that of good. In contrast to teleological theory, something is only good if it can be integrated into existing principles. On the other hand, you need a concept of good to establish the principles, because you have to take into account the motives of those involved. In order not to jeopardise the primacy of the concept of law, the concept of good can only be reduced to the essentials here. That's what I call the Thin Theory of the good. ---
I 397
Rationality: does not require the disposition of all knowledge. I suppose that rational actors are more likely to choose more than less primary public goods. (See Public Goods/Rawls). In the initial situation of a society to be established, the participants assume that their ideas of good have a certain structure. The concept of good is later used in connection with the moral value of persons.
---
I 398
In a well-ordered, approximately fair society it will turn that it is good in itself to be a good person. For this, however, we need a theory of good that presupposes the principles of justice. If the sense of justice itself is a good one, then only in the sense of the Thin Theory. ---
I 399
In this case, the sense of justice contributes to the stability of an orderly society. I call this accordance of goodness and justice congruence. Definition Good/The Good/Rawls: I assume the following for a definition.
1. a thing A is a good X if it has a certain property to a greater extent than something else, average. (See W. D. Ross, The Right and the Good (Oxford 1930), p. 67.)
2. A is a good X for a person K exactly when A has the characteristics that make it rational for K to aim for X.
3. K's life plan has to be rational on the whole.
---
I 400
See for this: Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, bks. I, vk. III, chs. 1-63; Kant The Fundamental Principles oft he Metaphysics of Morals, Acadmy Edition, vol IV, pp.425-419; The Critique of Practical Reason, Ch. II, bk. I of pt. I; siehe H. J. Paton on Kant in: In Defense of Reason (London, 1951), pp. 157-177; H. Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics, 7rh. Ed.(London, 1907), bk. I ch. IX and bk. III ch. XIV. F. H. Bradley, Ethical Studies, 2nd. Ed. (Oxford, 1926), ch. II; Joshua Royce The Philosophy of Loyalty (New York, 1908), lext II; H. J. Paton, The Good Will (London, 1927)bks II and III, esp. chs. VIII and IX. W.D. Lamont, The Value Judgment (Edingurgh, 1955); J. N. Findlay, Values and Intentions (London, 1961) ch. V, secs I, and III, and ch. VI. – Naturalistic value theory: John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct (New York, 1922), pt. III; R. B: Perry, General Theory of Value (New York, 1926), chs. XX-XXII; C. I. Lewis, An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation (Lasalle Ill. 1946), bk. III. – Rawls: my whole approach is based on: J. O. Urmson „On Grading“, MInd, vol 59 (1950; Paul Ziff, Semantic Analysis (Ithaca, NY, 1960), ch. VI; Philippa Foot, „Goodness and Choice“, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, supp. Vol. 35 (1961). ---
I 423
Being Good/Goodness as Rationality/Rawls: (See Planning/Rawls): One might think that it is necessary for the individual to constantly raisonninate to explore whether his/her plans are rational. This is a misunderstanding. Ultimately, it's about finding a criterion for the value of a person. This is mainly defined by reference to a rational (hypothetical) plan. ---
I 424
However, we cannot infer from the definition of a rational plan the content of objectives. There are human needs in general, plans have to take into account human skills and social dependencies, etc. ---
I 426
Definition Aristotelian Principle/Terminology/Rawls: that is what I call the following principle: ceteris paribus means that people enjoy the exercise of their abilities, and all the more so the more they realize these abilities and the more complex they are. (Cf. Aristoteles, Nicomachean Ethics, bk. VIII, chs. 11-14, bk X. chs 1-5; Siehe W.F.R. Hardie, Aristote’s Ethical Theory, (Oxford, 1968), ch. XIV; G.C. Field, Moral Theory (London, 1932), pp.76-78; R. W. White, „Ego and Reality in Psychoanalytic Theory“,Psychological Issues, vol. III (1963), ch. III and pp. 173-175, 180f.) ---
I 429
Rawls: The principle formulates a tendency and shows no pattern of how to make a choice. ---
I 431
VsRawls: Why should the Aristotelian Principle be true - RawlsVsVs: we observe it on children and higher animals. It also seems to be possible to explain it with evolutionary theory. The selection will have selected the individuals to whom it applies. (See B. G. Campbell, Human Evolution (Chicago, 1966), pp. 49-53; W. H. Thorpe, Science, Man and Morals, (London, 1965), pp. 87-92; I. Eibl-Eibesfeldt, Ethology (New York, 1970), pp. 217-248.) ---
I 435
In order to make the Thin Theory a fully-fledged one that is about the value of a person, we ask how fellow citizens judge other fellow citizens who are in the same position. This involves average skills in an average position and in different roles, especially those that are considered more important. In addition, we assume broad characteristics that are normally sought by rational persons. (The indication of broad properties comes from T. M. Scanlon). ---
I 437
Definition Good Person/Definition Moral Value/Rawls: a person of moral value is then an individual with an above-average degree of broad moral qualities, so that it is rational for individuals in the initial situation of a society to be established to strive for this for themselves and for each other. N.B.: no additional ethical concepts are introduced. Person/HareVsRawls: some authors have argued that a person qua person has no defined role or function if he/she is not treated as an instrument or object, so this definition of goodness or rationality would also have to fail. (See R. M. Hare, "Geach on Good an Evil", Analysis 17 (5), pp. 109ff.)
---
I 438
RawlsVsHare/RawlsVsVs: we do not have to assume that people have a certain role and even less that they should serve as a means to higher purposes. We only refer to the initial situation of a society to be established. ---
I 446
Good/The Good/The Right/Rightness/Rawls: how does the Good differ from the Right? 1. The principles of justice that are used for the purpose of determining the good are principles that are chosen in the initial situation of a society to be established. On the other hand, the principles of rational decision and rationality used to determine the right thing are not chosen. ---
I 447
Another difference is that people differ in what is considered good, but not so in the case of determining the right thing.

