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Criteria | Goodman | II 50 GoodmanVsPragmatism: the usefulness of a term does not prove that it is clear, but rather that its clarification is philosophically important. Since there is no reliable criterion of clarity, one must question one's philosophical conscience. >Pragmatism. |
G IV N. Goodman Catherine Z. Elgin Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988 German Edition: Revisionen Frankfurt 1989 Goodman I N. Goodman Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1978 German Edition: Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984 Goodman II N. Goodman Fact, Fiction and Forecast, New York 1982 German Edition: Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988 Goodman III N. Goodman Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976 German Edition: Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997 |
Deflationism | Horwich | I XVI Deflationism/Horwich: deflationism implies bivalence and even vagueness, e.g. unicorn (DeflationismVsPragmatism, DeflationismVsUsefulness of truth, etc. >Disquotationalism, >Minimalism, >Quote/Disquotation, >Bivalence. |
Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
Pragmatism | Brandom | I 415 Pragmatism/Classical/Truth/Rorty/Brandom: thesis: 1) performative: act of calling something true, not content 2) thereby taking a normative perspective 3) approval of an assertion as guide to action 4) Success as a benchmark 5) that is all there is to be understood about truth. Pragmatism: truth is not a characteristic. >Assertions, >Truth, cf. >Deflationism. I 418 Brandom per: proposition of the statement not before utterance - one rather commits onself to something personally. I 421 Prague circle/Brandom: is phenomenalism in terms of truth. I 432 BrandomVsPragmatism: cannot distinguish between freestanding and (in conditionals) embedded truth assertions. >Subsententials. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
Pragmatism | Goodman | II 117 Very often past cases might be unexamined cases. II 118f GoodmanVsPragmatism: pragmatism has caused confusion here: by asserting that the truth lies in the accuracy of predictions. Does this mean that it counts only if the hypothesis about the future is true? Maybe the pragmatist thinks, you can only say something about past cases through future experiences. >Prediction, >Future. II 18/9 VsPragmatism: we should remember that one hypothesis at a time can be unrefuted, although some of their recent applications in reality are false. They are just not yet recognized. |
G IV N. Goodman Catherine Z. Elgin Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988 German Edition: Revisionen Frankfurt 1989 Goodman I N. Goodman Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1978 German Edition: Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984 Goodman II N. Goodman Fact, Fiction and Forecast, New York 1982 German Edition: Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988 Goodman III N. Goodman Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976 German Edition: Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997 |
Pragmatism | James | Diaz-Bone I 68 Pragmatism/James: the term pragmatism is used for the first time by James 1898. He, however, refers to Peirce, 1878. Signs/Peirce/VsKant: VsConstruction of the transcendental subject: Pragmatism is the method that enables successful linguistic and intellectual communication and clear ideas. For Peirce every thought is a sign. I 70 Pragmatism/Peirce: pragmatism is a voluntary action theory. Definition Voluntarism: Will as the basic principle of being. I 76 Pragmatism: pragmatism is like a corridor in the middle of many rooms, it belongs to all who use it. Concept/Pragmatism: He considers all concepts hypotheses. Use is always a personal decision. I 78 We do not live to think, but we think to live. 79 Science/James: Science, comon sense and individual consciousness have one thing in common: they should increase the human adaptability. I 88 PragmatismVsCorrespondence theory: Conformity in James, the dichotomy true/false is softened. (> Realization, >adjustment). I 102 VsPragmatism: that James confuses truth with certainty: it can never be ascertained whether an observation is properly translated. (> Basic sentence problem). |
James I R. Diaz-Bone/K. Schubert William James zur Einführung Hamburg 1996 |
Pragmatism | Rorty | VI 105 Pragmatism/Reality/Rorty: pragmatism thinks it is pointless to ask whether neutrinos really are entities or are merely useful heuristic fictions. >Fiction, >Theoretical entities. VI 111 Difference/Pragmatism: every difference must make a difference in terms of practice. >Distinction without a difference, >Practise. VI 112 G.K. ChestertonVsPragmatism: "Pragmatism is about human needs, and one of the most important human needs is to be more than a pragmatist." Vi 186 Language/Sellars: cannot be verified at all on the base of non-linguistic things! Rorty: Therefore, only utility is interesting for pragmatism. >Benefit. There is nothing non-human, to which we are committed! VI 286f Preference for small compromises rather than large theoretical syntheses. VI 290 VI 425 Truth/pragmatism/benefits/James/Rorty: contrary to some problematic formulations by James the truth is timeless, so it cannot be mixed up with benefits. (RortyVsJames, W.). >William James, >John Dewey, >Charles Sanders Peirce. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
