Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 4 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Functions Wittgenstein II 332
Function/arithmetic/Russell/Wittgenstein: Russell believed one could not talk about the number 3 independently of each function - the number would be a property of a function. WittgensteinVsRamsey: the construction of a relation does not depend on finding a phenomenon.
---
IV 68
Operation/Tractatus: (5.25) not the same as function: function cannot be its own argument, but rather an operation - operation: E.g. logical sum, logical product, negation.

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958
German Edition:
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921.
German Edition:
Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960

Ramsey Rule Ramsey Mause I 272
Ramsey-Rule/Ramsey:
(pi – MC)/pi ej
________ = __
(pj – MC)/pj ei

Pi = price of the i-th good; MC = marginal good in the markets of the i-th good; ei = Price elasticity of demand for the i-th good.
Thus, for two goods i and j selected from the quantity of all existing goods, the tax rates levied on consumption of i and j will be in inverse proportion to the price elasticities of demand. With relatively low price elasticity, relatively high tax revenues can be achieved without causing major substitution effects (and thus welfare losses). (RamseyVsEdgeworth, see Taxation/Edgeworth, Taxation/Ramsey.
The rule therefore says something about the optimal ratio of tax rates on consumer goods to each other. However, this does not say anything about the amount of the tax. See also economic theories on taxation
Mause I 273
VsRamsey: Problem: if goods with very low price elasticity of demand are, for example, staple foods or drinking water, the Ramsey Rule can quickly have undesirable, strongly regressive distribution effects. The tax system would place a disproportionate burden on relatively poor households. Solution/DiamondVsRamsey/MirrleesVsRamsey: those goods that are heavily consumed by individuals whose welfare still has a strongly positive marginal effect on social welfare should be taxed less. (1)(2)
This integrates the weighing of pure efficiency goals and ideas of distributive justice.


1. Peter A. Diamond und James Mirrlees. 1971. Optimal taxation and public production I/ II. American Economic Review 61( 1): 8– 27 und 61( 3): 261– 278.
2. Peter A. Diamond, 1975. A many person Ramsey tax rule. Journal of Public Economics 4 (4). S. 335– 342.

Ramsey I
F. P. Ramsey
The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays 2013

Ramsey II
Frank P. Ramsey
A contribution to the theory of taxation 1927

Ramsey III
Frank P. Ramsey
"The Nature of Truth", Episteme 16 (1991) pp. 6-16
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994


Mause I
Karsten Mause
Christian Müller
Klaus Schubert,
Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018
Redundancy Theory Brandom I 433f
Redundancy theory/Brandom: VsPragmatism: has not recognized that the significance of the corresponding assertions must be the same - VsRamsey: E.g. "Goldbach’s Conjecture" is not equivalent to "the Goldbach's Conjecture is true". - Solution: Originally posted eradication > set of sentences. VsRamsey.

Bra I
R. Brandom
Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994
German Edition:
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001
German Edition:
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001

Singular Terms Strawson Substitutions/Strawson / (s):
of singular terms: reversible
of predicates: not reversible.
---
I 198
Singular Term/QuineVsGeach/QuineVsFrege/QuineVsRamsey: (Singular Term) can occur at the places of quantifiable variables, general expressions not - singular term: quantifiable, Generic Term: not quantifiable - StrawsonVsQuine: not so important. ---
I 198
Singular Term/Quine: abstract singular terms: E.g. "piety", "wisdom": names of abstract objects - no general terms - Names of concrete objects: e.g. "Earth" - on the other hand general term: E.g "philosopher" - StrawsonVsQuine: no good explanation: we would not like to say that this would be true of many things - solution/Quine: in reality distinction between singular term and predicates - general term/Quine: the location which is taken by them, has no own status - decisive: predicates cannot be quantified. ---
I 203
"a philosopher"/Quine: no singular term. ---
IV 63
QuineVs singular Term: eliminable StrawsonVsQuine.

Strawson I
Peter F. Strawson
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959
German Edition:
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Strawson II
Peter F. Strawson
"Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit",
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Strawson III
Peter F. Strawson
"On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Strawson IV
Peter F. Strawson
Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992
German Edition:
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Strawson V
P.F. Strawson
The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966
German Edition:
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Strawson VI
Peter F Strawson
Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Strawson VII
Peter F Strawson
"On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950)
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993