Rawl I
J. Rawls
A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005

Good Sandel Brocker I 677
Good/The Good/Politics/State/Reason/SandelVsRawls/SandelVsLiberalism/Sandel: Sandel wants to put the achievements of modern democracy on a different basis than the purely formal one that Rawls drafts in his theory of justice. (1) Instead of a formal theory of rights, they should find their justification through an understanding of goodness rich in content. See Liberalism/Sandel, Rawls/Sandel, Contract Theory/Sandel, SandelVsRawls, Politics/Sandel. The space of the political would then be the space of lively debate about the good and not a space of a priori formulation of principles of justice. (2)


1 . Cf. John Rawls, Theory of Justice 1971(dt. 1975)
2. Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, Cambridge/New York 1998 (zuerst 1982),


Markus Rothhaar, “Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice” in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018

Sand I
Michael Sandel
The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self 1984


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Individuals Walzer Mause I 198f
Individual/Communitarianism/Walzer: Representatives of communitarianism (like Walzer) always see the individual instead as part of a specific society with a specific history and culture. Moral ideas are always shaped by this history and the specific culture. Even more: the principles of social justice must build on this history if they are to be considered legitimate. (1) WalzerVsRawls.
1.Bernd Ladwig, Gerechtigkeitstheorien zur Einführung. Hamburg 2013, S. 163.


Mause I
Karsten Mause
Christian Müller
Klaus Schubert,
Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018
Inequalities Rawls I 100
Inequality/Rawls: there is a principle of remedy for individuals who are disadvantaged because of their natural endowment, at least for the first few years of school. ---
I 101
To my knowledge, however, this principle has never been more than a prima facie principle. (See H. Spiegelberg, "A Defense of Human Equality" Philosophical Review, vol 53,1944, pp. 101,113-123 - D. D. Raphael, "Justice and Liberty", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, vol. 51,1950-1951, pp. 187f.) Rawls: However, the principle of remedy must always be taken into account, no matter what other principles we follow.
Difference principle/Rawls: secures resources, e. g. for the promotion of disadvantaged people. (See Difference Principle/Rawls). It has the same intention as the principle of remedy.
---
I 102
The basic structure (of a society to be built) can be arranged in such a way that natural inequalities, which cannot be changed, have an effect for the benefit of the most disadvantaged. Nature/natural distribution/Rawls: is neither fair nor unfair. What is fair or unfair are the institutions that deal with this distribution. In justice as fairness ((s) Rawl's approach), members agree to participate in the fate of others.
---
I 103
VsRawls: now one could argue that the preferred ones expect a bigger gain for themselves if they agree to the arrangement. RawlsVsVs: however, this requires a cooperation scheme. ---
I 104
It is nobody's merit to be able to take a certain position in a community through natural talent or disadvantage. Since no right to a certain cooperation scheme with advantages for the better follows from this, it is the difference principle that can be accepted by all. The concept of merit simply cannot be used here. ---
I 171
Inequality/Economy/Economics/Mathematics/Rawls: we must not underestimate the continuing effect of our individual initial conditions, talents and our original place in society and trust that mathematically appealing solutions would at some point provide a balance. Resolution/Rawls: our principles of justice must remedy the situation (see Principles/Rawls).
---
I 226
Inequality/politics/economy/Rawls: thesis: the effects of injustice in the political system are much more serious and long-lasting than market irregularities. Political power expands rapidly and becomes uneven. Those who take advantage of this can easily move into positions of power by taking advantage of the apparatus of state institutions and law. Equal suffrage is not a secure means of combating this. (See F. H. Knight, The Ethics of Competition and Other Essays, (New York, 1935) pp. 293-305.)

Rawl I
J. Rawls
A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005

Institutions Nussbaum Brocker I 895
Institutions/NussbaumVsRawls/Nussbaum: Rawls' liberal institutional doctrine lacks the ethical foundations to convey its values.(1)

1. Martha C. Nussbaum, Gerechtigkeit oder das gute Leben, Frankfurt/M. 1999, 45


Sandra Seubert, „Martha C. Nussbaum, Women and Human Development (2000)“, in:Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Intersubjectivity Sandel Brocker I 672
Intersubjectivity/SandelVsRawls/Sandel: In its supposed primordial state, Rawls presupposes a certain anthropology for a society to be established, which assumes that intersubjectivity or social relations are not constitutive for the identity of subjects. Rawls then assumes that people already possess their identity and individuality independently of and prior to the social relationships and historical locations in which they stand.
Brocker I 673
Moreover: for Rawls, people's goals and purposes can never be constitutive for a subject's identity.
Brocker I 676
If we include the dimension of intersubjectivity, politics cannot consist of defining a series of principles of justice, which would then be administered for all time, as it were, only by politics and jurisprudence. Rather, politics must consist of a constant, democratic debate about the good of the community. (1)
1. Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, Cambridge/New York 1998 (zuerst 1982), p. 48.

Markus Rothhaar, “Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice” in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018

Sand I
Michael Sandel
The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self 1984


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Justice Hayek Mause I 197
Justice/Hayek: HayekVsRawls: Hayek's philosophy of freedom sees redistribution as an inadmissible interference in the autonomy rights of individuals and therefore rejects them because of their negative effects on social justice. (1)
Hayek's thesis: the overriding norm is that of individual autonomy. Terms that limit this autonomy need to be justified. For example, re-distribution: does not stand up to this justification, as the market is unsurpassedly efficient for Hayek.
Market/Hayek: For the market to function optimally, all it needs is equal rights for all market participants, maximum contractual freedom and a minimum social security system. Any further redistribution measures would not only suppress the incentive to secure one's own existence. Nor would it have any legitimation either: possible unequal exchange results of the market are an unintended consequence of individual action and, due to the lack of intentionality, cannot justify any follow-up responsibility. (2)
VsHayek: he does not take into account that interest groups can influence pricing or that a large number of services are not provided via the market. (3)
Mause I 203
Justice/Theories of Justice/Hayek: Where Hayek relies on the principle of performance justice, Rawls focuses on equal opportunities, while Sens' principle of participation justice comes very close to need justice. (4)(5) RawlsVsHayek, HayekVsRawls, SenVsRawls, RawlsVsSen, SenVsRawls, SenVsHayek, HayekVsSen.


1. F. A. von Hayek, Die Verfassung der Freiheit. Tübingen 1971.
2. W. Kersting, Kersting, Theorien der sozialen Gerechtigkeit. Stuttgart 2000, pp. 60-63.
3.I. Becker, R. Hauser, 2011. Soziale Gerechtigkeit – ein magisches Viereck: Zieldimensionen, Politikanalysen und empirische Befunde. Berlin 2011, pp. 31-34.
3. Sven Jochem, Reformpolitik im Wohlfahrtsstaat: Deutschland im internationalen Vergleich. Berlin 2009, p. 68.
4. Cf. Rieger, Elmar, und Stephan Leibfried, Kultur versus Globalisierung: Sozialpolitische Theologie in Konfuzianismus und Christentum. Frankfurt am Main 2004, p. 44.

