Lexicon of Arguments


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The author or concept searched is found in the following 9 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Deflationism Horwich
 
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I XVI
Deflationism / Horwich implies bivalence - even vagueness - e.g. Unicorn - deflationism VsPragmatism - DeflationismVs usefulness of truth, etc.

Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994

Pragmatism Brandom
 
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I 415
Pragmatism/Classical/Truth/Rorty/Brandom: 1) performative: act of calling something true, not content - 2) thereby taking a normative perspective - 3) approval of an assertion as guide to action - 4) Success as a benchmark - 5) that is all there is to be understood about truth - Pragmatism: truth is not a characteristic. ---
I 418
Brandom pro: proposition of the statement not before utterance - one rather commits onself to something personally. ---
I 421
Prague/Brandom: is phenomenalism in terms of truth. ---
I 432
BrandomVsPragmatism: cannot distinguish between freestanding and (in conditionals) embedded truth assertions.

Bra I
R. Brandom
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001

Pragmatism Goodman
 
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II 117
Very often past cases might be unexamined cases.
II 118f
GoodmanVsPragmatism: pragmatism has caused confusion here: by asserting that the truth lies in the accuracy of predictions. Does this mean that it counts only if the hypothesis about the future is true? Maybe the pragmatist thinks, you can only say something about past cases by future experiences ... + ..
  118/9 II
Vspragmatism, against pragmatism: we should remember that a hypothesis at a time can be unrefuted, although some of their recent applications in reality are false. They are just not yet recognized.

G I
N. Goodman
Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984

G II
N. Goodman
Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988

G III
N. Goodman
Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997

G IV
N. Goodman/K. Elgin
Revisionen Frankfurt 1989

Pragmatism Rorty
 
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Richard Rorty
VI 92 ff: pragmatism thinks it is pointless to ask whether neutrinos really are entities or are merely useful heuristic fictions. VI 105
VI 111
Difference/Pragmatism: every difference must make a difference in terms of practice.
VI 112
G.K. ChestertonVsPragmatism: "Pragmatism is about human needs, and one of the most important human needs is to be more than a pragmatist."
Vi 186
Language/Sellars: cannot be verified at all on the base of non-linguistic things! Rorty: Therefore, only utility is interesting for pragmatism. There is nothing non-human, to which we are committed!
VI 286f
Preference for small compromises rather than large theoretical syntheses. VI 290
VI 425
Truth/pragmatism/benefits/James/Rorty: contrary to some problematic formulations by James the truth is timeless, so it cannot be mixed up with benefits - (RortyVsJames) -

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Pragmatism James
 
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Diaz-Bone I 68
Pragmatism/James: the term pragmatism is used for the first time by James 1898. He, however, refers to Peirce, 1878. ---
I 68f
Signs/Peirce/VsKant: VsConstruction of the transcendental subject: Pragmatism is the method that enables successful linguistic and intellectual communication and clear ideas. For Peirce every thought is a sign. ---
I 70
Pragmatism/Peirce: pragmatism is a voluntary action theory. Definition Voluntarism: Will as the basic principle of being.
---
I 76
Pragmatism: pragmatism is like a corridor in the middle of many rooms, it belongs to all who use it. Concept/Pragmatism: He considers all concepts hypotheses. Use is always a personal decision.
---
I 78
We do not live to think, but we think to live. ---
79
Science/James: Science, comon sense and individual consciousness have one thing in common: they should increase the human adaptability.
---
I 88
PragmatismVsCorrespondence theory: Conformity in James, the dichotomy true/false is softened. (> Realization,> adjustment). ---
I 102
VsPragmatism: that James confuses truth with certainty: it can never be ascertained whether an observation is properly translated. (> Basic problem).


James I
R. Diaz-Bone/K. Schubert
William James zur Einführung Hamburg 1996
Pragmatism Williams,B.
 
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Rorty IV 38
Bernard WilliamsVsPragmatismus Unterschied zwischen praktischen Überlegungen und der Suche nach Wahrheit.


Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Redundancy Theory Brandom
 
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I 433f
Redundancy theory/Brandom: VsPragmatism: has not recognized that the significance of the corresponding assertions must be the same - VsRamsey: E.g. "Goldbach’s Conjecture" is not equivalent to "the Goldbach's Conjecture is true" - solution: Originally posted eradication > set of sentences. VsRamsey.

Bra I
R. Brandom
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001

Truth Davidson
 
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I 56
Immanence Theory of Truth/Davidson: The sentence of another could be true for him, even though, when I translate it correctly, it makes no sense for me. ---
The T-predicate defined in the meta-language can be translated back into the object language and the state before the elimination can be restored of the "true".
  Object and meta-language should contain the predicate "true".
Davidson, however, can avoid the dilemma by not defining a definition at all. He calls this a truth definition in the style of Tarski in the following called "T-theory".
DavidsonVsTarski: empirical instead of formal - Empiricism excludes false additions of law (Goodman) .- Convention T is not sufficiently empirical
The truth of an utterance depends only on two things: of what the words, as they were used, mean, and of the world.
---
K. Glüer, Davidson zur Einführung, 1993
Glüer II 131
VsTranscendentalism: one cannot separate language competence and influence on the world. "Negative Transcendentalism". ---
Rorty VI 51
Davidson/Truth: We collect information and patterns about whether actors agree to sentences or not. And this, without knowing the meaning of the sentences of actor. But after a while we do the step from the "nonpropositional to the propositional". A theory of truth is at the same time automatically a theory of meaning and rationality. Every intensional concept is intertwined with every other intensonal concept.
---
K. Glüer, Davidson zur Einführung, 1993
Glüer II 28
Interpretation theory/Glüer: must not assume that their theorems were derived with the help of a translation (circle) - therefore DavidsonVsTarski: presupposing truth to explain meaning. ---
Horwich I 443
Truth/Davidson/Rorty: should be identified with nothing. - There is no correspondence, no truth-making. DavidsonVsPragmatism: Truth is not equal to assertion. ---
Rorty VI 189
Truth/Norms/Davidson: (according to Brandom): the pursuit of truth cannot go beyond our own practices (also Sellars).

D I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D III
D. Davidson
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

D IV
D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990


D II
K. Glüer
D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Truth Goodman
 
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I 31
Truth/Goodman: Provided that a world consists of statements, truth may be relevant. But truth cannot be defined or be checked by compliance with "the world". Truth is a docile and obedient servant, no severe master. ---
I 34
The scientist who assumes he is especially looking for truth deceives himself. He does not care about trivial truths he could grind out. "The truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth": this would be a wrong and paralyzing policy for any world producer. The whole truth would be too much, it is too large, too variable and too burdened by trivial. Nothing but the truth would be too little, for some right versions are not true (they are either false or neither true nor false).
---
I 147
GoodmanVsTarski: Tarski must be revised: ""Snow is white" is true according to a version if and only if snow is in accordance with this version of white".
---
I 149
Truth/Goodman: is like intelligence exactly what the tests test. ---
I 146 ff
GoodmanVsPragmatism: then the pragmatist thesis loses at the moment of victory its force: because that truths best meet the purpose of acquiring truths is as empty as it is obvious. Accuracy/Goodman:
Goodman suggests high acceptability as accuracy scale.
---
III 242
The truth of a hypothesis is a matter of fitting. Of fitting to a theory building and the fitting of hypotheses and theory to the existing data and the facts one will encounter. Truth/Goodman: We should reserve truth for the symbols in sentence form.
---
IV 208
Accuracy/Goodman: does not seek a formal definition. Accuracy is a matter of fitting and activity. ---
IV 205
Accuracy and truth sometimes go apart even in statements. Although snow is white, the statement "snow is white" can sometimes be incorrect.