The author or concept searched is found in the following 12 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Carnap, R. Field Vs Carnap, R. I 118
FieldVsCarnap: although my approach is similar to that of Carnap in Meaning and Necessity, 1) it does not refer to meaning at all. I.e. no "meaning relations between predicates" ((s)> meaning postulates).
2) my treatment of free variables does not require the introduction of "individual concepts" and is consistently anti-essentialist. (FieldVsEssentialism): no formula of the form "MB" is true in a model with view to an attribution function if it is not also true in the model in relation to any other attribution function. Nino Cocchiarella/Carnap/Field: Cocchiarella: ("On the Primary and Secondary semantics of logical necessity"): an approach similar to Carnap: FieldVsCocchiarella/FieldVsRamseyFieldVsCarnap: leads to Ramsey’s bizarre conclusion that E.g. "it is possible that there are at least 10 to the power of 10 to the power of 10 objects" is logically false if the world happens to contain fewer objects (empirical).
FieldVsCarnap: 3) his idea that modal concepts are derived from semantic concepts should be modified, Field: Just the other way around! (QuineVsField).
II 186
Referential Indeterminacy/Reference/Theory Change/Reference Change/Semantic Change/Field: we now have all the components for the indeterminacy of reference: Only (HR) and (HP) remain, but are mutually exclusive. (HP) Newton’s word "mass" denoted net mass.
(HR) Newton’s word "mass" denoted relativistic mass.
In fact there is no fact on the basis of which you could opt for one of two. Vs: it could be argued that we only lack additional information. FieldVsVs: but then it should be possible already to say what kind of information that is supposed to be. And we have already found that there can be no fact here. "Mass"/Newton/Denotation/Reference/Field: the issue is not that we do not know what Newton’s "mass" denotes, but that Newton’s word was referentially indeterminate. (Because we do not know which of the two, HP or HR should be excluded.) II 187 The truth and falsity of (4R) and (5P) cannot be explained on the basis of what Newton referred to. FieldVsReferential Semantics/FieldVsCarnap: this is excluded by this indeterminacy of reference.

Field I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Field II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Field III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Field IV
Hartry Field
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994
Frege, G. Verificationism Vs Frege, G. Field II 104
Verifikationstheorie/VsFrege/VsRussell/VsTractatus/VsRamsey/Bedeutung/Field: hier ist der Hauptbegriff nicht Wahrheitsbedingungen (WB) sondern Verifikations-Bedingungen (VB). (Vielleicht über Reize). Diese werden ohne daß-Sätze gegeben. WB/Rege/Russell/Field: einige Vertreter dieser Linie werden sagen, was beim Verifikationismus ausgelassen ist, sind nicht die WB, sondern propositionaler Inhalt.
Proposition/Verifikationismus/Field: kann der Verifikationist dann einfach als Klasse von VB bezeichnen. Für eine Äußerung drückt die entsprechende Proposition dann die Menge der VB aus, die sie hat. So mußten Propositionen im verifikationistischen Sinn nicht mit daß-Sätzen beschrieben werden.
Proposition/Inflationismus/Frege/Russell/Field: würde sagen, daß das keine richtigen Propositionen sind, weil diese WB einschließen müssen. InflationismusVsVerifikationismus.
Lewis, D. Armstrong Vs Lewis, D. Arm III 70
Def Law of Nature/LoN/Lewis: Iff it occurs as a theorem (or axiom) in each of the true deductive systems that unites the best combination of simplicity and strength. Armstrong: "each" is important: Suppose we had L3 and L4 (see E.g. above), both as a law, but both support incompatible counterfactual conditionals.
Lewis: then there is no third law.
ArmstrongVsLewis: that seems wrong.
III 71
The least evil would be to say that an involuntary choice must be made between L3 or L4 as the third law. The price for this is the discovery that in some possible situations the view of Ramsey Lewis does not offer an involuntary response. This may not be a problem for Lewis:
Law/Lewis: "vague and difficult concept".
ArmstrongVsLewis: if one does not assume the regularity theory, there is a precise distinction between laws and non-laws.
Vs Systematic approach/VsRamsey/VsLewis: pro: it is as they say, the manifestations of LoN can be singled out of the Humean uniformities. But:
This is not a necessary truth. Their criterion is not part of our concept of LoN.
ArmstrongVsLewis: it is logically possible that the uniformities (unif.) in an arbitrarily chosen subclass are manifestations of LoN, while the unif. in the residue class are purely coincidental unif... It is logically possible that every Humean uniformity is the manifestation of a LoN, that none is a manifestation or that any other subclass is this class of manifestations of LoN.

Schwarz I 94
Def properties/Lewis: having a property means being a member of a class. ArmstrongVsLewis/Problem/Schwarz: you cannot explain "red" by saying that its bearer is the element of such and such a class. ((s) either, it is circular, or it misses the property, because the object (bearer) can also belong to other classes. E.g. the fact that a tomato is red is not due to the fact that it is an element of the class of red things, but vice versa.) Arm 1978a, 2,5,2,7)
Schw I 95
LewisVsVs: Unlike other representatives of the universals theory, Lewis does not want to explain what it means or why it is that things have the properties that they have. Explanation/Lewis: proper explanations don’t speak of elementness. (1997c, 1980b). However, there can be no general explanation of having properties or predication! Because the explanation has to contain predicates if it were circular. Therefore, "Having a property" is not a relation. But there is nothing more to be said about it, either. (2002a, 6,1983c: 20 24,1998b, 219). E.g. "A is F" is to be generally true, because A has this and that relationship with the property F: here, "A is in this and that relationship with the property F" would have to be true again, because A and F are in this and that relation with "having this and that relation", etc.

Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong II (a)
David M. Armstrong
Dispositions as Categorical States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (b)
David M. Armstrong
Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (c)
David M. Armstrong
Reply to Martin
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (d)
David M. Armstrong
Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983

Schw I
W. Schwarz
David Lewis Bielefeld 2005
Prosentential Theory Verschiedene Vs Prosentential Theory Horwich I 344
Quote/VsProsentential Theory/Camp, Grover, Belnap/VsCGB: one accuses the prosentential theory of ignoring cases where truth of quotes, i.e. names of sentences is stated. Example (27) "Snow is white" is true.
CGB: we could say here with Ramsey that (27) simply means that snow is white.
CGBVsRamsey: this obscures important pragmatic features of the example. They become clearer when we use a foreign-language translation. Example
(28) If „Schnee ist weiß“ is true, then…
Why (28) instead of
If it’s true that snow is white, then
Or
If snow is white, then…
CGB: there are several possible reasons here. We may want to make it clear that the original sentence was written in German. Or it could be that there is no elegant translation, or we do not know the grammar of German well enough. Or example: "Snow is white" must be true because Fritz said it and everything Fritz says is true.
I 345
Suppose English* has a way of formally presenting a sentence: E.g. „Betrachte __“ („Consider____").
(29) Consider: Snow is white. This is true.
CGB: why should it not work the same as "snow is white is true" in normal English?
VsCGB: you could argue that it requires a reference to sentences or expressions because quotation marks are name-forming functors.
Quotation marks/CGB: we deviate from this representation! Quotation marks are not name-forming functors. ((s) not for CGB).
Quote/CGB: should not be considered as a reference to expressions in normal English. But we do not want to follow that up here.
I 346
VsCGB: one has accused the prosentential theory of tunnel vision: Maybe we overlooked certain grammatically similar constructions? Example (30) John: there are seven legged dogs
Mary: that's surprising, but true.
(31) John: the being of knowledge is the knowledge of being
Mary: that is profound and it is true.
Ad (30): of course the first half is "that is surprising" in no way prosentential. It is a characterization!
VsCGB: Ad (31) "is profound" expresses a quality that Mary attributes to the sentence. Why shouldn't "true" be understood in the same way?
CGB: it makes sense to take "this" here as referring to a sentence. But that would make things more complicated because then we would have to treat "that" and "it" differently in "that's true" and "it's true".
CGBVsVs: 1. it is just not true that the "that" in "that's surprising" refers to an utterance (in the sense of what was said, or a proposition).
What is surprising here? Facts, events or states of affairs.
Statement/Surprise/CGB: a statement can only be surprising as an act.
I 347
The surprising thing about the statement is the fact reported. ((s) But then the content rather than the act of testimony.)
CGBVs(s): it is not the fact that there are seven legged dogs claimed to be true in (30), because that fact cannot be true!
Proposition/CGB: (ad (31) Propositions are not profound. Acts can be profound. For example insights or thoughts.
Truth/Act/Action/Statement/CGB: but statements in the sense of action are not what is called true. ((s) see also StrawsonVsAustin, ditto).
Reference/Prosentential Theory/CGB: even if we consider "that's surprising, but it's true" as referring, the two parts don't refer to the same thing! And then the theory is no longer economic.
Reference/Prosentential Theory/CGB: are there perhaps other cases where it is plausible that a pronoun refers to a proposition? Example
(32) John: Some dogs eat grass.
Mary: You believe that, but it's not true.
Proposition: is often understood as a bearer of truth, and as an object of belief. (CGBVs).
I 348
However, if "that" is understood here as a referencing pronoun, then the speaker must be a proposition. CGBVs: we can interpret "that you believe" also differently: as prosentential anaphora (as above in the example "that is wrong", with preceding negation prefix). Then we have no pronominal reference.
N.B.: the point is that no property is attributed. Truth is not a property.
VsCGB: another objection: it is also a "tunnel vision" that we only have "that is true" but not "that is right" in view. Or the example "exaggerated" by Austin.
Example: a child says
I've got 15 logs
That is right.
I 349
Question: should this (and e.g. "This is an exaggeration!") be understood prosententially? CGBVsVs: "that is right" is here the statement that the child counted right, that it did something right. Sometimes this can overlap with the statement that a statement is true. The overlap must exist because there is no clear boundary between language learning and use.
I 349
Anaphora/Prosentential Theory/VsCGB: could not one split the prosody and take the individual "that" as an anaphora? CGBVsVs: then one would also have to split off "is true" and no longer perceive it as referencing, but as characterizing ((s) And thus attributing it as property).
CGBVs: then we would have to give up our thesis that speech about truth is completely understandable without "carrier of truth" or "truth characteristic".
Moreover:
Reference/CGB: it is known that not every nominalization has to be referencing ((s) E.g. Unicorn).
Predication/CGB: also not every predication has to be characterizing.
Divine Perspective/outside/PutnamVsGod's point of view/Rorty: Putnam amuses himself like James and Dewey, about such attempts.
Rorty: But he has a problem when it comes to PutnamVsDisquotationalism: it smells too reductionist, too positivist, too "behaviorist" ("transcendental skinnerism").
Truth/Putnam: when a philosopher says truth is something other than electricity because there is room for a theory of electricity but not for a truth theory,
I 456
and that knowledge of the truth condition is all that could be known about truth, then he denies that truth is a property. So there is also no property of correctness or accuracy ((s) >Deflationism, PutnamVsDeflationism, PutnamVsGrover.) PutnamVs: that is, to deny that our thoughts are thoughts and our assertions are assertions.
Theory/Existence/Reduction/Putnam/Rorty: Putnam here assumes that the only reason to deny is that you need a theory for an X is to say that the X is "nothing but Y" ((s) eliminative reductionism).
PutnamVsDavidson: Davidson must show that claims can be reduced to sounds. Then the field linguist would have to reduce actions to movements.
Davidson/Rorty: but this one does not say that claims are nothing but sounds.
Instead:
Truth/Explanation/Davidson: other than electricity, truth is no explanation for something. ((s) A phenomenon is not explained by the fact that a sentence that claims it is true).





Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Quine, W.V.O. Russell Vs Quine, W.V.O. Prior I 39
Ramified type theory/rTT/Prior: first edition Principia Mathematica: here it does not say yet that quantification on non-nouns (non nominal) is illegitimate, or that they are only apparently not nominal. (Not on names?) But only that you have to treat them carefully. ---
I 40
The ramified type theory was incorporated in the first edition. (The "simple type theory" is, on the other hand, little more than a certain sensitivity to the syntax.)
Predicate: makes a sentence out of a noun. E.g. "φ" is a verb that forms the phrase "φx".
But it will not form a sentence when a verb is added to another verb. "φφ".
Branch: comes into play when expressions form a sentence from a single name. Here we must distinguish whether quantified expressions of the same kind occur.
E.g. "__ has all the characteristics of a great commander."
logical form: "For all φ if (for all x, if x is a great commander, then φx) then φ__".
ΠφΠxCψxφx" (C: conditional, ψ: commander, Π: for all applies).
Easier example: "__ has the one or the other property"
logical form: "For a φ, φ __"
"Σφφ". (Σ: there is a)
Order/Type: here one can say, although the predicate is of the same type, it is of a different order.
Because this "φ" has an internal quantification of "φ's".
Ramified type theory: not only different types, but also various "orders" should be represented by different symbols.
That is, if we, for example, have introduced "F" for a predicative function on individuals" (i.e. as a one-digit predicate), we must not insert non-predicative functions for "f" in theorems.
E.g. "If there are no facts about a particular individual ..."
"If for all φ, not φx, then there is not this fact about x: that there are no facts about x that is, if it is true that there are no facts about x, then it cannot be true. I.e. if it is true that there are no facts about x, then it is wrong, that there is this fact.
Symbolically:
1. CΠφNφxNψx.
---
I 41
"If for all φ not φ, then not ψx" (whereby "ψ" can stand for any predicate). Therefore, by inserting "∏φφ" for "ψ": 2. CΠφNφxNΠφNφx
Therefore, by inserting and reductio ad absurdum: CCpNpNp (what implies its own falsehood, is wrong)
3. CΠφNφx.
The step of 1 to 2 is an impermissible substitution according to the ramified type theory.
Sentence/ramified type theory/Prior: the same restriction must be made for phrases (i.e. "zero-digit predicates", propositions).
Thus, the well-known old argument is prevented:
E.g. if everything is wrong, then one of the wrong things would be this: that everything is wrong. Therefore, it may not be the case that everything is wrong.
logical form:
1. CΠpNpNq
by inserting: 2. CΠpNpNPpNp
and so by CCpNpNp (reductio ad absurdum?)
3. NΠpNp,
Ramified type theory: that is now blocked by the consideration that "ΠpNp" is no proposition of the "same order" as the "p" which exists in itself.
And thus not of the same order as the "q" which follows from it by instantiation, so it cannot be used for "q" to go from 1 to 2.
RussellVsQuine/Prior: here propositions and predicates of "higher order" are not entirely excluded, as with Quine. They are merely treated as of another "order".
VsBranched type theory: there were problems with some basic mathematical forms that could not be formed anymore, and thus Russell and Whitehead introduce the reducibility axiom.
By contrast, a simplified type theory was proposed in the 20s again.
Type Theory/Ramsey: was one of the early advocates of a simplification.
Wittgenstein/Tractatus/Ramsey: Thesis: universal quantification and existential quantification are both long conjunctions or disjunctions of individual sentences (singular statements).
E.g. "For some p, p": Either grass is green or the sky is pink, or 2 + 2 = 4, etc.". (> Wessel: CNF, ANF, conjunctive and adjunctive normal form)
Propositions/Wittgenstein/Ramsey: no matter of what "order" are always truth functions of indiviual sentences.
Ramified Type TheoryVsRamsey/VsWittgenstein: such conjunctions and disjunctions would not only be infinitely long, but the ones of higher order would also need to contain themselves.
E.g. "For some p.p" it must be written as a disjunction of which "for some p, p" is a part itself, which in turn would have to contain a part, ... etc.
RamseyVsVs: the different levels that occur here, are only differences of character: not only between "for some p,p" and "for some φ, φ" but also between
"p and p" and "p, or p", and even the simple "p" are only different characters.
Therefore, the expressed proposition must not contain itself.

