Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 14 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Consciousness | Millikan | 91 Consciousness/tradition: we experience our consciousness directly. MillikanVsTradition: What kind of experience of intentionality is this? What kind of force should this argument have? >Self-identification, >Self-consciousness, >Self-knowledge, >Intentionality. The force should be epistemic and rational. Uncorrectability/MillikanVsTradition: the experience of consciousness (experience of intentionality) should have something infallible. We should also have an immediate understanding then. It should also assume the existence of intentionality and consciousness, otherwise the experience could not be "in" it. Consciousness/Tradition: tradition assumes that consciousness is transparent. And therefore it cannot consist solely of external relations to the external world, and even if these are necessary. MillikanVsVs: Suppose we reject this epistemically rationalist image, that is, we deny that there is "epistemically given". Then we could admit that people are sometimes aware of their thoughts. But we could maintain that this awareness is partly an external relation. The "inside" of this feeling (awareness)... >Awareness. I 92 ...does not guarantee that it is the inside of a true awareness relation. Consciousness/Millikan: self awareness of consciousness is not an immediate object. There is nothing transparent in consciousness. N.B./Millikan: that is disturbing because it follows - negative thesis: that it is possible that we do not know what we think! ((s) DavidsonVsHume: dito). That is, from the act of consciousness itself nothing is guaranteed. Rationalism/rationalisticiIntentionality/consciousness/MillikanVsRationalism/Millikan: the traditional rationalist view of consciousness and intentionality leads to a cul-de-sac one after another. >Rationalism. I 246 Consciousness/classical realism/Millikan: an act of becoming aware of an object is momentary and never has any relation to past or future consciousness acts. Problem: how should a thing then be identified as the one from earlier. From this, classical realism makes a mystery. Object/thing/classical realism: an object must then have no permanent existence. >Realism. Perception/Plato/Descartes/Locke/Millikan: Thesis: Nothing can be identified by perception alone, Recognition: is an act of pure thought in the reunion in the volatile flow of the things given to the senses. >Perception. Sense/Plato/Descartes/Locke: consisted then in the fact to direct the mind somehow to eternal objects. Thinking/Plato/Descartes/Locke: then one could only have thoughts of eternal objects, or of the eternal nature of volatile objects. Solution/Millikan: qualities and species were assumed as the eternal objects of which one could directly think. >Thinking/World, >Plato, >Descartes, >Locke. I 247 Problem: How should one explain that eternal objects (properties) are related to temporal states? How could involvement in the world be essential to it. Then one had to assume that there are properties and types that are not exemplified. Cf. >Temporal identity. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Constitution | Spinoza | Höffe I 235 Constitution/Spinoza/Höffe: Spinoza(1) starts with the foundations of law and state, shows that it is neither possible nor necessary to transfer everything to the highest authorities, and draws some political doctrines from the state constitution and history of the Hebrews. He declares that the law in spiritual matters, including the decision on external religious worship, is the exclusive prerogative of the highest authorities, and ends with the argumentation goal of the entire treatise: that in a free state not everyone is allowed to act as one wants, but that one is allowed to think what one wants and say what one thinks. >Natural Justice/Spinoza, >State/Spinoza, >Freedom/Spinoza. Chapter 16(1), which is fundamental for the philosophy of law and state, breaks with the traditional Aristotelian Stoic-Thomist theory of natural law, which extends into the Spanish late scholasticism. >Natural justice, >Aristotle, >Stoa, >Thomas Aquinas. Natural Law/SpinozaVsThomas Aquinas/SpinozaVsAristotle: Spinoza retains the traditional expression of natural law, but gives it a fundamentally new, exclusively naturalistic meaning. According to its principle of self-preservation, natural law does not contain any moral or otherwise normative claim. >Validity claims. SpinozaVsMachiavelli: On the contrary, every human being, not just the prince as in Machiavelli's case, may do what morality tends to forbid, he may act with force or cunning. >N. Machiavelli. Defined without any sense of duty, pre-state law consists in nothing other than its own natural power (potentia). With this, a subjective right - the legitimate claim of a person - coincides with one’s ability to enforce one’s right. >Law, >Rights, >Freedom, >Society. SpinozaVsRationalism: Spinoza, a rationalist who is methodologically uncompromising in ethics, surprisingly rejects any recourse to ratio here. Thus, Höffe I 236 within his metaphysics he gives priority to content-related naturalism over methodical rationalism. >Rationalism. The state treaty necessary for overcoming the state of nature is only valid under considerations of usefulness. >Contract Theory/Spinoza. 1. B. Spinoza, Tractatus theologico-politicus 2. Ibid., Chap. 16 |