Pragmatism | Williams | Rorty IV 38 Bernard WilliamsVsPragmatism: there is a difference between practical considerations and the search for truth. >Practise, >Truth, >Progress, >Science, >Ideal assertibility. |
WilliamsB I Bernard Williams Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy London 2011 WilliamsM I Michael Williams Problems of Knowledge: A Critical Introduction to Epistemology Oxford 2001 WilliamsM II Michael Williams "Do We (Epistemologists) Need A Theory of Truth?", Philosophical Topics, 14 (1986) pp. 223-42 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
Redundancy Theory | Brandom | I 433f Redundancy theory/Brandom: VsPragmatism: has not recognized that the significance of the corresponding assertions must be the same - VsRamsey: E.g. "Goldbach’s Conjecture" is not equivalent to "the Goldbach's Conjecture is true". - Solution: Originally posted eradication > set of sentences. VsRamsey. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
Truth | Davidson | I (c) 56 Immanence Theory of Truth/Davidson: The sentence of another could be true for him, even though, when I translate it correctly, it makes no sense for me. The truth predicate defined in the meta-language can be translated back into the object language and the state before the elimination can be restored of the "true". >Truth predicate, >Object language, >Metalanguage. Object language and meta-language should contain the predicate "true". >Expressiveness, >Richness, >Truth theory. Davidson, however, can avoid the dilemma by not defining a definition at all. He calls this a truth definition in the style of Tarski in the following called "truth theory". DavidsonVsTarski: empirical instead of formal - Empiricism excludes false additions of law (Goodman) - Convention: truth is not sufficiently empirical. >Convention T. The truth of an utterance depends only on two things: of what the words, as they were used, mean, and of the world. Glüer II 131 VsTranscendentalism: one cannot separate language competence and influence on the world. "Negative Transcendentalism". Rorty VI 51 Davidson/Truth: We collect information and patterns about whether actors agree to sentences or not. And this, without knowing the meaning of the sentences of actor. But after a while we do the step from the "nonpropositional to the propositional". A theory of truth is at the same time automatically a theory of meaning and rationality. Every intensional concept is intertwined with every other intensional concept. Glüer II 28 Interpretation Theory/Glüer: must not assume that their theorems were derived with the help of a translation (circle) - therefore DavidsonVsTarski: presupposing truth to explain meaning. >Interpretation theory. Horwich I 443 Truth/Davidson/Rorty: should be identified with nothing. - There is no correspondence, no truth-making. DavidsonVsPragmatism: Truth is not equal to assertion. Richard Rorty (1986), "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth" in E. Lepore (Ed.) Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford, pp. 333-55. Reprinted in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of truth, Dartmouth, England USA 1994 Rorty VI 189 Truth/Norms/Davidson: (according to Brandom): the pursuit of truth cannot go beyond our own practices (also Sellars). |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
Truth | Goodman | I 31 Truth/Goodman: provided that a world consists of statements, truth may be relevant. But truth cannot be defined or be checked by compliance with "the world". Truth is a docile and an obedient servant, no severe master. >Reality, >World, >Nature, >Correspondence theory. I 34 The scientist who assumes he is especially looking for truth deceives himself. He does not care about trivial truths he could grind out. "The truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth": this would be a wrong and paralyzing policy for any world producer. The whole truth would be too much, it is too large, too variable and too burdened by trivial. Nothing but the truth would be too little, for some right versions are not true (they are either false or neither true nor false). I 147 GoodmanVsTarski: Tarski must be revised: "'Snow is white' is true according to a version if and only if snow is in accordance with this version of white". >Truth definition/Tarski, >Disqotation scheme. I 149 Truth/Goodman: truth is like intelligence exactly what the tests test. I 146 ff GoodmanVsPragmatism: then the pragmatist thesis loses at the moment of victory its force: because that truths best meet the purpose of acquiring truths is as empty as it is obvious. Accuracy/Goodman: Goodman suggests high acceptability as an accuracy scale. >Acceptability. --- III 242 The truth of a hypothesis is a matter of fitting. Of fitting to a theory building and the fitting of hypotheses and theory to the existing data and the facts one will encounter. Truth/Goodman: we should reserve truth for the symbols in sentence form. --- IV 208 Accuracy/Goodman: accuracy does not seek a formal definition. Accuracy is a matter of fitting and activity. IV 205 Accuracy and truth sometimes go apart even in statements. Although snow is white, the statement 'snow is white' can sometimes be incorrect. |