Russell I
B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead
Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986

Russell II
B. Russell
The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969
German Edition:
Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989

Russell IV
B. Russell
The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912
German Edition:
Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967

Russell VI
B. Russell
"The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202
German Edition:
Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus
In
Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993

Russell VII
B. Russell
On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit"
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996

Pri I
A. Prior
Objects of thought Oxford 1971

Pri II
Arthur N. Prior
Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003
Ramsey, F. P. Fraassen Vs Ramsey, F. P. I 54
FraassenVsSyntactical Approach: all this was a mistake: the empirical meaning (set of observation consequences) of a theory cannot be isolated in this syntactic way. If that were possible, T/E would say the same as T about what is observable and how the observed behaves, and nothing else. Unobservable/Fraassen: Will naturally differ from the observable in that it systematically lacks the characteristics of the observed. Unobservability/Fraassen: unless we ban the negation, we can express in a language of observation that something is unobservable. And to a certain degree even how these unobserved entities are. E.g. unobservable/Copenhagen Interpretation/Observation Language: says that there are things that sometimes have a particular position, and sometimes don’t. Important argument/Fraassen: I have just expressed this conclusion, without using a single TT.
I 55
PhilosophyVsSyntaktical Approach: philosophers thought it to be rather too wide: many theories T are such that T/E is tautological. Such theories probably derive their empirical meaning from the observation consequences along with other theories or empirical hypotheses.
I 56
Syntactical/FraassenVsSyntactical Approach: the syntactically defined relations are simply the wrong ones! The biggest mistake of the syntactical approach was to focus on irrelevant technical questions: FraassenVsRamsey/FraassenVsCarnap/FraassenVsCraig: things like the Ramsey sentence, Carnap Conditional, Craig’s Theorem, "reduction sentence", "empirical language", theoretical terms (TT) "axiomatization in limited vocabulary" were all self-inflicted problems! They are philosophically not important!. FraassenVsRamsey Sentence.

Fr I
B. van Fraassen
The Scientific Image Oxford 1980
Ramsey, F. P. Tarski Vs Ramsey, F. P. EMD II 367
Truth Theory/TT/Ramsey/Tarski/Kripke: both the truth theory and the explicit truth definition of this section are formally strongly reminiscent of Ramsey's famous theory that TarskiVsRamsey rejected. It is the failure of this theory that had Tarski say: "the attempt to give a correct semantic definition of the expression "true sentence" encounters very real difficulties. Kripke: whatever these difficulties may be, they can be solved with substitutional quantification and the formula Q(p,a).(1)


1. Saul A. Kripke, "Is there a problem with substitutional quantification?" in: G. Evans/J. McDowell (eds.) Truth and Meaning, Oxford 1976

Tarski I
A. Tarski
Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923-38 Indianapolis 1983

EMD II
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977

Evans I
Gareth Evans
"The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

Evans II
Gareth Evans
"Semantic Structure and Logical Form"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Evans III
G. Evans
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989
Ramsey, F. P. Wittgenstein Vs Ramsey, F. P. II 332
Russell/Ramsey/Wittgenstein: the two believed one could prepare in any sense, the logic for the possible existence of certain entities, one could construct a system to welcome the results of the analysis. WittgensteinVsRussell/WittgensteinVsRamsey: the construction of a relation does not depend on that one finds a phenomenon. The discovery of a word game is something else than the discovery of a fact.