Spinoza I B. Spinoza Spinoza: Complete Works Indianapolis 2002 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Empiricism | Adorno | XIII 85 Experience/Empiricism/Adorno: In Locke, Berkeley, and Hume one finds a great deal about the experience, but the experience itself will hardly be encountered in this philosophy. >Experience/Locke, >Sensations/Berkeley, >Sensory impressions/Berkeley. >Experience/Hume. XIII 86 Philosophy has the problem that, as soon as it attempts to make its experiences valid, it always has only a concept of experience and not the content of experience. From this, it has made a virtue and derived from it that experience, because it can be expressed only in the concept of experience, is in itself only a concept, only a being. >Concepts/Adorno, >Concepts, >Essence. Content/Adorno: Paradoxically, the content of idealist philosophies such as in Hegel, but also Schelling, is much more effective than in empirical philosophies. >Content, >Content of truth/Adorno, >F.W.J. Schelling, >G.W.F. Hegel. XIII 155 Empiricism/Adorno: in contrast to rationalism, thinking, as it were, adds something. By adding itself from the outside to the given, the two pinciples (res cogitans and res extensa) are again immediate. >res cogitans, >R. Descartes, >Rationalism. Then all thinking without sense is just a mere idea. However, this approach also develops further and further from its own consequence in the sense of a progressive subjectivization. From Bacon's naively realistic empiricism, over Locke, as well as over Berkeley and Hume, a consistent empiricism gradually developed, in which, by a consistent recourse to the senses, nothing else is left to be valid as a legal source of knowledge than the immediate circumstances of my consciousness. From Bacon's naively realistic empiricism, Locke, as well as Berkeley and Hume, gradually developed into empiricism, in which, by consistently appealing to the senses, nothing else is left to be regarded as a source of knowledge than the immediate realities of my consciousness. >F. Bacon, >J. Locke, >G. Berkeley, >D. Hume. XIII 156 RationalismVsEmpiricism/EmpiricismVsRationalism/Adorno: the opposition between empiricism and rationalism is not so radically remote as is often imagined. Both are based on the scientific model of evidence. They are both residual theories of the truth, and thus always interrelate. >Truth/Locke. The moment of mastery of nature and finally self-control is the basis of both schools. >Nature/Locke, >Nature/Hume. XIII 157 Experience/Empiricism/Adorno: empiricism also treats experience always only as a principle, according to its most general categories, not at all according to its content. >Experience. XIII 158 Only the creator of empiricism, idealism, and in the most comprehensive measure Hegel have attempted to get the full mental experience under control. >Idealism, >Experience/Kant, >Experience/Hegel. KantVsEmpiricism/Adorno: There is absolutely no experience without thinking, otherwise it would stop by the mere discontinuity of the individual moments. The unity principle ((s) of subjectivity, reason, and mind) would then be completely omitted. >Empiricism/Kant, >Thinking/Kant. |
A I Th. W. Adorno Max Horkheimer Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978 A II Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000 A III Theodor W. Adorno Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973 A IV Theodor W. Adorno Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003 A V Theodor W. Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995 A VI Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071 A VII Theodor W. Adorno Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002 A VIII Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003 A IX Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003 A XI Theodor W. Adorno Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990 A XII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973 A XIII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974 |
| Empiricism | James | Diaz-Bone I 56 JamesVsEmpirism: "Nominalism": Empirists claim that there is a concept for every object. James: What about facts for which no concept exists? >Nominalism. Even worse: I 57 Language/James: language supports the nominalistic tendency to dismember the stream of consciousness. Nevertheless, James develops a position of radical empiricism (VsRationalism, VsEmpirism, which is represented by Hume;JamesVsHume). JamesVsHume: in order to be radical, empiricism must not contain elements which are not directly perceptible, nor exclude elements which are directly experienced. Cf. Empiricism/Hume. Radical Empiricism/James: 1. Only such issues can be discussed, which are based on categories of observation. 2. The relations between objects of experience are as accessible as the objects themselves. 3. Context as a result of partial experience is itself the object of experience. The experience of this connection is the stream of consciousness. 4. No preliminary reconstruction of subjective consciousness. |
James I R. Diaz-Bone/K. Schubert William James zur Einführung Hamburg 1996 |