G IV N. Goodman Catherine Z. Elgin Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988 German Edition: Revisionen Frankfurt 1989 Goodman I N. Goodman Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1978 German Edition: Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984 Goodman II N. Goodman Fact, Fiction and Forecast, New York 1982 German Edition: Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988 Goodman III N. Goodman Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976 German Edition: Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997 |
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Correspondence Theory | Davidson Vs Correspondence Theory | I (e) 96 So we get rid of the correspondence theory of truth at the same time. It is the belief in it, which gives rise to relativistic thought. Representations are relative to a scheme. E.g. Something can be a map of Mexico, but only in relation to the Mercator projection, or just a different projection. Horwich I 443 Truth/Truth theory/tr.th./DavidsonVsCorrespondence theory: a truth theory presents no entities that could be compared with sentences. (A Coherence Theory of Thruth and Knowledge.): Thesis: "correspondence without confrontation." Davidson/Rorty: this is in line with his rejection of the "dualism of scheme and content". (= Thesis, that something like "mind" or "language" had a relation like "fit" or "organize" to the world). Rorty: such theories are a remnant of pragmatism. Pragmatism/Davidson/Rorty: because of the strong connection between Dewey Quine Davidson one can assume that Davidson is part of the tradition of American pragmatism. Nevertheless, Davidson explicitly denied that his break with empiricism made him a pragmatist. Def Pragmatism/Davidson/Rorty: Davidson thinks that pragmatism identifies truth with assertibility. Then DavidsonVsPragmatism. Truth/Davidson: should not be identified with anything. Truthmaker/Make true/DavidsonVsTruth makers: do not exist. Horwich I 553 Correspondence/Fulfillment/Tarski/truth theory/Davidson/Rorty: the correspondence that should be described in terms of "true of" and is supposedly revealed by "philosophical analysis" in a truth theory is not what is covered by Tarski’s fulfillment relation. The relation between words and objects, which is covered by fulfillment is irrelevant for this philosophical truth. ((s) of "Correspondence"). "true"/Explanation/Rorty: "true" does not provide material for analysis. Truth/Davidson: is nice and transparent as opposed to belief and coherence. Therefore, I take it as a basic concept. Horwich I 454 Truth/DavidsonVsTarski/Rorty: can therefore not be defined in terms of fulfillment or something else. We can only say that the truth of a statement depends on the meaning of the words and the arrangement of the world. DavidsonVsCorrespondence Theory/Rorty: with that we get rid of them. Intermediate/Intermediary/Davidson/Rorty: ("tertium", "Tertia") E.g. "perspective", E.g. conceptual scheme, E.g. "point of view", E.g. language, E.g. cultural tradition. We do not need to worry about these things anymore if we drop correspondence (VsCorrespondence theory). DavidsonVsSkepticism: is triggered just by the assumption of such "tertia". "Less is more": we no longer need to worry about the details of the correspondence relation. Correspondence/Davidson/Rorty: we can regard it as trivial, without the need for an analysis. It has been reduced to a "stylistic variant" of "true". DavidsonVsSkepticism/Rorty: arises because of these intentionalist concepts that build imaginary barriers between you and the world. RortyVsDavidson: has still not shown how coherence yields correspondence. He has not really refuted the skeptics, but rather keeps them from the question. Richard Rorty (1986), "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth" in E. Lepore (Ed.) Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford, pp. 333-55. Reprinted in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of truth, Dartmouth, England USA 1994 Quine II 56 DavidsonVsCorrespondence Theory: the conception of the fact coincidence which corresponds to the whole of the experience adds nothing relevant to the simple concept of being true. No thing makes sentences and theories true, not experience, not surface irritation, not the world. (> make true). |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