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958
German Edition:
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921.
German Edition:
Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960
Ramsey, F. P. Grover Vs Ramsey, F. P. Horwich I 319
VsRedundancy Theory/VsRamsey/Camp, Grover, Belnap/CGB/Grover: the first two objections assume that the data base is too narrow, i.e. that there are cases that are not covered by the theory. (See Redundancy Theory).
I 320
1)
Index words: (Here: repetition of indices): (14) John: I’m greedy - Mary: That is true Problem: here no mere repetition, or else she would say "I am,..." Problem: there is no general scheme for such cases. 2)
Modification: Here, a translation is absolutely impossible: (here with indirect reference and quantification):
(15) Every thing that Mark said could be true Problem: there is no verb for "could". Similar:
(16) Something that Charlie said is either true or not true.
(17) Everything that Judith said was true then, but none of it is still true today. Of course you can try:
(15’)(p) Mark said that p > It could be the case that p) or
(15’)(p) (Mark said that p > that might p exist) Vs: "being the case" and "existing" are variations of "being true". This would make the redundancy theory a triviality. In this case, Ramsey’s "direct" theory would be wrong. CGBVsRamsey: we improve the redundancy theory by we let by not only allowing propositional quantification for the target language, but also an indeterminate field of links, such as M (for "might"), "P" (for past tense), "~" for negation, etc.
I 321
The reader has likely already assumed that we have introduced the negation long ago. But that’s not true. Then: (16’)(p) (Mark said that p > Mp)
(17’)(Ep) (Charlie said that p & (p v ~p))
(17’)(p) (Judith said that p > (Pp & ~p))
Redundancy Theory/Ramsey/CGB: it is this variant of the theory of Ramsey, enriched by the above links and propositional quantification, which we call redundancy theory (terminology) from now on. The thesis is that "true" thus becomes superfluous. Thesis this allows translations in Ramseyan sense to be found always.
VsRedundancy Theory/VsRamsey: 3) "About"/Aboutness/Accuracy of the Translation/CGB: some authors: argue that "snow is white" is about snow, and "That snow is white, is true" is about the proposition. And that therefore the translation must fail.
CGB: this involves the paradox of analysis. We do not directly touch upon it. ((s) Paradox of analysis, here: you’d have to act more stupid than you are in order not to realize that both sentences are about snow; to be able to name the problem at all (as the opponents do) you need to have it solved already.)
4)
PragmatismVsRedundancy Theory: even if the translation preserves the alleged content, it neglects other features which should be preserved. Case of recurrence: E.g.
(3) Mary: Snow is white. John: That is true.
(3’) Mary: Snow is white. John: Snow is white. Is that supposed to be a good translation?.
I 322
Strawson: "true" and "not true" have their own jobs to do!. Pro-Sentence/Pronoun/Anaphora/"True"/CGB: "that is true" presupposes that there is an antecedent. But that is not yet taken into account in Ramsey’s translation (3’). So Ramsey’s translation fails in pragmatic terms.
VsPropositional Quantification/PQ/VsRedundancy Theory/VsRamsey/CGB: 4) redundancy: at what price? Propositional quantification is mysterious: it is not consistent with everyday language. It is not shown that "is true" is superfluous in German, but only in a curious ad hoc extension. 5) Grammar: (already anticipated by Ramsey): variables need predicates that are connected with them, even if these variables take sentence position. CGBVsRamsey: unfortunately, Ramsey’s response is not convincing. Ramsey: (see above) "p" already contains a (variable) verb. We can assume the general sentence form as aRb here, then.
I 232
(a)(R)(b): If he says aRb, then aRb). Here,"is true" would be a superfluous addition. CGBVsRamsey: We must assume an infinite number of different sentence forms ((s)> language infinite). Redundancy Theory/CGB: But that does not need to worry us. 1) Propositional quantification can be set up formally and informally proper. 2) Variables which take sentences as substituents do not need a verb that is connected to them. That this was the case, is a natural mistake which goes something like this:
E.g.(4’) (p)(John says p > p).
If we use pronouns that simplify the connected variable:
For each sentence, if John said it, it then it.
Heidelberger: (1968): such sentences have no essential predicate!.
Solution/Ramsey:
(4’) For each sentence, if John said that it is true, then it is true. T-Predicate/CGB: "T": reads "is true".
(4’) (p) (John said that Tp > Tp) Problem: because "T" is a predicate, and "Tp" is a sentence, "p" must be a term of the language, i.e. it must take a nominal position. I.e. the quantifiers bind individual variables (of a certain type), and not variables about sentences.
I 335
Disappearance Cases/Pro-Sentence: some of them can be regarded as a translation in Ramsey language. Def Ramsey Language/CGB/(s): Language in which "true" is entirely superfluous. English*/CGBVsRamsey: for the purpose of better explanation. E.g. (26) It is true that snow is white, but in Pittsburgh it rarely looks white.
(27) It is true that there was unwarranted violence by the IRA, but it is not true that none of their campaigns was justified. T-Predicate/CGB: used in (25) and (26) to concede a point in order to determine afterwards by "but" that not too much emphasis should be placed on it. English*.
I 336: E.g.
(26’) There was unwarranted violence by the IRA, that’s true, but it is not true that none of their campaigns was justified. These are all disappearance cases.
I 342
VsProsentential Theory/Spurious Objections/CGB:
I 343
Index Words: Laziness pro-sentences refer to their antecedent. Therefore, the theory must be refined further when it comes to indexical expressions. Otherwise E.g. John: "I’m lazy." Mary: "That’s true." Is not to say that Mary means "I (Mary) am lazy". CGB: but that’s a common problem which occurs not only when speaking about truth: E.g. John: My son has a wart on his nose. Bill: He is the spitting image of his father. E.g. Lucille: You dance well. Fred: That’s new to me. Pragmatics/CGBVsRamsey: our approach represents it correctly, in particular, because we exclude "plagiarism". Ramsey’s theory does not.
I 344
Quote/VsPro-Sentence Theory/VsCGB: The pro-sentence theory is blamed to ignore cases where truth of quotes, i.e. names of sentences, is expressed. E.g. (27) "Snow is white" is true. CGB: We could say with Ramsey, that (27) simply means that snow is white. CGBVsRamsey: that obscures important pragmatic features of the example. They become more apparent when we use a foreign language translation. E.g.
(28) If "snow is white" is true, then... Why (28) instead of If it’s true that snow is white, then or If snow is white, then... CGB: There are several possible reasons for this. It may be that we want to make clear that the original sentence was said in German. Or it is possible that there is no elegant translation, or we are not sufficiently familiar with German grammar. Or E.g. "snow is white" must be true, because Fritz said it, and everything Fritz says is true.
I 345
Suppose, English* had a possibility to present a sentence formally: E.g. "consider __".
(29) Consider: Snow is white. This is true. CGB: why should it not work just like "Snow is white is true" in normal English? VsCGB: it could be argued that this requires a reference on sentences or expressions, because quotation marks are name-forming functors. Quotation Marks/CGB: we depart from this representation! Quotation marks are not name-forming functors.
I 353
Propositional Variable/Ramsey: Occupies sentence position. (Quantification over propositions). CGBVsRamsey: Such variables are of pro-sentential nature. Therefore, they should not be connected to a T-predicate. ((s) otherwise, "true" appears twice). T-Predicate/Ramsey/Redundancy Theory/CGB: this answers the old question of whether a Ramsey language has to contain a T-predicate: see below. Our strategy is to show how formulas can be read in English*, where there is no separable T-predicate. E.g. (4’) For each proposition, if John says it is true, then it is true. CGB: in this case,propositional variables and quantificational pro-sentences do the same job. Both take sentence position and have the cross-reference that is required of them. Important argument: (4’) is just the candidate for a normal English translation of (4’). Problem: this could lead to believing that a Ramsey language needs a T-predicate, as in
(4’) (p)(John said that Tp > Tp). ((s) then, "true" implicitly appears twice).
I 354
But since (4’) is perfect English, there is no reason to assume that the T-predicate is re-introduced by that. Or that it contains a separately bound "it" (them).