Hayek I
Friedrich A. Hayek
The Road to Serfdom: Text and Documents--The Definitive Edition (The Collected Works of F. A. Hayek, Volume 2) Chicago 2007


Mause I
Karsten Mause
Christian Müller
Klaus Schubert,
Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018
Justice Honneth Brocker I 790
Justice/HonnethVsRawls/Honneth: In contrast to other theories of justice, Honneth places the constructive role of social conflicts and the significance of the sources of "self-respect" (1) to be opened up intersubjectively in the foreground for the question of social relations. See Self-Respect/Rawls.

1. John Rawls, Eine Theorie der Gerechtigkeit, Frankfurt 1979, p. 479-486

Hans-Jörg Sigwart, „Axel Honneth, Kampf um Anerkennung“, in: Manfred Brocker (Ed.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018

Honn I
A. Honneth
Das Ich im Wir: Studien zur Anerkennungstheorie Frankfurt/M. 2010

Honn II
Axel Honneth
Kampf um Anerkennung. Zur moralischen Grammatik sozialer Konflikte Frankfurt 2014


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Justice Pettit Brocker I 858
Justice/PettitVsRawls/Pettit: Pettit has stylized himself as a republican opponent of Rawl's theory of justice. He wants to oppose Rawl's model (see Justice/Rawls) with its own model, which "in a more substantial way" elaborates the ideas of freedom and social justice. (1)(2) Rawls/(s): is based on principles instead of "contents".
Brocker i 859
RichterVsRawls: Pettit's model appears weak precisely where the concrete allocation of functions to public participation for the purpose of defining and controlling options for action by the state is concerned. Moreover, ironically, Rawls and Pettit's models resemble each other at precisely those points where Pettit claims to present the alternative to liberal political theory.
It is Rawl's principle of difference that makes it possible to solve the problems raised by Pettit. (3) See Difference Principle/Rawls.



1. Philip Pettit, »Depoliticizing Democracy«, in: Ratio Juris 17/1, 2004
2. Philip Pettit, Beyond Rawls, 2012, 107ff
3. John Rawls, Eine Theorie der Gerechtigkeit, 1975, S. 96


Emanuel Richter, „Philip Pettit, Republicanism“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018

Pett I
Ph. Pettit
Just Freedom: A Moral Compass for a Complex World New York 2014


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Kant Sandel Brocker I 670
Kant/SandelVsRawls/SandelVsKant/SandelVsLiberalism/Sandel: Kant has perhaps most consistently decoupled ethics and law from the vanishing point of good living and instead fully relied on a theory of right, understood in the sense of the reasonable generalizability of maxims of action. Rawls builds on this with his theory of justice (1975). See Principles/Rawls. SandelVsRawls, SandelVsKant: propagates the priority of an idea of good and successful life (Aristotle's eudaimonia) as a starting point. See Liberalism/Sandel, Law/Kant, SandelVsRawls.


Markus Rothhaar, “Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice” in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018

Sand I
Michael Sandel
The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self 1984


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Law Kant Brocker I 670
Law/Justification/Kant: Kant's conception of the law is based on the assumption of a transcendental subject whose capacity for moral autonomy lies in the fact that it is not part of the world of appearances determined by natural laws and can therefore orient itself on the idea of generalizability, instead of acting on the basis of its tendencies, urges and desires. Transcendental Subject/Kant: has a purely formal character in that it neither pursues certain content purposes nor has preferences.
Subjectivity/Kant: this subjectivity is free and yet individualized, as each transcendental subject relates purely to itself as a being of freedom.
RawlsVsKant: Rawls tries to reformulate Kant without these "metaphysical" (more precisely transcendental philosophical) prerequisites.
Brocker I 671
SandelVsRawls: Rawls's attempt fails because Rawls implicitly has to base his theory on a theory of the "self" that is not substantially different from Kant's theory. Kant's theory and deontological liberalism cannot be saved from the difficulties that the Kantian subject brings with it (1) Transcendental Subject/Rawls: Rawl's "veil of ignorance" in an assumed initial state of a society to be established, in which people do not know what role they will play later, is an attempt to reconstruct Kant's transcendental subject without metaphysical assumptions. See Veil of Ignorance/Rawls.


1. Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, Cambridge/New York 1998 (zuerst 1982), S. 14.


Markus Rothhaar, “Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice” in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03

Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Liberalism Kant Brocker I 670
Liberalism/State/Kant: Kant has perhaps most consistently decoupled ethics and law from the vanishing point of good living and instead based himself entirely on a theory of the right, understood in the sense of the reasonable generalizability of maxims of action. Rawls builds on this with his theory of justice (1975). See Principles/Rawls. SandelVsRawls, SandelVsKant: propagates the priority of an idea of good and successful life (Aristotle's eudaimonia) as a starting point. See Liberalism/Sandel. See Law/Justification/Kant.


Markus Rothhaar, “Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice” in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03

Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Liberalism Sandel Brocker I 668
Liberalism/Communitarianism/Sandel: Sandels Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, together with Alasdair MacIntyres After Virtue and Michael Walzer's Spheres of Justice, are considered the main work of communitarianism. Sandel, however, is more concerned with a differentiation from John Rawl's liberalism (and his main work Theory of Justice (1975)). SandelVsLiberalism, SandelVsRawls.
Def Liberalismus/Rawls/Rothhaar: Rawls's liberalism is usually characterized in that it postulates a priority of the "right" over the "good", whereby these terms stand for two different possibilities to justify ethical and legal norms at all.
A. Teleology: ethical theories aimed at the good or a successful life (eudaimonia),
Brocker I 669
are usually called teleological. Norms/values: are justified here by the fact that a good or successful life is realized through them.
B. Law/Rightfulness/Ethics/Liberalism: ethical theories, on the other hand that are aimed at the right, are characterized by the fact that norms are to be founded here independently of any idea of a good life. The concept of "right" only makes sense as a counter-concept to a teleological theory of normativity and can only occur where teleological theories have already become questionable. example.
HobbesVsTeleology: Hobbes rejects the idea of a "highest good" himself.
Other (liberal) approaches assume a plurality of conceptions of a good life.
Norms: are usually defined in such theories of the right in relation to the generalizability of rules of action or to the concept of freedom.
State/Liberalism: such theories normally confer on the state the role of guaranteeing, through a legal system, the freedom it needs to pursue its respective notions of good.
Liberalism/Rawls: this is about the priority of the right over the good in a twofold sense: a) at the level of justification, b) at the level of the state and society itself.
SandelVsLiberalism/SandelVsRawls: criticizes above all the priority of rights at the level of justification: he criticizes the "claim that the principles of justice (...) do not depend on a particular conception of good living (...) to justify them. (1)
Brocker I 676
SandelVsLiberalism: liberalism demands that the state and politics be shaped in such a way, i.e. that the subjects leave behind those moments of communality that constitute their identity ((s) and quasi reinvent it). Sandel: this must almost inevitably lead to an unpleasure in democracy. (2)


1. Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, Cambridge/New York 1998 (zuerst 1982), S. x.
2. Vgl. M. Sandel Democracy’s Discontent. America in Search of a Public Philosophy, London/Cambridge 1996.