Correspondence Theory | Williams, M. Vs Correspondence Theory | Horwich I 487 Deflationism/M. Williams: (pro) However, we should not call it theory but perspective. He is interesting, not because he tells us something new, but because he denies that we need something beyond that. (VsCorrepsondence Theory, VsCoherence Theory). I 488 Question: What could a substantial truth theory (which goes beyond deflationism) say that deflationism cannot? Correspondence TheoryVsCoherence Theory/M.Williams: appeals to "intuition", which is not a helpful term. (Also Correspondence TheoryVsPragmatism). "Intuition": should be here that even ideally justified beliefs can be wrong. ((s) Whereby the term "ideal" is kept rigid.) Correspondence Theory: then follows realism by saying that truth has nothing to do with justification or acceptability, but with a non-epistemic relation to the world. ((s) Example causation). M.WilliamsVs: if this were the case: even if all philosophers shared this intuition, why should it be more than a cultural prejudice in favor of correspondence theory? Def Epistemic/(s): e.g. justification, acceptability. Instead of e.g. causation. M.WilliamsVsCorrespondence Theory: the intuition against epistemic access to truth is not automatically an argument for correspondence theory. At best it excludes an identification of truth with an epistemic property. Thus it becomes acceptable for deflationism, which does not make this identification either. Disquotationalism//M.Williams: this shows that even disquotational truth is "realistic". That is, truth is not an epistemic property (justification or acceptability, M. WilliamsVsPutnam), just as it is not in a full-fledged correspondence theory. Someone who believes that truth must be epistemic can regard disquotationalism as a "minimal realism". |
Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
Dewey | Horkheimer Vs Dewey | Suhr I 180 HorkheimerVsDewey: VsInstrumental Reason. Horkheimer: core of pragmatism is the view that an idea, a concept or a theory is nothing but a scheme or plan for action, and therefore truth nothing but the success of an idea. VsHorkheimer: presupposes the notion of truth as correspondence. I 182 HorkheimerVsDewey: pragmatism replaced the concept of truth by probability. Truth is not tied to verification, but absolute. HorkheimerVsDewey: so is prediction (and predictability) the nature "of this kind of thinking". But: The current importance and future verification of a sentence are not the same. (Horkheimer: per change of meaning.) I 182. VsHorkheimer: equals truth to contemplation. Horkheimer has not explained why truth is supposed to be even desirable. (NietzscheVs.) I 182 Pragmatism: Vs "stationary contemplation" (James): Truth that is sought for its own. I 183 HorkheimerVsPragmatism: Both the attack on the contemplation, as well as the "praise of the craftsman" express the "triumph of the means over the purpose". (Originated in Greek class society). |
Suhr I Martin Suhr John Dewey zur Einführung Hamburg 1994 |
Donagan, A. | Rorty Vs Donagan, A. | Horwich I 452 Explanation/Truth/Causality/Donagan/Rorty: Although it could be said that the fact that most of the beliefs of the natives and field linguists are true is an explanation for the fact that they can communicate. RortyVsDonagan: but that is not an explanation that requires a causally effective property. Explanation/Rorty: this is like an explanation of communication by the fact that, e.g., people populate the same spacetime region. Problem: we do not know what it would be like for these people if it were not like this, just as we do not know, e.g., what it would be like if most beliefs were wrong. Causal Explanation/Rorty: the only candidates for causally effective properties are such properties that we can think away! ((s) >it must be possible to abstract from properties). >Causal explanation. Important argument: therefore "truth" ("true") has no explanatory use. Truth/DavidsonVsPragmatism/VsJames: but besides the normative use it also has disquotational use. Truth/RortyVsTradition: it mixes disquotational and normative use and tries to explain both through the use of "true" to designate a non-causal relation of "correspondence". This is a false attempt to have "inside" and "outside" of the language game at the same time. Rorty I 120 Sensation/Wittgenstein/Donagan/Rorty: Wittgenstein clarified the situation by conceding "that sensations are private, non-dispositional concomitants of the behavior, which is their natural expression", but refusing "to subsume processes under these concomitants, which can be explored regardless of the circumstances that produced them." I 121 RortyVsDonagan: that is correct, but you have to go one step further: a "private, non-material medium" is obscure. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