Grover I
D. L. Grover
Joseph L. Camp
Nuel D. Belnap,
"A Prosentential Theory of Truth", Philosophical Studies, 27 (1975) pp. 73-125
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Ramsey, F. P. Schurz Vs Ramsey, F. P. I 114
Probability Theory/Schurz: Problems: b) subjective probability: justification problems. For what reasons should rational degrees of belief fulfill the Kolmogorov axioms? What role should degrees of belief play for the goal of finding real truths?
Solution/Ramsey/de Finetti: Bet.
Bet/Bet Odds/Ramsey/Schurz: Thesis: fair odds of a person fulfill the Kolmogorov axioms A1 - A3 exactly when they are coherent, i.e. there is no system where a total loss is possible.
VsRamsey/Vs Bet/Schurz: a bet is not a rational behaviour in the sense of a search for truth! They are not truth-oriented, because the definition of the fair odds only refers to the subjective degrees of belief, not to objective probability. The real frequency of success is not touched at all.
For example, suppose a subjectivist enthusiastically accepts a bet of 1 : 1 that he rolls a six. He is fair if he is willing to accept the opposite bet, 1:1 that he does not roll a six.
Problem: he remains coherent and fair even if he has lost all his fortune. He will only be surprised that no one will accept the counter bets he has accepted as fair. He cannot explain it as long as he is not allowed to consider the objective frequencies. This shows that the axioms A1 - A3 are at best a minimum condition. But this is too weak to exclude irrational behaviour.

