Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 5 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Nature | Butler | Brocker I 741 Nature/Culture/Butler: Butler shakes the scaffold of thinking that refers to human nature. Her book (1) presents a fundamental critique of identity thinking and the nature/culture distinction that Butler continues in her philosophy of the political and ethical subject. This theory conceives subjectivity and the possibility of political action as a balancing act of the self in intersubjective and political relationships. See Identity/Butler, Gender/Butler. Brocker I 748 ButlerVsPsychoanalysis: the assumption that there is a dangerous pre-social drive structure cannot be verified outside the psychoanalytic thinking movement. Social control mechanisms Brocker I 749 are identified as such, but at the same time rationalized with assumptions about their natural necessity. Butler criticizes this setting of a human nature and patriarchal laws that seem inevitable from its constitution. >Psycholanalysis, >Gender roles. 1. Judith Butler, Gender Trouble. Feminism and the Subversion of Identity, New York/London 1999 (zuerst 1990); Dt. Judith Butler, Das Unbehagen der Geschlechter, Frankfurt/M. 1991. Christine Hauskeller, “Judith Butler, Das Unbehagen der Geschlechter“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Personality Traits | Deary | Corr I 89 Personality traits/Deary: There are still issues about how psychologists know whether traits, and any given model of traits, are the right way to construe human personality differences, and their nature is still largely mysterious. Corr I 91 Temporal stability/traits/developmental psychology/Deary: The stability of personality trait ratings has been questioned. A review of over 152 longitudinal studies with over 3,000 correlation coefficients found that trait stability increased from childhood to adulthood, rising from about 0.3 to over 0.7 (Roberts and DelVecchio 2000)(1). This supported earlier research with traits from the Five Factor Model (Costa and McCrae 1994(2)) and Eysenck’s factors (Sanderman and Ranchor 1994)(3), which had found stability coefficients of well above 0.6, rising to above 0.8, for periods of between six and thirty years. The stability of individual differences among children can be high, given an appropriate measurement instrument. Using the Berkeley Puppet Inventory, in which identical puppets make opposite statements, and the children choose which applies better to them, the stability coefficients between age six and seven years were often well above 0.5, and considerably higher when corrected for period-free unreliability (Measelle, John, Ablow et al. 2005)(4). Traits are stable aspects of people’s (including children’s) make-up. Heritability of traits: There is (…) the well-supported heritability of traits including those of the Five Factor Model (Bouchard and Loehlin 2001)(5). However, in ten years of molecular genetic studies of personality, there are still no solid associations between genetic variations and personality traits (Ebstein 2006)(6). Animals/traits: There is evidence that other species, including primates (Weiss, King and Perkins 2006)(7) and others (Gosling 2001)(8), have something like a Five-Factor Model of personality. See >Five-Factor model, >personality traits. Some milestones in the research on personality traits: Corr I 99 The starting point for Tupes and Christal (1961)(9) was the thirty-five trait variables developed by Cattell (1947)(10), whose work in turn derived from the identification of dictionary trait terms by Allport and Odbert (1936)(11). The result (Tupes and Christal 1961(9), p. 232): from their eight heterogeneous studies ‘five fairly strong rotated factors emerged’: Surgency (Extraversion), Agreeableness, Dependability (Conscientiousness), Emotional Stability (opposite of Neuroticism) and Culture. This was a breakthrough in dispelling some uncertainty about the structure of personality trait ratings. At about the same time, citing the same empirical history and with a similar aim, Norman (1963)(12) found similar results. The focus was on clarifying the observational language of personality, arguing that research into personality ‘will be facilitated by having available an extensive and well-organised vocabulary by means of which to denote the phenotypic attributes of persons’ (Norman 1963, p. 574). Corr I 100 One of Norman’s (1963) conclusions was that researchers should go back to the pool of trait items to search for traits beyond the five. By this stage, one can discern three processes (there might be more) going on in the trait approach to personality. (1) There was good progress in identifying traits for measurement and predictive validity. (2) There was the process of defending the trait approach from whatever was the zeitgeist in psychology (Freudiansim, behaviourism, situationism, etc.). (VsPsychoanalysis, VsBehaviorism, VsSituationism). (3) There was the process of thinking about and studying what traits actually were, beyond scores from an inventory or rating scales. Meehl (1986)(13) addressed the third issue by going back to Cattell’s (e.g. 1945)(14) surface traits and source traits distinction. He gave a good account of how, in everyday language we make trait attributions, and how these generalize from narrow to broader traits. He gave a good account of how, in everyday language we make trait attributions, and how these generalize from narrow to broader traits. These are from observed behaviours, and they are surface traits. Narrow traits that go to make up broader traits are ‘related by a) empirical covariation and b) content similarity’ (p. 317). For today’s discussion see >Personality traits/Tellegen, >Personality traits/McCrae. 1. Roberts, B. W. and DelVecchio, W. F. 2000. The rank-order consistency of personality from childhood to old age: a quantitative review of longitudinal studies, Psychological Bulletin 126: 3–25 2. Costa, P. T., and McCrae, R. R. 1994. Set like plaster? Evidence for the stability of adult personality, in T. Heatherton and J. Weinberger (eds.), Can personality change?, pp. 21–40. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association 3. Sanderman, R. and Ranchor, A. V. 1994. Stability of personality traits and psychological distress over six years, Perceptual and Motor Skills 78: 89–90 4. Measelle, J. R., John, O. P., Ablow, J. C., Cowan, P. A. and Cowan, C. P. 2005. Can children provide coherent, stable, and valid self-reports on the Big Five dimensions? A longitudinal study from ages 5 to 7, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 89: 90–106 5. Bouchard, T. J. and Loehlin, J. C. 2001. Genes, evolution, and personality, Behaviour Genetics 31: 243–73 6. Ebstein, R. P. 2006. The molecular genetic architecture of human personality: beyond self-report questionnaires, Molecular Psychiatry 11: 427–45 7. Weiss, A., King, J. E. and Perkins, L. 2006. Personality and subjective well-being in orangutans, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 90: 501–11 8. Gosling, S. D. 2001. From mice to men: what can we learn about personality from animal research?, Psychological Bulletin 127: 45–86 9. Tupes, E. C. and Christal, R. E. 1961. ASD Technical Report (reprinted in 1991 as Recurrent personality factors based on trait ratings), Journal of Personality 60: 225–51 10. Cattell, R. B. 1947. Confirmation and clarification of primary personality factors, Psychometrika 12: 197–220 11. Allport, G. W. and Odbert, H. S. 1936. Trait-names: a psycho-lexical study, Psychological Monographs 47: No. 211 12. Norman, W. T. 1963. Toward an adequate taxonomy of personality attributes, Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 66: 574–83 13. Meehl, P. E. 1986. Trait language and behaviourese, in T. Thompson and M. Zeiler (eds.), Analysis and integration of behavioural units, pp. 315–34. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates 14. Cattell, R. B. 1945. The principal trait clusters for describing personality, Psychological Bulletin 42: 129–61 Ian J. Deary, “The trait approach to personality”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Psychoanalysis | Bowlby | Corr I 232 Psychoanalysis/BowlbyVsPsychoanalysis/Bowlby/Shaver/Mikulincer: In discussing individual differences in the functioning of behavioural systems, Bowlby (1973)(1) rejected psychoanalytic and object relations approaches that placed exclusive emphasis on a person’s fantasies, internal conflicts and defences and downplayed a person’s actual experiences with relationship partners. Although Bowlby (1980)(2) agreed that behavioural-system functioning is a reflection of intrapsychic processes related to a person’s wishes, fears and defences, it is still sensitive to the relational context in general and to a relationship partner’s particular responses on a specific occasion. >Relationships, >Social relations, >Attachment theory, >Affectional bond. 1. Bowlby, J. 1973. Attachment and loss, vol. II, Separation: anxiety and anger. New York: Basic Books 2. Bowlby, J. 1980. Attachment and loss, vol. III, Sadness and depression. New York: Basic Books Phillip R. Shaver and Mario Mikulincer, “Attachment theory: I. Motivational, individual-differences and structural aspects”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Psychoanalysis | Butler | Brocker I 744 Psychoanalysis/Butler: Like post-structuralist theories, psychoanalysis is also based on the nature of bisexualism that precedes the processes of the development of the ego and its identity. However these are determined, whether as an incest taboo, as heterosexual bisexuality or as polymorph-perverse of a bisexual predisposition, these presupposed rules and natural systems determine how socialization socializes the individual.(1) >Gender/Butler, >Gender roles. Brocker I 745 ButlerVsPsychoanalysis: Deviating desires and lusts become illegitimate and a problem. Brocker I 748 Psychoanalysis/Foucault/Butler: Butler uses Foucault's theory of power, according to which rules and laws are not only repressive, but at the same time productive: they produce appropriate expressions of character, gender and desire. >Power. ButlerVsPsychoanalysis: the assumption that there is a dangerous pre-social drive structure cannot be verified outside the psychoanalytic thinking movement. Social control mechanisms Brocker I 749 are identified as such, but at the same time rationalized with assumptions about their natural necessity. Butler criticizes this setting of a human nature and patriarchal laws. >Nature/Butler. 1. Judith Butler, Gender Trouble. Feminism and the Subversion of Identity, New York/London 1999 (zuerst 1990); Dt. Judith Butler, Das Unbehagen der Geschlechter, Frankfurt/M. 1991, chap 2. Christine Hauskeller, “Judith Butler, Das Unbehagen der Geschlechter“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Representation | Psychoanalysis | Corr I 247 Representation/PsychoanalysisVsAttachment theory/VsPsychoanalysis/Psychoanalysis/ Shaver/Mikulincer: outcomes. While contemporary psychoanalysis still views adult mental representations of self and others as mental residues of childhood experiences, Bowlby (1973(1), 1980(2)) believed that the developmental trajectory of working models is not linear or simple and that these mental representations in adulthood are not exclusively based on early experiences. Rather, they can be updated throughout life and affected by a broad array of contextual factors. >Representation/Bowlby, >Representation/Attachment theory. 1. Bowlby, J. 1973. Attachment and loss, vol. II, Separation: anxiety and anger. New York: Basic Books 2. Bowlby, J. 1980. Attachment and loss, vol. III, Sadness and depression. New York: Basic Books Phillip R. Shaver and Mario Mikulincer, “Developmental, psychodynamic and optimal-functioning aspects”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Darwin, Ch. | Wittgenstein Vs Darwin, Ch. | Putnam V 148/149 Wittgenstein: (lectures and discussions) WittgensteinVsPsychoanalysis "myth", admired Freud's mind. WittgensteinVsDarwin: "In a statement, the most important to me is, that it works, that we can predict something from it." The physics is related to the engineering. ~ "People are convinced by extremely meager reasons". Vollmer I 290 WittgensteinVsDarwin: (Tractatus 4.1122) "has not more to do with the philosophy than any other hypothesis of natural science." |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988 |
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