Functionalism | Verschiedene Vs Functionalism | Münch III 338 Functionalism/Holenstein: its obvious limit refers to the phenomenal qualities. Phenomena are functionally not identifiable. It can be decided whether the property of a thing that two persons assign the adjective "red" to is functionally equivalent for them. However, it is undecidable whether both perceive the same color. Elmar Holenstein, Mentale Gebilde, in: Dieter Münch (Hg) Kognitionswissenschaft, Frankfurt 1992 James I 102 VsFunctionalism,VsPragmatism: The concept of utility is circular and empty. "Everything that is useful for a system" can be understood arbitrarily. VsPragmatism: that James confuses truth with probation: it can never be established whether an observation is correctly translated. (Basic sentence problem, also Quine). Schwarz I 155 VsRoll/VsLewis: a special feature of our mental states is their familiarity. We do not identify them through causal roles. LewisVsVs: integrates introspection into the causal role without further ado. The causal role of conscious experiences includes the fact that (under appropriate circumstances) they produce opinions about their own existence. (1966a(1), 103). 1. David Lewis [1966a]: “An Argument for the Identity Theory”. Journal of Philosophy, 63: 17–25. Mit Erg¨anzungen in David M. Rosenthal (Hg.), Materialism and the Mind-Body Problem, Engelwood Cliffs: Prentica-Hall, 1971 |
Mü III D. Münch (Hrsg.) Kognitionswissenschaft Frankfurt 1992 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
Instrumentalism | Chisholm Vs Instrumentalism | III 132 ChisholmVsPragmatism/ChisholmVsInstrumentalism: even refinements of these theories do not eliminate the problem of the lack of clarity of the application of the concepts of satisfaction and frustration. |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
James, W. | Russell Vs James, W. | Brendel I 132 Pragmatism/RussellVsPragmatism/RussellVsJames/Brendel: with the usefulness-definition of truth, it may be that "Santa Claus exists" is true, although it does not exist, simply because it is useful. James/Brendel: but does not want to claim that refuted statements are true, but wants to show that there is inextricable interdependence between values and facts. Truth/James/Brendel: also for James truth is influenced by our perceptions and causal relationships to the environment. >Pragmatism. --- Rescher I 349 RussellVsJames: grotesquely unfair with respect to the pragmatism: accused him, his pragmatic formula does not comply with the colloquial meaning of "true". E.g. "it is true that other people exist", and "it is useful to think that other people exist" when the two sentences would have the same meaning, then that does not comply with the colloquial meaning of "true". Russell himself pointed to a solution: better distinction between definition and criterion. |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Bre I E. Brendel Wahrheit und Wissen Paderborn 1999 Resch I Nicholas Rescher The Criteriology of Truth; Fundamental Aspects of the Coherence Theory of Truth, in: The Coherence Theory of Truth, Oxford 1973 - dt. Auszug: Die Kriterien der Wahrheit In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Resch II N. Rescher Kant and the Reach of Reason: Studies in Kant’ s Theory of Rational Systematization Cambridge 2010 |
James, W. | Verschiedene Vs James, W. | James I 102 VsFunctionalism, VsPragmatism: The concept of utility is circular and empty. "Anything that is useful for a system" can be interpreted arbitrarily. PragmatismVs: VsJames: confused truth with probation: it can never be determined whether an observation is translated correctly. (Basis sentence-problem - Quine ditto). |
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Peirce, Ch.S. | Quine Vs Peirce, Ch.S. | I 54 Method/Quine: The question of what exists is the question of proof. The final arbitration in this matter is the scientific method, as amorphous it may be. However it is defined in detail, the scientific method produces theories, whose connection with any surface stimulation is solely in the scientific method, without independent testing instance, by which they are supported. In this sense, it is the final arbitrator of truth. Peirce was trying to define the truth straight as a scientific method. Namely an ideal theory, which one approaches as a limit if one does not disist to apply the (supposedly canonical) rules of method to the constantly renewing experience. Definition Truth/Pierce: Ideal Theory QuineVsPeirce: there is a lot wrong with this analogy: Appointment of Organon for infinite process, limit, erroneous use of the analogy with numbers, because the concept of the limit is dependent on the term "closer than". And this is defined for numbers, but not for theories. --- I 55 Vs: but we have, after all, no reason to believe that the surface stimulation of people, even if one considers it in the eternity, allows a certain systematization, which is scientifically seen better or easier, than possible alternatives. Although