Markus Rothhaar, “Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice” in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018

Sand I
Michael Sandel
The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self 1984


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Politics Sunstein I 42
Politics/Sunstein: should politics be made according to survey results? The theorem of Condorcet makes the question seem less pointless than it appears at first glance. (See Decision Theory/Condorcet). However, this only applies to yes/no questions within groups whose members are most likely to be correct in their majority. This may be the case in consultative bodies in companies, or in certain specialist areas when a panel of experts is consulted. However, it would not work if the population of a country, such as the United States, were asked whether the Kyoto Protocol should be signed.
---
I 44
In many areas, people are subject to systematic mistakes. However, the question remains whether group discussions help. (See Democracy/Sunstein). Functioning democracies delegate certain issues to expert committees. ((s) See MorozovVsJarvis and MorozovVsShirky. ---
I 45
In an experiment in Colorado in the summer of 2005, liberal and conservative groups were mixed together to discuss some issues such as whether the United States should sign a climate change agreement or whether affirmative action should be accorded to disadvantaged groups. (1) The result was clear: in almost every group, the positions were more extremely polarized after the discussions, with the respective starting positions of the groups being more strongly represented.
---
I 46
In addition, the respective groups found greater homogeneity. ---
I 49
Group discussion/John Rawls: Thesis: The advantages lie in the combination of information and increasing the range of arguments. (2) SunsteinVsRawls: see above.

1. See Reid Hastie, David Schkade, and Cass R. Sunstein, “What Really Happened on Deliberation Day?” (University of Chicago Law School, unpublished manuscript, 2006).
2. 8. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1971), 358–59.

Sunstein I
Cass R. Sunstein
Infotopia: How Many Minds Produce Knowledge Oxford 2008

Sunstein II
Cass R. Sunstein
#Republic: Divided Democracy in the Age of Social Media Princeton 2017

Politics Sandel Brocker I 676
Politics/Principles/SandelVsRawls/SandelVsKant/Sandel: Taking into account the dimension of inter-subjectivity, politics cannot consist of defining a series of principles of justice that would then, as it were, only be administered by politics and jurisdiction for all time. Rather, politics must consist of a constant, democratic debate about the good of the community.
Brocker I 677
Thus Sandel is in the tradition of Aristotelianism and republicanism. (1) (RepublicanismVsKant, RepublicanismVsLiberalism, AristotleVsKant). HegelVsKant/Rothhaar: this is also an echo of Hegel's criticism of Kant: Kant neglects the subjects' inter-subjectivity; for Kant, the subject is ultimately oriented towards the transcendental subject. (2) (See Intersubjectivity/Sandel, Principles/Rawls.)
Politics/Morality/Sandel: Sandel's design of a political philosophy strongly recalls the concept of "morality" that Hegel develops in the basic lines of the philosophy of law. (3)
The space of the political would then be the space of lively debate about the good and not a space of a priori formulation of principles of justice.


1. Michael Sandel, Democracy’s Discontent. America in Search of a Public Philosophy, London/Cambridge Mass. 1996, p. 4-8.
2. Steven B. Smith, Hegel Critique of Liberalism. Rights in Context, London/Chicago 1991, p. 4.
3. Allen W. Wood, Hegel’s Ethical Thought, Cambridge/New York 1991, p. 202.


Markus Rothhaar, “Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice” in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018

Sand I
Michael Sandel
The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self 1984


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Politics Pettit Brocker I 858
Politics/Depoliticization/Pettit: Pettit defines "depoliticization"(1) as distancing political decision-making from an emotionally charged, moralizing and clichédly prejudiced struggle of opinion in which he fears that simple and polarizing platitudes rather than public welfare-oriented considerations will prevail. Instead of, however, in a good republican tradition, branding this shift from public welfare orientation to strategic, effect-hasty incitement as a process of "de-politicization", as an alarming loss of civic political judgement, Pettit understands de-politicization exactly the other way round as a taming of the downright dreaded will of the people by a rationality examination of the arguments, which circulate and meet in the public opinion struggle exercised by experts. (2) ((s) PettitVsHabermas). ((s) "Government of Experts", "Government of Technocrats", "Technical Cabinets" (See also Sartori). PettitVsRepublicanism: Pettit obviously does not share the republican punch line that "politicization" is precisely the measure for the ability to make intuitive and conscious references to the common good.
John P. McCormickVsPettit: In this respect, says disrespectfully that Pettit has made a democratically forgotten, institution-centred "senatorial move" and shows the tendency to neglect the problem horizon of nurturing and sharpening the political judgement of citizens, a genuine and central concern of Republican thought. (3)
RichterVsPettit: Pettit did not succeed in resolving the tension between state trust and criticism of power, between civic participation and elite trust which he is building.
PettitVsRawls: see Justice/Pettit.