G I
N. Goodman
Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984

G II
N. Goodman
Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988

G III
N. Goodman
Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997

G IV
N. Goodman/K. Elgin
Revisionen Frankfurt 1989


The author or concept searched is found in the following 16 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Correspondence Theory Davidson Vs Correspondence Theory
 
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I 96
So we get rid of the correspondence theory of truth at the same time. It is the belief in it, which gives rise to relativistic thought. Representations are relative to a scheme. E.g. Something can be a map of Mexico, but only in relation to the Mercator projection, or just a different projection.
Horwich I 443
Truth/Truth theory/tr.th./DavidsonVsCorrespondence theory: a truth theory presents no entities that could be compared with sentences. (A Coherence Theory of Thruth and Knowledge.): Thesis: "correspondence without confrontation."
Davidson/Rorty: this is in line with his rejection of the "dualism of scheme and content". (= Thesis, that something like "mind" or "language" had a relation like "fit" or "organize" to the world).
Rorty: such theories are a remnant of pragmatism.
Pragmatism/Davidson/Rorty: because of the strong connection between Dewey Quine Davidson one can assume that Davidson is part of the tradition of American pragmatism.
Nevertheless, Davidson explicitly denied that his break with empiricism made him a pragmatist.
Def Pragmatism/Davidson/Rorty: Davidson thinks that pragmatism identifies truth with assertibility. Then DavidsonVsPragmatism.
Truth/Davidson: should not be identified with anything.
Truthmaker/Make true/DavidsonVsTruth makers: do not exist.

Correspondence/Fulfillment/Tarski/truth theory/Davidson/Rorty: the correspondence that should be described in terms of "true of" and is supposedly revealed by "philosophical analysis" in a truth theory is not what is covered by Tarski’s fulfillment relation.
The relation between words and objects, which is covered by fulfillment is irrelevant for this philosophical truth. ((s) of "Correspondence").
"true"/Explanation/Rorty: "true" does not provide material for analysis.
Truth/Davidson: is nice and transparent as opposed to belief and coherence. Therefore, I take it as a basic concept.
I 454
Truth/DavidsonVsTarski/Rorty: can therefore not be defined in terms of fulfillment or something else. We can only say that the truth of a statement depends on the meaning of the words and the arrangement of the world. DavidsonVsCorrespondence Theory/Rorty: with that we get rid of them.
Intermediate/Intermediary/Davidson/Rorty: ("tertium", "Tertia") E.g. "perspective", E.g. conceptual scheme, E.g. "point of view", E.g. language, E.g. cultural tradition.
We do not need to worry about these things anymore if we drop correspondence (VsCorrespondence theory).
DavidsonVsSkepticism: is triggered just by the assumption of such "tertia".
"Less is more": we no longer need to worry about the details of the correspondence relation.
Correspondence/Davidson/Rorty: we can regard it as trivial, without the need for an analysis. It has been reduced to a "stylistic variant" of "true".
DavidsonVsSkepticism/Rorty: arises because of these intentionalist concepts that build imaginary barriers between you and the world.
RortyVsDavidson: has still not shown how coherence yields correspondence. He has not really refuted the skeptics, but rather keeps them from the question.

Quine II 56
DavidsonVsCorrespondence Theory: the conception of the fact coincidence which corresponds to the whole of the experience adds nothing relevant to the simple concept of being true. No thing makes sentences and theories true, not experience, not surface irritation, not the world. (> make true).

D I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D III
D. Davidson
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

D IV
D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q II
W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Q III
W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Q IX
W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Q V
W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Q VI
W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Q VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Q VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Q X
W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003
Correspondence Theory Williams, M. Vs Correspondence Theory
 