| Errors | Millikan | I 94 Mistake/Falsehood/False/Error/Deception/Naturalistic fallacy/Millikan: nothing can be described as broken by looking at only this single, isolated thing. Normality/solution: it is always about how a thing "is supposed to be". Problem: also false beliefs and false sentences do not show for themselves alone that they are wrong. Even senseless sentences do not show their senselessness in themselves. >Context dependence. Rationalism/MillikanVsRationalism: rationalism must therefore be false in relation to intentionality. MillicanVsDescartes: Cartesian reflection alone does not even show the intentional character of our beliefs and ideas. >Rationalism. I 171 Error/Deception/Showing/index word/Millikan: e.g. there are two items on the table, an ashtray that I do not consider an ashtray, and a thing that is not an ashtray, but I think that it is an ahstray and say: "this is a nice ashtray". Question: Did I say with this that the ashtray is beautiful, even though I meant the other object? E.g. I hold up a book and say "This belonged to my grandfather". I am wrong, however, and hold up the wrong book. I 172 What I said is, of course, wrong. Not so clear is whether what I have meant is something different than what I said. Millikan: Thesis: here it is not the case that I and my token of "this" meant different things. Solution: "this" is ambiguous in relation to the Fregean sense. >Fregean sense, >Ambiguity. MillikanVsTradition: philosophers have often neglected this. Solution/Millikan: perception can lead to temporary concepts in us. Temporary concepts/intensions/Millikan: Intensions are then tied to our abilities to trace and reidentify things. Provisional concept: e.g. this coffee cup is for me completely indistinguishable from a dozen others, but at the moment it is my cup. I 173 Question: Does this even count as a concept? The ability to trace the object leads to an inner concept. This leads to the distinction between perception and thought. Thinking/Millikan: when thinking is not mediated by perception, the objects you think of are not indexed. Perception: here the objects are indexed. >Perception, >Indexicality. I 174 Error/Deception/Index Word/Perception/Misidentification/Millikan: E.g. Suppose I am wrong when I identify a recurring object. Then my inner concept has two senses, it has an ambiguous Fregean sense. 1. derived sense from the ability to trace the object 2. inner concept which I already had before "This" is ambiguous. >Index words. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Experience | Dilthey | Gadamer I 67 Experience/Dilthey/Gadamer: Something becomes an experience, as long as it was not only experienced, but its being experienced had a special emphasis, which gives it lasting meaning. What is in this way one, completely wins a new state of being in the expression of art. Dilthey's famous book title "Das Erlebnis und die Dichtung" (English: "The Experience and Poetry") brings this connection to a catchy formula. Indeed, it was Dilthey who first assigned a conceptual function to the word, which soon became a popular buzzword and was soon to rise to a term of such a plausible concept of value that many European languages have adopted it as a foreign word. Gadamer I 68 Dilthey's Goethe essay allows us (...) to look back (...) into the unconscious prehistory of the word, because this essay is available in the version of 1877(1) and in the later adaptation of "Das Erlebnis und die Dichtung" (1905). In this essay Dilthey compares Goethe with Rousseau, and in order to describe Rousseau's novel poetry from the world of his inner experiences, he uses the expression "the experience". In the paraphrase of a Rousseau text, the phrase "the experiences of earlier days"(2) can be found. DiltheyVsRationalism: The coinage of the word obviously evokes the criticism of the rationalism of the Enlightenment, which in Rousseau's late times emphasized the concept of life. It is probably Rousseau's influence on German Classicism that set the standard for "being experienced" ("Erlebtsein") and thus enabled the formation of the word experience ("Erlebnis").(3) Life/Idealism/Gadamer: The concept of life forms Gadamer I 69 also the metaphysical background that carries the speculative thinking of German idealism, and plays a fundamental role in both Fichte and Hegel, but also in Schleiermacher. In contrast to the abstraction of understanding as well as to the particularity of feeling or imagination, this concept implies the connection to totality, to infinity. Gadamer: This can be clearly heard in the tone that the word experience has had up to the present day. >Experience/Historical Development/Gadamer, >Given/Dilthey. Gadamer I 71 Dilthey/Gadamer: The entities of meaning we encounter in the humanities may be very strange and incomprehensible to us - they can be traced back to the last units of what is given in consciousness, which themselves no longer contain anything foreign, representational or in need of interpretation. They are the units of experience, which are themselves units of sense. Sensation/DiltheyVsMach/DiltheyVsCarnap/Gadamer: [It was of decisive importance (...) for Dilthey's] thinking (...) that as the last unit of consciousness not sensation or feeling is mentioned, as was taken for granted in Kantianism and still in the positivist epistemology of the 19th century up to Ernst Mach, but what Dilthey says for it. He thus limits the constructive ideal of a construction of knowledge from sensation atoms and opposes it with a sharper version of the concept of the given. >Life/Dilthey. Gadamer I 226 Experience/Dilthey/Gadamer: The question is (...) how the experience of the individual and his or her insight can be elevated to historical experience. History is no longer about interrelations that are experienced as such by the individual or are relived as such by others. Dilthey develops how the individual acquires a life context and from there seeks to gain the constitutive terms that are also important for the historical context and his recognition. In contrast to the categories of the knowledge of nature, these concepts are concepts of life. For the last prerequisite for the knowledge