1. Philip Pettit, »Depoliticizing Democracy«, in: Ratio Juris 17/1, 2004 S. 53
2. Ebenda S. 63
3. John P. McCormick, »Republicanism and Democracy«, in: Andreas Niederberger/Philipp Schink (Hg.), Republican Democracy. Liberty, Law, and Politics, Edinburgh 2013, S. 108


Emanuel Richter, „Philip Pettit, Republicanism“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018

Pett I
Ph. Pettit
Just Freedom: A Moral Compass for a Complex World New York 2014


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Principles Rawls I 4
Principles/Society/Rawls:
1. Everyone accepts and knows that the other members of society accept the same principles of justice.
2. The basic social institutions fulfill these principles in general and are known for doing so.
---
I 7
Principles/Rawls: we are only interested in general principles of the justice of society as a whole, not in such special or private communities or for cross-national institutions. ---
I 10/11
Principles/Justice/Rawls: Principles must be defined at the beginning. Our point of departure, the situation of equality, which should follow an election, corresponds to the natural state of the traditional theories of the social contract, but it is neither a concrete historical situation nor a primitive culture. It is a purely hypothetical situation which should lead to a certain realization of justice.
---
I 41
Principles/MillVsIntuitionism/Mill/Rawls: Mill argued that the principle of usefulness could be the only supreme principle, since otherwise there could be no arbitrator between competing criteria. (Mill, A System of Logic, bk VI, ch. XII, sec 7, and Utilitarianism, ch. V, paers. 26-31). Principles/Sidgwick: the principle of usefulness is the only one that can play this role. (Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, bk. IV chs. II and III).
Rawls: that is what made the classical doctrine so attractive: that it tries to solve the problem of priorities and avoids intuitionism.
RawlsVsMill/RawlsVsSidgwick/RawlsVsUtilitarism: we need to realize that there may be no way to dissolve the plurality of the different principles.
---
I 43
Principles/Rawls: I suggest that even in the "lexical order" (the piecemeal processing of principles according to an external order) the principle of equal distribution of rights should be treated as a priority rather than the regulation of economic or social inequalities. ---
I 61
Principles/justice/Rawls: provisional wording: 1. every person must have the same right to the widest possible fundamental freedom, insofar as it is compatible with the same freedom for others.
2. social and economic inequalities shall be arranged in such a way that they
(a) are reasonably expectable for everyone's benefit; and
(b) are linked to positions and administrative procedures that can be held by anyone.
The two principles are applied in chronological order. This means that abandoning the first principle cannot be offset by greater social or economic benefits.
---
I 62
Deviations from equal distribution of social rights or economic benefits can only be justified by the fact that this is to everyone's advantage. ((s) This is a reference to utilitarianism. ---
I 63
The chronological order of compliance also excludes that fundamental freedoms can be exchanged for economic benefits. ---
I 64
Similarly, the chronological order of the principles means that people can only ever be talked about in the form of social role holders. ---
I 83
Principles/Rawls: Redrafting of the Second Principle: Social and economic inequality must be arranged in such a way that (a) it provides the greatest benefit for the worst-off people and (b) it is linked to administrative bodies and positions which are open to all under conditions of fair equal opportunities. ---
I 89
I assume that the two parts of the principle are arranged lexically. ---
I 116
Principles/Rawls: there is nothing inconsistent about the fact that fairness makes unconditional principles possible. It is sufficient to show that, in the initial situation (of a society to be established), the parties agree to principles that define the natural obligations that then apply without fail. ((s)VsRawls: Contradiction: Rawls himself says that the natural duties, for example not to be cruel, are not subject to agreements. (See Rawls I 114). ---
I 250
Principles/Rawls: reformulation in the light of the consideration of contingent individual and historical inequalities: First principle: Every person must have an equal right to the most comprehensive system of equal fundamental rights that is compatible with an equal system of freedom for all.
Priority rule: the principles of justice are built in lexical order and therefore freedom can only be restricted for the benefit of freedom. There are two cases here: a) a less comprehensive freedom must increase the freedom of the total system of freedom shared by all, b) a restricted freedom must be acceptable to those affected by it.
---
I 253
Principles/Categorical imperative/Kant/Rawls: in the sense of Kant, these principles are also categorical imperatives. They do not require any particular social conditions or individual goals. Only an interest in primary public goods (e. g. freedom) is assumed. The preference for these in turn is derived from the most general assumptions about rationality and the conditions of human life. ---
I 302
Principles/Rawls: final version for Institutions/Rawls: the two principles of justice (see above) plus priority rules: 1. Priority rule: the principles of justice must be dealt with in lexical order, so that freedom may only be restricted in favour of greater freedom. Two cases are possible: a) Restricted freedom must strengthen the overall system of freedoms that benefit all. b) Freedom that is not equal must be accepted by those who enjoy fewer freedoms.
2. Priority rule: (Justice precedes efficiency and prosperity): The second principle of justice is lexical superior to the principle of efficiency and the one of maximizing benefits,...
---
I 303
.... fair equal opportunities are superior to the difference principle. Two cases are possible: a) Opportunity inequality must increase the chances of the disadvantaged. b) An extreme savings rate must reduce the burdens on those affected. General conception: all primary social goods (freedoms, rights, income, prosperity, conditions for self-esteem, etc.) shall be distributed equally, except where an unequal distribution of some or all of these goods is to the benefit of the least favoured.
---
I 446
Principles/Rawls: while the principles of justice are those chosen in the initial position, the principles of rational decision or rationality are not chosen at all. This leads to the distinction between right and good.

Rawl I
J. Rawls
A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005

Principles Rescher Rawls I 317
Prinzipien/Gerechtigkeit/RescherVsRawls/Rescher: Statt des Differenzprinzips könnte man das Kriterium des Durchschnittsnutzens abzüglich eines Bruchteils der Standardabweichung setzen(Siehe N. Rescher, Distributive Justice (New York, 1966), pp. 35-38.) Damit wird stärker auf die Schwächeren Rücksicht genommen als beim Durchschnittsprinzip.

Resch I
Nicholas Rescher
The Criteriology of Truth; Fundamental Aspects of the Coherence Theory of Truth, in: The Coherence Theory of Truth, Oxford 1973 - dt. Auszug: Die Kriterien der Wahrheit
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Resch II
N. Rescher
Kant and the Reach of Reason: Studies in Kant’ s Theory of Rational Systematization Cambridge 2010


Rawl I
J. Rawls
A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005
Rawls Nozick Brocker I 674
Rawls/NozickVsRawls/Nozick: Rawls' difference principle boils down to that the better-off with their talents are used as a mere means of improving the social and economic situation of the worse-off. However, this would run counter to the deontological-Kantian claim. (1) See Difference Principle/Sandel, SandelVsRawls.

1.Robert Nozick, Anarchie, Staat, Utopia, München 2006,(engl. 1971) p. 300f.