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Horwich I 487
Deflationismus/M. Williams: (pro) sollten wir aber nicht Theorie sondern Sichtweise nennen. Er ist interessant, nicht weil er uns Neues sagt, sondern weil er bestreitet, dass man etwas darüber hinausgehendes braucht. (VsKorrepsondenztheorie, VsKohärenztheorie).
I 488
Frage: was könnte eine substantielle WT (die über den Deflationismus hinausgeht) sagen, das der Deflationismus nicht kann? KorrespondenztheorieVsKohärenztheorie/M.Williams: appelliert an „Intuition“, was kein hilfreicher Begriff ist. (Auch KorrespondenztheorieVsPragmatismus).
„Intuition“: soll hier sein, dass sogar ideal gerechtfertigte Überzeugungen falsch sein können. ((s) Wobei der Begriff „ideal“ starr gehalten wird.)
Korrespondenztheorie: schließt sich dann an den Realismus an, indem sie sagt, dass Wahrheit nichts mit Rechtfertigung oder Akzeptierbarkeit zu tun hat, sondern mit einer nicht epistemischen Relation zur Welt. ((s) Bsp Verursachung).
M.WilliamsVs: wenn es so wäre: selbst wenn alle Philosophen diese Intuition teilten, warum sollte es mehr sein als ein kulturelles Vorurteil zugunsten der Korrespondenztheorie?
Def epistemisch/(s): Bsp Rechtfertigung, Akzeptierbarkeit. Statt z.B. Verursachung.
M.WilliamsVsKorrespondenztheorie: die Intuition gegen epistemischen Zugang zur Wahrheit ist nicht automatisch ein Argument für die Korrespondenztheorie. Bestenfalls schließt sie eine Identifikation von Wahrheit mit einer epistemischen Eigenschaft aus. Damit wird sie akzeptierbar für den Deflationismus, der diese Identifikation auch nicht macht.
Disquotationalismus//M.Williams: das zeigt, dass sogar disquotationale Wahrheit „realistisch“ ist. D.h. Wahrheit ist keine epistemische Eigenschaft (Rechtfertigung oder Akzeptierbarkeit, M. WilliamsVsPutnam), genauso wenig wie in einer ausgewachsenen Korrespondenztheorie.
Jemand der glaubt, dass Wahrheit epistemisch sein muss, kann den Disquotationalismus als einen „minimalen Realismus“ ansehen.

Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Dewey, J. Horkheimer Vs Dewey, J.
 
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I 180
HorkheimerVsDewey: VsInstrumental Reason. Horkheimer: core of pragmatism is the view that an idea, a concept or a theory is nothing but a scheme or plan for action, and therefore truth nothing but the success of an idea.
VsHorkheimer: presupposes the notion of truth as correspondence.
I 182.
HorkheimerVsDewey: pragmatism replaced the concept of truth by probability. Truth is not tied to verification, but absolute. HorkheimerVsDewey: so is prediction (and predictability) the nature "of this kind of thinking". But: The current importance and future verification of a sentence are not the same. (Horkheimer: per change of meaning.)
I 182.
VsHorkheimer: equals truth to contemplation. Horkheimer has not explained why truth is supposed to be even desirable. (NietzscheVs.) I 182 Pragmatism: Vs "stationary contemplation" (James): Truth that is sought for its own.
I 183
HorkheimerVsPragmatism: Both the attack on the contemplation, as well as the "praise of the craftsman" express the "triumph of the means over the purpose". (Originated in Greek class society).
Donagan, A. Rorty Vs Donagan, A.
 
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Richard Rorty
Horwich I 452
Explanation/Truth/Causality/Donagan/Rorty: Although it could be said that the fact that most of the beliefs of the natives and field linguists are true is an explanation for the fact that they can communicate. RortyVsDonagan: but that is not an explanation that requires a causally effective property.
Explanation/Rorty: this is like an explanation of communication by the fact that, e.g., people populate the same spacetime region.
Problem: we do not know what it would be like for these people if it were not like this, just as we do not know, e.g., what it would be like if most beliefs were wrong.
Causal Explanation/Rorty: the only candidates for causally effective properties are such properties that we can think away! ((s) >it must be possible to abstract from properties)
Important argument: therefore "truth" ("true") has no explanatory use.
Truth/DavidsonVsPragmatism/VsJames: but besides the normative use it also has disquotational use.
Truth/RortyVsTradition: it mixes disquotational and normative use and tries to explain both through the use of "true" to designate a non-causal relation of "correspondence". This is a false attempt to have "inside" and "outside" of the language game at the same time.

Rorty I 120
Sensation/Wittgenstein/Donagan/Rorty: Wittgenstein clarified the situation by conceding "that sensations are private, non-dispositional concomitants of the behavior, which is their natural expression", but refusing "to subsume processes under these concomitants, which can be explored regardless of the circumstances that produced them."
I 121
RortyVsDonagan: that is correct, but you have to go one step further: a "private, non-material medium" is obscure.