of the historical world, in which the identity of consciousness and object, Gadamer I 227 this speculative postulate of idealism, is still a demonstrable reality and is according to Dilthey the experience. Here is immediate certainty. For what is experience is no longer differentiated into an act, such as becoming one, and a content, that which one is becoming(3). It is rather an inner being that cannot be further dissolved. Context/Dilthey: Already in his ideas "on descriptive and dissecting psychology" Dilthey had distinguished the task of deriving "the acquired context of the soul life" from the explanatory forms of the knowledge of nature(4). He had used the term structure in order to distinguish the experience of soul connections from the causal connections of the natural event. The logical characteristic of "structure" was, that here a whole of a relationship is meant, which is not based on the temporal sequence of being achieved, but on inner relationships. >Subject/Dilthey, >Interrelation/Dilthey. 1. Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie, Bd. X; cf. die Anmerkung Diltheys zu »Goethe und die dichterische Phantasie« (Das Erlebnis und die Dichtung, p. 468 ff.). 2. Das Erlebnis und die Dichtung, 6. Aufl., p. 219; cf. Rousseau, Les Confessions, Partie Il, Livre 9. The exact correspondence cannot be proven. Obviously it is not a translation, but a paraphrase of the description to be read in Rousseau's work. 3. Dilthey, Ges. Schriften Vll, 27f.; 230. 4. VII, 13a. |
Dilth I W. Dilthey Gesammelte Schriften, Bd.1, Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften Göttingen 1990 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Proof of God’s Existence | Descartes | Danto I 189 Ontological proof of God/Descartes/Danto: if God did not exist, he could be prevented only by something outside the existence - which contradicts the thesis that God is not limited by anything. I 191 In the case of God the understanding of the idea already leads to knowledge about his existence by itself - we cannot know what God is and doubt his existence. >Knowledge, >Existence, >Understanding, >Ideas, >Doubt, >God, >Definitions, >Definability. Danto I 193 Rationalism/ontological proof of God/Descartes/Danto: Rationalism > understanding = knowledge of existence Rationalism/Danto: 1st out of concepts 2nd starting from that conceive the nature and existence of the world. KantVsRationalism: existence is not a property. >Properties, >Predicate of existence, >Predication, >Rationalism. |
Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Rationalism | Chisholm | II 36f RationalismVsBerkeley: we believe in the outside world from the beginning, no decision situation; similar to Hume, but very modest position. Methodology/Sciences: Strategy: better than maintaining a change -> belief in the uniformity of the world. II 39 Rationalism/Rutte: reason always appealed to already existing belief-majorities. Rason: strategy: attitude maintained when change is not attractive. This is also true for indecision. It is more attractive to maintain realism. On the other hand: Solipsism: maintaining is less attractive. Rutte, Heiner. Mitteilungen über Wahrheit und Basis empirischer Erkenntnis, mit besonderer Berücksichtigung des Wahrnehmungs- und Außenweltproblems. In: M.David/L. Stubenberg (Hg) Philosophische Aufsätze zu Ehren von R.M. Chisholm Graz 1986 II 76 KantVsRationalism: mere consistency shall impose existence - (s) existence: freedom from contradiction, but not vice versa guaranteed -> Field: consistency = logical possibility. Sauer, W. Über das Analytische und das synthetische Apriori bei Chisholm. In: M.David/L. Stubenberg (Hg) Philosophische Aufsätze zu Ehren von R.M. Chisholm Graz 1986 |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Rationalism | Locke | Arndt II 188 VsRationalism/Arndt: confusion between the simple and the general! Obscured the debate about the analyticity criterion - made falsely seem possible the derivation of properties from essential concepts. LockeVsRationalism: he avoids this by distinguishing: ascent (bottom-up): in the formation of ideas by abstraction from particular to general (from the individual to species and genus) - descent (top-down) reducing the composite (complex ideas) to the simple. >Idea/Locke, >Mind/Locke, >Order/Locke. |
Loc III J. Locke An Essay Concerning Human Understanding Loc II H.W. Arndt "Locke" In Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen - Neuzeit I, J. Speck (Hg) Göttingen 1997 |
| Rationality | Wittgenstein | II 125 Rationality/Generality/Whole/System/Wittgenstein: you cannot ask whether the whole is rational - "rational" only applies within the system. >Wholes, >Systems, >Circular reasoning. II 100 Rationalism/Empiricism: WittgensteinVsRationalism: Rationalism is wrong to assume that there are synthetic judgments a priori. Rationalists think you can always sit there like that and only use reason. >Synthetic/analytic, >a priori, >Judgments. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| Reasons | Armstrong | III 159 Principle of Sufficient Reason/explanation/ArmstrongVsRationalism /VsSchopenhauer/Armstrong: if we accept the principle then we must accept that laws can be brought under laws of a higher level - then again problem that there is no sufficient reasonfor a higher level law. >Explanation/Armstrong, >Laws/Armstrong. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
