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Rationality | Ayer | Black III 25 Rationality/Ayer/Black: Ayer could say no proof VsRationality is possible, because nothing is allowed, at this stage, as evidence. - ((s) Because we do not have the standards). Black: problem: if there is no reason VsRationality, then there is none VsIrrationality. >Evidence, >Proofs, >Justification, >Verification. |
Ayer I Alfred J. Ayer "Truth" in: The Concept of a Person and other Essays, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ayer II Alfred Jules Ayer Language, Truth and Logic, London 1936 In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Ayer III Alfred Jules Ayer "The Criterion of Truth", Analysis 3 (1935), pp. 28-32 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Black I Max Black "Meaning and Intention: An Examination of Grice’s Views", New Literary History 4, (1972-1973), pp. 257-279 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg) Frankfurt/M 1979 Black II M. Black The Labyrinth of Language, New York/London 1978 German Edition: Sprache. Eine Einführung in die Linguistik München 1973 Black III M. Black The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983 Black IV Max Black "The Semantic Definition of Truth", Analysis 8 (1948) pp. 49-63 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
Rationality | Hume | Black III 21 Rationality/Hume/HumeVsRationality/Black: ("agnostic rationalist"): rationality listens to the reasons but doubts the foundation for beliefs and actions. >Beliefs/Hume. --- Hume I 20 Rationalism/representation/Deleuze: rationalism makes the representation of a criterion be based on the idea in the mind. HumeVs: that will not work, because the generality of the imagination may not be an idea in itself. >Imagination/Hume, >Idea/Hume. |
D. Hume I Gilles Delueze David Hume, Frankfurt 1997 (Frankreich 1953,1988) II Norbert Hoerster Hume: Existenz und Eigenschaften Gottes aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen der Neuzeit I Göttingen, 1997 Black I Max Black "Meaning and Intention: An Examination of Grice’s Views", New Literary History 4, (1972-1973), pp. 257-279 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg) Frankfurt/M 1979 Black II M. Black The Labyrinth of Language, New York/London 1978 German Edition: Sprache. Eine Einführung in die Linguistik München 1973 Black III M. Black The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983 Black IV Max Black "The Semantic Definition of Truth", Analysis 8 (1948) pp. 49-63 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
Rationality | Singer | Black III 23 Rationality/P. Singer/circularity/self-justification/reasoning/RationalityVsVs: thesis: the challenge VsRationality must be rejected. Black III 24 Because it questions something, which is a prerequisite. BlackVs: Problem: it does not help if someone is too stubborn to recognize a good reason. >Justification, >Ultimate justification, >Argumentation, >Circularity, >Reason. |
SingerP I Peter Singer Practical Ethics (Third Edition) Cambridge 2011 SingerP II P. Singer The Most Good You Can Do: How Effective Altruism is Changing Ideas About Living Ethically. New Haven 2015 Black I Max Black "Meaning and Intention: An Examination of Grice’s Views", New Literary History 4, (1972-1973), pp. 257-279 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg) Frankfurt/M 1979 Black II M. Black The Labyrinth of Language, New York/London 1978 German Edition: Sprache. Eine Einführung in die Linguistik München 1973 Black III M. Black The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983 Black IV Max Black "The Semantic Definition of Truth", Analysis 8 (1948) pp. 49-63 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
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Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author![]() |
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Geach, P. | Black Vs Geach, P. | III 22 Rationality/Geach/Black: Thesis: ~ "although it is reasonable to ask for reasons, it is not always reasonable. E.g. it is not reasonable to ask for what reason you should ever ask for reasons. III 23 E.g. Someone who rejects the asking for reasons may not ask others why they need reasons. Otherwise the questioner shows that he is not totally independent of reasons. (Self-contradiction, contradiction). Black: thus Geach assumes that the Skepticus is a militant anti-rationalist who rejects all practice. Rationality/Hume/Black: Hume, on the other hand, goes along with that, he was just never presented with the justification. Geach/Black: with him we would have to say, "I cannot respond to the anti-rationalists at all, because his question is itself unreasonable." BlackVsGeach: that means that we ourselves must have good reasons to reject the question, and that would not affect the anti-rationalists at all. According to Geach, the responder would be just as irrational. Black: (see below) but it must not be assumed that the challenger is a militant anti-rationalist. Even a complete skeptic VsRationality can maliciously try to harass the defenders of rationality. |
Black I Max Black "Meaning and Intention: An Examination of Grice’s Views", New Literary History 4, (1972-1973), pp. 257-279 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg) Frankfurt/M 1979 Black II M. Black The Labyrinth of Language, New York/London 1978 German Edition: Sprache. Eine Einführung in die Linguistik München 1973 Black III M. Black The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983 Black IV Max Black "The Semantic Definition of Truth", Analysis 8 (1948) pp. 49-63 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
Rationalism | Black Vs Rationalism | III 21 VsRationality/Black: the challenger: ("Why should I be rational?"): We can assume that in different variants: 1) Def militant anti-rationalist/terminology/Black: is like the cry of a donkey. He uses expressions like "reason" or "rational justification" only in distancing quotation marks. He is insensitive to rational persuasion. 2) Def agnostic rationalist/terminology/Black: he listens to reasons, but despairs, like Hume, over finding a rational basis for his beliefs and actions. But in terms of actions and thoughts he is conformist. That makes him a victim of relativism which claims that "our rationality" is culture-dependent. 3) Def Trustful rationalist/Terminology/Black: pursues a rational lifestyle wholeheartedly, but undogmatically, and it is certain that there are good reasons for his actions, only that he can not bring them up. Anti-Rationalism/VsRationalism/Challenge/Black: In the following I depart from type 2: the agnostic rationalists, like Hume. III 22 Rationality/Geach/Black: Thesis: ~"although it is reasonable to ask for reasons, it is not always reasonable. E.g. it is not reasonable to ask for what reason you should ever ask for reasons. |
Max Black I Black Bedeutung und Intention aus "Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung Georg Meggle (Hrsg) Frankf/M 1979 II Black Sprache München 1973 III Black The Prevalence of Humbug ornell University Press Ithaka/London 1983 |
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Disputed term/author/ism | Author![]() |
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Rationality | Singer, P. | Black III 23 Rationality /Circularity /Self-justification / Reasoning / Rationality / P. Singer/VsVs: Thesis: the challenge VsRationality must be rejected, III 24 because it puts something in question, which is assumed. (Cambridge 1979, 203). |
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