Markus Rothhaar, “Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice” in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018

No I
R. Nozick
Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981

No II
R., Nozick
The Nature of Rationality 1994


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Rawls Sandel Brocker I 673
Rawls/Subject/Individual/Metaphysics/Subjectivity/Individuality/SandelVsRawls/Sandel: Sandel criticizes Rawl's conception of an assumed starting point for a society to be built (see Veil of Ignorance/Rawls, Reflective Equilibrium/Rawls, Veil of Ignorance/Sandel): 1. Rawls fails to achieve his own goal of reconstructing Kant's practical philosophy free of metaphysics and without reformulating the subject's specific theory. On the contrary, Rawls presupposes a specific theory of the subject ("mutual disinterest", subjectivity and identity independent of the subject's goals and purposes). (1) (See Subjectivity/Sandel).
2. this leads to an impoverishment of the possibilities of human self-conception in the political community. (2)
3. with this, the approach of Rawls is simply wrong, because people cannot understand each other in this way at all. (3)
4. The concept of Rawls' initial state is in contradiction to other elements of his theory, especially to the principle of difference (see Difference Principle/Rawls) and to his contract theory. (See Contract Theory/Rawls). See also Difference Principle/Sandel, Rawls/Nozick.


1. Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, Cambridge/New York 1998 (zuerst 1982), S. 65
2. Ibid. p. 177
3. Ibid. p. 65.

Markus Rothhaar, “Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice” in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018

Sand I
Michael Sandel
The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self 1984


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Reciprocity Singer I 61/62
Ethics/Reciprocity/Compensation/Equality/Plato/P. Singer: Plato lets Glaucon say in the state: "It is by nature good to commit injustice, but to suffer it is bad, and the latter in a stronger way than the first. So if you have experienced both, you should come to avoid both. ---
I 62
Socrates disproves this view of Glaucon in the dialogue. P. SingerVsRawls: Glaucon's conception is still to this day found in the work of John Rawls and David Gauthier. It leads to the exclusion of animals from the sphere, which is subject to our own ethical standards, because animals cannot behave in the way we behave towards them. Therefore, no reciprocity can be assumed in our relationship with them. In order to deal with this problem, we must distinguish between explanation and justification.

SingerP I
Peter Singer
Practical Ethics (Third Edition) Cambridge 2011

SingerP II
P. Singer
The Most Good You Can Do: How Effective Altruism is Changing Ideas About Living Ethically. New Haven 2015

Selection Rawls I 426
Selection/Evolution/Abilities/Aristotelian Principle/Rawls: Definition Aristotelian Principle/Terminology/Rawls: that is what I call the following principle: ceteris paribus means that people enjoy the exercise of their abilities to a greater extent, the more they realize these abilities and the more challenging (complex) they are. (Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, bk. VIII, chs. 11-14, bk X. chs 1-5; See W. F. R. Hardie, Aristote's Ethical Theory, (Oxford, 1968), ch. XIV; G. C. Field, Moral Theory (London, 1932), pp. 76-78; R. W. White,"Ego and Reality in Psychoanalytic Theory", Psychological Issues, vol. III (1963), ch. III and pp. 173-175,180f.) ---
I 429
Rawls: The principle formulates a tendency and shows no pattern of how to make a choice. ---
I 431
VsRawls: Why should the Aristotelian Principle be true - RawlsVsVs: we observe it on children and higher animals. It also seems to be possible to explain it with evolutionary theory. The selection will have selected the individuals to whom it applies. (See B. G. Campbell, Human Evolution (Chicago, 1966), pp. 49-53; W. H. Thorpe, Science, Man and Morals, (London, 1965), pp. 87-92; I. Eibl-Eibesfeldt, Ethology (New York, 1970), pp. 217-248.)

Rawl I
J. Rawls
A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005

Self Sandel Brocker I 676
Self/Sandel: Sandel thesis: for the identity and individuality of subjects, their respective self-understanding as members of a community and bearers of a story, as well as their beliefs of what constitutes good for people, is constitutive. (1) SandelVsLiberalism/SandelVsRawls: N.B.: if these moments of community are not "possessed" and thus ultimately remain external, but rather constitute the identity of subjects, then people cannot "leave them behind them" when they enter the "space of the political".
SandelVsLiberalism: liberalism demands that the state and politics be shaped in such a way, i.e. that the subjects leave behind those moments of communality that constitute their identity ((s) and quasi reinvent it). Sandel: this must almost inevitably lead to an unpleasure in democracy. (2)


1. Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, Cambridge/New York 1998 (zuerst 1982), p. 179
2. Vgl. M. Sandel Democracy’s Discontent. America in Search of a Public Philosophy, 1996.


Markus Rothhaar, “Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice” in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018

Sand I
Michael Sandel
The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self 1984


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Slavery Rawls I 167
Slavery/average benefits/Rawls: against the principle of average benefit one could argue that it requires the same risk acceptance from all. Since in the beginning there was never a situation in which all parties involved could agree, the principle should be rejected. Extreme example: A slave keeper could argue that in the circumstances of his society, the institution of slavery is necessary to produce the greatest average happiness. Furthermore, he would argue that he himself, in the initial situation of a society to be established (in which all parties involved stand behind a veil of ignorance with regard to their later position in society), would have voted for slavery with the risk of ending up as a slave themselves.
Rawls: At first glance, this could be dismissed as absurd, one could think that it makes no difference what he chooses; as long as individuals have agreed to a concept of justice with real risks, no one is bound to such requirements.
Contract theory/Rawls: if one takes the view of contracts as a basis, however, the argument of the slave keeper is correct: it would be a mistake if the slaves wanted to answer that the argument was superfluous, since there is no actual choice and no equal distribution of opportunities. The treaty doctrine is purely hypothetical: if a version of justice were chosen in the initial situation, its principles would be those that were applied. It is not an argument that such an understanding was not intended or would ever be.
We cannot have both: a hypothetical interpretation without concrete information about the result...
---
I 168
...and later by reassessing the risk, rejecting principles we no longer want to have. G. HarmanVsRawls/Rawls: Gilbert Harman pointed out to me that I had made this mistake myself. (See G. Harman "Constitutional Liberty and the Concept of Justice", Nomos VI: Justice, ed. C. J. Friedrich and J. W. Chapman, New York, 1963).
Solution/Rawls: The theory of justice as fairness refutes the slave owner argument already in the initial situation. (See also Principles/Rawls).
Here, according to the theory of justice as fairness, we have the possibility to accept the two principles of justice, then the imponderables can be circumvented: Cf.
---
I 61
Principles/justice/Rawls: provisional wording: 1. every person must have the same right to the widest possible fundamental freedom, insofar as it is compatible with the same freedom for others.
2. social and economic inequalities shall be arranged in such a way that they
(a) are reasonably expectable for everyone's benefit; and
(b) are linked to positions and administrative procedures that can be held by anyone.
This guarantees fundamental freedoms.

