Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
[german]

Screenshot Tabelle Begriffes

 

Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.

Enhanced Search:
Search term 1: Author or Term Search term 2: Author or Term


together with


The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Meaning (Intending) McGinn I 104
Meaning/reference/McGinn: when I use the word "red", I mean something in particular, and that is different from what I mean with other words. ---
I 106
Whoever masters the meaning of the word, has never seen the vast majority of the corresponding objects. Infinity is created from the outset in the intentionality. That is just the joke of meaning. The meaning allows us to access places, times and distances that cannot be approached by the body and the senses.
If one means something with a word, one does not host an isolable element in the stream of mental processes, because the intended meaning does not behave like pain.
The meaning does not spread in a medium, in which the individual things are lined up.
It is even more important that meaning is diffuse.
---
I 109
It is impossible, to mean something with one word, without that it would be determined what is considered the right expression for this word. (((s) See also the problems in relation to the artificial connective > "tonk".) The intended meaning is the one instance that permits the formation of true or false statements.
---
I 118
Tradition: we know what we mean. McGinnVsPrivileged access/meaning: this is a mistake: it may be that we know something of a description, without being able to subordinate it to other descriptions that the immediate known in a theoretical view is perhaps not understandable to us.

McGinn I
Colin McGinn
Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993
German Edition:
Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996

McGinn II
C. McGinn
The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999
German Edition:
Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001

Privileged Access Ryle Frank I 638
RyleVs all other authors: VsPrivileged Access: only better position of the speaker - you can not discover facts of a different type.
Donald Davidson (1984a): First Person Authority, in: Dialectica38 (1984),
101-111

Ryle I
G. Ryle
The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949
German Edition:
Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Self- Consciousness Ryle I 217 f
Self-consciousness / knowledge / RyleVstradition / Ryle: there is no knowledge of self-consciousness. - This is logically false. - No knowledge of an act of closing. - "Light metaphor" does not help in case of knowledge, only in vision. -
I 218
VsPrivileged Access: you can also misjudge your own state of mind. - Self-knowledge: not different from thinking.

Ryle I
G. Ryle
The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949
German Edition:
Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969


The author or concept searched is found in the following 4 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Privileged Access McGinn Vs Privileged Access I 118
privileged access: allegedly, we have a unique relationship to the meanings we mean: we know what we mean. (verb of success, you can not wrongly mean something, privileged access). McGinnVsPrivileged access/to mean sth: this is a mistake: it may be that we know something as described in a certain way, without being able to subordinate it to other descriptions. We must abstract from the first person and look at the FIN-features (fruitfulness, invulnerability, normativity) in a more objective manner. Question: how can a system that is put together as we are succeed to have properties that meet the appropriate number of defining characteristics (FIN), and then we can leave mental space for the idea that what so immediately known to us may not even be comprehensible in theoretical terms.

McGinn I
Colin McGinn
Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993
German Edition:
Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996

McGinn II
C. McGinn
The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999
German Edition:
Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001
Privileged Access Ryle Vs Privileged Access I 65
Privileged Access/RyleVsPrivileged access/Ryle: it will be shown later that you do not judge your own performance in a different way than other people's. But if someone were to be enlightened about how to apply concepts of mental activity (which do not exist) to his own actions, he would be completely wrong in his supposed analogy with others. ---
I 218
It is no contradiction to say that one has misunderstood his emotional state (VsPrivileged access). One continually deceives one's own motivations, one is surprised that the clock has ceased to tick, without believing to have been aware of its ticking. ---
I 306
Outside world/perception/RyleVsPrivileged access: in fact, there are birds and games that we observe, and sensations we can never observe. There is no central and "one" problem of perception. ---
I 307
The question is not to be asked in the paramechanical form: "How do we see robins?" But in the form: "How do we use descriptions" like "he saw a robin"". E.g Someone has discovered a mosquito in the room, what do we say, except that he had a certain buzz in his ear?
He identified something. We are inclined to say in general terms that he subsumed something and drew a conclusion. We have a foot on the right track, but also one on the wrong!
There were no ghostly wheels turning when he heard the mosquito.
---
I 308
What we want to know is the logical behavior of "He discovered a mosquito" and how it differs from "he had a buzz in his ear". He might have mistaken something for a mosquito, or the wind whispering in the telephone wires.

Ryle I
G. Ryle
The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949
German Edition:
Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969
Privileged Access Wittgenstein Vs Privileged Access VI 191
WittgensteinVsPrivileged access/Schulte: leads to the idea of a "something" that we can only guess at others.

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958
German Edition:
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921.
German Edition:
Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960
Ryle, G. Searle Vs Ryle, G. I 118
SearleVsPrivileged Access/SearleVsRyle: this is a spatial metaphor, like a private room, but I would have to distinguish myself from the room which I enter. There is no sort of a by me accessible room. >Priviledged access, >first person. While I can observe another person just like that, I can however not watch their subjectivity! What's worse:
I 119
I cannot observe my own subjectivity because every speech observation itself is what should be observed.
V 216
"Voluntary"/Ryle: is normally used in connection with any acts of which it is generally believed that they should be avoided.
V 217
SearleVsRyle: there are normal or standard situations. The explanation has nothing to do with the analysis of special words, but forms a moment of explanation of the operation of assertions.

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

The author or concept searched is found in the following disputes of scientific camps.
Disputed term/author/ism Pro/Versus
Entry
Reference
Ryle Versus Brandom I 340
BrandomVsRyle: VsPrivileged Access - person-reflection is internalization of P-reflection.

Bra I
R. Brandom
Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994
German Edition:
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001
German Edition:
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001
Privileged Access Versus Brandom I 340
Kant: BrandomVsRyle: Vsprivileged access - person-reflection is internalization of P-reflection - on the other hand, later in the text: per.

Bra I
R. Brandom
Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994
German Edition:
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000