| Syntheticity | Chisholm | II 60 Synthetic: Existence/Kant: every existential judgment is synthetic according to Kant. Synthetic judgments a priori/Kant: make conditional existence assertion. (> Analogies of experience) - ChisholmVs. II 61 Synthetic a priori/Kant: E.g. the space is three-dimensional. - RiemannVs: refuted - synthetic a priori/Chisholm: depends on whether there are non-analytic propositions of the form All S are P. - E.g. Chisholm: All squares are form-bearing, all red is colored, nothing red is green. - But not clearly: two forms: a) all humans are mortal, b) all humans are descendants. II 62 Chisholm: form-identical with the analytical propositions - KantVsChisholm: form differs. II 72 Synthetic a priori/Chisholm/Sauer: Problem: no synthetic a priori if the definition of necessity is: p expresses a contradictory proposition which can be negated - false solution: to chose necessity as mere inclusion (understanding a includes understanding b), then contradiction: it would be possible that there is no or one possible worlds , so that non-p. - reason: E.g. "p" expresses an inclusion, then non-p is contradictory. II 73 Synthetic a priori/Chisholm/Sauer: E.g. (S) All red is colored: is not a logical truth because there are no red objects in every possible world (poss.w.). - analytic/Sauer: Problem: the same happens with the analysis: from the fact that (A) "all squares are rectangles" is analytic, would follow that this is true in every possible world, but not from the simple sentence "All squares are rectangles". - Problems: see below. II 74 If "all squares are rectangular" is true, then the property of the square exists. II 76 The doctrine of the synthetic a priori in Kant is VsEmpiricism. The doctrine of the analytic is VsRationalism: to reach the knowledge of objects by means of consistent thinking. - ((s) No existence follows from this.) Sauer, W. Über das Analytische und das synthetische Apriori bei Chisholm. In: M.David/L. Stubenberg (Hg) Philosophische Aufsätze zu Ehren von R.M. Chisholm Graz 1986 |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Technocracy | Morozov | I 138 Technocracy/VsTechnocracy/Technocracy Criticism/Technology Criticism/Morozov: most critics of modern technocracy or technology refer to the ((s) assumed) arrogance of planners and reformers who are lacking experience with the actual lives of people in their habitats. According to these critics, thought and consideration are indispensable; even the most perfect algorithms will not make them superfluous. Examples are: Jane Jacob, I. Berlin, F. Hayek, K. Popper, M. Oakeshott. >F. A. Hayek, >K. Popper, >M. Oakeshott, >I. Berlin, >Technology. Literature: I 137 Urban planning/Jane Jacob: Jacob's critique of unimaginative urban planning: see Jane Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great American Cities (New York: Vintage, 1992); Isaiah Berlin: his critique of a "Pro-Crusteanism": a compulsive unification: See Jonathan Allen, "Isaiah Berlin's Anti-Procrustean Liberalism: Ideas, Circumstances, and the Protean Individual", lecture at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association (28-31 August 2003, Philadelphia, PA). Available at http:// berlin. wolf. ox. ac. ac. uk/ lists/ onib/ allen2003. pdf; Planning/Central Planning/Friedrich Hayek: his criticism of centralized planning: see Friedrich Hayek. The Use of Knowledge in Society", The American Economic Review 35, No. 4 (September 1, 1945): 519- 530; Karl PopperVsHistorism: see Karl Popper. The Poverty of Historicism, I, Economica 11, No. 42 (May 1,1944): 86- 103; Michael OakeshottVsRationalism: see Michael Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics and other essays, exp. Edited by (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1991). I 168 Definition Techno-neutral/Majid Tehranian/Morozov: are preferably consultants who do not want to upset their clients. (1) I 170 Definition Techno-structuralists/Tehranian/Morozov: believe that technologies evolve from institutional needs, spread by social forces of which they are part. (2) 1. Majid Tehranian, Technologies of Power: Information Machines and Democratic Prospects (New York: Ablex Publishing, 1990), 5. 2. ibid. |
Morozov I Evgeny Morozov To Save Everything, Click Here: The Folly of Technological Solutionism New York 2014 |
| Theories | Waltz | Brocker I 625 Theory/Politics/Waltz: A theory should explain the emergence of regularities (1). For Waltz, a theory is not a "series of laws concerning a certain behavior or phenomena". Nor do theories have the function of explaining laws. (2) Laws/Waltz: are obtained by observation. Theories: are obtained through speculative processes designed to explain laws. Theories are speculations. Therefore, they are only loosely connected to the real world. N.B.: from this definitional separation of laws and theories it follows that theories cannot be judged by whether they are true. Solution/Waltz: a good theory is characterized by the fact that it is coherent in its structure and other scientists take it seriously. (3) Laws/Waltz: Laws, on the other hand, can be judged according to the criteria "true" and "false". WaltzVsEmpirism: Waltz propagates a sharp separation between theory and reality. But it also applies: WaltzVsRationalism. Brocker I 626 Pragmatism/Waltz/Masala: Waltz has a pragmatic position close to Sellars and Quine. Reality/Waltz: For Waltz, theories construct a reality without anyone ever being able to say that this is reality (4). ((s) However, this position cannot be easily attributed to Quine). See Theories/Quine, Reality/Quine, Laws/Quine, Empiricism/Quine. Criteria/Waltz: for the formation of theories: 1. Criterion: Theories must discriminate. Reality/Realism/Waltz: Thesis: there is a reality independent of