Rawl I
J. Rawls
A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005

Subjectivity Sandel Brocker I 672
Subjectivity/SandelVsRawls/Sandel: In its supposed primordial state, Rawls presupposes a certain anthropology for a society to be established: in Rawls, the identity of subjects is not determined by their social relationships and just as little by inter-subjectivity. This is connected with the fact that in the assumed initial situation there should be a "mutual disinterest" between the subjects. (1)
Brocker I 673
Goals/Purposes: according to Rawls, should also not be constitutive for the identity of a subject. Rawls's subject has its goals as something external. This would be the "concept of a subject of property that is already individualized and given before its purposes". (2) Self/Rawls/Sandel: Sandel describes this concept of a subject as that of an "unencumbered self" (3). See Rawls/Sandel.


1. Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, Cambridge/New York 1998 (zuerst 1982), p. 48.
2. Ibid. p. 59
3. Michael Sandel “The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self” in: Political Theory, 12/1 1984, p. 86.
Markus Rothhaar, “Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice” in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018

Sand I
Michael Sandel
The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self 1984


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Veil of Ignorance Rawls I 136
Veil of Ignorance/society/Rawls: this is about excluding contingent peculiarities when establishing a new form of society. To this end, the parties are to remain behind a veil of ignorance in the >initial situation of a society to be established, with regard to alternatives concerning their own individual case.
I 137
This is intended to ensure that the principles in question are chosen on the basis of general considerations. Certain facts are said to be unknown: No one knows their place in society, class affiliation or social status, or their endowment with goods, intelligence, strength, and so on. Even his individual psychology, such as his propensity to optimism or pessimism, risk appetite or affiliation to a certain generation.
On the other hand, general facts about human society should be known: people understand political problems and economic theory, social organization and the laws of the human psyche.
I 138
There should be no restrictions on general information, i. e. on general laws and theories. ((s) Rawls assumes here that there are psychological laws, especially laws of moral psychology. (DavidsonVsRawls: VsPsychological Laws: see Anomalous Monism/Davidson). Initial Condition/problems/Rawls: it must be clarified that proposals belong to the range of permissible alternatives and general consequences of proposed principles must be known.
I 139
The initial state is not a general assembly, that would be too much of a strain on the imagination. On the other hand, it is important that it does not matter who accepts the perspective of the initial state or when he does it. This is what the veil of ignorance is supposed to guarantee: the information available should be relevant but always the same. VsRawls: one can argue that the veil is irrational. RawlsVsVs: it is about ensuring that everyone can be convinced by the same arguments. Then people's points of view can be picked out by chance, the other people will behave in the same way. In addition, it is possible to accept an arbitrator who declares a ban on coalition, but this is superfluous if one assumes that the consultations of the parties are the same. Since no one has any further information, he cannot adjust the situation to his personal advantage.
I 140
The only exception: an egoist could basically refuse to make his savings available to posterity. He could decide to do that without having any further information. The question of intergenerational justice must therefore be tackled elsewhere.
I 141
Unanimity/conformity: in the initial state it is not a matter of agreement on concrete random facts (which are not known anyway). Otherwise, only trivial problems could be solved.
I 142
Through the veil of Ignorance, the two principles of justice (see Principles/Rawls) are preferred to the criterion of usefulness.
I 143
Rationality/Initial state: even in the initial state, where individuals have only general information, we assume that they strive to have more of it than less in relation to primary public goods (e. g. freedoms, infrastructure, etc.).
I 166
Veil of Ignorance/Rawls: there is no problem with the assumption that newcomers arriving at the initial situation, which of course have less information. The veil of ignorance erases every basis for distinguishing different levels of information.

Rawl I
J. Rawls
A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005

Veil of Ignorance Sandel Brocker I 672
Veil of Ignorance/SandelVsRawls/Sandel: Rawl's "Veil of Ignorance" in an assumed >initial state of a society to be built, in which people do not know what role they will later play, is an attempt to reconstruct Kant's transcendental subject without metaphysical assumptions. See Veil of Ignorance/Rawls. SandelVsRawls: Problem: How do the conditions of the original state come about if they are not the result of transcendental philosophical reflection on the non-empirical conditions of the possibility of freedom, as in Kant?
Rawls: assumes a "mutual disinterest" of people in their original state.
Sandel: Question: What is the criterion for "plausibility" or "reasonability" that underlies this construction of an initial state? (1) See Beginning/Sandel, Intersubjectivity/Sandel.
Brocker I 675
SandelVsRawls: behind the veil of ignorance there is no negotiation at all, since the subjects assumed by Rawls have no different interests at all. The "conclusion of a contract" is therefore not based on a free agreement but - in the Kantian sense of the word - on the realization that implies such a conceived practical subjectivity in terms of principles of justice from the outset. (2) See Contract Theory/Sandel.

1. Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, Cambridge/New York 1998 (zuerst 1982), p. 48.
2. Ibid. p. 130, 132.
Markus Rothhaar, “Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice” in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018

Sand I
Michael Sandel
The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self 1984


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018

The author or concept searched is found in the following 6 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Rawls, J. Habermas Vs Rawls, J. Rorty II 89
HabermasVsRawls: He requires proof of transculturally valid premises for the superiority of the liberal West.

Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988

Ha III
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981

Ha IV
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Rawls, J. Verschiedene Vs Rawls, J. Die ZEIT 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink: Rawls)
Moral / Rawls: sees in Hegel the precursor of his own "political liberalism".
HeidbrinkVsRawls: This suppresses that the process of procedural agreement presupposes the "collective purpose" that it is intended to create. (> Circle).




Rawls, J. Mackie Vs Rawls, J. Stegmüller IV 206
Altruism/Rawls: ( "justice as fairness"): Rawls feins that creatures are not guided by sympathy, but only by self-love, "rational egoist".
IV 207
Rawls/Stegmüller: the "veil of ignorance" goes back to J. Harsanyi. VsUtilitarianism: initially, subjective preferences are unknown.
MackieVsRawls: nevertheless, the result is something similar to utilitarianism: each rational egoist presumes, probably rightly so, that he is more likely to belong to the broader group of luckies than to the smaller group of unfortunates and accordingly schemes disadvantages for "the others."
Instead: search for a compromise that is acceptable to everyone involved.
Society/MackieVsRawls: but now this compromise is identical to U3, the third stage of universalization.
IV 208
RawlsVsMackie/Stegmüller: Rawls would not accept that, since his model is not an immediate guide to action. Def morality in the narrower sense/Mackie/Stegmüller: restriction of the self-interests of the agents.