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Instrumentalism Chisholm Vs Instrumentalism
 
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III 132
ChisholmVsPragmatism/ChisholmVsInstrumentalism: even refinements of these theories do not eliminate the problem of the lack of clarity of the application of the concepts of satisfaction and frustration.

Chi I
R. Chisholm
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chi III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004
James, W. Russell Vs James, W.
 
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Bertrand Russell
Brendel I 132
Pragmatism/RussellVsPragmatism/RussellVsJames/Brendel: with the usefulness-definition of truth, it may be that "Santa Claus exists" is true, although it does not exist, simply because it is useful. James/Brendel: but does not want to claim that refuted statements are true, but wants to show that there is inextricable interdependence between values and facts.
Truth/James/Brendel: also for James truth is influenced by our perceptions and causal relationships to the environment.
---
Rescher I 349
RussellVsJames: grotesquely unfair with respect to the pragmatism: accused him, his pragmatic formula does not comply with the colloquial meaning of "true". E.g. "it is true that other people exist", and "it is useful to think that other people exist" when the two sentences would have the same meaning, then that does not comply with the colloquial meaning of "true".
Russell himself pointed to a solution: better distinction between definition and criterion.

R I
B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead
Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986

R II
B. Russell
Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989

R IV
B. Russell
Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967

R VI
B. Russell
Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus
In
Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg), Frankfurt 1993

R VII
B. Russell
Wahrheit und Falschheit
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg), Frankfurt 1996
James, W. Verschiedene Vs James, W. James I 102
VsFunctionalism, VsPragmatism: The concept of utility is circular and empty. "Anything that is useful for a system" can be interpreted arbitrarily. PragmatismVs: VsJames: confused truth with probation: it can never be determined whether an observation is translated correctly. (Basis sentence-problem - Quine ditto).




Peirce, Ch.S. Quine Vs Peirce, Ch.S.
 
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Willard V. O. Quine
I 54
Method/Quine: The question of what exists is the question of proof. The final arbitration in this matter is the scientific method, as amorphous it may be. However it is defined in detail, the scientific method produces theories, whose connection with any surface stimulation is solely in the scientific method, without independent testing instance, by which they are supported. In this sense, it is the final arbitrator of truth. Peirce was trying to define the truth straight as a scientific method. Namely an ideal theory, which one approaches as a limit if one does not disist to apply the (supposedly canonical) rules of method to the constantly renewing experience.
Definition Truth/Pierce: Ideal Theory
QuineVsPeirce: there is a lot wrong with this analogy: Appointment of Organon for infinite process, limit, erroneous use of the analogy with numbers, because the concept of the limit is dependent on the term "closer than". And this is defined for numbers, but not for theories.
---
I 55
Vs: but we have, after all, no reason to believe that the surface stimulation of people, even if one considers it in the eternity, allows a certain systematization, which is scientifically seen better or easier, than possible alternatives. Although the scientific method is the way to the truth, it does not even enable a definition of truth.
Likewise, any so-called pragmatic truth-definition is doomed (QuineVsPragmatism) to fail.
---
I 444
Definition ordered pair: provides the possibility to treat two objects as one. One can thus adjust relation classes by perceiving them as classes of ordered pairs. Footnote: we are interested in "relations-in-extension" here. They stand in a relationship to relations-in-intension like classes to properties (difference class/property.). E.g. The father-relation becomes the class of exactly those ordered pairs whose respective members - for example (Abraham, Isaac), are a man and one of his children. Peirce: Definition ordered pair: (terribly cumbersome with mental charts, etc.)
QuineVsPeirce: simply a defective noun that is not used to be at home, where we are used to embed completely grown-up general terms. Mathematical
---
I 445
Definition: (1) If (x, y) = (z, w), so x = z and y = w.
If relations are classes of ordered pairs, then pairs on the same level as other objects as members of classes must be available. The ordered pair plays the role of an object, which performs the task of two.
---
X 23
Verification Theory/Peirce/Quine: roughly: "tell me what difference the truth/falsehood of a sentence would make for the possible experience, and you have said everything about its meaning." QuineVsPeirce: also this equates the concept of proposition with the concept of objective information.
Basic Rules: is here the whole of possible distinctions and combinations of sensory perceptions.
Introspection: some epistemologists would catalog these alternatives by introspection of sense data, others (naturalists) would observe the nerve stimulation (at the nerve endings).
Problem: you can not assign senses proof to unique individuals sentences. (Underdetermination of empiricism).
---
XII 94
Empiricism/QuineVsCarnap: empiricism has 1. abandoned to deduce the truth about the nature of the sensory experience. Thus, it has made a substantial concession.
2. it has abandoned the rational reconstruction, that is, the attempt to translate these truths into observation terms and logical mathematical tools.
QuineVsPeirce: Suppose, we think that the meaning of a statement consists in the difference that its truth makes for the experience. Could we then not formulate in a page-long sentence of observation language all differences that might account for the truth, and could we then not see this as a translation?
Problem: this description could be infinitely long, but it could then be trapped in an infinite long axiomatization.
N.B.: thus, the empiricist gives up the hope that the empirical meaning of typical statements can be expressed via the reality.
Quine: the problem is a not too high complexity for a finite axiomatization, but the holism:
---
XII 95
Meaning/QuineVsPeirce: what normally has experience implications ("difference of opinions") only relates to theories as a whole, not individual experience sentences. QuineVsCarnap: also the "structure" should be one in which the texts, in which logical mathematical observation terms will be translated into, are whole theories and not just terms or short sentences.