language and theories. ((s) contradiction to the thesis above, according to which there should be several "realities"). ((s) This is a position of extreme realism). The proximity to Quine and Sellars mentioned by Masala cannot be fully understood: See Realism/Quine, Reality/Sellars, Theory/Sellars. Method/WaltzVsPopper: Waltz advocates a pluralistic process of falsification and verification. (5) 2. Criterion for theory building: (WaltzVsBehavioralism): WaltzVsInduction: the inductive method of political theories of the 1960s and 1970s is wrong, since it wants to formulate laws from existing correlations. With the method of correlation, each variable can be related to another one in a statistically significant way. Complexity/WaltzVsInduction: the complexity of the real world cannot be explained by theories. For these theories are not descriptions, but instruments to explain parts of the real world. Brocker I 627 Theories/Waltz: should be simpler than reality; they should be "elegant". (6) To achieve this, a theory must ignore certain factors. Terms/Meaning/WaltzVsSocial Sciences: Problem: not only do meanings vary with viewers, this makes every social science theory inherently black. But even the attempt to specify the meaning of a term by operationalizing definitions is no way out, because any term can be operationalized in any discourse context. (7) See also Concepts/Quine. Solution/Waltz: we have to specify causalities. Brocker I 628 Social Sciences/Waltz: if causal connections and the interaction of variables can be explained, hard social science theories are possible. Theories/Waltz: cannot be tested - only the hypotheses derived from them. Therefore, a theory should not be rejected if one of its hypotheses is not confirmed. (8) 1. Kenneth N. Waltz, „Theory of International Relations“, in: Fred Greenstein/Nelson W. Polsby (Hg.) International Politics: Handbook of Political Science, Reading, Mas. 1975, p. 4 2. Ibid. p. 3. 3. Kenneth N. Waltz, “Assaying Theories: Reflections on Imre Lakatos”, in: Colin Elman/Miriam Fendius Elman (Ed.) Progress in International Relations Theory: Appraising the Field, Cambridge, Mass.2003, S. xii. 4. Kenneth N. Waltz Theory of International Politics, Reading, Mas. 1979, p. 9. 5. Kernneth N. Waltz “Response to my Critics” in: Robert O. Keohane (Ed.) Neorealism and its Critics, New York 1986, p. 336. 6. Waltz 1975, p. 9. 7. Ibid. p. 11 8. Ibid. p. 13. Carlo Masala, „Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics” in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
PolWaltz I Kenneth N. Waltz Man,the State and War New York 1959 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Ayer, A. J. | Black Vs Ayer, A. J. | III 25 Rationality/Circularity/Self-justification/Reasoning/RationalityVsVs/Black: what we need is proof that what we regard as rational practice (procedure), is truly rational. That our idea of good evidence is correct. Problem: purely formal evidence would not be applicable for it, and everything else would not answer the question. That does not mean that the inductive method is irrational within science. It just might be irrational if there were a standard of rationality which would not be achieved. In fact, rationalitysets the standard itself according to which arguments are valued as rational or irrational. (Baltimore, 1956, S 75). Ayer/Black: does not speak explicitl about of our problem with rationality, but his argument can be transferred to it. He could then say: Rationality/Ayer/Black: he might say: no proof is possible, because nothing is allowed at this stage as evidence. Ayer: if it is clear that there can be no logical superior law, then it should not be worrying that something can be decisive in its own right. III 26 Science/Rationality/Justification/Self-affirmation/Ayer/Black: Ayer’s view then leads to the following: scientific method is what scientists accept as what justifies the conclusions accepted by them. Belief/Justification/Standard/Black: Our standard for the justification of our beliefs (in science) is an appeal to good reasons. ((s)> "good scientific practice"). Standard/Evidence/Justification/Ayer: but there is no proof for the quality of the standard itself. Important argument: the result is that even if experience shows that relying on reasons is not sufficient in some areas, that our ongoing reliance on reasons was not even discredited by that in the same area. BlackVsAyer: unlike himself, I find that indeed very troubling! Because I believe that it supports the irrationalist. Irrationalism/VsRationalism/Black: From this position, one can say that if there are no reasons for rationality, there is no reason against irrationality. Then there is also no possibility for relativism (cultural relativism), to defend itself against a serious revolt against the standards (i.e. also against culture-specific standards). |