Schu I
G. Schurz
Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006
Redundancy Theory Austin Vs Redundancy Theory I 19
AustinVsRedundancy theory: a statement has other functions than just being true or false. Statements, not propositions (as in Tarski), are candidates for the predicates "true" and "false". "Is true" describes a satisfactory relationship between words and the world. (StrawsonVs). ---
I 234
AustinVsRedundancy theory: it has been argued that saying that an assertion is true is not another assertion. It is logically redundant. Austin: but that’s not true. DAdA refers to the world outside of dAdA. That is, to everything except this statement itself! DAdAW refers to the world including dAdA, although the statement itself, i.e. dAdAW, in turn is excluded! DadAW is appropriate only if one imagines that dAdA is already made and verified.
---
I 236
AustinVsRedundancy theory: a statement that says that it is true is just as absurd as one with the content that it is wrong itself! The crreation of hierarchies formation is not a solution either. ---
Strawson II 263
AustinVsRedundancy Theory: AustinVsRamsey and StrawsonVsRamsey: we contradict the thesis that the expression "is true" is logically superfluous. "True" has its own tasks. When we use it, we do not simply assert that something is so, we assert it as we could not do it if certain conditions were not fulfilled. We can also grant, deny, confirm something etc. StrawsonVsAustin: but that does not mean the assumption of the thesis that we assert something about a statement by the use of "true". It is not a new assertion at all!
II 265
By looking ((s) by pointing) one can also determine whether a statement is true without the performative use of "true". E.g. someone reported, "he saw that the statement was true". What does he report? He reports that I've seen a cat on the mat. But only in certain circumstances. This also means that one has heard such a statement.

Austin I
John L. Austin
"Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 24 (1950): 111 - 128
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Austin II
John L. Austin
"A Plea for Excuses: The Presidential Address" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 57, Issue 1, 1 June 1957, Pages 1 - 3
German Edition:
Ein Plädoyer für Entschuldigungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, Grewendorf/Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Strawson I
Peter F. Strawson
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959
German Edition:
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Strawson II
Peter F. Strawson
"Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit",
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Strawson III
Peter F. Strawson
"On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Strawson IV
Peter F. Strawson
Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992
German Edition:
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Strawson V
P.F. Strawson
The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966
German Edition:
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Strawson VI
Peter F Strawson
Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Strawson VII
Peter F Strawson
"On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950)
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993
Redundancy Theory Brandom Vs Redundancy Theory I 434
E.g. Vsredundancy theory "Goldbach s conjecture is true".
I 438
This sentence is not interchangeable with "Goldbach s conjecture".VsRamsey. E.g. »everything the oracle says is true," is not open to simpler approaches of redundancy and disquotation.
I 468
Brandom: "true" expresses a pro-sentence-forming operator. Its syntax and grammar is very different from that of a predicate. Just as "no" is not the necessary grammatical form to pick out a person .

Bra I
R. Brandom
Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994
German Edition:
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001
German Edition:
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001

The author or concept searched is found in the following disputes of scientific camps.
Disputed term/author/ism Pro/Versus
Entry
Reference
Theory/Observ. Language Versus Fraassen I 56
FraassenVsRamsey-Satz/FraassenVsCarnap/FraassenVsCraig - Vs distinction observation language/ theory language irrelevant technical questions - Vs syntatical interpretation of theories - FraassenVsLanguage Dependence.

Fr I
B. van Fraassen
The Scientific Image Oxford 1980
Ramsey-Sentence Versus I 56
FraassenVsRamsey Sentence / FraassenVsCarnap / FraassenVsCraig - Vs separation observation language / theory of language - irrelevant technical questions - Vs syntactic representation of theories - FraassenVsLanguage Dependence.

The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 theses of the more related field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
propos Quantific. Grover, D. II 58
Propositional Variables/Quantification/Suppes/Heidelberger: (Heidelberger 1968, S 214): Thesis: propositional variables must take either names of propositions, that-sentences or names of sentences. HeidelbergerVsRamsey: (ad Ramsey: "Facts and propositions".)
Ramsey: Example
"He's always right."
Paraphrase:
(p)(if he claims p then p). ((s) without "that"!)
HeidelbergerVsRamsey: It is not clear whether the last occurrence of "p" falls within or outside the range of the universal quantifier.
II 146
Propositional Quantification/pQ/Grover: Thesis: They exist in everyday language (English).
Prior: (1967) ditto.
StrawsonVsPrior/StrawsonVsGrover: They do not exist in everyday language.
Variables Grover, D. II 57
Grover: Thesis: the grammar of the variables in the "philosophical English" is determined by that of the variables in the formal language.
II 58
Propositional Variables/Quantification/Suppes/Heidelberger: (Heidelberger 1968, S 214): Thesis: propositional variables must take either names of propositions, that-sentences, or names of sentences. HeidelbergerVsRamsey: (ad Ramsey: "facts and propositions")
Ramsey: Example
He's always right:
Paraphrase:
(p)(if he claims p then p). (s) without "that"!)
HeidelbergerVsRamsey: it is not clear whether the last occurrence of "p" falls within or outside the range of the universal quantifier.