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003
Pragmatism Brandom Vs Pragmatism
 
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I 196
BrandomVsPragmatism: you can know what follows from an assertion, for example, that an act is immoral without having understood the claim. ((s) Overemphasis on the consequences).
Horwich I 444
Truth/Pragmatism/Rorty: has no explanatory role. a) it has confirmatory (endorsing) use b) warning use: E.g. "Your belief is justified, but perhaps not true," I 445 c) disquotationale use: designed to meta-linguistically express "S is true iff. __ ". JamesVs b) and c). Relativism/Rorty: that is why pragmatism was equaled with relativism. Truth/Pragmatism/Davidson/Rorty: Davidson accepts all three, without the idea that usefulness of beliefs could be explained by truth.
BrandomVsPrimitive pragmatism/Rorty: (truth = assertibility): is refuted by the use of "true" in the antecedent of conditionals.
Brandom: an evolution of Frege and CGB (pro-sentence theory, Camp, Grover, Belnap) receives Dewey’s intentions.
Pro-sentence theory/Brandom: receives the anti-descriptive approach of pragmatism ((s) truth not a property).
Brandom/Rorty: shows how the pro-sentence theory can be reconciled with Davidson’s disquotationalism.

Bra I
R. Brandom
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001

Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Pragmatism Dennett Vs Pragmatism
 
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Rorty II 116
Truth/DennettVsPragmatism/Rorty: Can pragmatism love the truth if there can be no accurate representation of it?

Den I
D. Dennett
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Den II
D. Dennett
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Pragmatism Geach Vs Pragmatism
 
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I 431
Geach: the performative analyses of the use of "good" have run aground: because, for example, questions and commands cannot be embedded as premisses in well-formed conditionals. Brandom
I 432
  VsPragmatism: if the essential part of calling something good consisted in an action, and not saying something, it could not reasonably be said, for example, "If this is good, then you should do it." That it is possible shows that "good" has a descriptive content which survives the elimination of the force when embedded. VsPragmatism: it cannot distinguish the two meanings of truth assertions: freestanding and embedded.
  Otherwise he would have to conclude: someone who is set to "if it is true that p, then it is true that p", is then also set to "if I assert that p, then it is true that p". A variant of the naturalistic fallacy.

Gea I
P.T. Geach
Logic Matters Oxford 1972
Pragmatism Goodman Vs Pragmatism
 
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II 50
GoodmanVspragmatism: The usefulness of a term does not prove that it is clear, but that his clarification is philosophically important. Since there is no reliable criterion of clarity, one must consult his philosophical conscience.