Black I Max Black "Meaning and Intention: An Examination of Grice’s Views", New Literary History 4, (1972-1973), pp. 257-279 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg) Frankfurt/M 1979 Black II M. Black The Labyrinth of Language, New York/London 1978 German Edition: Sprache. Eine Einführung in die Linguistik München 1973 Black III M. Black The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983 Black IV Max Black "The Semantic Definition of Truth", Analysis 8 (1948) pp. 49-63 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Descartes, R. | Millikan Vs Descartes, R. | I 94 Error/falsehood/false/mistake/deception/naturalistic fallacy/Millikan: nothing can be described as faulty (broken) by considering only this single, isolated thing. Normality/Solution: It's always about how a thing "should be" ("supposed to be"). Problem: even false convictions and false sentences show do not by themselves that they are wrong. Also, meaningless sentences do not indicate themselves their meaninglessness. Rationalism/MillikanVsRationalism: must therefore be wrong in regard to intentionality. MillikanVsDescartes: Cartesian reflection alone does not even show the intentional character of our convictions and ideas. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Empiricism | James Vs Empiricism | I 57 JamesVsEmpiricism: "nominalism": empiricists assert that there is a term for any object. James: how about facts for which there is no concept?. - Worse: Language / James: supports the nominalist tendency to fragment the stream of consciousness. Nevertheless, James developed a position of radical empiricism (VsRationalism, Vsempiricism that is represented by Hume.). JamesVsHume: to be radical empiricism must neither accept elements that are not directly experienced, nor exclude elements that are experienced directly. Radical empiricism / James: 1st Only those issues can be discussed, that are based on categories of observation. 2nd The relationships between the objects of experience are just as accessible as the objects themselves. 3rd connection as a result of the sequence of partial experience is itself an object of experience. The experience of this relationship is the power of consciousness. 4th No upfront construction of subjective consciousness. |
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| Empiricism | Wittgenstein Vs Empiricism | Stegmüller IV 59 Imagination/Kripke WittgensteinVsHume: 1. Assuming that the meaning understanding or meaning (to mean) would be a kind of headache or toothache, --- IV 60 and "+" meaning (to mean) would always be accompanied by a distinctive type of headache. How can the pain be a help for me to decide if the correct answer is "276" or "7"? (For a new task with which I did not previously face). (WittgensteinVsEmpiricism). There may be distinctive qualities, but this just does not help the VsSkepticism. --- Wittgenstein II 100 Rationalism/empiricism: WittgensteinVsRationalism: is wrong with the assumption that there are a priori synthetic judgments. They think you can always sit so, and only use reason. Empirists/Wittgenstein: they realized that we can only describe the world. That's right. WittgensteinVsEmpiricism: error: they were trying to make the philosophy empirically. Correct: the reason cannot decide everything. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Hume, D. | James Vs Hume, D. | I 55 JamesVsHume, JamesVsMill: "associationism": sees in conceptual ideas and experiences only reflections of perceptual impressions that generate by acting on the organism ideas. >Association. James: This "determinism" may explain the sensations of details, but not the experience of volition, moods, rationality, memories. I 57 VsRationalism, VsEmpiricism as it is represented by Hume.). JamesVsHume: radical empiricism must neither take elements that are not directly experienced, nor exclude elements that are experienced directly. |
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| Millikan, R. | Verschiedene Vs Millikan, R. | Millikan I 90 Sentence/Belief/Language/Thinking/Millikan: it seems clear that if we had no beliefs, we would stop speaking or uttering sentences with meaning. But why is that clear? We need another explanation (see below). Sentence/Intentionality/Millikan: Thesis: a sentence (and any other typical intentional pattern) is intentional because of the eigenfunctions and normal relations that this pattern has to a producer and an interpreter. These two are cooperating units in this process. N.B.: then sentences are fundamentally intentional and have no derived intentionality. (MillikanVsTradition, MillikanVsSearle). ((s) Intentionality/Millikan/(s): must then no longer refer to the mental.) VsMillikan: one could argue that intentionality must be connected with the mental, because the analysis of the intentionality of thoughts or inner representations must at least take place in accordance with principles according to which consciousness and the mental itself must be analyzed. Relation/VsMillikan: the relations offered by Millikan are merely external. At best, they correlate changes in consciousness with changes in the external world. They themselves lie outside the mind and outside consciousness. Consciousness/Tradition: but be a consciousness of the world, not merely consciousness of the changes of itself. I 91 Tradition: we experience our consciousness directly. MillikanVsTradition: what kind of experience of intentionality should this be? What kind of power should this argument have? The force should be epistemic and rational. Uncorrectability/MillikanVsTradition: the experience of consciousness (experience of intentionality) should have something infallible. We would then also have to have an immediate understanding. It would also have to assume the existence of intentionality and consciousness, otherwise the experience could not be "in" it. Consciousness/Tradition: assumes that consciousness is transparent. And therefore it cannot only consist of external relations to the outer world, and these are necessary for nature. MillikanVsVs: suppose we reject this epistemic rationalistic picture, i.e. we deny that there is "something epistemically given". Then we could admit that sometimes people are aware of their thoughts. But we could maintain that this awareness is partly an external relation. The "inside" of this feeling (consciousness, awareness) I 92 does not guarantee that it is the inside of a true awareness relation. Consciousness/Millikan: even consciousness of consciousness is not an immediate object. There is nothing transparent about consciousness. N.B./Millikan: this is disturbing because it follows (negative thesis) that it is possible that we do not know what we think! ((s) DavidsonVsHume: ditto). I.e. nothing is guaranteed from the act of consciousness itself. Rationalism/rationalist/intentionality/consciousness/MillikanVsRationalism/Millikan: the traditional rationalist view of consciousness and intentionality leads to one dead end after the other. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Rationalism | Black Vs Rationalism | III 21 VsRationality/Black: the challenger: ("Why should I be rational?"): We can assume that in different variants: 1) Def militant anti-rationalist/terminology/Black: is like the cry of a donkey. He uses expressions like "reason" or "rational justification" only in distancing quotation marks. He is insensitive to rational persuasion. 2) Def agnostic rationalist/terminology/Black: he listens to reasons, but despairs, like Hume, over finding a rational basis for his beliefs and actions. But in terms of actions and thoughts he is conformist. That makes him a victim of relativism which claims that "our rationality" is culture-dependent. 3) Def Trustful rationalist/Terminology/Black: pursues a rational lifestyle wholeheartedly, but undogmatically, and it is certain that there are good reasons for his actions, only that he can not bring them up. Anti-Rationalism/VsRationalism/Challenge/Black: In the following I depart from type 2: the agnostic rationalists, like Hume. III 22 Rationality/Geach/Black: Thesis: ~"although it is reasonable to ask for reasons, it is not always reasonable. E.g. it is not reasonable to ask for what reason you should ever ask for reasons. |
Black IV Max Black "The Semantic Definition of Truth", Analysis 8 (1948) pp. 49-63 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Rationalism | Feyerabend Vs Rationalism | II 198 FeyerabendVsrationalism: they embellish their indoctrination attempts: "I might be wrong, maybe you re right, but together we will find the truth." |
Feyerabend I Paul Feyerabend Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, London/New York 1971 German Edition: Wider den Methodenzwang Frankfurt 1997 Feyerabend II P. Feyerabend Science in a Free Society, London/New York 1982 German Edition: Erkenntnis für freie Menschen Frankfurt 1979 |
| Rationalism | Hume Vs Rationalism | I 20 Rationalism/Deleuze: rationalism turns representation into a criterion, it locates imagination in the mind. HumeVsRationalism: with that he has placed that in the imagination which cannot be put into imagination without contradiction, the generality of imagination itself. He has moved the determination of the mind into the external objects. I 21 This has deprived philosophy of the understanding and the sense of practice and subject. |
D. Hume I Gilles Delueze David Hume, Frankfurt 1997 (Frankreich 1953,1988) II Norbert Hoerster Hume: Existenz und Eigenschaften Gottes aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen der Neuzeit I Göttingen, 1997 |
| Rationalism | James Vs Rationalism | I 57 Rationalism: James developed a position of radical empiricism (Vsrationalism, Vsempiricism as it is represented by Hume). >Empiricism/Hume. JamesVsHume: in order to be radical the empiricist must neither accept elements that are not directly experienced, nor exclude elements that are experienced directly. Horwich I 24 Truths/James: in the plural they have only one thing in common: they pay off. Truth/JamesVsRationalism: is produced. (1) 1. William James (1907) "Pragmatisms Conception of Truth“ (Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods, 4 p. 141-55 and 396-406) in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth, Aldershot 1994 |
Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Rationalism | Kant Vs Rationalism | Danto I 193 Rationalism: starting from our concepts attempts to initially imagine the existence and nature of the real world. By applying pure, irrefutable reasoning, he tries to determine how the world should be. KantVsRationalism: shows the mistake: Existence is not a property, therefore no essential feature. Fundamental error: to treat the predicate "exists" as if it was something like "blue" or "round". Kant I 39 KantVsConventional philosophy: Areas of expertise: "rational psychology," "rational cosmology" and "rational theology". Kant: "sophistical conclusions": deceptive because something given is subsumed under mere idea to give them objective reality. But all that is there is conditional: 1. an imaginative I 2. the indefinite world of experience 3. the fact that everything is in necessary order. Chisholm II 76 analytical judgment/Kant: a judgment in which the "mind is concerned only with what is already thought of in concepts" (CPR, B 314) Sauer: So in his truth, independent of the existence. KantVsRationalism: illusion: to foist a transcendental possibility of things from the logical possibility of the concept. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Rationalism | Wittgenstein Vs Rationalism | II 100 Rationalism/Empiricism: WittgensteinVsRationalism: is wrong with the assumption that there are a priori synthetic judgments. You think you can always sit like this, and only use reason. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
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