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The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Imagination | Kosslyn | I 253 Pylyshyn: Problem: internal knowledge representation. Vs Visual ideas as a qualitatively independent or theoretically adequate form of mental representation. >Representation, >Knowledge representation. Imagination, visual/Kosslyn: Question: do they differ from other conceptions in structure and function? I 253 Interpretation: we are never aware of having to interpret imaginary images. There are no incomplete ideas, for example that half a sofa is missing. But too much storage capacity would be necessary to store all the information from the retina. I 256 Besides, there would be no practical access if all of them were stored. So there must be some interpretation. >Interpretation. Pictorial ideas are never necessarily true. (In contrast to some propositions). >Necessity, >Logical truth, >Truth. Visual imagination/Kosslyn: mere having does not imply that there is a causal role here. >Causality, >Causal role. I 260 Thesis: Our perception consists of parts assigned to objects. KosslynVsPylyshyn: we do have imaginary images. Even if they are not scanned internally. If the images are saved uninterpreted, you do not need too much time to access them. I 253 Imagination/visual imagination/image/picture/Kosslyn/Pomerantz: Interpretation: we are never aware of the need to interpret mental images. There are no incomplete ideas about e.g. that the half of a sofa is lacking. There would be no practical access, if all imaginations were saved. So there must be some interpretation. I 257 Pylyshyn Thesis: there must be a third code between language and visual presentation - problem: that is uneconomical. Stephen M. Kosslyn/James R. Pomerantz, Imagery, Propositions and the Form of Internal Representations”, Cognitive Psychology 9 (1977), 52-76 |
Kosslyn I Stephen M. Kosslyn James R. Pomerantz "Imagery, Propositions, and the Form of Internal Representations", in: Cognitive Psychology 9 (1977), 52-76 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 |
| Imagination | Pomerantz | I 253 Pylyshyn: Problem: internal knowledge representation. Vs. Visual ideas as a qualitatively independent or theoretically adequate form of mental representation. >Knowledge representation, >Knowledge, >Representation, >Presentation, >Information processing. Imagination, visual/Kosslyn: Question: do visual imaginations differ from other conceptions in structure and function? Interpretation: we are never aware of having to interpret imaginary images. >Language, >Images, >Picture theory. There are no incomplete ideas, for example that half a sofa is missing. >Interpretation. But too much storage capacity would be necessary to store all the information from the retina. I 256 Besides, there would be no practical access if all of them were stored. So there must be some interpretation. Pictorial ideas are never necessarily true. (In contrast to some propositions). >Truth, >Logical truth, >Propositions. Imagination/visual/Kosslyn: mere having an imagination does not imply that there is a causal role here. >Causal roles. I 260 Thesis: Our perception consists of parts assigned to objects. >Objects, >Parts, >Compositionality. KosslynVsPylyshyn: we do have imaginary images. Even if they are not scanned internally. If the images are saved uninterpreted, you do not need too much time to access them. I 257 Pylyshyn Thesis: there must be a third code between language and visual presentation. Problem: that is uneconomical. Cf. >P. Gärdenfors. |
Pomerantz I James R. Pomerantz Stephen M. Kosslyn "Imagery, Propositions, and the Form of Internal Representations", in: Cognitive Psychology 9 (1977), 52-76 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 |
| Imagination | Pylyshyn | Kosslyn I 253 Imagination/Pylyshyn: Problem: internal knowledge representation. Vs figurative imaginations as a qualitatively independent or theoretically adequate form of mental representation. Imagination, figurative/Kosslyn: Question: do they differ in structure and function from other imaginations? Kosslyn I 253 Interpretation: we are never aware of having to interpret imaginary images. There are no incomplete imaginations, for example, that half a sofa is missing. However, it would take too much storage capacity to store all the information from the retina. Kosslyn I 256 Furthermore, there would be no practicable access if all of them were stored. So there must be some interpretation after all. Figurative ideas are never necessarily true. (In contrast to some propositions). Imagination/figurative/Kosslyn: the mere having does not imply that there is a causal role here. Kosslyn I 260 Proposition: Our perception consists of parts that are assigned to objects. KosslynVsPylyshyn: we have imagination images. Even if they're not scanned internally. If the images are stored uninterpreted, not too much time is required to access them. |
PsychPyly I Zenon W. Pylyshyn Things and Places: How the Mind Connects with the World Cambrindge, MA 2011 Kosslyn I Stephen M. Kosslyn James R. Pomerantz "Imagery, Propositions, and the Form of Internal Representations", in: Cognitive Psychology 9 (1977), 52-76 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 |
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