G I
N. Goodman
Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984

G II
N. Goodman
Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988

G III
N. Goodman
Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997

G IV
N. Goodman/K. Elgin
Revisionen Frankfurt 1989
Pragmatism Russell Vs Pragmatism
 
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Bertrand Russell
James I 102
RussellVsPragmatism: it must be possible to determine whether the idea of utility is useful in total without already recognizing this use as a pragmatic truth. ((s) Otherwise circles). It must be able to be comparable with what disadvantage would arise if something is not believed. Otherwise it is not possible to determine whether the effects of ideas are good overall or bad overall. Russell: standard for truth cannot be truth itself. (Adaptability). Such as usefulness is not a standard for usefulness. - Therefore, it is often difficult to determine whether an idea is useful, than to determine whether it is true. - (I 104) One can observe ex post, that some ideas have prevailed.
Russell: So the truth for epistemological purposes becomes a dull knife, because it describes the pure positivity of what is.
---
James I 105
RussellVsPragmatism: missing connection of truth to the facts: E.g. Solipsism: It seems possible that the hypothesis that other people exist is always true, even if they actually do not exist. The perception that it would be advantageous to reject the solipsism is not in itself enough to reject it. What I hope is not that the belief in solipsism in the pragmatic sense is wrong, but that other people exist. The belief in solipsism may be wrong, even if I am the only individual in the universe.

R I
B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead
Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986

R VII
B. Russell
Wahrheit und Falschheit
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg), Frankfurt 1996
Pragmatism Williams, B. Vs Pragmatism
 
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Rorty IV 38
Bernard WilliamsVsPragmatismus/Rorty: Unterschied zwischen praktischen Überlegungen und der Suche nach Wahrheit.
IV 40
Kulturrelativismus/Williams/Rorty: in Extremfällen ethischer Meinungsverschiedenheit stellen sich "Fragen der Bewertung" überhaupt nicht!
IV 44
Pragmatismus/Rorty: setzt die Arbeit Hegels fort und ist nicht daran interessiert, mentalitätsgeschichtliche Erklärungen für das Auftreten von Sackgassen ausfindig zu machen. Sprache/Rorty: Leute geben ein problematisches Vokabular schließlich einfach auf.
RealismusVsPragmatismus: Williams: das ist ein hinterlistiger Trick!

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Pragmatism Wright Vs Pragmatism
 
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I 204
Realism/WrightVsPragmatism: der naturwissenschaftliche Realismus ist die attraktivste Philosophie der Wissenschaften. Das geistige Abenteuer ist ein faszinierenderes Projekt als jede utilitaristische Fiktion.

Wri I
Cr. Wright
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001

WriGH I
G. H. von Wright
Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008
Pragmatism Verschiedene Vs Pragmatism James I 102
VsFunctionalism VsPragmatism: The concept of utility is circular and empty. "Everything that is useful for a system" can be interpreted arbitrarily. VsPragmatism: James confused truth with justification : it can never be determined whether an observation is translated correctly. (Basic sentence problem, see also Quine).

Rorty VI 112
G. K. ChestertonVsPragmatismus: Z "Beim Pragmatismus geht es um menschliche Bedürfnisse, und zu den ersten menschlichen Bedürfnissen gehört es, mehr zu sein als ein Pragmatist."
Rorty VI 306
VsPragmatismus: bekannter Vorwurf: er verhalte sich eigentlich konservativ und habe Vorurteile zugunsten des Status quo .(z.B. Jonathan Culler).
VI 307
CullerVsRorty: was man tut, muss auf den eigenen Überzeugungen beruhen, da es keine Grundlage außerhalb des Systems der eigenen Überzeugungen gibt, ist das einzige, was einen logisch zur Modifizierung einer Überzeugung veranlassen könnte, etwas, was man bereits glaubt. (Widerspruch). Rorty: da hat er recht, Unrecht hat er aber, wenn er uns nur logische Gründe als respektabel zugesteht! Die meisten moralischen und geistigen Fortschritte sind nicht durch "logische " Überzeugungsänderungen zustande gekommen!





Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000