Macki I
J. L. Mackie
Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong 1977

Carnap V
W. Stegmüller
Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis
In
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987

St I
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989

St II
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987

St III
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987

St IV
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989
Rawls, J. Cavell Vs Rawls, J. I 31
RawlsVsPerfectionism/RawlsVsEmerson: unjust celebration of strong and inventive individuals at the expense of the weak. CavellVsRawls: this is too limited to the social, cultural and political order. He only demands the maximization of the given culture and forgets to ask about the conditions for anything to be considered a successful cultural engagement.
I 32
CavellVsRawls: it is not the question how we can get more and more of the same, but how to find culture at all. Emerson: "Conversion of the world" ~Finding true goals.
Def Self/Cavell: to articulate the reasons and conditions by which one's own position in the world becomes understandable means to be a subject.

Cavell I
St. Cavell
Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen Frankfurt 2002

Cavell I (a)
Stanley Cavell
"Knowing and Acknowledging" in: St. Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say?, Cambridge 1976, pp. 238-266
In
Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell Frankfurt/M. 2002

Cavell I (b)
Stanley Cavell
"Excursus on Wittgenstein’s Vision of Language", in: St. Cavell, The Claim of Reason, Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy, New York 1979, pp. 168-190
In
Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell Frankfurt/M. 2002

Cavell I (c)
Stanley Cavell
"The Argument of the Ordinary, Scenes of Instruction in Wittgenstein and in Kripke", in: St. Cavell, Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome: The Constitution of Emersonian Perfectionism, Chicago 1990, pp. 64-100
In
Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Davide Sparti/Espen Hammer (eds.) Frankfurt/M. 2002

Cavell II
Stanley Cavell
"Must we mean what we say?" in: Inquiry 1 (1958)
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995
Rawls, J. Newen Vs Rawls, J. New I 157
Def Just/Basic Order/Rawls/Newen: just is a basic order if the participants themselves have agreed on it under fair conditions. Original State/Society/Rawls/Newen. Precursor: Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau.
Rawls:
1) The contract parties make a final choice of a basic order
2) They choose the order from a list of historical influential candidates that they can modify
3) the contract parties think rationally
4) they have the three higher-ranking regulatory interests.
5) they have general economic and psychological knowledge
6) they make their choice behind the veil of ignorance: they do not know their place in society.
I 158
Veil of Ignorance/Rawls/Newen: Point: leads to an endorsement of the Maximin principle. Principles/Rawls/Newen: the two principles would be supported by someone if their enemy can assign them a place. (Rawls ThdG 233).
Newen: with that, Rawls builds on Kant.
I 159
Veil of Ignorance/Rawls/Newen: is released gradually, each with reference to decisions already taken on a level. Justice/Justice Theory/Rawls/Pogge/Newen: a conception of justice that people with different worldviews obey together neither needs to affirm nor deny its own capacity for truth.
Justification/Pogge: it is enough for it to distinguish it as the most sensible or appropriate for our political culture. (Pogge, John Rawls, p 173).
I 160
VsRawls/Newen: people are more influenced by emotion than Rawls believes. Should people heavily influenced by emotion be excluded from the order?
I 161
VsRawls: he is at risk of falling behind the procedural fairness of the Enlightenment which ensures that all people can participate in the constitution-making process on an equal footing, regardless of race, opinion, and education. VsRawls: this leaves open the possibility of a "justice expertocracy".
UntilitarianismVsRawls/EnlightenmentVsRawls: they consider the political autonomy also of non-experts a priority.
VsRawls: cannot submit a concept for the (inhomogeneous) world population.

New II
Albert Newen
Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005

Newen I
Albert Newen
Markus Schrenk
Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008
Subjectivism Verschiedene Vs Subjectivism Stegmüller IV 177
VsSubjectivism/Ethics/Stegmüller: he has a hard time where most people consider norms and values to be objectively anchored, so that beliefs have already found their way into the meaning of moral words.
IV 178
VsVs: that would be a "metaethical fallacy": the conclusion of beliefs about their correctness.
IV 216
Def Moral in the broad sense/Mackie/Stegmüller: consists of an attitude to life and a system of rules of conduct that someone makes his own. Can vary from person to person. Def Moral in the narrower sense/Mackie/Stegmüller: limitation of the self-interests of the doers. Not flexible, as it must contain everything that is required to maintain cooperation.
Core piece: "Minimal Morality". Reasonable.
VsSubjectivism/Ethics/Stegmüller: two negative cornerstones:
1. Hierarchy of objective norms
2. The impossible changeability of human nature.
IV 242
ObjectivismVsSubjectivism/Ethics/Stegmüller: one could say that subjectivism degrades norms to a "bundle of conventions". VsVs: but this is not the case:
SubjectivismVsObjectivism/Ethics/Mackie/Stegmüller: the objectivists make things too easy for themselves if they regard the norms as objective, predetermined principles.
The subjectivist is faced with something like a miracle: he has to explain how such systems can develop at all!
1. What human considerations and abilities explain the emergence of those artificial conventions?
2. How are they maintained?
IV 304
VsSubjectivism/Moral: anyone could object that subjectivism would not prevent the extinction of a minority! There is no danger of being killed by a member of the minority! (VsRawls).
IV 305
VsVs: 1. Every person is a member of some minority. 2. Minimal morality only presupposes that all are rational egoists.
Morality/Ethics/Sympathy/Mackie: through the mass media, the "close range" of the human, within which he/she is capable of compassion, expands.
IV 306
Minority Problem/Mackie/Stegmüller: when it comes to empiricism, one could argue that all arguments against people of a certain skin colour are based on false empirical premises. Now there is no guarantee against genocide, it has taken place! Cultural achievements can be destroyed within a very short time.
IV 307
Moral Reason/Stegmüller: Motifs are Janus-faced: Seen from the inside, they are explanations,
from the outside they are causes.
Nor can the justification we have achieved be applied to all the principles of morality in the narrow sense. But this is not a shortcoming of the concept of justification itself. The network of standards is only intended to provide something like a framework.





Carnap V
W. Stegmüller
Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis
In
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987

St IV
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989