the scientific method is the way to the truth, it does not even enable a definition of truth. Likewise, any so-called pragmatic truth-definition is doomed (QuineVsPragmatism) to fail. --- I 444 Definition ordered pair: provides the possibility to treat two objects as one. One can thus adjust relation classes by perceiving them as classes of ordered pairs. Footnote: we are interested in "relations-in-extension" here. They stand in a relationship to relations-in-intension like classes to properties (difference class/property.). E.g. The father-relation becomes the class of exactly those ordered pairs whose respective members - for example (Abraham, Isaac), are a man and one of his children. Peirce: Definition ordered pair: (terribly cumbersome with mental charts, etc.) QuineVsPeirce: simply a defective noun that is not used to be at home, where we are used to embed completely grown-up general terms. Mathematical --- I 445 Definition: (1) If (x, y) = (z, w), so x = z and y = w. If relations are classes of ordered pairs, then pairs on the same level as other objects as members of classes must be available. The ordered pair plays the role of an object, which performs the task of two. --- X 23 Verification Theory/Peirce/Quine: roughly: "tell me what difference the truth/falsehood of a sentence would make for the possible experience, and you have said everything about its meaning." QuineVsPeirce: also this equates the concept of proposition with the concept of objective information. Basic Rules: is here the whole of possible distinctions and combinations of sensory perceptions. Introspection: some epistemologists would catalog these alternatives by introspection of sense data, others (naturalists) would observe the nerve stimulation (at the nerve endings). Problem: you can not assign senses proof to unique individuals sentences. (Underdetermination of empiricism). --- XII 94 Empiricism/QuineVsCarnap: empiricism has 1. abandoned to deduce the truth about the nature of the sensory experience. Thus, it has made a substantial concession. 2. it has abandoned the rational reconstruction, that is, the attempt to translate these truths into observation terms and logical mathematical tools. QuineVsPeirce: Suppose, we think that the meaning of a statement consists in the difference that its truth makes for the experience. Could we then not formulate in a page-long sentence of observation language all differences that might account for the truth, and could we then not see this as a translation? Problem: this description could be infinitely long, but it could then be trapped in an infinite long axiomatization. N.B.: thus, the empiricist gives up the hope that the empirical meaning of typical statements can be expressed via the reality. Quine: the problem is a not too high complexity for a finite axiomatization, but the holism: --- XII 95 Meaning/QuineVsPeirce: what normally has experience implications ("difference of opinions") only relates to theories as a whole, not individual experience sentences. QuineVsCarnap: also the "structure" should be one in which the texts, in which logical mathematical observation terms will be translated into, are whole theories and not just terms or short sentences. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
Pragmatism | Brandom Vs Pragmatism | I 196 BrandomVsPragmatism: you can know what follows from an assertion, for example, that an act is immoral without having understood the claim. ((s) Overemphasis on the consequences). Horwich I 444 Truth/Pragmatism/Rorty: has no explanatory role. a) it has confirmatory (endorsing) use b) warning use: E.g. "Your belief is justified, but perhaps not true," I 445 c) disquotationale use: designed to meta-linguistically express "S is true iff. __ ". JamesVs b) and c). Relativism/Rorty: that is why pragmatism was equaled with relativism. Truth/Pragmatism/Davidson/Rorty: Davidson accepts all three, without the idea that usefulness of beliefs could be explained by truth. BrandomVsPrimitive pragmatism/Rorty: (truth = assertibility): is refuted by the use of "true" in the antecedent of conditionals. Brandom: an evolution of Frege and CGB (pro-sentence theory, Camp, Grover, Belnap) receives Dewey’s intentions. Pro-sentence theory/Brandom: receives the anti-descriptive approach of pragmatism ((s) truth not a property). Brandom/Rorty: shows how the pro-sentence theory can be reconciled with Davidson’s disquotationalism. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
Pragmatism | Dennett Vs Pragmatism | Rorty II 116 Truth/DennettVsPragmatism/Rorty: Can pragmatism love the truth if there can be no accurate representation of it? |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
