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| Collective Action | Public Choice Theory | Parisi I 182 Collective action/Public choice theory/Farber: (…) public choice theory focuses on collective action problems where individual goals cannot be easily reconciled or coordinated. Collective action problems may be present because of the difficulty of mobilizing and coordinating individual actors, so that the necessary cooperative effort is not forthcoming. Groups: Once a group has formed, however, there are also inherent difficulties that attend translating the preferences of the group's members into a collective decision. VsPublic choice theory: early work on public choice tended to view the pitfalls of collective action as a justification for minimizing the role of government. But current public choice scholars tend to be more interested in how institutions evolve to cope with these pitfalls. Models: The new models are both more sophisticated and more complex. They Parisi I 183 include multiple strategic players, each of whom is attempting to influence final outcomes through a multi-stage policy process. In these newer models, outcomes are not simply a function of the inputs to political institutions—the preferences of voters, interest groups, and politicians. Instead, outcomes also depend critically on institutional structures. As Shepsle (2010)(1) puts it, institutions, not just individual preferences, matter for collective results" (p. 357). Institutions: But the effects of institutional structures are not always straightforward. For instance, an actor may sometimes be able to achieve better results when the actor's freedom of action is limited in some way than the actor could obtain with a fuller range of choices. This may seem paradoxical, but the paradox dissolves when we realize that other actors' behavior may change favorably for the actor because of the change.* Cooperation/problems: 1) The first difficulty that plagues collective action centers on failure to cooperate. The political sphere is rife with opportunities for free-riding. Everyone may benefit from a new statute. Yet, they can enjoy its benefits regardless of whether they contributed to its passage. Hence, there is an incentive to free-ride by letting others carry the burden of obtaining the new legislation. As a result, collective action may fail to take place at all. Or it may be warped because those individuals who do overcome the barriers to a collective action problem may have interests that differ from those of the non-participants. 2) Arrow’s theorem: The second fundamental difficulty in collective action is the inherent difficulty of aggregating individual preferences. Arrow's Theorem (Arrow, 1951)(3) sparked a body of literature proving that any method of aggregating preferences is necessarily flawed. Ranking/Arrow: For instance, as Arrow proved, it is impossible to have a method for ranking outcomes from best to worst in which no individual is a dictator, outcomes are based purely on individuals' rankings of options, and a unanimous choice will always prevail against its alternative (Mueller, 2003(4), pp. 5 82—590; Shepsle, 2010(1), pp. 67-76). >Arrow’s theorem/D’Agostino, >Governmental structures/Public choice theory. * For instance, the President may sometimes be able to achieve his policy goals more freely by agreeing to a restriction on his control over an agency, if doing so leads Congress to delegate more power to the agency (Gersen, 2010)(2). 1. Shepsle, K. A. (2010). Analyzing Politics: Rationality, Behavior, and Institutions. 2nd edition. New York: W.W. Norton & co. 2. Gersen, J. E. (2010). "Designing Agencies," in D. A. Farber and A. J. O'Connell, eds., Research Handbook on Public Choice and Public Law, 3 33—361. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar. 3. Arrow, K. J. (1951). social Choice and Individual values. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 4. Mueller, D. C. (2003). Public Choice 111. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Farber, Daniel A. “Public Choice Theory and Legal Institutions”. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
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