Pragmatism | Geach Vs Pragmatism | I 431 Geach: the performative analyses of the use of "good" have run aground: because, for example, questions and commands cannot be embedded as premisses in well-formed conditionals. Brandom I 432 VsPragmatism: if the essential part of calling something good consisted in an action, and not saying something, it could not reasonably be said, for example, "If this is good, then you should do it." That it is possible shows that "good" has a descriptive content which survives the elimination of the force when embedded. VsPragmatism: it cannot distinguish the two meanings of truth assertions: freestanding and embedded. Otherwise he would have to conclude: someone who is set to "if it is true that p, then it is true that p", is then also set to "if I assert that p, then it is true that p". A variant of the naturalistic fallacy. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
Pragmatism | Goodman Vs Pragmatism | II 50 GoodmanVspragmatism: The usefulness of a term does not prove that it is clear, but that his clarification is philosophically important. Since there is no reliable criterion of clarity, one must consult his philosophical conscience. |
G IV N. Goodman Catherine Z. Elgin Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988 German Edition: Revisionen Frankfurt 1989 Goodman I N. Goodman Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1978 German Edition: Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984 Goodman II N. Goodman Fact, Fiction and Forecast, New York 1982 German Edition: Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988 Goodman III N. Goodman Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976 German Edition: Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997 |
Pragmatism | Russell Vs Pragmatism | James I 102 RussellVsPragmatism: it must be possible to determine whether the idea of utility is useful in total without already recognizing this use as a pragmatic truth. ((s) Otherwise circles). It must be able to be comparable with what disadvantage would arise if something is not believed. Otherwise it is not possible to determine whether the effects of ideas are good overall or bad overall. Russell: standard for truth cannot be truth itself. (Adaptability). Such as usefulness is not a standard for usefulness. - Therefore, it is often difficult to determine whether an idea is useful, than to determine whether it is true. - (I 104) One can observe ex post, that some ideas have prevailed. Russell: So the truth for epistemological purposes becomes a dull knife, because it describes the pure positivity of what is. --- James I 105 RussellVsPragmatism: missing connection of truth to the facts: E.g. Solipsism: It seems possible that the hypothesis that other people exist is always true, even if they actually do not exist. The perception that it would be advantageous to reject the solipsism is not in itself enough to reject it. What I hope is not that the belief in solipsism in the pragmatic sense is wrong, but that other people exist. The belief in solipsism may be wrong, even if I am the only individual in the universe. |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 |
Pragmatism | Williams, B. Vs Pragmatism | Rorty IV 38 Bernard WilliamsVsPragmatism/Rorty: Difference between practical considerations and the search for truth. IV 40 Cultural Relativism/Williams/Rorty: in extreme cases of ethical disagreement "questions of evaluation" do not arise at all! IV 44 Pragmatism/Rorty: continues Hegel's work and is not interested in finding mentality-historical explanations for the occurrence of dead ends. Language/Rorty: people simply give up a problematic vocabulary. RealismVsPragmatism: Williams: that is a deceitful trick! |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
Pragmatism | Wright Vs Pragmatism | I 204 Realism/WrightVsPragmatism: scientific realism is the most attractive philosophy of the sciences. The mental adventure is a more fascinating project than any utilitarian fiction. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
Pragmatism | Verschiedene Vs Pragmatism | James I 102 VsFunctionalism/VsPragmatism: The concept of utility is circular and empty. "Everything that is useful for a system" can be interpreted arbitrarily. VsPragmatism: James confused truth with justification: it can never be determined whether an observation is translated correctly. (Basic sentence problem, see also Quine). Rorty VI 112 G. K. ChestertonVsPragmatism: Z "Pragmatism is about human needs, and one of the first human needs is to be more than a pragmatist." Rorty VI 306 VsPragmatism: well-known accusation: he actually behaves conservatively and has prejudices in favor of the status quo .(e.g. Jonathan Culler). VI 307 CullerVsRorty: what you do must be based on your beliefs, since there is no foundation outside the system of your beliefs, the only thing that could logically cause you to modify a belief is something you already believe. (Contradiction). Rorty: He's right, but he's wrong, if he only allows us logical reasons as respectable! Most moral and mental progress has not come about through "logical" changes of belief! |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
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